Many commentators and reports before and after the January 2009 provincial elections predicted that Moqtada al-Sadr would do badly in the vote. The results were a mixed bag for his followers. The movement did not say whom it supported until just before the balloting. It lost Maysan the only province that it controlled, and Sadr City as well to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law List. The Sadr Trend also did badly in Basra the site of a government crackdown in early 2008. At the same time the Sadrists finished second in four provinces, gained more representation than they had before, and could be forming ruling coalitions with Maliki’s List.
Because of the government’s operations against the Mahdi Army, and the movement’s late announcement of what lists it backed the Sadrists appeared to be at a disadvantage before the provincial vote. Beginning in March 2008 Prime Minister Maliki launched military operations against the Sadrists in Basra, Sadr City, Maysan, and the rest of the south. There was obviously a political element behind these moves, as the Prime Minister has not shied away from using the security forces as a political instrument. In April the political council for national security said that the Sadrists would be banned from the provincial elections if they did not disarm. That led Sadr to announce in June that his followers would not run their own candidates in the vote, but would rather support independents. Who exactly they were was not announced until early January 2009, when Sadr’s office said that they were behind two lists, the Blameless and Reconstruction List and the Independent Trend of the Noble Ones. That left little time for the Sadrists to organize. However, Sadr still controls dozens of local mosques across the country that spread his message, and has been attempting to reform his movement by disbanding the Mahdi Army and creating a new social and religious group the Mumahidoon, Those Who Pave The Way. This gave him a way to get out the vote at the grassroots level. At the same time, he had to compete with the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and Maliki who both saw Sadr’s followers as being up for grabs, and made a concerted effort to recruit them.
The Sadrists saw the elections as an important way to regain political influence that they had been losing since 2007, but seemed to realize the limits of their power as well. In the January 2005 elections, Sadr told his followers to refrain from voting, that was only partially heeded. Sadrists won 12.7% of the vote in three provinces, included control of Maysan, and seats in Baghdad and Qadisiyah. In the parliamentary vote, the movement received thirty seats. In 2006 the Sadr movement helped make Maliki prime minister, and received several ministries in return. However after that high point, the Sadrists became more and more political outsiders. In 2007 Sadr pulled his followers from the cabinet to protest Maliki not setting a date for a U.S. withdrawal effectively eliminating any influence Sadr might have over major government decisions. The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council also convinced the Prime Minister to isolate the Sadrists in parliament, and form a new ruling council with them, the Kurds, and the Sunni Iraqi Accordance Front that excluded Sadr’s followers. During the later half of the Surge, the Mahdi Army also became a major target of the U.S. Maliki’s offensives in 2008 shattered much of the militia as well. During this whole time the movement was also fracturing as more and more leaders began ignoring Sadr’s commands for their own grab at power. The 2009 election therefore was a major way for Sadr to not only get back into politics, but to show that his movement was still relevant. The Sadrists were therefore one of the one of the main voices calling for balloting as soon as possible, over the objections of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and Kurds who wanted to hold onto their positions in the provinces. As the vote finally approached, Sadr’s spokesmen said that they did not expect to win any province except Maysan, but were rather looking to gain enough seats to make sure no party dominated any province. The spokesmen also said that they hoped to gain around one-third of the votes across the south so that they would be part of any ruling coalition that was formed.
In the early election results the Sadrists lost in their strongholds, yet won seats across more provinces than they did in 2005. The Independent Trend of the Noble Ones came in second in four provinces Maysan, Dhi Qar, Baghdad, and Babil, third in Najaf and Wasit, fourth in Karbala and Basra, and fifth in Qadisiyah and Muthanna, and eighth in Diyala. They received 8.1% of the votes across those eleven provinces, far below the 33% Sadrist leaders were hoping for. Their greatest defeats were in Maysan where they lost control of the province to Maliki’s State of Law List, Baghdad where apparently Sadr City voted for Maliki as well, Najaf where Sadr’s main office is located, and Basra, the site of the Prime Minister’s first crackdown. In the capital, although they came in second, they only garnered 9% of the vote, a 29% difference from Maliki’s State of Law List who with 38%. In Basra the Sadrists finished fifth with 5%, and came in third in Najaf with 12.2%. In Maysan the vote was much closer with Maliki’s State of Law winning with 17.7%, but the Sadrists coming in second with 15.2%, only a 2.5% difference. On the positive side in 2005 Sadrist only gained seats in three provinces, but this time will have representation in eleven. They are also apparently forming a ruling coalition with the State of Law List in Baghdad and across the south. Despite Maliki’s offensives against the Mahdi Army, both sides have a mutual animosity towards the Supreme Council. Sadr’s strategy apparently worked on this front. While they did not win any provinces, and lost power in some, they did get votes in new ones, and have the opportunity to join with the winning State of Law List to govern.
Where Moqtada al-Sadr is heading is yet to be seen. Following one setback after another since 2006, his movement finally has something positive to talk about. The election results, while mixed, did give his list enough seats to be players in the ruling coalition if the reports prove to be true. It shows once again that Sadr is a survivor, and that when he appears to be done, his movement is still capable of a comeback. What is not known is if an alliance with the State of Law List will give the Sadrists any real positions of power in the provincial councils, and whether they will be able to delivery on any promises. The seats will give them access to patronage to rebuild their base, and build on before the parliamentary elections scheduled for the end of the year. On the other hand the provinces will have a 50% budget cut, which will limit this capability. In the provincials Shiite voting was down across the country, with many disillusioned with the current ruling elites. That could continue unless the Sadrists, and all the other Shiite parties, prove that they are better than the politicians they are replacing.
Sadrist Finishes In 2005 Provincial Elections
Received 12.7% of vote in three provinces
Maysan: 1st place 31.9%
Qadisiyah: 6th place 4.2%
Baghdad: 6th place 2.0%
Sadrist Early Returns In 2009 Provincial Elections
Received 8.1% of vote across 11 provinces
Maysan: 2nd place 15.2%
Dhi Qar: 2nd place 14.1%
Baghdad: 2nd place 9%
Babil: 2nd place 6.2%
Najaf: 3rd place 12.2%
Wasit: 3rd place 6%
Karbala: 4th place 6.8%
Basra: 4th place 5%
Qadisiyah: 5th place 6.7%
Muthanna: 5th place 5.1%
Diyala: 8th place 3.1%
SOURCES
Abdullah, Muahmmed, “Diyala Sees Early Campaigning,” Niqash, 12/8/08
Agence France Presse, “Iraqi Shiite Factions Intimidation Claims,” 2/5/09
Ali, Sarmad, “Arab Perspective: News for Feb. 4,” Baghdad Life Blog, Wall Street Journal, 2/4/09
Alsumaria, “Iraq elections leaks say Al Maliki ahead,” 2/2/09
- “Iraq parties form alliances after elections,” 2/13/09
- “Iraq Provincial Law causes deep rift,” 3/8/08
Associated Press, “Al-Sadr’s Followers Eye Comeback in Jan. 31 Vote,” 1/20/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Sadr calls for ‘renewing’ UIA, welcomes alliances,” 2/13/09
- “Sadrist MP fears election rigging,” 1/31/09
Bennett, Brian, “The Perils of Iraqi Lawmaking,” Time, 3/1/08
Bruno, Greg, “Iraq’s Political Landscape,” Council on Foreign Relations, 1/29/09
Cochrane, Marisa, “The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement,” Institute for the Study of War, January 2009
Cordesman, Anthony, “The Shi’ite Gamble: Rolling the Dice for Iraq’s Future,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 4/21/08
Dagher, Sam, “Gunmen Kill Iraqi Cleric Campaigning for Council,” New York Times, 1/17/09
Economist, “The enigma of Muqtada al-Sadr,” 2/14/08
Fadel, Leila, “Assassinations replacing car bombs in Iraq,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/9/08
Farrell, Stephen, “Election: Preliminary Results,” Baghdad Bureau Blog, New York Times, 2/5/09
Gordon, Michael, “The Last Battle,” New York Times, 8/3/08
Hoge, James, “A Discussion of Iraqi Futures,” Council on Foreign Relations, 9/8/08
International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Provincial Elections: The Stakes,” 1/27/09
Kahl, Colin, “Bridge On The River Euphrates,” National Interest, 9/2/08
Knights, Michael, “Significance of the Provincial Elections,” Arab Reform Bulletin, December, 2008
Knights, Michael and McCarthy, Eamon, “Provincial Politics in Iraq: Fragmentation or New Awakening?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2008
Kukis, Mark, “As Iraqi Elections Loom, al-Sadr’s Political Clout Fades,” Time, 1/26/09
Majeed, Alaa, “Iraq Press Roundup,” UPI, 1/8/09
Paley, Amit and Sarhan, Saad, “Powerful Iraqi Cleric Recalibrates Strategy,” Washington Post, 6/15/08
Raghavan, Sudarsan, “For Prominent Iraqi Cleric, a Test of Influence,” Washington Post, 1/31/09
Reuters, “Iraq’s Al-Sadr Ready For Alliances With Al-Maliki,” 2/14/09
Roads To Iraq Blog, “Maliki – Sadr alliance,” 2/11/09
Roggio, Bill, “Sadrist Fared Poorly in Iraq Elections,” The Blog, Weekly Standard, 2/5/09
Rubin, Alissa and Dagher, Sam, “Sadr, Insurgency Icon, Is Silent, but Backers Work Behind Scenes,” New York Times, 1/31/09
Shadid, Anthony, “Despite Discontent and Fragmentation, Islamic Parties Dominate,” Washington Post, 1/19/09
Visser, Reidar, “The Kirkuk Issue Exposes Weaknesses in Iraq’s Ruling Coalition,” Historiae.org, 8/7/08
- “The Sadrist Parliamentary Bloc Confirms Its Support of Two Electoral Lists,” Historiae.org, 1/11/09
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Showing posts with label Iraq election. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Iraq election. Show all posts
Thursday, February 19, 2009
Wednesday, February 11, 2009
The Islamic Party’s Victory In Diyala
There was a time when many observers believed that the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) would be one of the big losers in the January 2009 provincial election. The IIP had broken the Sunni boycott in 2005 and run anyway causing resentment amongst many. The formation of the Anbar Awakening, and then the Sons of Iraq across many of the Sunni areas directly challenged their rule as they had a popular base the IIP lacked. Instead the IIP and its Accordance Front coalition finished first in two provinces in the January balloting, and third in three others, plus a surprising fifth in Basra. One of those victories came in northern Diyala. The turn of events there showed how the IIP was able to turn the Sons of Iraq program to their electoral advantage.
Diyala province is in northern Iraq, and remains one of the most violent in Iraq. The population is roughly 55% Sunni Arabs, 30% Shiite Arabs, and 15% Kurds. In 2005 the Sunnis boycotted the election there allowing an alliance of the Dawa Party and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council to take power with twenty of the 41 council seats. The Islamic Party did run there, coming in second with fourteen seats. That led to sectarian fighting and the growth of Al Qaeda in Iraq in Diyala. In April 2006 Abu Musab al-Zarqawi announced Diyala as the center of his Islamic Caliphate. That brought in Shiite militias from Baghdad to fight for their brethren, who began receiving arms and weapons from Iran. The Kurdish peshmerga had also moved into the Khanaqin district shortly after the U.S. invasion.
Things looked bleak in Diyala until 2007. That was the year members of the 1920s Revolution Brigades, and several other insurgent groups, along with the Karki and Shimouri tribes began turning on their former allies Al Qaeda in Iraq. These became the first Sons of Iraq (SOI) units in the province. What was at first seen as a threat by the Islamic Party to their claim to stand for the Sunni population, turned into an opportunity. In February 2007 Hussein al-Zubaydi the head of security in the Diyala provincial council and a member of the Islamic Party volunteered to work with the Americans to help organize the SOI. Zubaydi’s position allowed him to determine the make-up of the SOI. Later, when the U.S. began distributing aid through the SOI, the Islamic Party took advantage of that as well claiming responsibility. Through their maneuverings they were able to co-opt the SOI program, and build up a popular base that they never had before. This put them in a good position heading into the provincial elections that were originally scheduled for 2008.
It was just then that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki became concerned about the growth of Sunni power there. In mid-2007 Baghdad created the Diyala Support Council that was supposed to ensure security in the province. It was not connected to the provincial council or security forces however, and worked explicitly to build up support for the Prime Minister. They were given control of recruiting locals into the security forces, which was a major form of patronage at Maliki’s disposal. The purpose of the council was to win over members of the SOI and weaken the Islamic Party’s new base. The U.S. quickly became concerned about the council's activities and complained to Baghdad about it saying that it might destabilize Diyala even more. In late October 2007 for example, the U.S. general in command of northern Iraq complained that Baghdad refused to take in 6,000 Sunnis into the Diyala provincial police. The general said that the Interior Ministry had turned down his request. Of course, the Diyala Support Council was able to deliver names directly to the Ministry and get them hired.
In 2008 Maliki upped the ante in Diyala. In January 2008 Baghdad formed the first Tribal Support Council in the province. Like the Diyala Support Council, the new Tribal Councils were meant to take fighters away from the SOI, create support for Maliki, divide the Sunnis, and weaken the Islamic Party. In July the Prime Minister launched the Omens of Prosperity security offensive there. The operation was aimed as much at the insurgents as the Islamic Party and their Sons of Iraq allies. By the end of August five top SOI leaders had been arrested along with hundreds of their followers, while others had fled the province. In the provincial capital Baquba for example, all of the SOI checkpoints were shut down by August, along with all but one of their offices. Members of the Islamic Party were also rounded and harassed. To underline the political nature of Omens of Prosperity the government arrested three SOI members as they were going to register as candidates for the provincial election. Their arrest made them ineligible to run. The SOI went to the U.S. for help, but they weren’t able to stop Maliki. This was a classic use of the carrot and the stick. At first, Maliki offered SOI jobs through the Diyala and Tribal Support Council programs in return for their support. He then went after those that had not joined him using the Iraqi Army and police.
The Islamic Party headed into the 2009 elections at a seeming disadvantage. There were over forty-five parties and lists running in Diyala, but the four major ones were expected to take most of the votes. Those were the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s Diyala Coalition, Maliki’s Rule of Law List, the Kurdistan Alliance, and the Accordance and Reform Front. The last was led by Ezze Addeen Ibrahim Yaseen Muhammed, and was made up of the Iraqi Islamic Party, the Iraqi Commission for Civil Society, the General Conference of Iraqi People, and the Iraqi Arab Assembly. It also included many members of the SOI. Concerned about their political future the SIIC controlled provincial council called for a delay in the election there for six months in December. That didn’t happen and the Islamic Party’s list began campaigning. That was tough in a province where there are still insurgent pockets. The List’s candidates rarely crossed sectarian lines, and one was kidnapped and killed. The Reform Front was also competing with Tribal Support Councils that were expected to deliver the tribes to Maliki’s list, along with Saleh al-Mutlak, a Sunni independent who was appealing mostly to Baathists.
When January 31, 2009 came along, the Islamic Party came out victorious. Despite the insurgency, and Maliki’s moves 57% of the province’s voters turned out, one of the highest in the country. They gave the Islamic Party’s list 21.1% of the vote, good enough for first place. The Kurdish Alliance came in second with 17.2%, Saleh al-Mutlak’s Iraqi National Project got 15%, while former Interim Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List was fourth at 9.5%. Maliki’s State of Law list came in fifth with 6%. That means the Islamic Party’s List will have to cut deals with at least two others to gain a majority to rule the province.
The Islamic Party’s moves allowed it to take advantage of Iraq’s two provincial elections. In 2005 they ran basically uncontested in Diyala because of the Sunni boycott and came in second place. In 2009 they were able to come in first. Their size, organization, access to money and the media, and the election law, which favored large parties all worked to the IIP’s advantage. More importantly they were able to co-opt the former insurgents that became the Sons of Iraq as they were first being organized in 2007, while surviving Maliki’s crackdown in 2008. The IIP can now claim that they speak for many of Iraq’s Sunnis having done well in two ballots. They have to exert their power in Diyala carefully however, as they will have coalition partners and be ever vigilant of Maliki’s willingness to use the security forces for his political gain.
