On July 25, 2009 the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) will hold elections for not only its parliament, but also a new constitution. 24 lists are running for 111 seats in the Kurdistan legislature. This year’s vote looks to be the most competitive since the first Kurdish election held in 1992. Then only seven parties ran, followed by thirteen in 2005. The two sets of balloting confirmed the dominant role of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Both times they ran together, and took 104 of 111 seats in the last vote in 2005. This time the two are facing a serious challenge from PUK co-founder Nishurwan Mustafa and his Change List. He has a powerful media company, Wisha that he has run since 2006 to get out his message of reform. The PUK has also gone through a series of internal revolts over corruption, autocratic rule, and lack of transparency that have led to many defections. Wisha claims that 30,000 PUK members have been fired for associating with the Change List, while 200 officials have been expelled from the party as well for doing the same. Some early estimates believe that Mustafa could get 20% of the vote. Even that amount, could break the hegemony of the PUK-KDP alliance within the Kurdish parliament.
There are several other smaller reform parties running, along with a host of candidates for the regional president. Among those are the Service and Reform List made up of Islamic groups like the Kurdistan Islamic Group and the Kurdistan Islamic Union. The Progress List headed by Halo Ibrahim Ahmed, the brother-in-law of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, and the Kurdish Reform Movement with its leader Abdul Musawer Barzani, cousin of KRG President Massoud Barzani. He is running for re-election to that post, along with Ahmed of the Progress List, London scholar Kamal Mirawdeli, and two businessmen, Hussein Karmiani and Safin Sheikh Mohammed.
In July Kurds will also vote for a controversial new constitution. The Kurdish parliament passed a draft of the document in mid-June. Among other things, it lays claim to Kirkuk, and other disputed territories in Ninewa and Diyala, calling them part of greater Kurdistan. These areas are one of the major divisions between Kurdistan and Baghdad. It is also playing out at the provincial level between the ruling al-Hadbaa party and the PUK-KDP led Fraternal List in Ninewa.
The 2009 election in Kurdistan could be a turning point for the region. If the Change List and the other reform tickets are able to gain a sizeable amount of seats they could break the strangle hold the KDP and PUK have over the legislature. That would only be a first step however. It’s been said that the parliament is only a rubber stamp as the PUK and KDP leaders make all the major decisions behind the scenes. Each party also runs its own peshmerga militia and Aseyash security force that have been accused of going after their opponents. This is part of separate administrations the two parties have, and a unification agreement between the two reserves all top posts in the government only for themselves. Presidents and councils of universities and scholarships are also only open to PUK and KDP party members, and any large business dealings in the region have to include party members, usually relatives or tribal members of the Barzani and Talabani families. Despite the image that the Kurdistan Regional Government likes to portray of itself, it still has a very long way to go to become an actual democratic region of Iraq.
Kurdish Lists Participating In The July 2009 Election
KURDISTAN LIST
Made up of the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. The list is headed by Barham Saleh of the PUK and current Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq. The Kurdistan List calls for maintain the status quo. The KDP was founded in 1946 by Mullah Mustafa Barzani, the father of KRG President Massoud Barzani. Massoud Barzani is the current head of the KPD, Fadhil Mirani is the leader of the KDP politburo, and Nechirvan Barzani is the KRG Prime Minister. The PUK was formed b Jalal Tabani when he broke from the KDP in 1975. Kosrat Rasul, the KRG’s Vice President, is the head of the PUK’s politburo. Saleh is number three in the PUK.
CHANGE LIST
Former PUK co-founder Nishurwan Mustafa is the head of the Change List. He left the PUK in December 2006 criticizing it for not reforming itself. Most of the list is made up of former PUK officials. They want to separate political parties from the government and economy, resolve the dispute between Baghdad and Kurdistan through dialogue, and provide more transparency in the administration and budget.
SERVICE AND REFORM LIST
The List is made up of the Kurdistan Islamic Union, the Islamic Group of Kurdistan, the Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party and the Future Party. It says it is fighting against corruption in the current government, claims disputed areas as part of Kurdistan, and wants to rule guided by Islam. Ali Bapir heads the Islamic Group of Kurdistan. He was arrested by the Americans in 2003 for ties with terrorist groups, and is said to be close to Iran. The Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party is led by Muhammad Haji Mahmud, the Future Party is headed by Qadir Aziz. It is related to the Muslim Brotherhood.
KURDISTAN CONSERVATIVE PARTY
Zaid Surchi, a tribal leader is the head of the party. It has ties with the PUK.
ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF KURDISTAN LIST
Shaykh Uthman Abdul-Aziz formed the list with other Sunni mullahs in 1979. It is based in Halabja, and headed by Sidiq Abdul Aziz and Ahmed Warte. It calls for the government to be based upon Islam, and wants greater transparency.
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND FREEDOM LIST
It is made up of the Kurdistan Communist Party, the Kurdistan Toilers Party, the Kurdistan Independent work Party, the Kurdistan Pro-Democratic Party, and the Democratic Movement of Kurdistan People. It calls for equal rights, rights for farmers, more housing, and secularism.
INDEPENDENT YOUTH LIST
Hiwa Abdul Karim Aziz, a journalist is the leader of the list, which only includes 10 people. It says it is standing for the young people of the KRG.
KURDISTAN REFORM MOVEMENT
Abdul Musawwar al-Barzani, cousing of Massoud Barzani, heads the movement. It calls for an end to corruption, rule of law, and human rights
PROGRESSION LIST
Jalal Talabani’s brother-in-law Halo Ibrahim Ahmed heads the list. They call for better living conditions. Ahmed was part of a dissident PUK group that was kicked out of the party.
KURDISTAN DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL PARTY LIST
Was founded in 1995 and calls for uniting Kurds across Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria. It wants more housing and women and youth rights.
KURDISTAN TOILERS AND WORKERS PARTY LIST
Calls for rule of law in the KRG.
IRAQI CONSTITUTIONAL PARTY
Was founded by Iraqi Interior Minister Jawad Bolani, who says he is no longer its official leader.
KURDISTAN BRIGHT FUTURE LIST
Is headed by Muhammad Saleh Hama Faraj, who lived in England until 2008. He wants the political parties out of administration and the justice system.
5 seats have been reserved for Turkmen
IRBIL TURKMEN LIST
Is led by Sherdil Tahsin Arsalan, Tafa Rostman Qasab, Thaura Saleh, Nafeh Rostam, and Artham Abdul Karim. It wants Kirkuk to be annexed, and it is against Turkish influence.
TURKMEN REFORM LIST
Is headed by Abdul Qadir Zangana. It wants more power for Turkmen and is against Turkish influence.
TURKMEN DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT IN KURDISTAN
Is led by Karkhi Alti Barmak, who calls for Turkmen unity. It also wants Kirkuk to be annexed, and is against Turkish influence.
INDEPENDENT TURKMEN LIST
Is led by Kanhan Shakir Aziz. It calls for Kirkuk to be an independent region
5 seats have been reserved for Christians
UNIFIED CHALDEAN LIST
Is made up of the Chaldean Union Party and the Chaldean National Council
CHALDEAN SYRIAC ASSYRIAN AUTONOMY LIST
AL-RAFIDAIN LIST
Is led by Iraqi parliamentarian Yunadam Kanna. It wants a greater role for Christians in the peshmerga and Asayesh.
