Early Reports On Iran’s Activities In Iraq

One of the first reports that Iran was taking an anti-American stance in Iraq came from a UPI. It quoted a U.S. intelligence source that said in March 2003 Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamanei, President Mohammad Khatami, and others met to decide Tehran’s policy in the wake of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. They decided to make the U.S. pay a price for invading Iraq. Tehran set about implementing this decision through several means.

On the military side Iran sent in agents, friendly Iraqis, and Hezbollah into several Iraqi cities including Baghdad, Najaf, Karbala, Basra, and Kirkuk to organize against the Americans. 1000s of fighters from the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s (SIIC) militia the Badr Brigade flowed into Iraq after the invasion. At the time, Badr was a formal arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, and was also supervised by Iranian intelligence. Later in 2003 there were reports that Hezbollah operatives were also dispatched to Iraq to help as well.

On the political front, Iran made agreements with the Kurds and facilitated negotiations between them and the SIIC. First, Iran and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) agreed upon a non-aggression pact. There were also a series of meetings in the fall of 2001 between the Badr Brigade and KDP and PUK leaders to discuss how to deal with the United States and a post-Saddam Iraq. Iranian intelligence was involved in many of these meetings.

After the invasion, Iran also tried to rally Iraq’s Shiite clerics against the Americans. In late April 2003 Iraqi born, but Iranian based Ayatollah Kadhem al-Haeri issued a fatwa calling on Shiite imams to fill the power vacuum left by the fall of the old regime by taking over administration of Iraq’s cities. Al-Haeri also said clerics needed to oppose the United States. There were several examples of this. In the city of Kut in Wasit province for example, the SIIC took over the city hall and a local cleric Sayed Abbas Fadhil claimed to control the city. His followers staged two protests against the American presence there, and there were several drive-by shooting on U.S. troops as well. Jay Garner, the head of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs, who was the civilian administrator of Iraq at the time, said the events in Kut were all examples of Iran trying to interfere in Iraq.

These early reports show the different sides of Iran’s policy towards Iraq. Not only was it going to use military means to undermine the American presence, but it was also using its extensive contacts with the Iraqi opposition, many of whom had been based in Iran during the Saddam years, and religious ties to Iraq’s clerics to get a foothold in Iraq’s new political order.

For more on Iran’s policy towards Iraq see:

Overview of Iran’s Influence In Iraq

Combating Terrorism Center’s Report On Iran’s Role In Iraq

SOURCES

Ayman, Dr. Hashemi, “A detailed and dangerous report about the Iranian role in the destruction of Iraq,” Homeland Security US.net, 3/19/06

Elkhamri, Mounir, “Iran’s Contribution to the Civil War in Iraq,” Jamestown Foundation, January 2007

Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08

Phillips, James, “Deter Iranian and Syrian Meddling In Postwar Iraq,” Heritage Foundation, 4/4/03

Pound, Edward, “The Iran Connection,” U.S. News & World Report, 11/22/04

Risen, James, “A Region Inflamed: The Hand Of Tehran: Hezbollah, in Iraq, Refrains From Attacks on Americans,” New York Times, 11/24/03

Smith, Craig, “Iraqi in Iran urges Shiites to take power,” San Francisco Chronicle, 4/26/03

Strauss, Valerie, “Pentagon: Ex-Iraqi Leader Aziz Is in Custody,” Washington Post, 4/24/03

Tanter, Raymond, “Iran’s Threat to Coalition Forces in Iraq,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1/15/04

New Challenges To Sadr’s Leadership

Moqtada al-Sadr’s movement has faced an increasing number of splits. After his August 2004 uprising some of his militia commanders began leaving the fold. Many of these went on to form Special Groups. One was Qais Khazali who created Asaib Ahl al-Haq, the League of the Righteous. He moved in and out of the Sadr Trend, but eventually turned to Iran and Hezbollah for aid, and was arrested by the Americans in March 2007. Within days Khazali’s followers responded by kidnapping five Britons. London is now in negotiations to release them in return for Khazali’s freedom. At the same time, moderate members of the Sadr movement have left and formed a new group because they fear leaders like Khazali are undermining their good work. This will add new challengers to Sadr’s leadership.

