Iraq is entering its seventh year since the U.S. invasion. Many things have changed in that time period, from the chaos that followed the collapse of the state after Saddam was overthrown, to the civil war that erupted, to the Surge. At the end of 2009 three Iraq analysts, Sam Parker of the United States Institute for Peace, Michael Hanna of the Century Foundation, and Reidar Visser of the Norwegian Institute of International Relations, wrote pieces speculating on what lay ahead for Iraq. All three agree that politics is the main forum for disputes within Iraq now, but don’t see much hope for the country’s elites to overcome their differences any time soon.
Sam Parker in his article “Is Iraq Back?” for Current History, and Michael Hanna in “Transitional state” in the Abu Dhabi newspaper The National start off by talking about Iraq’s current political situation. Both believe that politics has replaced violence as the main way groups in the country now resolve their problems. This started in early 2005 when some militants first began turning on Al Qaeda in Iraq, which would eventually snowball into most of the insurgency switching sides and giving up the fight to join the Anbar Awakening and the Sons of Iraq. Sunnis also greatly regretted boycotting the 2005 elections, which isolated them from local and national governments. In the 2009 provincial elections, Sunni turnout was very high as a result, and deaths have taken a sharp drop since then as a result. This process will continue in the 2010 vote, and has led Iraq from being a failed state to a fragile one.
What the central government now faces are three large and daunting problems, the first of which is sectarianism. Parker believes that this is now more about identity than religious differences, as Iraqis tend to vote for candidates of their own community. That means any future government will have to continue to include representatives of each of the major groups, the Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis. These large groups however, are breaking up into smaller factions. The Shiites for example, ran on one large list in 2005, the United Iraqi Alliance, but in 2010 will be competing in two lists, the State of Law led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, and the National Alliance made up of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and the Sadrists. Reidar Visser of the Norwegian Institute of International Relations in “COIN to Nowhere? Lesson from Iraq, Questions for Afghanistan” adds that he believes that these sectarian divisions have solidified rather than weakened. For example, while Maliki’s State of Law tried to create new cross-sectarian alliances after the 2009 elections and attempted to reach out to Sunnis and former Baathists, he was later stopped by criticisms by the other Shiite parties, pressure from Iran, and the Obama administration, which continues to stress a grand bargain between the three major groups. He then agrees with Parker and Hanna that any new Iraqi government will look and operate very much like the old one as a result.
The ethnosectarian groups also have long-standing differences over things like federalism versus centralism, oil policy, and the Arab-Kurd dispute. Hanna writes that there have been no serious efforts to deal with any of these issues, and that any new government is likely to be just as divided as the current one. Many of these problems have their origins in the 2005 constitution, which was drafted while the Iraqi state was weak and the sectarian war was just about to take off. The Arab-Kurd divide prevents any major changes to the document, leading to more deadlock. Hanna doesn’t believe that these divisions will lead the country back to civil war, and oddly adds that not dealing with them right now may be the best thing for Iraq right at the moment. He’s afraid that any move towards majority rule, and away from consensus could do more harm than good because the country’s weak institutions may not be able to deal with winners and losers. Visser has written extensively arguing the opposite, that the Iraqi system of consensus and quotas within the government should be ended because it only maintains the sectarian divisions.
The paralysis in Baghdad means that more mundane issues like basic governance, services, the displaced and refugees, corruption, jobs, poverty, etc. can’t be addressed. Technical issues like boosting oil production, and election laws for example get endlessly delayed because of the larger disputes between the ethnosectarian groups. The lack of development and the Arab-Kurd divide also allows militants to continue their attacks in Iraq.
All three analysts bring up important issues for Iraq’s future. Iraq is no longer a failed state as it once was. It is gaining back both its sovereignty and domestic standing. Violence is also down to its lowest level since the 2003 invasion, and the struggle for political power through peaceful means is now paramount. The inability of Baghdad to deliver on many basic needs however, its corruption, and sectarianism continue to eat away at its standing with the public. The continued factionalization of Iraq’s three major groups also means that it will be harder rather than easier to put together a new government and get things done. Parker and Hanna point out that this makes Iraq not much different from many other Third World countries who not only struggle with development, but also power sharing and ethnic differences. The problem is that public dissatisfaction with a government that seems dysfunctional can undermine a nascent democracy, and lead to a return to autocracy or worse, and that may be Iraq’s largest dilemma in the long-term.
SOURCES
Hanna, Michael, “Transitional state,” The National, 11/26/09
Parker, Sam, “Is Iraq Back?” Current History, December 2009
Visser, Reidar, “COIN to Nowhere? Lessons from Iraq, Questions for Afghanistan,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 12/1/09
Showing posts with label Violence. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Violence. Show all posts
Monday, January 04, 2010
Tuesday, December 29, 2009
United Nations Human Rights Report On Iraq
The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) released its latest human rights report for Iraq covering the first half of 2009. The U.N. noted the decrease in violence in Iraq, but that there were still deaths everyday in the country. More importantly, it recorded continued institutional abuses in the justice system, and reminders of the old regime.
The number of deaths and unidentified bodies found are down greatly. In the last half of 2008 for example, 434 people were found dead in the streets, compared to 210 in the first six months of 2009. There were still daily attacks, but the U.N. made an important observation that it is becoming increasingly difficult to tell political violence from ones involving crime, especially because many gangs also work as militias and insurgents. The major targets in Iraq are the security forces, government officials, professionals, Sons of Iraq (SOI) members, and tribal leaders. Two generals were killed and one escaped a car bombing during the first half of 2009, along with four SOI leaders killed or wounded in four areas in Diyala.
Iraq’s minorities are also targets. Yazidis, Sabeans, Shabaks and Christians claim that their numbers have been drastically reduced because of the violence, with many becoming refugees. Yazidis say their population went from 500,000 before the war to 300,000 now. Sabeans reported 35,000 followers in 2003, and 7,000-8,000 now. There were 1.4 million Christians in the 1987 census, and they now believe there are only 500,000-800,000. All of these groups complain about being arrested by the Kurdish security forces, and being pressured to vote for pro-Kurdish parties.
With the dramatic decrease in militant activity, cultural and institutional abuses are gaining more prominence. UNAMI has been focusing upon women’s issues for the last year or two, concentrating upon the Kurdistan region. The U.N has found continued honor killings and suicides due to abuses there. Few of these cases are ever reported to the police, as they are considered family matters. Journalists also say they face regular harassment by the security forces and politicians’ bodyguards. One NGO reported 64 cases of abuse in 3 days in Baghdad, Basra, Babil, and Anbar. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has also arrested and convicted journalists for criticizing the authorities.
Most importantly the U.N. reports that Iraq’s justice system remains overwhelmed by the number of detainees, and its reliance upon confessions leads to widespread abuses. From January to June 2009 the number of prisoners held by the government increased from 27,466 to 29,871. Detainees are regularly held for long periods of time without charges or seeing a lawyer. Torture and beatings are common, and this includes against children held. That led to a series of protests by prisoners in June 2009 against corruption, lack of trials, and abuses in Maysan and Qadisiyah provinces. That same month, the Interior Minister announced that 43 police officers were going to be prosecuted for abuses. Similar conditions and treatment are also prevalent in Kurdistan. UNAMI interviewed people who were held for 5 years or more in the region without charges or trials, while noting that the KRG has begun a program to renovate and improve conditions in its prisons.
Finally, the authorities are finding remains of the Saddam era. In May and June 2009 dozens of mass graves were found in Qadisiyah, Najaf, Basra, Karbala, and Tamim. Most of those contained hundreds of Kurdish victims of Saddam’s Anfal campaign, while two sites were found in Karbala that had Kuwaiti prisoners of war that were killed during the Gulf War. The Ministry of Human Rights believes that they may be 270 unopened mass graves throughout the country.
Iraq remains a troubled nation. The insurgency has been largely defeated, but there are still terrorist attacks everyday that continue to take a human toll. With the fighting largely over, other problems are coming to the fore including overcrowding and abuses in Iraqi prisons and the justice system, lack of rights for women, and limits on press freedom. This shows that Iraq remains a fragile, developing state, with a large terrorist threat.
SOURCES
United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, “Human Rights Report 1 January – 30 June 2009,” 12/15/09
The number of deaths and unidentified bodies found are down greatly. In the last half of 2008 for example, 434 people were found dead in the streets, compared to 210 in the first six months of 2009. There were still daily attacks, but the U.N. made an important observation that it is becoming increasingly difficult to tell political violence from ones involving crime, especially because many gangs also work as militias and insurgents. The major targets in Iraq are the security forces, government officials, professionals, Sons of Iraq (SOI) members, and tribal leaders. Two generals were killed and one escaped a car bombing during the first half of 2009, along with four SOI leaders killed or wounded in four areas in Diyala.
Iraq’s minorities are also targets. Yazidis, Sabeans, Shabaks and Christians claim that their numbers have been drastically reduced because of the violence, with many becoming refugees. Yazidis say their population went from 500,000 before the war to 300,000 now. Sabeans reported 35,000 followers in 2003, and 7,000-8,000 now. There were 1.4 million Christians in the 1987 census, and they now believe there are only 500,000-800,000. All of these groups complain about being arrested by the Kurdish security forces, and being pressured to vote for pro-Kurdish parties.
With the dramatic decrease in militant activity, cultural and institutional abuses are gaining more prominence. UNAMI has been focusing upon women’s issues for the last year or two, concentrating upon the Kurdistan region. The U.N has found continued honor killings and suicides due to abuses there. Few of these cases are ever reported to the police, as they are considered family matters. Journalists also say they face regular harassment by the security forces and politicians’ bodyguards. One NGO reported 64 cases of abuse in 3 days in Baghdad, Basra, Babil, and Anbar. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has also arrested and convicted journalists for criticizing the authorities.
