U.S. Reconstruction Coming To An End

Since the invasion of Iraq in 2003 the United States has promised the country $52.8 billion in reconstruction funds. That was the largest rebuilding effort in American history. Now this program is expected to end by 2014.

Of the $52.8 billion made available to Iraq, $43.57 billion of it has actually been obligated to specific projects, and $39.54 billion has been spent. The Obama administration has asked for $800 million for the 2010-2011 Fiscal Year. There is also $1 billion in supplemental funding for 2010 and $1.5 billion in 2012. The reconstruction effort is already winding down as only $58 million of the $1 billion in 2010 money has been obligated as of September 2009, and only $300,000 has been spent. That’s largely the result of the beginning of the withdrawal of U.S. forces. With less troops out in the field and the planned drawdown of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, there are fewer opportunities for new projects to be planned. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) estimates that by 2012-2014 all of the money currently in the pipeline for Iraq will run out. After that the U.S. will continue to provide aid, but not in the large amounts that it has in the past.

The largest chunk of reconstruction funds ended up going to security. In total, $24.52 billion was allocated for various security endeavors, with $20.72 billion actually being spent. Creating a new Iraqi Army is considered the one success of the U.S. effort. There are 245,000 Iraqi soldiers, and over 400,000 police. They now have control of all of Iraq’s 18 provinces, are in the lead of the country’s counterinsurgency program, and the Army is considered competent enough to handle internal security. The police are more open to political and local influences, thousands have not been trained, and are still considered a work in progress. Both forces remain almost completely dependent upon the U.S. for logistics and procurement however, and Iraq is not capable of protecting itself from outside threats.

In comparison, $21.2 billion was spent on the economy and government. $12.36 billion was allocated for infrastructure, $7.28 billion for governance, and $1.56 billion for the economy. Of that, $18.83 billion has actually been spent. The sectors that got the most money were electricity, $5.16 billion, water and sanitation $2.74 billion, government capacity $2.50 billion, oil and gas $2.06 billion, and developing democracy and civil society $2.03 billion.

There is still over $11.6 billion in on-going projects. Baghdad has the most with $2.92 billion, followed by $543.46 million in Basra, $362.23 million in Tamim, and $1.11 billion across the country. In terms of sectors, there is $5.07 billion in electricity projects, $3.08 billion in water and sanitation, $1.77 billion in oil and gas, $1.27 billion in transportation and communication, and $467.97 million in governance and infrastructure.

Reconstructing Iraq’s infrastructure and government has run into many problems. While things like electricity production is at an all time high, it is still not meeting demand. There are also millions of dollars worth of projects that are either not operating at capacity or have been abandoned because Iraqis cannot staff, supply, or afford them. Most importantly, just over half of the money got diverted to security rather than developing the country. 

Overall, the SIGIR believes that the U.S. failed in this endeavor because of a lack of pre-war planning and coordination, bad contracting practices, and building projects that Americans wanted, not Iraqis. Another major problem was that the lack of security derailed many projects, and led to huge cost overruns. That’s seen in the fact that as the reconstruction effort winds down, more money was spent on the Iraqi military and police than the economy or government. There are some successes like the Iraqi Army, but many continuing problems like the lack of adequate services. The U.S. invasion ended the dictatorial rule of Saddam, but the $52.8 billion reconstruction effort is leaving behind a rather typical, dysfunctional Third World country.

