Iraq’s 2010 parliamentary election law was finally passed by the legislature on November 8, 2009. It was then sent to the Presidential Council that consists of President Jalal Talabani, Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi and Vice President Tarqi al-Hashemi for ratification. It was expected that they would immediately sign the bill into law as it was originally supposed to be done in October. Instead, the legislation has run into more and more problems. As reported before, President Talabani and Vice President Hashemi want the quota for seats given to minorities and refugees increased since that would help their chances in the election. That led to Hashemi to veto the bill, sending it back to parliament for revision. Now Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Massoud Barzani is threatening a Kurdish boycott unless the number of seats up for grabs in each province is changed.
President Barzani recently told the press that the three Kurdish provinces of Dohuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniya would boycott the 2010 national elections unless more seats are allotted to the region. The number of members in parliament is going to be increased from 275 to 323 next year, and those will be determined by the voting in each of Iraq’s eighteen provinces. The total is based upon numbers derived from the Ministry of Trade’s food ration card system. For every 100,000 people in a province, one seat is to be placed up for election. There are also compensatory and quota seats set aside for minorities, refugees, and smaller parties that do well nationally, but not good enough in the provinces to earn a seat.
Barzani complained that the number of seats increased for several Sunni Arab provinces, but hardly changed at all for the Kurdistan region. For example, Sulaymaniya got no seat increases from 2005 staying at 15, while Dohuk went from 7 to 9, and Irbil went from 13 to 14. In comparison, Ninewa’s seats are going to go from 19 in 2005 to 31 in 2010, and Anbar will go from 9 to 14. In, fact every province, except for Sulaymaniya will see some sort of increase ranging from 1 to 12 seats, with an average of 4.1. According to Norwegian Iraq specialist Reidar Visser, the lack of increases for the KRG reflects the fact that their numbers were believed to be inflated in 2005, while the Sunni areas were not well represented before. The Kurdish Alliance in parliament has gone as far as to threaten a lawsuit against the Trade Ministry, alleging that it is manipulating its numbers.
Parliamentary Seats By Province 2005 vs 2010
Anbar 9 vs 14
Babil 11 vs 16
Baghdad 59 vs 68
Basra 18 vs 24
Dhi Qar 12 vs 18
Diyala 10 vs 13
Dohuk 7 vs 9
Irbil 13 vs 14
Karbala 6 vs 10
Maysan 7 vs 10
Muthanna 5 vs 7
Najaf 8 vs 12
Ninewa 19 vs 31
Qadisiyah 8 vs 11
Salahaddin 8 vs 12
Sulaymaniya 15 vs 15
Tamim 9 vs 12
Wasit 8 vs 11
The Kurdish Alliance and its allies the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) were the main reasons why the election bill was not passed on time. Their demands over voting in Tamim, the home of Kirkuk, and whether to use an open or closed list system, dragged out the discussion over the legislation for nearly a month after it was due. Now the Kurds are threatening the entire process by mentioning a boycott. They not only want the quota for minorities increased, something they should’ve worked out when the bill was under debate, but now also want the number of seats up for grabs to be redistributed to help Kurdistan. Representation is important in any election and country, but the way the Kurds are dealing with this piece of legislation is not only frustrating the Iraqi public, which is already fed up with their politicians and government for not delivering on issues such as basic services and the passage of laws, but also increasing the growing anti-Kurdish sentiment within the Arab population. The reasons behind the Kurds’ tactics are three-fold. First, after the U.S. invasion, the Kurds were one of the largest and most well organized parties in the country, and were able to translate that into a greater proportion of power than they probably deserved vis a vis the Arab majority. They are therefore use to getting their way. Second, the Kurds, along with all the other large political parties see politics in zero sum terms, which makes it hard for them to compromise on any meaningful issue. Third, with the ascendancy of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the central government, the Kurds are pushing for as much power as they can get out of fear that Baghdad will once again attempt to take away their rights or subjugate them like what happened under Saddam. All of those factors together, make it extremely difficult to get anything through Iraq’s legislative process, and the 2010 election law is just the latest example.
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Iraq’s January vote placed in doubt by presidency,” 11/16/09
AK News, “Kurdish Presidency warn to boycott parliamentary polls,” 11/17/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “KA threatens to sue Trade Ministry,” 11/16/09
- “Kurdistan won’t participate in polls unless allocation mechanism is reconsidered,” 11/17/09
Lucas, Ryan, “Kurdish, Sunni demands may derail Iraqi elections,” Associated Press, 11/17/09
Najm, Hayder, “election law faces new challenges,” Niqash, 11/13/09
Santora, “Kurdish Legislators Threaten Boycott of Iraq Election,” New York Times, 11/17/09
Visser, Reidar, “The IHEC Publishes the Distribution of Governorate and Compensatory Seats,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 11/11/09
Thursday, November 19, 2009
Wednesday, November 18, 2009
Is The U.S. Committed To Resolving The Kirkuk Controversy In Iraq?
The recent delay of the passage of the 2010 election law showed that Kirkuk remains one of the major unresolved issues in Iraq. There is now talk that the United States will try to deal with the city before it withdraws its troops by the end of 2011.
Joost Hilterman of the International Crisis Group recently wrote a piece in the New York Review of Books where he said that the U.S. Ambassador Christopher Hill and commander of U.S. forces in Iraq General Ray Odierno will attempt to work out a deal over the future of Kirkuk after the Iraqi elections, which are set for January 2010. Odierno is especially worried that Kirkuk could be a flashpoint for renewed violence, this time between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government. He has successfully pushed the two sides to create a joint command center to coordinate the work of the local Iraqi forces and the Kurdish peshmerga in Kirkuk, but plans to expand that to surrounding areas has stalled because of politically differences. The local Arabs and Turkmen for example, think that the idea will legitimize the presence of the peshmerga, which they hope will someday leave.
U.S. forces have also returned to the streets of Kirkuk to conduct joint patrols, the first since the June 30, 2009 withdrawal from Iraqi cities. The chief of police in Kirkuk publicly said that the Iraqis could do their jobs without assistance, but privately told the BBC that he still calls the Americans for help with operations. This is another step by the U.S. meant to keep a lid on tensions in Kirkuk.
Iraqis desperately need some outside mediation to deal with Kirkuk. Left to their own devices, Iraq’s politicians could go on for months and months debating the issue. It has already been responsible for delaying two election laws, and Article 140 of the Constitution that called for a census and then referendum on the issue has been all but given up on. The United Nations has been trying to work on the issue since early 2007, but to no avail. The U.S. might be the best and last chance to make forward movement on Kirkuk. While their influence with Baghdad is declining, they still have many friends in Kurdistan, and can act as an honest broker since they have taken no position on the city, other than wanting it resolved. It’s definitely something that needs to be kept an eye on in the coming months.
SOURCES
Alsumaria, “Iraq-US joint patrols tour Kirkuk City,” 10/22/09
Gatehouse, Gabriel, “US presence remains in divided Kirkuk,” BBC, 10/20/09
Hilterman, Joost, “Iraq on the Edge,” New York Review of Books,” 11/19/09
International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09
- “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08
Joost Hilterman of the International Crisis Group recently wrote a piece in the New York Review of Books where he said that the U.S. Ambassador Christopher Hill and commander of U.S. forces in Iraq General Ray Odierno will attempt to work out a deal over the future of Kirkuk after the Iraqi elections, which are set for January 2010. Odierno is especially worried that Kirkuk could be a flashpoint for renewed violence, this time between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government. He has successfully pushed the two sides to create a joint command center to coordinate the work of the local Iraqi forces and the Kurdish peshmerga in Kirkuk, but plans to expand that to surrounding areas has stalled because of politically differences. The local Arabs and Turkmen for example, think that the idea will legitimize the presence of the peshmerga, which they hope will someday leave.
