The story of the Iraqi Accountability and Justice and Election Commissions’ banning of 500 candidates from the March 2010 voting for alleged Baathist ties has taken a few new turns. First, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has finally come out in favor of the ban. He said that the decision of the Accountability and Justice Commission should be adhered to. He also commented that the process should not be politicized, which ignores the fact that the Commission members have used it as a partisan tool since its inception in 2003, and that its head, Ali al-Lami, is running as a candidate for the Iraqi National Alliance. Second, the Election Commission is debating whether just the 400 politicians are barred from participating in the balloting or all their parties as well. As Reidar Visser of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs points out, there is no legal basis in the constitution or election law that mentions blocking entire parties from running. Of course, the Accountability and Justice Commission’s members haven’t even been appointed by parliament, but everyone is going along with their decisions, so legality may not matter in this situation. Third, a document has emerged that allegedly shows that Saleh al-Mutlaq, the head of the Iraqi National Dialogue Front and the most prominent politician banned, had contact with Iraqi intelligence in 2002. This was supposedly used in the Accountability and Justice Commission’s ruling against him. There is no reporting on whether the document is real or not, and again, given the circumstances, may not matter. Fourth, Mutlaq and all those banned can appeal their cases to a 7-member board of judges that was just created a few days ago. There is a concern that they may not be able to go through all the cases before the March 2010 balloting however, which may exclude candidates even if they are ultimately found innocent. Finally, there is news that the Accountability and Justice Commission may not be finished and could demand that a total of 1,200 candidates be blocked from running.
It was hoped that the 2010 parliamentary vote would be a continuation of the 2009 provincial elections where nationalist parties did much better than ethnosectarian ones, and Sunnis came out in high numbers. This in turn, would usher in a new wave of politicians to replace a group of lawmakers that have achieved very little in their four years in office, and are very unpopular as a result. The decisions of the Accountability and Justice and Election Commissions however have not only marked a return to sectarian politics, but also threatened to undermine the legitimacy of the 2010 balloting, along with bringing into question the legality of the entire Iraqi political process. Unless some institution challenges the chicanery going on, this fiasco will only continue, and could get worse.
SOURCES
AK News, “Electoral commission discusses the issue of excluded entities and candidates,” 1/17/10
Roads To Iraq, “Three Sunni candidates for the presidency, Zebari to the Vice-President,” 1/17/10
Sly, Liz, “Iraqi prime minister backs ban on 500 election candidates,” Los Angeles, 1/17/10
Visser, Reidar, “The Bloc That Has No De-Baathification Worries,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 1/17/10
- “Constitutional Disintegration (Part III): The IHEC Is Making Up the Law,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 1/15/10
Showing posts with label De-Baathification. Show all posts
Showing posts with label De-Baathification. Show all posts
Monday, January 18, 2010
Friday, July 31, 2009
Will Iraq Ever Have Reconciliation?
As Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki visited the United States in July 2009 President Obama repeated the common refrain that he hoped that there would eventually be reconciliation in Iraq. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy issued a report on this very topic on July 17 entitled, “How This Ends: Iraq’s Uncertain Path toward National Reconciliation.” In it, authors Michael Eisenstadt and Ahmed Ali document the steps that the American and Iraqi governments have followed to try to achieve this goal, and find their efforts lacking, and the prospects of making amends unlikely.
Reconciliation is important in countries that have recently gone through armed conflict. It provides greater stability and lessons the chances of a return to chaos. Successful reconciliation processes in Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Honduras, Mozambique, South Africa, and Uruguay all shared the following steps:
1. Some form of truth telling
2. Recognition that all groups in the country are fellow citizens
3. Compensation programs and trials for some
4. Public peace events
Iraq has had some of these, but also gone against others. A major problem is that the United States and various Iraqi groups do not have a shared vision of what reconciliation means.