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHALDEAN SYRIAC ASSYRIANS
Is led by Sarkis Aghajan Mamendo. He calls for the Ninewa plaints to be annexed.
2 seats have been set aside for Armenians
Aram Shahine Dawood Bakoyan, Eshkhan Malkin Sargisyan, and Aertex Morses Sargisyan are running for these seats.
SOURCES
Abdulqadir, Mohammed Amin, “Kurds Still Without Govt After January Poll,” Inter Press Service, 5/26/05
Agence France Presse, “Iraq Kurds pass new constitution to include Kirkuk,” 6/24/09
Amnesty International, “Hope and Fear, Human rights in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq,” April 2009
Hamad, Qassim Khidhir, “kdp and puk face election challenge,” Niqash, 5/12/09
- “Kurdish election lists,” Niqash, 6/30/09
Jumani, Kamal, “kurdistan prepares for elections,” Niqash, 6/25/09
Khalil, Lydia, “Stability in Iraqi Kurdistan: Reality or Myth,” Brookings Institution, June 2009
Mahmoud Rebaz, “Election Fever Rises in Kurdistan,” Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 6/17/09
Sunday, July 12, 2009
Friday, July 10, 2009
Iraq Completely Disappears From America’s Headlines
According to the Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism’s News Index Iraq failed to reach the top ten in any media format for the four full weeks of June 2009. March 2009 was the first month that the war did not reach the top ten news stories overall in the country, but Iraq was still in the top ten of at least one media outlet such as TV, radio, newspapers or the internet. Since then Iraq has continued to fade from America’s attention. In May 2009 for example, Iraq not only did not make the top stories for the four weeks of the month, but in two of those weeks did not make the top ten in any media format. June has now topped that. This was despite the number of mass casualty bombings that racked the country, and the preparation for the American withdrawal from Iraq’s cities.
Reporting on the war began fading at the beginning of 2007 due to four major reasons. First, reporting from Iraq was dominated by stories about the violence there. According to a December 2007 study by the Project for Excellence In Journalism, from January to October 2007 daily violence accounted for 46.9% of all stories out of Iraq. As the fighting decreased in the second half of 2007 so to did the majority of stories from within the country. More important than that was the domestic situation in the United States. In May 2007 Congress gave up on trying to set a withdrawal date for U.S. forces to be out of Iraq. After that Washington hardly discussed the war anymore. As a June 2009 report by the Council on Foreign Relations on the media’s role in the lead-up to the 2003 invasion pointed out, the major source for stories within the U.S. is the government. When politicians stopped discussing the war then, reports on it started drying up as well. A third reason was the beginning of the 2008 presidential campaign, which really took off in January 2007. That soon got tied up with the recession, both of which became the main story in the U.S. up to the present day. Finally, with most media outlets facing major financial problems, they only had so much money and resources to spend. As the focus of American moved to domestic politics, the news companies began pulling out their reporters from Iraq. Out of the three major network TV stations for example, only ABC still has a bureau in Baghdad, but with no reporters according to the Los Angeles Times’ Show Tracker Blog. NBC and CBS already withdrew their staff. CNN and FOX have maintained reporters there, but out of the print media, only the New York Times, Washington Post, McClatchy Newspapers, the Associated Press, and Reuters are still committed to reporting from the country.
The U.S. still has 131,000 troops in Iraq. That’s expected to drop to 50,000 by August 2010, before the final withdrawal deadline for all combat troops to be out of Iraq by December 31, 2011. After that the U.S. could maintain a large military advisory role in the country. That means continued casualties as well. Iraq also has massive political, social, and economy problems to overcome. All of this seems fated to go on without the American public getting the information it needs to evaluate the situation however. The role of the media in a democracy is to inform the people. It’s failing to do that job today with a war that has been going on for six years, and is likely to last several more years into the future.
SOURCES
Gelb, Leslie with Jeanne-Paloma Zelmati, “Mission Unaccomplished,” Democracy Journal, Summer 2009
Gold, Matea, “Show Tracker: What you’re watching,” Show Tracker: What you’re watching, Los Angeles Times, 1/7/09
Jurkowitz, Mark, “Why News of Iraq Dropped,” Pew Research Center’s Project For Excellence In Journalism, 3/26/08
Londono, Ernesto, “U.S. Troops, Civilians to Become Less Protected on July 1,” Washington Post, 6/26/09
Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism, “Concilation In Cairo Drives The News Agenda, PEJ News Coverage Index: June 1-7, 2009,” 6/8/09
- “Iran Dominates As The Media Are The Message, PEJ News Coverage Index: June 15-21, 2009,” 6/22/09
- “Media Swing From Protests In Iran To The Passing Of The King Of Pop, PEJ News Coverage Index: June 22-28, 2009,” 6/29/09
- “No Story Dominates, But Iran Fascinates, PEJ News Coverage Index: June 8-14, 2009,” 6/15/09
- “The Portrait from Iraq – How the Press Has Covered Events on the Ground,” 12/19/07
Schogol, Jeff, “Odierno: Troop levels to drop to 120,000,” Stars and Stripes, 7/1/09
Stetler, Brian, “TV News Winds Down Operation on Iraq War,” New York Times, 12/29/08
Reporting on the war began fading at the beginning of 2007 due to four major reasons. First, reporting from Iraq was dominated by stories about the violence there. According to a December 2007 study by the Project for Excellence In Journalism, from January to October 2007 daily violence accounted for 46.9% of all stories out of Iraq. As the fighting decreased in the second half of 2007 so to did the majority of stories from within the country. More important than that was the domestic situation in the United States. In May 2007 Congress gave up on trying to set a withdrawal date for U.S. forces to be out of Iraq. After that Washington hardly discussed the war anymore. As a June 2009 report by the Council on Foreign Relations on the media’s role in the lead-up to the 2003 invasion pointed out, the major source for stories within the U.S. is the government. When politicians stopped discussing the war then, reports on it started drying up as well. A third reason was the beginning of the 2008 presidential campaign, which really took off in January 2007. That soon got tied up with the recession, both of which became the main story in the U.S. up to the present day. Finally, with most media outlets facing major financial problems, they only had so much money and resources to spend. As the focus of American moved to domestic politics, the news companies began pulling out their reporters from Iraq. Out of the three major network TV stations for example, only ABC still has a bureau in Baghdad, but with no reporters according to the Los Angeles Times’ Show Tracker Blog. NBC and CBS already withdrew their staff. CNN and FOX have maintained reporters there, but out of the print media, only the New York Times, Washington Post, McClatchy Newspapers, the Associated Press, and Reuters are still committed to reporting from the country.
The U.S. still has 131,000 troops in Iraq. That’s expected to drop to 50,000 by August 2010, before the final withdrawal deadline for all combat troops to be out of Iraq by December 31, 2011. After that the U.S. could maintain a large military advisory role in the country. That means continued casualties as well. Iraq also has massive political, social, and economy problems to overcome. All of this seems fated to go on without the American public getting the information it needs to evaluate the situation however. The role of the media in a democracy is to inform the people. It’s failing to do that job today with a war that has been going on for six years, and is likely to last several more years into the future.