Early Election Results In Diyala
Iraqi Accordance Front: 21.1%
Kurdish Alliance: 17.2%
Iraqi National Project: 15%
Iraqi National List: 9.5%
State of Law: 6%
Coalition of Diyala: 5.3%
National Reform Party: 4.3%
Independent Free Movement List: 3.1%
National Movement: 2.6%
Fadhila: 2.3%
TURNOUT: 57%
SOURCES
Abdullah, Muhammed, “calls to postpone diyala election,” Niqash, 12/10/08
- “Diyala Sees Early Campaigning,” Niqash, 12/8/08
Alsumaria, “Iraq Awakening Councils in Diyala end strike,” 3/4/08
Dagher, Sam, “Risky US alliances in Iraq,” Christian Science Monitor, 7/17/07
DPA, “Head of Iraqi provincial council calls for elections postponement,” 12/9/08
DVIDS News, “Paramount Sheiks Sign Peace Agreement,” 5/2/07
Farrell, Stephen, “Election: Preliminary Results,” Baghdad Bureau Blog, New York Times, 2/5/09
Garcia-Navarro, Lourdes, “Iraq Paramilitary Group Targeted, Despite Success,” Morning Edition, NPR, 9/4/08
- “Sunni Group Says It’s Being Harassed,” Morning Edition, 9/29/08
Goetze, Katharina and Salman, Daud and Naji, Zaineb, “Could Awakening Fighters Rejoin Insurgency?” Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 10/31/08
Gordon, Michael, “Iraq Hampers U.S. Bid to Widen Sunni Police Role,” New York Times, 10/28/07
Hendawi, Hamza, “Iraq moves against some US-backed Sunni fighters,” Associated Press, 8/18/08
Iraqi News, “Three Support Councils established in Diala,” 1/24/08
Kagan, Kimberly, “The Anbar Awakening: Displacing al Qaeda from Its Stronghold in Western Iraq,” Institute For The Study of War and WeeklyStandard.com, 8/21/06-3/30/07
Kimmons, Sean, “Hashing out their differences,” Stars and Stripes, 8/29/08
Knights, Michael and McCarthy, Eamon, “Provincial Politics in Iraq: Fragmentation or New Awakening?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2008
Levinson, Charles, “Awakening Councils in hiding as arrests on rise,” USA Today, 9/22/08
Multi-National Corps – Iraq, “Diyala leaders meet to establish tribal support councils (Diyala),” 3/21/08
Niqash, “accord and reform bloc,” 1/28/09
Oppel, Richard, “Iraq Takes Aim at Leaders of U.S.-Tied Sunni Groups,” New York Times, 8/22/08
Parker, Ned, “Baqubah a minefield of Iraqi sectarian tensions,” Los Angeles Times, 12/7/08
Parker, Ned, “Iraq seeks breakup of U.S.-funded Sunni fighters,” Los Angeles Times, 8/23/08
Roggio, Bill, “1920s Revolution Brigades turns on al Qaeda in Diyala,” Long War Journal.org, 6/12/07
- “Operation Omens of Prosperity begins in Diyala,” Long War Journal.org, 7/29/08
Russo, Claire, “Countdown To Diyala’s Provincial Election: Maliki & The IIP,” Institute for the Study of War, 1/30/09
- “The Maliki Government Confronts Diyala,” Institute for the Study of War,” 9/23/08
Shadid, Anthony, “Iraq’s Diyala Province Puts Power of Ballot to the Test,” Washington Post, 2/1/09
Al-Tuawijri, Ali, “Iraq’s anti-Qaeda fighters fear for their future,” Agence France Presse, 9/6/08
Tyson, Ann Scott, “Iraq Is Criticized for Slow Hire of Police,” Washington Post, 10/27/07
- “Sunni Fighters Find Strategic Benefits in Tentative Alliance With U.S.,” Washington Post, 8/9/07
- “Tribal Members Join in Effort To Assist U.S., Iraqi Forces,” Washington Post, 9/30/07
Zavis, Alexandra, “Residents wary as Iraq police blanket Baqubah,” Los Angeles Times, 7/31/08
Diyala province is in northern Iraq, and remains one of the most violent in Iraq. The population is roughly 55% Sunni Arabs, 30% Shiite Arabs, and 15% Kurds. In 2005 the Sunnis boycotted the election there allowing an alliance of the Dawa Party and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council to take power with twenty of the 41 council seats. The Islamic Party did run there, coming in second with fourteen seats. That led to sectarian fighting and the growth of Al Qaeda in Iraq in Diyala. In April 2006 Abu Musab al-Zarqawi announced Diyala as the center of his Islamic Caliphate. That brought in Shiite militias from Baghdad to fight for their brethren, who began receiving arms and weapons from Iran. The Kurdish peshmerga had also moved into the Khanaqin district shortly after the U.S. invasion.
Things looked bleak in Diyala until 2007. That was the year members of the 1920s Revolution Brigades, and several other insurgent groups, along with the Karki and Shimouri tribes began turning on their former allies Al Qaeda in Iraq. These became the first Sons of Iraq (SOI) units in the province. What was at first seen as a threat by the Islamic Party to their claim to stand for the Sunni population, turned into an opportunity. In February 2007 Hussein al-Zubaydi the head of security in the Diyala provincial council and a member of the Islamic Party volunteered to work with the Americans to help organize the SOI. Zubaydi’s position allowed him to determine the make-up of the SOI. Later, when the U.S. began distributing aid through the SOI, the Islamic Party took advantage of that as well claiming responsibility. Through their maneuverings they were able to co-opt the SOI program, and build up a popular base that they never had before. This put them in a good position heading into the provincial elections that were originally scheduled for 2008.
It was just then that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki became concerned about the growth of Sunni power there. In mid-2007 Baghdad created the Diyala Support Council that was supposed to ensure security in the province. It was not connected to the provincial council or security forces however, and worked explicitly to build up support for the Prime Minister. They were given control of recruiting locals into the security forces, which was a major form of patronage at Maliki’s disposal. The purpose of the council was to win over members of the SOI and weaken the Islamic Party’s new base. The U.S. quickly became concerned about the council's activities and complained to Baghdad about it saying that it might destabilize Diyala even more. In late October 2007 for example, the U.S. general in command of northern Iraq complained that Baghdad refused to take in 6,000 Sunnis into the Diyala provincial police. The general said that the Interior Ministry had turned down his request. Of course, the Diyala Support Council was able to deliver names directly to the Ministry and get them hired.
In 2008 Maliki upped the ante in Diyala. In January 2008 Baghdad formed the first Tribal Support Council in the province. Like the Diyala Support Council, the new Tribal Councils were meant to take fighters away from the SOI, create support for Maliki, divide the Sunnis, and weaken the Islamic Party. In July the Prime Minister launched the Omens of Prosperity security offensive there. The operation was aimed as much at the insurgents as the Islamic Party and their Sons of Iraq allies. By the end of August five top SOI leaders had been arrested along with hundreds of their followers, while others had fled the province. In the provincial capital Baquba for example, all of the SOI checkpoints were shut down by August, along with all but one of their offices. Members of the Islamic Party were also rounded and harassed. To underline the political nature of Omens of Prosperity the government arrested three SOI members as they were going to register as candidates for the provincial election. Their arrest made them ineligible to run. The SOI went to the U.S. for help, but they weren’t able to stop Maliki. This was a classic use of the carrot and the stick. At first, Maliki offered SOI jobs through the Diyala and Tribal Support Council programs in return for their support. He then went after those that had not joined him using the Iraqi Army and police.
The Islamic Party headed into the 2009 elections at a seeming disadvantage. There were over forty-five parties and lists running in Diyala, but the four major ones were expected to take most of the votes. Those were the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s Diyala Coalition, Maliki’s Rule of Law List, the Kurdistan Alliance, and the Accordance and Reform Front. The last was led by Ezze Addeen Ibrahim Yaseen Muhammed, and was made up of the Iraqi Islamic Party, the Iraqi Commission for Civil Society, the General Conference of Iraqi People, and the Iraqi Arab Assembly. It also included many members of the SOI. Concerned about their political future the SIIC controlled provincial council called for a delay in the election there for six months in December. That didn’t happen and the Islamic Party’s list began campaigning. That was tough in a province where there are still insurgent pockets. The List’s candidates rarely crossed sectarian lines, and one was kidnapped and killed. The Reform Front was also competing with Tribal Support Councils that were expected to deliver the tribes to Maliki’s list, along with Saleh al-Mutlak, a Sunni independent who was appealing mostly to Baathists.
When January 31, 2009 came along, the Islamic Party came out victorious. Despite the insurgency, and Maliki’s moves 57% of the province’s voters turned out, one of the highest in the country. They gave the Islamic Party’s list 21.1% of the vote, good enough for first place. The Kurdish Alliance came in second with 17.2%, Saleh al-Mutlak’s Iraqi National Project got 15%, while former Interim Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List was fourth at 9.5%. Maliki’s State of Law list came in fifth with 6%. That means the Islamic Party’s List will have to cut deals with at least two others to gain a majority to rule the province.
The Islamic Party’s moves allowed it to take advantage of Iraq’s two provincial elections. In 2005 they ran basically uncontested in Diyala because of the Sunni boycott and came in second place. In 2009 they were able to come in first. Their size, organization, access to money and the media, and the election law, which favored large parties all worked to the IIP’s advantage. More importantly they were able to co-opt the former insurgents that became the Sons of Iraq as they were first being organized in 2007, while surviving Maliki’s crackdown in 2008. The IIP can now claim that they speak for many of Iraq’s Sunnis having done well in two ballots. They have to exert their power in Diyala carefully however, as they will have coalition partners and be ever vigilant of Maliki’s willingness to use the security forces for his political gain.
Early Election Results In Diyala
Iraqi Accordance Front: 21.1%
Kurdish Alliance: 17.2%
Iraqi National Project: 15%
Iraqi National List: 9.5%
State of Law: 6%
Coalition of Diyala: 5.3%
National Reform Party: 4.3%
Independent Free Movement List: 3.1%
National Movement: 2.6%
Fadhila: 2.3%
TURNOUT: 57%
SOURCES
Abdullah, Muhammed, “calls to postpone diyala election,” Niqash, 12/10/08
- “Diyala Sees Early Campaigning,” Niqash, 12/8/08
Alsumaria, “Iraq Awakening Councils in Diyala end strike,” 3/4/08
Dagher, Sam, “Risky US alliances in Iraq,” Christian Science Monitor, 7/17/07
DPA, “Head of Iraqi provincial council calls for elections postponement,” 12/9/08
DVIDS News, “Paramount Sheiks Sign Peace Agreement,” 5/2/07
Farrell, Stephen, “Election: Preliminary Results,” Baghdad Bureau Blog, New York Times, 2/5/09
Garcia-Navarro, Lourdes, “Iraq Paramilitary Group Targeted, Despite Success,” Morning Edition, NPR, 9/4/08
- “Sunni Group Says It’s Being Harassed,” Morning Edition, 9/29/08
Goetze, Katharina and Salman, Daud and Naji, Zaineb, “Could Awakening Fighters Rejoin Insurgency?” Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 10/31/08
Gordon, Michael, “Iraq Hampers U.S. Bid to Widen Sunni Police Role,” New York Times, 10/28/07
Hendawi, Hamza, “Iraq moves against some US-backed Sunni fighters,” Associated Press, 8/18/08
Iraqi News, “Three Support Councils established in Diala,” 1/24/08
Kagan, Kimberly, “The Anbar Awakening: Displacing al Qaeda from Its Stronghold in Western Iraq,” Institute For The Study of War and WeeklyStandard.com, 8/21/06-3/30/07
Kimmons, Sean, “Hashing out their differences,” Stars and Stripes, 8/29/08
Knights, Michael and McCarthy, Eamon, “Provincial Politics in Iraq: Fragmentation or New Awakening?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2008
Levinson, Charles, “Awakening Councils in hiding as arrests on rise,” USA Today, 9/22/08
Multi-National Corps – Iraq, “Diyala leaders meet to establish tribal support councils (Diyala),” 3/21/08
Niqash, “accord and reform bloc,” 1/28/09
Oppel, Richard, “Iraq Takes Aim at Leaders of U.S.-Tied Sunni Groups,” New York Times, 8/22/08
Parker, Ned, “Baqubah a minefield of Iraqi sectarian tensions,” Los Angeles Times, 12/7/08
Parker, Ned, “Iraq seeks breakup of U.S.-funded Sunni fighters,” Los Angeles Times, 8/23/08
Roggio, Bill, “1920s Revolution Brigades turns on al Qaeda in Diyala,” Long War Journal.org, 6/12/07
- “Operation Omens of Prosperity begins in Diyala,” Long War Journal.org, 7/29/08
Russo, Claire, “Countdown To Diyala’s Provincial Election: Maliki & The IIP,” Institute for the Study of War, 1/30/09
- “The Maliki Government Confronts Diyala,” Institute for the Study of War,” 9/23/08
Shadid, Anthony, “Iraq’s Diyala Province Puts Power of Ballot to the Test,” Washington Post, 2/1/09
Al-Tuawijri, Ali, “Iraq’s anti-Qaeda fighters fear for their future,” Agence France Presse, 9/6/08
Tyson, Ann Scott, “Iraq Is Criticized for Slow Hire of Police,” Washington Post, 10/27/07
- “Sunni Fighters Find Strategic Benefits in Tentative Alliance With U.S.,” Washington Post, 8/9/07
- “Tribal Members Join in Effort To Assist U.S., Iraqi Forces,” Washington Post, 9/30/07
Zavis, Alexandra, “Residents wary as Iraq police blanket Baqubah,” Los Angeles Times, 7/31/08
Tuesday, February 10, 2009
Unfinished Businesses – Tamim Province
The Kurdistan Regional Government recently announced that they would be holding regional parliamentary elections in May 2009. The elections in fourteen of Iraq’s eighteen provinces have just concluded. That leaves Tamim as the only governorate that has not held or plans to hold balloting. The provincial election law, passed in September 2008 postponed voting there until a committee could come up with recommendations on how to conduct them there. Those findings are due at the end of March, but recent comments from a Kurdish politician questions whether they will have their work done on time, leaving the future of the province up in the air.
On February 2, a parliamentarian from the Kurdistan Islamic Union, an independent Kurdish bloc, claimed that the Tamim committee was not doing its job. He said that they will not have their work done by March 31, the deadline set by parliament in the provincial election law, which will threaten elections in that province. The Islamic Union member went on to say that the rest of the country had voted, and that any delay by the committee would be unfair for the citizens of Tamim.
Tamim is in northern Iraq and contains the disputed city of Kirkuk. In the January 2005 provincial elections, the List of Kurdistan Brotherhood led by the Kurdistan Democratic Party, took over half of the votes in the province, gaining control of 26 of the 41 seats on the provincial council. The rest of the votes went to the Iraqi Turkman Front with eight seats, the Iraqi Republican Group, five seats, and the Islamic Turkman Coalition and National Iraq Union that gained one seat each. The election allowed the Kurds to take over the administration of Tamim, the security forces, and appoint the governor, something greatly resented by the Arabs, Turkmen, and some Christians. The Arabs went on to boycott the council until December 2007. The Kurds have long wanted to annex Kirkuk and northern sections of Tamim, and the provincial election was their first step in that direction. They also attempted to force Arabs out of Kirkuk, and pressure Christians to support their moves.
Later in 2005 when the Constitution was drafted, the Kurds were able to insert Article 140. It called for normalization, a census in Tamim, and a vote by December 31, 2007 on whether Kirkuk wanted to be annexed. That followed the Kurds strategy of trying to peacefully, politically, and legally incorporate Kirkuk into Kurdistan, while creating facts on the ground through their control of the province to support their cause.
Article 140 has never been implemented however. By early 2007 the United Nations realized that the constitutional process would only lead to more conflicts, so they began looking for alternatives. On August 10, 2007 the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1770 that said the U.N. representative in Iraq was to work on settling Kirkuk, and all other disputed territories in the country. The first thing special envoy Stephan De Mistura did was get the Iraqi government to agree to delay Article 140. That was put off until June 30, 2008. When that passed no new date was set. This was supported by the United States that came to feel that a U.N. negotiated settlement was the best way to resolve Kirkuk. The Kurds however felt betrayed. They were also worried that any negotiations would cost them territory, perhaps even Kirkuk itself.
In the meantime, the Kurds were forced into a power sharing agreement that only angered them more. In December 2007 the Kurds gave up five of their seats on the provincial council so that the Turkmen could have eleven, the Arabs eight, and the Christians one. This ended the Arab boycott of the body that had been going on for over two years. The Kurds were also supposed to create a joint decision making process, release Arab prisoners, and have the Kurdish intelligence service withdraw from the province. The Kurds believed these moves violated the constitution, so they never followed through with the deal other than to give up some of their council seats.
To express their dissatisfaction, the Kurds began stonewalling important legislation and blocking U.S. policies. For example, they refused to allow the formation of Sons of Iraq in Tamim by the Americans for a very long time. They also began holding up a number of important laws such as the original version of the provincial election law.
The main sticking point in the passage of the provincial law was how to deal with Tamim. The first version of the legislation had an amendment inserted by a Turkmen parliamentarian that would postpone elections in Tamim, replace the Kurdish peshmerga with regular security forces, while the provincial council would be divided in thirds between the Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen, along with one seat for Christians. The council would then determine how elections were to be held there. Arabs and Turkmen supported this proposal because they knew they would lose in any vote. It was also taken up by the opposition in parliament made up of the Sadrists, the Fadhila Party, the National Dialogue Council, the Iraqi National List, along with parts of the Iraqi Accordance Front, who were opposed to the expansion of Kurdistan. The Christians on the other hand, were against the power-sharing deal because it would only give them one seat. The Kurds at first walked out in protest over the article, and then the President of Iraq Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, vetoed it. Finally the parliament agreed to a version of the law that also held off on balloting, but created the committee discussed before. The Kurds came up with this plan because it maintained their control over the province.
