The story of the Iraqi Accountability and Justice and Election Commissions’ banning of 500 candidates from the March 2010 voting for alleged Baathist ties has taken a few new turns. First, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has finally come out in favor of the ban. He said that the decision of the Accountability and Justice Commission should be adhered to. He also commented that the process should not be politicized, which ignores the fact that the Commission members have used it as a partisan tool since its inception in 2003, and that its head, Ali al-Lami, is running as a candidate for the Iraqi National Alliance. Second, the Election Commission is debating whether just the 400 politicians are barred from participating in the balloting or all their parties as well. As Reidar Visser of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs points out, there is no legal basis in the constitution or election law that mentions blocking entire parties from running. Of course, the Accountability and Justice Commission’s members haven’t even been appointed by parliament, but everyone is going along with their decisions, so legality may not matter in this situation. Third, a document has emerged that allegedly shows that Saleh al-Mutlaq, the head of the Iraqi National Dialogue Front and the most prominent politician banned, had contact with Iraqi intelligence in 2002. This was supposedly used in the Accountability and Justice Commission’s ruling against him. There is no reporting on whether the document is real or not, and again, given the circumstances, may not matter. Fourth, Mutlaq and all those banned can appeal their cases to a 7-member board of judges that was just created a few days ago. There is a concern that they may not be able to go through all the cases before the March 2010 balloting however, which may exclude candidates even if they are ultimately found innocent. Finally, there is news that the Accountability and Justice Commission may not be finished and could demand that a total of 1,200 candidates be blocked from running.
It was hoped that the 2010 parliamentary vote would be a continuation of the 2009 provincial elections where nationalist parties did much better than ethnosectarian ones, and Sunnis came out in high numbers. This in turn, would usher in a new wave of politicians to replace a group of lawmakers that have achieved very little in their four years in office, and are very unpopular as a result. The decisions of the Accountability and Justice and Election Commissions however have not only marked a return to sectarian politics, but also threatened to undermine the legitimacy of the 2010 balloting, along with bringing into question the legality of the entire Iraqi political process. Unless some institution challenges the chicanery going on, this fiasco will only continue, and could get worse.
SOURCES
AK News, “Electoral commission discusses the issue of excluded entities and candidates,” 1/17/10
Roads To Iraq, “Three Sunni candidates for the presidency, Zebari to the Vice-President,” 1/17/10
Sly, Liz, “Iraqi prime minister backs ban on 500 election candidates,” Los Angeles, 1/17/10
Visser, Reidar, “The Bloc That Has No De-Baathification Worries,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 1/17/10
- “Constitutional Disintegration (Part III): The IHEC Is Making Up the Law,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 1/15/10
Showing posts with label 2010 Parliamentary Election. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 2010 Parliamentary Election. Show all posts
Monday, January 18, 2010
Monday, January 04, 2010
What’s In The Future For Iraq?
Iraq is entering its seventh year since the U.S. invasion. Many things have changed in that time period, from the chaos that followed the collapse of the state after Saddam was overthrown, to the civil war that erupted, to the Surge. At the end of 2009 three Iraq analysts, Sam Parker of the United States Institute for Peace, Michael Hanna of the Century Foundation, and Reidar Visser of the Norwegian Institute of International Relations, wrote pieces speculating on what lay ahead for Iraq. All three agree that politics is the main forum for disputes within Iraq now, but don’t see much hope for the country’s elites to overcome their differences any time soon.
Sam Parker in his article “Is Iraq Back?” for Current History, and Michael Hanna in “Transitional state” in the Abu Dhabi newspaper The National start off by talking about Iraq’s current political situation. Both believe that politics has replaced violence as the main way groups in the country now resolve their problems. This started in early 2005 when some militants first began turning on Al Qaeda in Iraq, which would eventually snowball into most of the insurgency switching sides and giving up the fight to join the Anbar Awakening and the Sons of Iraq. Sunnis also greatly regretted boycotting the 2005 elections, which isolated them from local and national governments. In the 2009 provincial elections, Sunni turnout was very high as a result, and deaths have taken a sharp drop since then as a result. This process will continue in the 2010 vote, and has led Iraq from being a failed state to a fragile one.
What the central government now faces are three large and daunting problems, the first of which is sectarianism. Parker believes that this is now more about identity than religious differences, as Iraqis tend to vote for candidates of their own community. That means any future government will have to continue to include representatives of each of the major groups, the Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis. These large groups however, are breaking up into smaller factions. The Shiites for example, ran on one large list in 2005, the United Iraqi Alliance, but in 2010 will be competing in two lists, the State of Law led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, and the National Alliance made up of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and the Sadrists. Reidar Visser of the Norwegian Institute of International Relations in “COIN to Nowhere? Lesson from Iraq, Questions for Afghanistan” adds that he believes that these sectarian divisions have solidified rather than weakened. For example, while Maliki’s State of Law tried to create new cross-sectarian alliances after the 2009 elections and attempted to reach out to Sunnis and former Baathists, he was later stopped by criticisms by the other Shiite parties, pressure from Iran, and the Obama administration, which continues to stress a grand bargain between the three major groups. He then agrees with Parker and Hanna that any new Iraqi government will look and operate very much like the old one as a result.
The ethnosectarian groups also have long-standing differences over things like federalism versus centralism, oil policy, and the Arab-Kurd dispute. Hanna writes that there have been no serious efforts to deal with any of these issues, and that any new government is likely to be just as divided as the current one. Many of these problems have their origins in the 2005 constitution, which was drafted while the Iraqi state was weak and the sectarian war was just about to take off. The Arab-Kurd divide prevents any major changes to the document, leading to more deadlock. Hanna doesn’t believe that these divisions will lead the country back to civil war, and oddly adds that not dealing with them right now may be the best thing for Iraq right at the moment. He’s afraid that any move towards majority rule, and away from consensus could do more harm than good because the country’s weak institutions may not be able to deal with winners and losers. Visser has written extensively arguing the opposite, that the Iraqi system of consensus and quotas within the government should be ended because it only maintains the sectarian divisions.
The paralysis in Baghdad means that more mundane issues like basic governance, services, the displaced and refugees, corruption, jobs, poverty, etc. can’t be addressed. Technical issues like boosting oil production, and election laws for example get endlessly delayed because of the larger disputes between the ethnosectarian groups. The lack of development and the Arab-Kurd divide also allows militants to continue their attacks in Iraq.
All three analysts bring up important issues for Iraq’s future. Iraq is no longer a failed state as it once was. It is gaining back both its sovereignty and domestic standing. Violence is also down to its lowest level since the 2003 invasion, and the struggle for political power through peaceful means is now paramount. The inability of Baghdad to deliver on many basic needs however, its corruption, and sectarianism continue to eat away at its standing with the public. The continued factionalization of Iraq’s three major groups also means that it will be harder rather than easier to put together a new government and get things done. Parker and Hanna point out that this makes Iraq not much different from many other Third World countries who not only struggle with development, but also power sharing and ethnic differences. The problem is that public dissatisfaction with a government that seems dysfunctional can undermine a nascent democracy, and lead to a return to autocracy or worse, and that may be Iraq’s largest dilemma in the long-term.
SOURCES
Hanna, Michael, “Transitional state,” The National, 11/26/09
Parker, Sam, “Is Iraq Back?” Current History, December 2009
Visser, Reidar, “COIN to Nowhere? Lessons from Iraq, Questions for Afghanistan,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 12/1/09
Sam Parker in his article “Is Iraq Back?” for Current History, and Michael Hanna in “Transitional state” in the Abu Dhabi newspaper The National start off by talking about Iraq’s current political situation. Both believe that politics has replaced violence as the main way groups in the country now resolve their problems. This started in early 2005 when some militants first began turning on Al Qaeda in Iraq, which would eventually snowball into most of the insurgency switching sides and giving up the fight to join the Anbar Awakening and the Sons of Iraq. Sunnis also greatly regretted boycotting the 2005 elections, which isolated them from local and national governments. In the 2009 provincial elections, Sunni turnout was very high as a result, and deaths have taken a sharp drop since then as a result. This process will continue in the 2010 vote, and has led Iraq from being a failed state to a fragile one.