Qais Khazali was a student of Moqtada’s father Mohammed Sadeq al-Sadr. When he was assassinated by Saddam in 1999, Qais and a small group of other followers kept the movement alive by going underground. When Moqtada took over the group in April 2003 Khazali became one of his main supporters. After the second Sadr uprising that ended in September 2004 with a cease-fire, Khazali went back to Sadr City in Baghdad and continued attacking the American forces. By October 2004 Khazali had created his own independent group that would later be known as Asaib Ahl al-Haq, League of the Righteous. By March 2005 Khazali had been convinced to rejoin the Sadr movement, but he still carried out his own activities as well. In June 2006 Khazali left again, and was chosen to lead the Special Groups, the breakaway militia groups that had become disillusioned with Sadr and were receiving increasing funding and weapons from Iran. Many of these fighters began traveling to Iran for training and also received aid from Hezbollah. Those activities were coordinated through Hezbollah commander Ali Musa Daqduq who was operating in Iraq. On January 20, 2007 Asaib Ahl al-Haq carried out their most brazen attack when they raided a command center in Karbala dressed as U.S. soldiers, and killed five Americans and wounded three others. That eventually led to Khazali, his brother Laith, and Daqduq’s arrest on March 20. Akram al-Kabi took over the leadership of Asaib Ahl al-Haq.

In response to the capture of Khazali, Asaib Ahl al-Haq raided the Finance Ministry building in Baghdad on March 29. They kidnapped Peter Moore, a British computer consultant who was working for a U.S. company Bearing Point that was providing financial training to the Iraqi government. Moore’s two guards, and two others were taken as well. They worked for the Canadian security company Garda World. Two of them were Scottish, and the other two were from Wales. The British Foreign Ministry has been trying to negotiate their release ever since.

With the English stepping up their withdrawal from southern Iraq, pressure is increasing to gain Moore’s release. That began at the beginning of March 2009 when the British announced that they were opening ties with Hezbollah. The Lebanese group is acting as middleman between the British and Asaib Ahl al-Haq. Later in the month the Iraqi group sent a video of Moore to the British Embassy in Baghdad. It was shown on TV, which is supposedly part of the deal to release the hostages. Next ten members of Asaib Ahl al-Haq, including Laith Khazali are to be released for one of the British security guards. If that is successful more will follow with the final trade being Peter Moore for Ali Musa Daqduq and Qais Khazali.

If the Khazali brothers are released it could re-invigorate Asaib Ahl al-Haq, and complicate Sadr’s leadership. Khazali claims that he is the rightful heir to the elder Sadr’s movement. While they have been solely a military group committed to attacking the Coalition forces, in February 2009 they announced that they wanted to run in the parliamentary elections planned for December. Asaib Ahl al-Haq have said they want an Iranian style religious state. A move towards politics could be encouraged by Baghdad, as the government has been giving amnesty to some Special Group members in return for them giving up their weapons. Sadr is aware of this challenge, and has asked Special Group members to return to his group, but he hasn’t been successful.

Of more immediate concern to Sadr is the defection of moderate members of the Sadrist Trend. On March 21, 2009 a group of former Sadrists met in Baghdad to announce a new group, the Clerics Advisory, Shura al-Ullama. They claim to have 200 followers. The group has been formed because they fear that the Sadr movement is being taken over by militants backed by Iran. Shura al-Ullama will run social programs like the original Sadr movement, and is also hoping to set up offices across the country to run in the parliamentary elections. The government supports this group as well. The head of Iraq’s Reconciliation Committee Zuhair Chalabi attended their opening meeting.

