Showing posts with label Maliki. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Maliki. Show all posts

Tuesday, March 03, 2009

Maliki’s Private Security Forces?

On February 17 members of the Baghdad Brigade arrested the secretary of parliamentarian Mohammad al-Daini. Nine days before members of the same unit detained Daini’s chief bodyguard. That began the latest drama in Iraq’s parliament as Daini was accused of involvement in a series of terrorist and criminal acts. The events also highlighted one of two security units that have come to be increasingly scrutinized by Iraqi lawmakers.

The Baghdad Brigade and the Counterterrorism Unit have been accused of being Prime Minister’s private security forces. The Baghdad Brigade has been in charge of the Green Zone since it was handed over by the U.S. on New Year’s day 2009. It is led by General Emaad Yahseen Al Zuhary, and is officially part of the Army. Its’ operations against Daini’s staff shows that it apparently has police powers in other parts of the capital. The Counterterrorism force is an elite unit of over 4,000 that focuses upon militias, the insurgency, kidnappings, and gangs. The unit was brought together in April 2007 under the Counterterrorism Bureau created by the Prime Minister. The Unit is actually independent from both the Defense and Interior ministries. Nouri al-Maliki has just put forward a bill in parliament that would institutionalize their independence by creating their own budget. Both the Baghdad Brigade and the Counterterrorism Unit also answer directly to the Prime Minister. This is what has led some Iraqi politicians to question these two forces, and Maliki’s intentions. Some of their uses have also added to the controversy.

The Counterterrorism Unit was the first one to gain notoriety when it raided the Diyala provincial council headquarters in August 2008. The unit arrested the provincial security chief and the president of Diyala University, but along the way killed the governor’s secretary and one of his bodyguards, beat the deputy governor, and got into a firefight with local police killing four officers. Baghdad claimed the two arrested officials were on a wanted list, but then later claimed that it was a rogue operation. Few believed that explanation since the unit is under the direct control of Maliki. Some thought it was the Prime Minister asserting his control over the provincial council. Several of the Sunni members of the council from the Iraqi Islamic Party, including the arrested provincial security chief, were trying to reach out and co-opt the province’s Sons of Iraq (SOI) in preparation for the provincial elections. At the same time Maliki was intent on breaking the SOI by creating a rival Diyala tribal support council to lure away their members, while arresting others. The bungled raid was part of this struggle between Baghdad and the province.

In December 20008 the Counterterrorism Unit also arrested several Interior Ministry officials. The supposed reasons for their detentions ranged everywhere from plotting a coup, to being former Baathists, to planning arson in the Interior Ministry building, to making fake IDs to gain access to the ministry. The fact that the Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani had a different story for the arrests than Maliki would point to another use of the special force to send a political message. Al-Bolani is the leader of the Constitutional Party that ran in the provincial elections. He was said to have used the security forces and his position to expand the party. The arrests could have been a sign by the Prime Minister that Bolani needed to watch his steps before the January 2009 vote.

Maliki has increasingly used the security forces against his political rivals, and to impose his will and the authority of the central government over parts of the country. This began when he sent the security forces after the Mahdi Army in Basra in March 2008. Since then he has also employed them against the Sunni insurgents, the Sons of Iraq, the Kurds, the Sunnis of Diyala, and the Interior Ministry. If the charges against al-Daini prove to be true, it shows that the Baghdad Brigade and the Counterterrorism Unit are not just used at Maliki’s whim. At the same time, Iraq has few to any real checks and balances on the power of the prime minister, and the rule of law is weak. That has caused growing concern amongst parliamentarians over Maliki’s moves to create these two forces that are independent from the rest of the security forces and ministries, and only answer to him.

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “PM forms ministerial committee to investigate Diala incidents,” 8/19/08
- “PM’s special force arrested my chief guard, secretary – MP,” 2/18/09

August, Oliver, “Iraqi officials arrested in anti-Saddam party swoop,” Times of London, 12/18/08

Elliott, DJ, “Iraqi Security Forces Order of Battle update: February 2009,” Long War Journal.org, 2/5/09

Kadhim, Hussein, “Iraqi government plays down arrests of 23 police officers,” McClatchy Newspapers, 12/18/08

Michaels, Jim, “Chain of command concerns raised in Iraq,” USA Today, 2/23/09

Parker, Ned and Hameed, Saif, “Iraq releases detained security officers,” Los Angeles Times, 12/20/08

Parker, Sam, “Guest Post: Behind the Curtain in Diyala,” Abu Muqawama Blog, 8/20/08

Peyamner News Agency, “Articles – Baghdad residents welcome green zone handover,” 1/2/09

Raghavan, Sudarsan and Mizher, Qais, “Arrests in Iraq Seen as Politically Motivated,” Washington Post, 12/19/08

Robertson, Campbell and Al-Salhy, Suadad, “Charges Dismissed in Iraq Against Ministry Detainees,” New York Times, 12/23/08

Robertson, Campbell and Williams, Timothy, “Status of Detained Iraqis Is Murky Amid Talk of a Political Showdown,” New York Times, 12/21/08

Rubin, Alissa, “Ahead of Election, Iraq’s Leader Pushes for Gains,” New York Times, 1/26/09

Russo, Claire, “Countdown To Diyala’s Provincial Election: Maliki & The IIP,” Institute for the Study of War, 1/30/09
- “The Maliki Government Confronts Diyala,” Institute for the Study of War,” 9/23/08

Salaheddin, Sinan, “Police: Iraqi troops raid Diyala governor’s office,” Associated Press, 8/19/08

Spangler, Nicholas, “Diyala raid was rogue operation, Iraqi government says,” McClatchy Newspapers, 8/22/08

Susman, Tina and Salman, Raheem, “Manhunt targets Iraq lawmaker whose plane was turned back,” Los Angeles Times, 2/26/09

Tran, Mark, “Iraqi officials arrested over coup plot against prime minister,” Guardian, 12/18/08

Thursday, February 05, 2009

EPIC Guest Blogger: Reidar Visser on ISCI's Election Losses in Southern Iraq

Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim, leader of Shi'ite religious political party Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), waves to supporters during an election campaign rally in Najaf, south of Baghdad January 25, 2009. There are 14,431 candidates registered to contest just 440 council seats across Iraq for the coming January 31 provincial election. (c)2008 Reuters.

Reidar Visser is research fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs with a background in history and comparative politics (University of Bergen) and a doctorate in Middle Eastern studies (University of Oxford). He's the author of Basra, the Failed Gulf State: Separatism and Nationalism in Southern Iraq (Lit Verlag, 2006) and co-editor of An Iraq of Its Regions: Cornerstones of a Federal Democracy? (Columbia University Press, 2007). The following commentary was originally posted at http://www.historiae.org/

No Longer Supreme: After Local Elections, ISCI Becomes a 10 Per Cent Party South of Baghdad

The provisional results of the Iraqi local elections, released today, can be summarised in three main points as far as the areas from Baghdad and southwards are concerned: Maliki and his Daawa party are big winners everywhere and particularly so in the big cities of Basra and Baghdad; the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) has been decimated across the country; fragmentation rather than the emergence of a clear secular “third way” is mostly the rule, with the exception of a respectable 9% for Iraqiyya in Baghdad and a couple of local secular successes (including Karbala).

Maliki’s rise is spectacular. His coalition won Basra and Baghdad and came first in every Shiite-dominated governorate except Karbala (where the independent Yusuf al-Hububi won most votes), with results above 35% in Basra and Baghdad,around 23% in Dhi Qar and Qadisiyya, and between 10 and 20% in most other places. It should however be stressed that Maliki’s increasing appeal to Sunnis, while often acknowledged by Iraqi Sunnis themselves, is not convincingly reflected in the results. There may have been Sunni votes for Maliki in places like Baghdad and Basra, but his coalition did not run in Anbar, and achieved only 3% in a heavily Sunni province like Salahaddin and less than that in Nineveh.

The decline of ISCI is equally remarkable. From a position where it dominated most governorates south of Baghdad it has fallen to a status of a 10% party or less in most places. As indicated in the table below, it managed to hold on to 2005 levels only in Maysan, was strongly reduced in Baghdad and lost votes even in Najaf where its leadership in provincial government has been more valued by the inhabitants than elsewhere in Iraq.