U.S. forces have also returned to the streets of Kirkuk to conduct joint patrols, the first since the June 30, 2009 withdrawal from Iraqi cities. The chief of police in Kirkuk publicly said that the Iraqis could do their jobs without assistance, but privately told the BBC that he still calls the Americans for help with operations. This is another step by the U.S. meant to keep a lid on tensions in Kirkuk.
Iraqis desperately need some outside mediation to deal with Kirkuk. Left to their own devices, Iraq’s politicians could go on for months and months debating the issue. It has already been responsible for delaying two election laws, and Article 140 of the Constitution that called for a census and then referendum on the issue has been all but given up on. The United Nations has been trying to work on the issue since early 2007, but to no avail. The U.S. might be the best and last chance to make forward movement on Kirkuk. While their influence with Baghdad is declining, they still have many friends in Kurdistan, and can act as an honest broker since they have taken no position on the city, other than wanting it resolved. It’s definitely something that needs to be kept an eye on in the coming months.
SOURCES
Alsumaria, “Iraq-US joint patrols tour Kirkuk City,” 10/22/09
Gatehouse, Gabriel, “US presence remains in divided Kirkuk,” BBC, 10/20/09
Hilterman, Joost, “Iraq on the Edge,” New York Review of Books,” 11/19/09
International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09
- “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08
Tuesday, November 17, 2009
Iraq’s President and Vice President Want Election Law Revised
In the days after parliament finally passed the 2010 parliamentary election bill, both President Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi, formerly of the Iraqi Sunni Party, and now part of the new Iraqi National Movement, have called for it to be revised. They are both requesting that the number of seats set aside for refugees and minorities be increased.
As the election bill now stands, eight seats are set aside for minorities and eight seats are compensatory seats for refugees and political parties that don’t do well locally in the provinces, but do well nationally. Talabani and Hashemi are both asking that the quota be increased to 48 seats out of 323.
Talabani called for an amendment after the Kurdish parliament requested one. Many of Iraq’s minorities have fled to Kurdistan or live in the disputed territories in northern Iraq, so an increase in the quota would probably help the ruling Kurdish parties like Talabani’s PUK. This is a change for the President as he, and Iraq’s other Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi, already ratified the bill.
An adviser to Vice President Hashemi said that refugees need more representation since most are Sunnis, which is Hashemi’s constituency. Hashemi’s coalition partner Parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq has called for 30 seats for refugees. The Vice President went on TV saying that he will veto the bill unless it is changed by Tuesday, November 17, 2009.
The ball is now back in parliament’s court to either increase the quota or see whether Hashemi is bluffing about a veto. This is just the latest delay after many, as the law was supposed to be passed in October.
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Iraq’s January vote placed in doubt by presidency,” 11/16/09
Alsumaria, “Talabani and Abdul Mehdi ratify election law,” 11/14/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “URGENT/VP says won’t endorse election law come what may,”” 11/15/09
Najm, Hayder, “election law faces new challenges,” Niqash, 11/13/09
Reuters, “Iraq VP Threatens To Veto Vote Law Over Refugees,” 11/15/09
As the election bill now stands, eight seats are set aside for minorities and eight seats are compensatory seats for refugees and political parties that don’t do well locally in the provinces, but do well nationally. Talabani and Hashemi are both asking that the quota be increased to 48 seats out of 323.
Talabani called for an amendment after the Kurdish parliament requested one. Many of Iraq’s minorities have fled to Kurdistan or live in the disputed territories in northern Iraq, so an increase in the quota would probably help the ruling Kurdish parties like Talabani’s PUK. This is a change for the President as he, and Iraq’s other Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi, already ratified the bill.
An adviser to Vice President Hashemi said that refugees need more representation since most are Sunnis, which is Hashemi’s constituency. Hashemi’s coalition partner Parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq has called for 30 seats for refugees. The Vice President went on TV saying that he will veto the bill unless it is changed by Tuesday, November 17, 2009.
The ball is now back in parliament’s court to either increase the quota or see whether Hashemi is bluffing about a veto. This is just the latest delay after many, as the law was supposed to be passed in October.
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Iraq’s January vote placed in doubt by presidency,” 11/16/09
Alsumaria, “Talabani and Abdul Mehdi ratify election law,” 11/14/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “URGENT/VP says won’t endorse election law come what may,”” 11/15/09
Najm, Hayder, “election law faces new challenges,” Niqash, 11/13/09
Reuters, “Iraq VP Threatens To Veto Vote Law Over Refugees,” 11/15/09
Monday, November 16, 2009
The Changing Face of Violence In Mosul
Mosul remains the second most violent city in Iraq after Baghdad. Almost everyday there are reports of drive by shootings, assassinations, or bombings. Still, there has been a slight decline in casualties since 2007, and a change in the nature of the fighting there.
The problems in Mosul began in 2004. Immediately after the U.S. invasion in 2003 the 101st Airborne Division under the command of General David Petraeus was able to pacify the city by using strong security measures, funding reconstruction projects, and getting all the major parties in the area to join the local council. When his troops left, the city was turned over to Iraqis who were not up to the job. This vacuum allowed insurgents to set up shop in 2004. Mosul became an important way station for Baathists and Al Qaeda in Syria to transfer money, supplies, and foreign fighters into Iraq. By 2005 Al Qaeda was largely in control of the western half of the city, and security deteriorated as a result.
The U.S. responded by asking the Kurdish peshmerga to move into Mosul to help with security. They took up residence in the largely Kurdish western half of the city, while Kurdish army units were deployed in the surrounding areas of Ninewa province. This facilitated the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) taking over the local administration, and after the 2005 elections, they came to control the provincial council as well due to the Sunni Arab boycott. This created ethnic tensions between Arabs and Kurds, and more violence.
By 2008 Mosul had become the last urban bastion of the Iraqi insurgency. During the Surge in 2007 hundreds of militants were forced north to escape the increase in U.S. forces, and moved to Mosul. The ethnic divide there proved a fertile environment, as the insurgents increasingly portrayed themselves as the protectors of the Arabs against the Kurds. Security statistics show the changed environment. In the last three months of 2007 attacks and casualties were actually decreasing. In October 2007 there were an average of 1.51 attacks per day, resulting in 2.87 deaths and 5.83 wounded, compared to just 0.96 attacks per day, 1.58 deaths and 1.25 wounded by December. That averaged out to 1.26 security incidents per day, 2.52 deaths, and 3.73 wounded for the last three months of 2007. By the first half of 2008 that increased to 1.89 security incidents, 2.90 deaths, and 6.92 wounded.
The presence of so many insurgents in Mosul led to several Iraqi and U.S. offensives, with few results. Beginning in February 2008 U.S. forces began setting up combat outposts throughout the city, and erecting blast walls to try to control the movement of insurgents, as Iraqi forces created a Ninewa Operations Command after Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki promised a “decisive battle” against Al Qaeda in the city in January. Deaths only decreased marginally, while the number of wounded increased dramatically over the next two months. They went from 3.34 deaths per day in February 2008 to 2.76 by April, while the number of wounded went from 2.75 to 7.60 during that same period. The problem was that rather than fighting, the militants instead chose to hide amongst the population, and adopted hit-and-run attacks.