As reported before, Sadr has faced a series of defections over the years. Many militia members have left his group, while others have been rounded up after the government’s crackdown in 2008. In June of that year he disbanded his Mahdi Army, and formed a new organization, Mumahidoon, Those Who Pave The Way, which is an unarmed, cultural and religious group. In the January 2009 provincial elections, he backed two independent lists to mixed results. He lost control of Maysan and reportedly Sadr City, but gained seats in more provinces than he did in the last vote in 2005. Now he is facing more problems. Khazali is a rival for the loyalty of many militia members who are dissatisfied with Sadr’s move away from armed struggle. The Clerics Advisory could draw away those more moderate members who are opposed to continuing fighting. Either way it could be another break for an already fractious movement.


SOURCES

Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Anti-US Iraqi cleric facing leadership challenge,” Associated Press, 2/20/09
- “Report: Deal close to free Britons seized in Iraq,” Associated Press, 3/29/09

Chon, Gina, “Iraq Hopes Grow on Split in Sadr Body, Amnesties,” Wall Street Journal, 3/30/09

Chulov, Martin, “UK begins Iraq farewell by saying: so long, and thanks for the fish,” Guardian, 3/30/09

Cochrane, Marisa, “Asaib Ahl al-Haq and the Khazali Special Groups network,” Institute for the Study of War,” 1/13/08
- “The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement,” Institute for the Study of War, January 2009

Colvin, Marie, “Families told release of UK hostages not a done deal,” Times of London, 3/29/09

Haynes, Deborah, “Peter Moore footage keeps hope alive for five ‘forgotten’ hostages,” Times of London, 3/23/09

Al-Kaabi, Qassim, “Inside Al-Sadr’s Al-Mumahhidun Project,” Asharq Alawsat, 1/8/09

Landler, Mark, “Britain’s Contacts With Hezbollah Vex U.S.,” New York Times, 3/13/09

Rubin, Alissa and Dagher, Sam, “Sadr, Insurgency Icon, Is Silent, but Backers Work Behind Scenes,” New York Times, 1/31/09

Iran Tried To Trade Security In Basra For Nuclear Program

At the end of February 2009 the BBC is going to air a program “Iran and the West: Nuclear confrontation.” In the show they interview Sir John Sawers, the British ambassador to the U.N. He claims that Iran sent messages to England that they would help improve security and political stability in Basra in return for allowing Tehran to work on its nuclear program. At the time the Iranians were deeply involved in supporting a variety of Shiite militias in the city that were attacking British troops.

Beginning in late 2003 Iran began negotiating with Britain, France, and Germany over its nuclear program. The talks did not go well with Iran refusing to back off. At one point, the Iranians did offer a deal. According to Ambassador Sawers, the Iranians left several messages for the three European countries that involved Basra. Tehran said they would stop attacks on British troops in the city as well as halt undermining the Iraqi political system in return for Britain, France, and Germany accepting Iran’s nuclear program. The Iranians were intent on continuing work on their project. Sawers said the British did not accept the offer.

The Iranians started exerting influence over Basra immediately after the U.S. invasion. In March 2003 Iran’s leaders President Mohammad Khatami and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamanei decided that they would deploy the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s Badr Brigade to several Iraqi cities after the U.S. attack including Basra. At the time the militia was a formal part of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Qods Force, and received up to $20 million a year in funding from them. The Qods Force also used front groups like the Iranian Red Crescent to infiltrate Basra.

Eventually Tehran began supporting a wide variety of Shiite militias in Basra to carry out attacks on the British. In 2005 they were supplying Iraqi militias with the Explosively Formed Projectile (EFPs) roadside bombs that were used against the English forces. Iran also offered $300 a month to anyone that would carry out attacks on the British. In October 2005 the British said that they captured a Mahdi Army commander who admitted to using EFPs, and blamed Iran and Lebanon’s Hezbollah for supplying them. Basra also became a major transit point for the Qods Force to ship weapons to militias they supported throughout southern Iraq. By mid-2007 the U.S. and British claimed that these supplies had increased with larger caliber rockets being provided to militias. Earlier in March 2007 breakaway militia commander Qais Khazali, his brother Laith, and Hezbollah commander Ali Mussa Daqduq were arrested in Basra. Qais Khazali had once been one of the leaders of the Sadrist movement, helping keep it alive during the Saddam era. In 2004 however he broke away to form his own group, and was eventually named the leader of what became known as the Special Groups by Iran. Daqduq was sent to Iraq to coordinate Hezbollah’s work with the Qods Force.