What the central government now faces are three large and daunting problems, the first of which is sectarianism. Parker believes that this is now more about identity than religious differences, as Iraqis tend to vote for candidates of their own community. That means any future government will have to continue to include representatives of each of the major groups, the Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis. These large groups however, are breaking up into smaller factions. The Shiites for example, ran on one large list in 2005, the United Iraqi Alliance, but in 2010 will be competing in two lists, the State of Law led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, and the National Alliance made up of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and the Sadrists. Reidar Visser of the Norwegian Institute of International Relations in “COIN to Nowhere? Lesson from Iraq, Questions for Afghanistan” adds that he believes that these sectarian divisions have solidified rather than weakened. For example, while Maliki’s State of Law tried to create new cross-sectarian alliances after the 2009 elections and attempted to reach out to Sunnis and former Baathists, he was later stopped by criticisms by the other Shiite parties, pressure from Iran, and the Obama administration, which continues to stress a grand bargain between the three major groups. He then agrees with Parker and Hanna that any new Iraqi government will look and operate very much like the old one as a result.
The ethnosectarian groups also have long-standing differences over things like federalism versus centralism, oil policy, and the Arab-Kurd dispute. Hanna writes that there have been no serious efforts to deal with any of these issues, and that any new government is likely to be just as divided as the current one. Many of these problems have their origins in the 2005 constitution, which was drafted while the Iraqi state was weak and the sectarian war was just about to take off. The Arab-Kurd divide prevents any major changes to the document, leading to more deadlock. Hanna doesn’t believe that these divisions will lead the country back to civil war, and oddly adds that not dealing with them right now may be the best thing for Iraq right at the moment. He’s afraid that any move towards majority rule, and away from consensus could do more harm than good because the country’s weak institutions may not be able to deal with winners and losers. Visser has written extensively arguing the opposite, that the Iraqi system of consensus and quotas within the government should be ended because it only maintains the sectarian divisions.
The paralysis in Baghdad means that more mundane issues like basic governance, services, the displaced and refugees, corruption, jobs, poverty, etc. can’t be addressed. Technical issues like boosting oil production, and election laws for example get endlessly delayed because of the larger disputes between the ethnosectarian groups. The lack of development and the Arab-Kurd divide also allows militants to continue their attacks in Iraq.
All three analysts bring up important issues for Iraq’s future. Iraq is no longer a failed state as it once was. It is gaining back both its sovereignty and domestic standing. Violence is also down to its lowest level since the 2003 invasion, and the struggle for political power through peaceful means is now paramount. The inability of Baghdad to deliver on many basic needs however, its corruption, and sectarianism continue to eat away at its standing with the public. The continued factionalization of Iraq’s three major groups also means that it will be harder rather than easier to put together a new government and get things done. Parker and Hanna point out that this makes Iraq not much different from many other Third World countries who not only struggle with development, but also power sharing and ethnic differences. The problem is that public dissatisfaction with a government that seems dysfunctional can undermine a nascent democracy, and lead to a return to autocracy or worse, and that may be Iraq’s largest dilemma in the long-term.
SOURCES
Hanna, Michael, “Transitional state,” The National, 11/26/09
Parker, Sam, “Is Iraq Back?” Current History, December 2009
Visser, Reidar, “COIN to Nowhere? Lessons from Iraq, Questions for Afghanistan,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 12/1/09
Friday, December 11, 2009
Iraqi Parliament Passes Election Law – Again
Just before midnight on December 6, 2009 Iraq’s parliament passed a second draft of the election law. The new legislation mixes versions of the original law and the amended version, and seems to be headed for confirmation by the Presidential Council.
The first version was passed on November 8, and used statistics from 2009 provided by the Ministry of Trade to determine how many seats were up for grabs in each province. Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi vetoed the bill saying that more seats should be made available to Iraq’s two million refugees, many of whom are Sunnis, which is Hashemi’s constituency. The Kurdish Alliance took advantage of the veto to amend the law so that it used 2005 numbers instead, which increased the number of seats available to the three Kurdish provinces, while reducing seats in eight other governorates. That was heading for another veto by Hashemi until the recent compromise came about.
The new election bill uses parts of both the original and amended election laws. First the Kurds will get three extra seats, second refugees will be counted as part of their home provinces, and third every governorate will get an increase in seats.
The Kurds were still holding out for more, but calls from President Barak Obama and Vice President Joe Biden convinced them to vote for the legislation. In turn, the U.S. promised that there would be a national census in 2010, and that the status of the disputed territories would be resolved. The former has already started, and needs no American help. However little has happened with the disputed areas since the U.S. invasion in 2003. A referendum was supposed to be held at the end of 2007 to determine their future, but that was delayed and then abandoned. The United Nations also offered reports on each disputed territory, but that led nowhere. The issue remains another intractable one in Iraqi politics.
For now, Iraqis can rejoice that elections are finally moving forward. They are still going to happen past the January 31, 2010 deadline set by the constitution. March is being mentioned as the new date. The problem is the current government’s term expires in March, and it’s predicted that it will take the major parties several months to put together a new one. That means some kind of caretaker regime will have to be created in the meantime, which will open up a whole other can of constitutional worms showing that when one issue is resolved in Iraq, there is always another one in the wings.
Seat Distribution 2005 Election Law vs. 2010 Election Law
Anbar 9 vs 14
Babil 11 vs 16
Baghdad 59 vs 68
Basra: 18 vs 24
Dhi Qar: 12 vs 18
Diyala 10 vs 13
Dohuk 7 vs 10
Irbil 13 vs 14
Karbala 6 vs 10
Maysan: 7 vs 10
Muthanna 5 vs 7
Najaf 8 vs 12
Ninewa 19 vs 31
Qadisiyah 7 vs 11
Salahaddin 8 vs 12
Sulaymaniya 15 vs 17
Tamim 9 vs 12
Wasit 8 vs 11
Compensatory Seats 45 vs 15
TOTAL: 275 vs 325
SOURCES
International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09
Parker, Ned and Salman, Raheem, “Iraq lawmakers approve election law,” Los Angeles Times, 12/7/09
Visser, Reidar, “No Second Veto: The Election Law is Approved by Tariq al-Hashemi and the Iraqi Presidency,” Historiae.org, 12/6/09
The first version was passed on November 8, and used statistics from 2009 provided by the Ministry of Trade to determine how many seats were up for grabs in each province. Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi vetoed the bill saying that more seats should be made available to Iraq’s two million refugees, many of whom are Sunnis, which is Hashemi’s constituency. The Kurdish Alliance took advantage of the veto to amend the law so that it used 2005 numbers instead, which increased the number of seats available to the three Kurdish provinces, while reducing seats in eight other governorates. That was heading for another veto by Hashemi until the recent compromise came about.
The new election bill uses parts of both the original and amended election laws. First the Kurds will get three extra seats, second refugees will be counted as part of their home provinces, and third every governorate will get an increase in seats.
The Kurds were still holding out for more, but calls from President Barak Obama and Vice President Joe Biden convinced them to vote for the legislation. In turn, the U.S. promised that there would be a national census in 2010, and that the status of the disputed territories would be resolved. The former has already started, and needs no American help. However little has happened with the disputed areas since the U.S. invasion in 2003. A referendum was supposed to be held at the end of 2007 to determine their future, but that was delayed and then abandoned. The United Nations also offered reports on each disputed territory, but that led nowhere. The issue remains another intractable one in Iraqi politics.
For now, Iraqis can rejoice that elections are finally moving forward. They are still going to happen past the January 31, 2010 deadline set by the constitution. March is being mentioned as the new date. The problem is the current government’s term expires in March, and it’s predicted that it will take the major parties several months to put together a new one. That means some kind of caretaker regime will have to be created in the meantime, which will open up a whole other can of constitutional worms showing that when one issue is resolved in Iraq, there is always another one in the wings.
Seat Distribution 2005 Election Law vs. 2010 Election Law
Anbar 9 vs 14
Babil 11 vs 16
Baghdad 59 vs 68
Basra: 18 vs 24
Dhi Qar: 12 vs 18
Diyala 10 vs 13
Dohuk 7 vs 10
Irbil 13 vs 14
Karbala 6 vs 10
Maysan: 7 vs 10
Muthanna 5 vs 7
Najaf 8 vs 12
Ninewa 19 vs 31
Qadisiyah 7 vs 11
Salahaddin 8 vs 12
Sulaymaniya 15 vs 17
Tamim 9 vs 12
Wasit 8 vs 11
Compensatory Seats 45 vs 15
TOTAL: 275 vs 325
SOURCES
International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09
Parker, Ned and Salman, Raheem, “Iraq lawmakers approve election law,” Los Angeles Times, 12/7/09
Visser, Reidar, “No Second Veto: The Election Law is Approved by Tariq al-Hashemi and the Iraqi Presidency,” Historiae.org, 12/6/09
Friday, December 04, 2009
Kurdish Lawmaker Sums Up Problems With Iraqi Politics
Parliamentarian Mahmoud Othman, a leader in the Kurdish Alliance, was quoted in the November 28, 2009 New York Times summing up the problems with Iraqi politics. When asked about the possibility that the country would hold elections past the January 31, 2009 deadline set in the constitution he replied, “So what? Nothing in Iraq is very legitimate.” Every major piece of legislation and decision in Iraq is endlessly delayed because of power politics and a zero-sum attitude by law makers. Iraq held its last parliamentary elections on December 15, 2005, but it took four months for Nouri al-Maliki to be named prime minister, and a month after that for him to name his cabinet. The last national elections the country held were for provincial councils. They were originally planned for October 2008, but got delayed until January 2009. The new election law was supposed to be passed by October 15, 2009. There’s talk that it may be confirmed in the beginning of December, but there’s also a possibility that Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi will veto it a second time because the amended version reduces seats for Sunni provinces. Elections are now planned for February or March 2010, one to two months passed the constitutional deadline. Otherman is right than, Iraqi politics does lack legitimacy with its public who see the government as dysfunctional because its unable to provide basic services or make big decisions.