SOURCES
Gelb, Leslie with Jeanne-Paloma Zelmati, “Mission Unaccomplished,” Democracy Journal, Summer 2009
Gold, Matea, “Show Tracker: What you’re watching,” Show Tracker: What you’re watching, Los Angeles Times, 1/7/09
Jurkowitz, Mark, “Why News of Iraq Dropped,” Pew Research Center’s Project For Excellence In Journalism, 3/26/08
Londono, Ernesto, “U.S. Troops, Civilians to Become Less Protected on July 1,” Washington Post, 6/26/09
Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism, “Concilation In Cairo Drives The News Agenda, PEJ News Coverage Index: June 1-7, 2009,” 6/8/09
- “Iran Dominates As The Media Are The Message, PEJ News Coverage Index: June 15-21, 2009,” 6/22/09
- “Media Swing From Protests In Iran To The Passing Of The King Of Pop, PEJ News Coverage Index: June 22-28, 2009,” 6/29/09
- “No Story Dominates, But Iran Fascinates, PEJ News Coverage Index: June 8-14, 2009,” 6/15/09
- “The Portrait from Iraq – How the Press Has Covered Events on the Ground,” 12/19/07
Schogol, Jeff, “Odierno: Troop levels to drop to 120,000,” Stars and Stripes, 7/1/09
Stetler, Brian, “TV News Winds Down Operation on Iraq War,” New York Times, 12/29/08
Thursday, July 09, 2009
U.S. Public Opinion As Combat Troops Exit Iraq's Cities
June 30, 2009 was the official deadline for U.S. combat troops to be out of Iraqi cities. At the same time two public opinion polls were released of Americans on what they thought about Iraq. CBS News and the New York Times did one, and the other was by Rasmussen. The former found that a majority of Americans thought that things were going well in Iraq, while the later reported that very few people in the U.S. feel that the war is over, but a majority is hoping that President Obama brings home the troops by the end of his term in 2012.
The CBS News/New York Times poll was conducted from June 12 to 16, 2009 and just focused on how people thought the U.S. was doing in Iraq. 62% replied that the U.S. was doing well. This was actually lower than the last two times this question was asked back in April and March 2009. In April 71% said America was doing well, and 64% responded that way in March. The drop in the polling numbers in June might have been caused by the spate of bombings and violence in Iraq in that month on the eve of the withdrawal.
The public first began feeling positive about Iraq in September 2008 when 52% responded that things were good there. The low point was in June 2007 when 77% said the war was going badly. Democrats, Republicans, and Independents all had positive views as well. 71% of Republicans felt things were going good, compared to 63% for Democrats, and 54% for Independents.
How Are Things Going For The U.S. In Iraq? 6/09 4/09 3/09 12/08 9/08 6/07 5/03 Well 62% 71% 64% 56% 52% 22% 72% Bad 31% 24% 33% 39% 46% 77% 24%
The Rasmussen survey focused upon whether the public felt that the war was ending or not, the effect of the withdrawal on Iraq, and when they felt the troops would be home. Only 16% said the war was finished, while 64% said it wasn't, and 20% were not sure. When asked how they felt security in Iraq's cities would be in the future, 81% said that it was likely or somewhat likely that they would turn violent. 44% said they were very likely to go bad. When asked what the U.S. should do if that happens, only 17% said that American forces should be sent back in to help. 68% said that the Iraqis should handle it, while 15% were not sure. Respondents were also split on what Iraq would be like in the next 6 months. 38% said it would get better, 25% said it would get worse, and 24% said Iraq would stay about the same.
There were two questions about the final U.S. withdrawal from Iraq as well. When asked would America be out by December 2011, 48% said they were confident or very confident that would happen, compared to 46% who said they were not. When asked about a longer timeline, 66% said it was likely or somewhat likely that President Obama would have combat troops out by the time his first term ended in 2012. 59% went on to say that it was more important to get the troops out than finish the job in Iraq.
Those surveyed also seemed to have been keeping up with recent events. 80% said they had been following the news on the withdrawal from the cities, while only 4% said they had not kept up with the story at all.
The Surge and the drop in violence can be attributed with the change in American attitudes about Iraq. Beforehand, the sectarian war and high U.S. casualties turned most of the public against the war. The dramatic drop in deaths from 2008 to the present, has the U.S. back to thinking optimistically about the future of the conflict. The main priority however, is to get the combat troops out as soon as possible. It will be interesting to see how the U.S. public feels if President Obama decides to keep a large advisory force in Iraq after the 2011 deadline for withdrawal. Perhaps they will be satisfied with most troops coming home, but then again since so many feel that Iraq needs to deal with its own problems, they might be upset with a residual force staying behind.
SOURCES
De Pinto, Jennifer, "Polls Show Most Say Things Are Going Well in Iraq," CBS News, 6/30/09
Rasmussen Reports, "64% Say War in Iraq Is Not Over Yet," 7/1/09
Tuesday, July 07, 2009
Iraq Casualties See Large Increase In June 2009
Iraqi casualties continue to climb upwards since the beginning of the year. June 2009 saw the largest amount of deaths for several months. This follows May, which had the fewest victims since the 2003 invasion. Even before the monthly totals were released, the number of mass casualty bombings (attacks that caused 10 or more casualties) pointed to a bloody June.
Starting from highest to lowest sources, Iraq Body Count had a preliminary number of 516 killed last month, the Associated Press counted 447, the Iraqi Health Ministry claimed 438, and icasualties had 367.
