The Ground Truth in Iraq

Disengagement from conflict--not from Iraq

2010-08-06T16:56:00.000-04:00

As the United States prepares for a reduction in our military forces in Iraq, we cannot abandon the people whose lives have been irrevocably changed by the seven-year American occupation. As President Obama has emphasized, the United States has a moral responsibility to the Iraqi people. Such were the themes of the recent hearing of the Helsinki Commission on Capitol Hill called "No Way Home, No Way to Escape: The Plight of Iraqi Refugees and Our Iraqi Allies."

Congressman Alcee Hastings emphasized that the current Iraqi refugee crisis is the largest displacement in the Middle East since 1948. Among many hardships faced by refugees, Hastings noted that children are particularly at risk. Some haven’t attended school in over four. They represent the country’s future, and without education, they are more vulnerable to recruitment by extremist groups, he said.

Ambassador L. Craig Johnstone of Refugees International said that in his conversations with Iraqi refugees, most named their children’s education as their top priority. Johnstone further emphasized it is largely the Iraqi middle class that is now living in squatter settlements as refugees. These refugees represent the best and the brightest of Iraqi society, and they will be able to contribute a great deal whether they return to Iraq or resettle in the United States.

"While our military may be drawing down, our concern for and our commitment to the humanitarian and the protection needs of displaced Iraqis will remain robust," said Eric Schwartz, Assistant Secretary for Population, Refugees, and Migration at the State Department. At $400 million, funding for Iraq represents a quarter of the State’s worldwide refugee budget. While Schwartz has urged other donor countries to increase their funding, he said that the U.S. can expect to provide the "lion’s share" of funding. Ambassador Johnstone similarly called on the United States to provide 50% of the UN appeal.

Refugees and internally displaced persons are not the only Iraqis who have been endangered by our military operations there. Between 40,000 and 120,000 Iraqis risked their lives alongside Americans as interpreters, engineers, and advisors – work that left them targets for terrorist groups. While special immigrant visas (SIVs) expedite the process through which they can resettle in the United States, the process can still take up to a year – too long for Iraqis in urgent need of escape – and is more difficult to navigate than the regular refugee program. As a result, only 2,100 of the allotted 15,000 SIVs have been claimed.

Kirk Johnson of the List Project, which assists Iraqi allies in navigating the refugee resettlement process, spoke to the urgency of the situation. There are no serious contingency plans to evacuate our Iraqi allies as the U.S. military withdraws – but there need to be, he said. There is precedent for such an evacuation: Iraqi Kurds were airlifted to Guam in 1996. Schwartz said that his bureau was not currently considering such contingency plans but would do so.

Several of the speakers drew on past American successes and failures to protect those who worked with us. Representative Jim McDermott (D-WA) spoke regretfully about the fact that we "walked away" from Koreans who had helped our soldiers, and Ambassador Johnstone – who left the Foreign Service to help our Vietnamese allies to safety – reflected that the United States didn’t plan adequately for the fall of Saigon, and we seem poised to make the same mistake in Iraq.

As Ambassador Johnstone reflected, "The important message, I think, for us today, is as we disengage from this conflict, we cannot disengage from our humanitarian obligations." America must live up to our values as a nation that protects its friends. Although the U.S. relationship with Iraq is changing, our responsibilities to the Iraqi people are ongoing.

This post was written by Anna Mysliwiec.

IDPs in Iraq Still Waiting for Solutions

2010-07-12T16:54:00.000-04:00

Seven years of conflict, not to mention decades of violence under Saddam Hussein, have left more than 2.8 million Iraqis displaced inside Iraq but far from home. Like refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs) have lost their homes, property, and livelihoods. They’re often separated from their families and they may face violence in their host communities. Unlike refugees, however, they are not formally protected under international law, and post-conflict governments often lack the capacity to protect them.

Recently, the Brookings Institution released a report called Improving the US Response to Internal Displacement. In a panel discussion on June 30, the reports' authors, Department of State and USAID administrators, and leading experts came together to discuss the need for a more comprehensive response to the needs of internally displaced persons around the globe. IDPs need assistance not just at the emergency stage, but also when dealing with protracted displacement, said report co-author Dawn Calabia. Calabia further stressed that no IDP situation has ever been solved by humanitarian assistance alone; we also need hard political solutions.

Nowhere is the need for a comprehensive strategy more evident than in Iraq. With the international response to IDPs replete with "gaps rather than overlaps," as Calabia said, a decisive solution to the Iraqi internal displacement crisis has long eluded Iraqi, American, and international actors alike. The panelists emphasized that Iraqi government policy has inadequately addressed the reintegration and return of IDPs. Many Iraqi IDPs are stuck in informal squatter settlements and can't access services from their government because they lack proper documentation.

On the American side, the huge disparity in funding between U.S. military and civilian efforts in Iraq hasn't helped. While the Defense Department requested $533.7 billion for fiscal year 2010, the State Department, USAID, and other civilian agencies requested only $51.7 billion. According to Allison Stanger's One Nation under Contract, the fact that the Pentagon has shouldered so much of the physical reconstruction of Iraq has hindered development – as has the top-down manner in which it disbursed funds to American contractors instead of Iraqis. As a result, civilian efforts through agencies like USAID are chronically understaffed and underfunded.

As President Obama has said, the United States has a "moral responsibility" to assist Iraq's displaced. Like he acknowledged, displaced Iraqis are "a living consequence of this war" and "they must become a part of Iraq's reconciliation and recovery." Part of this means supporting the Iraqi government with reintegrating those displaced who wish to return to their homes. One step the Iraqi government has taken is the establishment of the Commission for the Resolution of Real Property Disputes (CRRPD), which is tasked with settling land and property disputes for people displaced during Saddam Hussein's regime.

In an earlier report called Resolving Iraqi Displacement, Brookings noted that long-term development is key to solving the IDP crisis because it will create the housing, jobs, and security necessary to rebuild communities and make return realistic and appealing. Iraq must integrate internally displaced persons into its plans for national reconciliation and economic development if return is to ever be a viable option.

What is the United States' role? The Brookings reports suggest that the United States can be most effective by providing development assistance and by working with the Iraqi government to create political solutions. The latter approach has already met with some success. In 2009, the State Department and the NSC negotiated the US-Iraq Joint Statement on Iraqi Refugees in which the Iraqi government promised a 250 percent budget increase for the Ministry of Displacement and Migration. Further, the administration has tasked two senior officials to work with the Iraqi government on implementing strategies that would assist and protect displaced persons.

What lessons can we learn from internal displacement in Iraq? First of all, more robust funding for civilian efforts will be critical to the recovery of IDPs in Iraq and elsewhere. When fully funded, American development assistance has the capacity to do immense good in the world. Iraq, for its part, can make important progress in national reconciliation and peacebuilding by creating a long-term strategy for reintegrating IDPs into their communities. IDPs are Iraqis too, after all, and their future will be critical to the future of the country.

This post was written by Anna Mysliwiec.

No Relief from Sweltering Heat in Iraq

2010-06-29T16:52:00.000-04:00

While Iraq’s politicians attempt to knit together a coalition and a new government, everyday Iraqis are left coping with even more fundamental problems: severe shortages in electricity and water. Combined with political limbo and violence, surging temperatures are resulting in a torrid summer in Iraq.

Protests in Basra over the Iraqi government’s failure to provide the population with consistent electricity turned violent when police fired into the crowd on June 20. The crowd had been demanding the resignation of electricity minister. After revolts later spread to Nasiriya, Karbala, Baquba, and Ramadi, electricity minister Karim Wahid al-Aboudi resigned last Monday.

Basra, like most Iraqi provinces, receives about five hours of electricity on the best days and only a single hour on the worst. In recent weeks, electricity has been even more scarce, leaving most Iraqis to swelter in temperatures as high as 120 degrees. Even hospitals, though connected to an emergency power grid, have had power failures during recent weeks forcing some to relocate patients outdoors for the night.

Despite the electricity minister’s resignation, the crisis is unlikely to be resolved in the foreseeable future. Although he promised that he would "give priority to the electricity sector in the next government," President Nouri al-Maliki also stated that it will be two years until the national grid can provide reliable electricity to the entire country. Now, many families must compensate by buying electricity from privately-owned neighborhood generators, which can cost between $50 and $100 a month.

Electricity is not the only necessity in short supply; persistent water shortages both dehydrate Iraqi civilians and undermine their faith in their government’s ability to deliver basic services. Twenty-five percent of Iraqis do not have access to safe drinking water. As a result, citizens have called on the government to devote more of its budget to revitalize water infrastructure and to implement sustainable management policy. The Red Cross and other NGOs truck thousands of gallons of water to neighborhoods that the dilapidated pipe system doesn’t reach.

Like the Red Cross, other actors have stepped in to fill the gap in basic services. Since the onset of the war, a vibrant Iraqi NGO sector has arisen that provides access to water and other basic services. The Women and the Environment Organization, founded by Iraqi academics, trains women in the Iraqi marshlands to make the most of what natural resources are available through conservation and sanitation efforts. In another project, Muslim Peacemaker Teams are supplying water filtration systems to schools and hospitals because sewage still leaks into the existing water infrastructure.

What policy wonks would call a deficiency in state capacity--Iraq just landed at #8 on Foreign Policy’s Failed States Index--has concrete repercussions for a hot, thirsty population. While non-governmental efforts are invaluable, they cannot replace national infrastructure that will ensure Iraqis a stable, secure quality of life. When the new government is eventually seated, it must deliver on its promises and meet the basic needs of its populace.

This post was written by Anna Mysliwiec.

A Woman's Right to Health Violated in Kurdistan

2010-06-23T16:37:00.001-04:00

Iraqi Kurdistan has gained a reputation as an emerging democracy in the Middle East, but a major human rights violation persists without little action from the government: the practice of female genital mutilation (FGM). A new report by Human Rights Watch details the practice, which is defined by the World Health Organization as "the partial or total removal of the external female genitalia for non-medical reasons." According to a study by the Iraqi NGO WADI, 72 percent of Kurdish women over the age of fourteen have been circumcised, most of them when they were between 3 and 12 years old.

Fear and pain is what Kurdish women emphasized about their experiences with FGM. Held down by their female relatives, and cut without their consent, women are given no anesthetic and the same razor blade is used for multiple procedures. The cutting can cause heavy bleeding and infection and have lifelong health consequences that include pain, infertility, and the loss of sexual pleasure. In short, "FGM violates women's and children's rights, including their rights to life, health, and bodily integrity," said lead researcher Nadya Khalife.

FGM is defended as linking Kurds to their cultural identity. While many senior Islamic clerics have publicly opposed it, many women believe that it is spiritually beneficial. Mothers, aunts, and other female relatives hope it will allow their daughters to make good marriages.

The government of Kurdistan has been progressive in addressing many forms of violence against women, but has yet to ban FGM. A draft law banning FGM was introduced in Parliament in 2008 only to be abandoned because the occurrence of FGM was deemed rare.

HRW proposes a comprehensive approach to eradicating FGM in Iraqi Kurdistan, including both policy measures and awareness-raising efforts. The Kurdistan Regional Government must take the lead by passing strong legislation to ban the procedure, provide appropriate penalties for those responsible, and support women who have been hurt by it.

While a ban is important, it must be supplemented by public health campaigns. To criminalize the procedure is to risk sending it underground, making it even more dangerous. Kurdish authorities must thus address the underlying factors that make women choose the procedure for their daughters, especially the lack of information on its harmful effects. Religious and community leaders must set an example and affirm their commitments to ending FGM.

So far, the Kurdish authorities’ reaction to the report has been to downplay the problem of FGM. During their research, WADI was even told by a minister that their "work was ruining the reputation of Kurdistan." Areyan Rauf, a governmental human rights officer, stated that "Female circumcision isn't such a pressing matter for us because there are only one or two cases that we discover a year." Similarly, Mariwan Naqshbandi, spokesman for the Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs, suggested that the study was based on rumors. "Circumcision exists as an isolated occurrence, rather than as a phenomenon in Kurdistan," he said.

If the Kurdish government is serious about its commitment to human rights and women’s rights, it must take concrete steps to address the high incidence of FGM and its negative consequences for women. Kurdish women and children have a right to health and autonomy over their bodies, and those rights are being violated by the persistence of female genital mutilation.

This post was written by Anna Mysliwiec.

The Continuing Saga Of The Candidate Banning In Iraq

2010-01-18T23:39:00.000-05:00

The story of the Iraqi Accountability and Justice and Election Commissions’ banning of 500 candidates from the March 2010 voting for alleged Baathist ties has taken a few new turns. First, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has finally come out in favor of the ban. He said that the decision of the Accountability and Justice Commission should be adhered to. He also commented that the process should not be politicized, which ignores the fact that the Commission members have used it as a partisan tool since its inception in 2003, and that its head, Ali al-Lami, is running as a candidate for the Iraqi National Alliance. Second, the Election Commission is debating whether just the 400 politicians are barred from participating in the balloting or all their parties as well. As Reidar Visser of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs points out, there is no legal basis in the constitution or election law that mentions blocking entire parties from running. Of course, the Accountability and Justice Commission’s members haven’t even been appointed by parliament, but everyone is going along with their decisions, so legality may not matter in this situation. Third, a document has emerged that allegedly shows that Saleh al-Mutlaq, the head of the Iraqi National Dialogue Front and the most prominent politician banned, had contact with Iraqi intelligence in 2002. This was supposedly used in the Accountability and Justice Commission’s ruling against him. There is no reporting on whether the document is real or not, and again, given the circumstances, may not matter. Fourth, Mutlaq and all those banned can appeal their cases to a 7-member board of judges that was just created a few days ago. There is a concern that they may not be able to go through all the cases before the March 2010 balloting however, which may exclude candidates even if they are ultimately found innocent. Finally, there is news that the Accountability and Justice Commission may not be finished and could demand that a total of 1,200 candidates be blocked from running.

It was hoped that the 2010 parliamentary vote would be a continuation of the 2009 provincial elections where nationalist parties did much better than ethnosectarian ones, and Sunnis came out in high numbers. This in turn, would usher in a new wave of politicians to replace a group of lawmakers that have achieved very little in their four years in office, and are very unpopular as a result. The decisions of the Accountability and Justice and Election Commissions however have not only marked a return to sectarian politics, but also threatened to undermine the legitimacy of the 2010 balloting, along with bringing into question the legality of the entire Iraqi political process. Unless some institution challenges the chicanery going on, this fiasco will only continue, and could get worse.

SOURCES

AK News, “Electoral commission discusses the issue of excluded entities and candidates,” 1/17/10

Roads To Iraq, “Three Sunni candidates for the presidency, Zebari to the Vice-President,” 1/17/10

Sly, Liz, “Iraqi prime minister backs ban on 500 election candidates,” Los Angeles, 1/17/10

Visser, Reidar, “The Bloc That Has No De-Baathification Worries,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 1/17/10
- “Constitutional Disintegration (Part III): The IHEC Is Making Up the Law,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 1/15/10

Iraq Could Become Game Changer In OPEC

2010-01-11T00:21:00.002-05:00

In mid-December 2009 the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) held its annual meeting in Angola. Besides agreeing to keep oil prices at their current level of between $70-$80 a barrel, Iraq was the other hot topic of debate.

After Iraq completed its second bidding round on its oil fields earlier in the month, Iraq Oil Minister Hussein Shahristani has been claiming that Iraq could reach 12 million barrels a day in capacity. That would rival Saudi Arabia, which currently has the largest capacity and is the largest oil producer in the world. The Oil Minister came into the OPEC conference claiming that Iraq has been denied its fair share of oil output in the past because of wars and international sanctions. He warned that was about to end, and that OPEC should reconsider how it calculates its quotas by taking into account a country’s development needs. He said that he expected some changes by 2011.

If Iraq does reach its potential, it has the ability to drastically affect the petroleum organization. Iraq has been exempt from OPEC’s quotas since it invaded Kuwait in 1990. Now it wants to export as much as it can because it desperately needs the money to rebuild. That could flood the market and undermine OPEC’s control over prices. Given this, Iraq could force compromises on quotas, ignore them, or leave OPEC altogether. It could also challenge the group’s leader, Saudi Arabia, which has given Iraq the cold shoulder since the U.S. invasion because it fears Shiite rule and Iran’s influence.

This could be a huge step in Iraq returning to the international stage. Baghdad was once a leading capital in the Arab world, but after 2003, Iraq was so caught up in internal divisions and civil war that it lost its place. Not only that, but all of the regional players have become involved in Iraqi politics, mostly to the detriment of the country. Iraq’s new oil deals, if successful, could give the nation the leverage it needs to once again be a player in the Middle East, but that’s still a big if as its petroleum industry has some massive hurdles to overcome before it can produce as much as the Oil Minister wants it to. It is a change though to talk about Iraq influencing others rather than it being the other way around as has been the norm since the overthrow of Saddam.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “No More Gestures To Saudi Arabia – Iraqi PM Maliki,” 5/28/09

Amies, Nick, “Iraq oil auctions cause concerns over stability in Gulf hierarchy,” Deutsche Welle, 12/23/09

Blas, Javier, “Iraq to challenge Opec on ‘fair share’ of output,” Financial Times, 12/22/09

What Do The New Oil Deals Mean for The Kurds?

2010-01-08T20:27:00.002-05:00

In mid-December 2009 the Iraqi Oil Ministry carried out its second round of bidding on oil fields by international companies. Winning offers were made on seven of the ten fields up for auction. Afterward Oil Minister Hussain Shahristani said Iraq could reach eleven million barrels a day in capacity in six years, which could make it one of the largest producers in the world. This may turn out to be a major setback for the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), and its own petroleum policy.

Since 2003 the KRG has been hoping that its oil reserves would give it greater autonomy, and perhaps eventually independence. They signed their first oil deal with a Turkish company in January 2003, and then finalized over twenty others in the following years. None of these went through the Oil Ministry. Most of these deals were for exploration, but with Iraq’s oil production at below pre-invasion levels, Kurdistan believed that Baghdad would eventually have to accept their oil policy and allow them to export. The KRG also attempted to foster closer ties with Turkey and Europe, offering to export oil directly to the former, and trying to get involved with the proposed Nabucco natural gas pipeline to the latter. If these deals succeeded than Kurdistan would be connected to the international energy trade, could put more pressure on Baghdad to accept its energy policy, and gain greater autonomy from the central government. Some believed that this would give the Kurds the self-sustainability and influence they would need to declare independence sometime in the future.

All of these goals are now in jeopardy because of the Oil Ministry’s second bidding round. With international companies finally agreeing to Baghdad’s terms, and Iraq’s hopes of becoming one of the largest oil exporters in the world, there is no reason for the central government to give into the Kurds’ demands. The Oil Ministry has always vigorously protested the Kurds’ actions, and blacklisted any petroleum corporations that do business with them, leaving only small businesses investing there. They and the KRG still hope that Baghdad will eventually allow them to export because no government will turn down money, but that’s becoming less and less likely now. In fact, the Kurds may be the biggest losers if Iraq’s oil potential is finally tapped.

SOURCES

AK News, “Iraq’s oil and gas assets are shared: Barzani,” 11/11/09

International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09
- “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08

Lando, Ben, “In the theater of oil, the politics of Iraq,” Iraq Oil Report, 12/17/09

Yackley, Ayla Jean, “Iraq’s new oil deals seen weakening Kurds’ hand,” Reuters, 12/17/09
- “UPDATE 2-Kurds say Iraqi oilfield auction is being rushed,” Reuters, 12/10/09

What’s In The Future For Iraq?

2010-01-04T23:21:00.000-05:00

Iraq is entering its seventh year since the U.S. invasion. Many things have changed in that time period, from the chaos that followed the collapse of the state after Saddam was overthrown, to the civil war that erupted, to the Surge. At the end of 2009 three Iraq analysts, Sam Parker of the United States Institute for Peace, Michael Hanna of the Century Foundation, and Reidar Visser of the Norwegian Institute of International Relations, wrote pieces speculating on what lay ahead for Iraq. All three agree that politics is the main forum for disputes within Iraq now, but don’t see much hope for the country’s elites to overcome their differences any time soon.

Sam Parker in his article “Is Iraq Back?” for Current History, and Michael Hanna in “Transitional state” in the Abu Dhabi newspaper The National start off by talking about Iraq’s current political situation. Both believe that politics has replaced violence as the main way groups in the country now resolve their problems. This started in early 2005 when some militants first began turning on Al Qaeda in Iraq, which would eventually snowball into most of the insurgency switching sides and giving up the fight to join the Anbar Awakening and the Sons of Iraq. Sunnis also greatly regretted boycotting the 2005 elections, which isolated them from local and national governments. In the 2009 provincial elections, Sunni turnout was very high as a result, and deaths have taken a sharp drop since then as a result. This process will continue in the 2010 vote, and has led Iraq from being a failed state to a fragile one.

What the central government now faces are three large and daunting problems, the first of which is sectarianism. Parker believes that this is now more about identity than religious differences, as Iraqis tend to vote for candidates of their own community. That means any future government will have to continue to include representatives of each of the major groups, the Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis. These large groups however, are breaking up into smaller factions. The Shiites for example, ran on one large list in 2005, the United Iraqi Alliance, but in 2010 will be competing in two lists, the State of Law led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, and the National Alliance made up of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and the Sadrists. Reidar Visser of the Norwegian Institute of International Relations in “COIN to Nowhere? Lesson from Iraq, Questions for Afghanistan” adds that he believes that these sectarian divisions have solidified rather than weakened. For example, while Maliki’s State of Law tried to create new cross-sectarian alliances after the 2009 elections and attempted to reach out to Sunnis and former Baathists, he was later stopped by criticisms by the other Shiite parties, pressure from Iran, and the Obama administration, which continues to stress a grand bargain between the three major groups. He then agrees with Parker and Hanna that any new Iraqi government will look and operate very much like the old one as a result.

The ethnosectarian groups also have long-standing differences over things like federalism versus centralism, oil policy, and the Arab-Kurd dispute. Hanna writes that there have been no serious efforts to deal with any of these issues, and that any new government is likely to be just as divided as the current one. Many of these problems have their origins in the 2005 constitution, which was drafted while the Iraqi state was weak and the sectarian war was just about to take off. The Arab-Kurd divide prevents any major changes to the document, leading to more deadlock. Hanna doesn’t believe that these divisions will lead the country back to civil war, and oddly adds that not dealing with them right now may be the best thing for Iraq right at the moment. He’s afraid that any move towards majority rule, and away from consensus could do more harm than good because the country’s weak institutions may not be able to deal with winners and losers. Visser has written extensively arguing the opposite, that the Iraqi system of consensus and quotas within the government should be ended because it only maintains the sectarian divisions.