Most importantly the U.N. reports that Iraq’s justice system remains overwhelmed by the number of detainees, and its reliance upon confessions leads to widespread abuses. From January to June 2009 the number of prisoners held by the government increased from 27,466 to 29,871. Detainees are regularly held for long periods of time without charges or seeing a lawyer. Torture and beatings are common, and this includes against children held. That led to a series of protests by prisoners in June 2009 against corruption, lack of trials, and abuses in Maysan and Qadisiyah provinces. That same month, the Interior Minister announced that 43 police officers were going to be prosecuted for abuses. Similar conditions and treatment are also prevalent in Kurdistan. UNAMI interviewed people who were held for 5 years or more in the region without charges or trials, while noting that the KRG has begun a program to renovate and improve conditions in its prisons.
Finally, the authorities are finding remains of the Saddam era. In May and June 2009 dozens of mass graves were found in Qadisiyah, Najaf, Basra, Karbala, and Tamim. Most of those contained hundreds of Kurdish victims of Saddam’s Anfal campaign, while two sites were found in Karbala that had Kuwaiti prisoners of war that were killed during the Gulf War. The Ministry of Human Rights believes that they may be 270 unopened mass graves throughout the country.
Iraq remains a troubled nation. The insurgency has been largely defeated, but there are still terrorist attacks everyday that continue to take a human toll. With the fighting largely over, other problems are coming to the fore including overcrowding and abuses in Iraqi prisons and the justice system, lack of rights for women, and limits on press freedom. This shows that Iraq remains a fragile, developing state, with a large terrorist threat.
SOURCES
United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, “Human Rights Report 1 January – 30 June 2009,” 12/15/09
Thursday, December 17, 2009
Is The Security Situation In Iraq Getting Worse?
Every time there is a massive, headline-grabbing bombing in Iraq, it sets off a wave of reports and commentaries in the West about how the security situation in the country is getting worse. The most recent such attack was on December 8, 2009 when four targets in Baghdad were assaulted resulting in 127 deaths and 448 wounded. In August and October there were similar bombings of government ministries and the Baghdad provincial council building. A typical response was by John McCreary of AFCEA Intelligence who wrote on December 8 that, “Day by day, the security situation is deteriorating. This should surprise no Readers and it will get much worse in the next few months.” Thomas Ricks, author of the books The Fiasco and The Gamble, member of the Center for a New American Century think tank, who runs the Best Defense blog on the Foreign Policy website, is another who has an on-going series of posts called “Iraq, the unraveling” that argues things are going downhill in the country. The problem with these writers is that they appear to be basing their writings purely upon press reports, which focus almost exclusively on violence. As reported before, that gives a distorted picture of the situation. What they lack is any kind of research or background into the larger trend in violence that can put these attacks into context.
First, there is no direct correlation between large bombings and the overall security situation. In June 2009 for example, there were 14 mass casualty bombings that resulted in 174 deaths and 517 wounded. The next month there were 35 such attacks that led to 180 dead and 655 wounded. According to Iraq Body Count however, there were more deaths in June, 488, than July, 395, even though the latter had more bombings.
Comparison Of Bombings and Overall Deaths In Iraq – June vs July 2009
June 2009
Mass Casualty Bombings: 14
Deaths Caused By: 174
Wounded Caused By: 517
Overall Monthly Death Count: 488
July 2009
Mass Casualty Bombings: 35
Death Caused By: 180
Wounded Caused By: 655
Overall Monthly Death Count: 395
Second, even if one were to judge Iraqi security by multiple fatality bombings, they have been declining since their peak in 2006. The Brookings Institution’s Iraq Index tracks such attacks from May 2003 to the present. According to their numbers, there were an average of 5.1 of these bombings a month in 2003, 13.5 in 2004, 29.1 in 2005, before they reached their highest point in 2006 with an average of 50.9. After that there was a steady decline with an average of 38.5 bombings a month in 2007, followed by 21.0 in 2008, and 15.5 this year from January to November 2009.
Average Number of Mass Casualty Bombings 2003-2009
2003: Avg. 5.1
2004: Avg. 13.5
2005: Avg. 29.1
2006: Avg. 50.9
2007: Avg. 38.5
2008: Avg. 21.0
2009: Avg. 15.5
Third, attacks overall are down to their lowest levels since 2004. From January to March 2004 there were around 250-300 security incidents each week. Attacks took off as the sectarian war started with the bombing of the Samarra mosque in February 2006 peaking at 1,800 per week in May 2007. After that point, weekly attacks steadily decreased with a few up-ticks. Since July 2009 they have averaged below 200 per week.
Some thought that the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq’s cities on June 30, 2009 would negatively affect security, but that hasn’t happened either. From mid-February to June 30, 2009 there were an average of 250 security incidents per week. From the withdrawal date to early November 2009 there has been an average of just under 200 attacks per week. The number killed has also seen a very slight decrease from before and after the pullout.
Like bombings, there is also no correlation between overall attacks and casualties in Iraq. As the chart below shows, security incidents reached their highest level at the middle of 2007, yet the number of deaths had been declining since the very end of 2006.
Regarding deaths, 2009 has seen the fewest number since the Iraq war began. From May to December 2003 when the invasion ended and the insurgency was just beginning, there was an average of 578.8 deaths per month according to Iraq Body Count. In comparison, from January to November 2009 there have been an average of 388.7. In fact, August 2009 was the only month this year that casualties reached the 500 mark. Deaths reached their highest levels in late-2006 to early-2007 when over 3,000 were being killed a month. Since then they have seen a steady decline, with November 2009 having the fewest fatalities since 2003.
Iraqi Monthly Deaths 2003 vs 2009
2003
May 545
June 593
July 650
Aug. 790
Sep. 553
Oct. 493
Nov. 478
Dec. 529
Avg. Monthly Deaths: 578.8
2009
Jan. 276
Feb. 343
March 416
Apr. 484
May 332
June 488
July 395
Aug. 593
Sep. 299
Oct. 438
Nov. 212
Avg. Monthly Deaths: 388.7
Overall, there is nothing to support the thesis that the security situation is worsening in Iraq. Mass casualty bombings, security incidents, and deaths have all gone down since the sectarian war of 2006-2007. The situation has not gotten worse since the U.S. pulled out of Iraq’s urban areas either at the end of June 2009. The major reason for this change is the fact that the majority of the Sunni insurgency gave up and switched sides to join the Anbar Awakening and Sons of Iraq program from 2005-2007. More recently, many Sunnis have decided to join the political process after they boycotted the first election in 2005. There are still militants in Iraq who carry out attacks every day, but their numbers and areas of operation are severely limited. Their violence will likely continue for the foreseeable future however as Iraqi politics are still divided, and some religious zealots still feel that Iraq is their cause. It should also be stressed that despite the drop in deaths and attacks, and the weakening of the insurgency, Iraq remains one of the most violent countries in the world. These incidents need to be put into a larger political context however, instead of the knee-jerk commentary that is currently prevalent.
SOURCES
Cordesman, Anthony, “Iraq: Security Trends,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 11/19/09
McCreary, John, “Night Watch For the Night of 8 December 2009,” AFCEA Intelligence, 12/8/09
O’Hanlon, Michael Livingston, Ian, “Iraq Index,” Brookings Institution, 12/11/09
RTT News, “Chief Of Iraqi Security Forces In Baghdad Replaced After Deadly Bomb Attacks,” 12/9/09
Tuesday, December 15, 2009
Baghdad Bombings Set Off Political Bickering Amongst Iraqi Elites
The December 8, 2009 bombings have led to a wave of accusations amongst Iraqi politicians. First members of parliament demanded that the Interior, Defense, and National Security ministers, the head of the Iraqi Intelligence Service, the chief of the Baghdad Operations Command, along with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki appear before them for questioning over the lapses in security that have led to the attacks. Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani said he would do so as long as the hearings were in public, while members of the Dawa Party said that the Prime Minister would never be questioned by the legislature because that would only serve his detractors who want to attack him.
Maliki also dismissed the Baghdad Security Chief General Abboud Qanbar, who is a close ally of the Prime Minister. At the same time, Maliki is calling for the resignation of Interior Minister Bolani for the bombings. A Dawa parliamentarian said that Bolani is responsible for the attacks, and that he had filled the Interior Ministry with members of his Constitution party, which prevented him from firing incompetent people. Bolani countered by saying that Maliki is at fault since the Baghdad Operations Command answers directly to his office, not the Interior or Defense ministries. Bolani also implied that some of Iraq’s political parties were involved in yesterday’s incident.
The 2010 parliamentary elections loom in the background of these charges. Maliki and Bolani are rivals, and head separate political list that are competing against each other. Maliki and his Dawa Party are in the lead of the State of Law coalition, while Bolani’s Constitution Party is part of the Unity of Iraq Alliance that also includes Sheikh Ahmad Abu Risha of the Anbar Awakening Conference, the head of the Sunni Endowment Ahmed Abed al-Ghafur al-Samarraie, and the former speaker of parliament Mahmoud Mashhadani of the National Independent Trend. One of Maliki’s main campaign points is that he has brought security to Iraq. The August, October, and December bombings have severely tarnished his image. In response, the Prime Minister has focused upon blaming others, at first Baathists in Syria for the attacks, and now Minister Bolani to defer responsibility. The Iraqi public doesn’t seem to care about the political attacks, and are increasingly blaming the entire government for failing at their job to protect the people.