Iraqi Deaths Iraq Body Count icasualties. Org Brookings Iraq Index Iraqi Ministries Associated Press July 08 584 419 500 851 N/A Aug. 08 592 311 450 N/A 475 Sep. 08 535 366 400 440 503 Oct. 08 528 288 350 317 N/A Nov. 08 473 317 270 340 N/A Dec. 08 522 320 350 316 N/A Jan. 09 276 187 270 191 242 Feb. 09 343 202 230 258 288 March 09 416 278 260 252 335 April 09 484 347 340 355 371 May 09 325 188 N/A 165 225 June 09 516 367 N/A 438 447 Last 6 months of 2008 Average 539.0 336.8 386.6 452.8 5 of 6 months N/A First 6 months of 2009 Average 393.3 261.0 275.0 1st 4 months 276.5 317.5 According to the Brookings Institution's Iraq Index overall attacks in Iraq have leveled off since December 2008 with no noticeable increases up to the middle of May 2009. As Anthony Cordesman from the Center for Strategic and International Studies recently pointed out however, there is not a direct correlation between security incidents and casualties in Iraq. A more telling statistic to look at would be the number of mass casualty bombings occurring each month. In April 2009 for example there were 20 such bombings, compared to only 9 in May. The increase in casualties in June could be seen in the fact that there were 14 bombings. Those led to 174 deaths and 517 wounded. Number of Bombings and Casualty Statistics – April to June 2009 The trend over the last year was for attacks and deaths to decline in the second half of 2008 as the provincial elections neared in January 2009. It appears that the insurgency held off on attacks to allow Sunnis to participate after they had boycotted the last voting in 2005. Until May, January saw the lowest casualties since the U.S. invasion. Since then the number of deaths has crept back up each month, with the exception of May. Since the insurgency is extremely weakened, that month might have been the result of the militants expending all of their resources on bombings and such in April, which they had to recover from in May. June of course was the deadline for U.S. combat troops to be out of Iraq's cities, so perhaps the insurgents were also saving up for that. If this pattern continues than there should be another decline in Iraqi dead and wounded towards the end of the year as Sunnis gear up for the January 2010 parliamentary elections. This all points to the fact that domestic events rather than American ones largely determine the security situation in Iraq. SOURCES
Bombings: 20
Deaths: 197 + 32 Iranians
Wounded: 488 + 105 Iranians + 10 Americans
May 2009
Bombings: 9
Deaths: 111
Wounded: 262
June 2009
Bombings: 14
Deaths: 174
Wounded: 517
Agence France Presse, “Iraq Suicide Bomber Wounds 34 in Mosul Shopping Street,” 5/24/09
- “Seven dead in Baghdad bus station blast,” 6/25/09
- “Two children killed in blast targeting father,” 4/20/09
Ahmed, Hamid, “Iraqi police: 35 dead in double bombing,” Associated Press, 4/24/09
Associated Press, “Car bomb kills 10 in northern Iraq city,” 4/15/09
- “Car bomb wounds 15 people west of Baghdad,” 5/27/09
- “June is deadliest month for Iraqis this year,” 7/1/09
- “Police report 17 dead in Baghdad bombings,” 5/6/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “2 civilians wounded by IED in Baghdad,” 5/18/09
- “2 cops killed, 20 wounded in blast inside police station in Baghdad,” 5/21/09
- “Booby-trapped car leaves 14 casualties in Mosul,” 6/25/09
- “Car bomb injures 10 in Mosul,” 4/1/09
- “Car bomb kills 4, wounds 10 in Baghdad,” 5/27/09
- “Car bomb leaves 10 casualties in Kirkuk,” 5/11/09
- “Final toll of Kirkuk blast reaches 126 – medic,” 6/30/09
- “URGENT/27 killed, 32 wounded in Kirkuk’s market explosion,” 6/30/09
- “URGENT/Mosul suicide blast leaves 5 killed, 6 wounded,” 5/1/09
Bakri, Nada, “3 U.S. Troops, 23 Iraqis Killed in Bomb Attacks,” Washington Post, 5/22/09
BBC News, “Iraq: Bomb in Baghdad café kills nine,” 6/4/09
- “Suicide blast hits Iraq army base,” 4/16/09
Cordesman, Anthony, “Iraq: UNSCENTCOM and Iraqi Government Estimates of the Trends in the Patterns in Violence and Casualties,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 5/1/09
Dhaher, Abdul Rahman, “Bombings kill at least 27 in Iraq,” Washington Post, 6/22/09
Gamel, Kim, “Motorcycle bomb kills 15 in Baghdad market,” Associated Press, 6/26/09
Hammoudi, Laith and Kadhim, Hussein, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Saturday 11 April 2009,” 4/11/09
Icasualties
Iraq Body Count
Issa, Sahar and Kadhim, Hussein, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Friday 10 April 2009,” 4/10/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 1 June 2009,” 6/1/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 6 April 2009,” 4/6/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 10 June 2009,” 6/10/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 6 June 2009,” 6/6/09
Kadhim, Hussein, “Roundup of Daily Violence in Iraq-Friday 24 April 2009,” 4/24/09
- “Roundup of Daily Violence in Iraq-Wednesday 8 April 2009,” 4/8/09
Londono, Ernesto and Bakri, Nada, “Blasts Kill 22 Across Baghdad,” Washington Post, 6/23/09
Londono, Ernesto and Mizher, Qais, “Attacks Across Baghdad Leave At Least 48 Dead, Scores Injured,” Washington Post, 4/30/09
Londono, Ernesto and Sabah, Zaid, “Market Blast Kills More Than 75 in Baghdad’s Sadr City,” Washington Post, 6/25/09
Middle East Online, “Six Iraqis killed in truck attack in Kirkuk,” 5/12/09
Monsters and Critics, “At least 6 killed, 15 wounded in Iraq suicide bombing (Roundup),” 4/22/09
Myers, Steven Lee, “Six Car Bombs Kill at Least 33 in Iraq,” New York Times, 4/6/09
O’Hanlon, Michael Campbell, Jason, “Iraq Index,” Brookings Institution, 6/25/09
Press TV, “Baghdad blast kills 9, wounds 31,” 6/4/09
Quinn, Patrick, “Iraqi bombings kill scores ahead of US withdrawal,” Associated Press, 6/25/09
Reuters, “Blast kills four, wounds eight in Baghdad,” 4/17/09
- “FACTOBX-Security developments in Iraq, April 29,” 4/29/09
- “FACTOBX-Security developments in Iraq, May 21,” 5/21/09
- “Suicide bomb kills 7 north of Baghdad – Iraq police,” 4/23/09
- “Suicide truck bomb kills 5 U.S. troops,” 4/10/09
Sly, Liz, “IRAQ: Death toll for Iraqis jumps in June,” Babylon & Beyond Blog, Los Angeles Times, 7/1/09
Tawfeeq, Mohammed, “Iraq: Death toll from huge suicide blast soars,” CNN, 6/21/09
Xinhua, “At least 2 killed, 15 injured in bomb explosion near Baghdad,” 4/10/09
Monday, July 06, 2009
How The Press Failed In Its Job In The Lead-up To The Iraq War
The Summer 2009 issue of Democracy Journal includes a piece by Leslie Gelb and Jeanne-Paloma Zelmati of the Council on Foreign Relations. In it they review and critique the media coverage of the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, Time magazine, and Newsweek, what they term “the elite media,” of four events surrounding the beginning of the Iraq War. Those are the congressional vote on the use of force, Secretary of State Colin Powell’s speech to the United Nations, President Bush’s mission accomplished speech, and the capture of Saddam Hussein. Gelb and Zelmati were inspired to write this piece because they didn’t feel there had been any comprehensive evaluation of the reporting leading up to the war. They believe that a democracy depends upon good information from the press, especially when one is considering whether or not to go to war. Overall, they found that the media did a mediocre job at best. Only occasionally did they question the reasons for the war or analyze the situation in Iraq. The most common form of reporting was simply to repeat the administration’s claims, and quote one or two experts who may or may not agree with the White House. The press only began critiquing the war when it was obvious things were going badly, which was too little, too late. In doing so, the media let the American public down, never giving them a full picture of what the arguments for and against the invasion were, and its consequences.
Gelb and Zelmati reviewed 576 stories and pieces by columnists on four events, the October 2002 Congressional debate an authorizing the use of force, Colin Powell’s February 2003 speech to the United Nations advocating for war, President Bush’s mission accomplished speech in May 2003, and the capture of Saddam Hussein on December 13, 2003. Each article was ranked 0-5. 0 was completely slanted towards the administration, 1 was somewhat biased, 2 reported statements by officials and experts, 3 raised some questions, 4 had fundamental doubts about the administration’s claims, and 5 did the best job reporting both the critics and the White House’s responses. Obviously they were privileging stories that questioned the White House, but they did that because those critics turned out to be right. On average they thought a story should rank a 3.0 or better on Iraq since it was such an important issue facing the country at the time. Too many times, in the press’ attempt to be neutral however it simply ended up supporting the administration by focusing mostly on what government officials said with little to no questioning.