Frustrated, in May Prime Minister Maliki announced Operation Lion’s Roar/Mother of Two Springs, but by August he admitted that it was a failure. Casualties actually increased in the two months after the offensive was launched going from 2.12 deaths per day, and 1.51 wounded in May to 3.58 deaths and 4.48 wounded by July. Following attacks on Christians in the city in October, U.S. and Iraqi forces launched Operation Mother of Two Springs II, and then Operation New Hope in February 2009. In October Operation Ninewa Wall was begun, which is almost exclusively Iraqi. Maliki also increasingly played up tensions with the Kurds, to try to rally the Sunni population of Mosul behind him to some success.
Casualties finally took a noticeable drop beginning in November 2008, but the security operations were not the cause. Rather it was the changing political situation in Mosul and Ninewa overall. In 2008 the al-Hadbaa party was formed to run in the 2009 provincial elections. The party was a coalition of Mosul elites, tribal leaders, and independent Kurds. Most important for the security situation, many Baathists and militants came to support the party as well. At the same time, the nationalist and Baathist factions of the insurgency were able to rest control of Mosul from Al Qaeda who had been losing ground in Iraq since the Anbar tribes turned on them beginning in 2005. These groups in turn, decided to try the political route after they boycotted the 2005 elections. The pending U.S. withdrawal was also a factor as many Sunni Arabs were afraid of greater Shiite domination after the Americans left, so they wanted to try to get positions in the government before that happened. Al-Hadbaa leaders were able to broker a cease-fire with the insurgents as a result, and the party ended up winning control of Ninewa in January 2009. Since then they have been able to forge a marriage of convenience with Maliki as both support a strong central government, and want the Kurdish peshmerga out of Mosul and Ninewa in general.
All of these factors led to a marked change in attacks in Mosul. Before armed clashes and shoot-outs were common in the city, along with all the bombings. Beginning in late 2008 through 2009 however, most attacks were drive by shootings, assassinations, house invasions, and still the bombs. The number of deaths went from 2.63 per day in the second half of 2008 to 1.97 in the first half of 2009, while the average number wounded dropped from 5.48 to 4.49 over the same period. From September to October the number of wounded also saw a noticeable drop.
Even with all of these changes Mosul remains a very dangerous place. Al-Hadbaa’s victory has increased tensions with the Kurdish Fraternal List that are boycotting the provincial council. That on-going ethnic divide provides a continued rationale for violence by some. In October 2009 Mosul still saw 66 attacks, 60 deaths, and 82 wounded. Until the problems between Arabs and Kurds are settled there, it will remain a largely war-torn city, unable to experience the slow return to normality that the rest of the country is beginning to experience.
The problems in Mosul began in 2004. Immediately after the U.S. invasion in 2003 the 101st Airborne Division under the command of General David Petraeus was able to pacify the city by using strong security measures, funding reconstruction projects, and getting all the major parties in the area to join the local council. When his troops left, the city was turned over to Iraqis who were not up to the job. This vacuum allowed insurgents to set up shop in 2004. Mosul became an important way station for Baathists and Al Qaeda in Syria to transfer money, supplies, and foreign fighters into Iraq. By 2005 Al Qaeda was largely in control of the western half of the city, and security deteriorated as a result.
The U.S. responded by asking the Kurdish peshmerga to move into Mosul to help with security. They took up residence in the largely Kurdish western half of the city, while Kurdish army units were deployed in the surrounding areas of Ninewa province. This facilitated the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) taking over the local administration, and after the 2005 elections, they came to control the provincial council as well due to the Sunni Arab boycott. This created ethnic tensions between Arabs and Kurds, and more violence.
By 2008 Mosul had become the last urban bastion of the Iraqi insurgency. During the Surge in 2007 hundreds of militants were forced north to escape the increase in U.S. forces, and moved to Mosul. The ethnic divide there proved a fertile environment, as the insurgents increasingly portrayed themselves as the protectors of the Arabs against the Kurds. Security statistics show the changed environment. In the last three months of 2007 attacks and casualties were actually decreasing. In October 2007 there were an average of 1.51 attacks per day, resulting in 2.87 deaths and 5.83 wounded, compared to just 0.96 attacks per day, 1.58 deaths and 1.25 wounded by December. That averaged out to 1.26 security incidents per day, 2.52 deaths, and 3.73 wounded for the last three months of 2007. By the first half of 2008 that increased to 1.89 security incidents, 2.90 deaths, and 6.92 wounded.
The presence of so many insurgents in Mosul led to several Iraqi and U.S. offensives, with few results. Beginning in February 2008 U.S. forces began setting up combat outposts throughout the city, and erecting blast walls to try to control the movement of insurgents, as Iraqi forces created a Ninewa Operations Command after Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki promised a “decisive battle” against Al Qaeda in the city in January. Deaths only decreased marginally, while the number of wounded increased dramatically over the next two months. They went from 3.34 deaths per day in February 2008 to 2.76 by April, while the number of wounded went from 2.75 to 7.60 during that same period. The problem was that rather than fighting, the militants instead chose to hide amongst the population, and adopted hit-and-run attacks.
Frustrated, in May Prime Minister Maliki announced Operation Lion’s Roar/Mother of Two Springs, but by August he admitted that it was a failure. Casualties actually increased in the two months after the offensive was launched going from 2.12 deaths per day, and 1.51 wounded in May to 3.58 deaths and 4.48 wounded by July. Following attacks on Christians in the city in October, U.S. and Iraqi forces launched Operation Mother of Two Springs II, and then Operation New Hope in February 2009. In October Operation Ninewa Wall was begun, which is almost exclusively Iraqi. Maliki also increasingly played up tensions with the Kurds, to try to rally the Sunni population of Mosul behind him to some success.
Casualties finally took a noticeable drop beginning in November 2008, but the security operations were not the cause. Rather it was the changing political situation in Mosul and Ninewa overall. In 2008 the al-Hadbaa party was formed to run in the 2009 provincial elections. The party was a coalition of Mosul elites, tribal leaders, and independent Kurds. Most important for the security situation, many Baathists and militants came to support the party as well. At the same time, the nationalist and Baathist factions of the insurgency were able to rest control of Mosul from Al Qaeda who had been losing ground in Iraq since the Anbar tribes turned on them beginning in 2005. These groups in turn, decided to try the political route after they boycotted the 2005 elections. The pending U.S. withdrawal was also a factor as many Sunni Arabs were afraid of greater Shiite domination after the Americans left, so they wanted to try to get positions in the government before that happened. Al-Hadbaa leaders were able to broker a cease-fire with the insurgents as a result, and the party ended up winning control of Ninewa in January 2009. Since then they have been able to forge a marriage of convenience with Maliki as both support a strong central government, and want the Kurdish peshmerga out of Mosul and Ninewa in general.
All of these factors led to a marked change in attacks in Mosul. Before armed clashes and shoot-outs were common in the city, along with all the bombings. Beginning in late 2008 through 2009 however, most attacks were drive by shootings, assassinations, house invasions, and still the bombs. The number of deaths went from 2.63 per day in the second half of 2008 to 1.97 in the first half of 2009, while the average number wounded dropped from 5.48 to 4.49 over the same period. From September to October the number of wounded also saw a noticeable drop.
Even with all of these changes Mosul remains a very dangerous place. Al-Hadbaa’s victory has increased tensions with the Kurdish Fraternal List that are boycotting the provincial council. That on-going ethnic divide provides a continued rationale for violence by some. In October 2009 Mosul still saw 66 attacks, 60 deaths, and 82 wounded. Until the problems between Arabs and Kurds are settled there, it will remain a largely war-torn city, unable to experience the slow return to normality that the rest of the country is beginning to experience.