SOURCES
AK News, “Parliament will question Premier as well over bombings,” 12/9/09
Ali, Ahmed, “Iraq’s Elections Challenge: A Shifting Political Landscape,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 11/20/09
Alsumaria, “Iraq Interior Minister set for accountability,” 12/9/09
- “MP blames blasts on Iraq Interior Ministry,” 12/9/09
Roads To Iraq, “Current situation and the three options,” 11/19/09
- “Al-Sadr’s election campaign, questioning Maliki is the next political crisis,” 12/9/09
RTT News, “Chief Of Iraqi Security Forces In Baghdad Replaced After Deadly Bomb Attacks,” 12/9/09
Maliki also dismissed the Baghdad Security Chief General Abboud Qanbar, who is a close ally of the Prime Minister. At the same time, Maliki is calling for the resignation of Interior Minister Bolani for the bombings. A Dawa parliamentarian said that Bolani is responsible for the attacks, and that he had filled the Interior Ministry with members of his Constitution party, which prevented him from firing incompetent people. Bolani countered by saying that Maliki is at fault since the Baghdad Operations Command answers directly to his office, not the Interior or Defense ministries. Bolani also implied that some of Iraq’s political parties were involved in yesterday’s incident.
The 2010 parliamentary elections loom in the background of these charges. Maliki and Bolani are rivals, and head separate political list that are competing against each other. Maliki and his Dawa Party are in the lead of the State of Law coalition, while Bolani’s Constitution Party is part of the Unity of Iraq Alliance that also includes Sheikh Ahmad Abu Risha of the Anbar Awakening Conference, the head of the Sunni Endowment Ahmed Abed al-Ghafur al-Samarraie, and the former speaker of parliament Mahmoud Mashhadani of the National Independent Trend. One of Maliki’s main campaign points is that he has brought security to Iraq. The August, October, and December bombings have severely tarnished his image. In response, the Prime Minister has focused upon blaming others, at first Baathists in Syria for the attacks, and now Minister Bolani to defer responsibility. The Iraqi public doesn’t seem to care about the political attacks, and are increasingly blaming the entire government for failing at their job to protect the people.
SOURCES
AK News, “Parliament will question Premier as well over bombings,” 12/9/09
Ali, Ahmed, “Iraq’s Elections Challenge: A Shifting Political Landscape,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 11/20/09
Alsumaria, “Iraq Interior Minister set for accountability,” 12/9/09
- “MP blames blasts on Iraq Interior Ministry,” 12/9/09
Roads To Iraq, “Current situation and the three options,” 11/19/09
- “Al-Sadr’s election campaign, questioning Maliki is the next political crisis,” 12/9/09
RTT News, “Chief Of Iraqi Security Forces In Baghdad Replaced After Deadly Bomb Attacks,” 12/9/09
Monday, December 14, 2009
Security Situation In Mosul, November 2009
The security situation in Iraq was a little different in November 2009. Unlike previous months, Baghdad province was not the deadliest place in the country. Rather Ninewa, largely driven by events in the provincial capital Mosul, had the most deaths for the month. Last month Ninewa had 61 attacks resulting in 41 dead and 80 wounded, compared to 59 attacks in Baghdad, 38 deaths, and 165 wounded. Around 90% of the violence in Ninewa occurred in Mosul. There were 55 attacks there in November, resulting in 37 deaths, and 71 wounded. That averaged out to 1.83 attacks per day, 1.23 deaths, and 2.36 wounded. That was the lowest number of attacks since January 2009 when there were 52, and an average of 1.67. 37 was also the lowest number of deaths since at least 2006, if not before.
Mosul is the second most violent city in Iraq after Baghdad. That’s because it is the largest urban stronghold of the insurgency. There are daily reports of assassinations, bombings, and attacks on local officials and security forces. That has begun to change however. Starting in November 2008 attacks and casualties began to see a steady decline. That coincided with the run-up to the January 2009 provincial elections, and the formation of the al-Hadbaa List. The coalition was a collection of Mosul business elites, tribal leaders, and Kurds opposed to the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. (3) Al-Hadbaa was eventually able to work out a cease-fire with local insurgents, and got the backing of local Baathists and their fighters, who by 2008 had been able to assume command of the fighting there from Al Qaeda in Iraq. Al-Hadbaa ended up winning the election, which marked a return of Sunni Arabs to politics in Ninewa after they had boycotted the 2005 vote. The greater participation is directly responsible for the reduction of attacks in Mosul. The divide of the city between Arabs and Kurds however, still gives some reason to turn to violence, and the continued security incidents there.
Attack and Casualty Statistics for Mosul – January to November 2009
January 52 Attacks/Incidents, Avg. 1.67/day
56 Deaths, Avg. 1.80/day
56 Wounded, Avg. 1.80/day
February 81 Attacks/Incidents, Avg. 2.89/day
58 Deaths, Avg. 2.00/day
111 Wounded, Avg. 3.96/day
March 86 Attacks/Incidents, Avg. 2.77/day
69 Deaths, Avg. 2.22/day
169 Wounded, Avg. 5.45/day
April 79 Attacks/Incidents, Avg. 2.63/day
53 Deaths, Avg. 1.76/day
191 Wounded, Avg. 6.36/day
May 83 Attacks/Incidents, Avg. 3.06/day
64 Deaths, Avg. 2.06/day
164 Wounded, Avg. 4.70/day
June 73 Attacks/Incidents, Avg. 2.43/day
58 Deaths, Avg. 1.93/day
123 Wounded, Avg. 4.10/day
July 73 Attacks/Incidents, Avg. 2.35/day
79 Deaths, Avg. 2.54/day
169 Wounded, Avg. 5.45/day
August 77 Attacks/Incidents, Avg. 2.48/day
102 Deaths, Avg. 3.29/day
171 Wounded, Avg. 5.51/day
September 72 Attacks/Incidents, Avg. 2.40/day
65 Deaths, Avg. 2.16/day
60 Wounded, Avg. 2.00/day
October 66 Attacks/Incidents, Avg. 2.12/ day
60 Deaths, Avg. 1.93/ day
82 Wounded, Avg. 2.64/ day
November 55 Attacks/Incidents, Avg. 1.83/ day
37 Deaths, Avg. 1.23/ day
71 Wounded, Avg. 2.36/ day
Averages:
4th Quarter 2007: 38.66 Attacks/Incidents/month, Avg. 1.26/day
77.33 deaths/month, Avg. 2.52/day
114.66 wounded/month, Avg. 3.73/day
1st Half 2008: 57.5 Attacks/Incidents/month, Avg. 1.89/day
88.00 deaths/month, Avg. 2.90/day
210.00 wounded/month, Avg. 6.92/day
2nd Half 2008: 75.33 Attacks/Incidents/month, Avg. 2.45/day
80.83 deaths/month, Avg. 2.63/day
168.33 wounded/month, Avg. 5.48/day
1st Half 2009: 75.66 Attacks/Incidents/month, Avg. 2.50/day
59.66 deaths/month, Avg. 1.97/day
135.66 wounded/month, Avg. 4.49/day
For a history of the violence in post-invasion Mosul see:
The Changing Face of Violence In Mosul
SOURCES
Aswat al-Iraq, “2 charred bodies found inside car bomb,” 11/1/09
- “2 civilians killed in Mosul,” 11/19/09
- “2 civilians wounded in cab bomb blast in Mosul,” 11/1/09
- “2 gunmen killed in IED blast they planted,” 11/8/09
- “2 policemen wounded in hand-grenade blast in Mosul,” 11/12/09
- “3 children wounded in Ninewa blast,” 11/15/09
- “3 mortar shells hit central Mosul,” 11/9/09
- “3 soldiers wounded in Mosul blast,” 11/15/09
- “13-year-old Christian boy shot down in Mosul,” 11/13/09
- “Army officer killed in Mosul blast,” 11/23/09
- “Asiacell employee gunned down in Mosul,” 11/2/09
- “Body found, civilian killed, another wounded separately in Mosul,” 11/12/09
- “Bomb kills child, wounds 5 civilians in Mosul,” 11/15/09
- “Car bomb causes slight damage in Mosul,” 11/25/09
- “Child wounded in Mosul blast,” 11/11/09
- “Civilian killed in eastern Mosul,” 11/9/09
- “Civilian killed, son wounded in western Mosul,” 11/16/09
- “Civilian wounded as police detonates IED,” 11/22/09
- “Civilian wounded by Iraqi fire in Mosul,” 11/10/09
- “Cop wounded in Mosul blast,” 11/11/09
- “Employee shot down by gunmen in Mosul,” 11/1/09
- “Gunmen kill employee in Mosul,” 11/22/09
- “Gunmen wound lawman in Mosul,” 11/3/09
- “Gunmen wound policeman in Mosul,” 11/8/09
- “Hand grenade wounds woman in Mosul,” 11/28/09
- “IED injures 2 cops in Mosul,” 11/20/09
- “IED wounds 2 civilians in Mosul,” 11/16/09
- “IED wounds 5 in western Mosul,” 11/6/09
- “Iraqi soldier shot down by gunmen in Mosul,” 11/26/09
- “Judge survives assassination attempt,” 11/17/09
- “Lawyer shot dead by gunmen in Mosul,” 11/1/09
- “Mortar attack on Sunni endowment leaves 3 wounded,” 11/3/09
- “Officer killed, 2 cops wounded by roadside bomb in Mosul,” 11/5/09
- “Policeman killed by gunmen fire in Mosul,” 11/7/09
- “Security element killed in Mosul,” 11/30/09
- “Soldiers wounded in clashes with gunmen,” 11/21/09
- “Teacher gunned down in Mosul,” 11/21/09
- “Thermal bomb kills, injures 2 cops in Mosul,” 11/30/09
- “Thermal bomb leaves child killed, 4 wounded in Mosul,” 11/22/09
- “Thermal bomb wounds civilian in Mosul,” 11/16/09
- “Turkmen politician assassinated in Mosul,” 11/22/09
- “Unidentified body of young man found in Mosul,” 11/13/09
- “Unknown bodies found in Mosul,” 11/4/09
DPA, “Bomb kills three in northern Iraq,” 11/17/09
Hammoudi, Laith, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 3 November 2009,” 11/3/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 10 November 2009,” 11/10/09
International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s New Battlefront: The Struggle Over Ninewa,” 9/28/09
Issa, Sahar, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Friday 6 November 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 11/6/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Sunday 8 November 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 11/8/09
Reuters, “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov. 9,” 11/9/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 26,” 11/26/09
Mosul is the second most violent city in Iraq after Baghdad. That’s because it is the largest urban stronghold of the insurgency. There are daily reports of assassinations, bombings, and attacks on local officials and security forces. That has begun to change however. Starting in November 2008 attacks and casualties began to see a steady decline. That coincided with the run-up to the January 2009 provincial elections, and the formation of the al-Hadbaa List. The coalition was a collection of Mosul business elites, tribal leaders, and Kurds opposed to the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. (3) Al-Hadbaa was eventually able to work out a cease-fire with local insurgents, and got the backing of local Baathists and their fighters, who by 2008 had been able to assume command of the fighting there from Al Qaeda in Iraq. Al-Hadbaa ended up winning the election, which marked a return of Sunni Arabs to politics in Ninewa after they had boycotted the 2005 vote. The greater participation is directly responsible for the reduction of attacks in Mosul. The divide of the city between Arabs and Kurds however, still gives some reason to turn to violence, and the continued security incidents there.