SOURCES
AK News, “Hashemi to take final decision on elections law after Eid,” 11/28/09
Chon, Gina, “Iraqis Miss Target Date on Election,” Wall Street Journal, 10/16/09
Myers, Steven Lee, “Benchmarks in Wartime: As Reliable as Promises,” New York Times, 11/28/09
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/09
SOURCES
AK News, “Hashemi to take final decision on elections law after Eid,” 11/28/09
Chon, Gina, “Iraqis Miss Target Date on Election,” Wall Street Journal, 10/16/09
Myers, Steven Lee, “Benchmarks in Wartime: As Reliable as Promises,” New York Times, 11/28/09
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/09
Tuesday, December 01, 2009
Maliki Returns To Sectarian Politics
On October 1, 2009 Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki officially announced his State of Law list that would compete in the 2010 parliamentary elections. Almost every Western report on his coalition mentioned how broad it was, that it was non-sectarian, and how the Prime Minister was running a nationalist campaign. Recently however, Maliki has been emphasizing sectarian politics by warning of the return of Baathists.
On November 12, 2009 for example, Maliki went to a meeting of tribal leaders in Sadr City, Baghdad and said that Iraq’s enemies were trying to undermine the political process during the elections. Three days later he was more specific when he said that Baathists were trying to use the 2010 vote to get back into power, and that he would never let that happen. Then on November 16 at a press conference Maliki said that Baathists would not be allowed to participate in the upcoming elections in any form, and that all talks with them by the government were banned. Maliki has been emphasizing the Baathist threat to Iraq since the August 2009 Baghdad bombings, which he blamed on former regime elements in Syria. In fact, the government aired a new set of video taped confessions on November 22 of three men who claimed they were Baath party members who carried out the October 25, 2009 attacks on Iraq’s Ministry of Justice and Baghdad provincial council offices. In Iraqi politics, whenever Shiite politicians mention Baathists they are talking about the threat of Sunnis returning to power, just as talk about Iranian influence by Sunnis is about Shiite rule.
Maliki’s rhetoric has angered one of his State of Law coalition partners, Sheikh Ali Hatem Sulaiman. He is the head of the Al-Anbar Tribal Council and the Flags of Iraq Party, and was one of the leaders of the Awakening movement there. The sheikh said that those who keep talking about Baathists sound like a broken record, and that Baathists should be able to participate in elections as long as they don’t have any charges against them. He finished by saying that if Baathists were to be truly banned from Iraqi politics, than half of the Sunnis in Anbar would not be able to participate. This is significant because Sheikh Sulaiman was the only notable Sunni politician Maliki was able to draw into his list. He is a minor player however as his party wasn’t able to win a single seat in Anbar in the 2009 elections, and Maliki’s Dawa Party is firmly in the lead of the coalition.
Of more interest is the fact that Ammar al-Hakim, the leader of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and member of the Iraqi National Alliance issued a statement saying that Baathists should be able to take part in Iraqi politics as long as they didn’t have blood on their hands. The Supreme Council has always been one of the most ardent proponents of using the Baathist card against any moves towards reconciliation with Sunnis, and only recently called for the banning of Baathists from the 2010 vote as well. His release was almost certainly a response to Maliki’s comments as the National Alliance is the State of Law’s main challenger.
At the other end of the spectrum, the Sadrists, the other major players in the National Alliance, both attacked Maliki and supported him at the same time. First, a Sadrist parliamentarian said that the authorities faked the November 22 confessions of the alleged bombers. At the same time, Moqtada al-Sadr, echoing the Prime Minister, said that there could never be reconciliation with the Baathists. This shows both that Maliki’s attempt to play sectarian politics with the Baghdad attacks is widely questioned within Iraq, while talking about Baathists still resonates in Shiite politics.
The Prime Minister’s emphasis upon the Baathist threat could be a sign of his foreboding about the coming election. While Maliki is still the most popular politician in Iraq, the August and October 2009 ministry bombings in Baghdad have hurt his claim that he has brought security and stability to the country, so bringing up Baathists is a way for him to defer blame. He also has not been able to bring in any new significant partners into his coalition. Some believe that that his announcements are aimed at his potential rivals, specifically the Iraqi National Movement of former Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi, parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq of the National Dialogue Council, and Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi. Finally, a return to sectarian politics may be a way for him to firm up his base with Shiites, and distract them from more pressing issues like the continued lack of services and corruption in the government.
SOURCES
Ali, Ahmed, “Iraq’s Elections Challenge: A Shifting Political Landscape,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 11/20/09
Alsumaria, “Maliki warns of enemies ahead of elections,” 11/12/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “PM warns of Baathists’ infiltration through election,” 11/15/09
Chon, Gina, “Maliki Coalition Tries to Bridge Iraq’s Deep Sectarian Divisions,” Wall Street Journal, 10/2/09
Al-Dulaimy, Mohammed, “Maliki unveils new national, nonsectarian Iraqi party,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/1/09
Al-Hayat, Elaph, “In Surprise Statement, Al-Hakim Calls for Involving Ba-athists in Iraqi Political Process,” MEMRI Blog, 11/20/09
Karadshesh, Jomana, “Alleged Baath members confess in videos to Iraq attacks,” CNN, 11/23/09
Myers, Steven Lee, “Iraqi Leader Creates Broad Coalition,” New York Times, 10/1/09
Roads To Iraq, “Ba’ath Party and the election – intro,” 11/24/09
- “Ba’ath Party and the election 1,” 11/24/09
- “Disagreement among the “State of Law” and The political-football crisis,” 11/17/09
Al Sabah, “PMi: No talk with Ba’athists,” 11/17/09
Shadid, Anthony, “Maliki Creates Coalition To Compete in Iraqi Vote,” Washington Post, 10/2/09
On November 12, 2009 for example, Maliki went to a meeting of tribal leaders in Sadr City, Baghdad and said that Iraq’s enemies were trying to undermine the political process during the elections. Three days later he was more specific when he said that Baathists were trying to use the 2010 vote to get back into power, and that he would never let that happen. Then on November 16 at a press conference Maliki said that Baathists would not be allowed to participate in the upcoming elections in any form, and that all talks with them by the government were banned. Maliki has been emphasizing the Baathist threat to Iraq since the August 2009 Baghdad bombings, which he blamed on former regime elements in Syria. In fact, the government aired a new set of video taped confessions on November 22 of three men who claimed they were Baath party members who carried out the October 25, 2009 attacks on Iraq’s Ministry of Justice and Baghdad provincial council offices. In Iraqi politics, whenever Shiite politicians mention Baathists they are talking about the threat of Sunnis returning to power, just as talk about Iranian influence by Sunnis is about Shiite rule.
Maliki’s rhetoric has angered one of his State of Law coalition partners, Sheikh Ali Hatem Sulaiman. He is the head of the Al-Anbar Tribal Council and the Flags of Iraq Party, and was one of the leaders of the Awakening movement there. The sheikh said that those who keep talking about Baathists sound like a broken record, and that Baathists should be able to participate in elections as long as they don’t have any charges against them. He finished by saying that if Baathists were to be truly banned from Iraqi politics, than half of the Sunnis in Anbar would not be able to participate. This is significant because Sheikh Sulaiman was the only notable Sunni politician Maliki was able to draw into his list. He is a minor player however as his party wasn’t able to win a single seat in Anbar in the 2009 elections, and Maliki’s Dawa Party is firmly in the lead of the coalition.
