Showing posts with label British. Show all posts
Showing posts with label British. Show all posts

Sunday, January 03, 2010

Iranians Planned Kidnapping And Held British Captives Taken In Iraq

On December 30, 2009 British computer technician Peter Moore was released from captivity by the Iranian backed League of the Righteous in return for the freeing of their leader, Qais Khazali. Moore and four British bodyguards, Alan McMenemy, Alec MacLachlan, Jason Swindlehurst, and Jason Creswell, were originally kidnapped from the Iraqi Finance Ministry building in downtown Baghdad on May 29, 2007. The Guardian claims that not only was this an Iranian organized operation led by their Revolutionary Guards Qods Force, but that the British hostages were held in Iran for most of their two and a half year captivity.

The events surrounding the kidnapping are a complicated one beginning with a series of American raids against Iranian operatives working within Iraq. In 2006, President George Bush okayed the killing and capturing of Iranians in Iraq who were supplying weapons and training to Shiite militias. In December 2006 that led to the arrest of General Mohsen Chirazi, the number 3 man in the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Qods Force, which is in charge of Tehran’s Iraq policy. That was followed by a speech by President Bush in January 2007 where he said that the U.S. would stop Iran’s interference in Iraqi affairs. Later, on January 11, five Iranians were arrested in Irbil, Kurdistan. The Americans actually missed their targets, Mohammed Jafari, the deputy of Iran’s National Security Council, and General Minojahar Frouzanda, the intelligence chief of the Revolutionary Guards, when Kurdish peshmerga stopped U.S. forces at the Irbil airport. Tehran retaliated by leading a raid on the Karbala Provincial Joint Coordination Center in conjunction with the League of the Righteous that led to the deaths of five U.S. soldiers in January. In March 2007, U.S. and U.K. forces detained the League’s leaders Qais and Latih Khazali in Basra in March 2007.

Qais Khazali was one of the leading figures in the Sadr movement when Moqtada’s father, Ayatollah Mohammed Sadeq al-Sadr, created it in the 1990s. Qais helped keep the movement alive underground after Saddam killed the elder Sadr. When Moqtada emerged as one of Iraq’s new leaders after the 2003 invasion, Qais was one of his top lieutenants. He would split and then rejoin Moqtada several times before creating his own group, the League of the Righteous in 2006. That year he was also selected to lead the Special Groups that Iran was creating to gain more direct control of Shiite gunmen in Iraq.

Iran planned the May 2007 raid on the Finance Ministry as part of the tit for tat exchange with the United Sates, while the League of the Righteous wanted hostages to gain the release of the Khazali brothers. 80-100 members of the League drove up to the Ministry’s buildings in SUVs in Baghdad, and kidnapped the five Britons in just about 15 minutes. Iraqi intelligence officers from the Defense Ministry who happened to be in the Ministry at the time told the Guardian that they followed the kidnappers to Sadr City where the captives were kept for one day before being transferred to Iran. They passed this information to the Defense Ministry who did nothing. In Iran, the Britons were moved around to several locations. General David Petraeus confirmed this in a recent interview with the BBC where he said he was 90% sure that Tehran held the captives for a time. All negotiations for the release of the hostages occurred in Qom, Iran, but the British Foreign Office refused to directly talk with them, which greatly complicated things.

Almost two years later, Iraq, England, the U.S., Iran, and the League worked out a release plan with Lebanon’s Hezbollah acting as a middleman. In March 2009 a deal was cut whereby the Americans would release all of the League of the Righteous members they held including Laith and Qais Khazali in return for the British captives. In that month a video was released of Moore, followed by the freeing of Laith Khazali. After that U.S. prisons were emptied of some 300 League followers they held under the guise of an Iraqi reconciliation program, along with some of the top Qods Force members that were arrested in 2006-2007, in return for the bodies of Jason Creswell, Jason Swindlehurst, and Alec MacLachlan. Alan McMenemy has yet to be released, but it’s believed that he is dead as well. Sources told the Guardian that the Iranians killed all four bodyguards because for one, they were not considered important since they were only security men, and two to show that they were serious to the British government. The process finally ended with the release of Peter Moore and Qais Khazali. Some American military officers were against this deal, but the Status of Forces Agreement signed between Washington and Baghdad at the very end of the Bush administration in December 2008 requires the U.S. to release all the detainees they hold unless they have broken Iraqi law.

The kidnapping and release of Moore, MacLachlan, Swindlehurst, Creswell, and McMenemy mark the end of one period of post-Saddam Iraq. Washington and Tehran were involved in a covert war for influence within Iraq after the 2003 invasion. The U.S. focused upon Iran’s Qods Force and their support for Special Groups like the League of the Righteous. The U.S. tried to kill or capture as many militiamen and Qods Force operatives as they could, but interference by Iraqi officials meant that this effort could only go so far. The smashing of Shiite militias by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s offensives in 2008, along with Iran’s greater interest in political influence through support of Shiite parties in the 2009 and coming 2010 elections, means that their military policy has been put on the back burner. The League even renounced violence in 2009, and briefly flirted with running in the upcoming vote, before withdrawing in early December. What that means for the League is unknown. Qais Khazali is said to still have sway with many Sadrists, which has made Moqtada very worried about his leadership, but its too late for them to run as a party in 2010, which would greatly limit their influence if they wished to join Iraqi politics. There’s a good chance that the League will fade from the scene just as the military confrontation between Iran and the U.S. in Iraq has.

SOURCES

Chulov, Martin, “Shia cleric’s release by US forces provided key to Peter Moore’s freedom,” Guardian, 12/30/09

CNN, “U.S. raid on Iranian consulate angers Kurds,” 1/11/07

Cochrane, Marisa, “The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement,” Institute for the Study of War, January 2009

Cockburn, Patrick, “The botched US raid that led to the hostage crisis,” The Independent, 4/3/07

Fordham, Alice, “Hostage Peter Moore’s fate tied to that of Laith and Qais al-Khazali,” Times of London, 12/31/09
- “Peter Moore freed after US hands over Iraqi insurgent,” Times of London, 12/31/09

Hines, Nico, “Peter Moore: 31 months of Iraqi captivity,” Times of London, 12/30/09

Lake, Eli, “GIs Raid Iranian Building in Irbil,” New York Sun, 1/12/07

Linzer, Dafna, “Troops Authorized to Kill Iranian Operatives in Iraq,” Washington Post, 1/26/07

Mahmood, Mona, O’Kane, Maggie, Grandjean, Guy, “Bush threats and an $18bn secret: why Iran’s kidnap squad struck,” Guardian, 12/31/09

Roggio, Bill, “US releases ‘dangerous’ Iranian proxy behind the murder of US troops,” Long War Journal, 12/31/09

Woodcock, Andrew and Johnson, Wesley, “Petraeus ‘90% certain’ that UK hostage was in Iran,” Independent, 12/31/09

Wright, Robin and Trejos, Nancy, “U.S. Troops Raid 2 Iranian Targets in Iraq, Detain 5 People,” Washington Post, 1/12/07

Thursday, December 03, 2009

Former British Diplomat Confirms That U.N. Inspectors Were Means To War With Iraq

On November 24, 2009 England began its third inquiry into the Iraq War, this time headed by John Chilcot. On November 26 Britain’s former ambassador to the United States Christopher Meyer testified. He confirmed what has been reported here before, that the Bush White House had decided upon war before the United Nations weapons inspectors returned to Iraq in November 2002. He told the inquiry, “The U.S. military timetable was already in place before weapons inspectors went in.” Meyer said the original invasion date had been set for January 2003, but was pushed back to March. He believed that the inspectors had no time to complete their work by that date, and instead the U.S. and England turned the process into a means to find evidence of Iraq’s WMD to provide a “smoking gun” to justify the war. Meyer told the inquiry, “It was another way of saying, ‘It’s not that Saddam Hussein has to prove he’s innocent, we’ve now got to bloody well prove he’s guilty.’ And we – Americans and British – have never really recovered from that because of course there was no smoking gun.” England’s former ambassador to the United Nations Sir Jeremy Greenstock agreed that the inspectors never had the time to do their job because the drive for an invasion was so strong in Washington.

Britain’s Prime Minister Tony Blair had been the original impetus to go to the United Nations and have weapons inspectors return to build support for an invasion. On March 12 and 13, 2002 Blair’s political adviser David Manning met with National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice in Washington where he suggested that inspectors be sent back into Iraq to build a legal base for war, and convince the international community of the U.S. and British’s case against Saddam because it was expected that he would refuse to give them unlimited access to his country. Later, on March 17, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz had lunch with Ambassador Meyer, where he suggested that inspections would be a way to trip up Saddam over WMD, and help justify regime change. In April President Bush met with Blair in Texas, where the Prime Minister again emphasized the need to go the U.N. route if the U.S. wanted British support. Bush finally agreed after Secretary of State Colin Powell lobbied him on the same point during dinner on August 5, 2002.