Monthly Casualties In Mosul – Oct. 2007 to Oct. 2009
Attacks/ Incidents | Avg. # Of Attacks/ Incidents | Deaths | Avg. # Of Deaths | Wounded | Avg. # Of Wounded | |
2007 | ||||||
Oct. | 47 | 1.51 | 89 + 2 Americans | 2.87 | 181 + 2 Americans | 5.83 |
Nov. | 39 | 1.30 | 94 + 1 American | 3.13 | 124 + 1 American | 4.13 |
Dec. | 30 | 0.96 | 49 + 3 Americans | 1.58 | 39+ | 1.25 |
2008 | ||||||
Jan. | 58 | 1.87 | 107 + 6 Americans | 3.45 | 385 + 1 American | 12.41 |
Feb. | 56 | 1.93 | 97 + 1 American | 3.34 | 80 | 2.75 |
March | 64 | 2.06 | 86 | 2.77 | 267 | 8.61 |
April | 67 | 2.23 | 83 | 2.76 | 228 | 7.60 |
May | 42 | 1.35 | 66 | 2.12 | 47 + 3 Americans | 1.51 |
June | 58 | 1.93 | 89 | 2.96 | 253 | 8.43 |
July | 83 | 2.67 | 111 | 3.58 | 139 | 4.48 |
Aug. | 67 | 2.16 | 59 | 1.90 | 113 + 1 American | 3.64 |
Sep. | 80 | 2.66 | 82 | 2.73 | 140+ | 4.66 |
Oct. | 92 | 2.96 | 112 | 3.61 | 188 | 6.06 |
Nov. | 65 | 2.16 | 53 | 1.76 | 249 | 8.30 |
Dec. | 65 | 2.09 | 68 | 2.19 | 181 | 5.83 |
2009 | ||||||
Jan. | 52 | 1.67 | 56 | 1.80 | 56 | 1.80 |
Feb. | 81 | 2.89 | 58 | 2.00 | 111 | 3.96 |
March | 86 | 2.77 | 69 | 2.22 | 169 | 5.45 |
April | 79 | 2.63 | 53 | 1.76 | 191 | 6.36 |
May | 83 | 3.06 | 64 | 2.06 | 164 | 4.70 |
June | 73 | 2.43 | 58 | 1.93 | 123 | 4.10 |
July | 73 | 2.35 | 79 | 2.54 | 169 | 5.45 |
Aug. | 77 | 2.48 | 102 | 3.29 | 171 | 5.51 |
Sep. | 72 | 2.40 | 65 | 2.16 | 60 | 2.00 |
Oct. | 66 | 2.12 | 60 | 1.93 | 82 | 2.64 |
Avgs. | ||||||
4th Qtr 2007 | 38.66/ month | 1.26/day | 77.33/ month | 2.52/ day | 114.66/ month | 3.73/day |
1st Half 2008 | 57.5/ month | 1.89/day | 88.00/ month | 2.90/ day | 210.00/ month | 6.92/day |
2nd Half 2008 | 75.33/ month | 2.45/day | 80.83/ month | 2.63/ day | 168.33/ month | 5.48/day |
1st Half 2009 | 75.66/ month | 2.50/day | 59.66/ month | 1.97/ day | 135.66/ month | 4.49/day |
SOURCES
ABC News, "Iraqi woman and child killed by US fire," 5/11/08
Abouzeid, Rania, "In Mosul, Iraq's Insurgency Refuses to Be Tamed," Time, 3/18/09
Agence France Presse, "Death toll from bombing in Iraq's Mosul rises to 13," 6/3/08
Associated Press, "Al-Qaida in Iraq front group warns it will retaliate vs. US-Iraqi crackdown," 5/27/08
- "Female bomber kills 3 near bus stop in Iraq," USA Today, 3/19/08
- "Iraq: explosion in apartment kills at least 7, wounds 70," 1/23/08
- "Iraqi police: 18 killed in clashes with al-Qaeda," USA Today, 11/10/07
- "Police: Female suicide bomber kills 3 in Iraq," 2/17/08
Aswat al-Iraq, "2 bombs defused in Mosul," 10/26/09
- "2 civilians killed in Mosul," 10/21/09
- "2 civilians wounded in 2 separate incidents in Mosul," 10/5/09
- "2 cops wounded in Mosul blast," 10/5/09
- "2 killed in separate incidents in Mosul," 10/3/09
- "2 unknown bodies found in Mosul," 10/20/09
- "3 killed, 5 wounded in bombing in Mosul," 10/28/09
- "3 policemen killed, officer wounded in Mosul attack," 10/29/09
- "Blast in Ninewa wounds cement company chief," 10/18/09
- "Bomb wounds 2 in Mosul," 10/6/09
- "Children, mother wounded in Mosul blast," 10/12/09
- "Civilian killed in tribal clashes in Mosul," 10/12/09
- "Civilian wounded in IED blast near Mosul," 10/26/09
- "Contractor gunned down in Mosul," 10/12/09
- "District chief escapes attempt on his life in Mosul," 10/19/09
- "Guard killed in crowded souk in Mosul," 10/23/09
- "Gunmen assassinate tribal affairs office chief in Ninewa," 10/19/09
- "Gunmen storm building in Mosul, kill two civilians," 10/26/09
- "Hand grenade injures 4 in Mosul," 10/31/09
- "IED defused in western Mosul," 10/12/09
- "Iraq army kills gunman in Mosul," 10/19/09
- "Iraqi soldier killed, 2 wounded in Mosul," 10/23/09
- "Police kill gunman in northeastern Mosul," 10/2/09
- "Policeman killed, 3 civilians wounded separately in Mosul," 10/22/09
- "Policeman, gunman killed in Mosul," 10/22/09
- "Policeman survives IED blast near his vehicle," 10/18/09
- "Policeman wounded in Mosul blast," 10/13/09
- "Real-estate office owner killed in Mosul," 10/25/09
- "Sticky bomb defused at official building in Ninewa," 10/28/09
- "Sticky bomb kills, wounds 5 family members," 10/7/09
- "Sticky bomb wounds 5 in Mosul," 10/31/09
- "U.S. forces kill civilian, arrest 4 brothers," 10/27/09
- "Vendor, child killed in northern Mosul," 10/21/09
- "Woman killed, 2 civilians wounded by police mistake fire in Mosul," 10/16/09
- "Woman's head found in Mosul," 10/3/09
Brown, Drewn, "U.S. troops setting down roots in Mosul," Stars and Stripes, 2/23/08
CNN, "Bombings kill 11 in northern Ira," 7/7/08
- "Iraq to host Iran leader for first time since nations warred," 1/24/08
Dagher, Sam, "Fractures in Iraq City as Kurds and Baghdad Vie," New York Times, 10/28/08
Dimov, Marina, "Three members of same family murdered in northern Iraq," Visit Bulgaria, 9/12/08
DPA, "Al-Qaeda suspects, tribal policemen, TV presenter killed in Iraq," 6/17/08
- "At least 10 killed, 15 injured in attacks in Iraq," 2/25/08
- "At least 12 killed in Iraq violence," 3/11/08
- "At least 31 killed in Iraq violence, 100 wounded – 3rd Update," 12/25/07
- "At least 59 killed, 76 wounded in Iraqi violence (1st Lead)," 4/15/08
- "At least five killed, three wounded in Iraqi violence – Summary," 2/3/08
- "Christians, churches attacked in Iraq during celebration," 1/7/08
- "Female students kidnapped, US soldier dies in Iraq," 7/6/08
- "Four Iraqi soldiers killed in clashes in northern Iraq (Extra)," 5/7/08
- "Four killed, three injured in attacks in Mosul," 10/21/09
- "Governor of Iraq's Nineveh escapes assassination attempt – Update," 6/7/08
- "Iraq's Islamic Party leader assassinated in Mosul," 8/7/08
- "Nine killed, nine wounded across Iraq (Roundup)," 10/31/07
- "Plane engines, explosives, and another grave found in Iraq – Summary," 3/9/08
- "Policeman, soldier killed in two incidents in Iraq (Extra)," 8/14/08
- "Three killed, 13 injured in blasts in northern Iraq (2nd Lead)," 4/23/08
- "US troops kill nine suspected al-Qaeda members in Iraq," 2/18/08
Al Dulaimy, Mohammed, "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 11 February 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 2/11/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 12 May 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 5/12/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 24 May 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 5/24/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday October 5 2009," McClatchy Newspapers, 10/5/09
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Saturday October 24, 2009
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Sunday 4 May 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 5/4/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Sunday 23 December 2007," McClatchy Newspapers, 12/23/07
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 26 February 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 2/26/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 7 May 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 5/7/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 10 September 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 9/10/08
Freeman, Sholnn, "At Least 35 Die As Bombers Hit Wedding Convoy," Washington Post, 5/2/08 - "U.S. Deaths in Iraq War Reach 4,000; Green Zone Is Shelled," Washington Post, 3/24/08
Hamilton, Eric, "The Fight for Mosul," Institute for the Study of War, 4/29/08
Hammoudi, Laith, "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 8 September 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 9/8/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 26 October 2009," McClatchy Newspapers, 10/26/09
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 4 September 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 9/4/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 20 October 2009," McClatchy Newspapers, 10/29/09
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 13 October 2009," McClatchy Newspapers, 10/13/09
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 22 April 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 4/22/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 29 April 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 4/29/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 5 March 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 3/5/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 13 August 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 8/13/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 14 October 2009," McClatchy Newspapers, 10/14/09
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 27 August 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 8/27/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 27 February 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 2/27/08
Holden, Michael, "U.S. and Iraqi forces begin al Qaeda action in Mosul," 2/11/08
Hussein, Jenan, "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 28 October 2009," McClatchy Newspapers, 10/28/09
International Crisis Group, "Iraq's New Battlefront: The Struggle Over Ninewa," 9/28/09
Iraq Today, April 2008
- August 2008
- December 2007
- February 2008
- March 2008
- January 2008
- July 2008
- June 2008
- May 2008
- November 2007
- October 2007
- September 2008
Issa, Sahar, "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Friday 5 September 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 9/5/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Friday 14 March 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 3/14/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Friday 22 August 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 8/22/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 19 October 2009," McClatchy Newspapers, 10/19/09
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Sunday 20 July 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 7/20/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 1 October 2009," McClatchy Newspapers, 10/1/09