Of more interest is the fact that Ammar al-Hakim, the leader of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and member of the Iraqi National Alliance issued a statement saying that Baathists should be able to take part in Iraqi politics as long as they didn’t have blood on their hands. The Supreme Council has always been one of the most ardent proponents of using the Baathist card against any moves towards reconciliation with Sunnis, and only recently called for the banning of Baathists from the 2010 vote as well. His release was almost certainly a response to Maliki’s comments as the National Alliance is the State of Law’s main challenger.
At the other end of the spectrum, the Sadrists, the other major players in the National Alliance, both attacked Maliki and supported him at the same time. First, a Sadrist parliamentarian said that the authorities faked the November 22 confessions of the alleged bombers. At the same time, Moqtada al-Sadr, echoing the Prime Minister, said that there could never be reconciliation with the Baathists. This shows both that Maliki’s attempt to play sectarian politics with the Baghdad attacks is widely questioned within Iraq, while talking about Baathists still resonates in Shiite politics.
The Prime Minister’s emphasis upon the Baathist threat could be a sign of his foreboding about the coming election. While Maliki is still the most popular politician in Iraq, the August and October 2009 ministry bombings in Baghdad have hurt his claim that he has brought security and stability to the country, so bringing up Baathists is a way for him to defer blame. He also has not been able to bring in any new significant partners into his coalition. Some believe that that his announcements are aimed at his potential rivals, specifically the Iraqi National Movement of former Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi, parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq of the National Dialogue Council, and Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi. Finally, a return to sectarian politics may be a way for him to firm up his base with Shiites, and distract them from more pressing issues like the continued lack of services and corruption in the government.
SOURCES
Ali, Ahmed, “Iraq’s Elections Challenge: A Shifting Political Landscape,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 11/20/09
Alsumaria, “Maliki warns of enemies ahead of elections,” 11/12/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “PM warns of Baathists’ infiltration through election,” 11/15/09
Chon, Gina, “Maliki Coalition Tries to Bridge Iraq’s Deep Sectarian Divisions,” Wall Street Journal, 10/2/09
Al-Dulaimy, Mohammed, “Maliki unveils new national, nonsectarian Iraqi party,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/1/09
Al-Hayat, Elaph, “In Surprise Statement, Al-Hakim Calls for Involving Ba-athists in Iraqi Political Process,” MEMRI Blog, 11/20/09
Karadshesh, Jomana, “Alleged Baath members confess in videos to Iraq attacks,” CNN, 11/23/09
Myers, Steven Lee, “Iraqi Leader Creates Broad Coalition,” New York Times, 10/1/09
Roads To Iraq, “Ba’ath Party and the election – intro,” 11/24/09
- “Ba’ath Party and the election 1,” 11/24/09
- “Disagreement among the “State of Law” and The political-football crisis,” 11/17/09
Al Sabah, “PMi: No talk with Ba’athists,” 11/17/09
Shadid, Anthony, “Maliki Creates Coalition To Compete in Iraqi Vote,” Washington Post, 10/2/09
Sunday, November 29, 2009
VP Hashemi Shoots Himself In The Foot With Veto Of Iraqi Election Law
On November 8, 2009 Iraq’s parliament finally passed an election bill after weeks of delay. Ten days later Vice President Tarqi al-Hashemi vetoed it. Hashemi objected to the fact that Iraq’s refugees, the majority of which are Sunnis, would have their votes go towards only eight compensatory seats that would also be shared with smaller parties that didn’t get enough votes at the provincial level, but did well nationally. The Iraqi Election Commission says that there should be one seat in parliament for every 100,000 people, and it’s generally believed that there are at least 2 million Iraqi refugees. The problem was that the Vice President tried to portray his act as a line-item veto, demanding a change in the number of seats set aside for refugees, while claiming that the rest of the bill should not be touched. This is not allowed under Iraqi law however. What his veto did in effect, was open the election bill to the demands of other parties that undermined his own goals.
As reported before, the Kurdish Alliance in parliament objected to the proposed increase in the parliamentary seats from 275 to 323 because the three Kurdish provinces got few to no new seats. Kurdistan Regional Government President Massoud Barzani even went as far as to threaten a Kurdish boycott unless the arrangements were changed. By vetoing the election bill, Hashemi empowered the Kurds to negotiate this very issue.
They aligned with the two major Shiite blocks, the Prime Minister’s State of Law and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, to pass an amendment on November 23 to the election bill. It skips Hashemi’s request for an increase in seats for refugees, by counting their votes as part of the provinces they were originally from, and rearranges the parliamentary seat allocations by province by using older 2005 statistics with a 2.8% increase for recent population growth, rather than 2009 numbers. Using the 2009 figures, Sunni provinces such as Ninewa were due for large increases in seats, but those will now go the Kurds instead. This suits the Shiite parties as well that were not enthusiastic about any extra seats in Sunni provinces.
Vice President Hashemi’s veto has thus backfired. He not only didn’t get the increases he requested for refugees, but the amendment reduces Sunni chances to get a larger say in parliament. When the changes were voted on members of the Iraqi Accordance Front, former Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List, and some Sadrists walked out. This will likely lead to another veto by Hashemi. The head of the Iraqi Election Commission said on November 19 that elections would be delayed because they can’t happen at the end of January 2010 as planned because that would coincide with Shiite religious ceremonies, while the constitution says that voting must be held no later than January 31. What is probably going to happen is that parliament will attempt to overturn Hashemi’s second expected veto, they need a three-fifths vote and the bill will become law, balloting will be held in February, and a caretaker government will have to be announced in the meantime. This all shows that Iraq is barely a country of laws as its politicians rarely if ever meet any deadlines, whether they’re self-imposed or in the constitution.
SOURCES
Arraf, Jane, “Iraq election official: Even if Kurdish boycott averted, January deadline impossible,” Christian Science Monitor, 11/20/09
Bakri, Nada, “Iraq’s parliament approves amended election law,” Washinogton Post, 11/23/09
Ibrahim, Waleed, “Iraqi parliament fails to reach election deal,” Reuters, 11/22/09
Londono, Ernesto, and Mizher, Qais, “Iraqi parliament passes election law after reaching deal on Kirkuk,” Washington Post, 11/9/09
Nordland, Rod, “Veto of Iraq’s Election Law Could Force Delay in Vote,” New York Times, 11/19/09
Roads To Iraq, “What happened today?” 11/23/09
Visser, Reidar, “Constitutional Disintegration,” Iraq And Gulf Analysis, 11/19/09
- “The Hashemi Veto Backfires, Parliament Ups the Ante,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 11/23/09
As reported before, the Kurdish Alliance in parliament objected to the proposed increase in the parliamentary seats from 275 to 323 because the three Kurdish provinces got few to no new seats. Kurdistan Regional Government President Massoud Barzani even went as far as to threaten a Kurdish boycott unless the arrangements were changed. By vetoing the election bill, Hashemi empowered the Kurds to negotiate this very issue.
They aligned with the two major Shiite blocks, the Prime Minister’s State of Law and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, to pass an amendment on November 23 to the election bill. It skips Hashemi’s request for an increase in seats for refugees, by counting their votes as part of the provinces they were originally from, and rearranges the parliamentary seat allocations by province by using older 2005 statistics with a 2.8% increase for recent population growth, rather than 2009 numbers. Using the 2009 figures, Sunni provinces such as Ninewa were due for large increases in seats, but those will now go the Kurds instead. This suits the Shiite parties as well that were not enthusiastic about any extra seats in Sunni provinces.
Vice President Hashemi’s veto has thus backfired. He not only didn’t get the increases he requested for refugees, but the amendment reduces Sunni chances to get a larger say in parliament. When the changes were voted on members of the Iraqi Accordance Front, former Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List, and some Sadrists walked out. This will likely lead to another veto by Hashemi. The head of the Iraqi Election Commission said on November 19 that elections would be delayed because they can’t happen at the end of January 2010 as planned because that would coincide with Shiite religious ceremonies, while the constitution says that voting must be held no later than January 31. What is probably going to happen is that parliament will attempt to overturn Hashemi’s second expected veto, they need a three-fifths vote and the bill will become law, balloting will be held in February, and a caretaker government will have to be announced in the meantime. This all shows that Iraq is barely a country of laws as its politicians rarely if ever meet any deadlines, whether they’re self-imposed or in the constitution.