The first two events largely received the same type of reporting. In October 2002 Congress debated whether or not to authorize the use of force against Iraq. On February 5, 2003 Secretary of State Colin Powell went before the United Nations arguing that the Security Council should pass a resolution allowing an attack on Saddam Hussein. In both cases the press mostly repeated the White House and Powell’s claims with little to no questioning. Powell’s speech especially was widely praised. A piece by Michael Gordon in the New York Times said that the Secretary had silenced the critics for example. Few asked whether Iraq really had weapons of mass destruction or were working with Al Qaeda, and even less went into what would happen in Iraq after an invasion. The articles that did mention critics usually had them at the end of the pieces. Columnists at the time were overwhelmingly advocating for the war. Coverage of the Congressional debate received a 2.0, while Powell’s speech got a 1.77, the lowest score of the study.
On May 1, 2003 President Bush gave his mission accomplished speech aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier. Again, the press mostly repeated Bush’s remarks. Reporting on the problems then occurring in Iraq after the invasion was largely not included in the articles. Skepticism was growing however, but it mostly came from reporters in Iraq. Those in Washington were still basing their stories off of government officials. Columnists at this time were also beginning to raise questions, but were only marginally better than the regular stories. For that, the columnists received a 2.36 score, while the press overall got a 2.12.
The final event was the capture of Saddam Hussein on December 13, 2003 in his home of Tikrit. This time the press coverage was notably different from the other three times. Stories mentioned the insurgency and the reconstruction in Iraq. Many reports were also questioning whether the war was really over or not. For the first time, the media was using more Iraq reports than ones from Washington, which played a large part in changing the tone. What was still missing was any real discussion of the claims the White House made leading up to the war. Because of their questions however, the press received its highest score with a 2.24.
Overall, the reporting never reached the 3.0 standard set by Gelb and Zelmati. They believe that the elite print press should be held to the highest standards. They are the largest outlet for in-depth reporting, questioning, and analysis about decisions that affect the country. Gelb and Zelmati believe that one of the biggest problems with them is institutional. The first job of a reporter is to tell what’s going on. The main way they do that is to report what the government says. The authors argue that editors need to push their staff to bring in more critics in their reporting to provide more of a debate on leading issues in the country. A way to compensate for that is to also use more overseas reporters during foreign policy crises since they are obviously removed from Washington. Another major problem is that many stories emphasize politics over policy. Many reporters simply don’t know enough about any given issue to really go into depth about it, but anyone can talk about Democrats versus Republicans and liberals versus conservatives. In the lead up to the war, that’s what many in the press did.
Eventually the media did change its tone, coming to criticize the White House and its handling of the war, but the study believes they went too far in the other direction. Gelb and Zelmati think this led the media to miss the importance of the Surge when it was launched at the beginning of 2007. When Bush changed policy, the press underreported its effects. They mostly focused just on the increase in troops, and not the new tactics used. They also did not connect the operation with Moqtada al-Sadr’s cease-fire, the emergence of the Anbar Awakening, the creation of the Sons of Iraq, and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki becoming a real leader, all of which helped end the sectarian war, and created a new status quo.
Gelb and Zelmati finish by calling for the media to do a better job questioning the government when important decisions come up. This is unlikely to happen as the major media outlets are facing declining sales, and more emphasis upon making profits as a result. A push to make money usually does not contribute to more in depth reporting. The methodology American journalists are trained in, and the culture in pressrooms is also not conducive to much analysis. It’s mostly getting out whatever the top story is as quickly as possible and relying upon proven sources, which usually come from the government. Also, when it comes to war group think usually sets in and the media supports the White House initially. Even now that the media is much more critical of the war, it doesn’t matter much because Iraq has largely disappeared from American reporting. It seems that the press has failed again in the process. It did not give the public the information it needed to assess going to war, and it is doing the same now on what Iraqi is like, and what that means for the U.S. since it is expected to have a major presence in the country for the foreseeable future.
SOURCES
Gelb, Leslie with Jeanne-Paloma Zelmati, “Mission Unaccomplished,” Democracy Journal, Summer 2009
Gelb and Zelmati reviewed 576 stories and pieces by columnists on four events, the October 2002 Congressional debate an authorizing the use of force, Colin Powell’s February 2003 speech to the United Nations advocating for war, President Bush’s mission accomplished speech in May 2003, and the capture of Saddam Hussein on December 13, 2003. Each article was ranked 0-5. 0 was completely slanted towards the administration, 1 was somewhat biased, 2 reported statements by officials and experts, 3 raised some questions, 4 had fundamental doubts about the administration’s claims, and 5 did the best job reporting both the critics and the White House’s responses. Obviously they were privileging stories that questioned the White House, but they did that because those critics turned out to be right. On average they thought a story should rank a 3.0 or better on Iraq since it was such an important issue facing the country at the time. Too many times, in the press’ attempt to be neutral however it simply ended up supporting the administration by focusing mostly on what government officials said with little to no questioning.
The first two events largely received the same type of reporting. In October 2002 Congress debated whether or not to authorize the use of force against Iraq. On February 5, 2003 Secretary of State Colin Powell went before the United Nations arguing that the Security Council should pass a resolution allowing an attack on Saddam Hussein. In both cases the press mostly repeated the White House and Powell’s claims with little to no questioning. Powell’s speech especially was widely praised. A piece by Michael Gordon in the New York Times said that the Secretary had silenced the critics for example. Few asked whether Iraq really had weapons of mass destruction or were working with Al Qaeda, and even less went into what would happen in Iraq after an invasion. The articles that did mention critics usually had them at the end of the pieces. Columnists at the time were overwhelmingly advocating for the war. Coverage of the Congressional debate received a 2.0, while Powell’s speech got a 1.77, the lowest score of the study.
On May 1, 2003 President Bush gave his mission accomplished speech aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier. Again, the press mostly repeated Bush’s remarks. Reporting on the problems then occurring in Iraq after the invasion was largely not included in the articles. Skepticism was growing however, but it mostly came from reporters in Iraq. Those in Washington were still basing their stories off of government officials. Columnists at this time were also beginning to raise questions, but were only marginally better than the regular stories. For that, the columnists received a 2.36 score, while the press overall got a 2.12.
The final event was the capture of Saddam Hussein on December 13, 2003 in his home of Tikrit. This time the press coverage was notably different from the other three times. Stories mentioned the insurgency and the reconstruction in Iraq. Many reports were also questioning whether the war was really over or not. For the first time, the media was using more Iraq reports than ones from Washington, which played a large part in changing the tone. What was still missing was any real discussion of the claims the White House made leading up to the war. Because of their questions however, the press received its highest score with a 2.24.