Status of Major U.S. Reconstruction Funds

Area	Sector	Allocated	Obligated	Expended
Security	Equipment	$7.29 bil	6.82 bil	6.03 bil
	Training	$6.11 bil	$5.68 bil	$5.45 bil
	Infrastructure	$5.81 bil	$5.55 bil	$4.84 bil
	Sustainment	$2.55 bil	$2.41 bil	$2.17 bil
	Rule of Law	$1.50 bil	$1.48 bil	$1.27 bil
	Related Activities	$1.27 bil	$1.15 bil	$0.97 bil
	Subtotal	$24.52 bil	$23.09 bil	$20.72 bil
Infrastructure	Electricity	$5.16 bil	$4.99 bil	$4.86 bil
	Water and Sanitation	$2.74 bil	$2.63 bil	$2.47 bil
	Oil and Gas	$2.06 bil	$1.92 bil	$1.91 bil
	General Infrastructure	$1.25 bil	$1.24 bil	$1.24 bil
	Transportation and Communication	$1.15 bil	$1.09 bil	$0.99 bil
	Subtotal	$12.35 bil	$11.88 bil	$11.47 bil
Governance	Capacity Development	$2.50 bil	$2.29 bil	$1.91 bil
	Democracy and Civil Society	$2.03 bil	$2.04 bil	$1.66 bil
	Public Services	$1.93 bil	$1.91 bil	$1.73 bil
	Humanitarian Relief	$0.82 bil	$0.82 bil	$0.75 bil
	Subtotal	$7.28 bil	$7.06 bil	$6.04 bil
Economy	Economic Governance	$0.82 bil	$0.80 bil	$0.74 bil
	Private Sector Development	$0.74 bil	$0.74 bil	$0.57 bil
	Subtotal	$1.56 bil	$1.54 bil	$1.32 bil
TOTAL		$45.72 bil	$43.57 bil	$39.54 bil

Remaining Infrastructure Projects by Province

Province	Electricity	Water and Sanitation	Oil and Gas	Transporta- tion and Commun- ication	General Infra- structure	Total
Baghdad	$1,504.22 mil	$755.31 mil	$40.6 mil	$282.17 mil	$341.68 mil	$2,923.97 mil
Basra	$543.46 mil	$238.32 mil	$558.55 mil	%171.8 mil	$8.39 mil	$1,520.52 mil
Tamim	$362.23 mil	$42.87 mil	$187.39 mil	$21.09 mil	$8.47 mil	$622.05 mil
Dhi Qar	$106.67 mil	$399.69 mil	$0.43 mil	$21.42 mil	$13.06 mil	$541.26 mil
Salahaddin	$311.19 mil	$59.51 mil	$71.52 mil	$65.75 mil	$7.37 mil	$515.36 mil
Anbar	$251.58 mil	$188.88 mil	-	$70.15 mil	$3.92 mil	$514.53 mil
Ninewa	$118.74 mil	$126.87 mil	$0.08 mil	$66.06 mil	$6.97 mil	$318.72 mil
Iirbil	$102.54 mil	$201.67 mil	$0.08 mil	$5.07 mil	$2.46 mil	$311.82 mil
Diyala	$80.66 mil	$143.47 mil	$2.89 mil	$23.79 mil	$6.24 mil	$257.05 mil
Muthanna	$15.02 mil	$189.79 mil	$0.07 mil	$19.12 mil	$3.87 mil	$227.87 mil
Babil	$121.65 mil	$47.63 mil	-	$36.01 mil	$3.49 mil	$208.78 mil
Najaf	$72.79 mil	$60.84 mil	-	$14.26 mil	$4.43 mil	$152.31 mil
Qadisiya	$86.78 mil	$30.46 mil	-	$21.75 mil	$2.65 mil	$141.63 mil
Maysan	$76.31 mil	$20.26 mil	$0.06 mil	$14.06 mil	$6.32 mil	$117.01 mil
Wasit	$45.38 mil	$30.21 mil	-	$19.18 mil	$10.23 mil	$105.01 mil
Karbala	$46.99 mil	$39.0 mil	-	$4.88 mil	$1.58 mil	$92.45 mil
Dohuk	$61.4 mil	$8l.34 mil	-	$0.93 mil	$7.63 mil	$78.3 mil
Sulaymaniya	$49.03 mil	$15.28 mil	-	$2.98 mil	$1.06 mil	$68.35 mil
Nationwide & Regional	$1,115.1 mil	$487.18 mil	$916.14 mil	$418.14 mil	$28.16 mil	$2,964.71 mil
TOTAL	$5,071.73 mil	$3,085.58 mil	$1,777.81 mil	$1,278.6 mil	$467.97 mil	$11,681.69 mil

 

SOURCES

Cordesman, Anthony, “Assessing the Readiness of the Iraqi Security Forces,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/12/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09

- “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/09

Is The U.S. Committed To Resolving The Kirkuk Controversy In Iraq?

The recent delay of the passage of the 2010 election law showed that Kirkuk remains one of the major unresolved issues in Iraq. There is now talk that the United States will try to deal with the city before it withdraws its troops by the end of 2011.