U.N. Resolution 1441 was eventually passed on November 8, 2002 and weapons inspectors entered Iraq shortly afterward. The U.S. and England saw them as a means to provide a justification for overthrowing Saddam however, rather than a way to disarm Iraq. When the inspectors found breaches of 1441 but no “smoking gun” Bush went ahead with the war anyway as planned in March 2003.

For more on the U.N. inspections see:

The U.N. Inspectors Were Right: Iraq Was Not A Threat


Charles Duelfer’s Account Of The End Of The 1990s U.N. Inspections

How The Administration Reversed Itself On Finding Iraq’s WMD

Interview With VP Dick Cheney On Weapons Inspections March 2003

2002 CIA White Paper On Iraq Vs The 2002-2003 U.N. Inspectors

SOURCES

Brown, David, “Invasion lacked legitimacy, Sir Jeremy Greenstock tells Chilcot inquiry,” Times of London, 11/28/09

Manning, David, “SECRET – STRICTLY PERSONAL,” 3/14/02

Marsden, Sam and Cordon, Gavin, “Iraq invasion was of questionable legitimacy, says envoy,” The Independent, 11/27/09

Melkle, James and Sparrow, Andrew, “Iraq war build-up ‘left us scrabbling for smoking gun’ says ex-UK ambassador,” Guardian, 11/26/09

Meyer, Ambassador Christopher, “CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL,” British Embassy, Washington, 3/18/02

Burrough, Bryan, Peretz, Evgenia, Rose, David and Wise, David, “Path To War,” Vanity Fair, May 2004

RTT News, “British Investigation Into Iraq War Begins,” 11/24/09

Sparrow, Andrew, “Iraq inquiry – live,” Guardian, 11/27/09

Sparrow, Andrew and Melkle, James, “Iraq invasion legitimacy was in doubt, Chilcot inquiry told,” Guardian, 11/27/09

Stobart, Janet, “Blair words on Iraq changed after 2002 visit with Bush, Briton testifies,” Los Angeles Times, 11/27/09

Friday, October 09, 2009

Sadr Tries To Reconcile With Breakaway League Of The Righteous

Awan Daily reported that Moqtada al-Sadr is attempting to reconcile with the League of the Righteous before the January 2010 elections. A delegation from the League is set to travel to Qom, Iran to meet personally with Sadr. According to Awan, they are likely to reject rejoining the Sadr movement before the vote, and are planning to run on their own, led by former Transport Minister Salam al-Maliki. Currently al-Maliki is the spokesman for the League.

Sadr may not be the only suitor for the League. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law may also court them. In March 2009 it was revealed that Baghdad was acting as a middleman in negotiations between England and the League to release five British hostages that the group kidnapped in 2007. The deal was to release members of the League in return for the Britons. By May the League said they wanted to run in the parliamentary elections. The Maliki government stated that it was important for Iraq’s future for the group to renounce violence. In August the Prime Minister met with representatives of the League who said that they had given up on violence and wanted to be integrated into the political process. In turn, Baghdad has been requesting the U.S. free dozens of League members in their custody. Sadr condemned this move, saying that anyone who was involved in resistance to the government should be excluded from politics. He’s obviously changed his mind as the elections are drawing nearer. For Maliki, if he were to run with the League it would cut into Sadr’s base, which is a key part of the new Iraqi National Alliance.

Qais Khazali is the leader of the League of the Righteous, and is still in U.S. custody. Khazali was a follower of Sadr’s father Ayatollah Mohammed Sadeq al-Sadr, and helped keep the movement alive after his death at the hands of Saddam’s government in 1999. Khazali later became a follower of Moqtada after the U.S. invasion, but quickly broke away. In 2004 after the second Sadrist uprising against the Coalition, Khazali refused to follow the cease-fire and formed his own militia in Sadr City. By early 2005 Sadr was able to bring him back into the fold, and named Khazali one of the heads of his organization. The next year Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Qods Force picked Khazali to head its network of Iranian supported and trained militias, which became known as Special Groups. That was when the League was formed. They carried out two spectacular attacks. The first was the January 2007 raid on the Karbala Joint Coordination Center in which five U.S. soldiers were killed. This led to the arrest of Qais and Laith Khazali in Basra in March. Second, the League kidnapped the five Britons from the Finance Ministry in Baghdad in May 2007. In 2008, the League was scattered after Maliki’s crackdown on militias. Moqtada has tried to hold talks with them off and on before, but to no avail, and may not be any more successful this time.

SOURCES

Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Report: Deal close to free Britons seized in Iraq,” Associated Press, 3/29/09

Agence France Presse, “2nd UPDATE: Iraqi PM Met Group Behind Kidnap Of Britons,” 8/3/09
- “Over 100 from Iraqi group who killed Britons freed,” 9/27/09
- “US sees confrontation with Sadr splinter factions,” 10/12/04

Associated Press, “Baghdad’s blast walls to come down,” 8/6/09
- “More Shiite militants freed by US in Iraq,” 9/28/09

Awan Daily, “Maliki announced next week, the electoral coalition,” 9/25/09

Chulov, Martin, “Split among captors hits hope of freedom for British hostages in Iraq,” Guardian, 5/28/09

Cochrane, Marisa, “Asaib Ahl al-Haq and the Khazali Special Groups network,” Institute for the Study of War,” 1/13/09
- “The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement,” Institute for the Study of War, January 2009

Dagher, Sam, “Sadr reins in Shiite militiamen, sends mixed signals,” Christian Science Monitor, 3/31/08

Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08

Howard, Michael, “Iraqi minister incensed by airport display bans alcohol,” Guardian, 8/5/05

Nordland, Rod and Dagher, Sam, “U.S. Will Release More Members of an Iraqi Militia,” New York Times, 8/17/09

Roads To Iraq, “Iraqi pre-election political map – The Shiites,” 9/21/09

Rubin, Alissa and Gordon, Michael, “U.S. Frees Suspect in Killing of 5 G.I.’s,” New York Times, 6/9/09

Xinhua, “Iraq frees 147 prisoners linked to abduction of 5 Britons: newspaper,” 9/28/09

Tuesday, August 04, 2009

The Return Of The Special Groups

Special Groups was a term coined by the U.S. during the Surge to identify Shiite militants that were supported by Iran and/or were not following Muqtada al-Sadr’s cease-fire decree. After Baghdad’s crackdown on militias in southern Iraq beginning with Basra in 2008, many of these Special Groups were scattered, arrested, or fled to Iran. Now they seem to be making their return. In a July 18 article in the Washington Post U.S. officials warned of a new spate of attacks on American forces by these armed groups. An official named three main culprits, the League of the Righteous, Khataib Hezbollah, and the Promised Day Brigades.

A review of English-language press reports shows that there has been a steady increase in incidents from March to July 2009. 1st these are only articles from southern Iraq. It’s difficult to determine who is behind many of the attacks in Baghdad. The southern section of the country however has been relatively peaceful, and has been a base of Special Groups and Mahdi Army activities in the past, so any attacks that occur there on the Americans are most likely done by one of these organizations.

In March 2009 there were only a few incidents involving the British in Basra and none with the United States, but since April there have been several attacks aimed at Americans across a variety of southern provinces. In March there were no attacks against American forces in the region. There were two rocket attacks on the English in the Basra airport however. In April things changed when five incidents were reported, and all involving U.S. troops in Maysan, Qadisiyah, Wasit, and Basra. Attacks went up in May to seven and were all concentrated in Basra, Babil, and Wasit. In June incidents went down to four, but again were spread out over the region in Dhi Qar, Muthanna, Basra, and Wasit. From July 1 to 28 there have been eight attacks on Americans occurring in Dhi Qar, Qadisiyah, Karbala, and Basra. The most dramatic was a roadside bomb that went off against U.S. Ambassador Christopher Hill’s convoy in Dhi Qar on July 13. In four and a half months there were a total of 26 attacks on U.S. forces, and only a few casualties. While that is not a large amount compared to the more violent areas of the country, it does constitute an increase from earlier in the year.