The paralysis in Baghdad means that more mundane issues like basic governance, services, the displaced and refugees, corruption, jobs, poverty, etc. can’t be addressed. Technical issues like boosting oil production, and election laws for example get endlessly delayed because of the larger disputes between the ethnosectarian groups. The lack of development and the Arab-Kurd divide also allows militants to continue their attacks in Iraq.

All three analysts bring up important issues for Iraq’s future. Iraq is no longer a failed state as it once was. It is gaining back both its sovereignty and domestic standing. Violence is also down to its lowest level since the 2003 invasion, and the struggle for political power through peaceful means is now paramount. The inability of Baghdad to deliver on many basic needs however, its corruption, and sectarianism continue to eat away at its standing with the public. The continued factionalization of Iraq’s three major groups also means that it will be harder rather than easier to put together a new government and get things done. Parker and Hanna point out that this makes Iraq not much different from many other Third World countries who not only struggle with development, but also power sharing and ethnic differences. The problem is that public dissatisfaction with a government that seems dysfunctional can undermine a nascent democracy, and lead to a return to autocracy or worse, and that may be Iraq’s largest dilemma in the long-term.

SOURCES

Hanna, Michael, “Transitional state,” The National, 11/26/09

Parker, Sam, “Is Iraq Back?” Current History, December 2009

Visser, Reidar, “COIN to Nowhere? Lessons from Iraq, Questions for Afghanistan,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 12/1/09

Iranians Planned Kidnapping And Held British Captives Taken In Iraq

2010-01-03T21:11:00.000-05:00

On December 30, 2009 British computer technician Peter Moore was released from captivity by the Iranian backed League of the Righteous in return for the freeing of their leader, Qais Khazali. Moore and four British bodyguards, Alan McMenemy, Alec MacLachlan, Jason Swindlehurst, and Jason Creswell, were originally kidnapped from the Iraqi Finance Ministry building in downtown Baghdad on May 29, 2007. The Guardian claims that not only was this an Iranian organized operation led by their Revolutionary Guards Qods Force, but that the British hostages were held in Iran for most of their two and a half year captivity.

The events surrounding the kidnapping are a complicated one beginning with a series of American raids against Iranian operatives working within Iraq. In 2006, President George Bush okayed the killing and capturing of Iranians in Iraq who were supplying weapons and training to Shiite militias. In December 2006 that led to the arrest of General Mohsen Chirazi, the number 3 man in the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Qods Force, which is in charge of Tehran’s Iraq policy. That was followed by a speech by President Bush in January 2007 where he said that the U.S. would stop Iran’s interference in Iraqi affairs. Later, on January 11, five Iranians were arrested in Irbil, Kurdistan. The Americans actually missed their targets, Mohammed Jafari, the deputy of Iran’s National Security Council, and General Minojahar Frouzanda, the intelligence chief of the Revolutionary Guards, when Kurdish peshmerga stopped U.S. forces at the Irbil airport. Tehran retaliated by leading a raid on the Karbala Provincial Joint Coordination Center in conjunction with the League of the Righteous that led to the deaths of five U.S. soldiers in January. In March 2007, U.S. and U.K. forces detained the League’s leaders Qais and Latih Khazali in Basra in March 2007.

Qais Khazali was one of the leading figures in the Sadr movement when Moqtada’s father, Ayatollah Mohammed Sadeq al-Sadr, created it in the 1990s. Qais helped keep the movement alive underground after Saddam killed the elder Sadr. When Moqtada emerged as one of Iraq’s new leaders after the 2003 invasion, Qais was one of his top lieutenants. He would split and then rejoin Moqtada several times before creating his own group, the League of the Righteous in 2006. That year he was also selected to lead the Special Groups that Iran was creating to gain more direct control of Shiite gunmen in Iraq.

Iran planned the May 2007 raid on the Finance Ministry as part of the tit for tat exchange with the United Sates, while the League of the Righteous wanted hostages to gain the release of the Khazali brothers. 80-100 members of the League drove up to the Ministry’s buildings in SUVs in Baghdad, and kidnapped the five Britons in just about 15 minutes. Iraqi intelligence officers from the Defense Ministry who happened to be in the Ministry at the time told the Guardian that they followed the kidnappers to Sadr City where the captives were kept for one day before being transferred to Iran. They passed this information to the Defense Ministry who did nothing. In Iran, the Britons were moved around to several locations. General David Petraeus confirmed this in a recent interview with the BBC where he said he was 90% sure that Tehran held the captives for a time. All negotiations for the release of the hostages occurred in Qom, Iran, but the British Foreign Office refused to directly talk with them, which greatly complicated things.

Almost two years later, Iraq, England, the U.S., Iran, and the League worked out a release plan with Lebanon’s Hezbollah acting as a middleman. In March 2009 a deal was cut whereby the Americans would release all of the League of the Righteous members they held including Laith and Qais Khazali in return for the British captives. In that month a video was released of Moore, followed by the freeing of Laith Khazali. After that U.S. prisons were emptied of some 300 League followers they held under the guise of an Iraqi reconciliation program, along with some of the top Qods Force members that were arrested in 2006-2007, in return for the bodies of Jason Creswell, Jason Swindlehurst, and Alec MacLachlan. Alan McMenemy has yet to be released, but it’s believed that he is dead as well. Sources told the Guardian that the Iranians killed all four bodyguards because for one, they were not considered important since they were only security men, and two to show that they were serious to the British government. The process finally ended with the release of Peter Moore and Qais Khazali. Some American military officers were against this deal, but the Status of Forces Agreement signed between Washington and Baghdad at the very end of the Bush administration in December 2008 requires the U.S. to release all the detainees they hold unless they have broken Iraqi law.

The kidnapping and release of Moore, MacLachlan, Swindlehurst, Creswell, and McMenemy mark the end of one period of post-Saddam Iraq. Washington and Tehran were involved in a covert war for influence within Iraq after the 2003 invasion. The U.S. focused upon Iran’s Qods Force and their support for Special Groups like the League of the Righteous. The U.S. tried to kill or capture as many militiamen and Qods Force operatives as they could, but interference by Iraqi officials meant that this effort could only go so far. The smashing of Shiite militias by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s offensives in 2008, along with Iran’s greater interest in political influence through support of Shiite parties in the 2009 and coming 2010 elections, means that their military policy has been put on the back burner. The League even renounced violence in 2009, and briefly flirted with running in the upcoming vote, before withdrawing in early December. What that means for the League is unknown. Qais Khazali is said to still have sway with many Sadrists, which has made Moqtada very worried about his leadership, but its too late for them to run as a party in 2010, which would greatly limit their influence if they wished to join Iraqi politics. There’s a good chance that the League will fade from the scene just as the military confrontation between Iran and the U.S. in Iraq has.

SOURCES

Chulov, Martin, “Shia cleric’s release by US forces provided key to Peter Moore’s freedom,” Guardian, 12/30/09

CNN, “U.S. raid on Iranian consulate angers Kurds,” 1/11/07

Cochrane, Marisa, “The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement,” Institute for the Study of War, January 2009

Cockburn, Patrick, “The botched US raid that led to the hostage crisis,” The Independent, 4/3/07

Fordham, Alice, “Hostage Peter Moore’s fate tied to that of Laith and Qais al-Khazali,” Times of London, 12/31/09
- “Peter Moore freed after US hands over Iraqi insurgent,” Times of London, 12/31/09

Hines, Nico, “Peter Moore: 31 months of Iraqi captivity,” Times of London, 12/30/09

Lake, Eli, “GIs Raid Iranian Building in Irbil,” New York Sun, 1/12/07

Linzer, Dafna, “Troops Authorized to Kill Iranian Operatives in Iraq,” Washington Post, 1/26/07

Mahmood, Mona, O’Kane, Maggie, Grandjean, Guy, “Bush threats and an $18bn secret: why Iran’s kidnap squad struck,” Guardian, 12/31/09

Roggio, Bill, “US releases ‘dangerous’ Iranian proxy behind the murder of US troops,” Long War Journal, 12/31/09

Woodcock, Andrew and Johnson, Wesley, “Petraeus ‘90% certain’ that UK hostage was in Iran,” Independent, 12/31/09

Wright, Robin and Trejos, Nancy, “U.S. Troops Raid 2 Iranian Targets in Iraq, Detain 5 People,” Washington Post, 1/12/07

Will New Oil Deals Provide Jobs For Iraqis?

2009-12-31T14:07:00.002-05:00

Iraq recently completed the second round of bidding on its oil fields, which will hopefully usher in the return of international petroleum companies to Iraq that will bring in much needed investment and know how. This round went much better than the first with deals for seven of the ten fields up for auction. Iraq’s Oil Minister Hussain Shahristani believes that Iraq could reach 12 million barrels a day in capacity in six years as a result, which would make it a rival to the world’s largest producer Saudi Arabia. With such high expectations, many Iraqis, especially in southern Iraq where most of the oil resides, are hoping that this wealth will trickle down in the form of jobs and better services.

Currently southern Iraq has some of the poorest sections of the country despite the huge petroleum reserves. A recent report by the government’s Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology, found that 49% of the population in Muthanna and 41% in Babil lived in poverty, the highest rates in Iraq. Residents of Dhi Qar told Agence France Presse that they didn’t expect much from the new oil deals, feeling that the best jobs would go to those that had political connections or paid bribes. In contrast, the Italian head of Dhi Qar’s Provincial Reconstruction Team, U.S.-funded groups that are aimed at improving the political and economic development of Iraq at the local level, believed that there would be plenty of job opportunities, and the complaints about corruption were overblown. Provincial officials in Basra also expressed similar optimism.

If jobs do appear, they will have to be from spin-offs such as construction and services, because its estimated that Iraq will only need 40,000 new oil workers by 2015. That’s a drop in the bucket when compared to the 250,000 young Iraqis who enter the job market each year. In Wasit for example, the sole foreign petroleum company currently operating in Iraq, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), only hired 450 Iraqis since it started working there in late-2008. They have also been accused of damaging farmland that has set off a wave of protests and small-scale sabotage against the corporation.

The problem as ever is that petroleum is not a labor-intensive industry. There will be a flurry of construction early on to improve the oil fields, which could offer opportunities to Iraqis. After that, probably in the best case, the increased revenues from higher exports will give Baghdad the necessary funds to improve services to placate the public. Otherwise the new oil deals will just give people another excuse to complain about their government.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Southern Iraq town hopes for jobs boom after oil auction,” 12/17/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “COSIT: Unemployment, poverty drop in Iraq,” 12/13/09

BBC, “Iraq oil capacity ‘to reach 12m barrels per day,’” 12/12/09

Gunter, Frank, “Liberate Iraq’s Economy,” New York Times, 11/16/09

Al Jazeera, “Iraq’s oil wealth eludes the poor,” 11/4/09

Yackley, Ayla Jean, “Iraqi oil deals mean reams of steel, miles of pipes,” Reuters, 12/10/09

United Nations Human Rights Report On Iraq

2009-12-29T21:27:00.002-05:00

The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) released its latest human rights report for Iraq covering the first half of 2009. The U.N. noted the decrease in violence in Iraq, but that there were still deaths everyday in the country. More importantly, it recorded continued institutional abuses in the justice system, and reminders of the old regime.

The number of deaths and unidentified bodies found are down greatly. In the last half of 2008 for example, 434 people were found dead in the streets, compared to 210 in the first six months of 2009. There were still daily attacks, but the U.N. made an important observation that it is becoming increasingly difficult to tell political violence from ones involving crime, especially because many gangs also work as militias and insurgents. The major targets in Iraq are the security forces, government officials, professionals, Sons of Iraq (SOI) members, and tribal leaders. Two generals were killed and one escaped a car bombing during the first half of 2009, along with four SOI leaders killed or wounded in four areas in Diyala.

Iraq’s minorities are also targets. Yazidis, Sabeans, Shabaks and Christians claim that their numbers have been drastically reduced because of the violence, with many becoming refugees. Yazidis say their population went from 500,000 before the war to 300,000 now. Sabeans reported 35,000 followers in 2003, and 7,000-8,000 now. There were 1.4 million Christians in the 1987 census, and they now believe there are only 500,000-800,000. All of these groups complain about being arrested by the Kurdish security forces, and being pressured to vote for pro-Kurdish parties.

With the dramatic decrease in militant activity, cultural and institutional abuses are gaining more prominence. UNAMI has been focusing upon women’s issues for the last year or two, concentrating upon the Kurdistan region. The U.N has found continued honor killings and suicides due to abuses there. Few of these cases are ever reported to the police, as they are considered family matters. Journalists also say they face regular harassment by the security forces and politicians’ bodyguards. One NGO reported 64 cases of abuse in 3 days in Baghdad, Basra, Babil, and Anbar. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has also arrested and convicted journalists for criticizing the authorities.

Most importantly the U.N. reports that Iraq’s justice system remains overwhelmed by the number of detainees, and its reliance upon confessions leads to widespread abuses. From January to June 2009 the number of prisoners held by the government increased from 27,466 to 29,871. Detainees are regularly held for long periods of time without charges or seeing a lawyer. Torture and beatings are common, and this includes against children held. That led to a series of protests by prisoners in June 2009 against corruption, lack of trials, and abuses in Maysan and Qadisiyah provinces. That same month, the Interior Minister announced that 43 police officers were going to be prosecuted for abuses. Similar conditions and treatment are also prevalent in Kurdistan. UNAMI interviewed people who were held for 5 years or more in the region without charges or trials, while noting that the KRG has begun a program to renovate and improve conditions in its prisons.

Finally, the authorities are finding remains of the Saddam era. In May and June 2009 dozens of mass graves were found in Qadisiyah, Najaf, Basra, Karbala, and Tamim. Most of those contained hundreds of Kurdish victims of Saddam’s Anfal campaign, while two sites were found in Karbala that had Kuwaiti prisoners of war that were killed during the Gulf War. The Ministry of Human Rights believes that they may be 270 unopened mass graves throughout the country.

Iraq remains a troubled nation. The insurgency has been largely defeated, but there are still terrorist attacks everyday that continue to take a human toll. With the fighting largely over, other problems are coming to the fore including overcrowding and abuses in Iraqi prisons and the justice system, lack of rights for women, and limits on press freedom. This shows that Iraq remains a fragile, developing state, with a large terrorist threat.

SOURCES

United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, “Human Rights Report 1 January – 30 June 2009,” 12/15/09

Oil Production Down in Nov. 09, But Exports Up

2009-12-28T21:28:00.002-05:00

The latest numbers for Iraq’s oil industry are out, and they show that while production declined in November 2009, exports actually increased. Last month, Iraq produced an average of 2.36 million barrels a day of petroleum, while exporting 1.99 million barrels a day. In October Iraq produced an average of 2.50 million barrels, and exported 1.89 million barrels.

Iraq’s oil industry has never had steady output, and constantly goes up and down. So far this year, Iraq is average 2.39 million barrels in overall production, the second highest since 2003, while exporting 1.91 million barrels, marking a post-invasion high. Both are below marks set by the Oil Ministry and 2009 budget however. The Ministry wanted to achieve 2.50 million barrels a month this year, which was only achieved in September and October. The 2009 budget called for 2.00 million barrels in exports each month. That only happened in July, 2.08 million barrels, and August, 2.00 million barrels. This has led to a deficit, which is going to continue into next year, especially because the new budget calls for 2.15 million barrels of exports per day. Iraq’s economy is still largely state-run, and relies upon oil for almost all of its revenue, so these deficits are holding up reconstruction and development of the country. The first two rounds of bidding on Iraq’s oil fields will not help in the short-term either as the new production is not likely to come on line for several years.

Monthly Averages of Iraqi Oil Production/Exports in Millions of Barrels Per Day

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Jan.		2.44/1.53	2.10/1.36	1.73/1.05	1.66/1.30	2.24/1.93	2.15/1.91
Feb.		2.27/1.38	2.10/1.43	1.83/1.47	2.08/1.50	2.39/1.93	2.32/1.77
March		2.43/1.82	2.09/1.39	2.10/1.32	2.08/1.58	2.38/1.93	2.37/1.81
April		2.38/1.80	2.14/1.39	2.14/1.60	2.14/1.50	2.40/1.88	2.37/1.83
May	0.3/0.0	1.88/1.38	2.10/1.30	2.13/1.51	2.03/1.64	2.60/1.96	2.41/1.90
June	0.675/0.2	2.29/1.14	2.17/1.37	2.30/1.67	2.00/1.47	2.52/1.96	2.43/1.96
July	0.925/0.322	2.20/1.40	2.17/1.55	2.22/1.68	2.07/1.71	2.54/1.85	2.48/2.08
Aug.	1.44/0.646	2.12/1.11	2.16/1.50	2.24/1.68	1.91/1.69	2.50/1.70	2.48/2.00
Sep.	1.72/0.983	2.51/1.70	2.11/1.60	2.23/1.65	2.3/1.90	2.37/1.65	2.50/1.95
Oct.	2.05/1.14	2.45/1.54	1.91/1.23	2.26/1.55	2.34/1.91	2.37/1.69	2.50/1.89
Nov.	2.10/1.52	1.95/1.32	1.98/1.16	2.10/1.44	2.38/1.88	2.40/1.88	2.36/1.99
Dec.	2.30/1.54	2.16/1.52	1.92/1.07	2.15/1.45	2.42/1.93	2.35/1.73
Yr. Avg.	1.44/0.795	2.25/1.47	2.07/1.36	2.11/1.50	2.11/1.66	2.42/1.84	2.39/1.91

SOURCES

Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, “Iraq Status Report,” U.S. Department of State, 12/16/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United Sates Congress,” 10/30/09

Iraq Still Has Problems Spending Its Money

2009-12-27T14:15:00.002-05:00

The new Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction report to Congress was released at the end of October 2009. It notes that Iraq is still having problems spending its budget. By June 2009 50% of Iraq’s $58.6 billion budget had been released, but only $16.4 billion, 27.9%, had been spent as of that month. $1.6 billion of that was for capital projects that are investments in infrastructure and services. The provinces had $16.4 billion, and only spent 30% of that during the same time period.

80% of the 2009 budget is for operational costs such as salaries, pensions, and the food ration system. Of the money spent in the first six months of the year, 90.3% came from the operational budget. That’s because from 2005 to 2008 Iraq’s spending increased each year and the ministries and agencies went on a hiring spree. In 2005 for example, there were 1.2 million government employees. By 2008 that had more than doubled to 2.8 million. Last year the country was also flush with money due to high oil prices and doubled most salaries for public employees. Now Iraq has no money to cover those costs because the global recession has caused a drop in the oil market, which is the nation’s main source of revenue.

Since Iraq got its official sovereignty back in 2005 its budgetary expenditures have gone up and down, with the majority of spending going to operational costs. In 2005 Iraq did its best, spending 73% of its $30.2 billion budget. Then followed 67% in 2006, 65% in 2007, and 69% in 2008. Barely any of the capital budgets were spent during those years, while the majority of the operational budgets were. In 2005 91% of the operational budget was spent, compared to 23% for the capital budget. In 2006 it was 83% operational versus 19% capital, 2007 it was 80% operational versus 28% capital, and in 2008 Baghdad did its best job spending 39% of its capital budget. Iraq’s major ministries responsible for security and services did an even worse job. In 2005 they spent 14% of their budgets, in 2006 13%, 2007 11%, and 2008 23%.

Iraq is now facing the triple pressures of reduced American and international aid, low to moderate petroleum prices, and increasing government costs. The bureaucracy, centralized control, and lack of trained staff has gotten no better since 2005, which are some of the main reasons why expenditures have so many problems. What that’s leading to is a bloated government, with limited money for development to raise the standard of living for its public.

Iraq’s Budget Expenditures
2005 73% of total budget, (4) 91% of operational budget, 23% of capital budget
2006 67% of total budget, 83% of operational budget, 19% of capital budget
2007 65% of total budget, 80% of operational budget, 28% of capital budget
2008 69% of total budget, 39% of capital budget

Budget Expenditures By Security and Services Ministries
2005 14%
2006 13%
2007 11%
2008 23%

SOURCES

Cockburn, Patrick, “Collapse in Iraqi oil price shatters hope of recovery,” Independent, 3/20/09

Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” June 2009

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09
- “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/09

United States Government Accountability Office, “IRAQ Key Issues for Congressional Oversight,” March 2009
- “Iraqi Revenues, Expenditures, and Surplus,” August 2008
- “Progress Report: Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed,” June 2008

U.S. Reconstruction Coming To An End

2009-12-24T21:30:00.000-05:00

Since the invasion of Iraq in 2003 the United States has promised the country $52.8 billion in reconstruction funds. That was the largest rebuilding effort in American history. Now this program is expected to end by 2014.

Of the $52.8 billion made available to Iraq, $43.57 billion of it has actually been obligated to specific projects, and $39.54 billion has been spent. The Obama administration has asked for $800 million for the 2010-2011 Fiscal Year. There is also $1 billion in supplemental funding for 2010 and $1.5 billion in 2012. The reconstruction effort is already winding down as only $58 million of the $1 billion in 2010 money has been obligated as of September 2009, and only $300,000 has been spent. That’s largely the result of the beginning of the withdrawal of U.S. forces. With less troops out in the field and the planned drawdown of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, there are fewer opportunities for new projects to be planned. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) estimates that by 2012-2014 all of the money currently in the pipeline for Iraq will run out. After that the U.S. will continue to provide aid, but not in the large amounts that it has in the past.

The largest chunk of reconstruction funds ended up going to security. In total, $24.52 billion was allocated for various security endeavors, with $20.72 billion actually being spent. Creating a new Iraqi Army is considered the one success of the U.S. effort. There are 245,000 Iraqi soldiers, and over 400,000 police. They now have control of all of Iraq’s 18 provinces, are in the lead of the country’s counterinsurgency program, and the Army is considered competent enough to handle internal security. The police are more open to political and local influences, thousands have not been trained, and are still considered a work in progress. Both forces remain almost completely dependent upon the U.S. for logistics and procurement however, and Iraq is not capable of protecting itself from outside threats.

In comparison, $21.2 billion was spent on the economy and government. $12.36 billion was allocated for infrastructure, $7.28 billion for governance, and $1.56 billion for the economy. Of that, $18.83 billion has actually been spent. The sectors that got the most money were electricity, $5.16 billion, water and sanitation $2.74 billion, government capacity $2.50 billion, oil and gas $2.06 billion, and developing democracy and civil society $2.03 billion.

There is still over $11.6 billion in on-going projects. Baghdad has the most with $2.92 billion, followed by $543.46 million in Basra, $362.23 million in Tamim, and $1.11 billion across the country. In terms of sectors, there is $5.07 billion in electricity projects, $3.08 billion in water and sanitation, $1.77 billion in oil and gas, $1.27 billion in transportation and communication, and $467.97 million in governance and infrastructure.