Overall, the reporting never reached the 3.0 standard set by Gelb and Zelmati. They believe that the elite print press should be held to the highest standards. They are the largest outlet for in-depth reporting, questioning, and analysis about decisions that affect the country. Gelb and Zelmati believe that one of the biggest problems with them is institutional. The first job of a reporter is to tell what’s going on. The main way they do that is to report what the government says. The authors argue that editors need to push their staff to bring in more critics in their reporting to provide more of a debate on leading issues in the country. A way to compensate for that is to also use more overseas reporters during foreign policy crises since they are obviously removed from Washington. Another major problem is that many stories emphasize politics over policy. Many reporters simply don’t know enough about any given issue to really go into depth about it, but anyone can talk about Democrats versus Republicans and liberals versus conservatives. In the lead up to the war, that’s what many in the press did.
Eventually the media did change its tone, coming to criticize the White House and its handling of the war, but the study believes they went too far in the other direction. Gelb and Zelmati think this led the media to miss the importance of the Surge when it was launched at the beginning of 2007. When Bush changed policy, the press underreported its effects. They mostly focused just on the increase in troops, and not the new tactics used. They also did not connect the operation with Moqtada al-Sadr’s cease-fire, the emergence of the Anbar Awakening, the creation of the Sons of Iraq, and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki becoming a real leader, all of which helped end the sectarian war, and created a new status quo.
Gelb and Zelmati finish by calling for the media to do a better job questioning the government when important decisions come up. This is unlikely to happen as the major media outlets are facing declining sales, and more emphasis upon making profits as a result. A push to make money usually does not contribute to more in depth reporting. The methodology American journalists are trained in, and the culture in pressrooms is also not conducive to much analysis. It’s mostly getting out whatever the top story is as quickly as possible and relying upon proven sources, which usually come from the government. Also, when it comes to war group think usually sets in and the media supports the White House initially. Even now that the media is much more critical of the war, it doesn’t matter much because Iraq has largely disappeared from American reporting. It seems that the press has failed again in the process. It did not give the public the information it needed to assess going to war, and it is doing the same now on what Iraqi is like, and what that means for the U.S. since it is expected to have a major presence in the country for the foreseeable future.
SOURCES
Gelb, Leslie with Jeanne-Paloma Zelmati, “Mission Unaccomplished,” Democracy Journal, Summer 2009
Sunday, July 05, 2009
Administration Needs to Prepare Congress and Public For A Long Stay In Iraq Says Iraq Analyst
As U.S. combat troops prepare to withdraw from Iraq’s cities, Anthony Cordesman, one of the top military analysts on Iraq from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, argues that the administration needs to build up support for a long-term presence there. This is a position that he has consistently called for. Cordesman worries that too much emphasis is being put on withdrawal, when the goal should be institutionalizing support for Iraq so that it can become a strong U.S. ally in the region. This is especially important because Cordesman does not believe that the U.S. has won in Iraq, but rather will continue to face challenges there before Iraq becomes a stabile and independent state. Cordesman wrote about these issues in a memorandum to General Ray Odierno after a recent trip to Iraq.
The main problems America faces in Iraq today are not what they use to be. Violence is down, and the Iraqi security forces are better. The sectarian war is over, and he does not believe that the Sunnis and Shiites want to return to fighting each other. Rather the main divisions today are over politics. The two main ones are between Arabs and Kurds, and with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his critics. The ethnic divisions are now the most pressing issue in his opinion as tensions are rising between Arabs and Kurds, and the two sides are losing patience with each other. Politically, Iraq is still dealing with integrating the Sunnis, and they themselves still lack strong leadership. This struggle has now become entangled with the Prime Minister, as the Sunnis have become the major opponent of Maliki trying to assert power.
Iraq faces an additional problem developing its economy. Iraq is almost completely dependent upon oil for revenues. That industry and the rest are all underdeveloped. Iraq needs to diversify, and open up to foreign investment so that it can build up its infrastructure and provide better services. The Iraqi government has been incapable of doing either so far, even with better security. Cordesman believes that Baghdad lacks the knowledge of how to create effective business deals and legislation, and politicians are too caught up in either defending their country against the perceived threats of foreign corporations or thinking about the possible profits, rather than on how to make things better.
Cordesman believes that these two issues will require constant attention and mediation by the Americans. The main tool he believes in using is aid. First, the U.S. needs to maintain its level of financial assistance flowing to Iraq. This is especially hard now with most Americans focused upon getting out of Iraq and the economic crisis at home. The U.S. also needs to help with the country’s political and economic troubles. American aid and mediation for example, could help integrate the Kurdish peshmerga into the security forces, an idea that is now dead due to the political divisions. This could assure the Kurds of security, while allowing Baghdad to continue with its plans of expanding its military. On the economic side, the U.S. should provide business models for Iraq to improve their contacts with foreign companies. The Americans have been working to revive the State Owned Enterprises, which have the potential to add much needed jobs as well. The U.S. should also get the World Bank involved with development more because the U.S. presence will shrink with the withdrawal of combat forces. To accomplish this the U.S. needs to maintain both military and civilian advisers in Iraq past the 2011 deadline for withdrawal.
Cordesman found that some planning for this is already being done in Iraq. The military especially is trying to transition from a security operation to a rebuilding mode. He did not see as much evidence of that on the civilian side however. Too many political and economic plans he saw were focused upon finishing specific programs rather than looking at the bigger picture of what needs to be done in the future.
Overall, Cordesman argues that the U.S. will be remembered for what they leave behind in Iraq, rather than on how they got there. The U.S. military and diplomatic staff in Iraq is thinking this way, but he’s not sure Washington is. Too much emphasis is being put on short-term goals such as pulling out of the cities this summer, and the withdrawal in 2011. Cordesman, like many other American Iraq experts, believes that the U.S. should have a long-term presence in Iraq that may last as long as 2020 or further. Unless the administration begins setting the groundwork for this by telling the public and Congress of the sacrifices needed, and the journey ahead, no one will support it, and Cordesman worries that will mean all the blood and money spent in Iraq will go to waste.
This will ultimately come down to whether President Obama wants to make this kind of commitment. There will be a diplomatic presence in Iraq no matter what. His real task is deciding on whether he will maintain troops there or not. He has been very open to his military commanders, and they will assuredly ask for tens of thousands of American advisers to stay past 2011. Coming up with the money for a robust assistance package however after most combat troops are out will be much harder as the public and Congress have already lost interest in Iraq.
The main problem with Cordesman and other similar analysts is that they often overlook the system of dependence the Iraqis have built up upon the Americans, which a long-term presence will only continue. Cordesman mentions this once when discussing the opening of the oil sector to foreign investment. He writes that Baghdad has offered oil contracts, but then expects Washington to do the rest of the work, pushing international companies to sign them. This is true for a whole range of other issues as well. As reported earlier, the U.S. has spent millions trying to build up the maintenance and logistics capacity of the Iraqi Army, but they have refused responsibility for much of it, leading to the Americans to do most of the work instead. The Americans need to get the Iraqis to do more rather than hold their hands for the next ten years. That’s basically what Cordesman and others want the administration to do. They want every issue in Iraq to be dealt with before a full withdrawal. This will not be like the U.S. presence in South Korea either as President Bush once suggested, because Iraq is likely to see violence during that entire stay. The Obama White House needs to do a cost-benefit analysis of what its willing to expend on Iraq, and how much responsibility they want to have for it because Cordesman, other Iraq experts, and the U.S. military are asking for an open-ended commitment.