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 7 February 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 2/7/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 10 April 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 4/10/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 17 January 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 1/17/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 18 September 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 9/18/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 20 March 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 3/20/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 24 July 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 7/24/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 7 October 2009," McClatchy Newspapers, 10/7/09
Kadhim, Hussein, "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 9 June 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 6/9/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 14 January 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 1/14/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 29 September 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 9/29/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 3 October 2007," McClatchy Newspapers, 10/3/07
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 6 March 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 3/6/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 11 October 2007," McClatchy Newspapers, 10/11/07
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 01 April 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 4/1/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 06 May 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 5/6/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 23 January 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 1/23/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 24 September 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 9/24/08
KUNA, "Attack in Mosul leads to injury of 17 people," 6/22/08
Mohammed, Mujahid, "Five arrested after Iraq TV crew murder," Agence France Presse, 9/14/08
Multi-National Corps – Iraq, "MNC-I Soldier attacked during military operations (Mosul)," 11/13/07
- "MND-N Soldiers attacked in Ninevah Province (Mosul)," 2/20/08
- "MND-North Soldiers attacked by small-arms fire (Mosul," 1/26/07
- "Task Force Iron Soldiers attacked in Mosul," 10/31/07
Nagpal, Sahil, "Governor of Iraq's Nineveh province survives assassination attempt," DPA, 6/7/08
Oppel, Richard, "Truck Bomb Kills Up to 16 Iraqis in Mosul," 10/17/07
Partlow, Joshua and Tyson, Ann Scott, "Five U.S. Soldiers Are Killed When Convoy Is Hit in Mosul," Washington Post, 1/29/08
PBS Frontline, "Interview Maj. Gen. David Petraeus," Beyond Baghdad, 2/12/04
Press TV, "Car bomb kills woman in Baghdad," 11/8/07
Reuters, "Bombs hit northern Iraq, forces expect more," 8/13/08
- "Car bomb kills 18 people in Iraqi city," 6/26/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, April 1," 4/1/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, April 2," 4/2/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, April 4," 4/4/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, April 6," 4/6/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, April 11," 4/11/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, April 12," 4/12/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, April 13," 4/13/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, April 15," 4/15/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, April 19," 4/19/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, April 22," 4/22/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, April 23," 4/23/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, April 25," 4/25/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, April 27," 4/27/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, April 30," 4/30/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 4," 8/4/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 5," 8/5/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 6," 8/6/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 8," 8/8/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 11," 8/11/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 14," 8/14/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 15," 8/15/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 18," 8/18/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 21," 8/21/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 23," 8/23/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 25," 8/25/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 27," 8/27/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 28," 8/28/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 30," 8/30/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 31," 8/31/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 25," 12/25/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 28," 12/28/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 29," 12/29/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 30," 12/30/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 4," 2/4/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 6," 2/6/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 7," 2/7/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 8," 2/8/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 9," 2/9/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 11," 2/11/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 19," 2/19/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 20," 2/20/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 24," 2/24/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 25," 2/25/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 27," 2/27/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 28," 2/28/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 1," 1/1/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 2," 1/2/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 7," 1/7/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 13," 1/13/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 16," 1/16/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 17," 1/17/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 20," 1/20/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 23," 1/23/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 30," 1/30/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 1," 7/1/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 3," 7/3/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 5," 7/5/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 7," 7/7/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 8," 7/8/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 9," 7/9/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 11," 7/11/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 12," 7/12/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 13," 7/13/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 14," 7/14/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 15," 7/15/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 16," 7/16/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 18," 7/18/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 19," 7/19/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 20," 7/20/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 21," 7/21/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 22," 7/22/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 24," 7/24/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 25," 7/25/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 28," 7/28/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 31," 7/31/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 2," 6/2/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 8," 6/8/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 9," 6/9/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 14," 6/14/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 16," 6/16/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 17," 6/17/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 19," 6/19/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 22," 6/22/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 24," 6/24/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 29," 6/29/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 30," 6/30/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, March 4," 3/4/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, March 10," 3/10/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, March 12," 3/12/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, March 16," 3/16/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, March 17," 3/17/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, March 18," 3/18/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, March 19," 3/19/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, March 21," 3/21/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, March 25," 3/25/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 2," 5/2/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 4," 5/4/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 5," 5/5/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 6," 5/6/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 9," 5/9/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 13," 5/13/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 20," 5/20/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 22," 5/22/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 24," 5/24/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 26," 5/26/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 29," 5/29/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 30," 5/30/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 3," 11/3/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 5," 11/5/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 6," 11/6/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 19," 11/19/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 22," 11/22/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 23," 11/23/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 24," 11/24/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 26," 11/26/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 27," 11/27/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 29," 11/29/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 1," 10/1/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 2," 10/2/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 9," 10/9/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 9," 10/9/09