While the British were focused upon Iran’s military policy in Basra, Tehran also began increasing economic ties. In July 2005 the two countries signed an export deal to ship 150,000 barrels of Iraqi oil per day to Iran for refining. Basra also imported electricity from Iran. Iranian products flooded the Basra market. England’s Guardian reported that Iran was using friendly militias to intimidate local merchants to buy Iranian goods. A free trade zone between Basra and Iran also facilitated this trade. Iran became so influential that many stores in Barsa had signs in Persian, and Iranian money was accepted.

Iran was willing to give up their support for the Badr Brigade, the Mahdi Army, Special Groups, and the Thar Allah militias in return for England’s acquiescence in Tehran’s pursuit of its nuclear program. When Britain turned them down was not mentioned in the press reports, but Iran’s strong military influence was finally curtailed when Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki launched his offensive in Basra in March 2008. During the fighting General Petraeus claimed that Iranians were helping the Sadrists with tactical operations. Tehran’s goal has always been political influence within Iraq however, so they helped negotiate the cease-fire to end the conflict. In the aftermath several Mahdi Army commanders were captured that detailed the training Iran offered to militiamen. New Iranian weapons with 2008 production dates were also found in the city, and a Hezbollah operative was captured there. Iran was dealt a setback in Basra, but its economic power remains, and it showed its political importance when it helped end the fighting.

Ambassador Sawers’ revelation shows the role Iraq plays in Iran’s foreign policy. Before Saddam Hussein was Iran’s greatest rival and threat. After the U.S. invasion, Iraq became a great opportunity for Tehran. They could increase their political, economic and cultural influence in Iraq, while using it as a tool in its dealing with the West. Supporting Shiite militias was not only a way to exert power in Iraq, but also a means to hold down American troops as Iran feared that the Bush administration might attack them. The offer to England also showed that Iran’s military policy was always subject to its political needs. Whether Iran will continue to play such a role in the future is a big question as Iraqi nationalism is now re-emerging.

SOURCES

Abdul-Ahad, Ghaith, “’Welcolme to Tehran’ – how Iran took control of Basra,” Guardian, 5/19/07

Allam, Hannah, Landay, Jonathan, and Strobel, Warren, “Is an Iranian general the most powerful man in Iraq?” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/28/08

Alsumaria, “Militias and neighbors loot Iraqi South Oil,” 2/9/08

Baxter, Sarah and Colvin, Marie, “Iran joined militias in battle for Basra,” Sunday Times of London, 4/6/08

BBC, “Iran ‘behind attacks on British,’” 10/5/05

Beehner, Lionel, “IRAN: Nuclear Negotiations,” Council on Foreign Relations, 5/16/05

Beehner, Lionel, Bruno, Greg, “Iran’s Involvement in Iraq,” Council on Foreign Relations, 3/3/08

Borger, Julian, “Iran offered to end attacks on British troops in Iraq, claims diplomat,” Guardian, 2/20/09

Cochrane, Marisa, “The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement,” Institute for the Study of War, January 2009

Dreazen, Yochi, “U.S. Weighs Messages From Iran,” Wall Street Journal, 4/29/08

Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08

Glanz, James and Rubin, Alissa, “U.S. and Iran Find Common Ground in Iraq’s Shiite Conflict,” New York Times, 4/21/08

Hendawi, Hamza and Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Hezbollah said to train Shiite militiamen in Iraq,” Associated Press, 7/1/08

Kagan, Kimberly, “Iran’s Proxy War against the United States and the Iraqi Government,” Institute for the Study of War, 8/20/07

Katzman, Kenneth, “Iran’s Activities and Influence in Iraq,” Congressional Research Service, 12/26/07