If the Tamim commission does not have its work done by the end of March, the issue will then pass to Baghdad. The Prime Minister, along with the President of Iraq Jalal Talabani, and the speaker of parliament are supposed to work with the United Nations to come up with an election process for Tamim if that happens. That could be very complicated, as Maliki has actively opposed the Kurds’ aspirations to annex any disputed territory. That will probably mean the future of Kirkuk will again be put off. That would suit the Kurds as they already have de facto control. Maliki on the other hand, after his victories in the provincial elections, may be tempted to send in Iraqi security forces as he did in Khanaqin in Diyala to assert central government authority, and push out the Kurds. The Prime Minister has been doing something similar in Mosul since the summer of 2008. The U.S. can’t be expected to step in as President Obama is committed to withdrawing U.S. forces, and even during the end of the Bush term abdicated responsibility to the United Nations. Tamim shows that there are still many difficult issues remaining in the country, with the Arab-Kurd disputed right at the top. The feuding parties have not been willing to negotiate or compromise. Instead they have put off any tough decisions as in the provincial election law, and preferred maneuvering on the ground to assert their authority.
SOURCES
Ali, Ahmed and Knights, Michael, “Kirkuk: A Test for the International Community,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1/14/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Investigation committee in Kirkuk ‘late’ – MP,” 2/2/09
BBC News, “Guide to Iraqi political parties,” 1/20/06
Goode, Erica, “Iraq Passes Provincial Elections Law,” New York Times, 9/25/08
International Crisis Group, “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08
Iraq The Model Blog, “Talabani Rejects the Provincial Election Law,” 7/24/08
Al-Khalidi, Diaa, “divisions split kirkuk Christians,” Niqash, 11/11/08
Knights, Michael and McCarthy, Eamon, “Provincial Politics in Iraq: Fragmentation or New Awakening?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2008
Raghavan, Sudarsan and Londono, Ernesto, “Iraqis Take Flawed Step On Electoral Legislation,” Washington Post, 7/23/08
Reuters, “Iraq’s Kurds to elect parliament on May 19,” 2/2/09
Rubin, Alissa, “Kurds Object to Iraqi Provincial Election Law,” New York Times, 7/23/08
Tavernise, Sabrina, and Muhammed, Riyadh, “Iraqi Measure on Provincial Voting Is Vetoed,” New York Times, 7/24/08
Visser, Reidar, “After Compromise on Kirkuk, Finally an Elections Law for Iraq’s Governorates,” Historiae.org, 9/24/08
- “The Kirkuk Issue Exposes Weaknesses in Iraq’s Ruling Coalition,” Historiae.org, 8/7/08
On February 2, a parliamentarian from the Kurdistan Islamic Union, an independent Kurdish bloc, claimed that the Tamim committee was not doing its job. He said that they will not have their work done by March 31, the deadline set by parliament in the provincial election law, which will threaten elections in that province. The Islamic Union member went on to say that the rest of the country had voted, and that any delay by the committee would be unfair for the citizens of Tamim.
Tamim is in northern Iraq and contains the disputed city of Kirkuk. In the January 2005 provincial elections, the List of Kurdistan Brotherhood led by the Kurdistan Democratic Party, took over half of the votes in the province, gaining control of 26 of the 41 seats on the provincial council. The rest of the votes went to the Iraqi Turkman Front with eight seats, the Iraqi Republican Group, five seats, and the Islamic Turkman Coalition and National Iraq Union that gained one seat each. The election allowed the Kurds to take over the administration of Tamim, the security forces, and appoint the governor, something greatly resented by the Arabs, Turkmen, and some Christians. The Arabs went on to boycott the council until December 2007. The Kurds have long wanted to annex Kirkuk and northern sections of Tamim, and the provincial election was their first step in that direction. They also attempted to force Arabs out of Kirkuk, and pressure Christians to support their moves.
Later in 2005 when the Constitution was drafted, the Kurds were able to insert Article 140. It called for normalization, a census in Tamim, and a vote by December 31, 2007 on whether Kirkuk wanted to be annexed. That followed the Kurds strategy of trying to peacefully, politically, and legally incorporate Kirkuk into Kurdistan, while creating facts on the ground through their control of the province to support their cause.
Article 140 has never been implemented however. By early 2007 the United Nations realized that the constitutional process would only lead to more conflicts, so they began looking for alternatives. On August 10, 2007 the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1770 that said the U.N. representative in Iraq was to work on settling Kirkuk, and all other disputed territories in the country. The first thing special envoy Stephan De Mistura did was get the Iraqi government to agree to delay Article 140. That was put off until June 30, 2008. When that passed no new date was set. This was supported by the United States that came to feel that a U.N. negotiated settlement was the best way to resolve Kirkuk. The Kurds however felt betrayed. They were also worried that any negotiations would cost them territory, perhaps even Kirkuk itself.
In the meantime, the Kurds were forced into a power sharing agreement that only angered them more. In December 2007 the Kurds gave up five of their seats on the provincial council so that the Turkmen could have eleven, the Arabs eight, and the Christians one. This ended the Arab boycott of the body that had been going on for over two years. The Kurds were also supposed to create a joint decision making process, release Arab prisoners, and have the Kurdish intelligence service withdraw from the province. The Kurds believed these moves violated the constitution, so they never followed through with the deal other than to give up some of their council seats.
To express their dissatisfaction, the Kurds began stonewalling important legislation and blocking U.S. policies. For example, they refused to allow the formation of Sons of Iraq in Tamim by the Americans for a very long time. They also began holding up a number of important laws such as the original version of the provincial election law.
The main sticking point in the passage of the provincial law was how to deal with Tamim. The first version of the legislation had an amendment inserted by a Turkmen parliamentarian that would postpone elections in Tamim, replace the Kurdish peshmerga with regular security forces, while the provincial council would be divided in thirds between the Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen, along with one seat for Christians. The council would then determine how elections were to be held there. Arabs and Turkmen supported this proposal because they knew they would lose in any vote. It was also taken up by the opposition in parliament made up of the Sadrists, the Fadhila Party, the National Dialogue Council, the Iraqi National List, along with parts of the Iraqi Accordance Front, who were opposed to the expansion of Kurdistan. The Christians on the other hand, were against the power-sharing deal because it would only give them one seat. The Kurds at first walked out in protest over the article, and then the President of Iraq Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, vetoed it. Finally the parliament agreed to a version of the law that also held off on balloting, but created the committee discussed before. The Kurds came up with this plan because it maintained their control over the province.
If the Tamim commission does not have its work done by the end of March, the issue will then pass to Baghdad. The Prime Minister, along with the President of Iraq Jalal Talabani, and the speaker of parliament are supposed to work with the United Nations to come up with an election process for Tamim if that happens. That could be very complicated, as Maliki has actively opposed the Kurds’ aspirations to annex any disputed territory. That will probably mean the future of Kirkuk will again be put off. That would suit the Kurds as they already have de facto control. Maliki on the other hand, after his victories in the provincial elections, may be tempted to send in Iraqi security forces as he did in Khanaqin in Diyala to assert central government authority, and push out the Kurds. The Prime Minister has been doing something similar in Mosul since the summer of 2008. The U.S. can’t be expected to step in as President Obama is committed to withdrawing U.S. forces, and even during the end of the Bush term abdicated responsibility to the United Nations. Tamim shows that there are still many difficult issues remaining in the country, with the Arab-Kurd disputed right at the top. The feuding parties have not been willing to negotiate or compromise. Instead they have put off any tough decisions as in the provincial election law, and preferred maneuvering on the ground to assert their authority.
SOURCES
Ali, Ahmed and Knights, Michael, “Kirkuk: A Test for the International Community,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1/14/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Investigation committee in Kirkuk ‘late’ – MP,” 2/2/09
BBC News, “Guide to Iraqi political parties,” 1/20/06
Goode, Erica, “Iraq Passes Provincial Elections Law,” New York Times, 9/25/08
International Crisis Group, “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08
Iraq The Model Blog, “Talabani Rejects the Provincial Election Law,” 7/24/08
Al-Khalidi, Diaa, “divisions split kirkuk Christians,” Niqash, 11/11/08
Knights, Michael and McCarthy, Eamon, “Provincial Politics in Iraq: Fragmentation or New Awakening?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2008
Raghavan, Sudarsan and Londono, Ernesto, “Iraqis Take Flawed Step On Electoral Legislation,” Washington Post, 7/23/08
Reuters, “Iraq’s Kurds to elect parliament on May 19,” 2/2/09
Rubin, Alissa, “Kurds Object to Iraqi Provincial Election Law,” New York Times, 7/23/08
Tavernise, Sabrina, and Muhammed, Riyadh, “Iraqi Measure on Provincial Voting Is Vetoed,” New York Times, 7/24/08
Visser, Reidar, “After Compromise on Kirkuk, Finally an Elections Law for Iraq’s Governorates,” Historiae.org, 9/24/08
- “The Kirkuk Issue Exposes Weaknesses in Iraq’s Ruling Coalition,” Historiae.org, 8/7/08
Labels:
2005 Iraqi elections,
Iraq election,
Kirkuk,
Kurds,
Tamim
Monday, February 09, 2009
Ninewa’s al-Hadbaa Party
One of the few new parties to come out victorious in the January 2009 provincial elections could be the al-Hadbaa party of Ninewa province. A U.S. official told Reuters that he thought the Hadbaa list would get around 66% of the vote there. The province is one of the most divided and violent in the country due to the simmering dispute between the majority Arabs who are ruled by the Kurds. There are also a large number of minorities such as Christians, Yazidis, Shabaks, and Turkomen who reside there that are caught in the middle. The province had one of the highest voter turnouts in the country at 60%, which could be the result of the power struggle between all these various groups. If al-Hadbaa does come out the winner, it may increase the tensions in Ninewa as it ran on an Arab-nationalist, anti-Kurdish ticket.
While there were twenty-five other entities running in Ninewa, the election was really between Al-Hadbaa and the Kurdish Ninewa Brotherly List. The al-Hadbaa National List was formed in 2007. It is made up of four parties, Al-Hadbaa National United Assembly, the Patriotic and National Forces Assembly, the Iraqi and Kurdistani Party for Freedom and Equality, and Al-Qasat Iraqi Assembly. Atheel Najafi who comes from a rich and famous Mosul pedigree heads the List. He and other well-known families and tribes form the backbone of the Al-Hadbaa National United Assembly, which was put together in 2007. The Patriotic Union and National Forces Assembly was founded by Isam Aead Sheat al-Jubouri. The Assembly is itself a coalition of the Democratic Reform and Justice Party, the Justice and Reform Iraqi Movement, the Arab Socialist Movement, the Nasserite Avant-Garde Socialist Party, and the Iraqi Arab Party. The Iraqi and Kurdistani Party for Freedom and Equality was also founded in 2007 by Arshad Ahmed al-Zebari. They oppose Kurdish independence. Al-Qasat Iraqi Assembly was started in Mosul in 2005 by engineer Fares Abdul Azeez al-Sanjari. They want an end to the U.S. occupation, freeing of prisoners, and decentralized rule.
Together the List called for Iraqi unity as an Arab and Islamic country, an end to the U.S. presence and militias, women’s rights, the development of the province, and claim they will help end the insurgency. They were most noted however for their attacks on the Kurds, who currently control the provincial council because of the Sunni boycott in January 2005. They opposed the Kurds’ aspirations to annex northern sections of the province, accused them of cheating in the voting, manipulating the security forces, blamed them for raids on their offices, and said they would remove Kurds from leadership positions. Atheel Najafi went as far as to claim that the Kurds tried to assassinate him.
The Kurdish List is made up of the two main Kurdish parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani, along with many other smaller entities Those include the Kurdistan Islamic Union, the Assyrian National Congress, the Iraqi Communist Party, the Kurdistan Communist Party, and the Kurdistan Socialist Party. The Kurds want a federal system that will ensure their autonomy, and the annexation of areas they lay historical claim to. One Kurdish member of the Ninewa council for example, said that the election would prove that the people in the disputed territories in the northern region of the province want to join Kurdistan, and a Kurdish Army officer claimed that Mosul would eventually be part of an independent Kurdistan as well. The Kurds also accused the al-Hadbaa list of being Baathists, and having ties to Al Qaeda in Iraq.
The Kurds held no illusion about their chances heading into 2009. In 2005 because of the Sunni boycott, only 14% of the province voted. This time they were expecting a heavy Arab turnout, which apparently happened. They were therefore cold about holding the elections in the first place, and tried to delay the passage of the provincial election law in parliament in 2008. In December, the Kurds on the Ninewa council attempted to delay the vote there unsuccessfully to hold off the inevitable.
As the campaign started, electioneering was difficult because of the lack of security. Much of the work was done secretly as a result. One researcher at Mosul University thought the 2005 election was actually more open with more parties participating, but with fewer voters because of the Sunni boycott. Al-Hadbaa was expected to take the southern Arab portions of Ninewa, and most of Mosul, while the Brotherly List had support in the north and west, and northern Mosul. The rural areas were considered up for grabs
American officials have often said that they hope the elections could help solve the problems in Ninewa. Right after the voting was completed for example, the U.S. general in command of Mosul said this could be a turning point. That may be wishful thinking, as the campaigning between the Kurds and Hadbaa was anything but cordial. If the U.S. official was correct and al-Hadbaa gets two-thirds of the seats they will be able to rule the province on their own, which could lead to a direct confrontation with the outgoing Kurds. Al-Hadbaa’s campaign promises of removing Kurds from positions of authority and asserting Arab identity will be rejected by the Kurdish List. Unfortunately, that is the way Iraqi nationalism is increasingly being formulated. Al-Hadbaa’s demands on the Kurds closely mirror statements and moves made by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki since 2008 as he has tried to establish himself as a national leader of the country. What is needed is reconciliation and power sharing in Ninewa, but none of the sides, nor Baghdad is proposing that. That means the divide between Arabs and Kurds will continue, but the big question now is whether it will still be as violent or become more political.
SOURCES
Al-Ansary, Khalid, “Election friction flares in Iraq’s violent north,” Reuters, 1/2/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “MP accuses Kurds of ‘illegitimate’ campaigning,” 1/24/09
- “Ninewa council votes for postponing local elections,” 12/18/08
Cocks, Tim, “Vote sows seeds of greater calm in Iraq’s north,” Reuters, 2/2/09
Farrell, Stephen, “Election Turnout: Early Figures,” Baghdad Bureau Blog, New York Times, 2/1/09
Garcia-Navarro, Lourdes, “Iraq’s Election Campaign Especially Bitter In Mosul,” Morning Edition, NPR, 1/30/09
International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Provincial Elections: The Stakes,” 1/27/09
Kamal, Adel, “violence threatens mosul elections,” Niqash, 12/11/08
Kukis, Mark, “Is Mosul on the Mend?” Time, 3/9/08
Londono, Ernesto, “In Iraq’s north, Vote Tallies To Define Loyalties,” Washington Post, 2/2/09
Niqash, “the hadbaa national list,” 1/28/09
- “Kurdistan alliance,” 1/28/09
Parker, Ned, “Iraq looks ahead to provincial, national elections,” Los Angeles Times, 11/5/08
Parker, Ned and Redha, Usama, “Arabs, Kurds take their fight to polls,” Los Angeles Times, 1/25/09
Visser, Reidar, “Pushing the Limits of Decentralization: Kurdish Parties ‘Decide’ to Postpone Local Elections in Mosul,” Historiae.org, 12/18/08
While there were twenty-five other entities running in Ninewa, the election was really between Al-Hadbaa and the Kurdish Ninewa Brotherly List. The al-Hadbaa National List was formed in 2007. It is made up of four parties, Al-Hadbaa National United Assembly, the Patriotic and National Forces Assembly, the Iraqi and Kurdistani Party for Freedom and Equality, and Al-Qasat Iraqi Assembly. Atheel Najafi who comes from a rich and famous Mosul pedigree heads the List. He and other well-known families and tribes form the backbone of the Al-Hadbaa National United Assembly, which was put together in 2007. The Patriotic Union and National Forces Assembly was founded by Isam Aead Sheat al-Jubouri. The Assembly is itself a coalition of the Democratic Reform and Justice Party, the Justice and Reform Iraqi Movement, the Arab Socialist Movement, the Nasserite Avant-Garde Socialist Party, and the Iraqi Arab Party. The Iraqi and Kurdistani Party for Freedom and Equality was also founded in 2007 by Arshad Ahmed al-Zebari. They oppose Kurdish independence. Al-Qasat Iraqi Assembly was started in Mosul in 2005 by engineer Fares Abdul Azeez al-Sanjari. They want an end to the U.S. occupation, freeing of prisoners, and decentralized rule.