Iran has conducted a multi-layered political, military, economic, and cultural strategy in Iraq since 2003. Supporting Shiite militiamen is only one part of this, and is aimed at tying down U.S. forces so they don’t attack Iran, and making the Americans pay a price for invading. In the past, when important events came up in Iraq such as the 2009 provincial elections, Iran has limited the amount of weapons and money that it provides to dampen violence so that it might focus upon its more important political goals. Afterwards Special Group attacks and activities have traditionally gone up. That appears to be what is occurring now. This could be a message from Iran that they are still capable of fomenting instability in Iraq and challenging Coalition Forces. Iraqi domestic issues may also play a part in some of these attacks. The League of the Righteous for example, has said that it wishes to participate in the 2010 parliamentary vote, so a few of these incidents may be a way to show that it is still relevant. Others may be conducted by violent gangs, which are active in places like Basra. Whatever the ultimate motivation, the last few months have shown that there are still militants in southern Iraq capable of attacking U.S. forces.

Attacks Against U.S. Forces In Southern Iraq

March 2009 – 0 Total

April 2009 – 5 Total

4/6/09 Rocket attack on U.S. base in Amarah, Maysan

4/20/09 IED attack on U.S. patrol in Basra

4/20/09 Rocket attack on U.S. base in Kut, Wasit

4/22/09 Rocket attack on U.S. base in Diwaniya, Qadisiyah

4/30/09 Sniper killed 2 U.S. soldiers in Amarah, Maysan

May 2009 – 7 Total

5/3/09 Rocket attack near U.S. consulate in Hilla, Babil

5/4/09 IED attack on U.S. patrol in Basra

5/11/09 IED attack on U.S. vehicle in Basra

5/14/09 IED attack on U.S. patrol in Wasit

5/14/09 IED attack on U.S. vehicle in Babil

5/16/09 One U.S. soldier killed in Basra

5/28/09 Rocket attack on U.S. base at Basra airport

June 2009 – 4 Total

6/1/09 Rocket attack on U.S. business in Wasit

6/7/09 Attack on U.S. patrol in Basra

6/16/09 IED attack on U.S. convoy in Muthanna

6/29/09 IED attack on joint Iraqi-U.S. patrol in Dhi Qar

July 1-28, 2009 - 8

7/5/09 Rocket attack on U.S. base in Diwaniya, Qadisiyah

7/10/09 Rocket attack near U.S. base in Basra

7/13/09 Rocket attack on U.S. base in Basra

7/13/09 Roadside bomb attack on U.S. Ambassador Christopher Hill’s convoy in Dhi Qar

7/17/09 Rocket attack on U.S. base in Basra

7/20/09 IED attack on U.S. convoy in Karbala

7/20/09 Bomb attack on U.S. convoy in Nassiriya, Dhi Qar

7/20/09 Rocket attack on U.S. base in Diwaniya, Qadisiyah

SOURCES

Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Anti-US Iraqi cleric facing leadership challenge,” Associated Press, 2/20/09

Adas, Basil, “Mahdi Army militia ‘going underground,’” Gulf News, 6/26/08

Aswat al-Iraq, “2 Katyushas land in U.S. camp in Diwaniya,” 7/20/09

- “2 Katyushas land in U.S. forces camp in Diwaniya,” 7/5/09

- “3 MNF soldiers injured in Basra,” 7/17/09

- “3 rockets land near U.S. consulate in Hilla,” 5/3/09

- “4 missiles fall near Echo camp in Diwaniya – spokesman,” 4/22/09

- “Blast in Nasseriya, no casualties, loses reported – U.S. spokesman,” 7/20/09

- “Bomb explodes on U.S. vehicle patrol in Wassit,” 5/14/09

- “British base in Basra rocketed,” 3/13/09

- “Hand grenade targets U.S. patrol, no casualties,” 6/7/09

- “IED explodes near joint convoy in Thi-Qar,” 6/29/09

- “IED targets U.S. convoy in Muthanna,” 6/16/09

- “IED targets U.S. convoy north of Karbala,” 7/20/09

- “IED targets U.S. patrol in Basra,” 5/4/09

- “MNF base in Kut rocketed,” 4/20/09

- “Roadside bomb hits MNF patrol in Basra,” 4/20/09

- “Rockets hit U.S. base in Amara,” 4/6/09

- “Sniper downs 2 U.S. soldiers in Amara,” 4/30/09

- “U.S. base at Basra airport rocketed,” 7/13/09

- “U.S. firm rocketed in Wassit,” 6/1/09

- “U.S. Hummer ablaze in Babel,” 5/14/09

- “U.S. vehicle damaged in IED blast in Basra,” 5/11/09

Gamel, Kim, “US military works to keep out Iraq militia leaders,” Associated Press, 8/6/08

Graff, Peter, "Influence wanes for followers of Iraq's Sadr," Reuters, 11/24/08

Haynes, Deborah, “Hope for British hostages in Iraq after release of Shia militant,” Times of London, 6/9/09

Issa, Sahar and Kadhim, Hussein, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 28 May 2009,” 5/28/09

Londono, Ernesto and DeYoung, Karen, “Iraq Restricts U.S. Forces,” Washington Post, 7/18/09

Multi-National Corps – Iraq, “MND-S Soldier dies from combat-related injures (Basra),” 5/16/09

- “U.S. Forces respond to rocket attack in Basra province,” 7/10/09

Peter, Tom, “After setbacks, Sadr redirects Mahdi Army,” Christian Science Monitor, 8/11/08

Reuters, “U.S. ambassador to Iraq unhurt by convoy bomb,” 7/13/09

Rubin, Alissa and Gordon, Michael, “U.S. Frees Suspect in Killing of 5 G.I.’s,” New York Times, 6/9/09

Small Wars Journal, “SWJ Interview with Bing West (Part 1),” 8/14/08

Weaver, Teri, “U.S. troops keeping a low profile in Basra,” Stars and Stripes, 6/1/09

Thursday, June 18, 2009

Britain Withdraws Combat Troops But Trainers Remain, Could This Be A Blueprint For The U.S.?

On December 23, 2008 Iraq’s parliament passed a bill allowing England and several other members of the Coalition of the Willing to stay in the country until July 2009. The English command set May 31, 2009 as the date they would actually have all combat troops out, and began a quick turnover of facilities to the Iraqis and Americans. With that achieved, London went on to sign an agreement with Baghdad to allow trainers to stay for one more year. Could this be what the U.S. will do when its deadline for withdrawal comes?

Beginning in January 2009, Britain began its pull out from Iraq. Originally 26,000 British took part in the 2003 invasion. That was quickly drawn down to 18,000 by the end of May 2003. A year later there were 8,600, and then 5,500 by May 2007. At the end of 2008 there were around 4,000 English troops still in Iraq. On January 1, 2009 Britain turned over Basra airport to the Iraqis. English troops would remain on the military side of the facility however. By the middle of February it was announced that all of its heavy equipment had been shipped back to England. On March 31, England handed over command of Basra to the Americans. 7,000 U.S. soldiers also moved into Basra to take over many of the jobs the British had previously been doing. At the end of April the English announced that all their combat operations were over. Finally May 31 arrived and all combat troops were pulled out. Within two days London negotiated a deal with Baghdad to allow just under 100 British sailors and five ships to remain in Basra to train the fledgling Iraqi Navy for one-year past the withdrawal deadline.

The Iraq Navy is a small, undermanned, and under equipped force. As of January 2009 there were only 1,898 in the Navy. They are authorized to have 3,596. At the beginning of this year they received 44 small craft, but they lack the personnel, knowledge, and leadership to man all of them. They also have no major ships, although they are to receive two from Italy this year. The British are the main advisors to the Iraqi Navy. Besides the troops in Basra, they have also taken Iraqis to England for further training.

Could the Americans repeat England’s recent experience in Iraq? The British drew down their troops, declared combat operations over, met their deadline to be out by May 2009, and then signed a new agreement to keep trainers in the country for another year. Like the British, the U.S. has also set the end of 2011 as the date that it will be out of Iraq. As reported before, by that time the Iraqi security forces will not be ready to protect the country from external threats. The Iraqi Navy is a perfect example of that as it lacks the personnel and ships to carry out that task right now. When December 31, 2011 approaches then, it’s very likely that both the U.S. and Iraqi military will put pressure on the Obama administration to maintain some kind of U.S. presence in Iraq. It will be up the President then to decide whether keeping perhaps several thousand American advisors in Iraq will break his promise to be out of the country in sixteen months of taking office.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iraq and Britain agree draft naval deal,” 6/3/09

Ashton, Adam and Hammoudi, Laith, “What are ‘combat troops’? Iraq withdrawal depends on answer,” McClatchy Newspapers, 12/23/08

Aswat al-Iraq, “Britain hands over Basra airport to Iraqi authorities,” 1/1/09

Cordesman, Anthony, “How Soon Is Safe? Iraqi Force Development and ‘Conditions-Based’ US Withdrawals,” 4/20/09

Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2009

Evans, Michael, “Basra gets better beds and burgers as US takes over from the British,” Times of London, 2/16/09

The National, “British military operations end in Iraq,” 4/30/09

Robertson, Campbell and Cowell, Alan, “U.S. Takes Over as Britain Begins Basra Pullout,” New York Times, 4/1/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 4/30/09

Times of London, “Q&A: Iraq inquiry,” 3/26/09

Thursday, April 09, 2009

New Challenges To Sadr’s Leadership

Moqtada al-Sadr’s movement has faced an increasing number of splits. After his August 2004 uprising some of his militia commanders began leaving the fold. Many of these went on to form Special Groups. One was Qais Khazali who created Asaib Ahl al-Haq, the League of the Righteous. He moved in and out of the Sadr Trend, but eventually turned to Iran and Hezbollah for aid, and was arrested by the Americans in March 2007. Within days Khazali’s followers responded by kidnapping five Britons. London is now in negotiations to release them in return for Khazali’s freedom. At the same time, moderate members of the Sadr movement have left and formed a new group because they fear leaders like Khazali are undermining their good work. This will add new challengers to Sadr’s leadership.