Province


2005 percentage of SCIRI
(now ISCI) votes

2009 percentage of ISCI votes

Basra

36 (coalition)

11

Maysan

11

14

Dhi Qar

19

12

Muthanna

14

9

Wasit

59 (grand coalition)

10

Qadisiyya

30

11

Babel

39 (coalition)

8

Najaf

45

14

Karbala

35 (coalition)

6

Baghdad

39

5

Of the various pro-Sadrist lists, it is generally the “independent current” (list 284) that has done well, mostly scoring between 5 to 10% – hence, still a force to be reckoned with in Maysan, and with a better result than ISCI in Baghdad. Fadila lost seats across the country and was reduced to a humiliating 3% even in its stronghold of Basra (where its performance in the executive branch of the local government, won in 2005, has been criticised). Ibrahim al-Jaafari's breakaway faction of the Daawa, which has been courting Sadrists, did reasonably well with a consistent score between 5 and 10 per cent.

There had been some talk of secularism emerging as an independent current this time; south of Baghdad this is generally reflected in a fragmentation of the vote in many councils, with lots of parties winning between 1 and 2%, and with further fragmentation and disproportionality expected to occur during the distribution of seats (when one-person lists are at disadvantage after they have secured a single seat because in contrast to the parties their surplus votes are not transferred anywhere and hence wasted). The exception, as far as voting goes, is Karbala (in terms of seat-counting, this is however a one-person list), and to some extent Baghdad itself, where Iraqiyya got around 10%. (North of Baghdad, there is a good 13% result for Iraqiyya in Salahaddin.) The emergence of the “Association of Justice and Unity” list in Basra with more than 5% seems a promising beginning for this party which originates with the Shaykhi community (a Shiite sub-sect) but appears to have been able to appeal to Basrawis at large.

Beyond the numbers, these elections have several implications for the overall atmosphere of Iraqi politics. One is that they to some extent mark a rejection of sectarian identity politics. The cleavage between ISCI and Daawa during the elections campaign ran precisely along these lines: Maliki tried to emphasise Iraqi nationalism; ISCI tried to emphasise sectarian Shiism. Maliki won. Secondly, the results clearly signify the triumph of centralism over pro-federal sentiments. Again, Maliki very explicitly emphasised this contrast between himself as favouring control by Baghdad and ISCI as the party of radical decentralisation. Reflecting the poor result in the recent federalism initiative in Basra (it has been reported that the final number of signatures was actually somewhat lower than the 34,000 originally collected to get the process going), no pro-federal Basra parties did well with the possible exception of the above-mentioned “Association of Justice and Unity” (5.5%)

Overall, this should serve as a wake-up call to the outside world, which tirelessly has sought to comply with the sectarian logic embraced by ISCI – in terms of ethno-sectarian quotas, sectarian variants of federalism, and the retrograde concept of “disputed areas”. It is high time that Western politicians realise that the party they have been considering as the key to Iraq’s Shiite community (and sometimes have singled out as the likely provider of the next Iraqi premier) actually commands less than 10% support in the constituency it purports to represent. In other words, for much of the period since 2003, America’s policy in Iraq has probably not enjoyed the support of more than 25% of the country’s politicians (the two Kurdish parties and ISCI). Yet, still today, Iraqis continue to be the prisoners of the ethno-sectarian system of government that emerged in this period and was designed by the two Kurdish parties and ISCI. Even the UN special representative in Iraq, Staffan de Mistura, seems to miss the point when he in a recent Washington Post op-ed claimed there is a need for “greater willingness to seek national reconciliation at all levels and among all major groups: Sunni-Shiite, Shiite-Shiite, Sunni-Sunni, Arab-Kurd and Kurd-Kurd.” What these elections go some way to show is that Iraqis are tired of these labels as such.

There are big tests ahead for Maliki’s “centralism” or even “Iraqi nationalism” (it was these two features, rather than a sometimes-trumpeted “secularism”, that dominated the campaign of his party). At the local level, will the Daawa engage in bold coalition-building outside the Shiite Islamist camp, or will it give in to advances from ISCI? And what about the parliamentary situation and the next speaker – will the Daawa think in terms of a “Sunni quota” or will it switch allegiance to the 22 July parties and the idea of a “nationalist” speaker of whatever sect? Finally, the next parliamentary elections scheduled for December: will Maliki now seek to convert all his nice words about centralism into specific proposals for constitutional reform? Only then will the positive tendencies seen in this election create an enduring result for the long term. The “No Injuries Reported in Iraqi Elections”, as per a recent New York Times headline, is in itself without much significance in the absence of true political reform.

NOTE: Some of the percentage figures are given as heard on Iraqi television and there may be minor inaccuracies although the big picture should be correct.

Photo caption: "Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim, leader of Shi'ite religious political party Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), waves to supporters during an election campaign rally in Najaf, south of Baghdad January 25, 2009. There are 14,431 candidates registered to contest just 440 council seats across Iraq for the coming January 31 provincial election." Photo by Reuters, (c)2008.

Saturday, January 10, 2009

Here Comes The Carrot For Diyala’s Sons Of Iraq

On January 4, 2009 Baghdad took over control of Diyala’s Sons of Iraq (SOI) Program. There are between 8,000-9,000 fighters in the province, 80% of which have signed up to receive their paychecks from Baghdad. In turn, the government has agreed to integrate 33% of them into the security forces, and build a vocational training center in Diyala for the rest. This is much higher than the 20% of the Baghdad Sons of Iraq Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki agreed to allow into the police earlier. As reported before, this comes after the government arrested dozens of SOI in the province and chased many others away. This has caused great animosity between the two sides. On the day the handover ceremony was held for example, two SOI leaders Abu Ali and Abu Taleb said they had warrants hanging over their heads, and were still afraid that the authorities would go after them. Two SOI leaders also passed away under suspicious circumstances in December. Bashir Jawrani died in a hospital after being arrested by the police, while Sattar al Hadidi was gunned down outside of a mosque.

The transfer also comes just before the provincial elections at the end of January. As noted before, the Shiite led provincial council in Diyala has called for a delay in the vote there because they fear that the Sunnis will have a high turnout this year. Many of the SOI in Diyala plan on running in the election. Three SOI members who were hoping to run as candidates were arrested just before the registration deadline in late 2008, which made them ineligible. Dozens of members of the Iraqi Islamic Party have also been detained in Diyala since Baghdad launched a security operation there in July.

After having used the stick against the Diyala SOI, Baghdad may now be turning to the carrot. The Sons of Iraq have been thoroughly intimidated in the province. Many feel persecuted and that the government is out to get them. Now Prime Minister Maliki may be using the other tool at his disposal, the purse to coo them. He has shown them he has the power to lock them up or allow them to continue on with their lives. The U.S. plans on transferring all the SOI in the country to Baghdad this year, so they have nowhere else to turn but the government if they want to continue to be paid. This is the carrot Maliki now has control over to try to ply the Diyala SOI to his will.

For more on the Diyala Sons of Iraq see:

Government Continues Its Crackdown On Diyala Sons Of Iraq

Carrot and The Stick With The Diyala’s Sons Of Iraq, Or Just The Stick?

The End Of The Diyala Sons Of Iraq?

Recent Government And Sons Of Iraq Relations

SOURCES

Ashton, Adam, “Iraqi government to take control of Sunni militia in Diyala,” McClatchy Newspapers, 12/27/08

Gamel, Kim, “US, Iraqis prepare to transfer to govt control of Sunni fighters in volatile Diyala province,” Associated Press, 11/20/08

Goetze, Katharina and Salman, Daud and Naji, Zaineb, “Could Awakening Fighters Rejoin Insurgency?” Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 10/31/08

Heintz, Jim, “Government gets control of Sons of Iraq in Diyala,” Associated Press, 1/4/09

Parker, Ned, “Baqubah a minefield of Iraqi sectarian tensions,” Los Angeles Times, 12/7/08

Tuesday, December 30, 2008

Basra Federal Region Update

December 27, up to 3,000 people marched in the city of Basra in support of a federal region for the province. Parliamentarian and former governor of Basra Wail Abd al-Latif has proposed the idea. In November 2008 he turned in an initial petition with enough signatures for the Iraqi Election Commission to move forward on the plan. Latif and his followers now have to get 10% of the province’s voting population, approximately 140,939 people, to sign a second petition. That effort started on December 14, and they have until January 14 to finish. If they accomplish that there has to be an election within 15 days. The initiative will pass with 51% of the vote. A Basra federal region has been on the mind of Latif and others for quite some time, but will face opposition from many powerful parties.