Attack and Casualty Statistics for Mosul – January to November 2009
January 52 Attacks/Incidents, Avg. 1.67/day
56 Deaths, Avg. 1.80/day
56 Wounded, Avg. 1.80/day
February 81 Attacks/Incidents, Avg. 2.89/day
58 Deaths, Avg. 2.00/day
111 Wounded, Avg. 3.96/day
March 86 Attacks/Incidents, Avg. 2.77/day
69 Deaths, Avg. 2.22/day
169 Wounded, Avg. 5.45/day
April 79 Attacks/Incidents, Avg. 2.63/day
53 Deaths, Avg. 1.76/day
191 Wounded, Avg. 6.36/day
May 83 Attacks/Incidents, Avg. 3.06/day
64 Deaths, Avg. 2.06/day
164 Wounded, Avg. 4.70/day
June 73 Attacks/Incidents, Avg. 2.43/day
58 Deaths, Avg. 1.93/day
123 Wounded, Avg. 4.10/day
July 73 Attacks/Incidents, Avg. 2.35/day
79 Deaths, Avg. 2.54/day
169 Wounded, Avg. 5.45/day
August 77 Attacks/Incidents, Avg. 2.48/day
102 Deaths, Avg. 3.29/day
171 Wounded, Avg. 5.51/day
September 72 Attacks/Incidents, Avg. 2.40/day
65 Deaths, Avg. 2.16/day
60 Wounded, Avg. 2.00/day
October 66 Attacks/Incidents, Avg. 2.12/ day
60 Deaths, Avg. 1.93/ day
82 Wounded, Avg. 2.64/ day
November 55 Attacks/Incidents, Avg. 1.83/ day
37 Deaths, Avg. 1.23/ day
71 Wounded, Avg. 2.36/ day
Averages:
4th Quarter 2007: 38.66 Attacks/Incidents/month, Avg. 1.26/day
77.33 deaths/month, Avg. 2.52/day
114.66 wounded/month, Avg. 3.73/day
1st Half 2008: 57.5 Attacks/Incidents/month, Avg. 1.89/day
88.00 deaths/month, Avg. 2.90/day
210.00 wounded/month, Avg. 6.92/day
2nd Half 2008: 75.33 Attacks/Incidents/month, Avg. 2.45/day
80.83 deaths/month, Avg. 2.63/day
168.33 wounded/month, Avg. 5.48/day
1st Half 2009: 75.66 Attacks/Incidents/month, Avg. 2.50/day
59.66 deaths/month, Avg. 1.97/day
135.66 wounded/month, Avg. 4.49/day
For a history of the violence in post-invasion Mosul see:
The Changing Face of Violence In Mosul
SOURCES
Aswat al-Iraq, “2 charred bodies found inside car bomb,” 11/1/09
- “2 civilians killed in Mosul,” 11/19/09
- “2 civilians wounded in cab bomb blast in Mosul,” 11/1/09
- “2 gunmen killed in IED blast they planted,” 11/8/09
- “2 policemen wounded in hand-grenade blast in Mosul,” 11/12/09
- “3 children wounded in Ninewa blast,” 11/15/09
- “3 mortar shells hit central Mosul,” 11/9/09
- “3 soldiers wounded in Mosul blast,” 11/15/09
- “13-year-old Christian boy shot down in Mosul,” 11/13/09
- “Army officer killed in Mosul blast,” 11/23/09
- “Asiacell employee gunned down in Mosul,” 11/2/09
- “Body found, civilian killed, another wounded separately in Mosul,” 11/12/09
- “Bomb kills child, wounds 5 civilians in Mosul,” 11/15/09
- “Car bomb causes slight damage in Mosul,” 11/25/09
- “Child wounded in Mosul blast,” 11/11/09
- “Civilian killed in eastern Mosul,” 11/9/09
- “Civilian killed, son wounded in western Mosul,” 11/16/09
- “Civilian wounded as police detonates IED,” 11/22/09
- “Civilian wounded by Iraqi fire in Mosul,” 11/10/09
- “Cop wounded in Mosul blast,” 11/11/09
- “Employee shot down by gunmen in Mosul,” 11/1/09
- “Gunmen kill employee in Mosul,” 11/22/09
- “Gunmen wound lawman in Mosul,” 11/3/09
- “Gunmen wound policeman in Mosul,” 11/8/09
- “Hand grenade wounds woman in Mosul,” 11/28/09
- “IED injures 2 cops in Mosul,” 11/20/09
- “IED wounds 2 civilians in Mosul,” 11/16/09
- “IED wounds 5 in western Mosul,” 11/6/09
- “Iraqi soldier shot down by gunmen in Mosul,” 11/26/09
- “Judge survives assassination attempt,” 11/17/09
- “Lawyer shot dead by gunmen in Mosul,” 11/1/09
- “Mortar attack on Sunni endowment leaves 3 wounded,” 11/3/09
- “Officer killed, 2 cops wounded by roadside bomb in Mosul,” 11/5/09
- “Policeman killed by gunmen fire in Mosul,” 11/7/09
- “Security element killed in Mosul,” 11/30/09
- “Soldiers wounded in clashes with gunmen,” 11/21/09
- “Teacher gunned down in Mosul,” 11/21/09
- “Thermal bomb kills, injures 2 cops in Mosul,” 11/30/09
- “Thermal bomb leaves child killed, 4 wounded in Mosul,” 11/22/09
- “Thermal bomb wounds civilian in Mosul,” 11/16/09
- “Turkmen politician assassinated in Mosul,” 11/22/09
- “Unidentified body of young man found in Mosul,” 11/13/09
- “Unknown bodies found in Mosul,” 11/4/09
DPA, “Bomb kills three in northern Iraq,” 11/17/09
Hammoudi, Laith, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 3 November 2009,” 11/3/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 10 November 2009,” 11/10/09
International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s New Battlefront: The Struggle Over Ninewa,” 9/28/09
Issa, Sahar, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Friday 6 November 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 11/6/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Sunday 8 November 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 11/8/09
Reuters, “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov. 9,” 11/9/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 26,” 11/26/09
Wednesday, December 09, 2009
Terrorists Strike Baghdad With Massive Bombings For Third Time
These bombings follow the August attacks on the Foreign and Finance Ministries, and the October bombings of the Justice Ministry and Baghdad provincial council building. The bombings could have been predicted. Since the beginning of 2009 casualties have gone up and down. November saw the fewest monthly deaths since the U.S. invasion in March 2003. December therefore is going to be a bloody time in comparison even though fatalities are at their lowest level since the beginning of the war. The bombings have followed the same pattern of occurring every other month.
The attacks are meant to undermine the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki who has built a large part of his popularity upon bringing relative calm to Iraq. It also allows militants to gain media attention, raise money, and appear much stronger than they actually are. Finally, it effects the operation of the government, which already works at a snails pace. Many basic services were no longer available immediately after the bombings in August and October because the various ministries and bureaucracies were disrupted.
Iraq’s insurgents, who were behind the bombings, have lost most of their standing with the Iraqi public. They can’t even launch these massive attacks every month like they use to. Unfortunately, the country’s society and politics remain so divided that there is still plenty of space for militants to operate and kill hundreds of people each month.