Reconstructing Iraq’s infrastructure and government has run into many problems. While things like electricity production is at an all time high, it is still not meeting demand. There are also millions of dollars worth of projects that are either not operating at capacity or have been abandoned because Iraqis cannot staff, supply, or afford them. Most importantly, just over half of the money got diverted to security rather than developing the country.

Overall, the SIGIR believes that the U.S. failed in this endeavor because of a lack of pre-war planning and coordination, bad contracting practices, and building projects that Americans wanted, not Iraqis. Another major problem was that the lack of security derailed many projects, and led to huge cost overruns. That’s seen in the fact that as the reconstruction effort winds down, more money was spent on the Iraqi military and police than the economy or government. There are some successes like the Iraqi Army, but many continuing problems like the lack of adequate services. The U.S. invasion ended the dictatorial rule of Saddam, but the $52.8 billion reconstruction effort is leaving behind a rather typical, dysfunctional Third World country.

Status of Major U.S. Reconstruction Funds

Area	Sector	Allocated	Obligated	Expended
Security	Equipment	$7.29 bil	6.82 bil	6.03 bil
	Training	$6.11 bil	$5.68 bil	$5.45 bil
	Infrastructure	$5.81 bil	$5.55 bil	$4.84 bil
	Sustainment	$2.55 bil	$2.41 bil	$2.17 bil
	Rule of Law	$1.50 bil	$1.48 bil	$1.27 bil
	Related Activities	$1.27 bil	$1.15 bil	$0.97 bil
	Subtotal	$24.52 bil	$23.09 bil	$20.72 bil
Infrastructure	Electricity	$5.16 bil	$4.99 bil	$4.86 bil
	Water and Sanitation	$2.74 bil	$2.63 bil	$2.47 bil
	Oil and Gas	$2.06 bil	$1.92 bil	$1.91 bil
	General Infrastructure	$1.25 bil	$1.24 bil	$1.24 bil
	Transportation and Communication	$1.15 bil	$1.09 bil	$0.99 bil
	Subtotal	$12.35 bil	$11.88 bil	$11.47 bil
Governance	Capacity Development	$2.50 bil	$2.29 bil	$1.91 bil
	Democracy and Civil Society	$2.03 bil	$2.04 bil	$1.66 bil
	Public Services	$1.93 bil	$1.91 bil	$1.73 bil
	Humanitarian Relief	$0.82 bil	$0.82 bil	$0.75 bil
	Subtotal	$7.28 bil	$7.06 bil	$6.04 bil
Economy	Economic Governance	$0.82 bil	$0.80 bil	$0.74 bil
	Private Sector Development	$0.74 bil	$0.74 bil	$0.57 bil
	Subtotal	$1.56 bil	$1.54 bil	$1.32 bil
TOTAL		$45.72 bil	$43.57 bil	$39.54 bil

Remaining Infrastructure Projects by Province

Province	Electricity	Water and Sanitation	Oil and Gas	Transporta- tion and Commun- ication	General Infra- structure	Total
Baghdad	$1,504.22 mil	$755.31 mil	$40.6 mil	$282.17 mil	$341.68 mil	$2,923.97 mil
Basra	$543.46 mil	$238.32 mil	$558.55 mil	%171.8 mil	$8.39 mil	$1,520.52 mil
Tamim	$362.23 mil	$42.87 mil	$187.39 mil	$21.09 mil	$8.47 mil	$622.05 mil
Dhi Qar	$106.67 mil	$399.69 mil	$0.43 mil	$21.42 mil	$13.06 mil	$541.26 mil
Salahaddin	$311.19 mil	$59.51 mil	$71.52 mil	$65.75 mil	$7.37 mil	$515.36 mil
Anbar	$251.58 mil	$188.88 mil	-	$70.15 mil	$3.92 mil	$514.53 mil
Ninewa	$118.74 mil	$126.87 mil	$0.08 mil	$66.06 mil	$6.97 mil	$318.72 mil
Iirbil	$102.54 mil	$201.67 mil	$0.08 mil	$5.07 mil	$2.46 mil	$311.82 mil
Diyala	$80.66 mil	$143.47 mil	$2.89 mil	$23.79 mil	$6.24 mil	$257.05 mil
Muthanna	$15.02 mil	$189.79 mil	$0.07 mil	$19.12 mil	$3.87 mil	$227.87 mil
Babil	$121.65 mil	$47.63 mil	-	$36.01 mil	$3.49 mil	$208.78 mil
Najaf	$72.79 mil	$60.84 mil	-	$14.26 mil	$4.43 mil	$152.31 mil
Qadisiya	$86.78 mil	$30.46 mil	-	$21.75 mil	$2.65 mil	$141.63 mil
Maysan	$76.31 mil	$20.26 mil	$0.06 mil	$14.06 mil	$6.32 mil	$117.01 mil
Wasit	$45.38 mil	$30.21 mil	-	$19.18 mil	$10.23 mil	$105.01 mil
Karbala	$46.99 mil	$39.0 mil	-	$4.88 mil	$1.58 mil	$92.45 mil
Dohuk	$61.4 mil	$8l.34 mil	-	$0.93 mil	$7.63 mil	$78.3 mil
Sulaymaniya	$49.03 mil	$15.28 mil	-	$2.98 mil	$1.06 mil	$68.35 mil
Nationwide & Regional	$1,115.1 mil	$487.18 mil	$916.14 mil	$418.14 mil	$28.16 mil	$2,964.71 mil
TOTAL	$5,071.73 mil	$3,085.58 mil	$1,777.81 mil	$1,278.6 mil	$467.97 mil	$11,681.69 mil

SOURCES

Cordesman, Anthony, “Assessing the Readiness of the Iraqi Security Forces,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/12/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09

- “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/09

Electricity Output Reaches Post-Invasion High, But System Still Plagued By Problems

2009-12-23T22:41:00.002-05:00

The Special Inspector for Iraq Reconstruction reported that for the fifth straight quarter Iraq’s average electricity supply increased from August to October 2009. For the 3rd quarter of 2009 Iraq produced 6,439 megawatts, a post-invasion high. That was a 10% increase from the 2nd quarter. In 2007 Iraq produced 4,488 megawatts, with 4,198 coming from the Ministry of Electricity, and 290 being imported. In 2009 the Ministry was responsible for 5,209 megawatts, 669 megawatts came from other countries, and 560 were from private generators. Iraq saw a 1,951 megawatt increase over those two years.

The growth in power supply comes from multiple sources. Half of the increase came from working on existing power plants at a cost of more than $2 billion in U.S. reconstruction aid since 2003. 29% of the increase was from two new private power plants opening in the Kurdistan Regional Government. 19% of this quarter's increase came from importing electricity from Iran and Turkey. In 2007 Turkey was the main supplier, providing 60% of imports, but since then Iran was eclipsed them, now accounting for 80%. The Electricity Ministry has also been able to make some small increases in its capacity. It has added two power plants on boats in Basra in 2009 for example, run by a Turkish company. They have a combined capacity of 250 megawatts.

The Ministry has bigger plans in store as well. In 2009 they finally got funding to buy turbines from General Electric and Siemens. These will be installed in twenty locations throughout the country. Every province except the three in Kurdistan will get at least one new power plant out of the deal. Construction is expected to begin in late 2010 or early 2011, and the new capacity will come on line in 2-6 years. When finished, the turbines will add an estimated 10,000 megawatts. There is a major problem with this plan however. Iraq's power grid cannot handle this increase. The transmission and distribution systems need to be renovated, but there are no plans to do so. There are also questions about whether the government will be able to provide fuel for all of these new plants adequately. The Electricity's Ministry promises therefore, may never be fulfilled. Baghdad will also have a hard time coming up with any extra money as it is facing a second year of budget deficits due to moderate oil prices, which provide almost all of its revenue.

Despite the recent increases, the national grid still does not meet the country’s demands. The Special Inspector General believes that the gap between supply and demand is twice what it was in 2003, although it has been slightly reduced since 2007. Based upon estimates it’s believed that the Electricity Ministry served 69% of the national demand in the 3rd quarters of 2009. In the 3rd quarter of 2007, it only met 54%. In terms of the provinces, Sulaymaniya, Basra, Irbil, and Diyala in that order did the best supplying electricity, meeting anywhere from 83% to 99% of demand. That’s because those governorates either have their own power plants or import large amounts from Iran. At the opposite end of the spectrum, Wasit, 51%, Maysan, 53%, Babil 56%, Ninewa and Najaf at 58%, do the worst serving their people. Because Iraqis cannot rely upon the government for its power, most rely upon private generators.

Electricity Supply And Demand By Provinces

Province	Avg. Daily Electricity Load Served (MW)	Avg. Daily Estimated Electricity Demand (MW)	Avg. Daily Demand Met
Sulaymaniya	352	357	99%
Basra	806	929	87%
Irbil	356	411	86%
Diyala	196	236	83%
Dhi Qar	289	405	71%
Salahaddin	275	385	71%
Tamim	222	325	68%
Muthanna	137	202	68%
Anbar	219	329	67%
Baghdad	1,718	2,571	67%
Dohuk	132	203	65%
Karbala	164	273	60%
Qadisiyah	150	253	59%
Najaf	216	375	58%
Ninewa	491	851	58%
Babil	240	425	56%
Maysan	145	273	53%
Wasit	155	304	51%

Iraq’s generators also do not operate up to their capabilities. Nameplate capacity is how much a generator should be able to produce in ideal conditions. Feasible capacity is how much it can produce given the actual conditions. Iraq has a nameplate generating capacity of 15,300 megawatts, and a feasible capacity of 11,150. Both were 4% increases from the 2nd quarter of 2009. However in the 3rd quarter Iraq only operated at 38% of nameplate capacity and 52% of feasible capacity. The Qudas power plant in Baghdad for example, which the U.S. spent $250 million to renovate, has a nameplate capacity of 910 megawatts, but only averages 429 megawatts of actual production, 47% of its nameplate capacity.

After the overthrow of Saddam, Iraqis went on a buying spree of consumer electronics. This has greatly increased demand for power, which has not been met by the increase in production. The lack of adequate funds, the inability of the Electricity Ministry to spend what it gets, not enough skilled and trained personnel, poor maintenance and aging equipment, along with subsidized energy and a large black market in generators encourages use rather than conservation. These all mean that demand will continue to increase in the near future, and even with the new power plants and renovations, the power system will still probably be running a deficit.

SOURCES

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, "Quarterly Report to the United States Congress," 10/30/09

2nd Round of Bidding On Iraq’s Oil Fields Ends As A Success

2009-12-18T22:00:00.002-05:00

The second round of bidding on Iraq’s oil fields ended on December 12, 2009. It was much more successful than the first round that occurred in June 2009. That auction only produced one successful contract, although two more were negotiated afterward. This round garnered seven deals for the ten fields up for bid.

Initially, the second round did not get off to a good start. On the first day, December 11, only two bids were accepted. The next day went much better with five more. If all of the companies are able to meet their projections, Iraq has the potential to add 4,765,000 extra barrels to its production total, which is currently averaging 2.39 million barrels a day in 2009. The deals from the first round could add an additional 6,075,000. Within thirteen years these oil companies are promising Iraq up to 13.23 million barrels a day in capacity, which would make it the largest oil producer in the world. Oil Minister Hussain Shahristani was even more optimistic, claiming that Iraq could reach 12 million barrels a day in six years, while noting that actual production would be determined by demand.

There are many that doubt Iraq’s ability. Oil analysts believe that all of the new facilities required to develop this potential would set off inflation in services, and be hard for the government to complete. Iraq has also not had to follow OPEC production quotas since it was placed under international sanctions after the 1991 Gulf War. Iraq is working to ends those, and thus would eventually have to comply with the organization’s prescriptions again. Some Oil Ministry officials however, are talking like they would not have to. The CEO of France’s Total oil company said in November that 10-12 million barrels a day in Iraqi production was “crazy.” He believed a much more realistic potential was 7-8 million barrels a day. Other experts believe that Iraq’s increased production would hurt it in the long run. The Director of the Center for Global Energy Studies in London, England for example, believes that greater petroleum production would lead to a fall in prices and profits for Iraq in the long run. Even Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s oil adviser said recently that Iraq could not reach the 10-12 million barrel plateau, and thought 6 million barrels was more achievable.

Whatever the final outcome is, Iraq is finally garnering the foreign investment and expertise it desperately needs to boost its oil production. Since the U.S. invasion the country has become more dependent upon petroleum than ever before as the other sectors of the economy have faltered due to American and government polices and violence. It needs to garner as much money as possible from its one major resource so that it can develop and sustain itself. As always, it’s up to the bureaucracy to fashion this into a successful venture. This may be a Catch 22, as other oil producing countries do not provide much hope. Few have diversified their economies, and remain tied to one industry that does not provide much employment. The development of petroleum could thus make Iraq even more reliant upon it.

First Day Deals December 11, 2009

Halfaya
Reserves: 4.098 billion barrels
Winner: China’s CNPC, Malaysia’s Petronas, and France’s Total
Terms: $1.40 for each extra barrel produced, will boost production to 535,000 barrels a day
Losing Bids:
1. Norway’s Statoil and Russia’s Lukoil – Asked for $1.53 per extra barrel and promised 600,000 barrels a day output
2. India’s ONGC and India Oil, and Turkey’s TPAO – Asked for $1.76 per extra barrel and promised 550,000 barrels a day output
3. Italy’s Eni, South Korea’s Kogas, U.S. Occidental Petroleum, Angola’s Sonangol, and China’s CNOOC – Asked for $12.50 per extra barrel and promised 400,000 barrels a day output

Majnoon
Reserves: 12.58 billion barrels
Winner: Anglo-Dutch Shell and Malaysia’s Petronas
Terms: $1.39 for each extra barrel produced, will boost production to 1.8 million barrels a day
Losing Bids: France’s Total and China’s CNPC – Asked for $1.75 per extra barrel and promised 1.405 million barrels a day output

Qayara
Reserves: 807 million barrels
Winner: Angola’s Sonangol
Terms: $5 per extra barrel produced, will boost production to 120,000 barrels a day
Losing Bids: None

Second Day Deals December 12, 2009

Badra
Reserves: 109 million barrels
Winner: Russia’s Gazprom, South Korea’s KoGas, Malaysia’s Petronas, and Turkey’s TPAO
Terms: $5.50 per extra barrel produced, will boost production to 170,000 barrels a day
Losing Bids: None

Garraf
Reserves: 863 million barrels
Winner: Malaysia’s Petronas and Japan’s Japex
Terms: $1.49 per extra barrel produced, will boost production to 230,000 barrels a day
Losing Bids:
1. Turkey’s TPAO and India’s ONGC – Asked for $2.76 per extra barrel and promised 200,000 barrels a day output
2. Kazakhstan’s KazMunaiGas, South Korea’s KoGas and Italy’s Edison – Asked for $2.55 per extra barrel and promised 185,000 barrels a day output
3. Indonesia’s Pertamina – Asked for $7.50 per extra barrel and promised 150,000 barrels a day output

Najmah
Reserves: 858 million barrels
Winner: Angola’s Sonangol
Terms: $6 for each extra barrel produced, will boost production to 110,000 barrels a day
Losing Bids: None

West Qurna 2
Reserves: 12.876 billion barrels
Winner: Russia’s Lukoil, Norway’s Statoil Hydro
Terms: $1.15 for each extra barrel produced, will boost production to 1.8 million barrels a day
Losing Bids:
1. Malaysia’s Petronas, Indonesia’s Pertamina, Vietnam’s Petro Vietnam – Asked for $1.25 per extra barrel and promised 1.2 million barrels a day output
2. France’s Total – Asked for $1.72 per extra barrel and promised 1.43 million barrels a day output
3. British Petroleum and China’s CNPC – Asked for $1.65 per extra barrel and promised 888,000 barrels a day output

Fields Receiving No Bids

East Baghdad
Eastern Fields
Middle Furat

SOURCES

BBC, “Iraq oil capacity ‘to reach 12m barrels per day,’” 12/12/09

Brock, Joe, “Firms overstate Iraq oil potential – govt adviser,” Reuters, 12/7/09

Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, “Iraq Status Report,” U.S. Department of State, 12/9/09

Canty, Daniel, “12 million barrels a day is unrealistic for Iraq,” Arabian Oil and Gas, 11/17/09

The National, “Iraq oil deals,” 12/12/09

Williams, Timothy, “Oil Companies Look to the Future in Iraq,” New York Times, 12/1/09

Yackley, Ayla Jean, “Iraqi oil deals mean reams of steel, miles of pipes,” Reuters, 12/10/09

Is The Security Situation In Iraq Getting Worse?

2009-12-17T21:04:00.000-05:00

Every time there is a massive, headline-grabbing bombing in Iraq, it sets off a wave of reports and commentaries in the West about how the security situation in the country is getting worse. The most recent such attack was on December 8, 2009 when four targets in Baghdad were assaulted resulting in 127 deaths and 448 wounded. In August and October there were similar bombings of government ministries and the Baghdad provincial council building. A typical response was by John McCreary of AFCEA Intelligence who wrote on December 8 that, “Day by day, the security situation is deteriorating. This should surprise no Readers and it will get much worse in the next few months.” Thomas Ricks, author of the books The Fiasco and The Gamble, member of the Center for a New American Century think tank, who runs the Best Defense blog on the Foreign Policy website, is another who has an on-going series of posts called “Iraq, the unraveling” that argues things are going downhill in the country. The problem with these writers is that they appear to be basing their writings purely upon press reports, which focus almost exclusively on violence. As reported before, that gives a distorted picture of the situation. What they lack is any kind of research or background into the larger trend in violence that can put these attacks into context.

First, there is no direct correlation between large bombings and the overall security situation. In June 2009 for example, there were 14 mass casualty bombings that resulted in 174 deaths and 517 wounded. The next month there were 35 such attacks that led to 180 dead and 655 wounded. According to Iraq Body Count however, there were more deaths in June, 488, than July, 395, even though the latter had more bombings.

Comparison Of Bombings and Overall Deaths In Iraq – June vs July 2009

June 2009
Mass Casualty Bombings: 14
Deaths Caused By: 174
Wounded Caused By: 517
Overall Monthly Death Count: 488

July 2009
Mass Casualty Bombings: 35
Death Caused By: 180
Wounded Caused By: 655
Overall Monthly Death Count: 395

Second, even if one were to judge Iraqi security by multiple fatality bombings, they have been declining since their peak in 2006. The Brookings Institution’s Iraq Index tracks such attacks from May 2003 to the present. According to their numbers, there were an average of 5.1 of these bombings a month in 2003, 13.5 in 2004, 29.1 in 2005, before they reached their highest point in 2006 with an average of 50.9. After that there was a steady decline with an average of 38.5 bombings a month in 2007, followed by 21.0 in 2008, and 15.5 this year from January to November 2009.

Average Number of Mass Casualty Bombings 2003-2009
2003: Avg. 5.1
2004: Avg. 13.5
2005: Avg. 29.1
2006: Avg. 50.9
2007: Avg. 38.5
2008: Avg. 21.0

2009: Avg. 15.5

Third, attacks overall are down to their lowest levels since 2004. From January to March 2004 there were around 250-300 security incidents each week. Attacks took off as the sectarian war started with the bombing of the Samarra mosque in February 2006 peaking at 1,800 per week in May 2007. After that point, weekly attacks steadily decreased with a few up-ticks. Since July 2009 they have averaged below 200 per week.

Some thought that the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq’s cities on June 30, 2009 would negatively affect security, but that hasn’t happened either. From mid-February to June 30, 2009 there were an average of 250 security incidents per week. From the withdrawal date to early November 2009 there has been an average of just under 200 attacks per week. The number killed has also seen a very slight decrease from before and after the pullout.

Like bombings, there is also no correlation between overall attacks and casualties in Iraq. As the chart below shows, security incidents reached their highest level at the middle of 2007, yet the number of deaths had been declining since the very end of 2006.

Regarding deaths, 2009 has seen the fewest number since the Iraq war began. From May to December 2003 when the invasion ended and the insurgency was just beginning, there was an average of 578.8 deaths per month according to Iraq Body Count. In comparison, from January to November 2009 there have been an average of 388.7. In fact, August 2009 was the only month this year that casualties reached the 500 mark. Deaths reached their highest levels in late-2006 to early-2007 when over 3,000 were being killed a month. Since then they have seen a steady decline, with November 2009 having the fewest fatalities since 2003.

Iraqi Monthly Deaths 2003 vs 2009

2003
May 545
June 593
July 650
Aug. 790
Sep. 553
Oct. 493
Nov. 478
Dec. 529
Avg. Monthly Deaths: 578.8

2009
Jan. 276
Feb. 343
March 416
Apr. 484
May 332
June 488
July 395
Aug. 593
Sep. 299
Oct. 438
Nov. 212
Avg. Monthly Deaths: 388.7

Overall, there is nothing to support the thesis that the security situation is worsening in Iraq. Mass casualty bombings, security incidents, and deaths have all gone down since the sectarian war of 2006-2007. The situation has not gotten worse since the U.S. pulled out of Iraq’s urban areas either at the end of June 2009. The major reason for this change is the fact that the majority of the Sunni insurgency gave up and switched sides to join the Anbar Awakening and Sons of Iraq program from 2005-2007. More recently, many Sunnis have decided to join the political process after they boycotted the first election in 2005. There are still militants in Iraq who carry out attacks every day, but their numbers and areas of operation are severely limited. Their violence will likely continue for the foreseeable future however as Iraqi politics are still divided, and some religious zealots still feel that Iraq is their cause. It should also be stressed that despite the drop in deaths and attacks, and the weakening of the insurgency, Iraq remains one of the most violent countries in the world. These incidents need to be put into a larger political context however, instead of the knee-jerk commentary that is currently prevalent.

SOURCES

Cordesman, Anthony, “Iraq: Security Trends,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 11/19/09

McCreary, John, “Night Watch For the Night of 8 December 2009,” AFCEA Intelligence, 12/8/09

O’Hanlon, Michael Livingston, Ian, “Iraq Index,” Brookings Institution, 12/11/09

RTT News, “Chief Of Iraqi Security Forces In Baghdad Replaced After Deadly Bomb Attacks,” 12/9/09

Iraq Lacks Will To Confront Corruption

2009-12-16T21:26:00.000-05:00

Iraq continues to be one of the most corrupt countries in the world. In its recent report, Transparency International ranked Iraq the fourth most corrupt nation out of 180, tied with Sudan. While Iraq’s anti-corruption agencies continue their work at the national and provincial level, the real problem is the lack of will and commitment by the country’s leaders to the fight.

