"Iraqi Volunteers, Iraqi Refugees: What is America's Obligation?"

I went to a House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia hearing yesterday concerning the plight of the millions of displaced Iraqis, both within and outside Iraq. The panelists testimonies covered a number of topics: personal stories of Iraqi civilians who have aided the U.S. and therefore are facing extreme danger; the millions of Iraqis living outside of the country and the humanitarian crisis in which they find themselves; the challenges lawmakers must confront in backing legislation that funds acceleration of the resettlement process; as well as the need for the U.S. to finally come to terms with the humanitarian catastrophe in Iraq and accept the moral responsibility of addressing it.

The first panel consisted of Ellen Sauerbrey, Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration. The second panel was made up of Major General Paul D. Eaton; George Packer, staff writer at The New Yorker; Kristele Younes, refugee advocate at Refugees International; and a former employee of the U.S. embassy in Baghdad who, for security purposes, had to go by the alias "Sarah."

The common theme of the hearing was that it has taken the Administration and lawmakers far too long to acknowledge and address the suffering of displaced Iraqis, especially those who have risked their lives by working with American and Coalition forces. Assistant Secretary Sauerbrey attempted to explain why admitting Iraqi refugees into the U.S. is such a lengthy process and why the Administration has not taken legislative or monetary steps to provide relief and safety for the 3.9 million displaced Iraqis. She explained that the Presidential determination for resettlement this year is 70,000 inclusive, and that 10% of that--or 7,000 spots--is designated for Iraqis. Representative Mike Pence of Indiana, suggested that 7,000 is UNHCR's capacity for processing refugees, not ours. He went on to state that there is a nonpartisan consensus that the problem should be addressed and that questions should be asked.

Chairman Gary L. Ackerman of New York agreed, stating that if lawmakers and the Administration were serious about processing Iraqi refugees it could be done. Sauerbrey argued that since 9/11, and the Immigration of Nationality Act, the process has gotten much longer for Homeland Security to conduct security clearances. Four to six months is the average length of time for someone to go through the process of asylum.

Many obstacles are facing Iraqis as they seek refuge. For example, there is no way of processing IDPs for resettlement; they must first leave Iraq under extremely dangerous conditions and then apply through UNHCR in a neighboring country. If someone has paid a ransom for a kidnapped family member, or paid off the insurgency for their own lives, the U.S. considers this "providing material support to terrorists"and the individuals will not be granted visas under the provisions of the PATRIOT and Real ID Acts. Iraqis who worked or are still working with the U.S. are not allowed housing in the Green Zone, and no protection is given to them. Only 500 Special Immigrant Visas are given a year, and only to direct hires of the government; this is not including the countless Iraqis who worked for contractors and subcontractors.

Major General Eaton explained that 70,000 Chinese and 80,000 Indian immigrants were accepted into the United States in 2006. He urged lawmakers to immediately identify Iraqis who have helped the U.S. and grant them asylum, regardless of quotas. George Packer argued that, "We cannot allow more Iraqis to die while we fine-tune refugee settlement." His first recommendation was to make in-country processing available, or at the very least, to ensure safe transfer to neighboring countries. Kristele Younes warned lawmakers that the problem stretches farther than Iraqis who have aided U.S. efforts; the millions living in Syria and Jordan, and those displaced within the country should not be forgotten. She urged an increase in funding for local Iraqi and International NGOs, as well as fully endorsing UNHCR recommendations.

"Sarah" relayed her personal story of working with the U.S. and being hopeful that she would be a part of the liberation and democratization of Iraq. She now lives in Jordan, unable to return to her home in Iraq. She did not receive protection while working for the CPA, and was eventually fired when her job was given to a Jordanian citizen. Today, "Sarah" lives in fear, with nowhere to go; she is considered by many of her countrymen to be a traitor and a spy. She said that she does not regret having worked with the Americans in Iraq, only that she trusted the U.S. government, but they never trusted Iraqis.

Real initiatives must be taken to address the plight of the 3.9 million displaced Iraqis. General Eaton asked that our government act with the dignity and respect that the Iraqi people deserve. Chairman Ackerman explained that:

If the world's only superpower cannot protect Iraqis from the danger we put them in, then we are facing a bigger problem than I thought.