America’s policies have changed over time, and been a mixed bag. At first, U.S. efforts were focused upon making up for their own early mistakes. This included integrating Sunnis into the security forces and politics after the Coalition Provisional Authority disbanded the Iraqi Army and initiated deBaathification, and paying compensation to families that were harmed by the military. The U.S. has also stressed ethnosectarian power sharing through the passage of laws, and mediation between Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds. Norwegian Iraq expert Reidar Visser has argued that this is a misreading of Iraqi politics and maintains differences in the country rather than helps heal them. Not only that, but the results of these early strategies were very poor. Few laws pushed by the U.S. have been passed for example, and the ones that were have not been implemented as planned. During the Surge, the American forces began working with insurgents and militiamen that were willing to give up fighting in a bottom-up approach. This was much more successful, and directly led to the decrease in violence. At the same time, the U.S. has not been able to link many of the groups they worked with to the Iraqi government such as the Sons of Iraq.
Many of Baghdad’s policies on the other hand, have been interpreted as retribution or done for political gain. Examples of the former were deBaathification and the trial and execution of Saddam Hussein, and cases of the latter were the moves by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. In June 2006 Maliki announced a 24-point plan that included amnesty, conferences, changes in deBaathification and the constitution, compensation, punishment for war criminals and terrorists, and the creation of a national dialogue council. Baghdad did compensate victims of the former regime, and passed an Amnesty Law and Accountability and Justice Act, which replaced the old deBaathification process created by the Americans. The Amnesty Law has only freed a few thousand prisoners, and has mostly been used for public relations purposes, while the Accountability Act has never been implemented. Baghdad created the Supreme Committee for Dialogue and National Reconciliation, which works with tribes, civil groups, political parties and religious leaders, but it has no staff, and parliament cancelled its funding. There is also the much more important Follow-Up Committee for National Reconciliation that vets former officials and soldiers to be re-integrated, and works with the Sons of Iraq, Tribal Support Councils, and the displaced. Both are headed by Maliki confidants, and have been accused of supporting the Prime Minister’s personal agenda. Sunnis in parliament also set up the National Reconciliation Committee to follow their vision. It mostly works to free Sunni prisoners. The government has integrated several thousand former soldiers and officers into the security forces or pays them pensions. There have also been examples of local reconciliation. The rest of Baghdad’s goals have been largely unmet, and led to accusations about the government’s intentions rather than helped heal wounds.
Eisenstadt and Ali finish by saying that reconciliation in Iraq will take years, and may never occur in a meaningful fashion. The problems are large and many. First, the major Iraqi political parties are based upon ethnosectarian politics, and could lose power if they give that up. Second, there is still fighting in Iraq, and a World Bank study on conflicts found that almost 50% of countries coming out of civil wars fall back into them within five years. Third, there is little consensus in Baghdad on major issues such as oil, and politics are fragmented, which makes it hard to conduct negotiations or find partners. Fourth, there is a lack of accountability as many militants are involved in politics and security with no regret for their past deeds. Fifth, many conflicts and fighting took place within communities, not just between them, which has never been resolved. Sixth, many groups still talk about revenge, and see things in zero-sum terms. Seventh Iraq has been in the throes of elections since 2008, which makes compromising more difficult. Last, Iraq’s neighbors have all interfered in its internal affairs, and continue to do so to this day such as Iran. These problems may never be overcome, which is why the authors are so pessimistic about the country’s future. Iraq’s government will continue, but without resolving some of these large and pressing concerns, it’s unlikely that major changes or legislation will be implemented, which are a necessity to pull the country out of its current predicament.
SOURCES
Biddle, Stephen, “Reversal in Iraq,” Center for Preventative Action Council on Foreign Relations, May 2009
DeYoung, Karen, “Obama Calls on Iraq to Foster National Unity,” Washington Post, 7/23/09
Eisenstadt, Michael and Ali, Ahmed, “’How This Ends’: Iraq’s Uncertain Path toward National Reconciliation,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 7/17/09
Visser, Reidar, “Biden, US Policy in Iraq and the Concept of Muhasasa,” Historiae.org, 7/6/09
Reconciliation is important in countries that have recently gone through armed conflict. It provides greater stability and lessons the chances of a return to chaos. Successful reconciliation processes in Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Honduras, Mozambique, South Africa, and Uruguay all shared the following steps:
1. Some form of truth telling
2. Recognition that all groups in the country are fellow citizens
3. Compensation programs and trials for some
4. Public peace events
Iraq has had some of these, but also gone against others. A major problem is that the United States and various Iraqi groups do not have a shared vision of what reconciliation means.