Qais Khazali was a student of Moqtada’s father Mohammed Sadeq al-Sadr. When he was assassinated by Saddam in 1999, Qais and a small group of other followers kept the movement alive by going underground. When Moqtada took over the group in April 2003 Khazali became one of his main supporters. After the second Sadr uprising that ended in September 2004 with a cease-fire, Khazali went back to Sadr City in Baghdad and continued attacking the American forces. By October 2004 Khazali had created his own independent group that would later be known as Asaib Ahl al-Haq, League of the Righteous. By March 2005 Khazali had been convinced to rejoin the Sadr movement, but he still carried out his own activities as well. In June 2006 Khazali left again, and was chosen to lead the Special Groups, the breakaway militia groups that had become disillusioned with Sadr and were receiving increasing funding and weapons from Iran. Many of these fighters began traveling to Iran for training and also received aid from Hezbollah. Those activities were coordinated through Hezbollah commander Ali Musa Daqduq who was operating in Iraq. On January 20, 2007 Asaib Ahl al-Haq carried out their most brazen attack when they raided a command center in Karbala dressed as U.S. soldiers, and killed five Americans and wounded three others. That eventually led to Khazali, his brother Laith, and Daqduq’s arrest on March 20. Akram al-Kabi took over the leadership of Asaib Ahl al-Haq.

In response to the capture of Khazali, Asaib Ahl al-Haq raided the Finance Ministry building in Baghdad on March 29. They kidnapped Peter Moore, a British computer consultant who was working for a U.S. company Bearing Point that was providing financial training to the Iraqi government. Moore’s two guards, and two others were taken as well. They worked for the Canadian security company Garda World. Two of them were Scottish, and the other two were from Wales. The British Foreign Ministry has been trying to negotiate their release ever since.

With the English stepping up their withdrawal from southern Iraq, pressure is increasing to gain Moore’s release. That began at the beginning of March 2009 when the British announced that they were opening ties with Hezbollah. The Lebanese group is acting as middleman between the British and Asaib Ahl al-Haq. Later in the month the Iraqi group sent a video of Moore to the British Embassy in Baghdad. It was shown on TV, which is supposedly part of the deal to release the hostages. Next ten members of Asaib Ahl al-Haq, including Laith Khazali are to be released for one of the British security guards. If that is successful more will follow with the final trade being Peter Moore for Ali Musa Daqduq and Qais Khazali.

If the Khazali brothers are released it could re-invigorate Asaib Ahl al-Haq, and complicate Sadr’s leadership. Khazali claims that he is the rightful heir to the elder Sadr’s movement. While they have been solely a military group committed to attacking the Coalition forces, in February 2009 they announced that they wanted to run in the parliamentary elections planned for December. Asaib Ahl al-Haq have said they want an Iranian style religious state. A move towards politics could be encouraged by Baghdad, as the government has been giving amnesty to some Special Group members in return for them giving up their weapons. Sadr is aware of this challenge, and has asked Special Group members to return to his group, but he hasn’t been successful.

Of more immediate concern to Sadr is the defection of moderate members of the Sadrist Trend. On March 21, 2009 a group of former Sadrists met in Baghdad to announce a new group, the Clerics Advisory, Shura al-Ullama. They claim to have 200 followers. The group has been formed because they fear that the Sadr movement is being taken over by militants backed by Iran. Shura al-Ullama will run social programs like the original Sadr movement, and is also hoping to set up offices across the country to run in the parliamentary elections. The government supports this group as well. The head of Iraq’s Reconciliation Committee Zuhair Chalabi attended their opening meeting.

As reported before, Sadr has faced a series of defections over the years. Many militia members have left his group, while others have been rounded up after the government’s crackdown in 2008. In June of that year he disbanded his Mahdi Army, and formed a new organization, Mumahidoon, Those Who Pave The Way, which is an unarmed, cultural and religious group. In the January 2009 provincial elections, he backed two independent lists to mixed results. He lost control of Maysan and reportedly Sadr City, but gained seats in more provinces than he did in the last vote in 2005. Now he is facing more problems. Khazali is a rival for the loyalty of many militia members who are dissatisfied with Sadr’s move away from armed struggle. The Clerics Advisory could draw away those more moderate members who are opposed to continuing fighting. Either way it could be another break for an already fractious movement.


SOURCES

Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Anti-US Iraqi cleric facing leadership challenge,” Associated Press, 2/20/09
- “Report: Deal close to free Britons seized in Iraq,” Associated Press, 3/29/09

Chon, Gina, “Iraq Hopes Grow on Split in Sadr Body, Amnesties,” Wall Street Journal, 3/30/09

Chulov, Martin, “UK begins Iraq farewell by saying: so long, and thanks for the fish,” Guardian, 3/30/09

Cochrane, Marisa, “Asaib Ahl al-Haq and the Khazali Special Groups network,” Institute for the Study of War,” 1/13/08
- “The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement,” Institute for the Study of War, January 2009

Colvin, Marie, “Families told release of UK hostages not a done deal,” Times of London, 3/29/09

Haynes, Deborah, “Peter Moore footage keeps hope alive for five ‘forgotten’ hostages,” Times of London, 3/23/09

Al-Kaabi, Qassim, “Inside Al-Sadr’s Al-Mumahhidun Project,” Asharq Alawsat, 1/8/09

Landler, Mark, “Britain’s Contacts With Hezbollah Vex U.S.,” New York Times, 3/13/09

Rubin, Alissa and Dagher, Sam, “Sadr, Insurgency Icon, Is Silent, but Backers Work Behind Scenes,” New York Times, 1/31/09

Sunday, March 22, 2009

New Opinion Poll of Iraqis

In mid-March 2009 the BBC, ABC, and NHK news departments released their latest public opinion poll of Iraqis. This was the seventh one they have conducted. A Turkish and an American company interviewed 2,228 Iraqis in person in February 2009. The questions were about security, services, the government, society, sectarianism, and the recent January 2009 provincial elections. A majority of Iraqis thought that security and life in general were improving, but still had questions about the country such as the economy, services, and the competence of the government.

Life In General

The poll began by asking people what they thought about their life and community. 65% said they thought their life was good compared to 35% that said it was bad. That was a slight increase from the last survey conducted in March 2008 when 54% said things were good and 45% said they were bad. During 2007 60% of respondents thought life was going badly in Iraq, while in 2004 and 2005 70% or more thought things were well. When broken down by group Shiites and Kurds had the most positive outlook on their lives, while Sunnis were split 50-50. That was an improvement however, because in the March 2008 poll only 34% of Sunnis said things were good.

When asked how Iraq in general was doing 58% had a positive view saying things were going well, compared to 40% that thought not. That was the best response since the question was asked over five polls beginning in 2005. Similarly when questioned about how things had changed in the country in the last six months 52% said things had gotten better, 39% said things were the same, with only 8% saying it had gotten worse. That was a dramatic turnaround from March 2008 and August 2007 when the same question was asked. In March only 36% said things were better. In August 2007 only 11% felt that way, while 61% thought things were worse.

When asked about the future, the majority of respondents had a favorable view as well. When questioned about how their area would be a year from now 65% said it would continue to be good, compared to 35% that said it would be bad. That was a huge increase from March 2008 when only 44% thought things would improve, but not up to the 2004 and 2005 levels when 70% and 71% respectively said things would be positive. When asked how their children's live would be, respondents weren't as optimistic with 44% saying it would be better, 26% saying it would be worse, and 29% claiming it would be about the same. Thoughts about the country overall were positive with 60% saying Iraq would be doing better within a year compared to 26% who said it would be the same, and only 12% who believed things would turn for the worse. Responses like that hadn't been seen since 2005 when 69% thought things would be better in a year, 11% though it would be the same, and 11% said the country would be worse off.