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 11," 10/11/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 11," 10/11/09
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 12," 10/12/09
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 14," 10/14/09
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 15," 10/15/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 15," 10/15/09
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 16," 10/16/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 17," 10/17/09
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 18," 10/18/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 18," 10/18/09
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 19," 10/19/09
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 20," 10/20/09
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 21," 10/21/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 22," 10/22/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 24," 10/24/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 26," 10/26/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 30," 10/30/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 30," 10/30/09
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 1," 9/1/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 3," 9/3/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 9," 9/8/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 9," 9/9/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 10," 9/10/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 13," 9/13/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 17," 9/17/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 18," 9/18/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 20," 9/20/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 21," 9/21/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 22," 9/22/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 23," 9/23/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 25," 9/25/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 28," 9/28/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 29," 9/29/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 30," 9/30/08
- "Iraqi, U.S. soldiers kill 14 gunmen in Mosul raids," 11/9/07
- "Kidnapped Iraq archbishop dead-Catholic news agency," 3/13/08
- "Truck bomb explodes near Iraq's largest dam," 12/17/07
Saeed, Samer, "U.S. troops erect walls in Mosul as inhabitants flee," Azzaman, 2/17/08
Surk, Barbara, "Truck bomb destroys key bridge in western Iraq," Associated Press, 10/17/09
Tait, Paul, "Severed heads and bodies found in Iraq field: police," Reuters, 1/29/08
U.S. Department of Defense, "News Release," 12/28/07
UPI, "Iraq violence claims nine lives," 9/12/08
- "Two soldiers die in Iraq car bomb," 7/19/08
Xinhua, "At least 2 killed in suicide truck bombing in N Iraq," 9/22/08
- "Car bomb hits police patrol in northern Iraq," 1/14/08
- "Car bomb kills policeman in northern Iraq," 9/8/08
- "Gunmen blow up 4 houses in N Iraq, child killed," 6/16/08
- "Gunmen kill provincial council member in N Iraq," 11/6/07
- "Head of provincial council survives bomb attack in N Iraq," 12/9/07
- "Insurgents blow up house of Sunni lawmaker in N Iraq," 9/23/08
- "Iraqi soldiers foil suicide bomb attack in Mosul," 4/29/08
- "Policeman killed in gunfire in northern Ira," 9/20/08
- "Policeman killed in shooting in N Iraq," 11/28/07
- "Seven killed in Iraq suicide car bombing," 9/2/08
- "Suicide car bomb injuring 14 in N Iraq," 6/23/08
- "Three policemen killed in insurgents' attack in Iraq," 1/4/08
- "Two people killed in bomb attack in northern Iraq," 5/24/08
- "Two suicide bombers hit police checkpoint in N Iraq," 11/4/07
Sunday, November 15, 2009
New Rumors Of Maliki-Iraqi National Alliance Talks
As the speaker of Iran’s parliament Ali Larijani came to Baghdad for a four-day visit beginning on November 4, 2009, rumors swirled in the Iraqi press that one of his main priorities was to get Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to join the major Shiite coalition, the Iraqi National Alliance. Iran was instrumental in putting the list together. Even after the National Alliance was announced in August 2009, talks continued with Maliki’s State of Law List. The sticking points were Maliki’s demand to get 50% of the alliance’s seats and be their only candidate for prime minister. The latest story to emerge of on-going negotiations was from Aswat al-Iraq who reported on November 8, 2009 that the Sadrists, members of the National Alliance, were demanding that the government release all of their followers from jail and death row in order for the State of Law to join. Members of the State of Law in parliament also said that talks were underway. This is all happening after Larijani denied that the point of his trip was to mediate between Maliki and the National Alliance, and Dawa lawmakers said they would not join the list or give into Iranian pressure.
One of Iran’s main priorities is to maintain Shiite power in Iraq. They do not favor one specific group, and have in fact, backed all of the major parties that are rivals with each other. Those divisions actually allow Tehran to maintain its influence as Shiite politicians go to them for assistance and mediation with the others. On the Iraqi side it seems unlikely that Maliki would agree to join the National Alliance. Its two major players, the Sadrists and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council have both been opponents of the prime minister in the past, and would like to replace him. On the other hand, the division of the Iraqi parties means that no list is likely to even get a plurality in the 2010 election. If the State of Law were to join with the National Alliance however, they would be assure of at least that many votes, which would give Maliki a greater chance of returning to the leadership. With the Byzantine nature of Iraqi politics, anything is possible.
SOURCES
Aswat al-Iraq, “Sadr says detainees’ release precondition for coalition,” 11/8/09
Al Jazeera, “Iraqi Shias form new alliance,” 8/24/09
Al-Sharq al-Awsat, “Larijani Denies Mediation Role In Iraq,” MEMRI Blog, 11/6/09
One of Iran’s main priorities is to maintain Shiite power in Iraq. They do not favor one specific group, and have in fact, backed all of the major parties that are rivals with each other. Those divisions actually allow Tehran to maintain its influence as Shiite politicians go to them for assistance and mediation with the others. On the Iraqi side it seems unlikely that Maliki would agree to join the National Alliance. Its two major players, the Sadrists and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council have both been opponents of the prime minister in the past, and would like to replace him. On the other hand, the division of the Iraqi parties means that no list is likely to even get a plurality in the 2010 election. If the State of Law were to join with the National Alliance however, they would be assure of at least that many votes, which would give Maliki a greater chance of returning to the leadership. With the Byzantine nature of Iraqi politics, anything is possible.
SOURCES
Aswat al-Iraq, “Sadr says detainees’ release precondition for coalition,” 11/8/09
Al Jazeera, “Iraqi Shias form new alliance,” 8/24/09
Al-Sharq al-Awsat, “Larijani Denies Mediation Role In Iraq,” MEMRI Blog, 11/6/09
Friday, November 13, 2009
Iranian Parliamentary Speaker’s Visit Raises Questions About Tehran’s Influence In Iraq
The speaker of Iran’s parliament, Ali Larijani just finished a four-day trip to Baghdad. His visit is raising questions about Iran’s role in the 2010 Iraqi elections, and Tehran’s continued support for militants.
Iran was instrumental in the formation of the main Shiite coalition, the Iraqi National Alliance. As the List was being put together a slew of Iranian officials traveled to Iraq, while Iraqi politicians went to Iran to talk with then leader of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, who was residing in a hospital in Tehran. Iranians often joined those meetings. They failed to convince Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to join the National Alliance however. As Larijani entered Baghdad, Iraqi and Arab papers were full of reports that he was to put pressure on the Prime Minister to form a single Shiite list. This is highly unlikely as many members of the National Alliance oppose Maliki, and would not support his bid to remain prime minister, which is his top priority. Maliki’s allies in parliament have said that he will not give into Iranian pressure.
The 2010 Iraqi elections were definitely on Larijani’s agenda as he visited many top politicians. On November 6, 2009 he met with the head of the Supreme Council Ammar al-Hakim to discuss the National Alliance. Larijani also had lunch with Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi of the Supreme Council, who said that despite problems Iran and Iraq had improved their relationship. The speaker of parliament Ilyad al-Samarrai, his two deputies, and other lawmakers were on his agenda as well.
A less friendly encounter happened when Larijani met with Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi of the newly formed Iraqi National Movement. Hashemi said that Iran had lost a lot of support within Iraq because of their interference in the country’s politics and security. Larijani also asked for Hashemi to pardon Iranian agents who had been captured trying to infiltrate into Iraq. The Vice President replied by saying that if Iran released Iraqis it held, than there could be an exchange.