America’s policies have changed over time, and been a mixed bag. At first, U.S. efforts were focused upon making up for their own early mistakes. This included integrating Sunnis into the security forces and politics after the Coalition Provisional Authority disbanded the Iraqi Army and initiated deBaathification, and paying compensation to families that were harmed by the military. The U.S. has also stressed ethnosectarian power sharing through the passage of laws, and mediation between Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds. Norwegian Iraq expert Reidar Visser has argued that this is a misreading of Iraqi politics and maintains differences in the country rather than helps heal them. Not only that, but the results of these early strategies were very poor. Few laws pushed by the U.S. have been passed for example, and the ones that were have not been implemented as planned. During the Surge, the American forces began working with insurgents and militiamen that were willing to give up fighting in a bottom-up approach. This was much more successful, and directly led to the decrease in violence. At the same time, the U.S. has not been able to link many of the groups they worked with to the Iraqi government such as the Sons of Iraq.
Many of Baghdad’s policies on the other hand, have been interpreted as retribution or done for political gain. Examples of the former were deBaathification and the trial and execution of Saddam Hussein, and cases of the latter were the moves by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. In June 2006 Maliki announced a 24-point plan that included amnesty, conferences, changes in deBaathification and the constitution, compensation, punishment for war criminals and terrorists, and the creation of a national dialogue council. Baghdad did compensate victims of the former regime, and passed an Amnesty Law and Accountability and Justice Act, which replaced the old deBaathification process created by the Americans. The Amnesty Law has only freed a few thousand prisoners, and has mostly been used for public relations purposes, while the Accountability Act has never been implemented. Baghdad created the Supreme Committee for Dialogue and National Reconciliation, which works with tribes, civil groups, political parties and religious leaders, but it has no staff, and parliament cancelled its funding. There is also the much more important Follow-Up Committee for National Reconciliation that vets former officials and soldiers to be re-integrated, and works with the Sons of Iraq, Tribal Support Councils, and the displaced. Both are headed by Maliki confidants, and have been accused of supporting the Prime Minister’s personal agenda. Sunnis in parliament also set up the National Reconciliation Committee to follow their vision. It mostly works to free Sunni prisoners. The government has integrated several thousand former soldiers and officers into the security forces or pays them pensions. There have also been examples of local reconciliation. The rest of Baghdad’s goals have been largely unmet, and led to accusations about the government’s intentions rather than helped heal wounds.
Eisenstadt and Ali finish by saying that reconciliation in Iraq will take years, and may never occur in a meaningful fashion. The problems are large and many. First, the major Iraqi political parties are based upon ethnosectarian politics, and could lose power if they give that up. Second, there is still fighting in Iraq, and a World Bank study on conflicts found that almost 50% of countries coming out of civil wars fall back into them within five years. Third, there is little consensus in Baghdad on major issues such as oil, and politics are fragmented, which makes it hard to conduct negotiations or find partners. Fourth, there is a lack of accountability as many militants are involved in politics and security with no regret for their past deeds. Fifth, many conflicts and fighting took place within communities, not just between them, which has never been resolved. Sixth, many groups still talk about revenge, and see things in zero-sum terms. Seventh Iraq has been in the throes of elections since 2008, which makes compromising more difficult. Last, Iraq’s neighbors have all interfered in its internal affairs, and continue to do so to this day such as Iran. These problems may never be overcome, which is why the authors are so pessimistic about the country’s future. Iraq’s government will continue, but without resolving some of these large and pressing concerns, it’s unlikely that major changes or legislation will be implemented, which are a necessity to pull the country out of its current predicament.