How are things in your life?


Feb. 09

Mar. 08

Aug. 07

Feb. 07

2005

2004

Very Good

21%

13%

8%

8%

22%

13%

Quite Good

44%

41%

31%

31%

49%

57%

Quite Bad

19%

29%

34%

32%

18%

14%

Quite Bad

16%

16%

26%

28%

11%

15%

Refused/Don't know

-

-

-

-

1%

1%

By community comparing Feb. 09/March 08


Kurds

Shiite

Sunni

Very Good

32%/24%

25%/14%

8%/7%

Quite Good

41%/49%

46%/48%

42%/27%

Quite Bad

23%/20%

16%/27%

23%/38%

Very Bad

4%/7%

13%/11%

28%/28%

How do you think Iraq is doing today?


Feb. 09

Mar. 08

Aug. 07

Feb. 07

2005

Very Good

20%

7%

3%

4%

14%

Quite Good

38%

36%

19%

31%

30%

Quite Bad

25%

36%

40%

35%

23%

Quite Bad

15%

20%

38%

31%

30%

Refused/Don't know

-

1%

-

-

3%

In the last six months how has the situation in Iraq changed?



Feb. 09

Mar. 08

Aug. 07

Became better

52%

36%

11%

Became worse

8%

26%

61%

Stayed the same

39%

37%

28%

What is your expectation for how things overall in your area will be a year from now?


Feb. 09

Mar. 08

Aug. 07

Feb. 07

2005

2004

Very Good

21%

13%

8%

8%

22%

13%

Quite Good

44%

41%

31%

31%

49%

57%

Quite Bad

19%

29%

34%

32%

18%

14%

Quite Bad

16%

16%

26%

28%

11%

15%

Refused/Don't know

-

-

-

-

1%

1%

How will your children's life be?



Feb. 09

March 08

Aug. 07

Feb. 07

Better

44%

39%

33%

42%

Worse

26%

28%

42%

37%

About the same

29%

31%

25%

21%

Refused/don't now

2%

1%

-

-

How do you think Iraq will be doing a year from now?


Feb. 09

Mar. 08

Aug. 07

Feb. 07

2005

Much Better

30%

14%

4%

14%

41%

Somewhat Better

30%

32%

19%

26%

28%

About the Same

26%

33%

35%

26%

11%

Somewhat Worse

10%

13%

25%

21%

6%

Much Worse

2%

7%

17%

13%

5%

Refused/Don't know

2%

2%

-

-

-


Security

The positive view of life in Iraq and its future is largely due to the improved security situation. 85% of Iraqis said they thought security in their area was good. That was a huge increase from 62% in March 2008 and 43% in August 2007. Most thought that security had also improved or stayed the same in their area over the last six months. When asked about their personal safety in their neighborhoods 59% said they felt very safe, 35% said not very safe, and 6% said not safe at all. That was a reversal of the March 2008 numbers when 37% said they felt very safe, and 53% said not very safe. Positive numbers had not really been seen since 2005 when 63% said they felt very safe, and 30% said not very safe.

The improved security situation was also shown when Iraqis were asked whether they had personally encountered violence in their life. Overall, around 40% of respondents from 2007 on had some kind of situation happen in their area. By February 2009 the number were down in every category. 18% for example had seen a car bomb or suicide attack compared to 35% in March 2008 and 32% in September 2007. 18% had witnessed sectarian fighting, compared to 35% in March 2008, and 27% in September 2007. What was still high was kidnappings, which were usually done for profit with 32% saying they had seen it, down from 45% in March 2008 and 40% in September 2007, but up from 25% in February 2007. Seeing abuses by Iraqi and American forces were also down.

The two slight exceptions were when Iraqis were asked about the future of the security situation, and their freedom to move and live where they wanted. On those questions people seemed a little apprehensive, but still positive. 74% of those that said the security situation was better thought that it would stay that way in the future, compared to 21% that were not confident. That was down however from March 2008 when 82% said they were confident. When asked could they go where they wanted 74% said they felt safe, and 25% said not. That trend began in March 2008 when 44% said the situation was good, and 56% said it was bad. In February and August 2007 the answers were only 24% and 25% good respectively. When Iraqis were questioned about whether they thought they could live where they wanted without persecution however, things were more mixed. 43% said they felt good, compared to 56% who felt bad. That was only a slight change from March 2008 when 40% felt good about being able to live where they wanted, compared to 60% who felt the situation was bad. That was a big improvement from 2007 however when only 23% felt good.

Security in your neighborhood


Feb. 09

Mar. 08

Aug. 07

Feb. 07

2005

2004

Very good

46%

20%

15%

17%

31%

20%

Quite good

39%

42%

28%

30%

30%

29%

Quite bad

14%

27%

24%

21%

17%

21%

Very bad

1%

12%

32%

32%

21%

29%

Refused/Don't know


-


-

1%

1%

Last six months has the security situation in your area changed?



Feb. 09

Mar. 08

Aug. 07

Became better

50%

46%

24%

Became worse

3%

17%

31%

Stayed the same

47%

36%

45%

Refused/Don't know

-

1%

-

How safe do you feel in your neighborhood?


Feb. 09

Mar. 08

Aug. 07

Feb. 07

2005

2004

Very safe

59%

37%

26%

26%

63%

40%

Not very safe

35%

53%

47%

41%

30%

40%

Not safe at all

6%

10%

28%

33%

6%

18%

Refused/Don't know

-

-

-

-

1%

3%

Which of the following have occurred near you?


Car bombs/suicide attacks

Have occurred near you

Have not occurred by you

Feb. 09

18%

82%

March 08

35%

64%

Sep. 07

32%

68%

Sniper, crossfire

Have occurred near you

Have not occurred by you

Feb. 09

21%

79%

March 08

34%

66%

Sep. 07

30%

70%

Feb. 07

30%

70%

Sectarian fighting

Have occurred near you

Have not occurred by you

Feb. 09

18%

82%

March 08

35%

64%

Sep. 07

27%

72%

Feb. 07

25%

75%

Kidnapping

Have occurred near you

Have not occurred by you

Feb. 09

32%

68%

March 08

45%

54%

Sep. 07

40%

59%

Feb. 07

25%

75%

Fighting between government and insurgents

Have occurred near you

Have not occurred by you

Feb. 09

20%

79%

March 08

37%

62%

Sep. 07

34%

66%

Feb. 07

34%

66%

Unnecessary violence against citizens by U.S. of Coalition

Have occurred near you

Have not occurred by you

Feb. 09

25%

74%

March 08

42%

57%

Sep. 07

41%

57%

Feb. 07

44%

55%

Unnecessary violence against citizens by Iraqi police

Have occurred near you

Have not occurred by you

Feb. 09

17%

83%

March 08

20%

79%

Sep. 07

21%

79%

Feb. 07

24%

76%

Unnecessary violence against citizens by Iraqi Army

Have occurred near you

Have not occurred by you

Feb. 09

18%

81%

March 08

20%

79%

Sep. 07

19%

81%

Feb. 07

24%

76%

Unnecessary violence against citizens by militias

Have occurred near you

Have not occurred by you

Feb. 09

18%

81%

March 08

36%

63%

Sep. 07

30%

70%

Feb. 07

31%

69%

Assassination or attempted assassination

Have occurred near you

Have not occurred by you

Feb. 09

22%

78%

If the security situation has improved do you think it will stay that way?


Feb. 09

March 08

Very confident

30%

32%

Somewhat confident

44%

50%

Not so confident

19%

15%

Not all confident

2%

-

Freedom of movement in your neighborhood


Feb. 09

Mar. 08

Aug. 07

Feb. 07

Very good

28%

21%

8%

8%

Quite good

46%

23%

17%

16%

Quite bad

19%

29%

32%

40%

Very bad

6%

27%

42%

35%

Refused/Don't know

1%

-

-

-

How do you feel about your freedom to live where you want without persecution in your neighborhood?


Feb. 09

Mar. 08

Aug. 07

Feb. 07

Very good

12%

16%

8%

8%

Quite good

31%

24%

15%

15%

Quite bad

36%

32%

32%

39%

Very bad

20%

28%

45%

38%

Refused/Don't know

1%

-

-

-


Economy and Services

When asked what was the biggest problem facing them in their own lives, economic issues outweighed security ones, something that was noted in the March 2008 poll. The top five personal concerns in the recent survey were high prices 9%, no jobs 9%, crime 5%, terrorist attacks 5%, economic problems 5%, lack of services 5%, and poor electricity 5%. That compared to the March 2008 survey where the top concerns were electricity 11%, no jobs 10%, high prices 6%, lack of security 6%, social disintegration 5%, fuel shortages 5%, and the U.S. occupation 5%. Some of the top concerns were thus the same, but just changed in importance, and security and the U.S. were more important.