Latif has been pushing the idea of a separate Basra region for several years now. In 2005 he first presented the plan as an amendment to the constitution. At the heart of the proposal is the deep-seated conviction amongst many Basrans that the central authorities and Baghdad have ignored them for generations. In turn, Latif has said that Basra needs a share of its vast oil wealth so that it can develop. This is a sizeable amount as the province has 60% of Iraq’s oil reserves, produces 1.8 million of Iraq’s 2.6 million barrels a day of crude, has the only major port through which the majority of the country’s petroleum exports pass through. He noted that the region would not be like Kurdistan however, and sign its own oil contracts, something he has been critical of the Kurdistan Regional Government in the past. Latif just wants Basra to receive a share of the oil profits.

The proposal has already gained a wide variety of supporters and detractors. The head of the Basra provincial council and the governor of the province were the first to publicly state they were for the idea. Their party, Fadhila, has had a similar plan for quite some time as well. In 2007 they said one dollar from each barrel of oil from Basra should go into a development fund for the province, while the governor twice called for a Basra federal region in 2008. They are already organizing social groups, and using their control of the provincial government to rally support. Several Shiite independents and tribes from the area are also pro-region. Finally, a parliamentarian from the Kurdish Alliance voiced support for the idea in November 2008 as well. Those opposed are the major Shiite and Sunni parties. First, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has been centralizing power around him in 2008. He would be against a lessoning of Baghdad’s power, especially over the majority of the country’s oil reserves. Oil Minister Hussein Sharhistani, who is running with Maliki’s Dawa party in the provincial elections, has repeatedly stated that all oil profits must go through the central government as well. He recently opposed the Kurds' call for a share of the oil profits. Moqtada al-Sadr also believes in authority being centralized in Baghdad, and one of his spokesmen in Najaf said the Basra idea would be bad for the country. There have even been discussions between Dawa and the Sadrists, two deep-seated foes, to work together in the province to block the proposal. The Iraqi Islamic Party is also against, reflecting the fears of many Sunnis that the Shiites and Kurds will control much of the country’s oil. The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), although having little influence in Basra itself, has proposed a southern Shiite region before. A separate Basra area would hamper that idea. The Communist Party in Basra, and former Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List are also in opposition.

Whether the Basra federal region goes up for a vote or not in January 2009 is a huge gamble for Latif and the Fadhila Party. It will happen just before the provincial elections on January 31. If the proposal passes both Latif and Fadhila will benefit. If it fails however, they will be going into the elections from a position of weakness. The Fadhila party is already widely unpopular for its lack of providing services and growth in Basra, and was a target of the government’s crackdown in March. The proposal also pits centralists like the Prime Minister against regionalists. Not only that, but local parties like Fadhila are against larger sectarian region backers such as the SIIC. The Oil Minister is also trying to fend off the Kurds' aspirations to control their oil, while building up the state’s capacity at a time when profits are dropping, and the country’s petroleum infrastructure is in dire need of repair. Having a Basra region with most of the oil reserves and the main pipeline and port could derail his plan. All of these factors have already pitted the major national parties against the local Basra ones. Intimidation, bribery, and the use of the security forces for political ends could all ensue to sway the process.

SOURCES

Abouzeid, Rania, “A New Twist in Iraq’s Shi’ite Power Struggle,” Time, 11/16/08

Agence France Presse, “Basra vote aims to benefit from Iraq oil wealth: planner,” 12/8/08

Alsumaria, “Basra heading towards independent region,” 11/17/08
- “Lights shed on federalism in Iraq Basra,” 11/13/08

Amara, Mostafa, “Kurds cannot collect oil royalties, says minister,” Azzaman, 12/22/08

Aswat al-Iraq, “Establishing Basra region easing off political congestion – MP,” 11/14/08
- “Sunni scholars, seculars object Basra federacy,” 11/15/08

Mohammed, Aref, “Thousands demand separate region for Iraq’s Basra,” Reuters, 12/27/08

Visser, Reidar, “The Basra Federalism Initiative Enters Stage Two,” Historiae.org, 12/15/08

Al-Wazzan, Saleem, “basra’s dominant parties expect to maintain power,” Niqash, 12/15/08

Wednesday, December 24, 2008

Importance Of The Upcoming Provincial Elections

The December 2008 issue of the Arab Reform Bulletin had an article by Michael Knights on the importance of the upcoming Iraqi provincial elections. Knights is a Middle East specialist from England that works for the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Knights’ main argument was that while the elections will not be perfect, they are an important sign of progress for Iraq’s political system. They will give a sense of how popular Iraq’s parties are, show that the government is committed to democracy, but Knights’ point may be undermined by the fact that actual governance might not improve.

Iraq’s elections are due at the end of January 2009. They will occur in fourteen of the country’s eighteen provinces. The Kurdish Regional Government will decide when the three Kurdish provinces of Dohuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniyah will hold their vote. Tamim, home of the disputed city of Kirkuk, will have its polling delayed as well until a committee can come up with a power sharing agreement, and a separate election law is drafted for it. The committee is supposed to finish their work by March 31, 2009. Even with these exceptions around 75% of the Iraqi public will still be voting.

The election law this time is more open than 2005, but still has limits. The new voting system is an open list, proportional one. In 2005 Iraq had a closed list vote. People picked from coalitions of parties, and then those parties decided what politicians would fill the provincial council seats. Many of these people were unqualified as the parties relied upon cronies, family ties, and patronage to dole out the seats. The new system will allow Iraqis to pick from individuals, parties or coalitions. The votes will be tallied to see how much each individual or party gets across the entire province, and then positions on the council will be given by the percentage each received. The top vote getters for each list will receive the actual seats, meaning the parties will not get to pick them as happened in 2005. This method favors the large parties that are better organized, funded, and already control the councils because they can operate across the entire province, which is necessary to win seats. There are also no campaign financing rules, which will allow rich individuals and foreign countries to also play a role in influencing the outcome. In November for example, an Iranian agent was arrested in Wasit hiding in a fuel truck carrying forged Iraqi IDs. An Iraqi source believed the Iranian was planning to use them in the elections to fake votes. The election law also sets aside a quota for women candidates with the top vote getting women getting every 3rd seat on the councils. The councils in turn pick the governors of each province and the provincial police chiefs. They also get to control the provincial budgets and local reconstruction projects.

The January elections will also be different from the 2005 one because of who’s running and how. In the 2005 provincial elections, the major Shiite parties the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) and the Dawa ran together as part of the United Iraqi Alliance. This time they will be running against each other. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has already made his move to improve his situation vis-a-vis the much larger SIIC that already controls most of the southern provinces by creating Tribal Support Councils aimed at gathering votes from sheikhs and their followers in rural areas. The Sunnis and Sadrists also largely boycotted the first 2005 elections. On the Sunni side, only the Iraqi Islamic Party ran, which now controls Anbar, while the Sadrists only really competed in Maysan, which they have sway over. The tribal Awakening forces in Anbar are hoping to unseat the Islamic Party, while the larger Iraqi Accordance Front coalition is looking to gain seats in central and northern Iraq. The Sadrists on the other hand, are handicapped by the series of government crackdowns that began in March 2008. Sadr said his followers would run with smaller parties. As reported earlier, this probably means they will not do well. Dozens of independents and individuals are going to run as well, even though their chances of victory are slim due to the voting system. The head of Iraq’s Election Commission announced that there were 14,800 individuals, 36 coalitions, and 366 political parties running for office this time.

In the end, Knights believes that the elections will only shuffle the seats between the current ruling parties. He predicts that the Shiite south will be evenly divided between the Dawa and SIIC after the election, with independents being the swing votes as to who is named governors. The Anbar tribes will split the vote with the Islamic Party, and the Accordance Front could take Salahaddin, which is currently ruled by the Kurds. The Sunnis might also gain seats in Diyala and Baghdad, while the Kurds could retain control of Ninewa, which has the disputed city of Mosul. Knights warns that violence and fraud might also influence the vote, both real and imagined. There have already been several reports of an uptake in assassinations and the use of sticky bombs to kill officials that could be linked to the elections.

When the election is over, the new councils may face opportunities and difficulties as well. The new governors could have more power as the provincial powers act gives them wide ranging authority. They could also be severely limited by two factors as well. First, the change in ruling parties could also hamper the local government as bureaucrats are likely to be replaced with a brand new set of family members and cronies that have little to no experience running anything. Second, Baghdad is planning on slashing the provincial budgets in half because of the drop in oil prices. Much of Iraq lives in poverty, and many citizens are cynical about the political system that has failed to improve their lot even as violence has declined in the last year. Because of these experiences and financial constraints, the new provincial governments may be no better than their predecessors in delivering on any of their election promises.