From January 1 to August 3, 2009 there were 80 successful convictions for corruption. The problem is that there are 445 other cases waiting to be adjudicated from just this year according to Iraq’s High Judicial Council. Of those found guilty, 45 were in Baghdad, 14 in Ninewa, 6 in Tamim and Babil each, 4 in Wasit, 2 in Muthanna, and 1 each in Karbala, Najaf, and Dhi Qar. In fourteen cases, the value of the crimes together was worth $136,000. The Ministry of Defense was implicated the most with 12 cases, followed by 9 from the Finance Ministry, 7 from Interior, 1 from Oil, 1 from Labor, 1 from Electricity, 1 from Transportation, 1 from Justice, and 1 from Displacement and Migration. A 2008 report by the Integrity Commission, one of three anti-corruption agencies in Iraq, found that the Defense Ministry was one of the most corrupt in the government. In 2008 there were $1.3 billion worth of cases pardoned, most from the Ministry of Defense. The Ministry also accounted for the third most convictions overall in the country last year. A major problem was that 42% of those found guilty in 2009 were absent for their sentencing, probably meaning they had fled.

This year has also seen some of the highest profile cases since the 2003 U.S. invasion. In May the Trade Minister was arrested for corruption charges surrounding the food ration system, which he is in charge of. In September the Deputy Transportation Minister was detained for attempting to obtain a $500,000 bribe from a private security company. The newly elected provincial councils have also indicted a number of people at the local level. In Karbala for example, four officials were arrested for embezzlement. Just recently in November, 13 members of the Baghdad mayor’s office were found stealing $20 million by forging checks for ghost employees.

Despite these successes, the anti-corruption agencies face an uphill battle in Iraq. The greatest impediment is the country’s leadership. Publicly, Iraq’s government says it is committed to dealing with corruption. In June 2009 Baghdad announced it would address bribery in public agencies. The next month the Kurdistan Regional Government said it was creating a program to promote good government and transparency. Then in October Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki gave a speech warning that political corruption was more dangerous than financial improprieties because it undermine the government. Yet Iraq’s ministries consistently stand in the way of investigations. Article 136B allows any minister to stop an inquiry into corruption. In 2008 210 cases were stopped using 136B, including two involving ministers and one case worth $6 million. Many high government officials also refuse to follow rules and regulations. For instance, only 92 of 275 members of parliament had made their financial declarations this year. Others have also tried to defer blame. Maliki for example, recently answered questions from reporters online, and while he said that corruption was more widespread now than under Saddam, he blamed Al Qaeda and Baathists for spreading fake stories about the government that influenced organizations like Transparency International.

With little to no accountability at the top, lower level corruption is allowed to flourish. In Diyala for example, the two former deputy governors fled after they heard they were going to be prosecuted. A U.S. officer in charge of reconstruction projects there said that he had found several fake projects, or contractors not doing their work because they were paid upfront. Iraqi officials in Diyala also said they suspected the police were extorting money from prisoners.

It’s no wonder than that few Iraqis have any confidence in their public officials taking care of this very serious problem. That is the most costly affect of corruption. It undermines the standing of the authorities, which is especially important in Iraq that is struggling after years of dictatorship to establish a new government. A country is only as democratic as its people want it to be. If they become apathetic or disheartened, then the government assumes more and more power, and becomes more corrupt. This is the situation that Iraq now faces.

SOURCES

Dawlat Al-Qanon, “Al-Maliki Answers Reporters’ Questions Online,” MEMRI Blog, 12/8/09

Inside Iraq, “$1.3 billion is pardoned in Iraq and more,” McClatchy Newspapers, 9/13/09

Al Rafidayn, “Gang steals millions of dollars in Iraq, regardless of names and fake checks,” 11/23/09

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraqi Deputies Chided For Not Making Financial Declarations,” 10/8/09
- “Iraqi Premier Warns Of Dangers Of Political Corruption,” 10/16/09

Al-Shara, Hazim and Mohamed, Abeer, “Iraqis Critical of Anti-Corruption Efforts,” Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 11/24/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/09

Tom, Peter, “Graft the next great hurdle to a ‘new’ Iraq,” Global Post, 10/16/09

Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2009,” 11/17/09

Baghdad Bombings Set Off Political Bickering Amongst Iraqi Elites

2009-12-15T22:29:00.002-05:00

The December 8, 2009 bombings have led to a wave of accusations amongst Iraqi politicians. First members of parliament demanded that the Interior, Defense, and National Security ministers, the head of the Iraqi Intelligence Service, the chief of the Baghdad Operations Command, along with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki appear before them for questioning over the lapses in security that have led to the attacks. Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani said he would do so as long as the hearings were in public, while members of the Dawa Party said that the Prime Minister would never be questioned by the legislature because that would only serve his detractors who want to attack him.

Maliki also dismissed the Baghdad Security Chief General Abboud Qanbar, who is a close ally of the Prime Minister. At the same time, Maliki is calling for the resignation of Interior Minister Bolani for the bombings. A Dawa parliamentarian said that Bolani is responsible for the attacks, and that he had filled the Interior Ministry with members of his Constitution party, which prevented him from firing incompetent people. Bolani countered by saying that Maliki is at fault since the Baghdad Operations Command answers directly to his office, not the Interior or Defense ministries. Bolani also implied that some of Iraq’s political parties were involved in yesterday’s incident.

The 2010 parliamentary elections loom in the background of these charges. Maliki and Bolani are rivals, and head separate political list that are competing against each other. Maliki and his Dawa Party are in the lead of the State of Law coalition, while Bolani’s Constitution Party is part of the Unity of Iraq Alliance that also includes Sheikh Ahmad Abu Risha of the Anbar Awakening Conference, the head of the Sunni Endowment Ahmed Abed al-Ghafur al-Samarraie, and the former speaker of parliament Mahmoud Mashhadani of the National Independent Trend. One of Maliki’s main campaign points is that he has brought security to Iraq. The August, October, and December bombings have severely tarnished his image. In response, the Prime Minister has focused upon blaming others, at first Baathists in Syria for the attacks, and now Minister Bolani to defer responsibility. The Iraqi public doesn’t seem to care about the political attacks, and are increasingly blaming the entire government for failing at their job to protect the people.

SOURCES

AK News, “Parliament will question Premier as well over bombings,” 12/9/09

Ali, Ahmed, “Iraq’s Elections Challenge: A Shifting Political Landscape,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 11/20/09

Alsumaria, “Iraq Interior Minister set for accountability,” 12/9/09
- “MP blames blasts on Iraq Interior Ministry,” 12/9/09

Roads To Iraq, “Current situation and the three options,” 11/19/09
- “Al-Sadr’s election campaign, questioning Maliki is the next political crisis,” 12/9/09

RTT News, “Chief Of Iraqi Security Forces In Baghdad Replaced After Deadly Bomb Attacks,” 12/9/09

Security Situation In Mosul, November 2009

2009-12-14T21:02:00.000-05:00

The security situation in Iraq was a little different in November 2009. Unlike previous months, Baghdad province was not the deadliest place in the country. Rather Ninewa, largely driven by events in the provincial capital Mosul, had the most deaths for the month. Last month Ninewa had 61 attacks resulting in 41 dead and 80 wounded, compared to 59 attacks in Baghdad, 38 deaths, and 165 wounded. Around 90% of the violence in Ninewa occurred in Mosul. There were 55 attacks there in November, resulting in 37 deaths, and 71 wounded. That averaged out to 1.83 attacks per day, 1.23 deaths, and 2.36 wounded. That was the lowest number of attacks since January 2009 when there were 52, and an average of 1.67. 37 was also the lowest number of deaths since at least 2006, if not before.

Mosul is the second most violent city in Iraq after Baghdad. That’s because it is the largest urban stronghold of the insurgency. There are daily reports of assassinations, bombings, and attacks on local officials and security forces. That has begun to change however. Starting in November 2008 attacks and casualties began to see a steady decline. That coincided with the run-up to the January 2009 provincial elections, and the formation of the al-Hadbaa List. The coalition was a collection of Mosul business elites, tribal leaders, and Kurds opposed to the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. (3) Al-Hadbaa was eventually able to work out a cease-fire with local insurgents, and got the backing of local Baathists and their fighters, who by 2008 had been able to assume command of the fighting there from Al Qaeda in Iraq. Al-Hadbaa ended up winning the election, which marked a return of Sunni Arabs to politics in Ninewa after they had boycotted the 2005 vote. The greater participation is directly responsible for the reduction of attacks in Mosul. The divide of the city between Arabs and Kurds however, still gives some reason to turn to violence, and the continued security incidents there.

Attack and Casualty Statistics for Mosul – January to November 2009

January 52 Attacks/Incidents, Avg. 1.67/day
56 Deaths, Avg. 1.80/day
56 Wounded, Avg. 1.80/day

February 81 Attacks/Incidents, Avg. 2.89/day
58 Deaths, Avg. 2.00/day
111 Wounded, Avg. 3.96/day

March 86 Attacks/Incidents, Avg. 2.77/day
69 Deaths, Avg. 2.22/day
169 Wounded, Avg. 5.45/day

April 79 Attacks/Incidents, Avg. 2.63/day
53 Deaths, Avg. 1.76/day
191 Wounded, Avg. 6.36/day

May 83 Attacks/Incidents, Avg. 3.06/day
64 Deaths, Avg. 2.06/day
164 Wounded, Avg. 4.70/day

June 73 Attacks/Incidents, Avg. 2.43/day
58 Deaths, Avg. 1.93/day
123 Wounded, Avg. 4.10/day

July 73 Attacks/Incidents, Avg. 2.35/day
79 Deaths, Avg. 2.54/day
169 Wounded, Avg. 5.45/day

August 77 Attacks/Incidents, Avg. 2.48/day
102 Deaths, Avg. 3.29/day
171 Wounded, Avg. 5.51/day

September 72 Attacks/Incidents, Avg. 2.40/day
65 Deaths, Avg. 2.16/day
60 Wounded, Avg. 2.00/day

October 66 Attacks/Incidents, Avg. 2.12/ day
60 Deaths, Avg. 1.93/ day
82 Wounded, Avg. 2.64/ day

November 55 Attacks/Incidents, Avg. 1.83/ day
37 Deaths, Avg. 1.23/ day
71 Wounded, Avg. 2.36/ day

Averages:

4th Quarter 2007: 38.66 Attacks/Incidents/month, Avg. 1.26/day
77.33 deaths/month, Avg. 2.52/day
114.66 wounded/month, Avg. 3.73/day

1st Half 2008: 57.5 Attacks/Incidents/month, Avg. 1.89/day
88.00 deaths/month, Avg. 2.90/day
210.00 wounded/month, Avg. 6.92/day

2nd Half 2008: 75.33 Attacks/Incidents/month, Avg. 2.45/day
80.83 deaths/month, Avg. 2.63/day
168.33 wounded/month, Avg. 5.48/day

1st Half 2009: 75.66 Attacks/Incidents/month, Avg. 2.50/day
59.66 deaths/month, Avg. 1.97/day
135.66 wounded/month, Avg. 4.49/day

For a history of the violence in post-invasion Mosul see:

The Changing Face of Violence In Mosul

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “2 charred bodies found inside car bomb,” 11/1/09
- “2 civilians killed in Mosul,” 11/19/09
- “2 civilians wounded in cab bomb blast in Mosul,” 11/1/09
- “2 gunmen killed in IED blast they planted,” 11/8/09
- “2 policemen wounded in hand-grenade blast in Mosul,” 11/12/09
- “3 children wounded in Ninewa blast,” 11/15/09
- “3 mortar shells hit central Mosul,” 11/9/09
- “3 soldiers wounded in Mosul blast,” 11/15/09
- “13-year-old Christian boy shot down in Mosul,” 11/13/09
- “Army officer killed in Mosul blast,” 11/23/09
- “Asiacell employee gunned down in Mosul,” 11/2/09
- “Body found, civilian killed, another wounded separately in Mosul,” 11/12/09
- “Bomb kills child, wounds 5 civilians in Mosul,” 11/15/09
- “Car bomb causes slight damage in Mosul,” 11/25/09
- “Child wounded in Mosul blast,” 11/11/09
- “Civilian killed in eastern Mosul,” 11/9/09
- “Civilian killed, son wounded in western Mosul,” 11/16/09
- “Civilian wounded as police detonates IED,” 11/22/09
- “Civilian wounded by Iraqi fire in Mosul,” 11/10/09
- “Cop wounded in Mosul blast,” 11/11/09
- “Employee shot down by gunmen in Mosul,” 11/1/09
- “Gunmen kill employee in Mosul,” 11/22/09
- “Gunmen wound lawman in Mosul,” 11/3/09
- “Gunmen wound policeman in Mosul,” 11/8/09
- “Hand grenade wounds woman in Mosul,” 11/28/09
- “IED injures 2 cops in Mosul,” 11/20/09
- “IED wounds 2 civilians in Mosul,” 11/16/09
- “IED wounds 5 in western Mosul,” 11/6/09
- “Iraqi soldier shot down by gunmen in Mosul,” 11/26/09
- “Judge survives assassination attempt,” 11/17/09
- “Lawyer shot dead by gunmen in Mosul,” 11/1/09
- “Mortar attack on Sunni endowment leaves 3 wounded,” 11/3/09
- “Officer killed, 2 cops wounded by roadside bomb in Mosul,” 11/5/09
- “Policeman killed by gunmen fire in Mosul,” 11/7/09
- “Security element killed in Mosul,” 11/30/09
- “Soldiers wounded in clashes with gunmen,” 11/21/09
- “Teacher gunned down in Mosul,” 11/21/09
- “Thermal bomb kills, injures 2 cops in Mosul,” 11/30/09
- “Thermal bomb leaves child killed, 4 wounded in Mosul,” 11/22/09
- “Thermal bomb wounds civilian in Mosul,” 11/16/09
- “Turkmen politician assassinated in Mosul,” 11/22/09
- “Unidentified body of young man found in Mosul,” 11/13/09
- “Unknown bodies found in Mosul,” 11/4/09

DPA, “Bomb kills three in northern Iraq,” 11/17/09

Hammoudi, Laith, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 3 November 2009,” 11/3/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 10 November 2009,” 11/10/09

International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s New Battlefront: The Struggle Over Ninewa,” 9/28/09

Issa, Sahar, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Friday 6 November 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 11/6/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Sunday 8 November 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 11/8/09

Reuters, “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov. 9,” 11/9/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 26,” 11/26/09

Foreign Investment Increasing In Iraq, Led By UAE

2009-12-13T12:36:00.002-05:00

A recent report by the Dunia Frontier Consultants company found that foreign investment in Iraq is increasing over the last year, led by the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The report said that direct foreign investment had more than doubled in the first nine-months of 2009 compared to all of 2008. Total investment is now estimated at $156 billion, a 241% increase from 2008. There are now 53 companies operating in Iraq from 24 countries. The UAE has placed $37 billion in Iraq, 25% of all investment. Their most recent deal was just announced on November 29, when a UAE company signed a contract to build a five-story, 5-star hotel in Karbala for 3,000 guests that is to be completed in the next four years. Karbala is a major destination for Shiite religious tourists. UAE businesses are also involved in a $20 billion real-estate deal in Baghdad and an $8 billion energy deal in Kurdistan.

Other countries putting money into Iraq are South Korea with $24.7 billion, the United States at $22 billion, England at $10.5 billion, Lebanon at $10.1 billion, and Kuwait with $6.8 billion. Overall, according to the Brookings Institution Iraq Index, foreign investment has increased from an average of $10 million a month from 2004-2007, to now $100 million a month in 2008 and 2009. The vast majority of these funds are going into Iraq’s energy sector, which is slowly opening up to foreign companies.

The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction however points out that foreign companies are still severely limited in Iraq. The World Bank’s “Doing Business 2010: Reforming Through Difficult Times” ranked Iraq 153 out of 183 countries for promoting private enterprise and investment. That placed it at the bottom of the region. The major reasons are Iraq’s legislation and bureaucracy. The most cited example is that Iraqi law restricts foreign ownership of land, and requires companies to pay for the cost of services wherever they do business. The Iraqi parliament has tired to fix this by passing a new law recently that allows 100% foreign ownership of property except for places with oil, gas or minerals. The Kurdistan Regional Government already has such a law, and is seen as being much more successful in attracting foreign companies because of its better security situation, and more inviting laws. An August 2009 survey of 120 Iraqi businessmen pointed out other problems that make Iraq a difficult place for investors. Those include the lack of an effective legal system and regulations, poor protection of property rights, corruption that adds 20-30% to costs, excessive red tape, and difficulty in getting licenses and credit.

World Bank Ranking “Doing Business 2010”
Saudi Arabia #13
Kuwait #61
Turkey #73
Jordan #100
Syria #143
Iraq #153

The improved security situation and the recent efforts of the Iraqi Oil Ministry are largely responsible for the increase in foreign investment in Iraq. Outside of Kurdistan however, almost all of this money is going into natural resources because Iraqi laws are still seen as creating a negative environment for companies. Baghdad has only just recently begun to promote itself as a destination for foreign companies to do business, and still retains a top heavy, state-run economy. The government needs to find a balance between its national interests and those of foreigners, and adjust its laws appropriately because the country needs as much money as it can get right now to develop as U.S. and foreign aid is declining, and oil is not bringing in enough to cover its budget.

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “Contract with UAE firm to build highest hotel in Karbala,” 11/29/09

Ibrahim, Waleed and Benham, Jason, “Iraq passes key investment law,” Reuters, 11/23/09

MENAFN, “UAE firm to build tourist hotel in Karbala,” 11/30/09

O’Hanlon, Michael Livingston, Ian, “Iraq Index,” Brookings Institution, 11/20/09

Sambidge, Andy, “UAE tops list of foreign investors in Iraq in 2009,” Arabia Business, 11/24/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/09

More On Wasted Reconstruction Projects In Iraq

2009-12-11T21:11:00.002-05:00

It’s been reported here many times before that one of the greatest signs of failure of the United States’ effort to rebuild Iraq was the number of large reconstruction projects that the Iraqis have not been able to maintain after they were handed over to them. The November 21, 2009 New York Times provided a few more examples:

• $270 million water treatment plant in Nasiriya, Dhi Qar. Works only at limited capacity because the equipment is too sophisticated for its Iraqi workers.

• $4 million maternity hospital Hilla, Babil. Doesn’t have staff or enough supplies. Iraqis were never trained on equipment that U.S. installed.

• $98 million wastewater treatment plant Fallujah, Anbar. Serves only 1/3 of homes it’s supposed to because government doesn’t deliver enough fuel for it to operate at full capacity.

• Ibn Sina Hospita, Baghdad. Was the largest American military medical facility in Iraq with $7.9 billion worth of equipment. Iraqi Ministry of Health didn’t have staff or supplies to maintain it so it was shut down.

• $165 million Basra Children’s Hospital. Has been under going construction for last four years and is $115 million over budget. Iraq hopes it will open sometime in mid-2010, but doesn’t have enough staff for it.

Based upon reports by the Congressional Research Service, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, and Government Accountability Office the major cause of these problems were that the Americans never asked the Iraqis what they wanted or could handle, didn’t provide enough training, the poor management skills of the Iraqis, a lack of funds from Baghdad, middle class flight due to the sectarian war that robbed the country of many of its professionals, and poor maintenance standards after years of wars and sanctions.

SOURCES

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09

Williams, Timothy, “U.S. Fears Iraqis Will Not Keep Up Rebuilt Projects,” New York Times, 11/21/09

Iraqi Parliament Passes Election Law – Again

2009-12-11T00:01:00.000-05:00

Just before midnight on December 6, 2009 Iraq’s parliament passed a second draft of the election law. The new legislation mixes versions of the original law and the amended version, and seems to be headed for confirmation by the Presidential Council.

The first version was passed on November 8, and used statistics from 2009 provided by the Ministry of Trade to determine how many seats were up for grabs in each province. Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi vetoed the bill saying that more seats should be made available to Iraq’s two million refugees, many of whom are Sunnis, which is Hashemi’s constituency. The Kurdish Alliance took advantage of the veto to amend the law so that it used 2005 numbers instead, which increased the number of seats available to the three Kurdish provinces, while reducing seats in eight other governorates. That was heading for another veto by Hashemi until the recent compromise came about.

The new election bill uses parts of both the original and amended election laws. First the Kurds will get three extra seats, second refugees will be counted as part of their home provinces, and third every governorate will get an increase in seats.

The Kurds were still holding out for more, but calls from President Barak Obama and Vice President Joe Biden convinced them to vote for the legislation. In turn, the U.S. promised that there would be a national census in 2010, and that the status of the disputed territories would be resolved. The former has already started, and needs no American help. However little has happened with the disputed areas since the U.S. invasion in 2003. A referendum was supposed to be held at the end of 2007 to determine their future, but that was delayed and then abandoned. The United Nations also offered reports on each disputed territory, but that led nowhere. The issue remains another intractable one in Iraqi politics.

For now, Iraqis can rejoice that elections are finally moving forward. They are still going to happen past the January 31, 2010 deadline set by the constitution. March is being mentioned as the new date. The problem is the current government’s term expires in March, and it’s predicted that it will take the major parties several months to put together a new one. That means some kind of caretaker regime will have to be created in the meantime, which will open up a whole other can of constitutional worms showing that when one issue is resolved in Iraq, there is always another one in the wings.

Seat Distribution 2005 Election Law vs. 2010 Election Law
Anbar 9 vs 14
Babil 11 vs 16
Baghdad 59 vs 68
Basra: 18 vs 24
Dhi Qar: 12 vs 18
Diyala 10 vs 13
Dohuk 7 vs 10
Irbil 13 vs 14
Karbala 6 vs 10
Maysan: 7 vs 10
Muthanna 5 vs 7
Najaf 8 vs 12
Ninewa 19 vs 31
Qadisiyah 7 vs 11
Salahaddin 8 vs 12
Sulaymaniya 15 vs 17
Tamim 9 vs 12
Wasit 8 vs 11
Compensatory Seats 45 vs 15
TOTAL: 275 vs 325

SOURCES

International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09

Parker, Ned and Salman, Raheem, “Iraq lawmakers approve election law,” Los Angeles Times, 12/7/09

Visser, Reidar, “No Second Veto: The Election Law is Approved by Tariq al-Hashemi and the Iraqi Presidency,” Historiae.org, 12/6/09

Terrorists Strike Baghdad With Massive Bombings For Third Time

2009-12-09T22:11:00.002-05:00

Terrorists again struck downtown Baghdad on December 8, 2009. This time several targets were attacked including the Karkh federal appeals court in Mansour west Baghdad, a police patrol in front of a technical college in Dora south Baghdad, the headquarters of the state-run Rafidain Bank in downtown where many Finance Ministry workers had relocated after their building was destroyed in an August 2009 bombing, and Iraq’s Judicial Institute in northeast Baghdad. The courthouse was totally destroyed, and overall at least 127 people were killed and 500 wounded.