What is the biggest problem you face?

February 2009 – Top 5

1.

High prices

9%

2.

No jobs/unemployment

9%

3.

Common crime

5%

3.

Terrorist attacks

5%

3.

Economic problems

5%

3.

Lack of goods and services/problems with food rations

5%

3.

Poor electricity supply

5%

March 2008

1.

Poor electricity supply

11%

2.

No jobs/unemployment

10%

3.

High prices

6%

3.

Lack of security

6%

5.

Can't trust people/social disintegration

5%

5.

Fuel shortages

5%

5.

U.S. occupation

5%

When asked about individual issues in their neighborhood, the situation was mixed. Jobs, electricity, water, and health care were felt to be inadequate, while education, basic needs, crime prevention, general economic situation, and fuel supply were good. 34% said access to jobs in their area was good, compared to 66% who thought it was bad. That was up from the March 2008 and 2007 polls, but not as high as 38% recorded in 2005. Similar numbers were found for electricity supply with 37% saying it was good, and 62% saying it was bad. That was the best response since 2005 however. In August 2007 positive responses were in single digits. 38% said the water situation was good, compared to 61% who said it was bad, which was similar to March 2008 responses. Medical care was also seen as inadequate with 40% saying it was good, 60% saying it was bad. Schools were seen as doing much better with 64% saying they were good, and 35% saying they were bad. Basic needs were also being met with 62% saying the situation was positive, 39% saying it was negative. 78% said they felt protected from crime, 60% said their family's general economic situation was good, and 67% said they had good access to fuel. Those were all improvements from March 2008 with the last having the largest increase.

Iraqis were also divided on how things had gone over the last six months. 33% said things had gotten better for their family economically over that period, 23% said things were worse, and 44% said things had stayed the same. Only 14% said the job situation had changed for the better, compared to 35% who said it was worse, and 50% who said it had stayed the same. Those were almost the exact same responses found in March 2008.

Jobs in your neighborhood


Feb. 09

Mar. 08

Aug. 07

Feb. 07

2005

2004

Very good

7%

7%

4%

3%

11%

7%

Quite good

27%

22%

17%

17%

27%

19%

Quite bad

32%

35%

37%

44%

23%

23%

Very bad

34%

35%

43%

35%

34%

46%

Refused/Don't know

-

1%

-

-

5%

6%

Electricity in your neighborhood


Feb. 09

Mar. 08

Aug. 07

Feb. 07

2005

2004

Very good

7%

1%

2%

2%

11%

8%

Quite good

30%

11%

6%

11%

35%

27%

Quite bad

32%

43%

35%

37%

30%

28%

Very bad

30%

45%

58%

51%

25%

37%

Refused/Don't know

-

-

-

-

1%

1%

Clean water in your neighborhood


Feb. 09

Mar. 08

Aug. 07

Feb. 07

2005

2004

Very good

13%

8%

9%

9%

19%

20%

Quite good

25%

23%

16%

22

39%

31%

Quite bad

29%

37%

35%

35%

27%

22%

Very bad

32%

31%

40%

34%

15%

26%

Refused/Don't know

-

1%

-

-

-

1%

Medical care in your neighborhood


Feb. 09

Mar. 08

Aug. 07

Feb. 07

2005

2004

Very good

14%

10%

9%

8%

27%

17%

Quite good

26%

27%

23%

23%

35%

34%

Quite bad

28%

32%

37%

35%

23%

24%

Very bad

32%

30%

30%

34%

13%

22%

Refused/Don't know

-

-

-

-

2%

3%

Schools in your neighborhood



Feb. 09

Mar. 08

Aug. 07

Feb. 07

2005

2004

Very good

18%

15%

15%

12%

43%

37%

Quite good

46%

48%

36%

31%

31%

35%

Quite bad

28%

29%

30%

35%

17%

15%

Very bad

7%

8%

19%

21%

7%

11%

Refused/Don't know

-

1%

-

-

1%

3%

Availability of basic needs in your neighborhood


Feb. 09

Mar. 08

Aug. 07

Feb. 07

2005

2004

Very good

18%

19%

9%

8%

22%

18%

Quite good

44%

46%

30%

30%

38%

38%

Quite bad

25%

27%

34%

39%

23%

24%

Very bad

14%

8%

27%

23%

15%

17%

Refused/Don't know

-

-

-

-

2%

2%

Protection from crime in your neighborhood


Feb. 09

Mar. 08

Aug. 07

Feb. 07

2005

2004

Very good

24%

19%

13%

14%

33%

21%

Quite good

54%

35%

22%

26%

33%

31%

Quite bad

17%

28%

28%

32%

19%

20%

Very bad

4%

18%

37%

28%

14%

23%

Refused/Don't know


-


-

1%

4%

Family's economic situation


Feb. 09

Mar. 08

Aug. 07

Feb. 07

2005

Very good

19%

15%

7%

7%

22%

Quite good

41%

42%

30%

29%

48%

Quite bad

23%

27%

37%

41%

20%

Very bad

17%

16%

26%

23%

10%

Refused/Don't know

-

-

-

-

1%

Availability of fuel for cooking and driving


Feb. 09

March 08

Aug. 07

Feb. 07

Very good

26%

2%

1%

1%

Quite good

41%

17%

8%

11%

Quite bad

24%

40%

33%

40%

Very bad

8%

41%

59%

48%

Refused/Don't know

-

-

-

-

In the past six months how has your family's economic situation changed?



Feb. 09

March 08

Became better

33%

31%

Became worse

23%

24%

Stayed the same

44%

45%

Refused/Don't know

-

1%

In the last six months how has the job situation changed?


Feb. 09

March 08

Became better

14%

18%

Became worse

35%

35%

Stayed the same

50%

46%

Refused/Don't know

-

1%


The government was seen as the main provider of services compared to others, but they were not believed to be competent. Only 16% said the national government was doing a good job providing services, compared to 67% who said they were doing something to little. 17% said they were doing nothing at all. The provincial governments did a little better with 15% saying they did a great deal, 73% saying they did something to a little, and 11% saying nothing at all. After that the Sons of Iraq, Awakenings, foreign aid groups, and the U.S. and Iraqi security forces were grouped together. For all those 9% said they were doing a great deal. Last were mosques and religious charities at 6% who thought they were doing a lot, and militias at 5%.

How is each group doing providing services to your neighborhood?


National Government

Provincial Government

Sons of Iraq/

Awakening

Militia

Mosque/

Religious charity

Foreign aid

U.S.-Iraqi security forces

A great deal

16%

15%

9%

5%

6%

9%

9%

Some

37%

39%

18%

11%

24%

11%

24%

A little

30%

34%

24%

17%

30%

25%

27%

Nothing at all

17%

11%

45%

64%

38%

53%

38%

Refused/Don't know

-

1%

4%

4%

2%

2%

2%

When questioned about the biggest problems facing the entire country, security and the U.S. presence were still at the top of the list, the same as in March 2008. The top issues were lack of security 8%, terrorist attacks 7%, the U.S. occupation 7%, civil war 6%, ethnic/religious tensions 6%, economic problems 6%, high prices 6%, and a weak government/political instability 6%. Those closely followed the March responses, which were lack of security 13%, terrorist attacks 12%, sectarian violence 7%, civil war 6%, ethnic/religious tensions 6%, and the U.S. occupation 6%.

What is the biggest problem Iraq is facing?

Feb. 09

1.

Lack of security

8%

2.

Terrorist attacks

7%

2.

U.S. occupation

7%

4.

War/civil war

6%

4.

Ethnic/religious tensions

6%

4.

Economic problems

6%

4.

High prices

6%

4.

Political instability/weak government/bad leaders

6%

March 08

1.

Lack of security

13%

2.

Terrorist attacks

12%

3.

Sectarian violence

7%

4.

War/civil war

6%

4.

Ethnic/religious tensions

6%

4.

U.S. occupation

6%


Government, Groups, and Provincial Elections

As shown in the recent provincial elections, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is riding on a wave of popularity. 55% said they approved of his performance, his highest rating over four surveys. Views on him amassing power were mixed however with 41% saying he had too much, 25% saying he had too little, and 31% thinking he had the right amount. Opinions of the Iraqi parliament weren't as positive, and actually declined from the March 2008 poll. 47% said the parliament was willing to pass an oil law, down from 53% in March 2008, 46% said they were promoting reconciliation, down from 48%, and 38% said they were willing to fight corruption, down from 46%. Local governments were seen in a much better light with 59% saying they were doing a good job, compared to 40% saying they were bad. That was the highest rating since ABC, BBC, and the NHK started conducting the polls.