Despite all of these faults, Knights still believes that the elections are important. Iraq is still formulating its political system after years of dictatorial rule. The same parties may end up in power, just with different positions vis-à-vis each other, and they may not be able to improve the provinces’ lot much, but Knights argues the vote will be significant symbolically. He thinks that Baghdad needs to instill in the public the fact that there will be regular elections, and the people will have a say in who rules the country. Of course, if it leads to the same type of incompetent and corrupt governance couldn’t that corrode the populace’s belief in democracy just as much? There are plenty of developing countries that have regular votes, but little changes. Ultimately, simply carrying out balloting is not enough to transform a nation. Elections need to be more than symbolic victories. They need to lead to real substantive changes as well.

For more on the upcoming provincial elections see:

Controversy Could Be Growing Over Ban On Using Religious Symbols During Provincial Elections

Iraqi Al-Amal Association and Baghdad University’s Public Opinion Poll On Poverty In Iraq

Maliki’s Tribal Support Councils Appear To Be Paying Off

Iraq Center for Research & Strategic Studies’ Survey Of Iraqis

Maliki Responds To His Critics On Tribal Support Councils

Disputes Over Tribal Support Councils

Iraq’s Displaced Not Excitied About Election

Iraq’s New Voting System

Election Law Passed, Now To Get People To Vote

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “Iranian with forged Iraqi IDs arrested in Wassit,” 11/22/08
- “Next year elections made by Iraqis – IHEC,” 12/4/08
- “No decrease in salaries because of oil prices – planning minister,” 12/19/08

Fadel, Leila, “Assassinations replacing car bombs in Iraq,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/9/08

Goode, Erica, “Iraq Passes Provincial Elections Law,” New York Times, 9/25/08

Institute for the Study of War, “Fact Sheet on Iraq’s Major Shi’a Political Parties and Militia Groups,” April 2008

Knights, Michael, “Significance of the Provincial Elections,” Arab Reform Bulletin, December, 2008

Middle East Reference.org, “Governorate elections held in Iraq on 31 January 2005”

Parker, Sam, “not so open,” Abu Muqawama Blog, 9/25/08

Saturday, December 20, 2008

Drought Leads To Food And Grain Imports

As reported before, Iraq is facing one of the worst droughts in decades. Rainfall in 2007 was down 40% according to Baghdad. Central and northern Iraq have been hit the hardest in places like Diyala, Ninewa, Dohuk, and Irbil. The Ministry of Agriculture noted that this was exacerbating the shrinking amount of arable land in the country, which is dropping 5% per year. Some of Iraq’s main crops have been devastated by this turn of events. A U.S. Department of Agriculture report called the situation a “disaster.” To deal with the problem, the government has announced plans to import thousands of tons of food and grain.

Baghdad declared that it would buy foreign foodstuffs to make up for the drop in domestic agriculture. That would have to account for wheat production that is down 27%, and a 60% reduction in barley. In the north, wheat farming has fallen 80-98%. To make up the difference, the government plans on spending $132 million on food imports. It will be buying 2.8 million tons of wheat for example, a 40% increase from last year.

Iraqi authorities have claimed they are providing aid to beleaguered farmers as well. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki promised $200 million to help with the drought. The Agriculture Ministry has been offering loans and fertilizer. A farming consultant that works for the U.S. however, claimed that this policy was a joke. He said that farmers usually can’t qualify for the loans, and needed to bribe officials if they really wanted one. He went on to say that the government was useless in this situation. The lack of electricity and fuel, which are necessary for irrigation pumps, and deteriorating infrastructure has also hampered Baghdad’s response.

To add to the difficulties, the severity of the drought is leading to some displacement. Agriculture is one of the largest employers in the country, and there are reports that farmers, especially, in the north, have begun leaving their land for towns and cities looking for employment. As an example, in July, when Iraqi forces launched an offensive in Diyala, U.S. and Iraqi forces came across the Fatamia village, which only had 3-4 families out of 30-40 still there. The military claimed the villagers had fled insurgents, but a resident said they had left because of the drought.

Because of these myriad problems, it’s not known when Iraq will recover from this drought. Farms have been devastated, the country is importing food, people are leaving rural areas, and the government as usual is not competent enough to really help. This comes on top of the financial problems Baghdad is running into with the huge drop in oil prices. The budget will probably run a deficit soon, which could imperial the import plan. The one bright spot is that in October there was rain. Whether this was a significant amount is not known. Until then Iraq will still be in this predicament.

For more on Iraq’s drought see:

United Nations Humanitarian Report On Iraq

More On Iraq’s Drought

Drought Update II

Drought Update

Iraq’s Drought

SOURCES

Haynes, Deborah, “Iraqis hunt for insurgents in Diyala unearths only ghost towns and drought,” Times of London, 7/29/08

Iraq Directory, “Iraq is Submitting a Tender to Buy 50 Thousand Tons of Wheat,” 11/25/08

Latif, Nizar, “Iraq in midst of ‘agricultural disaster,’” The National, 12/11/08

Rasheed, Ahmed and Ryan, Missy, “Iraq’s farm sector crumbling as drought bites,” Reuters, 10/24/08

Shatab, Ali, “Iraq to increase grain imports due to drop in local produce,” Azzaman, 5/16/08

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Iraq Humanitarian Update,” October 2008

Friday, December 19, 2008

Kenneth Pollack: Too Soon To Wave Victory Flag

Kenneth Pollack is an Iraq analyst and senior fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. At the beginning of December 2008 he was interviewed by Bernard Gwertzman from the Council on Foreign Relations. Pollack voiced his concerns over the future of Iraq, and U.S. policy. With a financial crisis hitting the United States and violence down in Iraq, he was afraid that the American government and public would forget about Iraq, and walk away when there was still much work to be done.

Pollack started his conversation with Gwertzman by expressing his concerns about America’s wherewithal in Iraq. Pollack said he was worried that the American public and its leaders thought the U.S. had achieved victory in Iraq. He believes that the country is still not stable, and that there are still major problems to be overcome. Some of these have the potential to bring Iraq back to the brink. This was happening at a time when the U.S. was reducing its role in the country, and has agreed to a 2011 deadline for combat troops to be out of the country under the Status of Forces Agreement. America has also been hit by a growing recession that will distract the public’s attention away from foreign affairs to domestic ones. It will also mean there are less resources available for Iraq. All together, Pollack was worried that the result would be America forgetting about what they started in the country.

In Iraq, the major problem that Pollack focused upon was the development of its political system. He warned that its government, parties, and institutions are still immature, and that there is an on-going struggle for power within the ruling coalition. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki for example, is centralizing authority in his office. Pollack doesn’t believe he has the ability to become a dictator, but his moves are worrying his partners, the Kurds and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council. This has the potential to topple the government if one decides to have a no confidence vote in Maliki.

Another potential threat to stability is the growing strength of the Iraqi security forces. The Army is growing in capabilities and self-assuredness. With weak politicians, they could launch a military coup. Pollack first mentioned this possibility after a trip to Iraq back in May 2008. This may or may not have just happened with the arrests of several officers in the Interior Ministry recently.

The third problem Pollack mentioned is the continued division and marginalization of the country’s Sunnis. The Sunnis as a group are still not unified. The Sunni Accordance Front is the largest Sunni coalition, but they are widely unpopular, and one of its members, the Iraqi Islamic Party of Vice President Tariq Hashemi will probably lose power in Anbar to the Awakening movement. Many tribes have also joined the Sons of Iraq program and hope to capitalize on that to run in the upcoming provincial elections. The problem is that they are not political parties or politicians who are organized to run campaigns, garner votes, or work the system. That means many may not be successful in the polling. More importantly, the state of disarray amongst them means that the Shiites and Kurds continue to exclude them from power.

Pollack finished his interview by urging America to stay focused and working on Iraq. He said that the U.S. needed to keep pressure on the Iraqi government, so that it makes the necessary compromises for national reconciliation. This is a paradox however, because the U.S.’s influence is declining, when it needs it to ensure a stable Iraq. Pollack has expressed similar opinions before in journal pieces, and is part of a larger group of Iraq analysts that believe America needs to stay in Iraq for the long haul until the country has overcome most of its problems.