These bombings follow the August attacks on the Foreign and Finance Ministries, and the October bombings of the Justice Ministry and Baghdad provincial council building. The bombings could have been predicted. Since the beginning of 2009 casualties have gone up and down. November saw the fewest monthly deaths since the U.S. invasion in March 2003. December therefore is going to be a bloody time in comparison even though fatalities are at their lowest level since the beginning of the war. The bombings have followed the same pattern of occurring every other month.

The attacks are meant to undermine the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki who has built a large part of his popularity upon bringing relative calm to Iraq. It also allows militants to gain media attention, raise money, and appear much stronger than they actually are. Finally, it effects the operation of the government, which already works at a snails pace. Many basic services were no longer available immediately after the bombings in August and October because the various ministries and bureaucracies were disrupted.

Iraq’s insurgents, who were behind the bombings, have lost most of their standing with the Iraqi public. They can’t even launch these massive attacks every month like they use to. Unfortunately, the country’s society and politics remain so divided that there is still plenty of space for militants to operate and kill hundreds of people each month.

SOURCES

Arraf, Jane, “Baghdad bombings: Iraqis demand security,” Christian Science Monitor, 12/8/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Today’s blasts leave federal appeal court 100% devastated,” 12/8/09

Londono, Ernesto, “At least 127 dead in string of Baghdad bomb attacks,” Washington Post, 12/8/09

Myers, Steven Lee and Santora, Marc, “Election Date Set in Iraq as Bombs Kill Scores,” New York Times, 12/8/09

Parker, Ned and Salman, Raheem, “At least 127 killed as explosions rock Baghdad,” Los Angeles Times, 12/8/09

Roggio, Bill, “Suicide attacks killed more than 120 Iraqis in Baghdad,” 12/8/09

Strobel, Warren and al Dulaimy, Mohammed, “String of bombings in Baghdad kills 127 people,” McClatchy Newspapers, 12/8/09

League Of Righteous Breaks Off Talks With Baghdad

2009-12-08T21:05:00.002-05:00

On December 1, 2009 it was announced that the Iranian-backed, breakaway Sadrist group, the League of the Righteous, had ended its talks with Baghdad and would not run in the upcoming parliamentary elections. The cited reason was that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki refused to release the League’s leader Qais Khazali who is being held by the Americans at Camp Cropper outside of Baghdad. At the beginning of August 2009 Maliki met with members of the League and said that they had renounced violence, and that they wanted to run in the 2010 balloting. The two sides also agreed to release League members held by the U.S. as long as they hadn’t killed Iraqis. By the end of September over 100 had been set free.

Around the same time, the League’s spokesman, former Transport Minister Salam al-Maliki, unveiled the group’s list, the Covenant, which would run in the 2010 elections. This seemed to worry Moqtada al-Sadr, who was afraid that the new party would cut into his supporters, some of which were upset that he had decided to turn away from the Iraqi street and militancy to try to participate in the government again. It probably worried him even more when rumors spread that Maliki was thinking of having the Covenant join his State of Law list, and Sadr’s overtures to the League to get them to rejoin his movement were rejected. Those all seems over now that they are withdrawing from the voting.

The talks between the government and the League began months earlier when Baghdad was acting as a mediator between the British government that wanted the release of five of their nationals that were kidnapped by the League back in May 2007 during a raid on the Finance Ministry. In March 2009 the group said that it would exchange the British hostages in return for ten of their leaders being freed by the Americans. On June 20, the bodies of two of the Britons were released, Jason Swindlehurst and Jason Creswell who were security guards. On September 4, a third guard, Alec MacLachlan, was turned over, but he too was dead. Another guard is also believed to be deceased, but Peter Moore, an internet technician is thought to still be alive. His fate is now up in the air as the talks between the League and Baghdad have fallen apart.

Qais Khazali, a former leader in the Sadrist movement when it was led by Ayatollah Mohammed Sadeq al-Sadr, Moqtada’s father, formed the League of the Righteous in 2006. Khazali was chosen by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Qods Force to lure members of the Mahdi Army away from Sadr, and bring them closer under Tehran’s wing. The League quickly made a name for itself when it attacked the Karbala Joint Coordination Center in January 2007, killing five U.S. soldiers. That led to the March arrest of Qais, and his brother Laith, as well as a Lebanese Hezbollah commander Ali Musa Daqduq that was coordinating Iran’s financing and training of the League and other Special Groups. The group retaliated with its raid on the Finance Ministry in Baghdad in May 2007, which resulted in the five Britons being kidnapped. Some think they were pawns to be traded for the release of the Khazali brothers. That took far longer than they thought, as Laith was only just released in June 2009 as part of the deal worked out with the Prime Minister, two years and one month after the Baghdad attack. Qais is still in custody, which is why the talks with the government broke down. This leaves the group in limbo, as it does not have its leader, has renounced both violence and participation in the upcoming elections, and is probably not receiving much attention from Iran either as it is more focused upon the major Shiite parties that it wants to win the vote. It’s not even clear what constituency the League has, so this could be a sign of its demise.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “2nd UPDATE: Iraqi PM Met Group Behind Kidnap Of Britons,” 8/3/09
- “Iraqi kidnappers abandon govt talks,” 12/1/09
- “Over 100 from Iraqi group who killed Britons freed,” 9/27/09

August, Oliver, “End the torment, says Brown as death of British hostage is confirmed,” Times of London, 9/4/09

Awan Daily, “Maliki announced next week, the electoral coalition,” 9/25/09

Cochrane, Marisa, “Asaib Ahl al-Haq and the Khazali Special Groups network,” Institute for the Study of War,” 1/13/09

Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08

Mohammed, Abeer, “Maliki’s Chess Game,” Institute of War & Peace Reporting, 9/10/09

Roads To Iraq, “Iraqi pre-election political map – The Shiites scene,” 9/21/09

Rubin, Alissa, and Gordon, Michael, “U.S. Frees Suspect in Killing of 5 G.I.’s,” New York Times, 6/9/09

Iraq’s Oil Exports Drop For Third Straight Month

2009-12-07T22:23:00.001-05:00

October 2009 saw the third straight month that Iraq’s oil exports dropped. Last month Iraq produced 2.50 million barrels of oil a day, and exported 1.87 million. That was down from September when the same amount was produced, but 1.95 million barrels a day were exported. An Iraqi official said the cause for the reduced numbers were two terrorist attacks upon the northern pipeline that goes to Turkey, which was just struck again this month.

Overall, Iraq’s petroleum industry has seen two divergent trends in 2009. Production has consistently gone up since January where it started at 2.15 million barrels a day, and then peaked at 2.50 million barrels by September, the benchmark set by the Oil Ministry for 2009. At the same time, exports have followed a rollercoaster pattern, starting high in January at 1.91 million, then dropping in February to 1.77, then climbing back up to 2.08 million barrels a day in July, a post-invasion high, before falling to 1.87 million last month. An average of 2.00 million barrels a day in exports was the mark called for in the 2009 budget, which has not been achieved.

Iraq’s highest oil production since 2003 was in 2008 when it produced 2.50-2.60 million barrels a day from May to August. By the end of that year Iraq averaged 2.41 million barrels. So far, from January to October 2009, it has averaged 2.16 million barrels. This year has seen the most exports at a yearly average of 1.91 million barrels. The previous high was in 2008 at 1.84 million. Those numbers are still below pre-war levels when Iraq was producing around 2.8 million barrels a day. Before the 1991 Gulf War and international sanctions, it was able to average 3.5 million barrels a day in overall output.

Due to the on-going global recession, Iraq’s revenue from petroleum is also down from previous years even though the price of a barrel of Iraqi crude has increased during the year. At the beginning of 2009 Iraqi oil was selling for $36 a barrel. That has since increased to $71.94 in October. That has brought in $29.1 billion so far. That compares to $61.9 billion in 2008, and $41.0 billion in 2007. The overwhelming majority of Iraq’s funds come from oil. The economy is still largely state-run as well, so the government is the major source of investment and jobs.

As reported before, Baghdad has had to scale back its budget two years straight because of the combination of low prices and uneven exports, and is going to run a deficit for the second straight year, which had not happened since the 2003 invasion. Iraq’s petroleum industry suffers from old and aging infrastructure, too much government bureaucracy, inadequate planning, and deep political divisions within parliament, and between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government over who has control of contracts and future development of oil fields, all of which have held up development of the industry.

Monthly Averages of Iraqi Oil Production/Exports in Millions of Barrels Per Day

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Jan.		2.44/1.53	2.10/1.36	1.73/1.05	1.66/1.30	2.24/1.93	2.15/1.91
Feb.		2.27/1.38	2.10/1.43	1.83/1.47	2.08/1.50	2.39/1.93	2.32/1.77
March		2.43/1.82	2.09/1.39	2.10/1.32	2.08/1.58	2.38/1.93	2.37/1.81
April		2.38/1.80	2.14/1.39	2.14/1.60	2.14/1.50	2.40/1.88	2.37/1.83
May	0.3/0.0	1.88/1.38	2.10/1.30	2.13/1.51	2.03/1.64	2.60/1.96	2.41/1.90
June	0.675/0.2	2.29/1.14	2.17/1.37	2.30/1.67	2.00/1.47	2.52/1.96	2.43/1.96
July	0.925/0.322	2.20/1.40	2.17/1.55	2.22/1.68	2.07/1.71	2.54/1.85	2.48/2.08
Aug.	1.44/0.646	2.12/1.11	2.16/1.50	2.24/1.68	1.91/1.69	2.50/1.70	2.48/2.00
Sep.	1.72/0.983	2.51/1.70	2.11/1.60	2.23/1.65	2.3/1.90	2.37/1.65	2.50/1.95
Oct.	2.05/1.14	2.45/1.54	1.91/1.23	2.26/1.55	2.34/1.91	2.37/1.69	2.50/1.89
Nov.	2.10/1.52	1.95/1.32	1.98/1.16	2.10/1.44	2.38/1.88	2.40/1.88
Dec.	2.30/1.54	2.16/1.52	1.92/1.07	2.15/1.45	2.42/1.93	2.35/1.73
Yr. Avg.	1.44/0.795	2.25/1.47	2.07/1.36	2.11/1.50	2.11/1.66	2.42/1.84	2.16/1.91

SOURCES

Associated Press, “Iraq’s Oct. oil exports drop due to attacks,” 11/22/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Iraq’s oil exports in Oct. reach 58.2m barrels,” 11/22/09

Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, “Iraq Status Report,” U.S. Department of State, 11/18/09

Elliott, Michael, “So, What Went Wrong?” Time, 10/6/03

Reuters, “Bomb Attacks Halts Iraq-Turkey Oil Pipeline,” 11/24/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United Sates Congress,” 10/30/09

Iraq Still Doesn’t Have Meters On Oil Industry

2009-12-07T22:22:00.002-05:00

As reported before, Iraq’s oil production and exports have fluctuated up and down since the U.S. invasion in 2003. In 2009 Iraq has averaged 2.28 million barrels a day in overall production, and 1.83 million barrels in exports. Those are only estimates however by the Oil Ministry because hardly any of the industry has meters to get accurate numbers. In July 2009 the Board of Supreme Audit, one of three anti-corruption agencies in Iraq, reported the following about recording the Ministry’s production:

• Only 2 of the 34 meters installed at 21 sites run by the North Oil Company were functioning correctly

• North Oil Company said that by end of 2009 it would have meters installed on all of its facilities

• Maysan Oil Company has no meters

• South Refinery Company has no meters

• Dhi Qar refinery uses a depth bar rather than meters

• 59 meters are required for the southern Iraqi facilities, but there are only 4 orders currently in progress, and no credit to purchase the rest

The lack of meters not only means the Oil Ministry has no real numbers on its production, but also allows large smuggling to occur. A 2008 audit of the Ministry for example, found 698,000 barrels of crude missing that were believed to have been stolen, and the Ministry recorded 6 million barrels less than the South Oil Company claimed it produced.

SOURCES

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/09

Human Rights Watch: Ninewa’s Minorities Under Pressure From Both Sunni Insurgents and Kurds

2009-12-06T14:30:00.002-05:00

In November 2009 Human Rights Watch released a new report detailing the plight of minorities in Ninewa province entitled “On Vulnerable Ground.” The report covers the history of successive governments in Baghdad to Arabize Ninewa by pushing out minorities and Kurds and replacing them with Arabs, and then the ascendancy of Kurds there after the U.S. invasion. They turned around and tried to Kurdicize those same regions to advance their plans to annex the disputed territories there. At the same time, the Sunni Arab insurgency has targeted minorities for being non-believers or cooperators with the Americans. Minorities such as Christians, Shabaks, and Yazidis are therefore in a precarious situation being pressured from all sides to either leave or comply with stronger forces.

Map of Mosul Province

“On Vulnerable Ground” starts with some historical background to Ninewa. Beginning in the 1930s the Iraqi central government started a program to Arabize Ninewa, which has historically been one of the most diverse areas in the country. It is the home to Arabs, Kurds, Christians, Shabaks, and Yazidis, especially in an area known as the Ninewa plains, which are the districts immediately to the east of Mosul. In the 1970s Baghdad stepped up its efforts to move Arabs into Ninewa and push Kurds and minorities out that only got worse under Saddam Hussein. After the Gulf War in 1991 Baghdad tried to pressure Kurds and minorities to register as Arabs, and would not give birth certificates to babies with non-Arab names for instance. They also pressured minorities to join militias and perform other tasks to prove their loyalty or face expulsion. Many Kurds and minorities moved to Kurdistan, which had gotten its autonomy in 1991.

Map of the Ninewa Plain

After the U.S. invasion, the Kurdish peshmerga swept south into Ninewa with U.S. forces. Many Arabs who had moved there under the government’s programs fled before the advance. In the days after the fall of Mosul, the capital of Ninewa, the peshmerga also began kicking out Arab families from towns in the surrounding areas. These factors together increased the ethnic tensions in the province. In all the areas where the Kurds occupied they eventually established their influence through the presence of their peshmerga forces and control of the administration. The divide between Arabs and Kurds intensified after the 2005 provincial elections, when the Sunni Arabs decided to boycott. This allowed the Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan, which was made up of the two major Kurdish parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party, to win 31 of the 41 council seats in Ninewa.

The ascendancy of the Kurds, and the displacement and loss of power of the Sunni Arabs directly led to the growth of the insurgency in Ninewa. As reported before, Mosul remains the last urban stronghold of the Sunni militants. They in turn, have carried out some of the largest attacks in the Iraq war against Ninewa’s minorities. Christians, Yazidis, and Shabaks have all been singled out for mass casualty bombings, and targeted killings, taking thousands of lives, and forcing many minorities to flee the region. In one spate in October 2008 for example, the Christians of Mosul faced an organized campaign of murder and intimidation to drive them out of the city. 40 were killed, and 12,000 fled Mosul. Arabs and Kurds exchanged blame for the attacks, but Human Rights Watch’s interviews led them to believe that it was definitely the work of Arab insurgents. Some of the largest bombings in Ninewa this year have also been against Yazidis and Shabaks. Sunni militants consider all three groups, Christians, Yazidis, and Shabaks, to be non-believers or collaborators with the Americans.

From 2005 to the present the Kurds also carried out a systematic campaign to co-opt, cajole, threaten, and intimidate Ninewa’s minorities to support the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) plans to annex the disputed areas in the province. This has followed a two-pronged carrot and stick approach. First, the KRG has spent millions of dollars on minorities to win over their loyalty and create patronage systems. For example, the KRG’s Finance Minister Sarkis Aghajan, a Christian, was ordered by the KRG Prime Minister Nerchivan Barzani to build churches, fund Christian community organizations, and create Christian militia groups. They also used these means to undermine those who opposed the KRG’s plans. Second, the Kurds have used pressure and intimidation. Christians told Human Rights Watch that they were encouraged to sign forms calling for the annexation of Ninewa’s disputed areas by Kurdistan. The KRG also considers Yazidis and Shabaks to be Kurds, and have pressured them to register themselves as such to gain aid. Minority leaders and activists have also been targeted with the Kurds implicated in the attacks. Two Yazidi activists opposed to Kurdish aims were arrested and tortured for six months in 2007. The leader of the Shabak Democratic Gathering was killed by gunmen in July 2008 a few meters from a peshmerga checkpoint who did nothing before, during, or after the attack. Another Shabak politician claimed he was attacked by men wearing Kurdish uniforms before the 2009 provincial elections. Other minorities said they were stopped from attending political rallies by anti-Kurdish groups before the 2009 elections, and were warned that if they didn’t vote for the Kurdish Fraternal List they would lose their homes and jobs. Many of these tactics reminded Human Rights Watch of Saddam’s and earlier Arab government policies. Both the Kurds and minorities were victimized and expelled from Ninewa under the Arabization program. Now the Kurds are repeating many of these same policies to annex the northern regions of Ninewa to Kurdistan.

The 2009 elections turned out to be a major setback for the Kurds’ plans. They lost to the Arab led al-Hadbaa party who took all of the provincial offices, shutting the Kurds out of power, and calling for the withdrawal of the peshmerga. In response, the Kurdish Fraternal list is boycotting the provincial council, have refused to allow Arab officials to carry out their duties in Kurdish controlled areas, and have threatened to break away 16 towns and districts from Ninewa and create their own administration in protest. In June 2009 the KRG made the situation worse when it passed a draft constitution that claimed all of the disputed areas in Ninewa as part of Kurdistan, and said that the peshmerga had the right to operate in Ninewa.

In the end, Human Rights Watch is very worried about the future of minorities in Ninewa province. They are concerned as well, as a Christian leader recently said he is worried about increased attacks on his community in Mosul as Christmas approaches. They are facing the violence of Sunni insurgents, and the forced assimilation and co-option by the Kurds. They are also caught in the middle between the dispute between the central government, the al-Hadbaa provincial government, and the KRG for control of the disputed territories in Ninewa. Human Rights Watch’s findings are also not new. In December 2008 two similar reports were released, one by the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom on Iraqi minorities throughout the country, and another by the Brookings Institution and the University of Bern on minorities and displacement. They both noted the relentless attacks minorities have faced at the hands of insurgents, and the tactics the Kurds have employed against them. Due to these circumstances, Iraq’s minorities have been left with only two real options. First, many have fled becoming displaced or refugees. 20% of Iraq’s refugees for example are believed to be Christians. Second, those that have stayed in Ninewa have tried to align with one of the more powerful actors, whether it be the Kurds, or now the central government and the al-Hadbaa provincial council. None of these provide the protection and rights Ninewa’s minorities deserve, and as long as the divide exists between the KRG and Baghdad their situation is unlikely to get any better.

SOURCES

AK News, “Christians fear escalation of attacks with approach of Christmas,” 11/28/09

Badkhen, Anna, “Kurds evicting Arabs in north Iraq,” San Francisco Chronicle, 4/19/03

Ferris, Elizabeth and Stoltz, Kimberly, “Minorities, Displacement and Iraq’s Future,” Brookings Institution-University of Bern, December 2008

Human Rights Watch, “On Vulnerable Ground,” 11/10/09

United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, "Iraq Report - 2008," December 2008

Kurdish Lawmaker Sums Up Problems With Iraqi Politics

2009-12-04T22:26:00.001-05:00

Parliamentarian Mahmoud Othman, a leader in the Kurdish Alliance, was quoted in the November 28, 2009 New York Times summing up the problems with Iraqi politics. When asked about the possibility that the country would hold elections past the January 31, 2009 deadline set in the constitution he replied, “So what? Nothing in Iraq is very legitimate.” Every major piece of legislation and decision in Iraq is endlessly delayed because of power politics and a zero-sum attitude by law makers. Iraq held its last parliamentary elections on December 15, 2005, but it took four months for Nouri al-Maliki to be named prime minister, and a month after that for him to name his cabinet. The last national elections the country held were for provincial councils. They were originally planned for October 2008, but got delayed until January 2009. The new election law was supposed to be passed by October 15, 2009. There’s talk that it may be confirmed in the beginning of December, but there’s also a possibility that Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi will veto it a second time because the amended version reduces seats for Sunni provinces. Elections are now planned for February or March 2010, one to two months passed the constitutional deadline. Otherman is right than, Iraqi politics does lack legitimacy with its public who see the government as dysfunctional because its unable to provide basic services or make big decisions.

SOURCES

AK News, “Hashemi to take final decision on elections law after Eid,” 11/28/09

Chon, Gina, “Iraqis Miss Target Date on Election,” Wall Street Journal, 10/16/09

Myers, Steven Lee, “Benchmarks in Wartime: As Reliable as Promises,” New York Times, 11/28/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/09

Former British Diplomat Confirms That U.N. Inspectors Were Means To War With Iraq

2009-12-03T21:30:00.000-05:00

On November 24, 2009 England began its third inquiry into the Iraq War, this time headed by John Chilcot. On November 26 Britain’s former ambassador to the United States Christopher Meyer testified. He confirmed what has been reported here before, that the Bush White House had decided upon war before the United Nations weapons inspectors returned to Iraq in November 2002. He told the inquiry, “The U.S. military timetable was already in place before weapons inspectors went in.” Meyer said the original invasion date had been set for January 2003, but was pushed back to March. He believed that the inspectors had no time to complete their work by that date, and instead the U.S. and England turned the process into a means to find evidence of Iraq’s WMD to provide a “smoking gun” to justify the war. Meyer told the inquiry, “It was another way of saying, ‘It’s not that Saddam Hussein has to prove he’s innocent, we’ve now got to bloody well prove he’s guilty.’ And we – Americans and British – have never really recovered from that because of course there was no smoking gun.” England’s former ambassador to the United Nations Sir Jeremy Greenstock agreed that the inspectors never had the time to do their job because the drive for an invasion was so strong in Washington.

Britain’s Prime Minister Tony Blair had been the original impetus to go to the United Nations and have weapons inspectors return to build support for an invasion. On March 12 and 13, 2002 Blair’s political adviser David Manning met with National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice in Washington where he suggested that inspectors be sent back into Iraq to build a legal base for war, and convince the international community of the U.S. and British’s case against Saddam because it was expected that he would refuse to give them unlimited access to his country. Later, on March 17, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz had lunch with Ambassador Meyer, where he suggested that inspections would be a way to trip up Saddam over WMD, and help justify regime change. In April President Bush met with Blair in Texas, where the Prime Minister again emphasized the need to go the U.N. route if the U.S. wanted British support. Bush finally agreed after Secretary of State Colin Powell lobbied him on the same point during dinner on August 5, 2002.

U.N. Resolution 1441 was eventually passed on November 8, 2002 and weapons inspectors entered Iraq shortly afterward. The U.S. and England saw them as a means to provide a justification for overthrowing Saddam however, rather than a way to disarm Iraq. When the inspectors found breaches of 1441 but no “smoking gun” Bush went ahead with the war anyway as planned in March 2003.