Joost Hilterman of the International Crisis Group recently wrote a piece in the New York Review of Books where he said that the U.S. Ambassador Christopher Hill and commander of U.S. forces in Iraq General Ray Odierno will attempt to work out a deal over the future of Kirkuk after the Iraqi elections, which are set for January 2010. Odierno is especially worried that Kirkuk could be a flashpoint for renewed violence, this time between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government. He has successfully pushed the two sides to create a joint command center to coordinate the work of the local Iraqi forces and the Kurdish peshmerga in Kirkuk, but plans to expand that to surrounding areas has stalled because of politically differences. The local Arabs and Turkmen for example, think that the idea will legitimize the presence of the peshmerga, which they hope will someday leave.

U.S. forces have also returned to the streets of Kirkuk to conduct joint patrols, the first since the June 30, 2009 withdrawal from Iraqi cities. The chief of police in Kirkuk publicly said that the Iraqis could do their jobs without assistance, but privately told the BBC that he still calls the Americans for help with operations. This is another step by the U.S. meant to keep a lid on tensions in Kirkuk.

Iraqis desperately need some outside mediation to deal with Kirkuk. Left to their own devices, Iraq’s politicians could go on for months and months debating the issue. It has already been responsible for delaying two election laws, and Article 140 of the Constitution that called for a census and then referendum on the issue has been all but given up on. The United Nations has been trying to work on the issue since early 2007, but to no avail. The U.S. might be the best and last chance to make forward movement on Kirkuk. While their influence with Baghdad is declining, they still have many friends in Kurdistan, and can act as an honest broker since they have taken no position on the city, other than wanting it resolved. It’s definitely something that needs to be kept an eye on in the coming months.

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “Iraq-US joint patrols tour Kirkuk City,” 10/22/09

Gatehouse, Gabriel, “US presence remains in divided Kirkuk,” BBC, 10/20/09

Hilterman, Joost, “Iraq on the Edge,” New York Review of Books,” 11/19/09

International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09
- “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08

Joint U.S.-Iraq-Kurdish Patrols In Disputed Areas Remains A Political Football

In mid-August 2009, the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq General Ray Odierno proposed joint U.S.-Iraqi-Kurdish patrols in Ninewa. The Americans made the proposal after a series of mass casualty bombings rocked the province. The offer was later extended to all of the disputed territories in northern Iraq. The idea originated from a joint military command set up outside of Kirkuk to coordinate security operations between American, Iraqi, and Kurdish peshmerga forces. The purpose of the patrols is to increase cooperation and communication between Iraqi and Kurdish forces, which have often been at odds with each other, and close the security gaps that the insurgents have been able to exploit between them to carry out attacks.

General Odierno met with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and Kurdish President Massoud Barzani about the plan. The Kurdish authorities immediately welcomed the idea, as did the Kurdish Ninewa Fraternal List. The main opponents of the plan have been Sunni Arab and Turkmen parties and politicians. Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi, expressed concerns about the idea when he met with Vice President Joe Biden in mid-September 2009 during his trip to Iraq. A few days before on September 12 a group of Turkmen demonstrated against the U.S. plan in Kirkuk. Earlier on September 1 Arab and Turkmen marched together in opposition to the idea as well. The Arab bloc in the Tamim provincial council also threatened a boycott if the patrols were implemented, and the al-Hadbaa controlled provincial council in Ninewa was also critical of the concept in August. The most inflammatory statement however, came from the al-Hadbaa governor of Ninewa Atheel al-Najafi who said that joint patrols in his province would influence the 2010 parliamentary elections in favor of the Kurds, and that therefore voting in Kurdish areas of Ninewa should be cancelled.

With the joint patrol concept creating that many divisive opinions, they’re unlikely to be implemented for now. There may be specific towns where local officials might be able to work something out, but otherwise the issue is becoming a political football between Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmen. With parliamentary elections coming up in January 2010 as well, politicians are likely to take up the issue one way or the other to promote their own agendas further complicating the matter.