Together the List called for Iraqi unity as an Arab and Islamic country, an end to the U.S. presence and militias, women’s rights, the development of the province, and claim they will help end the insurgency. They were most noted however for their attacks on the Kurds, who currently control the provincial council because of the Sunni boycott in January 2005. They opposed the Kurds’ aspirations to annex northern sections of the province, accused them of cheating in the voting, manipulating the security forces, blamed them for raids on their offices, and said they would remove Kurds from leadership positions. Atheel Najafi went as far as to claim that the Kurds tried to assassinate him.
The Kurdish List is made up of the two main Kurdish parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani, along with many other smaller entities Those include the Kurdistan Islamic Union, the Assyrian National Congress, the Iraqi Communist Party, the Kurdistan Communist Party, and the Kurdistan Socialist Party. The Kurds want a federal system that will ensure their autonomy, and the annexation of areas they lay historical claim to. One Kurdish member of the Ninewa council for example, said that the election would prove that the people in the disputed territories in the northern region of the province want to join Kurdistan, and a Kurdish Army officer claimed that Mosul would eventually be part of an independent Kurdistan as well. The Kurds also accused the al-Hadbaa list of being Baathists, and having ties to Al Qaeda in Iraq.
The Kurds held no illusion about their chances heading into 2009. In 2005 because of the Sunni boycott, only 14% of the province voted. This time they were expecting a heavy Arab turnout, which apparently happened. They were therefore cold about holding the elections in the first place, and tried to delay the passage of the provincial election law in parliament in 2008. In December, the Kurds on the Ninewa council attempted to delay the vote there unsuccessfully to hold off the inevitable.
As the campaign started, electioneering was difficult because of the lack of security. Much of the work was done secretly as a result. One researcher at Mosul University thought the 2005 election was actually more open with more parties participating, but with fewer voters because of the Sunni boycott. Al-Hadbaa was expected to take the southern Arab portions of Ninewa, and most of Mosul, while the Brotherly List had support in the north and west, and northern Mosul. The rural areas were considered up for grabs
American officials have often said that they hope the elections could help solve the problems in Ninewa. Right after the voting was completed for example, the U.S. general in command of Mosul said this could be a turning point. That may be wishful thinking, as the campaigning between the Kurds and Hadbaa was anything but cordial. If the U.S. official was correct and al-Hadbaa gets two-thirds of the seats they will be able to rule the province on their own, which could lead to a direct confrontation with the outgoing Kurds. Al-Hadbaa’s campaign promises of removing Kurds from positions of authority and asserting Arab identity will be rejected by the Kurdish List. Unfortunately, that is the way Iraqi nationalism is increasingly being formulated. Al-Hadbaa’s demands on the Kurds closely mirror statements and moves made by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki since 2008 as he has tried to establish himself as a national leader of the country. What is needed is reconciliation and power sharing in Ninewa, but none of the sides, nor Baghdad is proposing that. That means the divide between Arabs and Kurds will continue, but the big question now is whether it will still be as violent or become more political.
SOURCES
Al-Ansary, Khalid, “Election friction flares in Iraq’s violent north,” Reuters, 1/2/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “MP accuses Kurds of ‘illegitimate’ campaigning,” 1/24/09
- “Ninewa council votes for postponing local elections,” 12/18/08
Cocks, Tim, “Vote sows seeds of greater calm in Iraq’s north,” Reuters, 2/2/09
Farrell, Stephen, “Election Turnout: Early Figures,” Baghdad Bureau Blog, New York Times, 2/1/09
Garcia-Navarro, Lourdes, “Iraq’s Election Campaign Especially Bitter In Mosul,” Morning Edition, NPR, 1/30/09
International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Provincial Elections: The Stakes,” 1/27/09
Kamal, Adel, “violence threatens mosul elections,” Niqash, 12/11/08
Kukis, Mark, “Is Mosul on the Mend?” Time, 3/9/08
Londono, Ernesto, “In Iraq’s north, Vote Tallies To Define Loyalties,” Washington Post, 2/2/09
Niqash, “the hadbaa national list,” 1/28/09
- “Kurdistan alliance,” 1/28/09
Parker, Ned, “Iraq looks ahead to provincial, national elections,” Los Angeles Times, 11/5/08
Parker, Ned and Redha, Usama, “Arabs, Kurds take their fight to polls,” Los Angeles Times, 1/25/09
Visser, Reidar, “Pushing the Limits of Decentralization: Kurdish Parties ‘Decide’ to Postpone Local Elections in Mosul,” Historiae.org, 12/18/08
Saturday, February 07, 2009
The State Of Law List
The early returns from the provincial elections are in. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law list came in first in eight of the fourteen provinces that voted including Baghdad, second in Wasit, third in Karbala, fifth in Diyala, and tenth in Salahaddin. They did not win a majority in any province however. That will mean his List will have to form coalitions with other parties to form ruling alliances. Still it was an impressive sweep of the south. Whatever deals the List cuts to rule, Maliki will be in much a stronger position to advance his agenda afterwards.
The State of Law list is made up of the Islamic Dawa Party, Dawa Party – Iraq Organization, the Independent Bloc, the Solidarity Bloc, the Islamic Union of Iraqi Turkmen, the Kurdistan Feli Fraternity Movement, and the Shaabani Uprising Bloc 1991. The Islamic Dawa was the first Shiite Islamist party formed in Iraq in the 1950s. They were small and weak after the U.S. invasion, but were able to maneuver themselves into the middleman between the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) and the Sadrists in parliament. When those two groups could not decide upon a prime minister they selected a member of the Dawa, first Ibrahim al-Jaafari and then Nouri al-Maliki, as a compromise candidate. Since Maliki took office, he has transformed himself from a weak and ineffective politician to a leader to be reckoned with largely through his use of the security forces. He has also moved away from Dawa’s religious roots. The Dawa Party – Islamic Organization is a breakaway from the main Dawa bloc that was formed in Basra. It holds the Ministry of Education. The Independent Bloc is led by Oil Minister Hussain al-Shahristani, and is known for being close to Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. The Solidarity Bloc used to be part of the United Iraqi Alliance, but left in 2007. It is made up of independent Shiites, and led by former Minister of National Security Qasem Dawood from the interim Iraqi government. The Islamic Union of Iraqi Turkomen is led by Abbas al-Bayati, a Shiite Turkomen. His party too was once a member of the United Iraqi Alliance, and holds two seats in parliament. The Kurdish Feli Fraternity Movement is a Shiite Kurdish party formed in exile in Iran during the Saddam years. It had ministries in both the Maliki and Jaafari governments. Two Shiites that fought against Saddam in 1991 after the Gulf War formed the Shaabani Uprising Bloc 1991, hence its name. They hold one seat in parliament. Together the State of Law ran candidates in Baghdad, Babil, Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiyah, Muthanna, Wasit, Maysan, Basra, Diyala, Salahaddin, Ninewa, and Dhi Qar. They are united by a call for law and order, a strong central government, the end of militias, and opposition to the Kurds and the Supreme Council. It was formed around October 2008.
The List’s victories will allow Maliki to advance three of his goals. First he will have a strong base in the provinces to build upon before the parliamentary elections that are due towards the end of the year. Second his List will control several councils and governors that will support a strong central government with him at its head. Finally, the defeat of the Fadhila Party and the Supreme Council could mean the end of any calls for autonomous regions in the south. Maliki is probably also counting on Sunni parties to defeat the Kurds in Ninewa and Salahaddin, which will limit their plans of annexing northern regions. His main rivals will thus be weakened. He will still have to negotiate with other parties and stave off any no-confidence votes in the legislature, but he will probably be at the peak of his power.
Early Returns For State Of Law List’s Finishes In January 2009 Provincial Election
1st place:
Baghdad 38%
Basra 37%
Dhi Qar 23.1%
Qadisiyah 23.1%
Maysan 17.7%
Najaf 16.2%
Babil 12.5%
Muthanna 10.9%
2nd place:
Wasit 15.3%
3rd place:
Karbala 6.8%
5th place:
Diyala 6%
10th place:
Salahaddin 3.5%
SOURCES
Alsumaria, “Iraq elections leaks say Al Maliki ahead,” 2/2/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Maliki Leads 7 Parties Alliance in Provincial Elections – MP,” 11/13/08
- “Maliki’s List Advancing in Basra’s Initial Vote Count,” 2/2/09
International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Provincial Elections: The Stakes,” 1/27/09
Niqash, “state of law coalition,” 1/28/09
Paley, Amit, “In Iraq’s Provincial Elections, Main Issue Is Maliki Himself,” Washington Post, 1/17/09
Al-Sabah, “Maliki, Four Slates Lead in Nine Provinces, Results Say,” 2/4/09
Said, Yahia Khairi, “Political Dynamics in Iraq within the Context of the ‘Surge,’” Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 4/2/08
The State of Law list is made up of the Islamic Dawa Party, Dawa Party – Iraq Organization, the Independent Bloc, the Solidarity Bloc, the Islamic Union of Iraqi Turkmen, the Kurdistan Feli Fraternity Movement, and the Shaabani Uprising Bloc 1991. The Islamic Dawa was the first Shiite Islamist party formed in Iraq in the 1950s. They were small and weak after the U.S. invasion, but were able to maneuver themselves into the middleman between the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) and the Sadrists in parliament. When those two groups could not decide upon a prime minister they selected a member of the Dawa, first Ibrahim al-Jaafari and then Nouri al-Maliki, as a compromise candidate. Since Maliki took office, he has transformed himself from a weak and ineffective politician to a leader to be reckoned with largely through his use of the security forces. He has also moved away from Dawa’s religious roots. The Dawa Party – Islamic Organization is a breakaway from the main Dawa bloc that was formed in Basra. It holds the Ministry of Education. The Independent Bloc is led by Oil Minister Hussain al-Shahristani, and is known for being close to Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. The Solidarity Bloc used to be part of the United Iraqi Alliance, but left in 2007. It is made up of independent Shiites, and led by former Minister of National Security Qasem Dawood from the interim Iraqi government. The Islamic Union of Iraqi Turkomen is led by Abbas al-Bayati, a Shiite Turkomen. His party too was once a member of the United Iraqi Alliance, and holds two seats in parliament. The Kurdish Feli Fraternity Movement is a Shiite Kurdish party formed in exile in Iran during the Saddam years. It had ministries in both the Maliki and Jaafari governments. Two Shiites that fought against Saddam in 1991 after the Gulf War formed the Shaabani Uprising Bloc 1991, hence its name. They hold one seat in parliament. Together the State of Law ran candidates in Baghdad, Babil, Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiyah, Muthanna, Wasit, Maysan, Basra, Diyala, Salahaddin, Ninewa, and Dhi Qar. They are united by a call for law and order, a strong central government, the end of militias, and opposition to the Kurds and the Supreme Council. It was formed around October 2008.
The List’s victories will allow Maliki to advance three of his goals. First he will have a strong base in the provinces to build upon before the parliamentary elections that are due towards the end of the year. Second his List will control several councils and governors that will support a strong central government with him at its head. Finally, the defeat of the Fadhila Party and the Supreme Council could mean the end of any calls for autonomous regions in the south. Maliki is probably also counting on Sunni parties to defeat the Kurds in Ninewa and Salahaddin, which will limit their plans of annexing northern regions. His main rivals will thus be weakened. He will still have to negotiate with other parties and stave off any no-confidence votes in the legislature, but he will probably be at the peak of his power.
Early Returns For State Of Law List’s Finishes In January 2009 Provincial Election
1st place:
Baghdad 38%
Basra 37%
Dhi Qar 23.1%
Qadisiyah 23.1%
Maysan 17.7%
Najaf 16.2%
Babil 12.5%
Muthanna 10.9%
2nd place:
Wasit 15.3%
3rd place:
Karbala 6.8%
5th place:
Diyala 6%
10th place:
Salahaddin 3.5%
SOURCES
Alsumaria, “Iraq elections leaks say Al Maliki ahead,” 2/2/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Maliki Leads 7 Parties Alliance in Provincial Elections – MP,” 11/13/08
- “Maliki’s List Advancing in Basra’s Initial Vote Count,” 2/2/09
International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Provincial Elections: The Stakes,” 1/27/09
Niqash, “state of law coalition,” 1/28/09
Paley, Amit, “In Iraq’s Provincial Elections, Main Issue Is Maliki Himself,” Washington Post, 1/17/09
Al-Sabah, “Maliki, Four Slates Lead in Nine Provinces, Results Say,” 2/4/09
Said, Yahia Khairi, “Political Dynamics in Iraq within the Context of the ‘Surge,’” Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 4/2/08
Wednesday, February 04, 2009
International Crisis Group Report On Iraq’s Provincial Elections
Four days before Iraq’s January 31 provincial elections, the International Crisis Group released a report on the power struggles, perceptions, and institutions that would shape the vote. The provincial councils can set local agendas, spend money, direct reconstruction, and collect taxes. Their budgets however are set by Baghdad, which complicates their work, as they don’t have full control over the purse. The current councils are not always representative of their populations because of a Sunni and Sadrist boycott. That has caused ethnic divisions between Arabs and Kurds in Salahaddin, Diyala, and Ninewa. Since their election in 2005, many of the councils have also done a poor job governing, because they are largely untrained, incompetent, sectarian, and corrupt. Many Iraqis are disillusioned by their rule. The new candidates will have to maneuver through the institutional and political barriers to getting elected, and then prove that they can do a better job than their predecessors.
Battleground Provinces
Ninewa is one of the most troubled provinces in Iraq that has suffered as a result of the 2005 provincial elections. It is divided between the Sunni Arab majority and the Kurdish minority that resides in eastern Mosul, western Sinjar, and northern and eastern strips along the Kurdistan border. There are also many smaller minorities such as Turkomen, Yazidis, Christians, and Shabaks, who are caught in the crossfire between the Arabs and Kurds. This ethnic conflict has caused Ninewa to be one of the most violent in the country with a still active Al Qaeda in Iraq and other insurgents. In 2005 55.7% of the voting population participated in provincial elections, but only 14% in Ninewa. This was largely due to the Sunni boycott. As a result, the Kurdistan Nationalist Democratic List comprising the Kurdistan Democratic Party and several smaller parties took 31 of the 41 provincial seats. As a result, the Kurds gained control of the local government as well as the security forces that has been greatly resented by the Arabs to this day. Their dispute with the Arabs has led them to block the formation of Sons of Iraq (SOI) units because they see them as a threat to their power. They were eventually created, but only in three Arab majority areas. The Kurds also have aspirations to annex northern sections of the province. Several military campaigns have been carried out in Ninewa, which might have made the situation worse. In 2008 Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki also became involved when he launched his own offensive in Mosul, and then began concentrating on the Kurds. As reported before, he placed his brother-in-law in charge of the Army division in control of Mosul, and began rotating Kurdish officers and units out, to be replaced by Arab ones. He also tried to win the Arabs over by offering them reconstruction projects. Future peace in the province depends not only upon Sunnis gaining representation, but reconciliation between them, the Kurds, and the province’s minorities.
Diyala is another mixed province with many Shiite Arabs. It also has Kurds and Turkomen in the north. Like Ninewa, the Kurds want to annex northern portions of the province. Many of the tribes there are mixed Sunni-Shiite. In 2005 only about 33% of the province voted. As a result, the council was divided between the SIIC-Dawa coalition that received 20 seats, the Iraqi Islamic Party that got 14, and the Kurds’ seven. The SIIC gained the governorship and control of the security forces, the Islamic Party got the deputy governor, and the Kurds the head of the council. Many Sunnis resented the Islamic Party’s participation since they violated the boycott. These divisions contributed to violence, a dysfunctional council, little reconstruction, and up to 27,000 families fleeing their homes. Eight of the 41 council members were assassinated, leading to many others living in other parts of the country for protection. In 2007 the first Sons of Iraq (SOI) unit was formed, which helped quell violence in some areas, but not all, and they also clashed with the provincial police who were mostly Shiite and Kurds. In 2008 Maliki launched a security operation in Diyala as well. At first the security forces went after the insurgents, but later trained their sights on the SOI, members of the provincial council, and then the Kurds in the disputed Khanaqin district. Like in Ninewa, Maliki made the situation worse in Diyala by increasing tensions.
Anbar was once the heart of the Sunni insurgency. In 2005 only around 3,800 out of approximately 574,000 voters participated. The Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) ran almost unopposed winning 34 of the province’s 41 council seats. The IIP acted almost unilaterally afterwards, cutting deals to maintain power that were illegal. First, in August 2006 they replaced thirteen council members with people that were not elected. This was due to the fact that four council members were killed, seven never took office out of fear, one became an aide to the governor, and one was elected to parliament. Then at the end of 2006, they added eight additional seats to the council in an attempt to appease and co-opt the Anbar Awakening, who was seen as a threat to the IIP’s rule. That didn’t work, and the Awakening began pushing for elections as soon as possible hoping to sweep the IIP out.