Mazzetti, Mark, Myers, Steven Lee and Shanker, Thom, “Questions Linger on Scope of Iran’s Threat in Iraq,” New York Times, 4/26/08

Norton-Taylor, Richard, “British troops to stay in Basra ‘for the long term,’” Guardian, 5/2/08

Oliver, Christian, “Iran and Iraq look to heal old wounds with oil deal,” Reuters, 7/19/05

Overhaus, Marco, “European diplomacy and Iran’s nuclear programme,” EuroActiv.com, 7/27/07

Partlow, Joshua, “Iraq and Iran: the ties that bind,” Seattle Times, 1/27/07

PBS Newhour, “Iran’s Role in Iraq, Nuclear Ambitions Cloud U.S. Policy,” 4/16/08

Pearson, Bryan, “Clear Iranian role in Baghdad violence: military,” Agence France Presse, 4/27/08

Phillips, James, “Deter Iranian and Syrian Meddling In Postwar Iraq,” Heritage Foundation, 4/4/03

Rayment, Sean, “Iran ‘paid Iraq insurgents to kill UK soldiers,” Telegraph, 5/25/08

Rubin, Alissa and Gordon, Michael, “Iraq Team to Discuss Militias With Iran,” New York Times, 5/1/08

Susman, Tina, “Iraq jumps into U.S.-Iran tussle,” Los Angeles Times, 4/29/08

Tanter, Raymond, “Iran’s Threat to Coalition Forces in Iraq,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1/15/04

White, Jeffrey, “Fighting Iran in Iraq,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2/14/07

Wong, Edward, “Iran Is Playing a Growing Role in Iraq Economy,” New York Times, 3/17/07

Wright, Robin, “Iranian Flow Of Weapons Increasing, Officials Say,” Washington Post, 6/3/07

Combating Terrorism Center Report On Iranian Training of Shiite Militants

Claims that Iran is training Shiite militants in Iraq are common. The last occurred in August and September 2008. In that first month, a U.S. intelligence official told the Associated Press that the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Qods Force and Lebanon’s Hezbollah were training Iraqis to carry out attacks. London's Asharq Alawsat also interviewed a former Iranian official who said that Iran and Hezbollah were assisting Iraqis in Basra, Amarah in Maysan province, Najaf, and Baghdad before the government’s crackdown on the Sadrists in March 2008. Towards the end of August, Abu Dhabi's The National interviewed two Mahdi Army fighters who said they went to Lebanon for training by Hezbollah. Finally, in September, the head of the provincial police in Dhi Qar warned that Iranian backed Special Groups were infiltrating from Iran in small groups to renew violence in Iraq. These were all similar to previous stories of their kind. In October the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point released a paper analyzing Iran’s role in Iraq from the time of the Iranian Revolution to the present. Part of the report documented the training regime that Tehran created for Iraqis. It was based upon dozens of interrogations of captured militiamen who had gone through the process. One major finding was that the Iraqis accepted the Iranians’ help as a marriage of convenience rather than for ideological reasons as they generally disliked the Persians and their religious doctrine. Second, the goal of the Iranians was to influence Iraqi politics and expel the Americans.

Tehran supports various Shiite groups within Iraq. Before the U.S. invasion, they helped form the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) in Iran in the 1980s. Its Badr Brigade was created by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and was an official wing of its Qods Force. Many members of the Dawa Party were also in exile in Iran and received aid. Both groups received training from Hezbollah as well. They all shared a common hatred of Saddam Hussein, and Iran maintains strong contacts with all of them now that they are the ruling parties in Iraq. Shortly after the U.S. invasion in 2003, Iran also began reaching out to Moqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army. He proved too temperamental, so Iran began moving towards local militia leaders and Sadrist splinter groups that became known as Special Groups.