SOURCES

AK News, “Kurds welcome Americans Kirkuk proposal,” 8/20/09
- “Kurdish areas in Nineveh spark sharp disputes,” 9/17/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Arab bloc in Kirkuk threatens to boycott council,” 9/3/09
- “Hashemi voices reservations about joint forces presence in Kirkuk, Ninewa,” 9/16/09

International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09

Nordland, Rod and Dagher, Sam, “U.S. Will Release More Members of an Iraqi Militia,” New York Times, 8/18/09

Radio Sawa, “A demonstration in Kirkuk against the proposed deployment of a joint disputed areas,” 9/12/09

Visser, Reidar, “Maliki’s Northern Headache, and How General Odierno Is Compounding It,” Iraq And Gulf Analysis, 9/9/09

U.S. Holds Talks Between Al-Hadbaa And Kurds In Ninewa

Iraq The Model recently reported on a story from al-Sharq al-Awsat on U.S. sponsored talks between the ruling al-Hadbaa party in Ninewa and the Kurdish Ninewa Fraternal List. The meeting included two members of al-Hadbaa who hold 19 of the 37 provincial seats, two members of the Fraternal List who have twelve seats, a member of the Iraqi Islamic Party who have three seats, and several American officials. The U.S. was said to be working on these negotiations since at least August 2009. The Kurdish emissaries were quoted as saying that they welcomed the discussions.

Currently the Fraternal List is boycotting the provincial council since they got no positions after the 2009 elections, and 16 administrative units controlled by the Kurds in Ninewa are refusing to follow the directives of al-Hadbaa. The war of words between the two sides has only gotten worse in recent weeks. The dispute is also giving the insurgents room to operate as they are playing up Arab fears of the Kurds, and the lack of cooperation between al-Hadbaa and the Fraternal List is creating security holes, which militants have been able to exploit with attacks. The question now is how much of an effort will the Americans put into these talks, and whether al-Hadbaa and the Fraternal List are willing to compromise. So far, several Iraqi parties have tried to mediate, but to no avail. It seems for now the two sides are willing to talk, but little else.

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “Mosul parties’ intransigence encumbered IIP initiative – spokesman,” 8/16/09
- “Sadrist delegation in Mosul to defuse crisis,” 6/13/09

Al-Badrani, Jamal, “Qaeda stronger as blasts feed Iraqi Kurd-Arab feud,” Reuters, 8/16/09

Dagher, Sam, “Minorities Trapped in Northern Iraq’s Maelstrom,” New York Times, 8/16/09

Iraq The Model, “U.S. sponsored talks between Nineveh’s Arabs and Kurds,” 9/7/09

Mohsen, Amer, “Iraq Papers Wed: A Wounded Country,” IraqSlogger.com, 6/23/09

Joint U.S.-Iraq-Kurdish Patrols Okayed In Ninewa Objected To In Kirkuk

August 2009 saw a sharp increase in mass casualty bombings across Iraq. After Baghdad, Ninewa was the hardest hit. On August 9 a suicide bomber struck a mosque in Mosul killing 23 and wounding 130. The next day two truck bombs hit the village of Khazna in eastern Ninewa killing 20 and wounding 110. Finally, on August 13 a suicide truck bomber attacked a café in Sinjar killing 20 and wounding 35.

Tensions were already high in the province due to the divide between the Kurdish Ninewa Fraternal List and the ruling al-Hadbaa party, and the two sides blamed each other for the violence. In response the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq General Ray Odierno suggested creating joint U.S.-Iraqi-Kurdish patrols in Ninewa. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the head of the Fraternal List initially welcomed the idea, and on September 1, 2009 it was announced that the joint operations would go ahead in the Mosul suburbs, the capital of Ninewa. The Americans have already set up similar patrols outside of Kirkuk in Tamim province, and are seen as a way to foster cooperation between Arabs and Kurds, so they could be a positive move in Ninewa as well since things have only gotten worse there politically since the January 2009 provincial elections.

In neighboring Tamim however, Arabs have protested against expanding the program to Kirkuk itself and other parts of the province. On September 3, the Arab bloc on the provincial council said they would conduct a boycott if joint patrols were created within the city of Kirkuk. Then on September 5, 500 people in the town of Huweija demonstrated against the patrols being formed across the rest of the province. The Arabs are probably afraid that the policy will give the Kurds a larger presence in Tamim and Kirkuk then before, and thus upset the delicate balance between groups.