Baghdad was the center of the violence in Iraq and only 48% voted in 2005. The SIIC won 28 of 51 seats, and gained control of the governorship and the head of the council. Dawa won 11 seats, the Fadhila party six, and a group of pro-Sadrist independents three. The Sunnis were virtually absent from power due to their boycott, and gave no legitimacy to the council. After the sectarian war and the massive displacement that ensued, the council now almost represents the demographics of the capital.
The last province the Crisis Group discussed was Basra. In 2005 the Supreme Council-Dawa coalition won 20 seats, the Fadhila Party twelve, the secular Iraqi National List of former Interim Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi five, the Islamic Dawa – Iraq Organization three, and the Future Iraq Gathering of the former oil minister Ibrahim Bahr al-Ulum two. After the election, Fadhila formed a coalition with those last three groups to take the governor position. The Fadhila Party controls the province’s administration, the SIIC the security forces, and the Sadrists once ran the streets and port. The rivalry between these groups led to open warfare between their competing militias. That wasn’t quelled until Maliki’s offensive there in March 2008.
The Major Political Parties
The parties participating in the 2009 elections are divided between the current ruling ones made up of the SIIC, the Kurdish Alliance, the Iraqi Islamic Party, and the Dawa Party, and the opposition consisting of the Sadrists, the Fadhila Party, the Iraqi National List, the Iraqi Communist Party, and the Awakening/SOI forces. The parties now in power have the advantage of controlling the facts on the ground, offering patronage, friendly mosques, and links with the tribes.
The Supreme Councils is one of the largest parties in Iraq. It was formed in Iran in the 1980s. In 2005 they largely ran under the banner of Grand Ayatollah Sistani. Since then they have raised the ire of almost every party in the country that hopes to unseat them. The SIIC controls most of the local governments in the south, along with Baghdad, which they will use to win votes. In many provinces they run the security forces, and also have a large number of friendly clerics and mosques. In 2009 they are running the Martyr of the Mihrab and Independent Forces List, which includes the Shahid al-Mihrab Gathering, the Badr Organization, Vice President Adel Abd al-Mahdi’s Independent Gathering, the Hezbollah Movement, and the Sayyed al-Shuhada Movement. They want to maintain control, and establish a Shiite nine province autonomous region in the south.
The Kurdish Alliance is made up of Massoud Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party, Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and several smaller parties. They have proven to be the most disciplined and organized of all of Iraq’s coalitions. They are unified by Kurdish nationalism, and the call for a federal system that will allow them greater autonomy. They also wish to annex several northern areas that they claim are historically Kurdish. They have worked through the constitution and government to accomplish these goals. Kurdish politicians interviewed by the Crisis Group expected defeat in 2009, but wanted to lose as few seats as possible.
The Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) was helped by the country’s turn to religion after the U.S. invasion, and the sectarian-ethnic quota system created by the Americans. They were also an established party, having been one of the first Sunni Islamist groups in the country. In 2005 they ran largely unopposed and gained seats in several provinces. They later formed the Iraqi Accordance Front with two other Sunni parties. They have had a difficult relationship with the other ruling parties, and boycotted the cabinet for several months. They have basically been included to provide the image of national unity, while given no real power or responsibility other than the ministries they control. The other ruling parties have also been upset that they have not been able to stop the insurgency. When the Awakening and Sons of Iraq forces emerged, they were put on the defensive by their own community that questioned their running in 2005 provincial elections. In December 2008 the Accordance Front also broke up when the National Dialogue Council left. They could lose seats as a result, but still have urban support, and are counting on the tribal forces splitting apart and dividing the Sunni vote to the IIP’s advantage.
The Dawa Party was the smallest and weakest of the major parties after the election, but may come out the biggest winner in 2009. Dawa was the first Shiite Islamic party founded in Iraq back in the 1950s. It gained control of the premiership due to the rivalry between the SIIC and Sadrists who blocked each other’s grab for power. They ended up selecting first Ibrahim al-Jaafari and then Nouri al-Maliki as compromise candidates for Prime Minister so their rival couldn’t have the post. Maliki replaced Jaafari, and was at first seen as weak and ineffectual, but has since then proven to be an adept politician able to negotiate a path between the United States, Iran, and the other ruling parties. Since his moves against the Mahdi Army, insurgents, and Kurds, he has fashioned himself into a nationalist leader. He has also argued for a strong central government, and opposed the SIIC’s and Kurds’ regional aspirations. As Prime Minister he has put Dawa members in key positions throughout the government, and centralized control of the security forces in his office. For the 2009 elections Maliki put together the State of Law list made up of his Dawa Party, Islamic Dawa – Iraq Organization, Oil Minister Hussain al-Shahristani’s Independents List, the Solidarity List, al-Intifadha al-Shaabaniya Pact, the Fayli Kurds’ Brotherhood Movement, and the Turkomen Islamic Union. As noted before, they may come away with more than half of the fourteen provinces that held elections this month.
There are also several opposition parties that are hoping to gain in the provincial elections. They are made up of the Sadrists, the Anbar Awakening and Sons of Iraq, the National Reform Party, the Fadhila Party, the Iraqi National List, and the Iraqi Communist Party. They all favor Iraqi nationalism, reject federalism, and oppose the SIIC. They were largely responsible for having elections this year over the protests of the ruling parties. Two major problems with all of them are that they are not running as a unified list, and are largely driven by their individual leaders’ personalities.
The Sadrists have been on the defensive since 2007. They were blamed for much of the violence as the sectarian war died down, were targeted by the U.S. and Maliki, went through Sadr’s cease-fire, then disbanded their militia, and now are trying to form a new social group. They still control many mosques, which are crucial to turn out and motivate voters. Sadrist politicians interviewed by the Crisis Group said they didn’t expect to win power in any province, but rather were wanted to stop the major parties from having a monopoly over them. Due to threats by Maliki to ban any party from running that had a militia, the Sadrists are instead backing two independent groups, the Integrity and Construction List and the Liberals Independent Trend.
The Awakening and SOIs are some of the newest groups on Iraq’s political scene. They forged an alliance with the U.S. aimed at kicking out Al Qaeda in Iraq, and gaining power. They oppose both the Shiite led government, and the Iraqi Accordance Front. The Awakening is based in Anbar, while SOIs have formed political parties in Baghdad and Diyala. They have not created a unified list however, and have increasingly been splintering along tribal lines. The Anbar Awakening for example, split in late 2008 with Abu Risha, the brother of the slain founder of the Awakening, and at least one other sheikh forming an alliance with the ruling Islamic Party. Maliki has also attempted to weaken the SOI in Baghdad and Diyala by arresting and harassing them.
Former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari was once one of the leaders of the Dawa Part, but became increasingly dissatisfied after he was replaced by Maliki. He eventually left to form his own National Reform Party that includes his wing of the Dawa. He has also looked to form links with the Sadrists, and appears to have had lots of money to spend electioneering.
The Fadhila Party is based out of Basra, and was created by Muhammad al-Yaqoubi. He claimed the mantle of Ayatollah Muhammaed Sadeq al-Sadr’s movement, the father of Moqtada al-Sadr, after the invasion. They support an autonomous Basra region, which was defeated just before the January 31 provincial elections. They have not governed Basra well, and have been accused of corruption and oil smuggling. They will probably lose control there, but are hoping to gain seats in the rest of the south.
Last there is former Interim Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi’s secular Iraqi National List. They received massive support from the Americans in the 2005 election but did extremely poorly. They have formed an alliance with the Iraqi Communist Party and the Sunni Iraqi Front for National Dialogue.
Forces Shaping the 2009 Election
Besides the political parties, the 2009 elections will also be shaped by several structural issues within Iraqi society. Those include the performance of the current ruling councils, public perceptions, institutions, political manipulation, mosques, and the tribes.
Performance and perceptions might prove to be the most important factors in the 2009 election. In 2005 violence, boycotts, sectarian divisions, and a mix of confusion and excitement were major factors in the voting. As a result, many Iraqis stuck with parties from their own sect. Exile groups that had moved back to the country after the U.S. invasion had an advantage over others because they were established parties. The Shiite ones had clerics and mosques, and claimed Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani supported them. This gained them votes, but perhaps not legitimacy. They had to earn that, but have largely failed due to their bad governance. Many provinces suffered during the sectarian war, but even in the south that didn’t have as much violence the provincial politicians were not able to provide law and order, fight corruption, overcome inexperience, provide development, or spend their budgets. The councils have mostly blamed the lack of security and Baghdad for their problems, but many Iraqis blame them personally. The Crisis Group predicted this might depress the vote, which might be one major reason why only 51% of Iraqis decided to come out to the polls this time.
The ruling parties also tried to exploit their control of local governments to win votes. Government jobs are a massive source of employment in the country and are given out as a form of patronage. They may have also used their positions and control of the security forces to intimidate voters. Maliki for one actively used the government to promote his State of Law List.
Because of the plethora of new political groupings, the established ones have also resorted to political manipulation by forming their own independent parties to fool and divide voters. Many of these new independents are simply branches of the major political parties. In Anbar for example, the Islamic Party is running on its own, but also has the National Future Gathering and the Independent National Tribal Gathering. The SIIC created the Independent Gathering, which is supposed to be a less religious branch of the movement.
Mosques and clerics will also play a role in the vote. The leading Shiite ayatollahs have said they do not support any party this time around. Grand Ayatollah Sistani has implied that he is deeply upset with the current provincial governments, but that didn’t stop the SIIC from using his image and name repeatedly in their campaign events. The SIIC and Sadrists also control many local mosques and preachers that called for their followers to vote.
Iraq’s tribes also re-emerged in 2006 due to the Anbar Awakening at first, but then as tools of Maliki’s Dawa Party. In 2008 Maliki began creating Tribal Support Councils across Iraq. They were first started in his drive against the Sadrists with many southern tribes joined because they felt that the Mahdi Army was taking away their followers. Since then they have been created as a vote getter for Maliki. Each is controlled by a member of the Dawa Party, and gets $25,000 a month from Maliki’s office. Each member is allowed to hire several people, which creates a strong patronage system for both the tribal sheikhs and Maliki. The sheikhs were expected to turn out their tribesman on January 31 for the State of Law List. This was bitterly opposed by both the SIIC and Kurds who rightly saw them as challenges to their rule. Several tribes have also formed their own parties seeking a piece of the political and reconstruction pie.
Possible Results
The Crisis Group paper focused exclusively on the battleground provinces they identified at the beginning. For some reason they did not include Salahaddin, which is also divided between Arabs and Kurds. In Ninewa the newly formed al-Hadbaa party, which is the largest Arab coalition was expected to win. They oppose both the Kurds and the Islamic Party. The Kurds tried to postpone the election there to stave off their inevitable defeat, but were unsuccessful. A Kurdish official said they expected to lose control of Ninewa, and get between nine to 12 seats compared to their current 31. In Diyala the ruling Shiite and Kurdish parties also tried to delay the vote in anticipation of a strong Sunni turnout. The Kurdish head of the provincial council predicted that the Kurds would only have four seats compared to their current seven, and thought the Sunnis would walk away with twenty of the twenty-nine seats. Just who that would be was unknown as Maliki has created Tribal Support Councils in Diyala, and there are also various SOI groups competing with the Islamic Party. The fracturing of the Anbar Awakening will probably lead to joint rule between them and the Islamic Party. That could work if the two sides can negotiate a power sharing agreement. Baghdad was seen as up in the air since there were so many parties, Maliki’s State of Law, the SIIC, the Sadrists, the SOI, Allawi’s Iraqi National List to name just a few, competing there. Basra was a battle between Fadhila, the SIIC, the Sadrists, and Dawa.
Conclusion
The Crisis Group concluded by saying the greatest barriers to an effective vote in January 2009 that could bring about change was voter apathy, corrupt and incompetent councils, and political manipulation. Many parties ran on nationalism and the provision of services. The problem is more and more Iraqis are growing cynical about the political process due to the actions of the ruling parties that have failed to improve their daily lives. The Crisis Group thought that even if there were a successful January vote that would not mean that the underlying problems in the country would be solved. They could bring about new politicians that are more nationalist and support central control, but the ultimate test of the elections will be if the new politicians can gain popularity and legitimacy by doing a good job governing.
SOURCES
Fadel, Leila, “Low turnout in Iraq’s election reflects a disillusioned nation,” McClatchy Newspapers, 2/2/09
International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Provincial Elections: The Stakes,” 1/27/09
Parker, Sam, “Guest Post: Behind the Curtain in Diyala,” Abu Muqawama Blog, 8/20/08
Rubin, Alissa, “Ahead of Election, Iraq’s Leader Pushes for Gains,” New York Times, 1/26/09
Battleground Provinces
Ninewa is one of the most troubled provinces in Iraq that has suffered as a result of the 2005 provincial elections. It is divided between the Sunni Arab majority and the Kurdish minority that resides in eastern Mosul, western Sinjar, and northern and eastern strips along the Kurdistan border. There are also many smaller minorities such as Turkomen, Yazidis, Christians, and Shabaks, who are caught in the crossfire between the Arabs and Kurds. This ethnic conflict has caused Ninewa to be one of the most violent in the country with a still active Al Qaeda in Iraq and other insurgents. In 2005 55.7% of the voting population participated in provincial elections, but only 14% in Ninewa. This was largely due to the Sunni boycott. As a result, the Kurdistan Nationalist Democratic List comprising the Kurdistan Democratic Party and several smaller parties took 31 of the 41 provincial seats. As a result, the Kurds gained control of the local government as well as the security forces that has been greatly resented by the Arabs to this day. Their dispute with the Arabs has led them to block the formation of Sons of Iraq (SOI) units because they see them as a threat to their power. They were eventually created, but only in three Arab majority areas. The Kurds also have aspirations to annex northern sections of the province. Several military campaigns have been carried out in Ninewa, which might have made the situation worse. In 2008 Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki also became involved when he launched his own offensive in Mosul, and then began concentrating on the Kurds. As reported before, he placed his brother-in-law in charge of the Army division in control of Mosul, and began rotating Kurdish officers and units out, to be replaced by Arab ones. He also tried to win the Arabs over by offering them reconstruction projects. Future peace in the province depends not only upon Sunnis gaining representation, but reconciliation between them, the Kurds, and the province’s minorities.
Diyala is another mixed province with many Shiite Arabs. It also has Kurds and Turkomen in the north. Like Ninewa, the Kurds want to annex northern portions of the province. Many of the tribes there are mixed Sunni-Shiite. In 2005 only about 33% of the province voted. As a result, the council was divided between the SIIC-Dawa coalition that received 20 seats, the Iraqi Islamic Party that got 14, and the Kurds’ seven. The SIIC gained the governorship and control of the security forces, the Islamic Party got the deputy governor, and the Kurds the head of the council. Many Sunnis resented the Islamic Party’s participation since they violated the boycott. These divisions contributed to violence, a dysfunctional council, little reconstruction, and up to 27,000 families fleeing their homes. Eight of the 41 council members were assassinated, leading to many others living in other parts of the country for protection. In 2007 the first Sons of Iraq (SOI) unit was formed, which helped quell violence in some areas, but not all, and they also clashed with the provincial police who were mostly Shiite and Kurds. In 2008 Maliki launched a security operation in Diyala as well. At first the security forces went after the insurgents, but later trained their sights on the SOI, members of the provincial council, and then the Kurds in the disputed Khanaqin district. Like in Ninewa, Maliki made the situation worse in Diyala by increasing tensions.
Anbar was once the heart of the Sunni insurgency. In 2005 only around 3,800 out of approximately 574,000 voters participated. The Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) ran almost unopposed winning 34 of the province’s 41 council seats. The IIP acted almost unilaterally afterwards, cutting deals to maintain power that were illegal. First, in August 2006 they replaced thirteen council members with people that were not elected. This was due to the fact that four council members were killed, seven never took office out of fear, one became an aide to the governor, and one was elected to parliament. Then at the end of 2006, they added eight additional seats to the council in an attempt to appease and co-opt the Anbar Awakening, who was seen as a threat to the IIP’s rule. That didn’t work, and the Awakening began pushing for elections as soon as possible hoping to sweep the IIP out.
Baghdad was the center of the violence in Iraq and only 48% voted in 2005. The SIIC won 28 of 51 seats, and gained control of the governorship and the head of the council. Dawa won 11 seats, the Fadhila party six, and a group of pro-Sadrist independents three. The Sunnis were virtually absent from power due to their boycott, and gave no legitimacy to the council. After the sectarian war and the massive displacement that ensued, the council now almost represents the demographics of the capital.