SOURCES
Arraf, Jane, “Iraq election official: Even if Kurdish boycott averted, January deadline impossible,” Christian Science Monitor, 11/20/09
Bakri, Nada, “Iraq’s parliament approves amended election law,” Washinogton Post, 11/23/09
Ibrahim, Waleed, “Iraqi parliament fails to reach election deal,” Reuters, 11/22/09
Londono, Ernesto, and Mizher, Qais, “Iraqi parliament passes election law after reaching deal on Kirkuk,” Washington Post, 11/9/09
Nordland, Rod, “Veto of Iraq’s Election Law Could Force Delay in Vote,” New York Times, 11/19/09
Roads To Iraq, “What happened today?” 11/23/09
Visser, Reidar, “Constitutional Disintegration,” Iraq And Gulf Analysis, 11/19/09
- “The Hashemi Veto Backfires, Parliament Ups the Ante,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 11/23/09
Friday, November 27, 2009
Iraq’s Displaced Forgotten In Debate Over Election Law
Iraq’s parliament has spent months debating and negotiating over the 2010 election law. While it has discussed several issues such as the status of Kirkuk and voting for overseas Iraqis, nothing has really been said about Iraq’s internally displaced. The result is that many will likely be disenfranchised as happened in the 2009 balloting.
Recently, hundreds of displaced families protested in Diyala against the planned parliamentary vote. They said they would not participate because the voting rules were rigged against them. In the current election bill, Article IV says that displaced families can vote, but only in their original home district they were forced out of, and are ineligible if they transferred their food ration cards to another district. The Iraqi Election Commission has said that around 1 million displaced can vote under these regulations. The latest United Nations figures record around 1.6 million displaced, which means 600,000 people may be disenfranchised.
Another problem is that even those that can vote still have to register, and few have done so. In October 2009 the Iraqi Election Commission reported that only 20,000 displaced voters had signed up by then. The Commission said that it was setting up special teams to try to get more to participate. The same thing occurred in the 2009 provincial elections when the displaced were confused about the voter rules, and few registered. The result was that tens of thousands didn’t get to vote. That led to several protests.
Since there has been no real debate by Iraq’s politicians to correct these problems the same scenario is likely to play out in 2010. Iraq’s displaced are already facing a plethora of problems from findings jobs, housing, to getting services, now a sizeable number are probably going to be shut out of voting for their representatives for a second time.
SOURCES
Fadel, Leila, “Low turnout in Iraq’s election reflects a disillusioned nation,” McClatchy Newspapers, 2/1/09
Naji, Zaineb, “Voter Apathy Among Iraq Displaced,” Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 9/24/08
Niqash, “election law text,” 11/9/09
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraqi Election Commission Urges Vote Law’s Approval,” 10/7/09
Al Sabah, “Many displaced families in Diyala boycott elections,” 11/17/09
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Return Update Iraq September 2009,” November 2009
Recently, hundreds of displaced families protested in Diyala against the planned parliamentary vote. They said they would not participate because the voting rules were rigged against them. In the current election bill, Article IV says that displaced families can vote, but only in their original home district they were forced out of, and are ineligible if they transferred their food ration cards to another district. The Iraqi Election Commission has said that around 1 million displaced can vote under these regulations. The latest United Nations figures record around 1.6 million displaced, which means 600,000 people may be disenfranchised.
Another problem is that even those that can vote still have to register, and few have done so. In October 2009 the Iraqi Election Commission reported that only 20,000 displaced voters had signed up by then. The Commission said that it was setting up special teams to try to get more to participate. The same thing occurred in the 2009 provincial elections when the displaced were confused about the voter rules, and few registered. The result was that tens of thousands didn’t get to vote. That led to several protests.
Since there has been no real debate by Iraq’s politicians to correct these problems the same scenario is likely to play out in 2010. Iraq’s displaced are already facing a plethora of problems from findings jobs, housing, to getting services, now a sizeable number are probably going to be shut out of voting for their representatives for a second time.
SOURCES
Fadel, Leila, “Low turnout in Iraq’s election reflects a disillusioned nation,” McClatchy Newspapers, 2/1/09
Naji, Zaineb, “Voter Apathy Among Iraq Displaced,” Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 9/24/08
Niqash, “election law text,” 11/9/09
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraqi Election Commission Urges Vote Law’s Approval,” 10/7/09
Al Sabah, “Many displaced families in Diyala boycott elections,” 11/17/09
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Return Update Iraq September 2009,” November 2009
Thursday, November 19, 2009
Iraq’s 2010 Election Law Faces New Challenge From Kurdistan
Iraq’s 2010 parliamentary election law was finally passed by the legislature on November 8, 2009. It was then sent to the Presidential Council that consists of President Jalal Talabani, Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi and Vice President Tarqi al-Hashemi for ratification. It was expected that they would immediately sign the bill into law as it was originally supposed to be done in October. Instead, the legislation has run into more and more problems. As reported before, President Talabani and Vice President Hashemi want the quota for seats given to minorities and refugees increased since that would help their chances in the election. That led to Hashemi to veto the bill, sending it back to parliament for revision. Now Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Massoud Barzani is threatening a Kurdish boycott unless the number of seats up for grabs in each province is changed.
President Barzani recently told the press that the three Kurdish provinces of Dohuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniya would boycott the 2010 national elections unless more seats are allotted to the region. The number of members in parliament is going to be increased from 275 to 323 next year, and those will be determined by the voting in each of Iraq’s eighteen provinces. The total is based upon numbers derived from the Ministry of Trade’s food ration card system. For every 100,000 people in a province, one seat is to be placed up for election. There are also compensatory and quota seats set aside for minorities, refugees, and smaller parties that do well nationally, but not good enough in the provinces to earn a seat.
Barzani complained that the number of seats increased for several Sunni Arab provinces, but hardly changed at all for the Kurdistan region. For example, Sulaymaniya got no seat increases from 2005 staying at 15, while Dohuk went from 7 to 9, and Irbil went from 13 to 14. In comparison, Ninewa’s seats are going to go from 19 in 2005 to 31 in 2010, and Anbar will go from 9 to 14. In, fact every province, except for Sulaymaniya will see some sort of increase ranging from 1 to 12 seats, with an average of 4.1. According to Norwegian Iraq specialist Reidar Visser, the lack of increases for the KRG reflects the fact that their numbers were believed to be inflated in 2005, while the Sunni areas were not well represented before. The Kurdish Alliance in parliament has gone as far as to threaten a lawsuit against the Trade Ministry, alleging that it is manipulating its numbers.
Parliamentary Seats By Province 2005 vs 2010
Anbar 9 vs 14
Babil 11 vs 16
Baghdad 59 vs 68
Basra 18 vs 24
Dhi Qar 12 vs 18
Diyala 10 vs 13
Dohuk 7 vs 9
Irbil 13 vs 14
Karbala 6 vs 10
Maysan 7 vs 10
Muthanna 5 vs 7
Najaf 8 vs 12
Ninewa 19 vs 31
Qadisiyah 8 vs 11
Salahaddin 8 vs 12
Sulaymaniya 15 vs 15
Tamim 9 vs 12
Wasit 8 vs 11
The Kurdish Alliance and its allies the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) were the main reasons why the election bill was not passed on time. Their demands over voting in Tamim, the home of Kirkuk, and whether to use an open or closed list system, dragged out the discussion over the legislation for nearly a month after it was due. Now the Kurds are threatening the entire process by mentioning a boycott. They not only want the quota for minorities increased, something they should’ve worked out when the bill was under debate, but now also want the number of seats up for grabs to be redistributed to help Kurdistan. Representation is important in any election and country, but the way the Kurds are dealing with this piece of legislation is not only frustrating the Iraqi public, which is already fed up with their politicians and government for not delivering on issues such as basic services and the passage of laws, but also increasing the growing anti-Kurdish sentiment within the Arab population. The reasons behind the Kurds’ tactics are three-fold. First, after the U.S. invasion, the Kurds were one of the largest and most well organized parties in the country, and were able to translate that into a greater proportion of power than they probably deserved vis a vis the Arab majority. They are therefore use to getting their way. Second, the Kurds, along with all the other large political parties see politics in zero sum terms, which makes it hard for them to compromise on any meaningful issue. Third, with the ascendancy of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the central government, the Kurds are pushing for as much power as they can get out of fear that Baghdad will once again attempt to take away their rights or subjugate them like what happened under Saddam. All of those factors together, make it extremely difficult to get anything through Iraq’s legislative process, and the 2010 election law is just the latest example.