Iran’s support for Shiite militants was on display just as Larijani entered Iraq. On November 4, two members of Hezbollah were captured with weapons in north Baghdad. Iran has used Hezbollah operatives to train and organize Shiite militiamen within Iraq since the U.S. invasion in 2003. On November 6, security forces in Kut, Wasit put up wanted posters for four members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Qods Force, who they said were responsible for carrying out attacks on Iraqi forces and civilians. The Qods Force is a branch of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards who were created to run its foreign policy. The Qods Force’s Ramazan Cops was created in the mid-1990s to deal with Iraq. It not only funds Special Groups and training camps, but is also responsible for giving money to Iraqi political parties, and economic aid to the country.
Iran’s main concerns in Iraq are to maintain a friendly Shiite government in Baghdad, make sure that it never becomes a foe to Tehran again, and hinder the U.S. effort there. Those have been seen during Larijani’s visit. He has tried to shore up the main Shiite alliance before the 2010 elections. At the same time, Iranian agents and their Hezbollah allies continue to carry out operations within Iraq to keep the country weak, and make the Americans pay a price for being there. For those reasons, Iran creates very mixed feelings within Iraq. People welcome their economic assistance and tourism, but resent their influence and destabilizing effect.
SOURCES
Alsumaria, “Ali Larijani meets Sayyed Ammar Al Hakim,” 11/6/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Al-Hashemi disagrees with Larijani on several issues – source,” 11/6/09
- “Al-Hashemi: tension dominates meeting with Larijani,” 11/6/09
- “Security forces seek 4 suspected Iranian group members,” 11/6/09
- “VP says relations with Iran improve despite ‘difficulties,’” 11/6/09
Az-Zaman, “Two Hizbullah Operatives Arrested in Iraq,” MEMRI Blog, 11/4/09
Al-Rafidayn, Al-Sabah, “Iraqi PM Al-Maliki May Succumb to Iranian Pressure to Join Shi’ite Coalition,” MEMRI Blog, 11/4/09
Al-Sharq al-Awsat, “Larijani Denies Mediation Role In Iraq,” MEMRI Blog, 11/6/09
Al-Zaman, Al-Mada, “Larijani Mediates Between Al-Maliki And Al-Hakim,” MEMRI Blog, 11/5/09
Iran was instrumental in the formation of the main Shiite coalition, the Iraqi National Alliance. As the List was being put together a slew of Iranian officials traveled to Iraq, while Iraqi politicians went to Iran to talk with then leader of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, who was residing in a hospital in Tehran. Iranians often joined those meetings. They failed to convince Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to join the National Alliance however. As Larijani entered Baghdad, Iraqi and Arab papers were full of reports that he was to put pressure on the Prime Minister to form a single Shiite list. This is highly unlikely as many members of the National Alliance oppose Maliki, and would not support his bid to remain prime minister, which is his top priority. Maliki’s allies in parliament have said that he will not give into Iranian pressure.
The 2010 Iraqi elections were definitely on Larijani’s agenda as he visited many top politicians. On November 6, 2009 he met with the head of the Supreme Council Ammar al-Hakim to discuss the National Alliance. Larijani also had lunch with Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi of the Supreme Council, who said that despite problems Iran and Iraq had improved their relationship. The speaker of parliament Ilyad al-Samarrai, his two deputies, and other lawmakers were on his agenda as well.
A less friendly encounter happened when Larijani met with Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi of the newly formed Iraqi National Movement. Hashemi said that Iran had lost a lot of support within Iraq because of their interference in the country’s politics and security. Larijani also asked for Hashemi to pardon Iranian agents who had been captured trying to infiltrate into Iraq. The Vice President replied by saying that if Iran released Iraqis it held, than there could be an exchange.
Iran’s support for Shiite militants was on display just as Larijani entered Iraq. On November 4, two members of Hezbollah were captured with weapons in north Baghdad. Iran has used Hezbollah operatives to train and organize Shiite militiamen within Iraq since the U.S. invasion in 2003. On November 6, security forces in Kut, Wasit put up wanted posters for four members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Qods Force, who they said were responsible for carrying out attacks on Iraqi forces and civilians. The Qods Force is a branch of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards who were created to run its foreign policy. The Qods Force’s Ramazan Cops was created in the mid-1990s to deal with Iraq. It not only funds Special Groups and training camps, but is also responsible for giving money to Iraqi political parties, and economic aid to the country.
Iran’s main concerns in Iraq are to maintain a friendly Shiite government in Baghdad, make sure that it never becomes a foe to Tehran again, and hinder the U.S. effort there. Those have been seen during Larijani’s visit. He has tried to shore up the main Shiite alliance before the 2010 elections. At the same time, Iranian agents and their Hezbollah allies continue to carry out operations within Iraq to keep the country weak, and make the Americans pay a price for being there. For those reasons, Iran creates very mixed feelings within Iraq. People welcome their economic assistance and tourism, but resent their influence and destabilizing effect.
SOURCES
Alsumaria, “Ali Larijani meets Sayyed Ammar Al Hakim,” 11/6/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Al-Hashemi disagrees with Larijani on several issues – source,” 11/6/09
- “Al-Hashemi: tension dominates meeting with Larijani,” 11/6/09
- “Security forces seek 4 suspected Iranian group members,” 11/6/09
- “VP says relations with Iran improve despite ‘difficulties,’” 11/6/09
Az-Zaman, “Two Hizbullah Operatives Arrested in Iraq,” MEMRI Blog, 11/4/09
Al-Rafidayn, Al-Sabah, “Iraqi PM Al-Maliki May Succumb to Iranian Pressure to Join Shi’ite Coalition,” MEMRI Blog, 11/4/09
Al-Sharq al-Awsat, “Larijani Denies Mediation Role In Iraq,” MEMRI Blog, 11/6/09
Al-Zaman, Al-Mada, “Larijani Mediates Between Al-Maliki And Al-Hakim,” MEMRI Blog, 11/5/09
Thursday, November 12, 2009
Iraq Moves Ahead With Oil Deals
Iraq recently signed a number of new oil deals and has plans to move ahead with several others in the coming weeks. These are part of the Oil Ministry’s plans to open up Iraq’s resources to joint ventures with foreign companies to boost petroleum production to 7 million barrels a day in seven years. This is desperately needed as oil provides almost all of the Iraqi government’s revenue, and Iraq needs billions for development and reconstruction.
On November 5, 2009 the Iraqi Oil Ministry agreed to an initial deal with Exxon Mobile and Royal Dutch Shell for the West Qurna 1 oil field in Basra. It has reserves of 7.4 billion barrels of oil, and was placed up for auction in June 2009. Exxon Mobile and Shell were the top bidders then, but asked for $4 for each extra barrel they produced after production goals were met. The Oil Ministry was only willing to pay $1. In October the two sides agreed to a remuneration fee of $1.90, and the companies said they would increase production from the current level of 280,000 barrels a day to 2.1 million in seven years.
The day before, British Petroleum (BP) and the Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC) also finalized their contract for the Rumaila field in Basra. Rumaila has 17.8 billion barrels in reserves, and is Iraq’s largest producer at nearly 1 million barrels a day. BP and CNPC have agreed to boost production to 2.85 million barrels a day in six years, and be paid $2 for every extra barrel produced. BP and CNPC was the only consortium to win a bid in the June round.
On November 2, Eni of Italy, Occidental Petroleum Oil of the U.S., and KOGAS of South Korea signed a preliminary contract for the Zubair field also in Basra. Like Exxon Mobile and Shell, the Eni led consortium were involved in the June auction, but failed to agree to terms with the Oil Ministry until now. Zubair has reserves of 4 billion barrels of oil, and the oil companies have promised to boost production from 195,000 barrels a day to 1.125 million barrels in seven years. There still seems to be some disagreements as Eni said they expected to invest $10 billion, but the Oil Minister said he wanted $35 billion.