The last province the Crisis Group discussed was Basra. In 2005 the Supreme Council-Dawa coalition won 20 seats, the Fadhila Party twelve, the secular Iraqi National List of former Interim Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi five, the Islamic Dawa – Iraq Organization three, and the Future Iraq Gathering of the former oil minister Ibrahim Bahr al-Ulum two. After the election, Fadhila formed a coalition with those last three groups to take the governor position. The Fadhila Party controls the province’s administration, the SIIC the security forces, and the Sadrists once ran the streets and port. The rivalry between these groups led to open warfare between their competing militias. That wasn’t quelled until Maliki’s offensive there in March 2008.
The Major Political Parties
The parties participating in the 2009 elections are divided between the current ruling ones made up of the SIIC, the Kurdish Alliance, the Iraqi Islamic Party, and the Dawa Party, and the opposition consisting of the Sadrists, the Fadhila Party, the Iraqi National List, the Iraqi Communist Party, and the Awakening/SOI forces. The parties now in power have the advantage of controlling the facts on the ground, offering patronage, friendly mosques, and links with the tribes.
The Supreme Councils is one of the largest parties in Iraq. It was formed in Iran in the 1980s. In 2005 they largely ran under the banner of Grand Ayatollah Sistani. Since then they have raised the ire of almost every party in the country that hopes to unseat them. The SIIC controls most of the local governments in the south, along with Baghdad, which they will use to win votes. In many provinces they run the security forces, and also have a large number of friendly clerics and mosques. In 2009 they are running the Martyr of the Mihrab and Independent Forces List, which includes the Shahid al-Mihrab Gathering, the Badr Organization, Vice President Adel Abd al-Mahdi’s Independent Gathering, the Hezbollah Movement, and the Sayyed al-Shuhada Movement. They want to maintain control, and establish a Shiite nine province autonomous region in the south.
The Kurdish Alliance is made up of Massoud Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party, Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and several smaller parties. They have proven to be the most disciplined and organized of all of Iraq’s coalitions. They are unified by Kurdish nationalism, and the call for a federal system that will allow them greater autonomy. They also wish to annex several northern areas that they claim are historically Kurdish. They have worked through the constitution and government to accomplish these goals. Kurdish politicians interviewed by the Crisis Group expected defeat in 2009, but wanted to lose as few seats as possible.
The Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) was helped by the country’s turn to religion after the U.S. invasion, and the sectarian-ethnic quota system created by the Americans. They were also an established party, having been one of the first Sunni Islamist groups in the country. In 2005 they ran largely unopposed and gained seats in several provinces. They later formed the Iraqi Accordance Front with two other Sunni parties. They have had a difficult relationship with the other ruling parties, and boycotted the cabinet for several months. They have basically been included to provide the image of national unity, while given no real power or responsibility other than the ministries they control. The other ruling parties have also been upset that they have not been able to stop the insurgency. When the Awakening and Sons of Iraq forces emerged, they were put on the defensive by their own community that questioned their running in 2005 provincial elections. In December 2008 the Accordance Front also broke up when the National Dialogue Council left. They could lose seats as a result, but still have urban support, and are counting on the tribal forces splitting apart and dividing the Sunni vote to the IIP’s advantage.
The Dawa Party was the smallest and weakest of the major parties after the election, but may come out the biggest winner in 2009. Dawa was the first Shiite Islamic party founded in Iraq back in the 1950s. It gained control of the premiership due to the rivalry between the SIIC and Sadrists who blocked each other’s grab for power. They ended up selecting first Ibrahim al-Jaafari and then Nouri al-Maliki as compromise candidates for Prime Minister so their rival couldn’t have the post. Maliki replaced Jaafari, and was at first seen as weak and ineffectual, but has since then proven to be an adept politician able to negotiate a path between the United States, Iran, and the other ruling parties. Since his moves against the Mahdi Army, insurgents, and Kurds, he has fashioned himself into a nationalist leader. He has also argued for a strong central government, and opposed the SIIC’s and Kurds’ regional aspirations. As Prime Minister he has put Dawa members in key positions throughout the government, and centralized control of the security forces in his office. For the 2009 elections Maliki put together the State of Law list made up of his Dawa Party, Islamic Dawa – Iraq Organization, Oil Minister Hussain al-Shahristani’s Independents List, the Solidarity List, al-Intifadha al-Shaabaniya Pact, the Fayli Kurds’ Brotherhood Movement, and the Turkomen Islamic Union. As noted before, they may come away with more than half of the fourteen provinces that held elections this month.
There are also several opposition parties that are hoping to gain in the provincial elections. They are made up of the Sadrists, the Anbar Awakening and Sons of Iraq, the National Reform Party, the Fadhila Party, the Iraqi National List, and the Iraqi Communist Party. They all favor Iraqi nationalism, reject federalism, and oppose the SIIC. They were largely responsible for having elections this year over the protests of the ruling parties. Two major problems with all of them are that they are not running as a unified list, and are largely driven by their individual leaders’ personalities.
The Sadrists have been on the defensive since 2007. They were blamed for much of the violence as the sectarian war died down, were targeted by the U.S. and Maliki, went through Sadr’s cease-fire, then disbanded their militia, and now are trying to form a new social group. They still control many mosques, which are crucial to turn out and motivate voters. Sadrist politicians interviewed by the Crisis Group said they didn’t expect to win power in any province, but rather were wanted to stop the major parties from having a monopoly over them. Due to threats by Maliki to ban any party from running that had a militia, the Sadrists are instead backing two independent groups, the Integrity and Construction List and the Liberals Independent Trend.
The Awakening and SOIs are some of the newest groups on Iraq’s political scene. They forged an alliance with the U.S. aimed at kicking out Al Qaeda in Iraq, and gaining power. They oppose both the Shiite led government, and the Iraqi Accordance Front. The Awakening is based in Anbar, while SOIs have formed political parties in Baghdad and Diyala. They have not created a unified list however, and have increasingly been splintering along tribal lines. The Anbar Awakening for example, split in late 2008 with Abu Risha, the brother of the slain founder of the Awakening, and at least one other sheikh forming an alliance with the ruling Islamic Party. Maliki has also attempted to weaken the SOI in Baghdad and Diyala by arresting and harassing them.
Former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari was once one of the leaders of the Dawa Part, but became increasingly dissatisfied after he was replaced by Maliki. He eventually left to form his own National Reform Party that includes his wing of the Dawa. He has also looked to form links with the Sadrists, and appears to have had lots of money to spend electioneering.
The Fadhila Party is based out of Basra, and was created by Muhammad al-Yaqoubi. He claimed the mantle of Ayatollah Muhammaed Sadeq al-Sadr’s movement, the father of Moqtada al-Sadr, after the invasion. They support an autonomous Basra region, which was defeated just before the January 31 provincial elections. They have not governed Basra well, and have been accused of corruption and oil smuggling. They will probably lose control there, but are hoping to gain seats in the rest of the south.
Last there is former Interim Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi’s secular Iraqi National List. They received massive support from the Americans in the 2005 election but did extremely poorly. They have formed an alliance with the Iraqi Communist Party and the Sunni Iraqi Front for National Dialogue.
Forces Shaping the 2009 Election
Besides the political parties, the 2009 elections will also be shaped by several structural issues within Iraqi society. Those include the performance of the current ruling councils, public perceptions, institutions, political manipulation, mosques, and the tribes.
Performance and perceptions might prove to be the most important factors in the 2009 election. In 2005 violence, boycotts, sectarian divisions, and a mix of confusion and excitement were major factors in the voting. As a result, many Iraqis stuck with parties from their own sect. Exile groups that had moved back to the country after the U.S. invasion had an advantage over others because they were established parties. The Shiite ones had clerics and mosques, and claimed Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani supported them. This gained them votes, but perhaps not legitimacy. They had to earn that, but have largely failed due to their bad governance. Many provinces suffered during the sectarian war, but even in the south that didn’t have as much violence the provincial politicians were not able to provide law and order, fight corruption, overcome inexperience, provide development, or spend their budgets. The councils have mostly blamed the lack of security and Baghdad for their problems, but many Iraqis blame them personally. The Crisis Group predicted this might depress the vote, which might be one major reason why only 51% of Iraqis decided to come out to the polls this time.
The ruling parties also tried to exploit their control of local governments to win votes. Government jobs are a massive source of employment in the country and are given out as a form of patronage. They may have also used their positions and control of the security forces to intimidate voters. Maliki for one actively used the government to promote his State of Law List.
Because of the plethora of new political groupings, the established ones have also resorted to political manipulation by forming their own independent parties to fool and divide voters. Many of these new independents are simply branches of the major political parties. In Anbar for example, the Islamic Party is running on its own, but also has the National Future Gathering and the Independent National Tribal Gathering. The SIIC created the Independent Gathering, which is supposed to be a less religious branch of the movement.
Mosques and clerics will also play a role in the vote. The leading Shiite ayatollahs have said they do not support any party this time around. Grand Ayatollah Sistani has implied that he is deeply upset with the current provincial governments, but that didn’t stop the SIIC from using his image and name repeatedly in their campaign events. The SIIC and Sadrists also control many local mosques and preachers that called for their followers to vote.
Iraq’s tribes also re-emerged in 2006 due to the Anbar Awakening at first, but then as tools of Maliki’s Dawa Party. In 2008 Maliki began creating Tribal Support Councils across Iraq. They were first started in his drive against the Sadrists with many southern tribes joined because they felt that the Mahdi Army was taking away their followers. Since then they have been created as a vote getter for Maliki. Each is controlled by a member of the Dawa Party, and gets $25,000 a month from Maliki’s office. Each member is allowed to hire several people, which creates a strong patronage system for both the tribal sheikhs and Maliki. The sheikhs were expected to turn out their tribesman on January 31 for the State of Law List. This was bitterly opposed by both the SIIC and Kurds who rightly saw them as challenges to their rule. Several tribes have also formed their own parties seeking a piece of the political and reconstruction pie.
Possible Results
The Crisis Group paper focused exclusively on the battleground provinces they identified at the beginning. For some reason they did not include Salahaddin, which is also divided between Arabs and Kurds. In Ninewa the newly formed al-Hadbaa party, which is the largest Arab coalition was expected to win. They oppose both the Kurds and the Islamic Party. The Kurds tried to postpone the election there to stave off their inevitable defeat, but were unsuccessful. A Kurdish official said they expected to lose control of Ninewa, and get between nine to 12 seats compared to their current 31. In Diyala the ruling Shiite and Kurdish parties also tried to delay the vote in anticipation of a strong Sunni turnout. The Kurdish head of the provincial council predicted that the Kurds would only have four seats compared to their current seven, and thought the Sunnis would walk away with twenty of the twenty-nine seats. Just who that would be was unknown as Maliki has created Tribal Support Councils in Diyala, and there are also various SOI groups competing with the Islamic Party. The fracturing of the Anbar Awakening will probably lead to joint rule between them and the Islamic Party. That could work if the two sides can negotiate a power sharing agreement. Baghdad was seen as up in the air since there were so many parties, Maliki’s State of Law, the SIIC, the Sadrists, the SOI, Allawi’s Iraqi National List to name just a few, competing there. Basra was a battle between Fadhila, the SIIC, the Sadrists, and Dawa.
Conclusion
The Crisis Group concluded by saying the greatest barriers to an effective vote in January 2009 that could bring about change was voter apathy, corrupt and incompetent councils, and political manipulation. Many parties ran on nationalism and the provision of services. The problem is more and more Iraqis are growing cynical about the political process due to the actions of the ruling parties that have failed to improve their daily lives. The Crisis Group thought that even if there were a successful January vote that would not mean that the underlying problems in the country would be solved. They could bring about new politicians that are more nationalist and support central control, but the ultimate test of the elections will be if the new politicians can gain popularity and legitimacy by doing a good job governing.
SOURCES
Fadel, Leila, “Low turnout in Iraq’s election reflects a disillusioned nation,” McClatchy Newspapers, 2/2/09
International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Provincial Elections: The Stakes,” 1/27/09
Parker, Sam, “Guest Post: Behind the Curtain in Diyala,” Abu Muqawama Blog, 8/20/08
Rubin, Alissa, “Ahead of Election, Iraq’s Leader Pushes for Gains,” New York Times, 1/26/09
Early Election Predictions
The results of the January 31, 2009 provincial elections will not be known for weeks, but there are already a slew of reports predicting the winners. The biggest victor is Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki whose State of Law list could come away with more than half of the fourteen provinces that held elections. Former Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi, while not winning any governorates could have a strong showing as well. The Sadrists and Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council look to be the losers, but are still on the scene. New parties like the Awakening in Anbar and the Hadbaa party in Ninewa have also appeared. In the larger picture, the vote is a correction for some of the problems created by the 2005 one, it shows that the idea of a southern autonomous region is probably dead, that Maliki’s drive for a strong central government is on its way to becoming a reality, and that sectarian and ethnic divides still exist in Iraq. The biggest question is whether any of these new politicians will do any better at actual governing than the ones that they are replacing.
Who Could Be The Winners?
Six parties have apparently taken the lion’s share of votes in the January election. According to the government Al-Sabah paper those are Maliki’s State of Law list, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s list, the Iraqi National List of former Prime Minister Allawi, the Sadrists’ Independent Trend of the Noble Ones, the National Project, and the Iraqi Accordance Front of Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi. The State of Law coalition is made up of Maliki’s Islamic Dawa Party, the offshoot Dawa Party Iraqi Organization, the Independent Blog, the Solidarity Bloc, the Islamic Union of Iraqi Turkmen, Kurdish Feli Fraternity Movement, and the Shaabani Uprising Bloc 1991. They call for law and order, getting rid of militias and corruption, and a strong central government. It is a Shiite list, but includes Arabs, Kurds, and Turkomen. The Martyr of the Pulpit is made up of four branches of the Supreme Council, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, the Shaheed al-Mihrab Bloc, the Badr Organization, and the Independent Bloc. They advocate an autonomous Shiite region in the south, job creation, oppose the return of Baathists, and want compensation for crimes during Saddam’s rule. The Iraqi Accordance Front also put together a coalition consisting of the Iraqi Islamic Party, the Reform Bloc of Diyala Province, the Iraqi Legation for Independent Organization of Civil Society, the Arabic Iraqi Congregation, and the General Conference of Iraqi People. They advocate the unity of Iraq, Arab and Islamic identity, an end to the U.S. occupation, the freeing of all prisoners held by the Americans, amending the constitution, maintaining Diyala’s borders, and reforming the government and justice system. The National Project is an opposing Sunni coalition led by Salih al-Mutlaq and former speaker of parliament Mahmoud Mashadani. They are both from the Iraqi Natioanl Dialogue Council who recently split from the Accordance Front. They along with the Iraqi National List and Sadrists have all worked together in parliament as the loosely organized opposition. Iraqi nationalism, a call for a strong central government, and opposition to the ruling parties are what unite them.
Of those six, Maliki’s State of Law could walk away with the majority of Iraq’s provinces. Two papers Al-Sabah and Al-Sharq al-Awsat say that Maliki’s State of Law has come in first in six southern provinces. All are not known yet, but reports point to Basra, Dhi Qar, Muthanna, Wasit, Maysan, and one other. A government source said the list could come away with all nine southern provinces, the five already mentioned plus Karbala, Najaf, Babil, and Qadisiyah. That seems like wishful thinking. In Basra, which was the beginning of Maliki’s turnaround from a weak ineffectual leader to a strong one, his coalition has 50% of the vote. In second is the Supreme Council with 20%. The State of Law may also come away with Baghdad, having won the Shiite east, including Sadr City. That could leave the Prime Minister’s list in control of seven provinces, and be a major blow to the Supreme Council and the Sadrists that are now in power.
Some new parties such as the al-Hadbaa National List in Ninewa may also be victorious. The List is made up of the al-Hadbaa National United Assembly, the Patriotic and National Forces Assembly, the Iraqi and Kurdsitani Party for Freedom and Equality, and the Al-Wasat Iraqi Assembly. The party is led by Atheel al-Nujaifi, and has run on an explicitly anti-Kurdish and pro-security ticket. They oppose Kurdish rule and designs on the province. Currently Kurds control 31 of the 41 council seats, and wish to annex northern sections of the province. Al-Hadbaa has accused the Kurdish controlled security forces and their militia the peshmerga of harassing them. They also claim that if they are elected they will help bring an end to the insurgency in Ninewa, which is largely fueled by the ethnic divide between Arabs and Kurds. This conflict could be the reason why 60% of the province turned out to vote, one of the highest in the country. A U.S. official said that the party could have up to 66% of the vote. If true that would mean they could rule the province without the need of a larger coalition or joint rule with the Kurds. The U.S. general in command of Mosul said he hoped the election would lead to reconciliation, and an end to the violence in one of the country’s most volatile areas. However al-Hadbaa’s anti-Kurdish campaign could lead to more divisions instead.