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Iraq’s January vote placed in doubt by presidency,” 11/16/09
AK News, “Kurdish Presidency warn to boycott parliamentary polls,” 11/17/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “KA threatens to sue Trade Ministry,” 11/16/09
- “Kurdistan won’t participate in polls unless allocation mechanism is reconsidered,” 11/17/09
Lucas, Ryan, “Kurdish, Sunni demands may derail Iraqi elections,” Associated Press, 11/17/09
Najm, Hayder, “election law faces new challenges,” Niqash, 11/13/09
Santora, “Kurdish Legislators Threaten Boycott of Iraq Election,” New York Times, 11/17/09
Visser, Reidar, “The IHEC Publishes the Distribution of Governorate and Compensatory Seats,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 11/11/09
President Barzani recently told the press that the three Kurdish provinces of Dohuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniya would boycott the 2010 national elections unless more seats are allotted to the region. The number of members in parliament is going to be increased from 275 to 323 next year, and those will be determined by the voting in each of Iraq’s eighteen provinces. The total is based upon numbers derived from the Ministry of Trade’s food ration card system. For every 100,000 people in a province, one seat is to be placed up for election. There are also compensatory and quota seats set aside for minorities, refugees, and smaller parties that do well nationally, but not good enough in the provinces to earn a seat.
Barzani complained that the number of seats increased for several Sunni Arab provinces, but hardly changed at all for the Kurdistan region. For example, Sulaymaniya got no seat increases from 2005 staying at 15, while Dohuk went from 7 to 9, and Irbil went from 13 to 14. In comparison, Ninewa’s seats are going to go from 19 in 2005 to 31 in 2010, and Anbar will go from 9 to 14. In, fact every province, except for Sulaymaniya will see some sort of increase ranging from 1 to 12 seats, with an average of 4.1. According to Norwegian Iraq specialist Reidar Visser, the lack of increases for the KRG reflects the fact that their numbers were believed to be inflated in 2005, while the Sunni areas were not well represented before. The Kurdish Alliance in parliament has gone as far as to threaten a lawsuit against the Trade Ministry, alleging that it is manipulating its numbers.
Parliamentary Seats By Province 2005 vs 2010
Anbar 9 vs 14
Babil 11 vs 16
Baghdad 59 vs 68
Basra 18 vs 24
Dhi Qar 12 vs 18
Diyala 10 vs 13
Dohuk 7 vs 9
Irbil 13 vs 14
Karbala 6 vs 10
Maysan 7 vs 10
Muthanna 5 vs 7
Najaf 8 vs 12
Ninewa 19 vs 31
Qadisiyah 8 vs 11
Salahaddin 8 vs 12
Sulaymaniya 15 vs 15
Tamim 9 vs 12
Wasit 8 vs 11
The Kurdish Alliance and its allies the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) were the main reasons why the election bill was not passed on time. Their demands over voting in Tamim, the home of Kirkuk, and whether to use an open or closed list system, dragged out the discussion over the legislation for nearly a month after it was due. Now the Kurds are threatening the entire process by mentioning a boycott. They not only want the quota for minorities increased, something they should’ve worked out when the bill was under debate, but now also want the number of seats up for grabs to be redistributed to help Kurdistan. Representation is important in any election and country, but the way the Kurds are dealing with this piece of legislation is not only frustrating the Iraqi public, which is already fed up with their politicians and government for not delivering on issues such as basic services and the passage of laws, but also increasing the growing anti-Kurdish sentiment within the Arab population. The reasons behind the Kurds’ tactics are three-fold. First, after the U.S. invasion, the Kurds were one of the largest and most well organized parties in the country, and were able to translate that into a greater proportion of power than they probably deserved vis a vis the Arab majority. They are therefore use to getting their way. Second, the Kurds, along with all the other large political parties see politics in zero sum terms, which makes it hard for them to compromise on any meaningful issue. Third, with the ascendancy of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the central government, the Kurds are pushing for as much power as they can get out of fear that Baghdad will once again attempt to take away their rights or subjugate them like what happened under Saddam. All of those factors together, make it extremely difficult to get anything through Iraq’s legislative process, and the 2010 election law is just the latest example.
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Iraq’s January vote placed in doubt by presidency,” 11/16/09
AK News, “Kurdish Presidency warn to boycott parliamentary polls,” 11/17/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “KA threatens to sue Trade Ministry,” 11/16/09
- “Kurdistan won’t participate in polls unless allocation mechanism is reconsidered,” 11/17/09
Lucas, Ryan, “Kurdish, Sunni demands may derail Iraqi elections,” Associated Press, 11/17/09
Najm, Hayder, “election law faces new challenges,” Niqash, 11/13/09
Santora, “Kurdish Legislators Threaten Boycott of Iraq Election,” New York Times, 11/17/09
Visser, Reidar, “The IHEC Publishes the Distribution of Governorate and Compensatory Seats,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 11/11/09
Tuesday, November 17, 2009
Iraq’s President and Vice President Want Election Law Revised
In the days after parliament finally passed the 2010 parliamentary election bill, both President Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi, formerly of the Iraqi Sunni Party, and now part of the new Iraqi National Movement, have called for it to be revised. They are both requesting that the number of seats set aside for refugees and minorities be increased.
As the election bill now stands, eight seats are set aside for minorities and eight seats are compensatory seats for refugees and political parties that don’t do well locally in the provinces, but do well nationally. Talabani and Hashemi are both asking that the quota be increased to 48 seats out of 323.
Talabani called for an amendment after the Kurdish parliament requested one. Many of Iraq’s minorities have fled to Kurdistan or live in the disputed territories in northern Iraq, so an increase in the quota would probably help the ruling Kurdish parties like Talabani’s PUK. This is a change for the President as he, and Iraq’s other Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi, already ratified the bill.
An adviser to Vice President Hashemi said that refugees need more representation since most are Sunnis, which is Hashemi’s constituency. Hashemi’s coalition partner Parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq has called for 30 seats for refugees. The Vice President went on TV saying that he will veto the bill unless it is changed by Tuesday, November 17, 2009.
The ball is now back in parliament’s court to either increase the quota or see whether Hashemi is bluffing about a veto. This is just the latest delay after many, as the law was supposed to be passed in October.
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Iraq’s January vote placed in doubt by presidency,” 11/16/09
Alsumaria, “Talabani and Abdul Mehdi ratify election law,” 11/14/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “URGENT/VP says won’t endorse election law come what may,”” 11/15/09
Najm, Hayder, “election law faces new challenges,” Niqash, 11/13/09
Reuters, “Iraq VP Threatens To Veto Vote Law Over Refugees,” 11/15/09
As the election bill now stands, eight seats are set aside for minorities and eight seats are compensatory seats for refugees and political parties that don’t do well locally in the provinces, but do well nationally. Talabani and Hashemi are both asking that the quota be increased to 48 seats out of 323.
Talabani called for an amendment after the Kurdish parliament requested one. Many of Iraq’s minorities have fled to Kurdistan or live in the disputed territories in northern Iraq, so an increase in the quota would probably help the ruling Kurdish parties like Talabani’s PUK. This is a change for the President as he, and Iraq’s other Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi, already ratified the bill.
An adviser to Vice President Hashemi said that refugees need more representation since most are Sunnis, which is Hashemi’s constituency. Hashemi’s coalition partner Parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq has called for 30 seats for refugees. The Vice President went on TV saying that he will veto the bill unless it is changed by Tuesday, November 17, 2009.
The ball is now back in parliament’s court to either increase the quota or see whether Hashemi is bluffing about a veto. This is just the latest delay after many, as the law was supposed to be passed in October.
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Iraq’s January vote placed in doubt by presidency,” 11/16/09
Alsumaria, “Talabani and Abdul Mehdi ratify election law,” 11/14/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “URGENT/VP says won’t endorse election law come what may,”” 11/15/09
Najm, Hayder, “election law faces new challenges,” Niqash, 11/13/09
Reuters, “Iraq VP Threatens To Veto Vote Law Over Refugees,” 11/15/09
Wednesday, November 11, 2009
Iraq’s Parliament Finally Does Its Job – Passes Election Law
On the night of November 8, 2009, Iraq’s parliament finally passed the 2010 election law. 195 of the 175 members were present, with 141 voting for the bill. As mentioned before, the law was originally supposed to be passed on October 16, but disputes over how to conduct voting in Tamim, home to the disputed city of Kirkuk, and whether to use an open or closed list voting system, delayed the proceedings. From reports, it seems that the legislature was able to break the deadlock when the major parties, including Prime Minister Maliki’s Dawa, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, the Iraqi Islamic Party, and the Sadrists, decided to drop their arguments over Tamim, so that the bill could move forward. U.S. Ambassador Christopher Hill was also seen at the parliament on Sunday desperately trying to bring lawmakers together so that a vote could happen.