He stated that there must be funding and legislation put forth to back the rhetoric of concern coming from the Administration.

Will Embedded PRTs Be Effective?

I went to an event on Wednesday at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) on Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and the role that the ten new PRTs will have in President Bush's accelerated plan for Iraqi self-reliance. The panel included Barbra Stephenson of the State Department, LTC Lynda Granfield who was head of the PRT in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, and Robert Perito, Senior Program Officer at USIP.

In the past, the primary purpose of PRTs in Iraq was to develop the economy and to build capacity at provincial and local levels. Most would agree that they were not very successful due to primarily a lack of oversight. All future PRT's will continue with the original goals, while at the same time taking on three new responsibilities: bolstering Iraqi moderates, building Iraqi self-reliance, and assembling the foundation for reconciliation. There are ten PRTs currently in Iraq. Six will be added in Baghdad, three in Anbar, and one in Babel, making up the newly formed Embedded PRTs. Each of the ten new groups will have four core people who will be trained in how to assess conflict and develop a joint civil and military unit. Their goal will be to shift conflict dynamics, allowing room for moderates to flourish.

The most important difference between the origional PRT model and the Embedded PRTs is that instead of it being lead and comprised of primarily military personnel, the team leader will be a State Department official and the deputy team leader will be a senior military commander. Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) will work alongside PRTs providing "security, life support and operations." In a soon to be published USIP report, the operational concept, command and control, and funding for Embedded PRTs is clearly outlined.

The role Iraqis will have is an important question that was raised. LTC Lynda Granfield explained her experience in Afghanistan, and the importance local civilians, military and police played in the success of her PRT in Jalalabad. She explained that the fundamental role of the PRT was to establish a link between the central government and the Provence. The possibility of success was greater if the local population saw their police and neighbors working with the PRT in projects that were being established. The panel argued that it would be difficult to engage Iraqi citizens in certain projects because of the uncertainty as to whether or not they were working for a militia or were connected with the insurgency. It seems to me it will be difficult to achieve the goal of building Iraqi self-reliance if Iraqis are not engaged alongside the PRTs.

The challenges that made previous PRTs ineffective will face the new ones as well. Questions of corruption, a lack of resources from the central government, low salaries, low levels of education, and high unemployment still persist. The panel gave insight into what PRTs are meant to accomplish, but questions of how these will differ in effectiveness from the models already seen were not answered. The speakers discussed implementing a higher level of training for staff before deployment, instead of the "volunteering and on-the job training" that was the norm for the original Iraqi PRTs. Acquiring staff with a better skill-set and better training is a smarter approach, but the March deployment date is fast approaching and one month of training might not make the difference in the success of Embedded PRTs.

Oversight of Iraq Relief & Reconstruction Programs

Yesterday I sat in on a State/Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee hearing on Iraq reconstruction oversight. Witnesses included Stuart Bowen, the Special Inspector General of Iraq Reconstruction; Donald Gambatesa, Inspector General of the USAID; and Howard J. Krongard, Inspector General for the State Department. The purpose of the hearing was to determine what after four years and $38 billion for Iraq relief and reconstruction, have we achieved?

First to testify was Stuart Bowen, of SIGIR. His testimony gave a relatively positive report on the success of reconstruction projects, but he said that Iraqis--and one must presume Americans as well--did not hear about the successes, only the failures. Here are some highlights of his statement before the committee:

"SIGIR investigations have produced five arrests and four convictions, with another 23 cases under prosecution at the Department of Justice...SIGIR advice and recommendations on policy have promoted economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the conduct of the US reconstruction program in Iraq and have served as a deterrent to malfeasance...SIGIR audit have saved or recovered $50 million and have identified the potential to recover and additional $106 million. SIGIR investigators have recovered or seized $9.5 million in assets and are working on the recovery of an additional $15 million...SIGIR inspectors also found that engineering improvements to oil pipelines could increase oil exports and potentially increase the volume of Iraqi oil revenues by more than $1 billion annually if the pipeline can be effectively secured...To date, approximately 70 percent of the 80 projects inspected on sight by SIGIR complied with contract specifications."