The joint patrols when implemented have apparently helped relieve tensions, but they are only a band-aid. American troops are drawing down so the operations can only last for a set amount of time. The bigger problem is the growing divide between the Fraternal List and al-Hadbaa, Baghdad and Kurdistan, and Arabs and Kurds. This needs U.S. mediation, but Washington doesn’t seem to be giving it much priority. Only the American military seems to be taking the initiative, and that’s not enough.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Humdreds protest against proposed US-Iraq-Kurd force,” 9/5/09

AK News, “Kurds welcome Americans Kirkuk proposal,” 8/20/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Arab bloc in Kirkuk threatens to boycott council,” 9/3/09
- “Demonstrations in Huweija against tripartite force,” 9/5/09
- “Iraqi-Kurdish-U.S. security teams in Mosul-source,” 9/1/09
- “Mosul mosque blast death toll up to 38, wounded 90,” 8/7/09
- “Mosul truck bombs casualties rise to 153,” 8/10/09
- “Sinjar suicide blast casualties up to 55,” 8/13/09
- “Truck bombs kill 20, wound 110 in Mosul,” 8/10/09

Graeber, Daniel, “arab-kurdish divide dominating u.s. agenda,” Niqash, 9/1/09

International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09

Juhi, Bushra, “Iraqi Arabs protest US plan for Kurdish patrols,” Associated Press, 9/5/09

Nordland, Rod and Dagher, Sam, “U.S. Will Release More Members of an Iraqi Militia,” New York Times, 8/17/09

The U.S. Needs To Save Iraq From Itself Says Analyst

Kenneth Pollack of the Brookings Institution has been one of the long-time American commentators on Iraq. He recently wrote a piece for The National Interest journal entitled “The Battle for Baghdad". In it he argues that Iraqis, left to their own devices will destroy the gains made in Iraq since the Surge. He warns that the older political parties that took over after the 2003 invasion are still clinging to power, and are willing to bring down Iraqi democracy to maintain their positions. According to Pollack the only thing standing in the way of this happening is the United States. Even that is endangered because of the moves of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Like most of his think tank counterparts, Pollack is arguing for a long-term American diplomatic and military presence in Iraq to act as peacekeepers and mediators. Without them Pollack believes that Iraqis will only think about their own short-term interests to the detriment of the country.

Pollack begins with two conversations he had with Iraq politicians after the January 2009 provincial elections. The first was with a group that was opposed to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. They started off assuring Pollack that they had enough supporters for a no confidence vote against the Prime Minister in parliament, but in the end they admitted that Abdul Aziz al-Hakim of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council opposed this idea because it would go against the recent balloting that was in Maliki’s favor. The absence of Hakim’s support was considered a deal breaker. This represents one dynamic of the post sectarian war status quo in Iraq where many of the disputes are now political, and groups abide by the broad rules of the constitution and electoral system. On the other hand, Pollack met with a group of Dawa officials who were sure that Maliki would win in the 2010 parliamentary vote after his victory in 2009. They said the Prime Minister would run on services and security, and blame his opponents for any setbacks, something that’s actually happened recently. On the other hand when these politicians were asked about Maliki creating extra-judicial bodies and going outside standard procedures in the government they attempted to dodge the issues by saying that this was necessary because Iraq’s bureaucracy didn’t work and different political parties controlled the ministries and often didn’t listen to Maliki. This represented the other side of Iraq’s system where many believe that the Prime Minister is acting like leaders of the past and centralizing all authority around himself, which could intentionally or not lead to autocratic rule. To Pollack, this is the ying and the yang of Iraq. On the one hand democracy is taking root however precariously, on the other hand, there are plenty of forces in the country that threaten it.