Thoughts on Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki?


Feb. 09

Mar. 08

Aug. 07

Feb. 07

Approve

55%

40%

33%

43%

Disapprove

43%

58%

66%

57%

Refused/Don't know

2%

2%

1%

-

What do you think about Maliki's power?


Feb. 09

Too much power

41%

Too little power

25%

Right amount of power

31%

Refused/Don't know

3%

Opinions of Iraqi parliament

Sharing oil wealth with all parts of the country


Feb. 09

March 08

Willing

47%

53%

Not willing

51%

46%

Refused/Don't know

2%

1%

Promoting reconciliation


Feb. 09

March 08

Willing

46%

48%

Not willing

53%

51%

Refused/Don't know

1%

1%

Fighting corruption


Feb. 09

March 08

Willing

38%

46%

Not willing

61%

53%

Refused/Don't know

1%

1%

Government in your neighborhood


Feb. 09

Mar. 08

Aug. 07

Feb. 07

2005

2004

Very good

16%

11%

11%

12%

21%

18%

Quite good

43%

35%

28%

31%

30%

32%

Quite bad

25%

33%

32%

31%

24%

20%

Very bad

15%

21%

29%

26%

18%

18%

Refused/Don't know

-

1%

-

-

7%

12%


When asked their opinions on groups in Iraq, the security forces rated the best, with militias doing the worst. 73% said they had confidence in the Iraqi Army, and 74% said the same about the police. That was followed by the legal system 68%, the national government 61%, community leaders 44%, and Awakening councils 43%. The U.S. at 26%, and local militias with 18% were at the bottom. 67% also said that the security forces were loyal to the country. 30% said they followed individual factions. There was also suspicions about religious groups with 44% said they had too much power.

How do you feel about each group?

Iraqi Army


Feb. 09

Mar. 08

Aug. 07

Feb. 07

2005

2004

2003

Great deal of confidence

37%

28%

23%

24%

36%

18%

13%

Quite a lot of confidence

36%

37%

43%

37%

31%

38%

25%

Not very much confidence

24%

24%

21%

25%

18%

25%

29%

None at all

3%

11%

12%

14%

12%

10%

16%

Refused/Don't know

-

-

-

-

3%

9%

17%

Iraqi police


Feb. 09

March 08

Aug. 07

Feb. 07

2005

2004

2003

Great deal of confidence

36%

33%

33%

32%

38%

26%

18%

Quite a lot of confidence

38%

34%

36%

32%

31%

41%

28%

Not very much confidence

20%

20%

17%

16%

18%

20%

30%

None at all

5%

13%

15%

20%

12%

8%

15%

Refused/Don't know

-

1%

-

-

2%

4%

10%

U.S. military


Feb. 09

Mar. 08

Aug. 07

Feb. 07

2005

2004

2003

Great deal of confidence

12%

4%

4%

6%

7%

8%

7%

Quite a lot of confidence

14%

16%

11%

12%

11%

17%

12%

Not very much confidence

28%

33%

27%

30%

23%

23%

20%

None at all

45%

46%

58%

52%

55%

43%

52%

Refused/Don't know

1%

1%

-

-

5%

8%

9%

Community leaders



Feb. 09

Mar. 08

Aug. 07

Feb. 07

2005

2004

2003

Great deal of confidence

10%

12%

11%

11%

17%

17%

19%

Quite a lot of confidence

34%

35%

36%

34%

23%

34%

26%

Not very much confidence

33%

32%

34%

34%

29%

22%

21%

None at all

23%

20%

20%

21%

21%

16%

17%

Refused/Don't know

1%

1%

-

-

10%

12%

18%

National government


Feb. 09

Mar. 08

Aug. 07

Feb. 07

2005

Great deal of confidence

26%

17%

11%

18%

23%

Quite a lot of confidence

35%

31%

28%

31%

30%

Not very much confidence

26%

26%

31%

27%

25%

None at all

13%

25%

30%

24%

16%

Refused/Don't know

1%

1%

-

-

6%

Local militia


Feb. 09

Mar. 08

Aug. 07

Feb. 07

Great deal of confidence

4%

7%

11%

16%

Quite a lot of confidence

14%

15%

13%

20%

Not very much confidence

25%

24%

26%

26%

None at all

56%

47%

43%

38%

Refused/Don't know

1%

8%

8%

-

Awakening Council



Feb. 09

Mar. 08

Great deal of confidence

15%

16%

Quite a lot of confidence

28%

40%

Not very much confidence

28%

27%

None at all

25%

9%

Refused/Don't know

4%

7%

Legal system


Feb. 09

Great deal of confidence

28%

Quite a lot of confidence

40%

Not very much confidence

24%

None at all

8%

Refused/Don't know

1%

Who are the Iraqi security forces loyal to?


Feb. 09

Loyal to individual factions

30%

Loyal to Iraq

67%

Refused/Don't know

2%

Opinion on role of religious groups in society


Feb. 09

Too much

44%

Too little

29%

The right amount

26%

Refused/Don't know

2%


When asked about Iraq's governmental system, a strong central authority and democracy seem to have taken hold. 70% said Iraq power should be centered in the capital. 20% believed in regional governments, while 7% thought Iraq should break apart into separate states. Since 2004 Iraqis have said they support power being based in Baghdad. A democratic system also received the highest mark with 64% supporting it. That was a large jump from February 2007 when only 43% believed in it. Next was an Islamic state at 19%, then a strongman at 14%. Regardless of what type of government they wanted, a majority also believed in voting.

How should Iraq be governed in the future?


Feb. 09

Mar. 08

Aug. 07

Feb. 07

2005

2004

Unified Iraq under a central government

70%

66%

62%

58%

70%

79%

Regional governments

20%

23%

28%

28%

18%

14%

Separate independent states

7%

9%

9%

14%

9%

4%

Refused/Don't know

3%

1%

1%

-

3%

3%

Which political system would be best for Iraq?


Feb. 09

Feb. 07

2005

2004

Strong leader for life

14%

34%

26%

28%

Islamic state

19%

22%

14%

21%

Democracy

64%

43%

57%

49%

Refused/Don't know

3%

-

3%

4%

Regardless of type of government you prefer, are you confident that voting can work in Iraq?


Feb. 09

Very confident

28%

Somewhat confident

38%

Not so confident

25%

Not confident at all

7%

Refused/Don't know

2%


The January 2009 provincial elections also seem to have had a positive affect on the public. 43% said the election increased their confidence in voting. 47% also said they felt that they were free and fair, as opposed to 37% who said they were not. When asked how the elections would affect a variety of issues, all the results were positive. 56% said it would make the political situation better, 40% said it would improve cooperation amongst sectarian groups, 48% said it would help with security, 44% believed it would improve services, 45% thought it would improve the economy. The only issue that most did not think the elections would change were rights for women with 44% saying it would have no effect. One big change in the 2009 voting was that more Sunnis participated compared to the last ones in January 2005. Over two-thirds thought this was a positive development.

How did the Jan. 09 provincial elections affect your view of voting working in Iraq?


Feb. 09

Increased confidence

43%

Decreased confidence

18%

Made no difference

37%

Refused/Don't know

2%

Opinion of Jan. 09 provincial elections


Feb. 09

Were free and fair

47%

Were not free or fair

37%

Depends on province

14%

Refused/Don't know

3%

Effect of provincial elections on the following

Political situation


Feb. 09

Better

56%

Worse

12%

No real effect

29%

Refused/Don't know

3%

Cooperation amongst sectarian groups



Feb. 09

Better

40%

Worse

27%

No real effect

31%

Refused/Don't know

1%

Security


Feb. 09

Better

48%

Worse

22%

No real effect

28%

Refused/Don't know

1%

Public services


Feb. 09

Better

44%

Worse

26%

No real effect

28%

Refused/Don't know

2%

Economic opportunity


Feb. 09

Better

45%

Worse

22%

No real effect

31%

Refused/Don't know

1%

Rights for women


Feb. 09

Better

27%

Worse

26%

No real effect

44%

Refused/Don't know

3%

Opinion on more Sunnis participating in Jan. 09 provincial elections than Jan. 05 vote


Feb. 09

Positive

67%

Negative

10%

No real effect

20%

Refused/Don't know

3%


Many Iraqis believed that the sectarian and ethnic tensions were improving in the country. 60% said relations between Shiites and Sunnis were excellent to good. 79% believed that Sunnis and Shiites would reconcile, with only 17% believing that they would separate.