The Oil Ministry is also involved in negotiations with a Japanese group consisting of Nippon Oil Corp., Inpex Corp., and JGC Corp. for the Nassiriya field in Dhi Qar. Nassiriya was not part of the June bid round, and has reserves of 5 billion barrels. This deal is for $10 billion and is for engineering and construction work.
Together these contracts, if they come to fruition could almost double Iraq’s oil production. That’s desperately needed as Iraq is almost completely dependent upon petroleum for money. Currently, it has the third largest oil reserves, but is only the 11th largest producer in the world. As reported before, Iraq’s oil production has slowly increased since the 2003 invasion, but has consistently fluctuated up and down and is nowhere near its potential. In September 2009 for example, Iraq produced 2.5 million barrels of oil per day, and exported 1.94 million. That was down from the 2.0 million barrels exported in August. The Oil Ministry’s maneuvers have also been criticized by parliament. The oil and gas committee declared the recent wave of deals as illegal because they were not approved by the legislature, and they want to question the Oil Minister over his poor performance. That is only one small portion of the dispute over Iraq’s most valuable resource. Like so many major issues in Iraq, the country’s politicians have not been able to separate the short-term technical need to boost oil production, from the long-term debate over who has control over contracts and development. That has led to a debilitating set of arguments that have held up major legislation like a new oil law. Those differences could delay these deals from being completed. The companies also have to be aware of local needs, as Iraqis have sabotaged the work of the only other foreign oil corporation working in the Ahdab field in Wasit over lack of jobs and damage to their land. All of these reasons together are why the petroleum industry has been slow to enter the Iraqi market because there are so many uncertainties. At the same time, these preliminary deals are a sign of success for the Oil Ministry, which has seen so many failures in the past. Five oil companies have agreed to their stiff terms after rejecting them in the June bid round. This does create some optimism that Iraq’s petroleum industry will finally begin to get the investment that it needs, but there are still many hurdles ahead.
SOURCES
Alsumaria, “Iraq MPs stress on questioning Oil Minister,” 11/4/09
BBC, “Iraq in third overseas oil deal,” 11/5/09
Dow Jones Newswires, “Iraq Sep Oil Exports -2.7% On Month At 1.956 Million B/D – Ministry,” 10/27/09
EU News Network, “Iraqi Lawmaker Irked Over BP Oil Contract,” 11/4/09
Hafidh, Hassan, “Iraq to Award Oil Field To ExxonMobil, Shell,” Wall Street Journal, 11/4/09
Hoyos, Carola, Warrell, Helen, and Bernard, Steve, “Crude Competition,” Financial Times, 6/30/09
Rasheed, Ahmed, “UPDATE 2-Iraq,Eni-led group sign initial Zubair oil deal,” Reuters, 11/2/09
Reuters, “Q+A-Iraq’s oil contracts, scale and obstacles,” 10/16/09
Williams, Timothy, “Iraq Signs Contract to Develop Oil Field,” New York Times, 11/4/09
On November 5, 2009 the Iraqi Oil Ministry agreed to an initial deal with Exxon Mobile and Royal Dutch Shell for the West Qurna 1 oil field in Basra. It has reserves of 7.4 billion barrels of oil, and was placed up for auction in June 2009. Exxon Mobile and Shell were the top bidders then, but asked for $4 for each extra barrel they produced after production goals were met. The Oil Ministry was only willing to pay $1. In October the two sides agreed to a remuneration fee of $1.90, and the companies said they would increase production from the current level of 280,000 barrels a day to 2.1 million in seven years.
The day before, British Petroleum (BP) and the Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC) also finalized their contract for the Rumaila field in Basra. Rumaila has 17.8 billion barrels in reserves, and is Iraq’s largest producer at nearly 1 million barrels a day. BP and CNPC have agreed to boost production to 2.85 million barrels a day in six years, and be paid $2 for every extra barrel produced. BP and CNPC was the only consortium to win a bid in the June round.
On November 2, Eni of Italy, Occidental Petroleum Oil of the U.S., and KOGAS of South Korea signed a preliminary contract for the Zubair field also in Basra. Like Exxon Mobile and Shell, the Eni led consortium were involved in the June auction, but failed to agree to terms with the Oil Ministry until now. Zubair has reserves of 4 billion barrels of oil, and the oil companies have promised to boost production from 195,000 barrels a day to 1.125 million barrels in seven years. There still seems to be some disagreements as Eni said they expected to invest $10 billion, but the Oil Minister said he wanted $35 billion.
The Oil Ministry is also involved in negotiations with a Japanese group consisting of Nippon Oil Corp., Inpex Corp., and JGC Corp. for the Nassiriya field in Dhi Qar. Nassiriya was not part of the June bid round, and has reserves of 5 billion barrels. This deal is for $10 billion and is for engineering and construction work.
Together these contracts, if they come to fruition could almost double Iraq’s oil production. That’s desperately needed as Iraq is almost completely dependent upon petroleum for money. Currently, it has the third largest oil reserves, but is only the 11th largest producer in the world. As reported before, Iraq’s oil production has slowly increased since the 2003 invasion, but has consistently fluctuated up and down and is nowhere near its potential. In September 2009 for example, Iraq produced 2.5 million barrels of oil per day, and exported 1.94 million. That was down from the 2.0 million barrels exported in August. The Oil Ministry’s maneuvers have also been criticized by parliament. The oil and gas committee declared the recent wave of deals as illegal because they were not approved by the legislature, and they want to question the Oil Minister over his poor performance. That is only one small portion of the dispute over Iraq’s most valuable resource. Like so many major issues in Iraq, the country’s politicians have not been able to separate the short-term technical need to boost oil production, from the long-term debate over who has control over contracts and development. That has led to a debilitating set of arguments that have held up major legislation like a new oil law. Those differences could delay these deals from being completed. The companies also have to be aware of local needs, as Iraqis have sabotaged the work of the only other foreign oil corporation working in the Ahdab field in Wasit over lack of jobs and damage to their land. All of these reasons together are why the petroleum industry has been slow to enter the Iraqi market because there are so many uncertainties. At the same time, these preliminary deals are a sign of success for the Oil Ministry, which has seen so many failures in the past. Five oil companies have agreed to their stiff terms after rejecting them in the June bid round. This does create some optimism that Iraq’s petroleum industry will finally begin to get the investment that it needs, but there are still many hurdles ahead.
SOURCES
Alsumaria, “Iraq MPs stress on questioning Oil Minister,” 11/4/09
BBC, “Iraq in third overseas oil deal,” 11/5/09
Dow Jones Newswires, “Iraq Sep Oil Exports -2.7% On Month At 1.956 Million B/D – Ministry,” 10/27/09
EU News Network, “Iraqi Lawmaker Irked Over BP Oil Contract,” 11/4/09
Hafidh, Hassan, “Iraq to Award Oil Field To ExxonMobil, Shell,” Wall Street Journal, 11/4/09
Hoyos, Carola, Warrell, Helen, and Bernard, Steve, “Crude Competition,” Financial Times, 6/30/09
Rasheed, Ahmed, “UPDATE 2-Iraq,Eni-led group sign initial Zubair oil deal,” Reuters, 11/2/09
Reuters, “Q+A-Iraq’s oil contracts, scale and obstacles,” 10/16/09
Williams, Timothy, “Iraq Signs Contract to Develop Oil Field,” New York Times, 11/4/09
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