SOURCES
Biddle, Stephen, “Reversal in Iraq,” Center for Preventative Action Council on Foreign Relations, May 2009
DeYoung, Karen, “Obama Calls on Iraq to Foster National Unity,” Washington Post, 7/23/09
Eisenstadt, Michael and Ali, Ahmed, “’How This Ends’: Iraq’s Uncertain Path toward National Reconciliation,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 7/17/09
Visser, Reidar, “Biden, US Policy in Iraq and the Concept of Muhasasa,” Historiae.org, 7/6/09
Monday, March 09, 2009
Baghdad’s Latest Reconciliation Effort
On March 6 at a conference in Baghdad of tribal sheikhs Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki called for reconciliation with former Baathist military personnel. He said that as long as these former regime members were focused on the future and not the past they would have a place in society. This followed a months worth of activities where the government was attempting to get Saddam era Army officers to return from exile and be integrated back into Iraq.
At a meeting in the capital for Tribal Support Council members Prime Minister Maliki called for reconciliation with Baathists soldiers. He said that they made mistakes in the past, but now was the time to forgive and forget, and close that chapter in Iraq’s history. A Sunni parliamentarian from Ilyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List said that the Prime Minister’s statements were needed, but more importantly, they needed to be backed up by action. That’s what the government was attempting to do the previous month.
In February 2009 Baghdad made several overtures to former soldiers from Saddam’s army that were living in foreign countries. This began with dialogue with former officers in both Jordan and Baghdad. The government was offering those below colonel jobs in the new Army, while those of a higher rank would receive pensions. According to Asharq al-Awsat this offer was open to any soldiers except members of Saddam’s Fedayeen. The Defense Ministry said they were preparing Iraq’s embassies and attaché offices across the region to accept whatever soldiers wanted to return, and set up a special committee to help integrate them. In the Baghdad meeting American and British officials were also involved, and according to the Saudi Al-Qatan paper, a delegation of Americans met with former officers in Amman, Jordan as well. The Iraqi armed forces have already taken in over 96,000 soldiers from Saddam’s army, so there was a precedent for this policy.
The motivations behind the move seemed to cause a bit of controversy in Iraq. In mid-January 2009 then Vice President elect Joe Biden visited Iraq. While there he told the Maliki government that they needed to do more on political reconciliation. A few weeks later Maliki, while meeting with French President Nicholas Sarkozy, responded by saying that the U.S. could no longer pressure Iraq, and that reconciliation was almost complete. Al-Hayat later reported that the outreach to soldiers was in fact done under pressure from the Americans.
While there were initial meetings with some officers, things seemed to quickly turn sour. In the beginning of February a former general met with Iraqi, American and British officials in Baghdad about soldiers returning. The former head of the Army also called on soldiers to go back to Iraq from abroad, and an ex-Republican Guard general said that the government was hoping 23,000 officers would come back. By mid-February however former officers were saying that they would not take up Maliki’s offer, and urged others to follow suit. They said they would only reconcile with the government if they got rid of the DeBaathification process, and paid them back pay for their years in exile. Discussions seemed to end at that point.
Iraq’s Army has already taken in thousands of former soldiers, but there are still some recalcitrant ones living in foreign countries. The latest outreach to those appeared to have been the result of Vice President Biden’s urging, showing that the U.S. still has pull within Iraq even though it is reducing troop levels. The future of the initiative is unknown however. What looked to be a promising start quickly turned into rejection by the old officers. Still, the military has been one of the few Iraqi institutions to take in members of the old regime in large numbers, although ironically it is prohibited under the Accountability and Justice Law (12) that replaced the DeBaathification order.