SOURCES
Cordesman, Anthony, “Observations From a Visit to Iraq,” 6/15/09
Gwertzman, Bernard, “U.S. ‘Winning’ Unpopular War in Iraq, but ‘Losing’ Popular War in Afghanistan,” Council on Foreign Relations, 9/8/08
Nagl, John and Burton, Brian, “After the Fire: Shaping the Future U.S. Relationship with Iraq,” Center for a New American Security, June 2009
The main problems America faces in Iraq today are not what they use to be. Violence is down, and the Iraqi security forces are better. The sectarian war is over, and he does not believe that the Sunnis and Shiites want to return to fighting each other. Rather the main divisions today are over politics. The two main ones are between Arabs and Kurds, and with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his critics. The ethnic divisions are now the most pressing issue in his opinion as tensions are rising between Arabs and Kurds, and the two sides are losing patience with each other. Politically, Iraq is still dealing with integrating the Sunnis, and they themselves still lack strong leadership. This struggle has now become entangled with the Prime Minister, as the Sunnis have become the major opponent of Maliki trying to assert power.
Iraq faces an additional problem developing its economy. Iraq is almost completely dependent upon oil for revenues. That industry and the rest are all underdeveloped. Iraq needs to diversify, and open up to foreign investment so that it can build up its infrastructure and provide better services. The Iraqi government has been incapable of doing either so far, even with better security. Cordesman believes that Baghdad lacks the knowledge of how to create effective business deals and legislation, and politicians are too caught up in either defending their country against the perceived threats of foreign corporations or thinking about the possible profits, rather than on how to make things better.
Cordesman believes that these two issues will require constant attention and mediation by the Americans. The main tool he believes in using is aid. First, the U.S. needs to maintain its level of financial assistance flowing to Iraq. This is especially hard now with most Americans focused upon getting out of Iraq and the economic crisis at home. The U.S. also needs to help with the country’s political and economic troubles. American aid and mediation for example, could help integrate the Kurdish peshmerga into the security forces, an idea that is now dead due to the political divisions. This could assure the Kurds of security, while allowing Baghdad to continue with its plans of expanding its military. On the economic side, the U.S. should provide business models for Iraq to improve their contacts with foreign companies. The Americans have been working to revive the State Owned Enterprises, which have the potential to add much needed jobs as well. The U.S. should also get the World Bank involved with development more because the U.S. presence will shrink with the withdrawal of combat forces. To accomplish this the U.S. needs to maintain both military and civilian advisers in Iraq past the 2011 deadline for withdrawal.
Cordesman found that some planning for this is already being done in Iraq. The military especially is trying to transition from a security operation to a rebuilding mode. He did not see as much evidence of that on the civilian side however. Too many political and economic plans he saw were focused upon finishing specific programs rather than looking at the bigger picture of what needs to be done in the future.
Overall, Cordesman argues that the U.S. will be remembered for what they leave behind in Iraq, rather than on how they got there. The U.S. military and diplomatic staff in Iraq is thinking this way, but he’s not sure Washington is. Too much emphasis is being put on short-term goals such as pulling out of the cities this summer, and the withdrawal in 2011. Cordesman, like many other American Iraq experts, believes that the U.S. should have a long-term presence in Iraq that may last as long as 2020 or further. Unless the administration begins setting the groundwork for this by telling the public and Congress of the sacrifices needed, and the journey ahead, no one will support it, and Cordesman worries that will mean all the blood and money spent in Iraq will go to waste.
This will ultimately come down to whether President Obama wants to make this kind of commitment. There will be a diplomatic presence in Iraq no matter what. His real task is deciding on whether he will maintain troops there or not. He has been very open to his military commanders, and they will assuredly ask for tens of thousands of American advisers to stay past 2011. Coming up with the money for a robust assistance package however after most combat troops are out will be much harder as the public and Congress have already lost interest in Iraq.
The main problem with Cordesman and other similar analysts is that they often overlook the system of dependence the Iraqis have built up upon the Americans, which a long-term presence will only continue. Cordesman mentions this once when discussing the opening of the oil sector to foreign investment. He writes that Baghdad has offered oil contracts, but then expects Washington to do the rest of the work, pushing international companies to sign them. This is true for a whole range of other issues as well. As reported earlier, the U.S. has spent millions trying to build up the maintenance and logistics capacity of the Iraqi Army, but they have refused responsibility for much of it, leading to the Americans to do most of the work instead. The Americans need to get the Iraqis to do more rather than hold their hands for the next ten years. That’s basically what Cordesman and others want the administration to do. They want every issue in Iraq to be dealt with before a full withdrawal. This will not be like the U.S. presence in South Korea either as President Bush once suggested, because Iraq is likely to see violence during that entire stay. The Obama White House needs to do a cost-benefit analysis of what its willing to expend on Iraq, and how much responsibility they want to have for it because Cordesman, other Iraq experts, and the U.S. military are asking for an open-ended commitment.
SOURCES
Cordesman, Anthony, “Observations From a Visit to Iraq,” 6/15/09
Gwertzman, Bernard, “U.S. ‘Winning’ Unpopular War in Iraq, but ‘Losing’ Popular War in Afghanistan,” Council on Foreign Relations, 9/8/08
Nagl, John and Burton, Brian, “After the Fire: Shaping the Future U.S. Relationship with Iraq,” Center for a New American Security, June 2009
Friday, July 03, 2009
Argument For Maliki Being Iraq’s Next Strongman
Reports that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki may be becoming a strongman have become part and parcel of Iraq reporting today. In the Spring 2009 edition of World Policy Journal Los Angeles Times’ reporter Ned Parker laid out a good argument for this in an article entitled “Machiavelli in Mesopotamia.” Parker’s position is that Maliki has successfully used a divide and conquer and carrot and stick approach with various groups across the country that is a move towards authoritarian government. The Prime Minister has also promised security and stability for a population that has been traumatized by the invasion and civil war. This has them looking towards a leader, Maliki, rather than institutions or democracy to provide a normal life, allowing the Prime Minister to become an autocrat.
This change in Iraq began with the end of the sectarian war in 2007. The Shiites won, and the Sunnis were defeated. This was shown when the majority of the insurgency switched sides to the Americans to escape the pressure from the Surge, Iraqi forces, Shiite militias, and Al Qaeda in Iraq. With the threat of the insurgency largely contained, Maliki was freed to move against his former supporter Moqtada al-Sadr. In 2008 Maliki sent the Iraqi army and police to crush the Mahdi Army in Basra, Sadr City, and Maysan. By mid-2008 the government was now free of two of its largest threats. In turn, this changed Maliki’s image from a weak and feckless leader to a nationalist one willing to impose order from the chaos that was engulfing Iraq.