In other Sunni areas, the Anbar Awakening and Accordance Front list are battling it out. According to Al-Sabah, the tribal Awakening is winning in Anbar. A parliamentarian from the Accordance Front claimed his list is taking in Anbar however, along with Diyala and Salahaddin. He also said they are coming in third in Babil and Basra, a surprise if true since they are Shiite majority provinces.
Another newcomer is Yousef Majid al-Haddoubi, who could walk away with Karbala. Al-Haddoubi is a secular Shiite independent who heads the Brigade List. He was the governor of the province under Saddam, and then became the mayor of Karbala City after the U.S. invasion.
Larger coalitions to rule provinces are also emerging. In Najaf, the Sadrists, the Iraqi National List, the Reform Movement, and the Iraqi National Congress announced that they would form an alliance to try to take the province.
What Does It All Mean?
Many of the parties that came to power in 2005 were not representative of their populations. This could account for most of them being swept from office. The Supreme Council won Babil, Baghdad, Dhi Qar, Karbala, Muthanna, Najaf and Qadisiyah in the previous vote because they were the largest Shiite party, the best organized, had the most money, were founded by an established clerical family the Hakims, had the backing of Iran, said Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani supported them, and the Sadrists largely stayed away from the polls. The SIIC also won in Diyala, the Iraqi Islamic Party in Anbar, and the Kurds in Ninewa and Salahaddin because of the Sunni boycott. The Islamic Party for example, only got 2,692 votes out of 3,775 in Anbar as a result because it ran largely uncontested. Those disparities are now over, although Anbar may still be up for grabs.
There have also been several articles stating that the 2009 vote is a rejection of the religious parties, but this is only partly true. The two main parts of Maliki’s State of Law list are Shiite religious groups, the Islamic Dawa and the Dawa Party Iraq Organization. The Supreme Council might have lost control of the south, but are still present, the same thing with the Sadrists. The Iraqi Islamic Party is also Islamist. Many stressed nationalism and backed independents, but that doesn’t invalidate their pasts. What the lists found is that they had to address issues more to get elected rather than just their religion, and that is an important shift in Iraqi politics. At the same time, Sunnis continued to mostly vote for Sunni parties, Shiites for Shiites, Kurds for Kurds. Sectarianism still exists in Iraq, it’s just more political than violent today.
For the south, the January election probably marks the end of any autonomous region there. The Supreme Council promoted a nine province Shiite region after the U.S. invasion, but largely dropped it. Right before the vote, a member of the Hakim family said they would revive the idea after January 31. That won’t happen now because the SIIC may not control a single province after everything is said and done. The defeat of the Basra autonomous plan and polls show little support for the idea anyway.
Instead, Iraq could be moving towards a stronger central government based in Baghdad. Maliki consistently called for this as he was campaigning across the country. His military actions against the Sadrists, insurgents, and Kurds were all part of his strategy. Now he could have control of both Baghdad, and friendly governors in the south to further his plan.
Finally, the most important question is whether any of the State of Law candidates or any of the other new lists coming to power will be any better at governing than the current ones. Many voted for the State of Law list because of the Prime Minister, not the actual politicians running. The current provincial councils are known for being incompetent, sectarian, corrupt, and suffer from a slow paper based bureaucracy and a centralized state where Baghdad and the individual ministers have all the power. The new councils will also have to deal with half the money as their predecessors due to the dramatic drop in the price of oil. That will make their job even more difficult. They will have to do a much better job to keep the loyalty of their followers, and not alienate more Iraqis from the political system that has not served them well on the local and provincial level.
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Iraqi PM Calls for Strong Central Government,” 1/22/09
Alsumaria, “Iraq elections leaks say Al Maliki ahead,” 2/2/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “IAF realizes progress in Salah el-Din, Diala, Anbar, - MP,” 2/2/09
- “No decrease in salaries because of oil prices – planning minister” 12/19/08
- “Sadrists in one bloc with INL, reform movement,” 2/2/09
Cocks, Tim, “Vote sows seeds of greater calm in Iraq’s north,” Reuters, 2/2/09
Farrell, Stephen, “Election: What The Papers Say,” Baghdad Bureau Blog, New York Times, 2/2/09
Hendawi, Hamza and Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Momentum builds for a self-ruled southern Iraq,” Associated Press, 1/16/09
Ibrahim, Waleed, “’Surprise’ poll victories strengthen Iraq’s Maliki,” Reuters, 2/1/09
International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Provincial Elections: The Stakes,” 1/27/09
Knights, Michael and McCarthy, Eamon, “Provincial Politics in Iraq: Fragmentation or New Awakening?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2008
Londono, Ernesto, “In Iraq’s north, a defining vote,” Washington Post, 2/2/09
Niqash, “accord and reform bloc,” 1/28/09
- “the hadbaa national list,” 1/28/09
- “the shaheed al-mihrab list,” 1/28/09
- “state of law coalition,” 1/28/09
Who Could Be The Winners?
Six parties have apparently taken the lion’s share of votes in the January election. According to the government Al-Sabah paper those are Maliki’s State of Law list, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s list, the Iraqi National List of former Prime Minister Allawi, the Sadrists’ Independent Trend of the Noble Ones, the National Project, and the Iraqi Accordance Front of Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi. The State of Law coalition is made up of Maliki’s Islamic Dawa Party, the offshoot Dawa Party Iraqi Organization, the Independent Blog, the Solidarity Bloc, the Islamic Union of Iraqi Turkmen, Kurdish Feli Fraternity Movement, and the Shaabani Uprising Bloc 1991. They call for law and order, getting rid of militias and corruption, and a strong central government. It is a Shiite list, but includes Arabs, Kurds, and Turkomen. The Martyr of the Pulpit is made up of four branches of the Supreme Council, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, the Shaheed al-Mihrab Bloc, the Badr Organization, and the Independent Bloc. They advocate an autonomous Shiite region in the south, job creation, oppose the return of Baathists, and want compensation for crimes during Saddam’s rule. The Iraqi Accordance Front also put together a coalition consisting of the Iraqi Islamic Party, the Reform Bloc of Diyala Province, the Iraqi Legation for Independent Organization of Civil Society, the Arabic Iraqi Congregation, and the General Conference of Iraqi People. They advocate the unity of Iraq, Arab and Islamic identity, an end to the U.S. occupation, the freeing of all prisoners held by the Americans, amending the constitution, maintaining Diyala’s borders, and reforming the government and justice system. The National Project is an opposing Sunni coalition led by Salih al-Mutlaq and former speaker of parliament Mahmoud Mashadani. They are both from the Iraqi Natioanl Dialogue Council who recently split from the Accordance Front. They along with the Iraqi National List and Sadrists have all worked together in parliament as the loosely organized opposition. Iraqi nationalism, a call for a strong central government, and opposition to the ruling parties are what unite them.
Of those six, Maliki’s State of Law could walk away with the majority of Iraq’s provinces. Two papers Al-Sabah and Al-Sharq al-Awsat say that Maliki’s State of Law has come in first in six southern provinces. All are not known yet, but reports point to Basra, Dhi Qar, Muthanna, Wasit, Maysan, and one other. A government source said the list could come away with all nine southern provinces, the five already mentioned plus Karbala, Najaf, Babil, and Qadisiyah. That seems like wishful thinking. In Basra, which was the beginning of Maliki’s turnaround from a weak ineffectual leader to a strong one, his coalition has 50% of the vote. In second is the Supreme Council with 20%. The State of Law may also come away with Baghdad, having won the Shiite east, including Sadr City. That could leave the Prime Minister’s list in control of seven provinces, and be a major blow to the Supreme Council and the Sadrists that are now in power.
Some new parties such as the al-Hadbaa National List in Ninewa may also be victorious. The List is made up of the al-Hadbaa National United Assembly, the Patriotic and National Forces Assembly, the Iraqi and Kurdsitani Party for Freedom and Equality, and the Al-Wasat Iraqi Assembly. The party is led by Atheel al-Nujaifi, and has run on an explicitly anti-Kurdish and pro-security ticket. They oppose Kurdish rule and designs on the province. Currently Kurds control 31 of the 41 council seats, and wish to annex northern sections of the province. Al-Hadbaa has accused the Kurdish controlled security forces and their militia the peshmerga of harassing them. They also claim that if they are elected they will help bring an end to the insurgency in Ninewa, which is largely fueled by the ethnic divide between Arabs and Kurds. This conflict could be the reason why 60% of the province turned out to vote, one of the highest in the country. A U.S. official said that the party could have up to 66% of the vote. If true that would mean they could rule the province without the need of a larger coalition or joint rule with the Kurds. The U.S. general in command of Mosul said he hoped the election would lead to reconciliation, and an end to the violence in one of the country’s most volatile areas. However al-Hadbaa’s anti-Kurdish campaign could lead to more divisions instead.
In other Sunni areas, the Anbar Awakening and Accordance Front list are battling it out. According to Al-Sabah, the tribal Awakening is winning in Anbar. A parliamentarian from the Accordance Front claimed his list is taking in Anbar however, along with Diyala and Salahaddin. He also said they are coming in third in Babil and Basra, a surprise if true since they are Shiite majority provinces.
Another newcomer is Yousef Majid al-Haddoubi, who could walk away with Karbala. Al-Haddoubi is a secular Shiite independent who heads the Brigade List. He was the governor of the province under Saddam, and then became the mayor of Karbala City after the U.S. invasion.
Larger coalitions to rule provinces are also emerging. In Najaf, the Sadrists, the Iraqi National List, the Reform Movement, and the Iraqi National Congress announced that they would form an alliance to try to take the province.
What Does It All Mean?
Many of the parties that came to power in 2005 were not representative of their populations. This could account for most of them being swept from office. The Supreme Council won Babil, Baghdad, Dhi Qar, Karbala, Muthanna, Najaf and Qadisiyah in the previous vote because they were the largest Shiite party, the best organized, had the most money, were founded by an established clerical family the Hakims, had the backing of Iran, said Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani supported them, and the Sadrists largely stayed away from the polls. The SIIC also won in Diyala, the Iraqi Islamic Party in Anbar, and the Kurds in Ninewa and Salahaddin because of the Sunni boycott. The Islamic Party for example, only got 2,692 votes out of 3,775 in Anbar as a result because it ran largely uncontested. Those disparities are now over, although Anbar may still be up for grabs.
There have also been several articles stating that the 2009 vote is a rejection of the religious parties, but this is only partly true. The two main parts of Maliki’s State of Law list are Shiite religious groups, the Islamic Dawa and the Dawa Party Iraq Organization. The Supreme Council might have lost control of the south, but are still present, the same thing with the Sadrists. The Iraqi Islamic Party is also Islamist. Many stressed nationalism and backed independents, but that doesn’t invalidate their pasts. What the lists found is that they had to address issues more to get elected rather than just their religion, and that is an important shift in Iraqi politics. At the same time, Sunnis continued to mostly vote for Sunni parties, Shiites for Shiites, Kurds for Kurds. Sectarianism still exists in Iraq, it’s just more political than violent today.
For the south, the January election probably marks the end of any autonomous region there. The Supreme Council promoted a nine province Shiite region after the U.S. invasion, but largely dropped it. Right before the vote, a member of the Hakim family said they would revive the idea after January 31. That won’t happen now because the SIIC may not control a single province after everything is said and done. The defeat of the Basra autonomous plan and polls show little support for the idea anyway.
Instead, Iraq could be moving towards a stronger central government based in Baghdad. Maliki consistently called for this as he was campaigning across the country. His military actions against the Sadrists, insurgents, and Kurds were all part of his strategy. Now he could have control of both Baghdad, and friendly governors in the south to further his plan.
Finally, the most important question is whether any of the State of Law candidates or any of the other new lists coming to power will be any better at governing than the current ones. Many voted for the State of Law list because of the Prime Minister, not the actual politicians running. The current provincial councils are known for being incompetent, sectarian, corrupt, and suffer from a slow paper based bureaucracy and a centralized state where Baghdad and the individual ministers have all the power. The new councils will also have to deal with half the money as their predecessors due to the dramatic drop in the price of oil. That will make their job even more difficult. They will have to do a much better job to keep the loyalty of their followers, and not alienate more Iraqis from the political system that has not served them well on the local and provincial level.
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Iraqi PM Calls for Strong Central Government,” 1/22/09
Alsumaria, “Iraq elections leaks say Al Maliki ahead,” 2/2/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “IAF realizes progress in Salah el-Din, Diala, Anbar, - MP,” 2/2/09
- “No decrease in salaries because of oil prices – planning minister” 12/19/08
- “Sadrists in one bloc with INL, reform movement,” 2/2/09
Cocks, Tim, “Vote sows seeds of greater calm in Iraq’s north,” Reuters, 2/2/09
Farrell, Stephen, “Election: What The Papers Say,” Baghdad Bureau Blog, New York Times, 2/2/09
Hendawi, Hamza and Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Momentum builds for a self-ruled southern Iraq,” Associated Press, 1/16/09
Ibrahim, Waleed, “’Surprise’ poll victories strengthen Iraq’s Maliki,” Reuters, 2/1/09
International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Provincial Elections: The Stakes,” 1/27/09
Knights, Michael and McCarthy, Eamon, “Provincial Politics in Iraq: Fragmentation or New Awakening?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2008
Londono, Ernesto, “In Iraq’s north, a defining vote,” Washington Post, 2/2/09
Niqash, “accord and reform bloc,” 1/28/09
- “the hadbaa national list,” 1/28/09
- “the shaheed al-mihrab list,” 1/28/09
- “state of law coalition,” 1/28/09
Tuesday, February 03, 2009
Comparing The January 2009 to January 2005 Provincial Elections
The results of the January 2009 elections will not be known for weeks, but the early returns show a lower turnout than the last time Iraqis voted on provincial councils in January 2005. At that time, 58% of Iraqis, over 8 million out of approximately 14 million people cast ballots. That included out-of-country voting in fourteen nations where 280,303 Iraqis registered. It also included a massive Sunni boycott, where only around 2% showed up. The first counts for the 2009 vote have 51% turnout with around 7.5 million out of 14.9 million registered voters participating. In Anbar for example, Sunnis were expected to come out in large numbers having regretted their 2005 boycott, and where the Awakening tribes were having a heated campaign against the Iraqi Islamic Party for control, but only 40% voted. There were many early reports of widespread apathy amongst Iraqis who felt that politics had not improved their daily lives, that could be proving true. There are also growing reports of voters either being left off of roles or being confused about where their election centers were.
Here are the early returns for the January 31 vote compared to the January 2005 election.
January 31, 2009 Provincial Election Early Voter Turnout By Province
Anbar: 40%
Babil: 56%
Baghdad: Still pending, expected 39-40%
Basra: 48%
Dhi Qar: 50%
Diyala: 57%
Karbala: 60%
Maysan: 46%
Muthanna: 61%
Najaf: 55%
Ninewa: 60%
Qadisiyah: 58%
Salahaddin: 65%
Wasit: 54%
January 2005 Provincial Election Voter Turnout By Province
Anbar 2%
Babil 71%
Baghdad 48%
Dhi Qar 67%
Diyala 34%
Dohuk 89%
Karbala 73%
Maysan 59%
Muthanna 61%
Najaf 73%
Ninewa 17%
Qadisiyah 69%
Salahaddin 29%
Sulaymaniya 80%
Wasit 66%
Who Currently Rules Iraq’s Provinces
ANBAR
Governor: Mamoun Sami Rashid al-Awani
Governor: Salim al-Mesalmaoui
Governor: Hussein al-Tahan, Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council
Governor: Muhmmad al-Waili, Islamic al-Fadhila Party
Al-Waili became governor because the Supreme Council ran two candidates and split their vote.
In April 2007 the Supreme Council had a no confidence vote against al-Waili that was ratified by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in July, but al-Waili is still in office.
Al-Waili was temporarily placed under house arrest during the government offensive in Basra in March 2008.
Governor: Aziz Kadum Alwan al-Ogheli, Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council
DIYALA
Governor: Raad Hameed al-Mula al-Tamimi, Badr Brigade, Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council
DOHUK
Governor: Tamar Ramadan, Kurdistan Democratic Party
IRBIL
Governor: Ali Nikzad, Kurdistan Democratic Party
KARBALA
Governor: Uqeil al-Khazaali, Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council
MAYSAN
Governor: Adil Mahwadar Radi, Sadrist
MUTHANNA
Governor: Muhammad ali-Hassan Abbas al-Hassani, Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council
Al-Hassani was assassinated in August 2007
Ahmad Marzouq Salal of the Dawa Party who was head of the provincial council took his place.