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, "Iraq parliament fails to elect new speaker," 2/8/09
Associated Press, “Biden Visits Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan,” 1/12/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Ministerial plan to receive former army officers,” 2/15/09
Azzaman, “Former army generals snub government’s offer to return,” 2/19/09
International Center for Transitional Justice, “Briefing Paper: Iraq’s New ‘Accountability and Justice’ Law,” 1/22/08
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraqi Government Invites Former Army Officers Back,” 2/18/09
- "Officers Who Served Under Saddam To Rejoin Iraqi Army," 2/7/09
Reid, Robert, “Iraqi PM reaches out to Saddam supporters,” Associated Press, 3/6/09
Roads To Iraq Blog, “American delegation met with former Iraqi army officers,” 2/20/09
- “Another failing reconciliation attempt,” 2/14/09
Santora, Marc and Cowell, Alan, “With Swipe at U.S., Iraq Builds ties to French,” New York Times, 2/11/09
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09
At a meeting in the capital for Tribal Support Council members Prime Minister Maliki called for reconciliation with Baathists soldiers. He said that they made mistakes in the past, but now was the time to forgive and forget, and close that chapter in Iraq’s history. A Sunni parliamentarian from Ilyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List said that the Prime Minister’s statements were needed, but more importantly, they needed to be backed up by action. That’s what the government was attempting to do the previous month.
In February 2009 Baghdad made several overtures to former soldiers from Saddam’s army that were living in foreign countries. This began with dialogue with former officers in both Jordan and Baghdad. The government was offering those below colonel jobs in the new Army, while those of a higher rank would receive pensions. According to Asharq al-Awsat this offer was open to any soldiers except members of Saddam’s Fedayeen. The Defense Ministry said they were preparing Iraq’s embassies and attaché offices across the region to accept whatever soldiers wanted to return, and set up a special committee to help integrate them. In the Baghdad meeting American and British officials were also involved, and according to the Saudi Al-Qatan paper, a delegation of Americans met with former officers in Amman, Jordan as well. The Iraqi armed forces have already taken in over 96,000 soldiers from Saddam’s army, so there was a precedent for this policy.
The motivations behind the move seemed to cause a bit of controversy in Iraq. In mid-January 2009 then Vice President elect Joe Biden visited Iraq. While there he told the Maliki government that they needed to do more on political reconciliation. A few weeks later Maliki, while meeting with French President Nicholas Sarkozy, responded by saying that the U.S. could no longer pressure Iraq, and that reconciliation was almost complete. Al-Hayat later reported that the outreach to soldiers was in fact done under pressure from the Americans.
While there were initial meetings with some officers, things seemed to quickly turn sour. In the beginning of February a former general met with Iraqi, American and British officials in Baghdad about soldiers returning. The former head of the Army also called on soldiers to go back to Iraq from abroad, and an ex-Republican Guard general said that the government was hoping 23,000 officers would come back. By mid-February however former officers were saying that they would not take up Maliki’s offer, and urged others to follow suit. They said they would only reconcile with the government if they got rid of the DeBaathification process, and paid them back pay for their years in exile. Discussions seemed to end at that point.
Iraq’s Army has already taken in thousands of former soldiers, but there are still some recalcitrant ones living in foreign countries. The latest outreach to those appeared to have been the result of Vice President Biden’s urging, showing that the U.S. still has pull within Iraq even though it is reducing troop levels. The future of the initiative is unknown however. What looked to be a promising start quickly turned into rejection by the old officers. Still, the military has been one of the few Iraqi institutions to take in members of the old regime in large numbers, although ironically it is prohibited under the Accountability and Justice Law (12) that replaced the DeBaathification order.
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, "Iraq parliament fails to elect new speaker," 2/8/09
Associated Press, “Biden Visits Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan,” 1/12/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Ministerial plan to receive former army officers,” 2/15/09
Azzaman, “Former army generals snub government’s offer to return,” 2/19/09
International Center for Transitional Justice, “Briefing Paper: Iraq’s New ‘Accountability and Justice’ Law,” 1/22/08
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraqi Government Invites Former Army Officers Back,” 2/18/09
- "Officers Who Served Under Saddam To Rejoin Iraqi Army," 2/7/09
Reid, Robert, “Iraqi PM reaches out to Saddam supporters,” Associated Press, 3/6/09
Roads To Iraq Blog, “American delegation met with former Iraqi army officers,” 2/20/09
- “Another failing reconciliation attempt,” 2/14/09
Santora, Marc and Cowell, Alan, “With Swipe at U.S., Iraq Builds ties to French,” New York Times, 2/11/09
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09
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