Parker provides three examples of how Maliki has used his newfound power and position since then. First, the Prime Minister built up his own independent base by forming Tribal Support Councils across southern Iraq. These became a huge patronage system for Maliki, which helped his State of Law list win a majority in Basra, and pluralities in the rest of the south in the 2009 provincial elections. In Diyala, the Prime Minister used force to try to break the alliance between the Iraqi Islamic Party and the Sons of Iraq. In July 2008 and May 2009, he used the security forces to arrest and intimidate Sunni leaders, while trying to peel others away to join his Tribal Support Councils. Finally, in the Saydiya district of Baghdad, Maliki convinced the local Sunnis there that he was the center of power. At first, they felt intimidated into electing a Shiite from the SIIC’s Badr Brigade to head the local council, but later when that same official was arrested, the Sunnis took it to be a sign that Maliki had turned against the Shiite militia, and that he was becoming a fair and just ruler. All of these moves are examples of the carrot and stick, divide and conquer strategy Maliki has employed since 2008. He has wooed both Sunnis and Shiites to his side, while threatening others with the security forces and the threat of arrests. It shows that the new status quo in Iraq is not based upon the rule of law or institutions, but rather the relationship between individuals and groups to the Prime Minister. He is now the center of Iraqi politics, able to wield his power to give some jobs and position, or to send others to jail.
Parker believes that the new Iraq that has emerged from the sectarian war is actually a return to its autocratic tradition. After the bloody years of the past, the most important thing to Iraqis is stability so that they can return to their normal lives. This is what Maliki has offered them. He has crushed or wooed his opponents including the Shiite militias and the Sons of Iraq, while offering protection, jobs and patronage to those that side with him such as Iraq’s tribes. It’s one man, Maliki that the people now look to. He represents the Iraqi state, much as Saddam or other past Iraqi leaders did. This is what makes “Machiavelli in Mesopotamia” one of the better arguments for the strongman theory that is becoming popular in analyses of Iraq. It is still up to debate however, whether Maliki is really moving in this direction. Many of the powers he is assuming are those that the government should have, but that it was not able to exert since it was so weak after the U.S. invasion. A regular government for example, should have a monopoly on force, so Baghdad should’ve cracked down on the Shiite militias. At the same time, Maliki has built up organizations like the Tribal Support Councils, which are outside the authority of the government, and used the security forces to take care of his opponents. Iraq seems to have gone from one extreme where the state had no real authority to where Maliki is using it everywhere for his own ends. Now however, the new speaker of the parliament is trying to strengthen the legislature to provide a check on Maliki’s power. This will be the real test as to whether the Prime Minister can become an autocrat. If he can shape the parliament after the 2010 elections then there will be no others in the country that can limit him.
SOURCES
Nordland, Rod and Santora, Marc, “Iraq Leader Omits a Bit in Lauding U.S. Pullout,” New York Times, 6/11/09
Parker, Ned, “Machiavelli in Mesopotamia,” World Policy Journal, Spring 2009
- “U.S. prepares to withdraw, Iraqi resistance prepares for battle,” Los Angeles Times, 5/25/09
Rosen, Nir, “The big sleep,” The National, 4/24/09
Russo, Claire, “Countdown To Diyala’s Provincial Election: Maliki & The IIP,” Institute for the Study of War, 1/30/09
Serwer, Daniel and Parker, Sam, “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2009
Shadid, Anthony, “In Iraq, a Different Struggle for Power,” Washington Post, 6/25/09
Wiseman, Paul, “U.S.-supported Iraqi militias clash with government,” USA Today, 5/27/09
This change in Iraq began with the end of the sectarian war in 2007. The Shiites won, and the Sunnis were defeated. This was shown when the majority of the insurgency switched sides to the Americans to escape the pressure from the Surge, Iraqi forces, Shiite militias, and Al Qaeda in Iraq. With the threat of the insurgency largely contained, Maliki was freed to move against his former supporter Moqtada al-Sadr. In 2008 Maliki sent the Iraqi army and police to crush the Mahdi Army in Basra, Sadr City, and Maysan. By mid-2008 the government was now free of two of its largest threats. In turn, this changed Maliki’s image from a weak and feckless leader to a nationalist one willing to impose order from the chaos that was engulfing Iraq.
Parker provides three examples of how Maliki has used his newfound power and position since then. First, the Prime Minister built up his own independent base by forming Tribal Support Councils across southern Iraq. These became a huge patronage system for Maliki, which helped his State of Law list win a majority in Basra, and pluralities in the rest of the south in the 2009 provincial elections. In Diyala, the Prime Minister used force to try to break the alliance between the Iraqi Islamic Party and the Sons of Iraq. In July 2008 and May 2009, he used the security forces to arrest and intimidate Sunni leaders, while trying to peel others away to join his Tribal Support Councils. Finally, in the Saydiya district of Baghdad, Maliki convinced the local Sunnis there that he was the center of power. At first, they felt intimidated into electing a Shiite from the SIIC’s Badr Brigade to head the local council, but later when that same official was arrested, the Sunnis took it to be a sign that Maliki had turned against the Shiite militia, and that he was becoming a fair and just ruler. All of these moves are examples of the carrot and stick, divide and conquer strategy Maliki has employed since 2008. He has wooed both Sunnis and Shiites to his side, while threatening others with the security forces and the threat of arrests. It shows that the new status quo in Iraq is not based upon the rule of law or institutions, but rather the relationship between individuals and groups to the Prime Minister. He is now the center of Iraqi politics, able to wield his power to give some jobs and position, or to send others to jail.
Parker believes that the new Iraq that has emerged from the sectarian war is actually a return to its autocratic tradition. After the bloody years of the past, the most important thing to Iraqis is stability so that they can return to their normal lives. This is what Maliki has offered them. He has crushed or wooed his opponents including the Shiite militias and the Sons of Iraq, while offering protection, jobs and patronage to those that side with him such as Iraq’s tribes. It’s one man, Maliki that the people now look to. He represents the Iraqi state, much as Saddam or other past Iraqi leaders did. This is what makes “Machiavelli in Mesopotamia” one of the better arguments for the strongman theory that is becoming popular in analyses of Iraq. It is still up to debate however, whether Maliki is really moving in this direction. Many of the powers he is assuming are those that the government should have, but that it was not able to exert since it was so weak after the U.S. invasion. A regular government for example, should have a monopoly on force, so Baghdad should’ve cracked down on the Shiite militias. At the same time, Maliki has built up organizations like the Tribal Support Councils, which are outside the authority of the government, and used the security forces to take care of his opponents. Iraq seems to have gone from one extreme where the state had no real authority to where Maliki is using it everywhere for his own ends. Now however, the new speaker of the parliament is trying to strengthen the legislature to provide a check on Maliki’s power. This will be the real test as to whether the Prime Minister can become an autocrat. If he can shape the parliament after the 2010 elections then there will be no others in the country that can limit him.
SOURCES
Nordland, Rod and Santora, Marc, “Iraq Leader Omits a Bit in Lauding U.S. Pullout,” New York Times, 6/11/09
Parker, Ned, “Machiavelli in Mesopotamia,” World Policy Journal, Spring 2009
- “U.S. prepares to withdraw, Iraqi resistance prepares for battle,” Los Angeles Times, 5/25/09
Rosen, Nir, “The big sleep,” The National, 4/24/09
Russo, Claire, “Countdown To Diyala’s Provincial Election: Maliki & The IIP,” Institute for the Study of War, 1/30/09
Serwer, Daniel and Parker, Sam, “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2009
Shadid, Anthony, “In Iraq, a Different Struggle for Power,” Washington Post, 6/25/09
Wiseman, Paul, “U.S.-supported Iraqi militias clash with government,” USA Today, 5/27/09
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