SOURCES
Arraf, Jane, “Baghdad bombings: Iraqis demand security,” Christian Science Monitor, 12/8/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Today’s blasts leave federal appeal court 100% devastated,” 12/8/09
Londono, Ernesto, “At least 127 dead in string of Baghdad bomb attacks,” Washington Post, 12/8/09
Myers, Steven Lee and Santora, Marc, “Election Date Set in Iraq as Bombs Kill Scores,” New York Times, 12/8/09
Parker, Ned and Salman, Raheem, “At least 127 killed as explosions rock Baghdad,” Los Angeles Times, 12/8/09
Roggio, Bill, “Suicide attacks killed more than 120 Iraqis in Baghdad,” 12/8/09
Strobel, Warren and al Dulaimy, Mohammed, “String of bombings in Baghdad kills 127 people,” McClatchy Newspapers, 12/8/09
Tuesday, December 01, 2009
Maliki Returns To Sectarian Politics
On October 1, 2009 Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki officially announced his State of Law list that would compete in the 2010 parliamentary elections. Almost every Western report on his coalition mentioned how broad it was, that it was non-sectarian, and how the Prime Minister was running a nationalist campaign. Recently however, Maliki has been emphasizing sectarian politics by warning of the return of Baathists.
On November 12, 2009 for example, Maliki went to a meeting of tribal leaders in Sadr City, Baghdad and said that Iraq’s enemies were trying to undermine the political process during the elections. Three days later he was more specific when he said that Baathists were trying to use the 2010 vote to get back into power, and that he would never let that happen. Then on November 16 at a press conference Maliki said that Baathists would not be allowed to participate in the upcoming elections in any form, and that all talks with them by the government were banned. Maliki has been emphasizing the Baathist threat to Iraq since the August 2009 Baghdad bombings, which he blamed on former regime elements in Syria. In fact, the government aired a new set of video taped confessions on November 22 of three men who claimed they were Baath party members who carried out the October 25, 2009 attacks on Iraq’s Ministry of Justice and Baghdad provincial council offices. In Iraqi politics, whenever Shiite politicians mention Baathists they are talking about the threat of Sunnis returning to power, just as talk about Iranian influence by Sunnis is about Shiite rule.
Maliki’s rhetoric has angered one of his State of Law coalition partners, Sheikh Ali Hatem Sulaiman. He is the head of the Al-Anbar Tribal Council and the Flags of Iraq Party, and was one of the leaders of the Awakening movement there. The sheikh said that those who keep talking about Baathists sound like a broken record, and that Baathists should be able to participate in elections as long as they don’t have any charges against them. He finished by saying that if Baathists were to be truly banned from Iraqi politics, than half of the Sunnis in Anbar would not be able to participate. This is significant because Sheikh Sulaiman was the only notable Sunni politician Maliki was able to draw into his list. He is a minor player however as his party wasn’t able to win a single seat in Anbar in the 2009 elections, and Maliki’s Dawa Party is firmly in the lead of the coalition.
Of more interest is the fact that Ammar al-Hakim, the leader of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and member of the Iraqi National Alliance issued a statement saying that Baathists should be able to take part in Iraqi politics as long as they didn’t have blood on their hands. The Supreme Council has always been one of the most ardent proponents of using the Baathist card against any moves towards reconciliation with Sunnis, and only recently called for the banning of Baathists from the 2010 vote as well. His release was almost certainly a response to Maliki’s comments as the National Alliance is the State of Law’s main challenger.
At the other end of the spectrum, the Sadrists, the other major players in the National Alliance, both attacked Maliki and supported him at the same time. First, a Sadrist parliamentarian said that the authorities faked the November 22 confessions of the alleged bombers. At the same time, Moqtada al-Sadr, echoing the Prime Minister, said that there could never be reconciliation with the Baathists. This shows both that Maliki’s attempt to play sectarian politics with the Baghdad attacks is widely questioned within Iraq, while talking about Baathists still resonates in Shiite politics.
The Prime Minister’s emphasis upon the Baathist threat could be a sign of his foreboding about the coming election. While Maliki is still the most popular politician in Iraq, the August and October 2009 ministry bombings in Baghdad have hurt his claim that he has brought security and stability to the country, so bringing up Baathists is a way for him to defer blame. He also has not been able to bring in any new significant partners into his coalition. Some believe that that his announcements are aimed at his potential rivals, specifically the Iraqi National Movement of former Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi, parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq of the National Dialogue Council, and Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi. Finally, a return to sectarian politics may be a way for him to firm up his base with Shiites, and distract them from more pressing issues like the continued lack of services and corruption in the government.
SOURCES
Ali, Ahmed, “Iraq’s Elections Challenge: A Shifting Political Landscape,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 11/20/09
Alsumaria, “Maliki warns of enemies ahead of elections,” 11/12/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “PM warns of Baathists’ infiltration through election,” 11/15/09
Chon, Gina, “Maliki Coalition Tries to Bridge Iraq’s Deep Sectarian Divisions,” Wall Street Journal, 10/2/09
Al-Dulaimy, Mohammed, “Maliki unveils new national, nonsectarian Iraqi party,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/1/09
Al-Hayat, Elaph, “In Surprise Statement, Al-Hakim Calls for Involving Ba-athists in Iraqi Political Process,” MEMRI Blog, 11/20/09
Karadshesh, Jomana, “Alleged Baath members confess in videos to Iraq attacks,” CNN, 11/23/09
Myers, Steven Lee, “Iraqi Leader Creates Broad Coalition,” New York Times, 10/1/09
Roads To Iraq, “Ba’ath Party and the election – intro,” 11/24/09
- “Ba’ath Party and the election 1,” 11/24/09
- “Disagreement among the “State of Law” and The political-football crisis,” 11/17/09
Al Sabah, “PMi: No talk with Ba’athists,” 11/17/09
Shadid, Anthony, “Maliki Creates Coalition To Compete in Iraqi Vote,” Washington Post, 10/2/09
On November 12, 2009 for example, Maliki went to a meeting of tribal leaders in Sadr City, Baghdad and said that Iraq’s enemies were trying to undermine the political process during the elections. Three days later he was more specific when he said that Baathists were trying to use the 2010 vote to get back into power, and that he would never let that happen. Then on November 16 at a press conference Maliki said that Baathists would not be allowed to participate in the upcoming elections in any form, and that all talks with them by the government were banned. Maliki has been emphasizing the Baathist threat to Iraq since the August 2009 Baghdad bombings, which he blamed on former regime elements in Syria. In fact, the government aired a new set of video taped confessions on November 22 of three men who claimed they were Baath party members who carried out the October 25, 2009 attacks on Iraq’s Ministry of Justice and Baghdad provincial council offices. In Iraqi politics, whenever Shiite politicians mention Baathists they are talking about the threat of Sunnis returning to power, just as talk about Iranian influence by Sunnis is about Shiite rule.
Maliki’s rhetoric has angered one of his State of Law coalition partners, Sheikh Ali Hatem Sulaiman. He is the head of the Al-Anbar Tribal Council and the Flags of Iraq Party, and was one of the leaders of the Awakening movement there. The sheikh said that those who keep talking about Baathists sound like a broken record, and that Baathists should be able to participate in elections as long as they don’t have any charges against them. He finished by saying that if Baathists were to be truly banned from Iraqi politics, than half of the Sunnis in Anbar would not be able to participate. This is significant because Sheikh Sulaiman was the only notable Sunni politician Maliki was able to draw into his list. He is a minor player however as his party wasn’t able to win a single seat in Anbar in the 2009 elections, and Maliki’s Dawa Party is firmly in the lead of the coalition.
Of more interest is the fact that Ammar al-Hakim, the leader of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and member of the Iraqi National Alliance issued a statement saying that Baathists should be able to take part in Iraqi politics as long as they didn’t have blood on their hands. The Supreme Council has always been one of the most ardent proponents of using the Baathist card against any moves towards reconciliation with Sunnis, and only recently called for the banning of Baathists from the 2010 vote as well. His release was almost certainly a response to Maliki’s comments as the National Alliance is the State of Law’s main challenger.
At the other end of the spectrum, the Sadrists, the other major players in the National Alliance, both attacked Maliki and supported him at the same time. First, a Sadrist parliamentarian said that the authorities faked the November 22 confessions of the alleged bombers. At the same time, Moqtada al-Sadr, echoing the Prime Minister, said that there could never be reconciliation with the Baathists. This shows both that Maliki’s attempt to play sectarian politics with the Baghdad attacks is widely questioned within Iraq, while talking about Baathists still resonates in Shiite politics.
The Prime Minister’s emphasis upon the Baathist threat could be a sign of his foreboding about the coming election. While Maliki is still the most popular politician in Iraq, the August and October 2009 ministry bombings in Baghdad have hurt his claim that he has brought security and stability to the country, so bringing up Baathists is a way for him to defer blame. He also has not been able to bring in any new significant partners into his coalition. Some believe that that his announcements are aimed at his potential rivals, specifically the Iraqi National Movement of former Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi, parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq of the National Dialogue Council, and Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi. Finally, a return to sectarian politics may be a way for him to firm up his base with Shiites, and distract them from more pressing issues like the continued lack of services and corruption in the government.