Pollack is right, Iraq still has many issues that need to be resolved, but Americans probably won’t fix them. One major issue with Pollack’s argument is that the ruling parties may not want the same thing as Pollack and other Americans. For example, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has said on several occasions that there has already been reconciliation in Iraq. The Accordance Front is part of the government, the parliament has passed the Amnesty Act and the Accountability and Justice Law to replace the old Debaathification process, as well as agreed to pay for and integrate the Sons of Iraq. Maliki therefore doesn’t see any reason to make any more compromises with the Sunnis. Not only that, but with the Sunnis divided, and their political parties weak, that gives more opportunities for the Shiites to gain power in central and northern Iraq. Lastly, why would Maliki give up centralizing authority around him? What kind of pressure could the Americans bring to bear, that would stop him? While he doesn’t have the ability to become a dictator, he could very well become more autocratic. His moves have upset his coalition so much, that there are already rumors that they may force him out of office. That leads to the last criticism. Pollack is calling for an open-ended commitment to Iraq, a country that may never turn out how he or other Americans want. If recent events point to anything, it’s that Iraqis will determine their own future, not the U.S.

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “National reconciliation behind security improvement – PM,” 12/4/08

Biddle, Stephen, Nasr, Vali, Nash, William, “Political and Security Developments in Iraq and the Region,” Council on Foreign Relations, 6/12/08

Biddle, Stephen, O’Hanlon, Michael, and Pollack, Kenneth, “How to Leave a Stable Iraq, Building on Progress in Iraq,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2008

Gwertzman, Bernard, “Despite Security Improvements, Iraq Remains ‘Very Troubled Country,’” Council on Foreign Relations, 12/10/08

Robertson, Campbell and Maher, Tareq, “An Inquiry in Baghdad Is Clouded by Politics,” New York Times, 12/18/08

Salman, Raheem and Parker, Ned, “Iraq detains police officials, including Interior Ministry generals,” Los Angeles Times, 12/18/08

Monday, December 15, 2008

International Organization for Migration’s Numbers On Refugee Returns

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) recently released reports on Iraq’s eighteen provinces. They included statistics on the number of Iraqis that have returned to their homes. As reported earlier, since this summer Baghdad has been calling for Iraq’s displaced to come back. It has offered a number of cash incentives, housing, schooling, and ordered squatters to vacate their premises as well. A European official however, recently told Abu Dhabi’s The National that Iraq has no real plan or process in place to pay, assist or integrate returnees. The IOM found that the Ministry of Displacement and Migration has only provided aid to 26.3% of internal refugees. A September 2008 joint survey by the Displacement Ministry and the IOM of 2,102 returning families found that only around half of them, 1,043 had even applied for the government’s offer of money, and of those, 732 had received nothing compared to 311 who had.

Despite this, Iraqis have started to go back, mostly to Baghdad, which saw the greatest displacement, and then Diyala and Anbar. The vast majority are internally displaced, with only a trickle of international refugees. Many sited the improved security, but also the bad living conditions they were in as factors. For refugees, a lack of money and visa restrictions by host countries were major issues.

Statistics

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for refugees there are 4.4 million displaced Iraqis. 2.4 million are within the country and 2 million outside Iraq.

Here are the IOM’s numbers on returnees:

Anbar: 3,101 families, approx. 18,606 people
Babil: 125 families, approx. 750 people
Baghdad: 26,347 families, approx. 158,082 people
Basra: 465 families, approx. 2,790 people
Dhi Qar: 86 families, approx. 516 people
Diyala: 6,216 families, approx. 37,296 people
Karbala: 297 families, approx. 1,782 people
Maysan: 626 families, approx. 3,756 people
Muthanna: 26 families, approx 156 people
Najaf: 102 families, approx. 612 people
Ninewa: 605 families, approx. 3,630 people
Qadisiyah: 24 families, approx. 144 people
Salahaddin: 96 families, approx. 576 people
Tamim: 165 families, approx. 990 people
Wasit: 120 families, approx. 720 people
TOTAL: 38,401 families, approx. 230,406 people, 5% of total number of refugees

There were no returnees to the three Kurdish provinces of Dohuk, Irbil and Sulaymaniyah


SOURCES


Agence France Presse, “Iraqi army destroys Baghdad squatter camp,” 11/13/08

CNN, “UN Gears Up for Return of Displaced Iraqis,” 12/4/08

Ministry of Displacement and Migration & International Organization for Migration, “Returnee Monitoring and Needs Assessments Tabulation Report,” September 2008

Sands, Phil, “Displaced Iraqis at point of no return,” The National, 12/2/08

International Organization for Migration’s Numbers On Refugee Returns

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) recently released reports on Iraq’s eighteen provinces. They included statistics on the number of Iraqis that have returned to their homes. As reported earlier, since this summer Baghdad has been calling for Iraq’s displaced to come back. It has offered a number of cash incentives, housing, schooling, and ordered squatters to vacate their premises as well. A European official however, recently told Abu Dhabi’s The National that Iraq has no real plan or process in place to pay, assist or integrate returnees. The IOM found that the Ministry of Displacement and Migration has only provided aid to 26.3% of internal refugees. A September 2008 joint survey by the Displacement Ministry and the IOM of 2,102 returning families found that only around half of them, 1,043 had even applied for the government’s offer of money, and of those, 732 had received nothing compared to 311 who had.

Despite this, Iraqis have started to go back, mostly to Baghdad, which saw the greatest displacement, and then Diyala and Anbar. The vast majority are internally displaced, with only a trickle of international refugees. Many sited the improved security, but also the bad living conditions they were in as factors. For refugees, a lack of money and visa restrictions by host countries were major issues.

Statistics

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for refugees there are 4.4 million displaced Iraqis. 2.4 million are within the country and 2 million outside Iraq.

Here are the IOM’s numbers on returnees:

Anbar: 3,101 families, approx. 18,606 people
Babil: 125 families, approx. 750 people
Baghdad: 26,347 families, approx. 158,082 people
Basra: 465 families, approx. 2,790 people
Dhi Qar: 86 families, approx. 516 people
Diyala: 6,216 families, approx. 37,296 people
Karbala: 297 families, approx. 1,782 people
Maysan: 626 families, approx. 3,756 people
Muthanna: 26 families, approx 156 people
Najaf: 102 families, approx. 612 people
Ninewa: 605 families, approx. 3,630 people
Qadisiyah: 24 families, approx. 144 people
Salahaddin: 96 families, approx. 576 people
Tamim: 165 families, approx. 990 people
Wasit: 120 families, approx. 720 people
TOTAL: 38,401 families, approx. 230,406 people, 5% of total number of refugees

There were no returnees to the three Kurdish provinces of Dohuk, Irbil and Sulaymaniyah


SOURCES


Agence France Presse, “Iraqi army destroys Baghdad squatter camp,” 11/13/08

CNN, “UN Gears Up for Return of Displaced Iraqis,” 12/4/08

Ministry of Displacement and Migration & International Organization for Migration, “Returnee Monitoring and Needs Assessments Tabulation Report,” September 2008

Sands, Phil, “Displaced Iraqis at point of no return,” The National, 12/2/08

Friday, December 12, 2008

Are Budget Cuts Ahead For Iraq?

Iraq’s financial woes seem to only be beginning. A member of the Iraqi parliament’s Finance Committee said that the country’s 2009 budget would have a 23% deficit, that could increase to 50% if oil prices keep on dropping. The budget was based upon a $62 a barrel price of oil, which was a conservative estimate at the time when oil was at over $100 a barrel. The problem stems from the fact that on December 8, oil was selling at $45 a barrel. The politician criticized the government saying that other countries in the region had planned budgets based upon a $40 a barrel price. As reported earlier, Iraq is far more dependent upon oil revenues that its Arab neighbors.

The budget problems are going to have a negative affect upon government services. Finance Minister Bayan Baqir Jabor has already called on ministries, government offices, and the provinces to cut spending. A financial expert from the Central Bank of Iraq told Aswat al-Iraq that austerity measures were probably in order to balance Iraq’s budget. He said Baghdad could cut spending by 20 trillion dinars. Otherwise the advisor suggested Iraq could issue bonds or seek international loans, but he discouraged that last one. Iraq is still struggling to come out from under Saddam era debts.

When the price of oil dropped a few observers noted this would have a dire affect upon Iraq. Calls for reducing spending and austerity measures are probably only the beginning of an approaching budget crisis. Reconstruction and programs for the needy could be the targets of cuts as most of the budget goes towards salaries, pensions, and paying operating costs. This would adversely affect the populace, up to 60% of which lives below the international poverty line. The fact that the economy was under sanctions for years, mismanaged by the Americans, flooded with cheap imports, and been underdeveloped by the current government will all mean that Iraq will continue to be dependent upon world oil markets for revenue, something they have no real control over.