The 2010 Election Law is actually a revision of the 2005 legislation with three major changes. First, there will be open instead of closed list voting. This allows the public to choose from individuals, parties or lists, instead of just coalitions. Second, elections in Tamim will be provisional for one year as a committee goes through the voter roles looking for any irregularities. This arises from claims by Arabs and Turkmen in the province that say Kurds have moved in thousands of their people into Kirkuk to shift the demographics in their favor to assure their victory in any vote, and eventually annex it. If the committee finds a difference of 5% or more in the vote, than the election can be invalidated there. To assuage the Kurds, the law says that other provinces can also have their voter roles scrutinized at the request of more than 50 lawmakers. The Kurdish Alliance currently has 53 seats. It also dropped the proposal to give two compensatory seats each to Arabs and Turkmen in Tamim to make up for the expected Kurdish victory there. Third, the number of seats up for grabs will increase from the current 275 to 323. This is based upon statistics from the Ministry of Trade that administers the food ration system, and a requirement that there be one seat in parliament for every 100,000 people.
After that, the bill is pretty much like the 2005 one. Iraqis living overseas will be allowed to vote. There will also be quotas for women, and minorities. Christians will get one seat each in Tamim, Ninewa, Baghdad, Irbil, and Dohuk, Yazidis and Shabaks will get one seat each in Ninewa, and Mandean Christians will get one seat in Baghdad. Women are also supposed to be 25% of the politicians elected to office.
The bill now goes to the Presidential Council for final approval, which is expected shortly. The Election Commission, however, says that because of the delays, Iraq cannot hold balloting on the original date, which was January 16, 2010. Instead they have proposed January 21 as the new deadline.
It was important that the parliament put aside its differences over the future of Kirkuk to get the election bill passed. If they had not, the debate over it could’ve dragged on for months as happened with the provincial election law that was originally planned for October 2008, but got delayed until January 2009, and had the original version vetoed as a result. At the same time, the law is definitely a victory for the Kurds. They got all of their major demands met, and their expected victory in Tamim in 2010 will create more facts on the ground to support their argument that the Kurdistan Regional Government should annex Kirkuk. That will have to wait for another day however as the technical issue of holding elections is finally moving forward.
SOURCES
AK News, “Iraq ends impasse of elections law,” 11/9/09
- “Kirkuk included in Iraqi elections,” 11/9/09
Arraf, Jane, “Iraq passes new election law, smoothing way for January elections,” Christian Science Monitor, 11/8/09
Associated Press, “Election Law Passes In Iraq, Setting Up National Vote,” 11/8/09
- “Iraq Election Panel Seeks Jan. 21 Vote,” 11/9/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “After stormy, wrangling session, election law passed,” 11/8/09
BBC, “Iraq MPs approve election reform,” 11/8/09
Chon, Gina, “Iraq Passes Key Election Law and Prepares for January Vote,” Wall Street Journal, 11/9/09
Chulov, Martin, “Deal on Kirkuk sets stage for Iraqi elections,” Guardian, 11/8/09
CNN, “Iraqi parliament passes key voting law,” 11/8/09
Al Jazeera, “Iraqi MPs pass delayed election law,” 11/9/09
Londono, Ernesto, “Iraqi lawmakers pass election law, paving way for January vote,” Washington Post, 11/8/09
Reuters, “Iraqi lawmakers pass election law,” 11/8/09
Roads To Iraq, “Election law, a first view,” 11/9/09
Strobel, Warren, Issa, Sahar, “Iraqis pass election law crucial to U.S. withdrawal plans,” McClatchy Newspapers, 11/8/09
- “Iraqis set elections for Jan. 23 after weeks of rancor,” McClatchy Newspapers, 11/8/09
Visser, Reidar, “The Election Law Is Passed: Open Lists, Kirkuk Recognised as a Governorate with “Dubious” Registers,” Historiae.org, 11/8/09
Williams, Timothy and Izzi, Sa’ad, “Iraq Passes Crucial Election Law,” New York Times, 11/9/09
The 2010 Election Law is actually a revision of the 2005 legislation with three major changes. First, there will be open instead of closed list voting. This allows the public to choose from individuals, parties or lists, instead of just coalitions. Second, elections in Tamim will be provisional for one year as a committee goes through the voter roles looking for any irregularities. This arises from claims by Arabs and Turkmen in the province that say Kurds have moved in thousands of their people into Kirkuk to shift the demographics in their favor to assure their victory in any vote, and eventually annex it. If the committee finds a difference of 5% or more in the vote, than the election can be invalidated there. To assuage the Kurds, the law says that other provinces can also have their voter roles scrutinized at the request of more than 50 lawmakers. The Kurdish Alliance currently has 53 seats. It also dropped the proposal to give two compensatory seats each to Arabs and Turkmen in Tamim to make up for the expected Kurdish victory there. Third, the number of seats up for grabs will increase from the current 275 to 323. This is based upon statistics from the Ministry of Trade that administers the food ration system, and a requirement that there be one seat in parliament for every 100,000 people.
After that, the bill is pretty much like the 2005 one. Iraqis living overseas will be allowed to vote. There will also be quotas for women, and minorities. Christians will get one seat each in Tamim, Ninewa, Baghdad, Irbil, and Dohuk, Yazidis and Shabaks will get one seat each in Ninewa, and Mandean Christians will get one seat in Baghdad. Women are also supposed to be 25% of the politicians elected to office.
The bill now goes to the Presidential Council for final approval, which is expected shortly. The Election Commission, however, says that because of the delays, Iraq cannot hold balloting on the original date, which was January 16, 2010. Instead they have proposed January 21 as the new deadline.
It was important that the parliament put aside its differences over the future of Kirkuk to get the election bill passed. If they had not, the debate over it could’ve dragged on for months as happened with the provincial election law that was originally planned for October 2008, but got delayed until January 2009, and had the original version vetoed as a result. At the same time, the law is definitely a victory for the Kurds. They got all of their major demands met, and their expected victory in Tamim in 2010 will create more facts on the ground to support their argument that the Kurdistan Regional Government should annex Kirkuk. That will have to wait for another day however as the technical issue of holding elections is finally moving forward.
SOURCES
AK News, “Iraq ends impasse of elections law,” 11/9/09
- “Kirkuk included in Iraqi elections,” 11/9/09
Arraf, Jane, “Iraq passes new election law, smoothing way for January elections,” Christian Science Monitor, 11/8/09
Associated Press, “Election Law Passes In Iraq, Setting Up National Vote,” 11/8/09
- “Iraq Election Panel Seeks Jan. 21 Vote,” 11/9/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “After stormy, wrangling session, election law passed,” 11/8/09
BBC, “Iraq MPs approve election reform,” 11/8/09
Chon, Gina, “Iraq Passes Key Election Law and Prepares for January Vote,” Wall Street Journal, 11/9/09
Chulov, Martin, “Deal on Kirkuk sets stage for Iraqi elections,” Guardian, 11/8/09
CNN, “Iraqi parliament passes key voting law,” 11/8/09
Al Jazeera, “Iraqi MPs pass delayed election law,” 11/9/09
Londono, Ernesto, “Iraqi lawmakers pass election law, paving way for January vote,” Washington Post, 11/8/09
Reuters, “Iraqi lawmakers pass election law,” 11/8/09
Roads To Iraq, “Election law, a first view,” 11/9/09
Strobel, Warren, Issa, Sahar, “Iraqis pass election law crucial to U.S. withdrawal plans,” McClatchy Newspapers, 11/8/09
- “Iraqis set elections for Jan. 23 after weeks of rancor,” McClatchy Newspapers, 11/8/09
Visser, Reidar, “The Election Law Is Passed: Open Lists, Kirkuk Recognised as a Governorate with “Dubious” Registers,” Historiae.org, 11/8/09
Williams, Timothy and Izzi, Sa’ad, “Iraq Passes Crucial Election Law,” New York Times, 11/9/09
Tuesday, November 10, 2009
Neo-Baathist-Nationalist Coalition Announced
October 31, 2009 was the deadline to register coalitions for the 2010 parliamentary elections. On that day a new list called the Iraqi National Movement was announced made up of parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq of the National Dialogue Council, former Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi of the Iraqi National List, and Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi. He was the former leader of the Iraqi Islamic Party, but left to form his own Renewal List. Hashemi had been in negotiations with Allawi and Mutlaq since August, and there were talks with Interior Minister Jawad Bolani and his Constitution Party. He chose to join Sheikh Ahmad Abu Risha of Anbar to form the Unity Alliance instead. Allawi was also courted by the major Shiite coalition, the Iraqi National Alliance. Hashemi may be responsible for the Awakening Councils of Diyala joining the Iraqi National Movement as well. The Islamic Party successfully co-opted the Sons of Iraq/Awakening movement in Diyala in 2007-2008, which helped their Iraqi Accordance Front List to come in first place in the 2009 elections there.