SOURCES
Ali, Ahmed, “Iraq’s Elections Challenge: A Shifting Political Landscape,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 11/20/09
Alsumaria, “Maliki warns of enemies ahead of elections,” 11/12/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “PM warns of Baathists’ infiltration through election,” 11/15/09
Chon, Gina, “Maliki Coalition Tries to Bridge Iraq’s Deep Sectarian Divisions,” Wall Street Journal, 10/2/09
Al-Dulaimy, Mohammed, “Maliki unveils new national, nonsectarian Iraqi party,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/1/09
Al-Hayat, Elaph, “In Surprise Statement, Al-Hakim Calls for Involving Ba-athists in Iraqi Political Process,” MEMRI Blog, 11/20/09
Karadshesh, Jomana, “Alleged Baath members confess in videos to Iraq attacks,” CNN, 11/23/09
Myers, Steven Lee, “Iraqi Leader Creates Broad Coalition,” New York Times, 10/1/09
Roads To Iraq, “Ba’ath Party and the election – intro,” 11/24/09
- “Ba’ath Party and the election 1,” 11/24/09
- “Disagreement among the “State of Law” and The political-football crisis,” 11/17/09
Al Sabah, “PMi: No talk with Ba’athists,” 11/17/09
Shadid, Anthony, “Maliki Creates Coalition To Compete in Iraqi Vote,” Washington Post, 10/2/09
Monday, November 16, 2009
The Changing Face of Violence In Mosul
Mosul remains the second most violent city in Iraq after Baghdad. Almost everyday there are reports of drive by shootings, assassinations, or bombings. Still, there has been a slight decline in casualties since 2007, and a change in the nature of the fighting there.
The problems in Mosul began in 2004. Immediately after the U.S. invasion in 2003 the 101st Airborne Division under the command of General David Petraeus was able to pacify the city by using strong security measures, funding reconstruction projects, and getting all the major parties in the area to join the local council. When his troops left, the city was turned over to Iraqis who were not up to the job. This vacuum allowed insurgents to set up shop in 2004. Mosul became an important way station for Baathists and Al Qaeda in Syria to transfer money, supplies, and foreign fighters into Iraq. By 2005 Al Qaeda was largely in control of the western half of the city, and security deteriorated as a result.
The U.S. responded by asking the Kurdish peshmerga to move into Mosul to help with security. They took up residence in the largely Kurdish western half of the city, while Kurdish army units were deployed in the surrounding areas of Ninewa province. This facilitated the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) taking over the local administration, and after the 2005 elections, they came to control the provincial council as well due to the Sunni Arab boycott. This created ethnic tensions between Arabs and Kurds, and more violence.
By 2008 Mosul had become the last urban bastion of the Iraqi insurgency. During the Surge in 2007 hundreds of militants were forced north to escape the increase in U.S. forces, and moved to Mosul. The ethnic divide there proved a fertile environment, as the insurgents increasingly portrayed themselves as the protectors of the Arabs against the Kurds. Security statistics show the changed environment. In the last three months of 2007 attacks and casualties were actually decreasing. In October 2007 there were an average of 1.51 attacks per day, resulting in 2.87 deaths and 5.83 wounded, compared to just 0.96 attacks per day, 1.58 deaths and 1.25 wounded by December. That averaged out to 1.26 security incidents per day, 2.52 deaths, and 3.73 wounded for the last three months of 2007. By the first half of 2008 that increased to 1.89 security incidents, 2.90 deaths, and 6.92 wounded.
The presence of so many insurgents in Mosul led to several Iraqi and U.S. offensives, with few results. Beginning in February 2008 U.S. forces began setting up combat outposts throughout the city, and erecting blast walls to try to control the movement of insurgents, as Iraqi forces created a Ninewa Operations Command after Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki promised a “decisive battle” against Al Qaeda in the city in January. Deaths only decreased marginally, while the number of wounded increased dramatically over the next two months. They went from 3.34 deaths per day in February 2008 to 2.76 by April, while the number of wounded went from 2.75 to 7.60 during that same period. The problem was that rather than fighting, the militants instead chose to hide amongst the population, and adopted hit-and-run attacks.
Frustrated, in May Prime Minister Maliki announced Operation Lion’s Roar/Mother of Two Springs, but by August he admitted that it was a failure. Casualties actually increased in the two months after the offensive was launched going from 2.12 deaths per day, and 1.51 wounded in May to 3.58 deaths and 4.48 wounded by July. Following attacks on Christians in the city in October, U.S. and Iraqi forces launched Operation Mother of Two Springs II, and then Operation New Hope in February 2009. In October Operation Ninewa Wall was begun, which is almost exclusively Iraqi. Maliki also increasingly played up tensions with the Kurds, to try to rally the Sunni population of Mosul behind him to some success.
Casualties finally took a noticeable drop beginning in November 2008, but the security operations were not the cause. Rather it was the changing political situation in Mosul and Ninewa overall. In 2008 the al-Hadbaa party was formed to run in the 2009 provincial elections. The party was a coalition of Mosul elites, tribal leaders, and independent Kurds. Most important for the security situation, many Baathists and militants came to support the party as well. At the same time, the nationalist and Baathist factions of the insurgency were able to rest control of Mosul from Al Qaeda who had been losing ground in Iraq since the Anbar tribes turned on them beginning in 2005. These groups in turn, decided to try the political route after they boycotted the 2005 elections. The pending U.S. withdrawal was also a factor as many Sunni Arabs were afraid of greater Shiite domination after the Americans left, so they wanted to try to get positions in the government before that happened. Al-Hadbaa leaders were able to broker a cease-fire with the insurgents as a result, and the party ended up winning control of Ninewa in January 2009. Since then they have been able to forge a marriage of convenience with Maliki as both support a strong central government, and want the Kurdish peshmerga out of Mosul and Ninewa in general.
All of these factors led to a marked change in attacks in Mosul. Before armed clashes and shoot-outs were common in the city, along with all the bombings. Beginning in late 2008 through 2009 however, most attacks were drive by shootings, assassinations, house invasions, and still the bombs. The number of deaths went from 2.63 per day in the second half of 2008 to 1.97 in the first half of 2009, while the average number wounded dropped from 5.48 to 4.49 over the same period. From September to October the number of wounded also saw a noticeable drop.
Even with all of these changes Mosul remains a very dangerous place. Al-Hadbaa’s victory has increased tensions with the Kurdish Fraternal List that are boycotting the provincial council. That on-going ethnic divide provides a continued rationale for violence by some. In October 2009 Mosul still saw 66 attacks, 60 deaths, and 82 wounded. Until the problems between Arabs and Kurds are settled there, it will remain a largely war-torn city, unable to experience the slow return to normality that the rest of the country is beginning to experience.
The problems in Mosul began in 2004. Immediately after the U.S. invasion in 2003 the 101st Airborne Division under the command of General David Petraeus was able to pacify the city by using strong security measures, funding reconstruction projects, and getting all the major parties in the area to join the local council. When his troops left, the city was turned over to Iraqis who were not up to the job. This vacuum allowed insurgents to set up shop in 2004. Mosul became an important way station for Baathists and Al Qaeda in Syria to transfer money, supplies, and foreign fighters into Iraq. By 2005 Al Qaeda was largely in control of the western half of the city, and security deteriorated as a result.
The U.S. responded by asking the Kurdish peshmerga to move into Mosul to help with security. They took up residence in the largely Kurdish western half of the city, while Kurdish army units were deployed in the surrounding areas of Ninewa province. This facilitated the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) taking over the local administration, and after the 2005 elections, they came to control the provincial council as well due to the Sunni Arab boycott. This created ethnic tensions between Arabs and Kurds, and more violence.
By 2008 Mosul had become the last urban bastion of the Iraqi insurgency. During the Surge in 2007 hundreds of militants were forced north to escape the increase in U.S. forces, and moved to Mosul. The ethnic divide there proved a fertile environment, as the insurgents increasingly portrayed themselves as the protectors of the Arabs against the Kurds. Security statistics show the changed environment. In the last three months of 2007 attacks and casualties were actually decreasing. In October 2007 there were an average of 1.51 attacks per day, resulting in 2.87 deaths and 5.83 wounded, compared to just 0.96 attacks per day, 1.58 deaths and 1.25 wounded by December. That averaged out to 1.26 security incidents per day, 2.52 deaths, and 3.73 wounded for the last three months of 2007. By the first half of 2008 that increased to 1.89 security incidents, 2.90 deaths, and 6.92 wounded.
The presence of so many insurgents in Mosul led to several Iraqi and U.S. offensives, with few results. Beginning in February 2008 U.S. forces began setting up combat outposts throughout the city, and erecting blast walls to try to control the movement of insurgents, as Iraqi forces created a Ninewa Operations Command after Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki promised a “decisive battle” against Al Qaeda in the city in January. Deaths only decreased marginally, while the number of wounded increased dramatically over the next two months. They went from 3.34 deaths per day in February 2008 to 2.76 by April, while the number of wounded went from 2.75 to 7.60 during that same period. The problem was that rather than fighting, the militants instead chose to hide amongst the population, and adopted hit-and-run attacks.
Frustrated, in May Prime Minister Maliki announced Operation Lion’s Roar/Mother of Two Springs, but by August he admitted that it was a failure. Casualties actually increased in the two months after the offensive was launched going from 2.12 deaths per day, and 1.51 wounded in May to 3.58 deaths and 4.48 wounded by July. Following attacks on Christians in the city in October, U.S. and Iraqi forces launched Operation Mother of Two Springs II, and then Operation New Hope in February 2009. In October Operation Ninewa Wall was begun, which is almost exclusively Iraqi. Maliki also increasingly played up tensions with the Kurds, to try to rally the Sunni population of Mosul behind him to some success.
Casualties finally took a noticeable drop beginning in November 2008, but the security operations were not the cause. Rather it was the changing political situation in Mosul and Ninewa overall. In 2008 the al-Hadbaa party was formed to run in the 2009 provincial elections. The party was a coalition of Mosul elites, tribal leaders, and independent Kurds. Most important for the security situation, many Baathists and militants came to support the party as well. At the same time, the nationalist and Baathist factions of the insurgency were able to rest control of Mosul from Al Qaeda who had been losing ground in Iraq since the Anbar tribes turned on them beginning in 2005. These groups in turn, decided to try the political route after they boycotted the 2005 elections. The pending U.S. withdrawal was also a factor as many Sunni Arabs were afraid of greater Shiite domination after the Americans left, so they wanted to try to get positions in the government before that happened. Al-Hadbaa leaders were able to broker a cease-fire with the insurgents as a result, and the party ended up winning control of Ninewa in January 2009. Since then they have been able to forge a marriage of convenience with Maliki as both support a strong central government, and want the Kurdish peshmerga out of Mosul and Ninewa in general.