For more on the U.N. inspections see:

The U.N. Inspectors Were Right: Iraq Was Not A Threat

Charles Duelfer’s Account Of The End Of The 1990s U.N. Inspections

How The Administration Reversed Itself On Finding Iraq’s WMD

Interview With VP Dick Cheney On Weapons Inspections March 2003

2002 CIA White Paper On Iraq Vs The 2002-2003 U.N. Inspectors

SOURCES

Brown, David, “Invasion lacked legitimacy, Sir Jeremy Greenstock tells Chilcot inquiry,” Times of London, 11/28/09

Manning, David, “SECRET – STRICTLY PERSONAL,” 3/14/02

Marsden, Sam and Cordon, Gavin, “Iraq invasion was of questionable legitimacy, says envoy,” The Independent, 11/27/09

Melkle, James and Sparrow, Andrew, “Iraq war build-up ‘left us scrabbling for smoking gun’ says ex-UK ambassador,” Guardian, 11/26/09

Meyer, Ambassador Christopher, “CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL,” British Embassy, Washington, 3/18/02

Burrough, Bryan, Peretz, Evgenia, Rose, David and Wise, David, “Path To War,” Vanity Fair, May 2004

RTT News, “British Investigation Into Iraq War Begins,” 11/24/09

Sparrow, Andrew, “Iraq inquiry – live,” Guardian, 11/27/09

Sparrow, Andrew and Melkle, James, “Iraq invasion legitimacy was in doubt, Chilcot inquiry told,” Guardian, 11/27/09

Stobart, Janet, “Blair words on Iraq changed after 2002 visit with Bush, Briton testifies,” Los Angeles Times, 11/27/09

Maliki Returns To Sectarian Politics

2009-12-01T21:31:00.000-05:00

On October 1, 2009 Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki officially announced his State of Law list that would compete in the 2010 parliamentary elections. Almost every Western report on his coalition mentioned how broad it was, that it was non-sectarian, and how the Prime Minister was running a nationalist campaign. Recently however, Maliki has been emphasizing sectarian politics by warning of the return of Baathists.

On November 12, 2009 for example, Maliki went to a meeting of tribal leaders in Sadr City, Baghdad and said that Iraq’s enemies were trying to undermine the political process during the elections. Three days later he was more specific when he said that Baathists were trying to use the 2010 vote to get back into power, and that he would never let that happen. Then on November 16 at a press conference Maliki said that Baathists would not be allowed to participate in the upcoming elections in any form, and that all talks with them by the government were banned. Maliki has been emphasizing the Baathist threat to Iraq since the August 2009 Baghdad bombings, which he blamed on former regime elements in Syria. In fact, the government aired a new set of video taped confessions on November 22 of three men who claimed they were Baath party members who carried out the October 25, 2009 attacks on Iraq’s Ministry of Justice and Baghdad provincial council offices. In Iraqi politics, whenever Shiite politicians mention Baathists they are talking about the threat of Sunnis returning to power, just as talk about Iranian influence by Sunnis is about Shiite rule.

Maliki’s rhetoric has angered one of his State of Law coalition partners, Sheikh Ali Hatem Sulaiman. He is the head of the Al-Anbar Tribal Council and the Flags of Iraq Party, and was one of the leaders of the Awakening movement there. The sheikh said that those who keep talking about Baathists sound like a broken record, and that Baathists should be able to participate in elections as long as they don’t have any charges against them. He finished by saying that if Baathists were to be truly banned from Iraqi politics, than half of the Sunnis in Anbar would not be able to participate. This is significant because Sheikh Sulaiman was the only notable Sunni politician Maliki was able to draw into his list. He is a minor player however as his party wasn’t able to win a single seat in Anbar in the 2009 elections, and Maliki’s Dawa Party is firmly in the lead of the coalition.

Of more interest is the fact that Ammar al-Hakim, the leader of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and member of the Iraqi National Alliance issued a statement saying that Baathists should be able to take part in Iraqi politics as long as they didn’t have blood on their hands. The Supreme Council has always been one of the most ardent proponents of using the Baathist card against any moves towards reconciliation with Sunnis, and only recently called for the banning of Baathists from the 2010 vote as well. His release was almost certainly a response to Maliki’s comments as the National Alliance is the State of Law’s main challenger.

At the other end of the spectrum, the Sadrists, the other major players in the National Alliance, both attacked Maliki and supported him at the same time. First, a Sadrist parliamentarian said that the authorities faked the November 22 confessions of the alleged bombers. At the same time, Moqtada al-Sadr, echoing the Prime Minister, said that there could never be reconciliation with the Baathists. This shows both that Maliki’s attempt to play sectarian politics with the Baghdad attacks is widely questioned within Iraq, while talking about Baathists still resonates in Shiite politics.

The Prime Minister’s emphasis upon the Baathist threat could be a sign of his foreboding about the coming election. While Maliki is still the most popular politician in Iraq, the August and October 2009 ministry bombings in Baghdad have hurt his claim that he has brought security and stability to the country, so bringing up Baathists is a way for him to defer blame. He also has not been able to bring in any new significant partners into his coalition. Some believe that that his announcements are aimed at his potential rivals, specifically the Iraqi National Movement of former Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi, parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq of the National Dialogue Council, and Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi. Finally, a return to sectarian politics may be a way for him to firm up his base with Shiites, and distract them from more pressing issues like the continued lack of services and corruption in the government.

SOURCES

Ali, Ahmed, “Iraq’s Elections Challenge: A Shifting Political Landscape,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 11/20/09

Alsumaria, “Maliki warns of enemies ahead of elections,” 11/12/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “PM warns of Baathists’ infiltration through election,” 11/15/09

Chon, Gina, “Maliki Coalition Tries to Bridge Iraq’s Deep Sectarian Divisions,” Wall Street Journal, 10/2/09

Al-Dulaimy, Mohammed, “Maliki unveils new national, nonsectarian Iraqi party,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/1/09

Al-Hayat, Elaph, “In Surprise Statement, Al-Hakim Calls for Involving Ba-athists in Iraqi Political Process,” MEMRI Blog, 11/20/09

Karadshesh, Jomana, “Alleged Baath members confess in videos to Iraq attacks,” CNN, 11/23/09

Myers, Steven Lee, “Iraqi Leader Creates Broad Coalition,” New York Times, 10/1/09

Roads To Iraq, “Ba’ath Party and the election – intro,” 11/24/09
- “Ba’ath Party and the election 1,” 11/24/09
- “Disagreement among the “State of Law” and The political-football crisis,” 11/17/09

Al Sabah, “PMi: No talk with Ba’athists,” 11/17/09

Shadid, Anthony, “Maliki Creates Coalition To Compete in Iraqi Vote,” Washington Post, 10/2/09

Fadhil Sons of Iraq Leader Sentenced To Death

2009-11-30T23:30:00.000-05:00

On November 20, 2009 the head of the Sons of Iraq (SOI) in Baghdad’s Fadhil district, Adil al-Mashhadani, was sentenced to death by an Iraqi court. He was charged with the murder of a girl whose mother complained to him about the violence in the neighborhood during the sectarian war. Mashhadani was originally arrested in late March 2009, which set off a day of fighting between Iraqi and U.S. forces, and Mashhadani’s SOI. The SOI leader shows both who the U.S. was willing to work with during the Surge as well as Baghdad’s ambivalent attitude towards the Sons of Iraq program.

In the summer of 2007 General David Petraeus and his top advisers met to discuss a new Sunni policy. It was decided that the U.S. would try to replicate the Anbar Awakening in Baghdad, and other Sunnis areas in central and northern Iraq. In 2005 the Sunni tribes of Anbar had begun to turn on Al Qaeda in Iraq because they no longer perceived them to be allies, but as a threat since the Islamists were attempting to take over the insurgency and impinge on many of the tribes’ businesses. This inspired the Sons of Iraq (SOI) program where American forces began creating ties with insurgents and tribal groups that were willing to fight Al Qaeda.

Fadhil is a small neighborhood in eastern Baghdad near the Tigris River. The area was known for having a very active insurgency in 2006-2007 that was battling Shiite militiamen from Sadr City, which was just to the northeast, and carrying out attacks on the Americans. Adil Mashhadani was a cell leader there. He was a former member of the Republican Guard, and originally joined the fight against the Americans in Fallujah in 2004. In April 2007 Mashhadani’s forces were devastated in a fight with the U.S., followed by Al Qaeda attempting to replace him. Faced with the triple pressure from the Islamists, the Shiites, and the Americans, he decided to switch sides and work with the last. By May the U.S. battalion in Fadhil had organized Mashhadani's men into a SOI unit, and had also been able to work out a deal with the Shiites in the surrounding areas. By June Mashhadani was in firm control, creating his own little fief supported by U.S. troops and reconstruction money. In October Al Qaeda tried to strike back at him with a failed suicide attack. That led to a month’s long battle that expelled the Islamists from the rest of the area. By December 2009 the U.S. got him to reluctantly work with the Iraqi Army and government. This earned Mashhadani the respect of the first two U.S. officers to work with him, who protected him from officials in Baghdad that wanted him arrested for murder.

At the very end of December 2008 things started to change. A new U.S. unit began receiving information about Mashhadani’s men taking part in extortion, rape, and insurgent activity, while it was transferring Fadhil to Iraqi control. This caused tensions with Mashhadani who didn’t want to give up his power. He also complained that hardly any of his men were getting jobs or being paid by the government as promised. That all ended at the end of March when he was arrested by Iraqi Special Forces. His SOI unit, which only numbered about 150 men, was disbanded afterward.

Mashhadani’s detention and the subsequent fighting set off alarm bells in the U.S., but got a much more mixed reaction within Iraq. Many American commentators feared that his arrest would set off a wave of fighting between the government and the SOI since the Prime Minister had never approved of the program since its inception. Sunnis expressed both fear and approval. An SOI commander in Dora, Baghdad for example, was afraid that Iraqi forces would arrest him, while another in Adhamiya said that Mashhadani had been killing people and extorting money and therefore deserved what he got. Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha of the Anbar Awakening chimed in that Mashhadani had been breaking the law, and called for an end to speculation that his arrest would undermine security in the country. His subsequent death sentence has created the same sort of mixed feelings amongst the SOI.

Adil Mashhadani was the type of man that the U.S. was willing to work with to bring an end to the sectarian war. The question has only been raised by a few like Nibras Kazimi of the Hudson Institute and Talisman Gate blog, but could the U.S. have avoided this whole ordeal if it had decided to crush the entire insurgency rather than attempting to divide and conquer it? After the Samarra bombing in February 2006, which set off the civil war, the Sunnis quickly realized that they were going to lose, as they were outnumbered 3 to 1 by the Shiites. At the same time Al Qaeda was focusing their violence on fellow insurgents who would not follow their lead. The Americans took advantage of this situation to cut a short-term deal with Sunnis like Mashhadani who were willing to turn on the Islamists to save their own skins, which created a long-term problem with the Iraqi government who never approved of the U.S. policy. Instead they could’ve let Mashhadani and Al Qaeda battle it out, and then swept up the remains. The problem for General Petraeus was that would’ve taken longer and led to more fighting at a time when he was under intense domestic pressure in the U.S. to show results as quickly as possible. The Sons of Iraq program appeared to be a way to do that, and the U.S. and Iraq are still facing the consequences as the Americans are trying to ensure the SOI get as many jobs as possible from a government that lacks both the will and capacity to do so.

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “Awakening council ex-leader sentenced to death,” 11/20/09
- “Awakening forces clash with Iraq police,” 3/30/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Sahwa leader captured in central Baghdad on “terror” charges – spokesman,” 3/28/09

Burns, John and Rubin, Alissa, “U.S. Arming Sunnis in Iraq to Battle Old Qaeda Allies,” New York Times, 6/11/07

Dagher, Sam, “Market bombings: Baghdad locals want security, not Iraqi police,” Christian Science Monitor, 2/4/08

Kazimi, Nibras, “How To Do A “Surge,”” Hudson Institute, 4/2/09

Leland, John, “Iraq Sentences Sunni Leader to Death,” New York Times, 11/20/09

Nordland, Rod, “Rebellious Sunni Council Disarmed After Clashes, Officials in Baghdad Say,” New York Times, 3/31/09

Nordland, Rod and Rubin, Alissa, “Sunni Fighters Say Iraq Didn’t Keep Job Promises,” New York Times, 3/24/09

Parker, Ned and Ahmed, Caesar, “Sons of Iraq movement suffers another blow,” Los Angeles Times, 3/30/09

Raghavan, Sudarsan, “Baghdad Arrest Sets Off Clashes,” Washington Post, 3/29/09

Reuters, “Iraqi forces arrest more U.S.-allied Sunni guards,” 4/4/09

Rosen, Nir, “The big sleep,” The National, 4/24/09

Rubin, Alissa and Cave, Damien, “In a Force for Iraqi Calm, Seeds of Conflict,” New York Times, 12/23/07

Rubin, Alissa and Farrell, Stephen, “Awakening Councils by Region,” New York Times, 12/22/07

Rubin, Alissa and Nordland, Rod, “Troops Arrest an Awakening Council Leader in Iraq, Setting Off Fighting,” New York Times, 3/29/09

Ziezulewicz, Geoff, “Empowered by the U.S., imprisoned by Iraqis,” Stars and Stripes, 9/24/09
- “U.S., Iraqi forces progress cautiously after ‘Sons of Iraq’ arrest,” Stars and Stripes, 4/15/09
- “U.S. troops, Iraqi army work to secure Baghdad district after militia leader’s arrest,” Stars and Stripes, 4/5/09

VP Hashemi Shoots Himself In The Foot With Veto Of Iraqi Election Law

2009-11-29T11:37:00.000-05:00

On November 8, 2009 Iraq’s parliament finally passed an election bill after weeks of delay. Ten days later Vice President Tarqi al-Hashemi vetoed it. Hashemi objected to the fact that Iraq’s refugees, the majority of which are Sunnis, would have their votes go towards only eight compensatory seats that would also be shared with smaller parties that didn’t get enough votes at the provincial level, but did well nationally. The Iraqi Election Commission says that there should be one seat in parliament for every 100,000 people, and it’s generally believed that there are at least 2 million Iraqi refugees. The problem was that the Vice President tried to portray his act as a line-item veto, demanding a change in the number of seats set aside for refugees, while claiming that the rest of the bill should not be touched. This is not allowed under Iraqi law however. What his veto did in effect, was open the election bill to the demands of other parties that undermined his own goals.

As reported before, the Kurdish Alliance in parliament objected to the proposed increase in the parliamentary seats from 275 to 323 because the three Kurdish provinces got few to no new seats. Kurdistan Regional Government President Massoud Barzani even went as far as to threaten a Kurdish boycott unless the arrangements were changed. By vetoing the election bill, Hashemi empowered the Kurds to negotiate this very issue.

They aligned with the two major Shiite blocks, the Prime Minister’s State of Law and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, to pass an amendment on November 23 to the election bill. It skips Hashemi’s request for an increase in seats for refugees, by counting their votes as part of the provinces they were originally from, and rearranges the parliamentary seat allocations by province by using older 2005 statistics with a 2.8% increase for recent population growth, rather than 2009 numbers. Using the 2009 figures, Sunni provinces such as Ninewa were due for large increases in seats, but those will now go the Kurds instead. This suits the Shiite parties as well that were not enthusiastic about any extra seats in Sunni provinces.

Vice President Hashemi’s veto has thus backfired. He not only didn’t get the increases he requested for refugees, but the amendment reduces Sunni chances to get a larger say in parliament. When the changes were voted on members of the Iraqi Accordance Front, former Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List, and some Sadrists walked out. This will likely lead to another veto by Hashemi. The head of the Iraqi Election Commission said on November 19 that elections would be delayed because they can’t happen at the end of January 2010 as planned because that would coincide with Shiite religious ceremonies, while the constitution says that voting must be held no later than January 31. What is probably going to happen is that parliament will attempt to overturn Hashemi’s second expected veto, they need a three-fifths vote and the bill will become law, balloting will be held in February, and a caretaker government will have to be announced in the meantime. This all shows that Iraq is barely a country of laws as its politicians rarely if ever meet any deadlines, whether they’re self-imposed or in the constitution.

SOURCES

Arraf, Jane, “Iraq election official: Even if Kurdish boycott averted, January deadline impossible,” Christian Science Monitor, 11/20/09

Bakri, Nada, “Iraq’s parliament approves amended election law,” Washinogton Post, 11/23/09

Ibrahim, Waleed, “Iraqi parliament fails to reach election deal,” Reuters, 11/22/09

Londono, Ernesto, and Mizher, Qais, “Iraqi parliament passes election law after reaching deal on Kirkuk,” Washington Post, 11/9/09

Nordland, Rod, “Veto of Iraq’s Election Law Could Force Delay in Vote,” New York Times, 11/19/09

Roads To Iraq, “What happened today?” 11/23/09

Visser, Reidar, “Constitutional Disintegration,” Iraq And Gulf Analysis, 11/19/09
- “The Hashemi Veto Backfires, Parliament Ups the Ante,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 11/23/09

Iraq’s Displaced Forgotten In Debate Over Election Law

2009-11-27T21:33:00.001-05:00

Iraq’s parliament has spent months debating and negotiating over the 2010 election law. While it has discussed several issues such as the status of Kirkuk and voting for overseas Iraqis, nothing has really been said about Iraq’s internally displaced. The result is that many will likely be disenfranchised as happened in the 2009 balloting.

Recently, hundreds of displaced families protested in Diyala against the planned parliamentary vote. They said they would not participate because the voting rules were rigged against them. In the current election bill, Article IV says that displaced families can vote, but only in their original home district they were forced out of, and are ineligible if they transferred their food ration cards to another district. The Iraqi Election Commission has said that around 1 million displaced can vote under these regulations. The latest United Nations figures record around 1.6 million displaced, which means 600,000 people may be disenfranchised.

Another problem is that even those that can vote still have to register, and few have done so. In October 2009 the Iraqi Election Commission reported that only 20,000 displaced voters had signed up by then. The Commission said that it was setting up special teams to try to get more to participate. The same thing occurred in the 2009 provincial elections when the displaced were confused about the voter rules, and few registered. The result was that tens of thousands didn’t get to vote. That led to several protests.

Since there has been no real debate by Iraq’s politicians to correct these problems the same scenario is likely to play out in 2010. Iraq’s displaced are already facing a plethora of problems from findings jobs, housing, to getting services, now a sizeable number are probably going to be shut out of voting for their representatives for a second time.

SOURCES

Fadel, Leila, “Low turnout in Iraq’s election reflects a disillusioned nation,” McClatchy Newspapers, 2/1/09

Naji, Zaineb, “Voter Apathy Among Iraq Displaced,” Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 9/24/08

Niqash, “election law text,” 11/9/09

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraqi Election Commission Urges Vote Law’s Approval,” 10/7/09

Al Sabah, “Many displaced families in Diyala boycott elections,” 11/17/09

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Return Update Iraq September 2009,” November 2009

Iraq Moves Down List Of Most Corrupt In The World

2009-11-26T22:09:00.001-05:00

Transparency International is a German based organization that tracks corruption across the world. They recently released their 2009 Corruption Index that ranked and compared 180 countries. Since the U.S. invasion in 2003 Iraq has consistently been in the bottom 25 most corrupt nations. In fact, by 2006 it had dropped to the second or third most corrupt in Transparency International’s list. In the latest Index Iraq actually moved down the list for the second year in a row to be tied for the fourth most corrupt country, along with Sudan. Iraq received a score of 1.5 out of 10. Somalia, 1.1, Afghanistan, 1.3, and Myanmar, 1.4, were at the very bottom.

Iraq’s Ranking In Corruption Index 2003-2009
2003 #20
2004 #17
2005 #22
2006 #3
2007 #2
2008 #3
2009 #4

Iraq’s score placed it at the very bottom of nineteen other countries in the Middle East. Qatar, 7.0, the United Arab Emirates, 6.5, and Israel 6.1, had the best scores. Iraq, 1.5, Iran 1.8, and Yemen 2.1, were at the other end of the spectrum.

Transparency International said that nations like Iraq faced severe challenges to establish solid institutions, transparency, and accountability because of instability. That’s apparent each month as there are constant reports about corruption. In November 2009, for example, the Integrity Committee, one of Iraq’s three main anti-corruption agencies, said that it was planning on going after 455 senior officials, including ministers and governors. In October, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s brother was arrested at the Dubai International Airport trying to smuggle Iraqi antiquities out of the country. In September, the Integrity Committee released a poll from June 2009 of 3,500 Iraqis that found 79% had to pay bribes at government departments, and 20% offered money to officials. Finally, in August, terrorists allegedly paid up to $10,000 to members of the Iraqi security forces to get two truck bombs through checkpoints to attack government ministries in Baghdad.

As Transparency International’s Indexes have shown over the years, corruption remains a pressing problem for Iraq. It eats away at the public’s confidence in the government, costs hundreds of millions of dollars for a country desperate for cash for rebuilding and development, and effects security and services. Baghdad and Washington often talk about addressing this issue, but according to Transparency International there has been little progress.

SOURCES

AK News, “Integrity Committee to sue 455 senior Officials,” 11/9/09

Benraad, Myriam, “Iraq’s Enduring al-Qaeda Challenge,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 11/18/09

Inside Iraq, “Officials take bribes, the Government Makes Reports,” McClatchy Newspapers, 9/30/09

Larsa News, “Maliki’s brother arrested in Dubai Airport while trying to smuggle Iraqi Antiquities,” 10/26/09

O’Hanlon, Michael and Campbell, Jason, “Iraq Index,” Brookings Institution, 11/4/09

Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2009,” 11/17/09

Columbia University Charts Sectarian Cleansing of Baghdad

2009-11-25T21:09:00.000-05:00

Dr. Michael Izady of Columbia’s School of International and Public Affairs recently gave an interview to the Swiss-based International Relations and Security Network. He presented a series of maps that he put together on Baghdad during Iraq’s civil war. They show the effects of the fighting as the capital went from a mixed Sunni-Shiite city, into a segregated one.

Izady’s first map is from 2003 when the U.S. invasion began. There were majority Sunni and Shiite areas peppered throughout Baghdad. Sadr City in northeast Baghdad was the largest and most well known Shiite area, but there were others such as Amiriya in the west by Baghdad Airport, Ghazaliya in the northwest by Abu Ghraib, and Shula and Kadhimiya in the north. Majority Sunni areas were Hurriya in the north, Washash, Mansur, and Karkh in the central region, Sadiya in the south, and Adhamiya on the eastern bank of the Tigris River. The majority of the capital however was mixed Sunni-Shiite, especially in the central, southern, and northeastern regions.