Thoughts on Arab-Kurdish relations were not as positive, but still good with 53% believing in reconciliation, compared to 43% who believed separation was in the future. 44% thought relations between the two groups were excellent to good. Iraqis tended to oppose the Kurds' aspirations however. 78% for example said Kirkuk should not become part of Kurdistan. 58% thought that the Kurds would eventually declare independence, an idea that only 23% would support.

How are relations between Shiites and Sunnis today in Iraq?


Feb. 09

March 08

Excellent

27%

9%

Good

33%

38%

Not so good

21%

33%

Poor

18%

19%

How are relations between Arabs and Kurds in Iraq today?


Feb. 09

March 08

Excellent

20%

11%

Good

24%

31%

Not so good

29%

33%

Poor

26%

24%

What is in Iraq's future between Sunnis and Shiites?


Feb. 09

Reconciliation

79%

Separation

17%

Refused/Don't know

3%

What is in the future for Arabs and Kurds?


Feb. 09

Reconciliation

53%

Separation

43%

Refused/Don't know

4%

Should Kirkuk become part of Kurdistan?


Feb. 09

Mar. 08

Should

20%

27%

Should not

78%

72%

Refused/Don't know

1%

1%

How likely is it that Kurdistan will declare independence?


Feb. 09

Very likely

31%

Somewhat likely

27%

Somewhat unlikely

23%

Very unlikely

17%

Would you support or oppose Kurdish independence?


Feb. 09

Support strongly

11%

Support somewhat

12%

Oppose somewhat

27%

Oppose strongly

48%


Finally, opinions on whether Iraq's refugees should return reversed from the earlier March 2008 poll. Then 45% said it as not time to return, as opposed to 54% who thought it was. In the newest poll 57% believed it was time, compared to 40% who said it was not.

Should Iraqi refugees return


Feb. 09

Mar. 08

Yes

57%

45%

No

40%

54%

Refused/Don't know

3%

1%


Opinions Of The U.S. And Coalition

Iraqis did not have a positive view of the U.S. or the Coalition. The low opinion of the American presence has been recorded in other polls. The Pentagon's quarterly report to Congress on Iraq for example, has consistently reported that few Iraqis are willing to give the U.S. military credit for security in their area.

In the ABC, BBC, NHK poll 53% said that the Americans controlled Iraq compared to 32% who said it was the government. When asked about the job the U.S. and other Coalition forces had done in Iraq only 30% said it had been good, with 69% saying they had done a bad job. That was the highest positive mark since 2005 however. Opinions of the U.S. invasion are also mostly negative with 56% saying it was wrong, compared to 42% who thought it was right. That was a decrease from the March 2008 poll. In February 2007 and 2004 however, there were higher positive marks. This might be the reason why 62% believed that journalist Muntadar al-Zaidi was a hero for throwing his shoes at President Bush. Iraqis didn't seem impressed by new President Obama either with only 35% saying he would have a positive effect on Iraq. 19% thought he would make things worse, while 38% said he would make no difference.

Who controls things in Iraq?


Feb. 09

Feb. 07

2005

Iraqi government

32%

34%

44%

U.S.

53%

59%

24%

Somebody else

9%

4%

17%

No one

3%

3%

6%

Refused/Don't know

3%

-

9%

Opinion on how the U.S. and other Coalition forces have done in Iraq


Feb. 09

Mar. 08

Aug. 07

Feb. 07

2005

A very good job

11%

6%

3%

6%

10%

Quite a good job

19%

23%

15%

18%

27%

Quite a bad job

30%

35%

32%

30%

19%

A very bad job

39%

35%

48%

46%

40%

Refused/Don't know

1%

1%

1%

-

5%

Opinion of U.S. invasion


Feb. 09

Mar. 08

Aug. 07

Feb. 07

2005

2004

Absolutely Right

19%

21%

12%

22%

19%

20%

Somewhat Right

23%

28%

25%

25%

28%

29%

Somewhat Wrong

28%

23%

28%

19%

17%

13%

Absolutely Wrong

28%

27%

35%

34%

33%

26%

Refused/Don't know

2%

-

-

-

4%

13%

What is your opinion of journalist Muntadar al-Zaidi who threw his shoe at President Bush


Feb. 09

A hero

62%

A criminal

24%

Both equally

10%

Refused/Don't know

4%

How will President Obama affect Iraq


Feb. 09

Better

35%

Worse

19%

No difference

38%

Depends

5%

Refused/Don't know

3%


Iraqis are also waiting for the U.S. to leave. 46% said the U.S. should leave before the 2011 deadline set by the Status of Forces Agreement. 59% thought that Iraqi forces were ready now to take over from the U.S. as well. Even so, there were some Iraqis who were worried about security after the U.S. left. 42% said they were concerned, compared to 57% who said they were not.

Should the U.S. leave before the 2011 deadline?


Feb. 09

Leaver sooner than 2011

46%

Stay longer than 2011

16%

The timetable for withdrawal is right

35%

Refused/Don't know

2%

Are the Iraqi forces ready now to take over from the U.S.?


Feb. 09

Ready

59%

Not Ready

40%

Refused/Don't know

1%

How concerned are you that security will worsen after the U.S. leaves?


Feb. 09

Very concerned

7%

Somewhat concerned

35%

Not so concerned

36%

Not concerned at all

21%

Refused/Don't know

1%


The British who controlled southern Iraq fared no better with a few exceptions. 42% said they had a negative affect, compared to 36% who thought they were a positive influence. 19% said they did both good and bad. 57% said the Iraqi forces were ready to take over from the English. 57% also thought that the security situation would not change much after the British left. When asked about the British impact upon the south overall, there were mixed reviews. 47% thought they helped with long-term security compared to 49% who thought they were a hindrance. 51% did say that the British helped rebuilding the government and police of the region, but only 42% said they helped with reconstruction.

Opinion of British forces in the south


Feb. 09

Generally positive

36%

Generally negative

42%

Some of both

19%

Refused/Don't know

3%

Are Iraqi forces ready to take over security in Basra from the British?


Feb. 09

Ready

57%

Not ready

38%

Refused/Don't know

5%

How concerned are you that security in Basra will worsen after British leave


Feb. 09

Very concerned

12%

Somewhat concerned

28%

Not so concerned

37%

Not concerned at all

20%

Refused/Don't know

2%

Opinion of British impact on each of the following:

Long-term security


Feb. 09

Help

47%

Hindrance

49%

Refused/Don't know

4%

Rebuilding government and police in the south


Feb. 09

Help

51%

Hindrance

47%

Refused/Don't know

3%

Rebuilding infrastructure


Feb. 09

Help

42%

Hindrance

55%

Refused/Don't know

4%


Foreign Relations

Iraqis didn't seem to have a positive few of very many countries overall. Only Turkey garnered a positive view with 35%. Even then 30% had a negative view of it. All of the other countries asked about were seen as negative. Those included Russia, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and England. The U.S. at 64% and Iran at 68% had the most negative responses.


Opinion of role of each country

Russia


Feb. 09

Feb. 07

Positive

18%

15%

Neutral

57%

72%

Negative

22%

13%

Saudi Arabia


Feb. 09

Feb. 07

Positive

21%

20%

Neutral

45%

28%

Negative

32%

52%

Iran



Feb. 09

Feb. 07

Positive

12%

17%

Neutral

19%

16%

Negative

68%

67%

Syria


Feb. 09

Feb. 07

Positive

23%

7%

Neutral

38%

30%

Negative

38%

63%

Turkey


Feb. 09

Feb. 07

Positive

35%

10%

Neutral

34%

44%

Negative

30%

46%

U.S.


Feb. 09

Feb. 07

Positive

18%

12%

Neutral

17%

11%

Negative

64%

77%

Britain


Feb. 09

Feb. 07

Positive

22%

11%

Neutral

18%

14%

Negative

59%

75%


Conclusion

This poll represents the new status quo in Iraq. The sectarian war of 2006-2007 is over. Violence is down. Iraqis feel much safer in their own neighborhood, although they are more apprehensive about the situation across the entire country. Still, the survey shows that many Iraqis feel that the situation is sustainable, and that the future holds promise. Economic issues have now eclipsed security as the most important issues for individuals when asked about their own neighborhoods. The U.S. and England have also set a date for withdrawal, something that is widely popular. Belief in a strong central government, and voting also appeared to have taken hold in the country. The two major complaints now appear to be about the government's inability to provide services, the economic outlook, and the claims of the Kurds for Kirkuk and possible independence.

SOURCES

BBC, ABC, NHK, “Iraq Poll February 2009,” 3/16/09

Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” December 2008


 
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