All of these factors led to a marked change in attacks in Mosul. Before armed clashes and shoot-outs were common in the city, along with all the bombings. Beginning in late 2008 through 2009 however, most attacks were drive by shootings, assassinations, house invasions, and still the bombs. The number of deaths went from 2.63 per day in the second half of 2008 to 1.97 in the first half of 2009, while the average number wounded dropped from 5.48 to 4.49 over the same period. From September to October the number of wounded also saw a noticeable drop.
Even with all of these changes Mosul remains a very dangerous place. Al-Hadbaa’s victory has increased tensions with the Kurdish Fraternal List that are boycotting the provincial council. That on-going ethnic divide provides a continued rationale for violence by some. In October 2009 Mosul still saw 66 attacks, 60 deaths, and 82 wounded. Until the problems between Arabs and Kurds are settled there, it will remain a largely war-torn city, unable to experience the slow return to normality that the rest of the country is beginning to experience.
Monthly Casualties In Mosul – Oct. 2007 to Oct. 2009
Attacks/ Incidents | Avg. # Of Attacks/ Incidents | Deaths | Avg. # Of Deaths | Wounded | Avg. # Of Wounded | |
2007 | ||||||
Oct. | 47 | 1.51 | 89 + 2 Americans | 2.87 | 181 + 2 Americans | 5.83 |
Nov. | 39 | 1.30 | 94 + 1 American | 3.13 | 124 + 1 American | 4.13 |
Dec. | 30 | 0.96 | 49 + 3 Americans | 1.58 | 39+ | 1.25 |
2008 | ||||||
Jan. | 58 | 1.87 | 107 + 6 Americans | 3.45 | 385 + 1 American | 12.41 |
Feb. | 56 | 1.93 | 97 + 1 American | 3.34 | 80 | 2.75 |
March | 64 | 2.06 | 86 | 2.77 | 267 | 8.61 |
April | 67 | 2.23 | 83 | 2.76 | 228 | 7.60 |
May | 42 | 1.35 | 66 | 2.12 | 47 + 3 Americans | 1.51 |
June | 58 | 1.93 | 89 | 2.96 | 253 | 8.43 |
July | 83 | 2.67 | 111 | 3.58 | 139 | 4.48 |
Aug. | 67 | 2.16 | 59 | 1.90 | 113 + 1 American | 3.64 |
Sep. | 80 | 2.66 | 82 | 2.73 | 140+ | 4.66 |
Oct. | 92 | 2.96 | 112 | 3.61 | 188 | 6.06 |
Nov. | 65 | 2.16 | 53 | 1.76 | 249 | 8.30 |
Dec. | 65 | 2.09 | 68 | 2.19 | 181 | 5.83 |
2009 | ||||||
Jan. | 52 | 1.67 | 56 | 1.80 | 56 | 1.80 |
Feb. | 81 | 2.89 | 58 | 2.00 | 111 | 3.96 |
March | 86 | 2.77 | 69 | 2.22 | 169 | 5.45 |
April | 79 | 2.63 | 53 | 1.76 | 191 | 6.36 |
May | 83 | 3.06 | 64 | 2.06 | 164 | 4.70 |
June | 73 | 2.43 | 58 | 1.93 | 123 | 4.10 |
July | 73 | 2.35 | 79 | 2.54 | 169 | 5.45 |
Aug. | 77 | 2.48 | 102 | 3.29 | 171 | 5.51 |
Sep. | 72 | 2.40 | 65 | 2.16 | 60 | 2.00 |
Oct. | 66 | 2.12 | 60 | 1.93 | 82 | 2.64 |
Avgs. | ||||||
4th Qtr 2007 | 38.66/ month | 1.26/day | 77.33/ month | 2.52/ day | 114.66/ month | 3.73/day |
1st Half 2008 | 57.5/ month | 1.89/day | 88.00/ month | 2.90/ day | 210.00/ month | 6.92/day |
2nd Half 2008 | 75.33/ month | 2.45/day | 80.83/ month | 2.63/ day | 168.33/ month | 5.48/day |
1st Half 2009 | 75.66/ month | 2.50/day | 59.66/ month | 1.97/ day | 135.66/ month | 4.49/day |
SOURCES
ABC News, "Iraqi woman and child killed by US fire," 5/11/08
Abouzeid, Rania, "In Mosul, Iraq's Insurgency Refuses to Be Tamed," Time, 3/18/09
Agence France Presse, "Death toll from bombing in Iraq's Mosul rises to 13," 6/3/08
Associated Press, "Al-Qaida in Iraq front group warns it will retaliate vs. US-Iraqi crackdown," 5/27/08
- "Female bomber kills 3 near bus stop in Iraq," USA Today, 3/19/08
- "Iraq: explosion in apartment kills at least 7, wounds 70," 1/23/08
- "Iraqi police: 18 killed in clashes with al-Qaeda," USA Today, 11/10/07
- "Police: Female suicide bomber kills 3 in Iraq," 2/17/08
Aswat al-Iraq, "2 bombs defused in Mosul," 10/26/09
- "2 civilians killed in Mosul," 10/21/09
- "2 civilians wounded in 2 separate incidents in Mosul," 10/5/09
- "2 cops wounded in Mosul blast," 10/5/09
- "2 killed in separate incidents in Mosul," 10/3/09
- "2 unknown bodies found in Mosul," 10/20/09
- "3 killed, 5 wounded in bombing in Mosul," 10/28/09
- "3 policemen killed, officer wounded in Mosul attack," 10/29/09
- "Blast in Ninewa wounds cement company chief," 10/18/09
- "Bomb wounds 2 in Mosul," 10/6/09
- "Children, mother wounded in Mosul blast," 10/12/09
- "Civilian killed in tribal clashes in Mosul," 10/12/09
- "Civilian wounded in IED blast near Mosul," 10/26/09
- "Contractor gunned down in Mosul," 10/12/09
- "District chief escapes attempt on his life in Mosul," 10/19/09
- "Guard killed in crowded souk in Mosul," 10/23/09
- "Gunmen assassinate tribal affairs office chief in Ninewa," 10/19/09
- "Gunmen storm building in Mosul, kill two civilians," 10/26/09
- "Hand grenade injures 4 in Mosul," 10/31/09
- "IED defused in western Mosul," 10/12/09
- "Iraq army kills gunman in Mosul," 10/19/09
- "Iraqi soldier killed, 2 wounded in Mosul," 10/23/09
- "Police kill gunman in northeastern Mosul," 10/2/09
- "Policeman killed, 3 civilians wounded separately in Mosul," 10/22/09
- "Policeman, gunman killed in Mosul," 10/22/09
- "Policeman survives IED blast near his vehicle," 10/18/09
- "Policeman wounded in Mosul blast," 10/13/09
- "Real-estate office owner killed in Mosul," 10/25/09
- "Sticky bomb defused at official building in Ninewa," 10/28/09
- "Sticky bomb kills, wounds 5 family members," 10/7/09
- "Sticky bomb wounds 5 in Mosul," 10/31/09
- "U.S. forces kill civilian, arrest 4 brothers," 10/27/09
- "Vendor, child killed in northern Mosul," 10/21/09
- "Woman killed, 2 civilians wounded by police mistake fire in Mosul," 10/16/09
- "Woman's head found in Mosul," 10/3/09
Brown, Drewn, "U.S. troops setting down roots in Mosul," Stars and Stripes, 2/23/08
CNN, "Bombings kill 11 in northern Ira," 7/7/08
- "Iraq to host Iran leader for first time since nations warred," 1/24/08
Dagher, Sam, "Fractures in Iraq City as Kurds and Baghdad Vie," New York Times, 10/28/08
Dimov, Marina, "Three members of same family murdered in northern Iraq," Visit Bulgaria, 9/12/08
DPA, "Al-Qaeda suspects, tribal policemen, TV presenter killed in Iraq," 6/17/08
- "At least 10 killed, 15 injured in attacks in Iraq," 2/25/08
- "At least 12 killed in Iraq violence," 3/11/08
- "At least 31 killed in Iraq violence, 100 wounded – 3rd Update," 12/25/07
- "At least 59 killed, 76 wounded in Iraqi violence (1st Lead)," 4/15/08
- "At least five killed, three wounded in Iraqi violence – Summary," 2/3/08
- "Christians, churches attacked in Iraq during celebration," 1/7/08
- "Female students kidnapped, US soldier dies in Iraq," 7/6/08
- "Four Iraqi soldiers killed in clashes in northern Iraq (Extra)," 5/7/08
- "Four killed, three injured in attacks in Mosul," 10/21/09
- "Governor of Iraq's Nineveh escapes assassination attempt – Update," 6/7/08
- "Iraq's Islamic Party leader assassinated in Mosul," 8/7/08
- "Nine killed, nine wounded across Iraq (Roundup)," 10/31/07
- "Plane engines, explosives, and another grave found in Iraq – Summary," 3/9/08
- "Policeman, soldier killed in two incidents in Iraq (Extra)," 8/14/08
- "Three killed, 13 injured in blasts in northern Iraq (2nd Lead)," 4/23/08
- "US troops kill nine suspected al-Qaeda members in Iraq," 2/18/08
Al Dulaimy, Mohammed, "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 11 February 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 2/11/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 12 May 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 5/12/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 24 May 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 5/24/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday October 5 2009," McClatchy Newspapers, 10/5/09
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Saturday October 24, 2009
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Sunday 4 May 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 5/4/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Sunday 23 December 2007," McClatchy Newspapers, 12/23/07
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 26 February 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 2/26/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 7 May 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 5/7/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 10 September 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 9/10/08
Freeman, Sholnn, "At Least 35 Die As Bombers Hit Wedding Convoy," Washington Post, 5/2/08 - "U.S. Deaths in Iraq War Reach 4,000; Green Zone Is Shelled," Washington Post, 3/24/08
Hamilton, Eric, "The Fight for Mosul," Institute for the Study of War, 4/29/08
Hammoudi, Laith, "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 8 September 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 9/8/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 26 October 2009," McClatchy Newspapers, 10/26/09
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 4 September 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 9/4/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 20 October 2009," McClatchy Newspapers, 10/29/09
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 13 October 2009," McClatchy Newspapers, 10/13/09
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 22 April 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 4/22/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 29 April 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 4/29/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 5 March 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 3/5/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 13 August 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 8/13/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 14 October 2009," McClatchy Newspapers, 10/14/09
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 27 August 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 8/27/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 27 February 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 2/27/08
Holden, Michael, "U.S. and Iraqi forces begin al Qaeda action in Mosul," 2/11/08
Hussein, Jenan, "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 28 October 2009," McClatchy Newspapers, 10/28/09
International Crisis Group, "Iraq's New Battlefront: The Struggle Over Ninewa," 9/28/09
Iraq Today, April 2008
- August 2008
- December 2007
- February 2008
- March 2008
- January 2008
- July 2008
- June 2008
- May 2008
- November 2007
- October 2007
- September 2008
Issa, Sahar, "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Friday 5 September 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 9/5/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Friday 14 March 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 3/14/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Friday 22 August 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 8/22/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 19 October 2009," McClatchy Newspapers, 10/19/09
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Sunday 20 July 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 7/20/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 1 October 2009," McClatchy Newspapers, 10/1/09
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 7 February 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 2/7/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 10 April 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 4/10/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 17 January 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 1/17/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 18 September 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 9/18/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 20 March 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 3/20/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 24 July 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 7/24/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 7 October 2009," McClatchy Newspapers, 10/7/09
Kadhim, Hussein, "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 9 June 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 6/9/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 14 January 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 1/14/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 29 September 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 9/29/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 3 October 2007," McClatchy Newspapers, 10/3/07
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 6 March 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 3/6/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 11 October 2007," McClatchy Newspapers, 10/11/07