There are two other issues that Pollack worries about. One is that Iraqi nationalism is making a comeback. This is helping to heal some of the wounds between Sunnis and Shiites created during the sectarian war. On the other hand, Iraqi nationalism is often interpreted as being solely Arab in character and anti-Kurdish. Maliki is playing on this by attempting to militarily confront the Kurds across the disputed territories in the north. There have been several times this has almost turned into shooting, only averted by the presence of U.S. forces. Pollack wonders if Maliki actually resents this outside interference, because he may want a confrontation with the Kurds so that he can rally the Arab public around him. Second, are the old Iraqi parties that have ruled Iraq since the 2005 elections. While he doesn’t name them, he is implying the Supreme Council, the Kurdistan Democratic Party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and the Iraqi Accordance Front, all of which either controlled their own militia or had contacts with the insurgency, and used these armed factions to gain political power. Pollack believes that these groups are trying to cling to power, and will do whatever it takes to do so. In the 2010 election for example, they are pushing for a closed list voting system where the electorate only gets to pick from coalitions instead of individuals because this gives party bosses, rather than the public, control over the politicians and government. Pollack thinks both of these are threats to stability and democracy, because Maliki and the old guard parties are only thinking about their own personal gain rather than the future of the country.

Pollack’s solution to all of these problems is a long-term American presence in Iraq. According to him, the U.S. needs to stay to provide support to the government and mediate conflicts. Only the U.S. he writes can help solve the problems between Baghdad and Kurdistan over disputed areas like Kirkuk and federalism. The U.S. needs to make sure that Iraqi prisoners and the Sons of Iraq are treated well. The U.S. needs to push the government to protect minorities. The U.S. needs to pressure Baghdad to increase its capacity and improve the bureaucracy. The Americans need to make sure that party bosses don’t take over the elections, and push for a closed list voting system. The U.S. needs to deal with Maliki’s attempt to centralize power, and corruption. In a nutshell, Pollack believes the U.S. is the only party in Iraq that will think about Iraq. The main lever of influence the U.S. has to achieve this laundry list of items is aid. U.S. advisors still partner with Iraqi units, the security forces are dependent upon the Americans for maintenance and supply, the Iraqi government has U.S. advisors throughout, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams are essential parts of the rebuilding provinces out in the governorates, and the U.S. still provides a large amount of economic aid and advice. All of this assistance needs to be made conditional based upon Baghdad’s compliance with the long list of reforms listed above. This is something many other American think tank writers have argued for over the last few years.

There is one major impediment to overcome to actually achieving this according to Pollack, Prime Minister Maliki. The Prime Minister seems to have an inflated sense of the capabilities of the Iraqi security forces and is playing politics with the U.S. presence. Maliki thinks that the Iraqi forces are going to be ready sooner rather than later so he wants to cut many of the public ties with the U.S. like joint patrols with U.S. forces and the blast walls in Baghdad. More importantly he is pushing for a referendum on the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) to coincide with the 2010 parliamentary vote. This will give Maliki a powerful tool to run on so he can portray himself as the leader that got the Americans to leave Iraq. He can also use it against his opposition since many support a longer stay for U.S. forces to protect against Maliki’s excesses. If the Iraqi public votes down the SOFA, a definite possibility, than Pollack is afraid U.S. influence will end that election day. A main priority then should be Washington lobbying Maliki to move the referendum to some other time.

Therein lies a major problem with Pollack and others who take this line of argument for a long-term U.S. role in Iraq. There is no real reason for Maliki to change the referendum date because holding it the same time as national balloting will benefit him the most. He has already given up many forms of American military assistance since the June 30, 2009 withdrawal from Iraq’s cities, and that is the greatest piece of leverage the U.S. holds. Iraqi domestic politics is a much greater force now than U.S. influence. The White House therefore, could make all kinds of assistance conditional, and the Iraqis might still not listen. Iraq may turn out to be the prodigal son for the United States, but Pollack and others can’t seem to let go. Ultimately, they seem afraid of Iraqis running their own affairs. Pollack in “The Battle for Baghdad” just happens to be the most explicit in voicing this opinion.

SOURCES

Biddle, Stephen, “Reversal in Iraq,” Center for Preventative Action Council on Foreign Relations, May 2009

Cordesman, Anthony, “Iraq: A Time To Stay?” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7/30/09

DPA, “Al-Maliki courts Iraqi Sunni tribal leaders,” 8/11/09

Nagl, John and Burton, Brian, “After the Fire: Shaping the Future U.S. Relationship with Iraq,” Center for a New American Security, June 2009

Nordland, Rod, “Bombs Hurt Maliki Case That Iraq Can Guard Itself,” New York Times, 8/21/09

Pollack, Kenneth, “The Battle for Baghdad,” The National Interest, September/October 2009