Baghdad 2003

Green – Shiite majority
Red – Sunni majority
Blue – Christian majority
Yellow – Mixed Sunni-Shiite

The next map skips ahead to 2006. The February bombing of the Shiite shrine at Samarra in Salahaddin province north of Baghdad in that year is credited as beginning of the sectarian war, and Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army is largely blamed for carrying out most of the ethnic cleansing. In actuality, in 2005 the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s Badr Brigade militia took over the Interior Ministry under the government of Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari, and began setting up death squads and carrying attacks on Sunnis. The Supreme Council also began pushing out Sunnis from the security forces, and replacing them with its followers. The activities of the Badr Brigade were exposed in late 2005 when U.S. forces came across a secret detention facility in the capital holding 169 abused prisoners, some of which were tortured. The Interior Minister Bayan Jabr, a Badr Brigade leader, tried to deny the seriousness of the find.

The 2006 map shows the first changes in the sectarian make-up of the city. These can be seen in the outskirts of the city. Sadiya in the south for example, and Hurriya and Washash on the west bank of the Tigris went from Sunni to Shiite majority. The three neighborhoods directly northwest of Sadr City, Hayy Aden, Sahab, and Hayy Sumer went from being mixed to Shiite. In turn, Amiriya in the west went from Shiite to Sunni, along with Ghazaliya above it, and Jihad went from mixed to Sunni to the south. Karkh in central Baghdad, which surrounds the Green Zone, also went from Sunni to mixed.

Baghdad 2006

Green – Shiite majority
Red – Sunni majority
Blue – Christian majority
Yellow – Mixed Sunni-Shiite

The third map covers early 2007. At that time the sectarian war was still going full throttle. For example, the Brookings Institution’s Iraq Index recorded 3,462 killed in November 2006, 2,914 in December, 3,500 in January 2009, 2,700 in February, and 2,400 in March. By that time the segregation of Baghdad was pretty much complete. Adhamiya was the last large Sunni majority neighborhood left in the western half of the capital. Most Sunnis were now concentrated in a strip of western neighborhoods including Kindi, Mansur, Yarmuk, Khadra, Amiriya, and Ghazaliya, along with a few southern district like Dora and Muradiya. Only central Baghdad around the Tigris River had large numbers of mixed areas left with the northwest, northeast, southwest, and southeast all Shiite majority now.

Baghdad Early 2007

Green – Shiite majority
Red – Sunni majority
Blue – Christian majority
Yellow – Mixed Sunni-Shiite

The fourth map is from late 2007. The only real change was along the west bank of the Tigris. There, the southern section of Adhamiya became Shiite, while Resaca and Gaitanis became Sunni majority. During that period, the sectarian fighting was petering out. The Iraq Index counted 1,100 deaths in September 2007; the last time it would record over one thousand deaths in a single month. After that there were 950 killed in October, and 750 in November and December each. The Surge had also led to blast walls being erected around many of the Sunni neighborhoods and the creation of the Sons of Iraq program where the majority of the Sunni insurgency gave up and switched sides to align with the Americans rather than face annihilation at the hands of the Shiite militias, Al Qaeda in Iraq, or the United States. Both of those policies solidified the segregation of Baghdad.

Baghdad Late 2007

Green – Shiite majority
Red – Sunni majority
Blue – Christian majority
Yellow – Mixed Sunni-Shiite

The last map is from mid-2008. There were very few changes by that time. The only noticeable ones were around the Riyad area that went from mixed to Shiite on the western bank of the Tigris across from the Green Zone. By 2008 the sectarian war was over, the insurgency was reduced to largely carrying out terrorist bombings and hit and run attacks, and deaths were dropping.

Baghdad Mid 2008

Green – Shiite majority
Red – Sunni majority
Blue – Christian majority
Yellow – Mixed Sunni-Shiite

Izady believes that the ethnic cleansing of Baghdad by the Shiite militias and the Sons of Iraq movement were the major reasons why the civil war ended. The Badr Brigade and Mahdi Army effectively removed most of the Sunnis to a western strip of the capital, while the Sons of Iraq signaled the collapse of the insurgency. The Surge didn’t fully get underway until mid-2007, and facilitated the reduction of violence and segregation that was already underway. Izady thinks much of the same for Sadr’s August 2007 cease-fire. Again, the fighting was already winding down by then, and Sadr never told his followers to disarm, and many factions had broken away or become Special Groups that were no longer following Sadr’s direction, so there were plenty of militiamen still active. There were just fewer Sunnis to target, and many militia cells turned to exploiting their own Shiite communities instead.

The BBC did a similar set of maps comparing pre-2006 Baghdad to 2007 based upon information from the International Medical Corps. It found a very similar pattern of Shiite expansion in the east and northwest, the vast reduction of mixed neighborhoods, and the concentration of Sunnis in the west. Many other students of the Surge attribute these same factors for the end of the civil war, but just put different emphasis on each point.

The one disputable point that Izady made in his interview with the International Relations and Security Network was when he said he believed that Sunnis were reduced to 12% of Iraq’s population because of the fighting. He said many became refugees in Syria and Jordan. While the exact percentage Sunnis made up of Iraq and Baghdad are disputed, a general number used in sources such as the CIA Factbook is around 30%. How much they made up of Baghdad before the U.S. invasion is an even harder figure to calculate. In the December 2005 national elections however, the Sunni Iraqi Accordance Front and Iraqi National Dialogue Front pulled 22.9% of the vote in the capital, while the Iraqi National List, even though led by a Shiite, former Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi, also draws strongly from Sunnis, got 13.4%. That’s roughly 30% of Baghdad as well. If Izady is to be believed than just over half of the Sunnis fled the country. In 2003 Iraq had a population of around 26 million, if 30% were Sunnis that would be roughly 7.8 million, half of which would be 3.9 million people. The United Nations estimates that there are only 2.5 million refugees however, not all of which are Sunnis. There are other sources that think that Sunnis were only 15-20% of all Iraqis, which would be approximately 3.9million-5.2 million. That would match the refugee numbers much more closely.

Izady’s maps are a valuable resource in charting the changes that Baghdad witnessed after the U.S. invasion. It was and remains the center of power and conflict in the country to this day. The Shiite militias undertook a concerted effort to push Sunnis out of parts of the city beginning in 2005, and largely succeeded as Izady’s graphics show. When the insurgency largely gave up and joined the Sons of Iraq, and the U.S. put up blast walls around many communities, those marked the effective end of the sectarian war. The result is a segregated and Shiite dominated capital, that in a way is symbolic of post-Saddam Iraq as there was displacement across the country, and the Shiite parties are now in firm control of the government, with no real threat from other sects.

SOURCES

BBC, “Baghdad: Mapping the violence,” 2007

CIA, Factbook

Guler, Claudio, “Baghdad Divided,” International Relations and Security Network, 11/9/09

Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq, “Legislation Election of 15 December 2005,” 2006

International Crisis Group, “Shiite Politics In Iraq: The Role Of The Supreme Council,” 11/15/07

Matthews, Dylan and Klein, Ezra, “How Important Was the Surge?” American Prospects, 7/28/08

Murphy, Dan, “New Iraqi leader seeks unity,” Christian Science Monitor, 4/24/06

O’Hanlon, Michael Campbell, Jason, “Iraq Index,” Brookings Institution, 8/20/09

Otterman, Sharon, “IRAQ: The Sunnis,” Council on Foreign Relations, 12/12/03

Wong, Edward, “U.S. Splits With Iraqi Official Over Prisoner Abuse,” New York Times, 11/17/05

Problems With Integrating Sons of Iraq Continue

2009-11-24T21:03:00.000-05:00

In May 2009 the Iraqi government took full responsibility for the payment of 95,000 Sons of Iraq (SOI). The SOI were put together by the United States when Sunni tribesmen and insurgents felt squeezed by the Shiite militias, Al Qaeda in Iraq, and U.S. forces. The Sunnis were willing to switch sides to forestall their annihilation, and hold on to what they had left. In 2008 Baghdad agreed to take control of the program from the United States, integrating 20% into the security forces, and finding the rest employment with Iraq’s ministries or in the private sector. Since that time, the policy has run into consistent problems. The government has continued with intermittently arresting SOI leaders, there have been problems with paying them, and only around a quarter have found employment.

At the beginning of November 2009, two Sons of Iraq leaders (SOI) were arrested by the security forces. One was the head of the SOI in the Dora neighborhood of Baghdad, and the other was a commander in Baquba in Diyala province. Details on the Diyala arrest were scant, but the authorities said that the SOI leader was arrested for taking part in military operations. The case of Mustafa Kamal Shibeeb of Dora was much better known. In October 2007, Shibeeb led his SOI against Al Qaeda fighters from a rival tribe killing several of them. In 2009 some of the relatives of the dead insurgents went to the police, and got an arrest warrant for Shibeeb. He is also charged with holding and beating 30 suspected insurgents, and killing five of them. Shibeeb was supported not only by the U.S., but a local Iraqi Army unit, in his fight against the authorities. Twice police commandos from the Interior Ministry tried to arrest him in the fall of 2009, and one-time Iraqi soldiers, with the backing of the Americans, blocked them. Shibeeb has also tried to work within the Iraqi justice system by hiring a lawyer, and saying that he would go to court. He has attempted to get the Prime Minister involved as well, by joining one of his Tribal Support Councils. The Baghdad Operations Command, which answers directly to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, ending up ordering a stop to the raids. That didn’t seem to work, as he was ultimately detained in November. Sunni parliamentarians have condemned the arrest, while it’s believed that Interior pursued the case because the victims’ families had tribal connections within the ministry.

This has not been the only time that the government has accepted charges against SOI for killing insurgents. In June 2008 it was reported that the head of the SOI in Amariya, Baghdad was being investigated for killing an Al Qaeda in Iraq leader. In April 2009, an SOI commander in Arab Jabour, a suburb of Baghdad, was arrested for killing Al Qaeda members. SOI members have responded by saying that some of these charges are based upon false information and insurgents who are attempting to undermine them. U.S. officials have told Baghdad to let many of those arrested go, but the government continues detaining them.

Another major problem in the integration of the SOI has been keeping up with their salaries. Since the day that Baghdad agreed to take over the program, they have not always paid the SOI on time. The latest complains came in October 2009, when a unit in Jaweja, southwest of Kirkuk in Tamim, and another in Azamiya, Baghdad said they had not been paid in three months. The U.S. general in charge of military planning in Iraq blamed Iraq’s budget problems for these delays. He said that the government was supposed to make double payments in October to make up for the missed ones. It’s not been reported whether that happened or not.

Finally, finding jobs for the SOI has gone extremely slow. Of the 95,000 SOI fighters that Baghdad took control of this year, only 26% have gotten jobs. The security forces have hired 9,500, 6,800 have gotten jobs in other parts of the government, and 8,800 have gone to work elsewhere. That leaves 69,900 who have not been integrated yet. Out of those, many are simply staying at their posts hoping that the government will come through with their promises. Others have left to find work elsewhere, while still others have probably tried to return to the insurgency out of frustration. It’s unlikely many will take that route as their information is known by the government, which makes it extremely hard for them to operate covertly which is a necessity in any successful guerrilla war, and few have the stomach to return to the fight.

When the Sunni tribes and fighters agreed to join the SOI, they were in effect admitting their defeat. They are now suffering the consequences. Most of them will have to bear with these problems because they have no other choice. Their main benefactors, the Americans, are withdrawing and losing influence. That means they are at the mercy of the Iraqi government, which does have massive bureaucratic and budget problems, but also has shown little enthusiasm for the SOI program since its inception. More stories of arrests and lack of pay are therefore likely.

SOURCES

Ahmed, Caesar, “Prominent member of Awakening movement arrested in Iraq,” Los Angeles Times, 11/10/09

Alsumaria, “Awakening Forces warn of quitting,” 10/8/09

Associated Press, “Budget of Iraqi security forces strained, PM says,” 10/7/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Sahwa fighters in Haweja demonstrate demanding salaries,” 10/6/09
- “Sahwa official arrested in Diala,” 11/9/09

Parker, Ned, “Awakening leader’s tale illustrates Iraq’s volatility,” Los Angeles Times, 10/18/09
- “The rise and fall of a Sons of Iraq warrior,” Los Angeles Times, 6/29/08

Parker, Ned and Hameed, Saif, “Sunni paramilitary leader released from Iraq jail,” Los Angeles Times, 4/3/09

Rosen, Nir, “An Ugly Peace,” Boston Review, November/December 2008

Rubin, Alissa, “Arrests Deepen Iraqi Sunnis’ Bitterness,” New York Times, 4/12/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/09

Number of Displaced Returning Likely To Increase, Will Iraq Be Ready?

2009-11-23T22:58:00.001-05:00

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is the premier relief group working with Iraq’s displaced. They focus upon those who have lost their homes since the February 2006 Samarra bombing that is credited with starting the sectarian war. The IOM’s latest report notes that Iraq’s displaced still face many problems, and that the country’s provinces, especially Baghdad will face an increasing number of returns, which they may not be ready for.

The IOM believes that around 282,251 families, approximately 1.6 mill people, have been displaced since February 2006, with another 250,000 families becoming refugees. The IOM’s numbers mirror closely those of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). They recorded 202,018 families displaced before 2006, equaling 1,212,108 people, and 265,499 families losing their homes afterward, totaling 1,552,003 individuals. (2) Baghdad, Diyala, and Ninewa saw almost 90% of the displacement after the Samarra bombing.

The IOM has recorded about 58,110 post-Samarra families that have gone back so far, amounting to 348,660 people. That’s 10.9% of the families that have lost their homes. Of the returnees 6% were refugees, 3,659 families, and 94% were displaced, 54,451 families. According to the UNHCR’s figures, overall 40% of the displaced have returned since the beginning of the war in 2003. The two heaviest periods of returns were immediately after the invasion when 55,429 came back in 2003 and 291,997 did so in 2004, and then from 2008 to the present. 221,260 people returned in 2008, and 154,850 have from January to September 2009 as well. Like the post-Samarra families, the majority of those coming back have been internally displaced. In total, 703,190 have been internal refugees, compared to 426,156 who arrived from other countries.

The mix of displaced and refugees coming back varies from province to province. In Irbil, 103 families returned, and 100% of them were refugees. Muthanna was very similar with 64 families coming back, 88% of which were from abroad. In comparison Basra has seen 500 families return, 100% of which were displaced. In Ninewa 1,732 families have come back, along with 110,843 to Diyala, 99-98% of which were displaced. Baghdad has seen the most returns, 33,521 families. Of those, 69% came from within Baghdad province, 24% were from other provinces, and 6% were from abroad.

Post-Feb. 2006 Families Returning To Iraq – IOM
Baghdad: 33,521
Diyala: 10,843
Anbar: 5,553
Tamim: 3,873
Ninewa: 1,732
Maysan: 626
Basra: 500
Babil: 306
Karbala: 298
Najaf: 221
Salahaddin: 189
Wasit: 123
Dhi Qar: 108
Irbil: 103
Muthanna: 64
Qadisiyah: 44
Dohuk: 6

The reasons for displacement and return follow some broad trends. First, 58.1% have been displaced for one year or more. The major reasons for leaving their homes were being forced from their property, 23.6%, general violence, 14.3%, and armed conflict, 13.6%. Conversely, improvement in security is the main reason for families coming back. 43.17% said it was better security in their area of origin, 32.48% said it was a combination of better security and difficult conditions where they were, and just 12.98% said it was only problems with where they currently lived. Those difficulties include high rent, poor shelter, and lack of jobs and services. Those going back to Baghdad cite getting their old jobs back, help with transportation, repair to their homes and property, access to services, and wanting to put their kids in school as their main motivations. Of those that have gone back 61% said they feel safe all of the time. Almost half, 49%, said they had good housing conditions, while 34% said they were bad. In Baghdad, Diyala, Tamim, and Anbar, 42.5% said their homes were partially or completely destroyed.

The returnees also face a variety of problems. One is lack of jobs. 44.5% said they were able and employed, compared to 33.5% who said they were able and unemployed, and 22.0% who claimed they were unfit to work. While 98% say they had their ration cards, only 40% said they had regular access to the system, 54% said they had intermittent access, and 6% said they had no access at all. The government is also offering $840 for families that return. Only 44% of returnees have registered for the money however, and of those only 39% have gotten it. Other issues mentioned to the IOM were fuel, 44%, and health care, 42%.

Of those families that are still displaced, the majority say that they want to return. 52.7% said they wanted to go back to their homes, 25.1% said they would integrate where they were, and 19.7% said they would settle somewhere else. The problem the IOM pointed out was if conditions stayed the same or got better than Baghdad, Diyala, and Ninewa provinces could receive a lot more returning families. The question is what will happen then? The government does not have the capacity to deal with all the property claims that arise with large-scale returns. They have not been able to provide for those families that have come back, and have no real policy to deal with them overall. That could start a whole new crisis with thousands of families coming back, but not finding the support and housing they require, and not being able to provide for themselves.

UNHCR Numbers On Displacement And Returns

Displaced 2003-2009
Pre-2006: 202,018 families, 1,212,108 individuals
Post-2006: 265,499 families, 1,552,003 individuals
TOTAL: 467,517 families, 2,764,111 individuals

Returns 2003-2009
2003: 9,237 families, 55,429 individuals
2004: 48,655 families, 291,997 individuals
2005: 25,689 families, 154,155 individuals
2006: 28,355 families, 170,235 individuals
2007: 13,541 families, 81,420 individuals
2008: 39,280 families, 221,260 individuals
Jan.-Sep. 2009: 28,630 families, 154,850 individuals
TOTAL: 193,387 families, 1,129,346, 40% of total displaced

SOURCES

International Organization for Migration, “Assessment of Return to Iraq,” 11/3/09

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Return Update Iraq September 2009,” November 2009

How Did Kirkuk Become Such A Divisive Issue? A Portrait of The City In 2003

2009-11-22T13:39:00.001-05:00

The Pre-War Situation

As recent events have shown, Kirkuk remains one of the outstanding issues in Iraqi politics. Not only does it have a national dynamic between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Baghdad, but a local one between Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, and Christians who live there and are all arguing over who has the right to control it. How did it get that way? A portrait of Kirkuk and Tamim province immediately after the U.S. invasion helps explain at least a part of the story.

In the weeks just before the war began in March 2003 hundreds of Kurds were being driven out of Kirkuk by Saddam’s forces. The goal was to prepare for the American invasion and suppress the Kurds who were expected to help them. This followed a long trend of Baghdad trying to change the demographics of the area. Saddam’s Anfal campaign that started in the 1980s, and his Arabization policy that displaced around 150,000 Kurds, Turkmen, and Assyrian Christians were the most famous examples, but the Iraqi government had been trying to move Arabs into Tamim since at least the 1950s. It’s believed that up to 350,000 Kurds and Turkmen were forced to leave as a result. The population was also changed by the fact that Kirkuk was the hub of the northern oil industry that attracted workers from around the country.

This has led to all kinds of claims to the city by each of the three major ethnicities there. For example, the Kurds say they were and are presently the majority, while the Turkmen point to the 1947 census that showed they were the largest group. A reporter from PBS’ Frontline that entered Kirkuk right after the invasion said that at that time the Kurds were 45% of city, Turkmen 25%, and the remaining 30% were split between Arabs and Christians.

Human Rights Watch warned in late March 2003 that Kirkuk was a disaster waiting to happen. They said unless the U.S. made plans for all of the people that were expected to return to the province after being pushed out by Saddam there would be a crisis. U.S., Turkish, and Iraqi opposition officials actually did meet that month, and said they would set up a committee to deal with northern Iraq, but it never materialized. This was no different from the rest of Iraq, where the U.S. also failed to adequately plan for the post-war situation.

Kirkuk During The U.S. Invasion

As soon as the U.S. war began in March 2003 Iraqi forces began abandoning their positions along the border with Kurdistan. This opened the road to Kirkuk, which the Kurds had promised the Americans they would not enter. The melting away of Saddam’s army was too tempting however, and the Kurdish peshmerga rushed to fill the vacuum. Looting was immediately reported in northern Tamim as the Kurds took out their anger at the Iraqi government. The situation was completely fluid and under Kurdish control, as there were only 2,000 U.S. paratroops in all of northern Iraq, and 50 Green Berets with the frontline peshmerga.

On April 10, the Iraqi forces withdrew from Kirkuk after heavy U.S. bombing, and Kurdish militiamen and civilians moved in. This set off alarm bells in Turkey that was afraid of Kurdish independence. Ankara warned that they would send in their troops if necessary to prevent that from happening, and the Turkish Foreign Minister demanded that observers be sent in at the minimum. He later talked to Secretary of State Colin Powell to get assurances that the Kurds would not be in control of Kirkuk.

Pillaging began in the city as well. There were lines of trucks and cars going back and forth from Irbil and Sulaymaniya to Kirkuk, full of looted goods. While most of the stealing appeared to be happening in Kurdish and government areas, the Turkmen claimed that they were being victimized by the Kurds as well. A day after Kirkuk fell, the Turkmen even held a demonstration against the looting. U.S. soldiers said they were powerless to stop it because they did not have control of the situation, very similar to what happened in other Iraqi cities after the fall of the government. The U.S. commander in Tamim later said that his unit had no plans for dealing with Kirkuk when they went into the country. They were originally tasked with just protecting the oil fields in the province, and were to stay out of the city. They were compelled to break those orders when Kirkuk descended into chaos.

Because of pressure from Washington and Turkey, the Kurdish leadership announced that the peshmerga would withdraw from Kirkuk. At the same time though, Kurdish police from Sulaymaniya were entering the city to assert law and order, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) was attempting to take over the administration. A contingent from the U.S. 173rd Airborne Brigade also arrived, and Ankara sent in a small group of Turkish Special Forces as observers.

As the looting was being brought under control, there were the first reports of Arabs being expelled from the city and surrounding rural areas. Divas, a middle class neighborhood in Kirkuk that was built for Iraqi army officers was found largely abandoned after Kurds told them they had 24 hours to leave or be shot. On orders from local PUK officials, 2,000 members of the Shamar tribe who had been moved into Tamim in 1973 with the promise of free land by the government were also forced out of four villages. A PUK official in a neighboring town said this was part of his party’s policy to remove all the Arabs that moved into the province under Saddam. Senior PUK leaders denied this claim however.

Most Arabs actually fled before the U.S. invasion even began. According to interviews conducted by Human Rights Watch, the main reasons why they left were to escape the U.S. bombings and fighting, fear of the Kurds’ revenge, and a belief that much of the property they occupied actually belonged to the Kurds. Many relocated to Kirkuk at first, but then moved south. There were already refugee camps full of Arabs just a week after the fall of the city, and those who tried to return to their homes said Kurdish civilians and peshmerga stopped them.

The Turkmen were also singled out. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) gave an eviction notice to the Iraqi Turkmen Front’s headquarters in Kirkuk on April 13. The party said that the KDP warned them that there would be trouble if they didn’t leave.