For militants that were interested, they could travel to Iran for military training. There, Tehran set up various levels of instruction. It was general knowledge amongst militiamen that these opportunities existed for them. Most trainees came from the cities of Najaf, Nasiriyah, Kut, Amarah, Basra, areas of Diyala province, and Sadr City in Baghdad. Iran demanded that all who came had to read and write. One major route to Iran was through Amarah in Maysan province. Iraqis could cross the border either legally or illegally. Once across, they met Iranians who took them to Ahvez or Kermansah where they would stay in safe houses. They would then travel to Tehran by plane with tickets provided by the Qods Force. Once in the capital, they stayed in apartments where their initial training would begin. They would then move to training camps outside of Tehran run by Iranian soldiers. There were four places where this would occur, Ahvaz, Elam, Qom, and Tehran. Afterwards they would travel back to Iraq through the same route.

In terms of the actual training there were three levels from basic to advanced. The basic training took up to 20 days on average, and consisted of work with small arms, mortars, and IEDs. The second level was Special Forces training, which lasted over 30 days. This could happen in both Iran and Lebanon, and consisted of more advanced weapons training. The highest-level was for Iraqis with leadership potential. This did not start until 2007. Iraqis were taught how to plan and carry out attacks, organize units, keep track of weapons, etc. This option was only offered to Iraqis who had already been to Iran once before. The Iranians were also very selective in who they picked. Another option increasingly used was to create Iraqis capable of training others inside of Iraq rather than have them travel to Iran. This allowed for a level of deniability.

Hezbollah also offered assistance. The Lebanese group had been connected to some Iraqis for years. In the 1980s for example, they assisted the Dawa Party in carrying out a terrorist attack on the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait. Hezbollah’s training occurred in both Iran and Lebanon. Many Iraqis went to Iran first, and then headed to Syria, and then Lebanon, but there were also examples of going directly there. Hezbollah offered three to four week courses. Besides weapons classes there was also intelligence training. According to interrogations, the Iraqis preferred the Lebanese far more because they were Arabs and treated them much better than the Iranians. There were also Hezbollah operatives working inside Iraq who were under the leadership of Ali Musa Daqduq until his capture in 2007. He received up to $3 million a month from the Qods Force to organize Iraqis.

Overall, the most significant finding of the Combating Terrorism Center report was the fact that this was a marriage of convenience between the two sides. Iran provided religious training to the Iraqis, which was generally rejected. The Sadrists especially felt that the Iranians were trying to sway them to their leadership. More importantly, many Iraqis also felt like the Iranians treated them with little respect. The Iranians too were aware of this divide. The Iraqis only went to get training, not because they believed in Iranian ideology, which they considered foreign.

The Iranians were also using the Iraqis. They wanted the Mahdi Army and Special Groups to undermine the U.S., and force them to leave because the American presence was seen as a direct threat to Tehran. The Iranians would also raise and lower the amount of supplies given to the Iraqis at important times to shape events there. In the run up to the 2005 provincial and national elections for example, Iran tried to temper attacks by Shiites, and pressured Moqtada al-Sadr to end his uprising so that the voting could take place. This allowed Iraq’s political allies the SIIC and Dawa to come to power. The violence Tehran helped create also made Iraq’s government turn to Tehran to mediate and stop it. This happened during the fighting in Basra and Sadr City earlier this year. This military policy, also misdirected the U.S. who focused upon cracking down on Shiite militiamen, and the Iranian networks that supported them rather than Iran’s political allies who ran much of the government. Overall, the Combating Terrorism Center paper believes that Iran’s main goal is not to control Iraq, but to have influence there so that whatever happens, they can benefit. Backing Iraqi militants is only one part of this stance, aimed at supporting its larger political policy of making sure friendly Iraqis are in the government. Tehran has largely been successful in achieving these goals.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iran-trained Shiite Iraqis returning to launch bombings: police,” 9/20/08

Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08

Hess, Pamela, “Hit squads training in Iraq,” Associated Press, 8/15/08

The National, “Hizbollah training us: Mahdi Army,” 8/23/08

Nourizadeh, Ali, “Iran’s Revolutionary Guard to Train Iraqi Shiite Youths,” Asharq Alawsat, 8/19/08