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 01 April 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 4/1/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 06 May 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 5/6/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 23 January 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 1/23/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 24 September 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 9/24/08
KUNA, "Attack in Mosul leads to injury of 17 people," 6/22/08
Mohammed, Mujahid, "Five arrested after Iraq TV crew murder," Agence France Presse, 9/14/08
Multi-National Corps – Iraq, "MNC-I Soldier attacked during military operations (Mosul)," 11/13/07
- "MND-N Soldiers attacked in Ninevah Province (Mosul)," 2/20/08
- "MND-North Soldiers attacked by small-arms fire (Mosul," 1/26/07
- "Task Force Iron Soldiers attacked in Mosul," 10/31/07
Nagpal, Sahil, "Governor of Iraq's Nineveh province survives assassination attempt," DPA, 6/7/08
Oppel, Richard, "Truck Bomb Kills Up to 16 Iraqis in Mosul," 10/17/07
Partlow, Joshua and Tyson, Ann Scott, "Five U.S. Soldiers Are Killed When Convoy Is Hit in Mosul," Washington Post, 1/29/08
PBS Frontline, "Interview Maj. Gen. David Petraeus," Beyond Baghdad, 2/12/04
Press TV, "Car bomb kills woman in Baghdad," 11/8/07
Reuters, "Bombs hit northern Iraq, forces expect more," 8/13/08
- "Car bomb kills 18 people in Iraqi city," 6/26/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, April 1," 4/1/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, April 2," 4/2/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, April 4," 4/4/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, April 6," 4/6/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, April 11," 4/11/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, April 12," 4/12/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, April 13," 4/13/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, April 15," 4/15/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, April 19," 4/19/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, April 22," 4/22/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, April 23," 4/23/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, April 25," 4/25/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, April 27," 4/27/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, April 30," 4/30/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 4," 8/4/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 5," 8/5/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 6," 8/6/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 8," 8/8/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 11," 8/11/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 14," 8/14/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 15," 8/15/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 18," 8/18/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 21," 8/21/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 23," 8/23/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 25," 8/25/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 27," 8/27/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 28," 8/28/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 30," 8/30/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 31," 8/31/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 25," 12/25/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 28," 12/28/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 29," 12/29/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 30," 12/30/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 4," 2/4/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 6," 2/6/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 7," 2/7/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 8," 2/8/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 9," 2/9/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 11," 2/11/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 19," 2/19/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 20," 2/20/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 24," 2/24/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 25," 2/25/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 27," 2/27/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 28," 2/28/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 1," 1/1/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 2," 1/2/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 7," 1/7/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 13," 1/13/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 16," 1/16/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 17," 1/17/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 20," 1/20/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 23," 1/23/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 30," 1/30/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 1," 7/1/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 3," 7/3/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 5," 7/5/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 7," 7/7/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 8," 7/8/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 9," 7/9/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 11," 7/11/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 12," 7/12/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 13," 7/13/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 14," 7/14/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 15," 7/15/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 16," 7/16/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 18," 7/18/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 19," 7/19/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 20," 7/20/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 21," 7/21/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 22," 7/22/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 24," 7/24/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 25," 7/25/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 28," 7/28/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 31," 7/31/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 2," 6/2/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 8," 6/8/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 9," 6/9/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 14," 6/14/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 16," 6/16/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 17," 6/17/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 19," 6/19/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 22," 6/22/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 24," 6/24/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 29," 6/29/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 30," 6/30/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, March 4," 3/4/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, March 10," 3/10/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, March 12," 3/12/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, March 16," 3/16/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, March 17," 3/17/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, March 18," 3/18/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, March 19," 3/19/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, March 21," 3/21/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, March 25," 3/25/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 2," 5/2/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 4," 5/4/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 5," 5/5/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 6," 5/6/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 9," 5/9/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 13," 5/13/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 20," 5/20/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 22," 5/22/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 24," 5/24/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 26," 5/26/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 29," 5/29/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 30," 5/30/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 3," 11/3/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 5," 11/5/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 6," 11/6/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 19," 11/19/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 22," 11/22/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 23," 11/23/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 24," 11/24/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 26," 11/26/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 27," 11/27/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 29," 11/29/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 1," 10/1/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 2," 10/2/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 9," 10/9/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 9," 10/9/09
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 11," 10/11/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 11," 10/11/09
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 12," 10/12/09
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 14," 10/14/09
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 15," 10/15/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 15," 10/15/09
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 16," 10/16/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 17," 10/17/09
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 18," 10/18/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 18," 10/18/09
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 19," 10/19/09
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 20," 10/20/09
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 21," 10/21/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 22," 10/22/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 24," 10/24/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 26," 10/26/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 30," 10/30/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 30," 10/30/09
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 1," 9/1/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 3," 9/3/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 9," 9/8/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 9," 9/9/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 10," 9/10/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 13," 9/13/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 17," 9/17/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 18," 9/18/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 20," 9/20/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 21," 9/21/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 22," 9/22/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 23," 9/23/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 25," 9/25/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 28," 9/28/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 29," 9/29/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 30," 9/30/08
- "Iraqi, U.S. soldiers kill 14 gunmen in Mosul raids," 11/9/07
- "Kidnapped Iraq archbishop dead-Catholic news agency," 3/13/08
- "Truck bomb explodes near Iraq's largest dam," 12/17/07
Saeed, Samer, "U.S. troops erect walls in Mosul as inhabitants flee," Azzaman, 2/17/08
Surk, Barbara, "Truck bomb destroys key bridge in western Iraq," Associated Press, 10/17/09
Tait, Paul, "Severed heads and bodies found in Iraq field: police," Reuters, 1/29/08
U.S. Department of Defense, "News Release," 12/28/07
UPI, "Iraq violence claims nine lives," 9/12/08
- "Two soldiers die in Iraq car bomb," 7/19/08
Xinhua, "At least 2 killed in suicide truck bombing in N Iraq," 9/22/08
- "Car bomb hits police patrol in northern Iraq," 1/14/08
- "Car bomb kills policeman in northern Iraq," 9/8/08
- "Gunmen blow up 4 houses in N Iraq, child killed," 6/16/08
- "Gunmen kill provincial council member in N Iraq," 11/6/07
- "Head of provincial council survives bomb attack in N Iraq," 12/9/07
- "Insurgents blow up house of Sunni lawmaker in N Iraq," 9/23/08
- "Iraqi soldiers foil suicide bomb attack in Mosul," 4/29/08
- "Policeman killed in gunfire in northern Ira," 9/20/08
- "Policeman killed in shooting in N Iraq," 11/28/07
- "Seven killed in Iraq suicide car bombing," 9/2/08
- "Suicide car bomb injuring 14 in N Iraq," 6/23/08
- "Three policemen killed in insurgents' attack in Iraq," 1/4/08
- "Two people killed in bomb attack in northern Iraq," 5/24/08
- "Two suicide bombers hit police checkpoint in N Iraq," 11/4/07
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