Post-War Kirkuk

By May there were sporadic outbursts of violence between the different ethnic groups in Tamim. In that month, around 500 Arabs from the town of Hawija attacked the Kurdish part of Kirkuk, starting 36 hours of fighting. Five people were killed in the process. The cause was Kurdish harassment of some Arabs at a market and a bridge in the city two days beforehand. The Kurdish police also reported that Arabs had killed four Kurds in another neighborhood, and 40 people had been wounded since the fall of the city. American troops were later shot at in Hawija, showing that some elements were also mad at the U.S. for how things were going.

That anger increased when the Americans put together a governing council in Tamim. On May 25, a 300-member assembly of local leaders elected 30 delegates to the council. The Kurds, Turkmen, Arabs, and Christians got six delegates each, plus there were six independent members. That council went on to pick a governor. The day the council was seated the U.S. arrested five Arab members saying that they were Baathists. Two days before American forces arrested two other Arab leaders on the same charges. The Kurds ended up winning the mayor of Kirkuk, and got the majority of seats on the council when the Americans gave them five of the six independent positions.

In August 2003 violence flared up between Turkmen and Kurds. On August 22, Turkmen held a parade for a rebuilt Shiite shrine in the town of Tuz Khumato, south of Kirkuk. They got into an argument with Kurdish residents, who then tried to destroy the shrine with rocket-propelled grenades. The Turkmen rioted, burning down a police station. Eight Turkmen were killed as a result, two by U.S. forces. The Turkmen were mad at the Kurds and the Americans beforehand because they had appointed a Kurdish mayor and chief of police, even though the Turkmen were a majority there. The next day, Turkmen held a protest in Kirkuk that also led to rioting. Three Turkmen were killed, 15-20 demonstrators and police were wounded, and Kurds set about attacking Turkmen statues in the city. There the Turkmen were accusing the Kurds of flooding the city to create a majority to take it over, while Kurdish officials accused the Turkmen of being manipulated by Turkey.

These bursts of violence continued for the rest of the year, with no one willing to back down. On November 20, the PUK headquarters in Kirkuk was bombed and the Islamist Ansar al-Islam was suspected of being responsible. A month later demonstrations and counter-demonstrations by Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen for and against federalism in Kirkuk led to a shootout on December 31 leaving five dead. U.S. raids were also turning up illegal weapons in all of the major political parties’ offices including those of the KDP, PUK and Turkmen Front, as all sides seemed to be gearing up for a fight.

The Kurdish parties were also trying to create facts on the ground to support their call for Kirkuk to be annexed by Kurdistan. They encouraged people to move back to Kirkuk, and even offered money to each family that did. Once there, these returnees tended to live in tent camps or squatted on government property. By March 2004, there were around 25,000 Kurds living in these conditions. None of them said they’d gotten any money from the Kurdish parties however, and they were desperate to find work, and were relying upon the government food ration system. There were thousands more still in Kurdistan who said they would not go back unless they knew they had housing and jobs. Others said they were simply too poor to make the trip. While many of these people had a legitimate desire to return to Kirkuk, the Kurdish parties were also manipulating them in their attempt to rest control of the city for themselves.

There were Turkmen and Arabs in a very similar situation. Turkmen were also attempting to return to Kirkuk, and were forced to live in tent camps too, as well as Arabs that had fled the city before the invasion. By 2004 the Mahdi Army was organizing Shiite Arabs and Turkmen in the city against the Kurdish claims, and threatening people to not leave.

The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was very worried about the situation. Paul Bremer, the head of the CPA, was so concerned that he talked twice with Kurdish leaders asking them to drop their claims to Kirkuk, but to no avail. In September 2003 for example, the Kurdish President and head of the KDP Massoud Barzani said that all Arabs who had moved to Kirkuk and other Kurdish areas since 1961 had to leave. The CPA was panicking as a result, and did not offer any assistance to any of the Kurds that returned to Tamim, fearing that it would legitimize the Kurdish strategy.

By early 2004 the situation in Kirkuk and Tamim province were quickly deteriorating just as Human Rights Watch had warned about before the opening of hostilities. Reports of Arabs being expelled by Kurds after the fall of Kirkuk didn’t capture the fact that the majority had fled even before the war started. By June 2003 the Kurdish parties had cracked down on many of their members and there were no more stories of displacement. Much more important were the occasional flashes of violence, and the growing dispute over the governance of Kirkuk and Tamim. A year after the invasion, Kirkuk had grown from a local and regional problem to a national one as insurgents and the Mahdi Army were operating in the city, and the CPA was being drawn in. It seems that the divide and conquer strategy of Saddam Hussein was so effective that it continued to play out even after he was disposed. The Kurds, Turkmen, and Arabs were so tied up in their conflicting claims to Kirkuk that cooperation was nearly impossible. The lack of U.S. forces in the north also created a security vacuum that left every group to fend for itself, and the absence of U.S. planning for post-war Iraq allowed the PUK and KDP to become the de facto sovereigns of Kirkuk and many surrounding areas through their police and control of the administration. The subsequent years have only increased these divisions in the city, just as it has become more of an issue in Iraqi politics.

SOURCES

Badkhen, Anna, “Kurds evicting Arabs in north Iraq,” San Francisco Chronicle, 4/19/03

Baker, Luke, “Ancient Rivalries Vie for Dominance of Iraq’s Kirkuk,” Reuters, 2/5/04

BBC, “Kurds flee Iraqi town,” 3/15/03

Bruni, Frank, “A Nation At War: Northern Iraq; Turkey Sending Military Observers to Watch Kurds; U.S. Warns Against Further Moves,” New York Times, 4/11/03

Chivers, C.J., “A Nation At War: In The Field – Kirkuk; Iraqis Abandon Post And Kurds Advance,” New York Times, 3/28/03
- “A Nation At War: In The Field l Northern Iraq; Kirkuk on the Horizon, and a Falcon and Shells Nearby,” New York Times, 4/2/03
- “A Nation At War: Northern Front; Attention Now Shifts to the Role of the Kurds,” New York Times, 4/10/03
- “A Nation At War: Northern Iraq; Paratroopers Find Suspicious Warheads and Rocket Parts in Kirkuk,” New York Times, 4/13/03
- “A Nation At War: The Kurds; Kirkuk’s Swift Collapse Leaves a City in Chaos,” New York Times, 4/11/03

CNN, “U.S. reinforcements arrive in Kirkuk,” 4/10/03

Fleishman, Jeffrey, “Kirkuk Rises to Uneasy Freedom,” Los Angeles Times, 4/12/03

Human Rights Watch, “Claims in Conflict,” 8/2/04
- “Iraq: Impending Inter-Ethnic Violence in Kirkuk,” 3/27/03
- “Iraq: Killings, Expulsions on the Rise in Kirkuk,” 4/14/03

Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, “IDP News Alert: 16 April 2003,” 4/16/03
- “IDP News Alert: 23 April 2003,” 4/23/03

IRIN, “IRAQ: Focus on IDPs in Kirkuk living in poor conditions,” 3/1/04

Kiley, Sam, “IRAQ: The Road to Kirkuk,” Frontline, May 2003

Mite, Valentinas, “Turkomans Say Kirkuk’s Growing Kurdish Population A Threat,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 11/13/03

Mufti, Hania, Stover, Eric, “Troubles in Kirkuk,” San Francisco Chronicle, 4/30/03

Oppel, Richard with MacFarquhar, Neil, “After the War: Southern Iraq; 3 British Soldiers Are Killed in Basra Attack,” New York Times, 8/24/03

PBS Frontline, “Interview Col. William Mayville,” Beyond Baghdad, 2/12/04

Rhode, David, “A Nation At War: The North; As Kurds Move Into Kirkuk, Arabs Fear Revenge,” New York Times, 4/11/03

Sachs, Susan, “A Region Inflamed: Attacks; Truck Bomb Kills 5 in a Pro-U.S. Kurdish Stronghold in Northern Iraq,” New York Times, 11/21/03

Travernise, Sabrina, “After The War: The North; Kurds Celebrate Election of Mayor in Kirkuk,” New York Times, 5/29/03
- “After The War: Northern Iraq; U.S. Detains 5 Suspected Baath Loyalists at Kirkuk Elections,” New York Times, 5/25/03
- “Aftereffects: The North; Arabs and Kurds Clash in Kirkuk, and at Least 5 Are Killed,” New York Times, 5/18/03

Tyler, Patrick, “A Nation At War: Combat; Allies Widen Hold on Iraq; Civil Strife on Rise,” New York Times, 4/11/03

Voice of America, “Iraqi Kurds Return to Kirkuk,” 5/29/03

Washington Times, “Insurgents stir up strife in Kirkuk,” 5/17/04

Wong, Edward, “The Struggle for Iraq: Northern Iraq; Back From Exile, Kurds Demand Political Power and Reparations for Seized Property,” New York Times, 1/19/04

Nir Rosen’s New Take On Iraq – “An Ugly Peace”

2009-11-20T22:04:00.000-05:00

In the November/December 2009 issue of the Boston Review, Nir Rosen has a piece called “An Ugly Peace.” In it, Rosen writes about the new status quo in Iraq that was created by the end of the sectarian war and the U.S. Surge, something that he was reluctant to talk about in previous articles. He writes that while Iraq still has plenty of problems such as sectarianism, there are no real challenges to the power of the Iraqi government, and a state of relative stability is beginning to emerge in the country.

Rosen tries to explain how Iraq has come to this new situation. The major reason to him was that the Shiites won the sectarian war. The Mahdi Army, with the implicit and sometimes explicit support of the Iraqi government and security forces were successful in driving large numbers of Sunnis out of central and southern Iraq. Sunni insurgents were also fighting with Al Qaeda in Iraq. By the time the U.S. began the Surge in 2007, many Sunnis were willing to switch sides and work with the Americans for money in the Sons of Iraq (SOI) program to expel the Islamists. U.S. erected blast walls also formalized the new segregation of Iraqi neighborhoods. The success of the Shiites, also led them to turn on each other. The Mahdi Army for example, devolved into several factions, some of which were no better than gangs that preyed on their own communities. In early 2008, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki took advantage of this situation by striking against the Sadrists in Basra and Baghdad, resting control of the streets from them. This helped transform him from a sectarian into a nationalist leader at the front of a newly invigorated Iraqi state.

All of this is generally agreed upon by Iraq observers. What’s new is that Rosen is finally writing about it. This has been a slow transformation. In 2008 for example, he wrote about the Sons of Iraq (SOI) program in an article entitled “The Myth of the Surge” in Rolling Stone that emphasized that the Sons of Iraq were insurgents with blood on their hands, and only a stop-gap measure that was actually increasing violence, and putting off the next battle between Sunnis and Shiites. By April 2009 in “The big sleep” for The National, however, he noted that the Sunnis had actually lost the war, and were done for as a military force. He revealed that back in 2006 Sunni insurgent leaders in Jordan and Syria had told him that they were done for now that the sectarian war had started because they could not beat the numerically superior Shiite militias and Shiite controlled government. Maliki’s arrest of an SOI leader in Fadhil that led to two days of fighting, but no further repercussions also showed that the insurgents were not unified enough to resist the power of the government. In fact, the entire SOI program meant that the former insurgents were publicly known, and denied them the anonymity that would allow them to melt back into the public and return to the insurgency.

Another major change in tone could be seen in Rosen’s opinion of the Mahdi Army. In “Songs for the Mahdi Army” for Mother Jones in December 2008 he wrote about how the Sadrists were a state within a state with their militia and social services. They were a force that could not be ignored, and that they were here to stay, even after the government’s crackdown. By the time of “The Ugly Peace” Rosen was talking about their shortcomings. Whereas before he said that the Mahdi Army attacked Sunnis who were Baathists and militants, now he wrote that the Sadrists were responsible for ethnic cleansing of entire Sunni communities. Sadr had also lost control of parts of his movement, some of which had devolved into gangs. This was a far change from previous reports that gave the impression that Sadrists were everywhere in Shiite communities, the security forces, and the government, and all were loyal followers.

Rosen also seems to have come to the conclusion that Iraq is entering a stage of some type of stability. Back in April 2009 he wrote in “The gathering storm” that while there was no more random violence in Baghdad, that shops were open and customers were out on the streets, that Iraq was rebuilding, and that some displaced and refugees were returning he felt a sense of foreboding of things falling apart once the U.S. withdrew. In “An Ugly Peace” he appears to be arguing that the Iraqis can handle security, and that the Iraqi government is strong enough to stand on its own.

The major problem he sees remaining in Iraq is latent sectarianism. That no longer takes the form of fighting out on the streets, but rather in an emerging Shiite culture in the security forces, and government offices. He found that in almost every Iraqi institution and ministry he went to there were posters of Shiite religious figures hanging from the walls, and Shiite music could be heard. He also mentions the continuing refugee and displaced crisis, corruption and Maliki’s move towards authoritarianism as other issues.

This is what Rosen means by his title. There is an ugly peace in Iraq with the Sadrists having lost their standing, the sectarian war is over, but sectarianism remains, and the Sunnis are thoroughly defeated and divided. The Iraqi state and Prime Minister Maliki are asserting their authority, and face no real challengers. These are all major changes in Rosen’s writing who before emphasized that renewed fighting and conflict were always just around the corner. The major problem is that he knew about many of these changes years ago, but didn’t really write about them until now. Having Sunni insurgent leaders saying that they knew they were going to eventually lose back in 2006 was not reported until 2009. The same is true for the Sadrists. Rosen must have known about their fracturing and loss of standing, but chose not to mention it until the end of this year. The real question is what took him so long to change his tune? Was it that he was so caught up in the moment that he didn’t realize the larger transformations occurring, or did his opposition to the U.S. invasion make him emphasize the resistance and chaos in Iraq to make the Americans look bad?

SOURCES

Rosen, Nir, “An Ugly Peace,” Boston Review, November/December 2009
- “The big sleep,” The National, 4/24/09
- “The gathering storm,” The National, 4/10/09
- “The Myth of the Surge,” Rolling Stone, 3/6/08
- “Songs for the Mahdi Army,” Mother Jones, 12/2/08

Iraq’s 2010 Election Law Faces New Challenge From Kurdistan

2009-11-19T20:32:00.001-05:00

Iraq’s 2010 parliamentary election law was finally passed by the legislature on November 8, 2009. It was then sent to the Presidential Council that consists of President Jalal Talabani, Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi and Vice President Tarqi al-Hashemi for ratification. It was expected that they would immediately sign the bill into law as it was originally supposed to be done in October. Instead, the legislation has run into more and more problems. As reported before, President Talabani and Vice President Hashemi want the quota for seats given to minorities and refugees increased since that would help their chances in the election. That led to Hashemi to veto the bill, sending it back to parliament for revision. Now Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Massoud Barzani is threatening a Kurdish boycott unless the number of seats up for grabs in each province is changed.

President Barzani recently told the press that the three Kurdish provinces of Dohuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniya would boycott the 2010 national elections unless more seats are allotted to the region. The number of members in parliament is going to be increased from 275 to 323 next year, and those will be determined by the voting in each of Iraq’s eighteen provinces. The total is based upon numbers derived from the Ministry of Trade’s food ration card system. For every 100,000 people in a province, one seat is to be placed up for election. There are also compensatory and quota seats set aside for minorities, refugees, and smaller parties that do well nationally, but not good enough in the provinces to earn a seat.

Barzani complained that the number of seats increased for several Sunni Arab provinces, but hardly changed at all for the Kurdistan region. For example, Sulaymaniya got no seat increases from 2005 staying at 15, while Dohuk went from 7 to 9, and Irbil went from 13 to 14. In comparison, Ninewa’s seats are going to go from 19 in 2005 to 31 in 2010, and Anbar will go from 9 to 14. In, fact every province, except for Sulaymaniya will see some sort of increase ranging from 1 to 12 seats, with an average of 4.1. According to Norwegian Iraq specialist Reidar Visser, the lack of increases for the KRG reflects the fact that their numbers were believed to be inflated in 2005, while the Sunni areas were not well represented before. The Kurdish Alliance in parliament has gone as far as to threaten a lawsuit against the Trade Ministry, alleging that it is manipulating its numbers.

Parliamentary Seats By Province 2005 vs 2010
Anbar 9 vs 14
Babil 11 vs 16
Baghdad 59 vs 68
Basra 18 vs 24
Dhi Qar 12 vs 18
Diyala 10 vs 13
Dohuk 7 vs 9
Irbil 13 vs 14
Karbala 6 vs 10
Maysan 7 vs 10
Muthanna 5 vs 7
Najaf 8 vs 12
Ninewa 19 vs 31
Qadisiyah 8 vs 11
Salahaddin 8 vs 12
Sulaymaniya 15 vs 15
Tamim 9 vs 12
Wasit 8 vs 11

The Kurdish Alliance and its allies the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) were the main reasons why the election bill was not passed on time. Their demands over voting in Tamim, the home of Kirkuk, and whether to use an open or closed list system, dragged out the discussion over the legislation for nearly a month after it was due. Now the Kurds are threatening the entire process by mentioning a boycott. They not only want the quota for minorities increased, something they should’ve worked out when the bill was under debate, but now also want the number of seats up for grabs to be redistributed to help Kurdistan. Representation is important in any election and country, but the way the Kurds are dealing with this piece of legislation is not only frustrating the Iraqi public, which is already fed up with their politicians and government for not delivering on issues such as basic services and the passage of laws, but also increasing the growing anti-Kurdish sentiment within the Arab population. The reasons behind the Kurds’ tactics are three-fold. First, after the U.S. invasion, the Kurds were one of the largest and most well organized parties in the country, and were able to translate that into a greater proportion of power than they probably deserved vis a vis the Arab majority. They are therefore use to getting their way. Second, the Kurds, along with all the other large political parties see politics in zero sum terms, which makes it hard for them to compromise on any meaningful issue. Third, with the ascendancy of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the central government, the Kurds are pushing for as much power as they can get out of fear that Baghdad will once again attempt to take away their rights or subjugate them like what happened under Saddam. All of those factors together, make it extremely difficult to get anything through Iraq’s legislative process, and the 2010 election law is just the latest example.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iraq’s January vote placed in doubt by presidency,” 11/16/09

AK News, “Kurdish Presidency warn to boycott parliamentary polls,” 11/17/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “KA threatens to sue Trade Ministry,” 11/16/09
- “Kurdistan won’t participate in polls unless allocation mechanism is reconsidered,” 11/17/09

Lucas, Ryan, “Kurdish, Sunni demands may derail Iraqi elections,” Associated Press, 11/17/09

Najm, Hayder, “election law faces new challenges,” Niqash, 11/13/09

Santora, “Kurdish Legislators Threaten Boycott of Iraq Election,” New York Times, 11/17/09

Visser, Reidar, “The IHEC Publishes the Distribution of Governorate and Compensatory Seats,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 11/11/09

Is The U.S. Committed To Resolving The Kirkuk Controversy In Iraq?

2009-11-18T20:42:00.000-05:00

The recent delay of the passage of the 2010 election law showed that Kirkuk remains one of the major unresolved issues in Iraq. There is now talk that the United States will try to deal with the city before it withdraws its troops by the end of 2011.

Joost Hilterman of the International Crisis Group recently wrote a piece in the New York Review of Books where he said that the U.S. Ambassador Christopher Hill and commander of U.S. forces in Iraq General Ray Odierno will attempt to work out a deal over the future of Kirkuk after the Iraqi elections, which are set for January 2010. Odierno is especially worried that Kirkuk could be a flashpoint for renewed violence, this time between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government. He has successfully pushed the two sides to create a joint command center to coordinate the work of the local Iraqi forces and the Kurdish peshmerga in Kirkuk, but plans to expand that to surrounding areas has stalled because of politically differences. The local Arabs and Turkmen for example, think that the idea will legitimize the presence of the peshmerga, which they hope will someday leave.

U.S. forces have also returned to the streets of Kirkuk to conduct joint patrols, the first since the June 30, 2009 withdrawal from Iraqi cities. The chief of police in Kirkuk publicly said that the Iraqis could do their jobs without assistance, but privately told the BBC that he still calls the Americans for help with operations. This is another step by the U.S. meant to keep a lid on tensions in Kirkuk.

Iraqis desperately need some outside mediation to deal with Kirkuk. Left to their own devices, Iraq’s politicians could go on for months and months debating the issue. It has already been responsible for delaying two election laws, and Article 140 of the Constitution that called for a census and then referendum on the issue has been all but given up on. The United Nations has been trying to work on the issue since early 2007, but to no avail. The U.S. might be the best and last chance to make forward movement on Kirkuk. While their influence with Baghdad is declining, they still have many friends in Kurdistan, and can act as an honest broker since they have taken no position on the city, other than wanting it resolved. It’s definitely something that needs to be kept an eye on in the coming months.

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “Iraq-US joint patrols tour Kirkuk City,” 10/22/09

Gatehouse, Gabriel, “US presence remains in divided Kirkuk,” BBC, 10/20/09

Hilterman, Joost, “Iraq on the Edge,” New York Review of Books,” 11/19/09

International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09
- “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08

Iraq’s President and Vice President Want Election Law Revised

2009-11-17T23:24:00.000-05:00

In the days after parliament finally passed the 2010 parliamentary election bill, both President Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi, formerly of the Iraqi Sunni Party, and now part of the new Iraqi National Movement, have called for it to be revised. They are both requesting that the number of seats set aside for refugees and minorities be increased.

As the election bill now stands, eight seats are set aside for minorities and eight seats are compensatory seats for refugees and political parties that don’t do well locally in the provinces, but do well nationally. Talabani and Hashemi are both asking that the quota be increased to 48 seats out of 323.

Talabani called for an amendment after the Kurdish parliament requested one. Many of Iraq’s minorities have fled to Kurdistan or live in the disputed territories in northern Iraq, so an increase in the quota would probably help the ruling Kurdish parties like Talabani’s PUK. This is a change for the President as he, and Iraq’s other Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi, already ratified the bill.

An adviser to Vice President Hashemi said that refugees need more representation since most are Sunnis, which is Hashemi’s constituency. Hashemi’s coalition partner Parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq has called for 30 seats for refugees. The Vice President went on TV saying that he will veto the bill unless it is changed by Tuesday, November 17, 2009.

The ball is now back in parliament’s court to either increase the quota or see whether Hashemi is bluffing about a veto. This is just the latest delay after many, as the law was supposed to be passed in October.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iraq’s January vote placed in doubt by presidency,” 11/16/09

Alsumaria, “Talabani and Abdul Mehdi ratify election law,” 11/14/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “URGENT/VP says won’t endorse election law come what may,”” 11/15/09

Najm, Hayder, “election law faces new challenges,” Niqash, 11/13/09

Reuters, “Iraq VP Threatens To Veto Vote Law Over Refugees,” 11/15/09