For more on the SIGIR reports be sure to read these postings. Giving his statement next was Donald Gambatesa, Inspector General for USAID. His statement briefly mentioned the relative success of five USAID program areas: agriculture (96% success), basic education (40% success), civil society/local governance (date unavailable due to lack of monitoring), electrical power (68% success), and water/sanitation rehabilitation (88% success). Gambatesa echoed Bowen in saying that security conditions impeded the inspection of many project sites.

Gambatesa was followed by Howard J. Krongard, Inspector General for the State Department. His statement was more prescriptive than descriptive, as he suggested a way to "ameliorate the foregoing difficulties" of inspection and oversight (i.e. lack of security for inspector general personnel) by establishing a Middle East Regional Office "to provide oversight for crisis and post-conflict State Department programs in Iraq and elsewhere in the region."

Another interesting bit of the hearing came when Ranking Member Wolf suggested the creation of a "decider" position for all things reconstruction-related in Iraq, à la General MacArthur in post-WWII Japan.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were a recurrent topic since they are a critical part of Bush's New Strategy in Iraq. Chairwoman Lowey asked the Inspector Generals about the feasibility and efficacy of sending largely civilian PRTs into Iraq. Bowen responded that security was a problem for all 9 (mostly military) PRTs in Iraq at the time of his last quarterly audit. Although several efficacy audits of PRT efforts are currently underway and therefore there is no hard data to draw from, Bowen made it a point to mention the crucial role PRTs play in training local officials in democratic practices.

New Displacement Task Force

According to a press release put out yesterday, the State Department has established the Iraq Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons Task Force. Its purpose is to coordinate refugee and IDP assistance to the region and refugees resettlement. It will also "devise strategies for Iraqis at risk because of their work with the U.S. Government." This comes on the heels of a recent Senate hearing on the refugee crisis during which two Iraqis employed by the coalition testified to how difficult it is to gain entry into the United States despite having risked their lives for the coalition effort.

According to the United Nations, about two million Iraqis, some eight per cent of the pre-war population, have fled the country to escape the war and mounting sectarian violence. Of those, only 466 have been allowed entry into the United States. The task force will be headed by Under Secretary of State for Democracy and Global Affairs Paula Dobriansky.

Though this is certainly a welcome sign, the creation of this task force still cannot make up for the fact that President Bush has not said a word about the displacement crisis. We can only hope that this task force is not merely a token gesture and actually does something about the growing displacement crisis in Iraq.

Iran's Diplomatic Overture

An interesting story on negotiations with Iraq has been making the rounds today and though the story itself first broke a while ago, I thought it would be good to review the story as quite few people (BBC news even!) missed it the first time round.

In the Spring of 2003, Iran sent the U.S. State Department a two-page fax outlining a proposal for a broad dialog between the two countries. The letter, a copy of which I've made available here, implied that everything was on the table, including full cooperation on nuclear programs, acceptance of Israel, termination of support to Palestinian militant groups and "coordination of Iranian influence for activity supporting political stabilization and the establishment of democratic institutions and a nonreligious government."

While State Department officials seriously considered the offer, ultimately the administration decided to reject it. The administration believed that the Iranian government weak and preferred a policy of regime change to diplomacy.

This was obviously quite the opportunity and such a promising overture from Iran is quite unlikely to be repeated today. The fax was sent after the capture of Baghdad when everything appeared to be going right in Iraq for the U.S. and Iran did not yet have a functioning nuclear program nor the level of oil revenues it enjoys today. As a member of the administration's "axis of evil," Iran was sincerely frightened by the prospect of facing a force that had in three weeks routed an army that Iran failed to defeat in 8 years.

Today, Iran has the upper-hand. As I mentioned in an earlier post: its influence in the region continues to grow, the majority population of Iraq (Shia) have a close connection with Iran giving it considerable power within Iraq, its nuclear enrichment program continues undeterred and its President is certain that the 12th Imam will soon return- "a certitude that leaves little room for compromise" as Scott Peterson of the Christian Science Monitor explains.

Furthermore, as Trita Parsi, a Middle East expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, explains, the incident "strengthened the hands of those in Iran who believe the only way to compel the United States to talk or deal with Iran is not by sending peace offers but by being a nuisance."