NAJAF
Governor: Asad Abu Gilel al-Taie, Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council
NINEWA
Governor: Usama Yousif Kashmula, Independent
Kashmula was assassinated in July 2004
Duraid Kashmoula, his brother, took his place
QADISIYAH
Governor: Khalil Jalil Hamza, Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council
Hamza was assassinated in August 2007
Hamid al-Khodairi of the Supreme Council replaced him
SALAHADDIN
Governor: Hamed Hamood Shekti al-Qaisi
SULAYMANIYA
Governor: Dana Ahmed Majid, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
TAMIM
Governor: Abdulrahman Mustapha Fatah
WASIT
Governor: Latif Hamid Turfa, Sadrist
NOTES
Allawi = Former Interim Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi of the Iraqi National List, aka Iraqi National Accord
Hashemi = Vice President Tariq Hashemi of the Iraqi Islamic Party that is part of the Iraqi Accordance Front
SOURCES
BBC, “Q&A: Iraqi election,” 2/13/05
Biddle, Stephen, Nasr, Vali, Nash, William, “Political and Security Developments in Iraq and the Region,” Council on Foreign Relations, 6/12/08
Chon, Gina and Naji, Zaineb, “Iraq Drive for Voters Lags,” Wall Street Journal, 9/18/08
Cordesman, Anthony, “The Shi’ite Gamble: Rolling The Dice For Iraq’s Future,” Center for Strategic And International Studies, 4/21/08
Dagher, Sam, “Basra strike against Shiite militias also about oil,” Christian Science Monitor, 4/9/08
Dreyfuss, Robert, “Iraq’s Election: What to Watch For,” The Nation, 1/28/09
Farrell, Stephen, “Election Turnout: Early Figures,” Baghdad Bureau Blog, New York Times, 2/1/09
International Mission for Iraqi Elections, “Final Report: Assessment of the January 30, 2005, Election Process,” August 2005
IRIN, “IRAQ: Year in Review 2005 – Iraqis go to the polls,” 1/9/06
Knights, Michael and McCarthy, Eamon, “Provincial Politics in Iraq: Fragmentation or New Awakening?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2008
Naji, Zaineb and Salman, Daud, “Iraq: Political Dynamics in Advance of Parliamentary Elections,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 2005
Najm, Hayder, “Poor Election Turnout Feared,” Niqash, 12/5/08
Nation Master.com, “Encyclopedia > National Independent Cadres and Elites”
Susman, Tina, “IRAQ: Low turnout mars Iraqi election,” Babylon & Beyond Blog, Los Angeles Times, 2/1/09
Here are the early returns for the January 31 vote compared to the January 2005 election.
January 31, 2009 Provincial Election Early Voter Turnout By Province
Anbar: 40%
Babil: 56%
Baghdad: Still pending, expected 39-40%
Basra: 48%
Dhi Qar: 50%
Diyala: 57%
Karbala: 60%
Maysan: 46%
Muthanna: 61%
Najaf: 55%
Ninewa: 60%
Qadisiyah: 58%
Salahaddin: 65%
Wasit: 54%
January 2005 Provincial Election Voter Turnout By Province
Anbar 2%
Babil 71%
Baghdad 48%
Dhi Qar 67%
Diyala 34%
Dohuk 89%
Karbala 73%
Maysan 59%
Muthanna 61%
Najaf 73%
Ninewa 17%
Qadisiyah 69%
Salahaddin 29%
Sulaymaniya 80%
Wasit 66%
Who Currently Rules Iraq’s Provinces
ANBAR
Governor: Mamoun Sami Rashid al-Awani
- Iraqi Islamic Party (Hashemi): 2,692 votes, 29 seats
- Independent Iraqi Group: 755 votes, 8 seats
- Reconciliation and Liberation Bloc: 328 votes, 4 seats
- TOTAL VALID BALLOTS: 3,775, 41 seats
- INVALID BALLOTS: 28
Governor: Salim al-Mesalmaoui
- Faithful Iraqis Association (Supreme Council): 192,643 votes, 25 seats
- Al-Rasul Association: 43,226 votes, 6 seats
- Imam Ali Society: 41,607 votes, 6 seats
- Security & Reconstruction: 17,295 votes, 2 seats
- Babil Independent Association: 15,779 seats, 2 seats
- TOTAL VALID BALLOTS: 494,054, 41 seats
- INVALID AND BLANK BALLOTS: 21,786
Governor: Hussein al-Tahan, Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council
- Baghdad Nation (Supreme Council): 694,800 votes, 28 seats
- Baghdad Peace (Dawa): 264,130 votes, 11 seats
- Islamic al-Fadhila Party: 156,229 votes, 6 seats
- National Democratic Alliance: 46,265 votes, 2 seats
- Iraqi Communist Party: 36,713 votes, 2 seats
- National Independent Cadres and Elites (Sadrists): 35,441 votes, 1 seats
- Iraqi Independent al-Bayan Gathering: 34,366 votes, 1 seats
- TOTAL VALID BALLOTS: 1,750,772, 51 seats
- INVALID BALLOTS: 21,600
Governor: Muhmmad al-Waili, Islamic al-Fadhila Party
Al-Waili became governor because the Supreme Council ran two candidates and split their vote.
In April 2007 the Supreme Council had a no confidence vote against al-Waili that was ratified by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in July, but al-Waili is still in office.
Al-Waili was temporarily placed under house arrest during the government offensive in Basra in March 2008.
- Islamic Basra (Supreme Council): 235,704 votes, 20 seats
- Islamic al-Fadhila Party: 150,823 votes, 12 seats
- Iraqi National List (Allawi): 49,005 votes, 4 seats
- Islamic Dawa Party: 37,997 votes, 3 seats
- Iraqi Independent List: 21,236 votes, 2 seats
- TOTAL VALID BALLOTS: 713,271, 41 seats
- INVALID BALLOTS: 7,733
Governor: Aziz Kadum Alwan al-Ogheli, Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council
- Islamic Al-Fadhila Party: 103,114 votes, 11 seats
- Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council: 100,237 votes, 11 seats
- Islamic Dawa – Iraq Organization: 89,263 votes, 10 seats
- Iraqi National List (Allawi): 20,767 votes, 2 seats
- Islamic Movement of the 15th of Shaaban: 19,709 votes, 2 seats
- Iraqi Communist Party: 18,769 votes, 2 seats
- Iraqi Independent Gathering: 15,531, votes, 2 seats
- Independent Coalition for the Care of Democracy: 13,880 votes, 1 seat
- TOTAL VALID BALLOTS: 522,271, 41 seats
- INVALID BALLOTS 4,707
DIYALA
Governor: Raad Hameed al-Mula al-Tamimi, Badr Brigade, Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council
- Coalition of Islamic & National Forces in Diyala (Dawa & Supreme Council): 84,390 votes, 20 seats
- Iraqi Islamic Party (Hashemi): 55,960 votes, 14 seats
- Kurdish Arabic Turkmen Democratic Coalition – Diyala Governorate: 30,268 seats, 7 seats
- TOTAL VALID BALLOTS: 210,574, 41 seats
- INVALID BALLOTS 3,283
DOHUK
Governor: Tamar Ramadan, Kurdistan Democratic Party
- Kurdistan Democratic Party: 302,133 votes, 33 seats
- Kurdistan Islamic Union: 35,675 votes, 4 seats
- Patriotic Union of Kurdistan: 35,483 votes, 4 seats
- TOTAL VALLID BALLOTS: 383,265, 41 seats
- INVALID BALLOTS: 5,273
IRBIL
Governor: Ali Nikzad, Kurdistan Democratic Party
- Democratic Voice of Kurdistan List (Kurdistan Democratic Party): 347,772 votes, 23 seats
- Patriotic Union of Kurdistan: 244,343 votes, 16 seats
- Kurdistan Islamic Union: 22,523 votes, 1 seats
- Islamic Group of Kurdistan: 18,781 votes, 1 seats
- TOTAL VALID BALLOTS: 647,994, 41 seats
- INVALID BALLOTS: 16,622
KARBALA
Governor: Uqeil al-Khazaali, Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council
- Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council: 101,932 votes, 21 seats
- Islamic al-Fadhila Party: 22,085 votes, 5 seats
- Shiite Political Council: 10,655 votes, 2 seats
- Democratic Progressive Gathering: 9,698 votes, 2 seats
- Independent Council of Tribal Sheikhs & Notables of Karbala Governorate: 9,647 votes, 2 seats
- Iraqi Democratic Current: 9,161 votes, 2 seats
- Independent Unified List for the Governorate of Holy Karbala: 8,719 votes, 2 seats
- Dr. Abbas al-Hasnawi: 8,621 votes, 1 seat
- Democratic Meeting for Holy Karbala: 7,605 votes, 2 seats
- Independent Intellectuals Gathering: 7,233 votes, 2 seats
- TOTAL VALID BALLOTS 297,201 41
- INVALID BALLOTS 3,168
MAYSAN
Governor: Adil Mahwadar Radi, Sadrist
- Al-Hussayni Thought Forum (Sadrists): 78,859 votes, 15 seats
- Islamic Unified Front (Supreme Council): 28,211 votes, 6 seats
- Islamic Dawa – Iraq Organization: 25,388 votes, 5 seats
- Islamic al-Fadhila Party: 20,379 votes, 4 seats
- Al-Rida Center for Culture & Guidance: 13,410 votes, 3 seats
- Gathering of the Independent Sons of Maysan: 9,674 votes, 2 seats
- Iraqi Republican Group: 7,560 votes, 2 seats
- Islamic Dawa Party: 7,006 votes, 1 seat
- Maysan Democratic Coalition: 6,833 votes, 1 seat
- Shiite Political Council: 6,558 votes, 1 seat
- Independent National Islamic Congregation: 6,201 votes, 1 seat
- TOTAL VALID BALLOTS: 246,957, 41 seats
- INVALID BALLOTS: 1,559
MUTHANNA
Governor: Muhammad ali-Hassan Abbas al-Hassani, Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council
Al-Hassani was assassinated in August 2007
Ahmad Marzouq Salal of the Dawa Party who was head of the provincial council took his place.
- Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council: 23,918 votes, 8 seats
- Islamic al-Fadhila Party: 18,206 votes, 6 seats
- Al-Furat al-Awsat Assembly: 17,924 votes, 6 seats
- Islamic Independent Society: 14,550 votes, 5 seats
- Islamic Dawa Party: 13,354 votes, 4 seats
- Gathering for al-Muthanna: 12,687 votes, 4 seats
- Allegiance Coalition: 10,221 votes, 3 seats
- Iraqi National List (Allawi): 7,530 votes, 3 seats
- Iraqi Communist Party: 5,602 votes, 2 seats
- TOTAL VALID BALLOTS: 173,155, 41 seats
- INVALID BALLOTS: 2,004
NAJAF
Governor: Asad Abu Gilel al-Taie, Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council
- Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council: 133,676 votes, 19 seats
- Loyalty to Al-Najaf: 64,837 votes, 9 seats
- Banner of the Independents: 26,585 votes, 4 seats
- Iraqi National List (Allawi): 23,663 votes, 3 seats
- Islamic al-Fadhila Party: 15,999 votes, 2 seats
- Allegiance Coalition: 13,464 votes, 2 seats
- Iraq Future Gathering: 11,513 votes, 2 seats
- TOTAL VALID BALLOTS: 359,268, 41 seats
- INVALID BALLOTS: 3,079
NINEWA
Governor: Usama Yousif Kashmula, Independent
Kashmula was assassinated in July 2004
Duraid Kashmoula, his brother, took his place
- Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan (Kurdistan Democratic Party & Patriotic Union of Kurdistan): 109,295 votes, 31 seats
- Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council: 17,255 votes, 5 seats
- Iraqi Islamic Party (Hashemi): 7,065 votes, 2 seats
- Council of the United Clans of Mosul: 6,624 votes, 2 seats
- National Rafidain List: 4,650 votes, 1 seat
- TOTAL VALID BALLOTS: 165,934, 41 seats
- INVALID BALLOTS: 864
QADISIYAH
Governor: Khalil Jalil Hamza, Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council
Hamza was assassinated in August 2007
Hamid al-Khodairi of the Supreme Council replaced him
- Martyr of the Sanctuary Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim (Supreme Council): 102,005 votes, 20 seats
- Shiite Political Council: 26,898 votes, 5 seats
- Islamic Dawa Party: 15,446 votes, 3 seats
- Iraqi National List (Allawi): 15,396 votes, 3 seats
- Islamic al-Fadhila Party: 14,606 votes, 3 seats
- Independent Brotherhood (Sadrists): 14,485 votse, 3 seats
- Islamic Dawa Party – Iraq Organization: 10,854 votes, 2 seats
- Loyalty to Irq Coalition (Sadrists): 8,052 votes, 2 seats
- TOTAL VALID BALLOTS: 337,220 votes, 41 seats
- INVALID BALLOTS: 3,898
SALAHADDIN
Governor: Hamed Hamood Shekti al-Qaisi
- List of the Unified Democratic Coalition in Salahaddin Governorate (Kurdish Democratic Party & Patriot Union of Kurdistan): 22,160 votes, 8 seats
- Liberation & Reconciliation Gathering: 17,017 votes, 6 seats
- Iraqi Turkmen Front: 14,917 votes, 5 seats
- Coalition of the Iraqi National Unity: 13,321 votes, 5 seats
- Unified List: 12,815 votes, 4 seats
- Iraqi National List (Allawi): 10,215 votes, 3 seats
- Islamic Dawa Party: 8,691 votes, 3 seats
- National Iraqi Gathering: 8,641 votes, 3 seats
- National al-Resalyoon List (Sadrists): 6,133 votes, 2 seats
- Gathering of Independent in Salahadin: 4,739 votes, 2 seats
- TOTAL VALID BALLOTS: 137,476, 41 seats
- INVALID BALLOTS: 1,834
SULAYMANIYA
Governor: Dana Ahmed Majid, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
- Patriotic Union of Kurdistan: 485,718 votes, 28 seats
- Kurdistan Islamic Union: 75,008 votes, 5 seats
- Islamic Group of Kurdistan: 53,088 votes, 5 seats
- Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq: 91,578 votes, 3 seats
- Communist Party of Kurdistan: 8,192 , 0 seats
- TOTAL VALID BALLOTS: 731,323, 41 seats
- INVALID BALLOTS: 13,183
TAMIM
Governor: Abdulrahman Mustapha Fatah
- List of Kurdistan Brotherhood (Kurdistan Democratic Party): 237,303 votes, 26 seats
- Iraqi Turkoman Front: 73,791 votes, 8 seats
- Iraqi Republican Group: 43,635 votes, 5 seats
- Islamic Turkoman Coalition: 12,678 votes, 1 seat
- National Iraq Union: 12,329 votes, 1 seat
- TOTAL VALID BALLOTS: 400,892, 41 seats
- INVALID BALLOTS: 5,059
WASIT
Governor: Latif Hamid Turfa, Sadrist
- Iraqi Elites Gathering: 185,813 votes, 31 seats
- Shiite Political Council (Supreme Council & Dawa): 22,346 votes, 4 seats
- Gathering of the Independents in Wasit: 16,518 votes, 3 seats
- Iraqi Communist Party: 12,780 votes, 2 seats
- Democratic Iraq Gathering: 9,010 votes, 1 seats
- TOTAL VALID BALLOTS: 324,678, 41 seats
- INVALID BALLOTS: 2,704
NOTES
Allawi = Former Interim Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi of the Iraqi National List, aka Iraqi National Accord
Hashemi = Vice President Tariq Hashemi of the Iraqi Islamic Party that is part of the Iraqi Accordance Front
SOURCES
BBC, “Q&A: Iraqi election,” 2/13/05
Biddle, Stephen, Nasr, Vali, Nash, William, “Political and Security Developments in Iraq and the Region,” Council on Foreign Relations, 6/12/08
Chon, Gina and Naji, Zaineb, “Iraq Drive for Voters Lags,” Wall Street Journal, 9/18/08
Cordesman, Anthony, “The Shi’ite Gamble: Rolling The Dice For Iraq’s Future,” Center for Strategic And International Studies, 4/21/08
Dagher, Sam, “Basra strike against Shiite militias also about oil,” Christian Science Monitor, 4/9/08
Dreyfuss, Robert, “Iraq’s Election: What to Watch For,” The Nation, 1/28/09
Farrell, Stephen, “Election Turnout: Early Figures,” Baghdad Bureau Blog, New York Times, 2/1/09
International Mission for Iraqi Elections, “Final Report: Assessment of the January 30, 2005, Election Process,” August 2005
IRIN, “IRAQ: Year in Review 2005 – Iraqis go to the polls,” 1/9/06
Knights, Michael and McCarthy, Eamon, “Provincial Politics in Iraq: Fragmentation or New Awakening?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2008
Naji, Zaineb and Salman, Daud, “Iraq: Political Dynamics in Advance of Parliamentary Elections,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 2005
Najm, Hayder, “Poor Election Turnout Feared,” Niqash, 12/5/08
Nation Master.com, “Encyclopedia > National Independent Cadres and Elites”
Susman, Tina, “IRAQ: Low turnout mars Iraqi election,” Babylon & Beyond Blog, Los Angeles Times, 2/1/09
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