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “Austerity could save 20 trillion dinars for 2009 budget – expert,” 12/9/08
- “Deficit in 2009 budget may reach 50% - MP,” 12/9/08
- “Finance ministry urges expenditure cuts,” 12/7/08

Bruno, Greg, “Transparency and Surpluses in Iraq’s Oil-Dependent Budget,” Council on Foreign Relations, 10/28/08

Chon, Gina, “As Crude Falls, Iraqi Leaders Scramble to Plan Budget,” Wall Street Journal, 10/22/08

IRIN, “Iraq: Low oil prices could affect government aid to IDPs,” 12/11/08

Sachet, Khalid Hantoush, “Results of the Field Survey For Needs and Opinions of The Poor in Iraq,” Iraqi Al Amal Association, University of Baghdad, September 2008

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/08

Tuesday, December 09, 2008

U.N. Suspends Work On Disputed Territories Until Provincial Elections Are Over

The disputed territories in Iraq came to the fore this summer. In August 2008 Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki sent the Iraqi army into the Khanaqin district in northern Diyala province. The area had been occupied by the Kurds since the U.S. invasion, and been under official Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) administration since February 2008. Tensions were so high that violence seemed inevitable but for the intervention and mediation of the United States. Khanaqin is one of a dozen districts in Iraq that the Kurds hope to annex. Currently the KRG occupies 300 miles of territory outside of Kurdistan. The United Nations had been working on these disputed areas since late 2007, but in November 2008 the U.N.’s envoy to Iraq Staffan de Mistura said that the organization would be suspending its effort on the issue until after the provincial elections scheduled for January 2009.

Map of Kurdish occupied areas outside of Kurdistan

The Iraqi constitution’s Article 140 is supposed to deal with Kirkuk and other disputed territories, but it has never been implemented. By December 31, 2007 the government was supposed to have completed a census of Kirkuk and held a plebiscite on whether the population wanted to join Kurdistan or not. As the end of 2007 approached and nothing substantial had happened, the Kurds agreed to a six-month delay. That too has passed with no action either. In early 2007 when it was apparent that the article was not going to work any time soon, the U.N. began looking into alternatives.

On August 10, 2007 the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1770 that said the U.N. envoy to Iraq would work on the disputed territories. The first thing Staffan de Mistura did under this new resolution was to get Baghdad and the Kurds to agree to delay Article 140. This was supported by the United States who began pushing for a negotiated settlement instead of 140. This was a great disappointment to the Kurds who had hoped that the constitution would ensure a legal take over of the areas. They feared that any negotiations would cost them territory, especially Kirkuk, which is the most revered by the Kurds.

5 – Akre, 17 – Hamdaniya, 77 – Khanaqin, 79 – Kirkuk, 81 - Makhmur, 92 – Shekhan, 93 – Sinjar, 98 – Tal Afar, 100 – Tilkaif are some of the areas to be mediated by the United Nations under Resolution 1770

The U.N. and the U.S. have been moving towards power sharing and a division of disputed areas since the end of 2007. In December of that year, the U.S. pressured the KRG into accepting a division of power with the Arabs in Kirkuk’s Tamim province. At the same time, the U.N. began working on a 3-phase report on what to do with the other territories. In June 2008 they released their initial report that dealt with four areas. The U.N. suggested that two, Makhmur in Tamim and Akre in Ninewa would go to Kurdistan, while Hamdaniya would go to Ninewa and Mandali to Diyala. The U.N. specifically chose these four to go first because they had Arab and Kurdish majorities and would evenly be split. That didn’t seem to help as no side was happy with the report. Both the Kurds and Baghdad however seemed to accept the process. The second report is to address Tal Afar, Tilkaif, Shekhan and Sinjar in Ninewa, and Khanaqin in Diyala. The final one would deal with the thorniest issue, Kirkuk. De Mistura was supposed to have finished this work by September or October 2008, but that didn’t happen. Now the U.N. envoy has said that he is going to postpone his work until after the provincial elections in January 2009. De Mistura said that he didn’t want the process to be caught up in politics and electioneering. The Kurds condemned the delay.

Tensions between Kurdistan and Baghdad have only grown since the first U.N. report. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki feels that his security operations have strengthened his hand, and he is working to limit the Kurds in a number of disputed areas including Mosul, Kirkuk, and Khanaqin. The KRG in turn have condemned his moves, claiming that Maliki is attempting a power grab, and is undermining the constitution. Only through strong pressure by the United States and the United Nations can these contested territories be resolved. Even then they might not be able to resolve this thorny issue, which pits the regional aspirations of the Kurds against the determination of Maliki to assert national power, along with the demands of minorities. The U.N.’s initial recommendations were not welcomed, but all sides seemed to agree to the organization’s work, which is a positive sign that they might accept its arbitration to fix this mounting problem.

For more on Khanaqin and the Kurd-Maliki dispute see:

Cold War Between Baghdad and Kurds Turns Hot

Could Maliki Be Deposed?

Deal Struck To Defuse Khanaqin Issue

Khanaqin Deal Off?

Kurdish-Baghdad Tensions Over Diyala

The Kurds Come Out Swinging

Maliki Still Pushing The Kurds On Khanaqin District

Maliki Ups the Ante in Khanaqin District of Diyala

Mosul: The New Battleground Between Maliki And The Kurds

Two Reports On Trying to Solve The Kirkuk Issue

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iraqi Kurds Accuse UN Of Delaying Report On Disputed Areas,” 11/30/08

Alsumaria, “Arabs in Kirkuk refuse UN recommendations,” 6/9/08

Aswat al-Iraq, “95 lawmakers criticize the U.N. recommendations over disputed districts,” 6/7/08
- “KRG: PM Should Create, Not Undermine, National Unity,” 12/2/08
- “Military units should be under central govt. control,” 8/19/08

Dagher, Sam, “Can the U.N. avert a Kirkuk border war?” Christian Science Monitor, 4/25/08

International Crisis Group, “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08

Janabi, Nazar, “Kirkuk’s Article 140: Expired or Not?,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1/30/08

Londono, Ernesto, “Kurds in N. Iraq Receive Arms From Bulgaria,” Washington Post, 11/23/08

Paley, Amit, “Strip of Iraq ‘on the Verge of Exploding,’” Washington Post, 9/13/08

Russo, Claire, “The Maliki Government Confronts Diyala,” Institute for the Study of War,” 9/23/08

Monday, December 08, 2008

Iraq’s New Budget Woes

Iraq’s Finance Minister Bayan Jabor recently said that Iraq needed to boost its oil exports if it wants to have a balanced budget in the future. On November 11, Iraq’s cabinet approved the country’s $67 billion 2009 budget. Originally the government planned on an $80 billion amount, but because of falling price of oil, it had to trim $13 billion. That was still $19 billion more than the 2008 budget. The problem is that the final budget was based upon a $62 a barrel price for crude. On December 2, the price stood at only $47 a barrel. According to the Finance Ministry 94% of the budget is based upon petroleum profits. To solve this problem Jabor called on increasing exports, but production has actually dropped recently, and Iraq may not have the ability to fix it any time soon.

Finance Minister Jabor said that with the declining price of oil, Iraq would run into a budget deficit by 2010. For now the government will rely upon a $15 billion surplus to make up the difference next year. In addition, Baghdad has plans to increase taxes, tariffs, and the tax base, along with selling a mobile telephone license, but Jabor noted that those would not fix the country’s huge dependence upon petroleum to finance its public spending. The Minister said the solution is to boost oil exports to 2.5 million barrels a day. Iraq is currently selling 1.7 million barrels a day to foreign markets. This is a problem already because the 2009 budget is based upon a 2 million barrels a day rate. The problem is Iraq lacks the infrastructure and know how to increase, let alone maintain a steady production of petroleum. In fact, an oil official recently said that oil exports and pumping would drop next year because old and aging equipment can’t be replaced and the country’s brain drain has deprived it of many skilled workers for maintenance.

As noted earlier, the other sectors of Iraq’s economy are facing major problems. That will mean the country will remain dependent upon oil for the foreseeable future. Minister Jabor claimed Iraq needs a $70 a barrel price to maintain its budget, but an earlier International Monetary Fund study said that Iraq needed a $111 a barrel price. That compared to other Arab states in the Persian Gulf that only needed $47 a barrel for a balanced budget. With oil prices nose-diving that will imperial more of Iraq’s spending. This is at a time when the country still needs massive reconstruction funding, and the U.S. is winding down its spending for that purpose. It will also mean the oil industry will not be improved, which is what is needed to boost production to make up for the declining prices. Iraq seems to be caught in a Catch-22 as a result.

For more on Iraq’s budget see:

United Nations Humanitarian Report On Iraq

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s Quarterly October Report

Iraq Cuts Its 2009 Budget, But Still Can’t Spend It

NY Times Finds Iraq Spends Even Less Of Their Budget

GAO August Report On Iraq’s Budget And Spending

SOURCES

Abbas, Mohammed and Ibrahim, Waleed, “Iraq fears budget crisis, urges oil export boost,” Reuters, 12/3/08

Alsumaria, “Iraq Cabinet approves 2009 budget,” 11/12/08

Associated Press, “Iraq plans to cut 2009 budget by $13 billion,” 10/31/08

Chon, Gina, “As Crude Falls, Iraqi Leaders Scramble to Plan Budget,” Wall Street Journal, 10/22/08

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/08

Swartz, Spencer, “Iraqi Oil Exports Could Fall Amid Maintenance Problems,” Wall Street Journal, 12/2/08

Saturday, December 06, 2008

Parliament Criticizes Shell Natural Gas DealParliament Criticizes Shell Natural Gas Deal

The Iraqi Parliament recently criticized the Oil Ministry’s decision to sign a natural gas deal with Royal Dutch Shell. The Oil and Gas Committee said that the Oil Ministry had mishandled its business with Shell to develop natural gas that is produced from Basra’s oil fields. The committee said that the negotiations lacked transparency, would give Shell a 25-year monopoly, and was therefore against the national interests of the country. They suggested that the government renegotiate the agreement. The Oil Ministry responded by saying that there was nothing wrong with their talks with Shell, and that everything was legal.

In early September 2008, the Oil Ministry signed a deal with Shell to exploit and export natural gas from Basra’s oil fields. Shell would enter into a joint venture with the government owned Southern Oil Company who would control 51%. The contract was to develop between 500-600 million cubic feet of gas per day. Shell could invest up to $3-$4 billion, which also involves building infrastructure. Currently Iraq does nothing with this resource, which is a natural by product of oil production in the south. Iraq claims it looses $40 million a day as a result. The U.S. Energy Information Administration says that Iraq has the 10th largest natural gas reserves in the world. The gas would be used for Iraqi factories and power stations, but many believe most of it will be sold to foreign buyers. Because Iraq’s parliament has not passed a new hydrocarbon law, this deal was negotiated using old Saddam era legislation. Iraq’s cabinet quickly ratified the agreement.

Currently, Iraq’s parliament has little power or oversight authority over the country’s ministries. The legislature can call officials to testify and either support or complain about Baghdad’s actions, but other than that, there is nothing the Oil Committee can do about the Shell deal. Their only recourse to stop it would be to go to court, but that is highly unlikely. As reported before, the Oil Ministry has followed a haphazard course in its effort to develop the country’s energy resources. The Shell agreement was only the second made with a major foreign company since the invasion. The fact that there was no bidding process, the negotiations were held privately, and Shell was given a 25-year contract all give weight to the Committee’s concerns that this will lead to a monopoly of Basra’s natural gas. Iraq does need the know how of foreign companies to develop its resources, but rushing into deals as the Oil Ministry has done with its two major contracts so far, puts short term goals ahead of the long term interests of the country.

For more on the Shell deal see:

Iraq Signs Natural Gas Deal, As Half Of Oil Plan Is Dropped

SOURCES

Crooks, Ed and Khalaf, Roula, “Shell in Iraqi gas deal worth up to $4bn,” Financial Times, 9/8/08

Graeber, Dan, “Iraq approves gas deal with Royal Dutch Shell,” Iraq Oil Report Blog, 9/7/08

Iraq Oil Report Blog, “Iraq opts for long term oil deals, ditches no-bids,” 9/9/08

Khadduri, Walid, “Oil in a Week (International Oil Companies Return to Iraq),” Al-Hayat, 10/20/08

Lando, Ben, “Shell-Iraq gas company is a monopoly, secret agreement shows,” UPI, 11/4/08

Lando, Ben and Majeed, Alaa, “Gas deal no monopoly, Shell and Iraq say,” UPI, 11/6/08

Rasheed, Ahmed, “Iraq Lawmakers Say Will Challenge Shell Gas Deal,” Reuters, 11/26/08

Yacoub, Sameer, “Iraq, Shell sign deal,” Associated Press, 9/22/08

Friday, December 05, 2008

Baghdad-Kurdish Oil Export Deal Collapses

No sooner had Baghdad’s offer of allowing the Kurds to export oil for the first time in return for concessions on passing the national oil law been reported here than today’s edition, December 3, of the Iraqi paper Azzaman ran a story that the deal had collapsed. Problems between the two sides were first reported on December 2 when Oil Minister Hussain al-Shahristani demanded that the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) void its oil contracts that it signed under its own oil law in return for a deal to export oil. The KRG refused as they have always stood by their right to negotiate their own oil contracts. The Kurds also wanted to have control over a portion of the revenue garnered from the petroleum exports. Oil Minister Shahristani believes that all oil agreements and profits should be under the sole control of the central government. KRG President Massoud Barzani attacked Shahristani for his stance, and said that the Kurds are determined to export crude. Without a new national oil law however this is impossible. Kurdistan is also landlocked, and the surrounding countries of Iran, Syria, and Turkey have all said they would not allow Kurdish oil to flow through their countries without authorization from Baghdad.

This is a major setback for Iraq’s energy policy. Without a rapprochement between the Kurdish Regional Government and Baghdad the hydrocarbon law that would regulate the development and exploitation of oil and natural gas will continue to be deadlocked in parliament. The collapse of this agreement points to the opposing views of the two sides that have held up the legislation. The Kurds want their autonomy and freedom to offer oil deals on their own, while Baghdad demands central control. The Oil Minister’s proposal to allow the Kurds to export petroleum in return for movement on the oil law was a major concession, but it was apparently not enough to overcome these deep-seated divisions.

SOURCES

AFX News Limited, “Kurdish Authorities Stand by Foreign Oil Contracts,” 12/2/08

Al-Laithi, Nidhal, “Agreement to export oil from Kurdish fields collapses,” Azzaman, 12/3/08

International Crisis Group, “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08

Thursday, December 04, 2008

Baghdad Tries To Cut Deal With Kurds To Facilitate Oil Law

In late November 2008, Iraq’s Oil Minister Hussain al-Shahristani traveled to Kurdistan for what could turn out to be a turning point in the country’s energy policy. He went there to cut a deal with the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). Since 2007 the Kurds and Baghdad have been pursuing two independent, and opposing oil plans. Now the Oil Minister was offering the Kurds the right to export oil for the first time in return for concessions to pass a national oil law.

Oil Minister Shahristani’s meeting with Kurdish officials marked a major change in Baghdad’s stance. Before, the central government had condemned the Kurds for passing their own oil law in August 2007, which led them to sign over twenty independent oil deals with a variety of small companies. Baghdad claimed that these contracts were illegal, and blacklisted the firms that signed them. When Shahristani arrived in Kurdistan he offered them the right to export oil from two fields, Taq Taq and Tawke, for the first time through a Turkish pipeline. The government said it was willing to make exceptions for these two deals because they were signed in early 2004 before the Kurds’ oil law went into affect. If confirmed, the Tawke field could be connected to Turkey by the end of 2008, and Taq Taq by March or April 2009.

As soon as the press got a hold of the deal however, the two sides began making conflicting statements. The Kurdish Regional Government’s National Resource Minister announced that they wanted to export 100,000 barrels a day at first, with a maximum production of 250,000 barrels by the end of 2009. The Resource Minister said this would all be coordinated with the Oil Ministry. Baghdad seemed taken aback however, saying that no licenses had been issued yet as the details were still being worked out. The central government also demanded that the KRG void its previous contracts in return for the export deal.

The point of Baghdad’s offer was to try to break the deadlock on the national oil law. Shortly after Shahristani's visit, the Kurds agreed to form five committees with the central government to work on parts of the hydrocarbon bill. The act has been deadlocked in parliament since February 2007. The Kurds claim that the constitution gives the regional government the right to sign oil deals without consulting with the Oil Ministry. They say that it shouldn’t matter who signs the contracts because the revenue would be shared with the nation. Additionally, the KRG has offered long-term Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) that pay oil companies back for their investment as well as a percentage of the profits from increased production. The Oil Minister on the other hand, believes that the central government should control all deals with foreign corporations, and has given Technical Support Agreements (TSAs), which pay a flat fee for services rendered. Shahristani and others contend that PSAs give oil businesses too much control over the country’s natural resources. Since 2007 there have been four drafts of the law, but none has been passed. Just this October, a version was sent to parliament, but it went nowhere. The lack of an oil law is what stops the KRG from exporting.

It is not clear when this export deal will be finalized between the central government and the Kurds. What is known is that the Oil Ministry has made a major reversal in its stance in an effort to move forward on the oil legislation. The two sides still have diametrically opposed views of how to develop petroleum, but Baghdad has taken the first step to try to shift the debate. If the bill was ever passed it could open up Iraq’s massive oil reserves, and boost production for an industry that provides over 90% of the budget and 60% of the Gross Domestic Product. Just as important, it could ease tensions between Baghdad and the KRG that have come to the boiling point recently, and be a real act of reconciliation.

Kurdish Regional Government Oil Contracts

The Kurds signed six oil deals from 2003 to 2006 before Iraq’s parliament suggested a national oil law. Frustrated with the lack of movement on the bill after it was introduced in February 2007, the KRG passed its own petroleum act in August 2007. This led to over twenty contracts, some with existing companies. The majority of these produce no oil. They simply explore and drill wells. They have thus been largely symbolic to show the autonomy of the KRG, and to protest Baghdad’s nationalist and centralized vision of oil development. Below is a list of companies that have signed with the Kurds.

Deals Signed Before The August 2007 Kurdish Oil Law
January 2003 – Pet Oil (Turkey), later joined by Prime Natural Resources (U.S.) and Oil Search (Australia)
January 2004 – Genel Enerji (Turkey), later joined by Addax Petroleum (Switzerland)
July 2004 – DNO (Norway)
May 2006 – Western Zagros (Canada)
2006 – Crescent Petroleum/Dana Gas (United Arab Emirates)
2006 – A&T Petroleum (Turkey), part of Pet Oil, and Prime Natural Resources, later joined by Oil Search

Deals Signed After The August 2007 Kurdish Oil Law
Addax Petroleum (Canada/Switzerland)
Aspect Energy (U.S.)
Crescent Petroleum (United Arab Emirates)
Dana Gas (United Arab Emirates)
DNO (Norway)
Groundstar Resources (Canada)
Gulf Keystone Petroleum (UK)
Heritage Oil and Gas (Canada)
Hillwood International Energy (US)
Hunt Oil (US)
Kalegran/MOL (Hungary)
Korea National Oil Corporation (South Korea)
Niko Resources (Canada)
Norbest (Russia)
Oil Search (Australia)
OMV Petroleum Exploration (Austria)
Perenco (France)
Pet Oil (Turkey)
Prime Natural Resources (US)
Reliance Energy (India)
SK Energy (South Korea)
Sterling Energy International (US)
Talisman Energy (Canada)
Texas Keystone (US)
Vast Exploration (Canada)

For more on Iraq’s oil industry see:

Analyst On Iraq’s Oil Plans: Don’t Expect Much Until A New Oil Law Is Passed

GAO August 2008 Report On Iraq’s Budget And Spending

Iraq Moves Ahead With 2nd Part Of Its Oil Plan

Iraq Signs Natural Gas Deal, As Half Of Oil Plan Is Dropped

Iraq’s Deteriorating Oil Infrastructure

Iraq’s Oil Ministry’s Plans Seem To Be Falling Apart

Iraq’s Troubled Economy

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction July Reports Major Findings

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s Quarterly October Report

SOURCES

Abbas, Mohammed, “Iraq Central Gov’t, Kurdistan Agree Oil Exports (UPDATE 2),” Reuters, 11/28/08

AFX News Limited, “Kurdish Authorities Stand by Foreign Oil Contracts,” 12/2/08

Agence France Presse, “New panel to iron out differences on Iraq oil law: Kurd leader,” 6/28/08

Ali, Mohanad, “Five committees set up to solve differences over oil with Kurds,” Azzaman, 11/30/08

Arabian Business, “Iraq in breakthrough to link Kurd oilfields to export,” 11/25/08

International Crisis Group, “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08

Lando, Ben and Majeed, Alaa, “Iraqi Parliament returns oil law to Maliki,” UPI, 10/27/08

Al-Nur, “American forces stopped the Norwegian DNO in Kurdistan,” 9/30/08

Salaheddin, Sinan, “Iraqi Kurds to Begin Solo Exports of Crude Oil,” Associated Press, 11/28/08

Webb, Tim, “Oil giants find scramble for Iraq is a game with complex rules,” Observer, 10/19/08

Sunday, November 30, 2008

July SOFA Referendum

On November 27 Iraq’s parliament agreed to two deals with the United States. The first was a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that allows the U.S. military to operate in Iraq until the end of 2011 when they are suppose to withdraw. The second was a Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) that set diplomatic relations between the two countries. Both deals can be renegotiated by Baghdad if it pleases. The Sunni parties also had the Iraqi legislature pass a bill that creates a referendum on the SOFA by the end of July 2009. The task ahead for the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is to build up public support for the agreement so that it passes the vote.

The first hurtle Maliki will face is informing the politicians and public of what the SOFA/SFA actually entail. During the parliamentary debate, an Iraqi reporter for the New York Times noted that 70% of the legislatures didn’t appear to know what was in the agreement. One said the deal didn’t give the government the right to search U.S. mail and cargo coming into Iraq, but it did. Another complained that it didn’t end the U.N.’s Chapter VII, which was passed during the Saddam years saying that Iraq was a threat to international security. That status is in fact terminated. A Sadrist parliamentarian claimed that the agreement didn’t stop the United States from using Iraq as a base to attack other countries, but there is an article that bars this, although there is some disagreement about its interpretation between the two sides.

The general public was even less informed. An October 2008 public opinion poll by the Iraq Centre For Research & Strategic Studies that did face to face interviews with 3,000 Iraqis from all 18 provinces found that 49.8% of respondents didn’t know about the SOFA. Of the 46.2% that had heard of the agreement, opinions were evenly split over whether it would be good or bad for the country. In the end though, 61.3% disagreed with the deal, compared to only 28.5% being for it. The poll was conducted in September and October however, before the government had been able to get a series of concessions from the United States that greatly increased its power over American forces within Iraq. The government run Al-Sabah paper published another poll on November 23 that found 46% of Iraqis for the SOFA, 34.5% against, and 19.4% replying that they didn’t know. Their poll asked 5,576 Iraqis from 10 provinces. Of those, the majority of respondents in Babil, Qadisiyah, and Diyala were against the agreement, while Baghdad, Dhi Qar, Basra, Karbala, Wasit, Maysan, and Irbil were for it.

In the run up to the parliamentary vote, the government tried to inform the public about the agreement to garner support, which will continue to be its job. Officials released copies of the SOFA to reporters and began reading parts of it on government owned TV. Whether this public relations campaign was responsible for the shift in opinion between the two polls is unknown. The Iraq Centre is a non-partisan Iraqi based think tank, while Al-Sabah operates out of the Green Zone, so the latter could’ve been propaganda. Either way, there is still not a majority in favor of the agreement according to the two, which is necessary to get pass the July referendum. Maliki’s government will then have its hands full trying to win over more people, while the United States needs to make sure it doesn’t have any breaches of the agreement that will turn Iraqis against the SOFA.

SOURCES

Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Sunni Arab support key to US-Iraq security deal,” Associated Press, 11/25/08

Ashton, Adam, Landay, Jonathan and Youssef, Nancy, “U.S. staying silent on its view of Iraq pact until after vote,” McClatchy Newspapers, 11/26/08

Baker, Peter and Tyson, Ann Scott, “Bush, Maliki Sign Pact on Iraq’s Future,” Washington Post, 11/27/07

Fox News, “Iraqi Parliament Approves U.S. Security Pact, 11/27/08

Rubin, Alissa, Robertson, Campbell and Farrell, Stephen, “Iraqi Parliament Approves U.S. Security Pact,” New York Times, 11/27/08

Rubin, Alissa, Robertson, Campbell and Farrell, Stephen, “Iraqi Parliament Approves U.S. Security Pact,” New York Times, 11/27/08

Al-Sabah, “Poll: 46% of Iraqis Support Security Agreement,” 11/23/08

al-Salhy, Suadad, “Analysis on the Spot: SOFA, From Inside Parliament,” Baghdad Bureau – Iraq From the Inside Blog, New York times, 11/24/08
 
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