The Iraqi National Movement includes both Shiites, Allawi, and Sunnis, Mutlaq and Hashemi, but its main appeal is to Baathists and nationalists. Since the U.S. invasion Mutlaq and Allawi have consistently pushed for the inclusion and rehabilitation of former army officers from Saddam’s time along with Baathists. Hashemi on the other hand has roots with the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist group that originated in Egypt, which gave birth to the Iraqi Islamic Party. All three also call for a strong central government, and to limit outside influences, especially from Iran.
Overall, the Iraqi National Movement is a medium sized coalition. In the 2009 provincial elections, Mutlaq and Allawi won 45 seats, accounting for 10.2% of the total. Allawi’s List gained seats in both the largely Sunni west and north, and a spattering across Shiite southern Iraq as well, and became part of the ruling coalitions in Babil, Qadisiyah, and Salahaddin. Mutlaq only gained representation in Sunnis areas, and came in second in Anbar where his party got the head of the council. In comparison, Maliki’s State of Law list won 140 seats, 31.8%, the Supreme Council got 55 seats, 12.5%, the Sadrists 41 seats, 9.3%, and former Prime Minister Ibrahima al-Jaafari 23 seats, 5.2%. Together those last three have formed the new Iraqi National Alliance, and got 119 seats total, 27.0%. The real importance of the Iraqi National Movement will be seen after the election, as no coalition is likely to even come out with a plurality. That will mean a huge amount of back door dealing and negotiations to name a new government, which will likely take months as it did the last two times Iraq went through that process.
Allawi and Mutlaq’s Showing In The 2009 Provincial Elections
Total Provincial Seats: 440
Allawi’s Iraqi National List – Provinces (# of seats)
Anbar (2)
Babil (3)
Baghdad (5)
Basra (2)
Diyala (3)
Qadisiyah (3)
Salahaddin (5)
Wasit (3)
TOTAL: 26, 5.9%
Mutlaq’s Iraqi National Project – Provinces (# of seats)
Anbar (6)
Baghdad (4)
Diyala (6)
Salahaddin (3)
TOTAL: 19, 4.3%
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Iraqi VP joins forces with ex-PM to form new bloc,” 10/28/09
Alsumaria, “New Iraq political coalition in the offing,” 8/24/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Iraq’s Unity Alliance formally announced,” 10/21/09
- “VP announces new list for upcoming parliamentary elections,” 9/12/09
Iraq The Model, “Accord Front Collapses, Sunni Tribes Seek Shiite Allies,” 8/15/09
Al Jazeera, “Iraqi parties form new coalition,” 10/31/09
Roads To Iraq, “The National Movement,” 10/31/09
Visser, Reidar, “Allawi-Mutlak: Consolidation at the Centre of Iraqi Politics,” Ira and Gulf Analysis, 10/27/09
The Iraqi National Movement includes both Shiites, Allawi, and Sunnis, Mutlaq and Hashemi, but its main appeal is to Baathists and nationalists. Since the U.S. invasion Mutlaq and Allawi have consistently pushed for the inclusion and rehabilitation of former army officers from Saddam’s time along with Baathists. Hashemi on the other hand has roots with the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist group that originated in Egypt, which gave birth to the Iraqi Islamic Party. All three also call for a strong central government, and to limit outside influences, especially from Iran.
Overall, the Iraqi National Movement is a medium sized coalition. In the 2009 provincial elections, Mutlaq and Allawi won 45 seats, accounting for 10.2% of the total. Allawi’s List gained seats in both the largely Sunni west and north, and a spattering across Shiite southern Iraq as well, and became part of the ruling coalitions in Babil, Qadisiyah, and Salahaddin. Mutlaq only gained representation in Sunnis areas, and came in second in Anbar where his party got the head of the council. In comparison, Maliki’s State of Law list won 140 seats, 31.8%, the Supreme Council got 55 seats, 12.5%, the Sadrists 41 seats, 9.3%, and former Prime Minister Ibrahima al-Jaafari 23 seats, 5.2%. Together those last three have formed the new Iraqi National Alliance, and got 119 seats total, 27.0%. The real importance of the Iraqi National Movement will be seen after the election, as no coalition is likely to even come out with a plurality. That will mean a huge amount of back door dealing and negotiations to name a new government, which will likely take months as it did the last two times Iraq went through that process.
Allawi and Mutlaq’s Showing In The 2009 Provincial Elections
Total Provincial Seats: 440
Allawi’s Iraqi National List – Provinces (# of seats)
Anbar (2)
Babil (3)
Baghdad (5)
Basra (2)
Diyala (3)
Qadisiyah (3)
Salahaddin (5)
Wasit (3)
TOTAL: 26, 5.9%
Mutlaq’s Iraqi National Project – Provinces (# of seats)
Anbar (6)
Baghdad (4)
Diyala (6)
Salahaddin (3)
TOTAL: 19, 4.3%
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Iraqi VP joins forces with ex-PM to form new bloc,” 10/28/09
Alsumaria, “New Iraq political coalition in the offing,” 8/24/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Iraq’s Unity Alliance formally announced,” 10/21/09
- “VP announces new list for upcoming parliamentary elections,” 9/12/09
Iraq The Model, “Accord Front Collapses, Sunni Tribes Seek Shiite Allies,” 8/15/09
Al Jazeera, “Iraqi parties form new coalition,” 10/31/09
Roads To Iraq, “The National Movement,” 10/31/09
Visser, Reidar, “Allawi-Mutlak: Consolidation at the Centre of Iraqi Politics,” Ira and Gulf Analysis, 10/27/09
Monday, November 02, 2009
The Sadrist Primaries
On October 15, 2009, the Sadrist movement held the very first primary election in Iraq’s post-Saddam era history. While the group hailed it as a step towards democracy, it was more a way to rally and gauge support before the 2010 parliamentary elections.
670 candidates ran for 50 positions. Voting was held in approximately 350 centers in thirteen of Iraq’s eighteen provinces, excluding the three in Kurdistan, Anbar, and Ninewa. Anyone could run as long as they met an age and background requirement. The Sadrists claimed 1.5 million people participated, but the day before a spokesman said that only 250,000 had registered. There were also no voter roles to check the balloting against.
As reported before, the Sadrists had a very mixed showing in the 2009 provincial elections. They did badly in Sadr City and Basra, two of their strongholds, lost control of Maysan province, and received a lower percentage of votes compared to 2005. At the same time, they gained representation across almost four times as many governorates as before, and joined the governing councils in Babil, Dhi Qar, Karbala, got the governorship of Babil, and the head of the council there and in Karbala.
Since then the Sadrists have joined the new Iraqi National Alliance. The List also includes former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s National Reform Party, and the Sadrists’ archrival the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC). Working with the SIIC was probably due to the influence of Iran, which played a leading role in putting the coalition together, and a realization by Moqtada al-Sadr that he cannot go it alone, like his followers did in 2009. The National Alliance however, lacks any ideological consistently, other than being Shiite, and opposed to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.
The primaries were a preliminary move before the actual 2010 vote. It helped gauge how much support they had, rallied the faithful, and gave their candidates the air of popular support. This is all part of the Sadrists’ new strategy of focusing upon politics and society. Sadr is gambling that by running with the National Alliance, he can gain more seats in parliament, and help put together a new ruling coalition, which would give him control of ministries. In 2006 he withdrew from the government, and lost all of his cabinet positions. It’s unclear how the Alliance will do however, especially since it is a deeply flawed list to begin with. It’s also not clear whether this will be a successful approach overall. Sadr always held large sway with the Shiite street through his anti-establishment militancy, and armed opposition to the U.S. presence. Now he is attempting to give much of that up and rejoin the mainstream, as he tried to do after the 2005 elections. That had mixed results as many of his supporters are opposed to the government, and there’s no telling whether this will do any better.
SOURCES
Faraj, Salam, “Sadrists choose candidates for Iraqi poll,” Agence France Presse, 10/16/09
Hussein, Jenan and Al Dulaimy, Mohammad, “An Iraqi primary election draws crowds but lacks safeguards,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/16/09
Raghavan, Sudarsan, “Sadr Casts a Shadow Over Bush-Maliki Meeting,” Washington Post, 11/30/06
Sullivan, Marisa Cochrane, “Iraq’s Parliamentary Election,” Institute for the Study of War, 10/21/09
670 candidates ran for 50 positions. Voting was held in approximately 350 centers in thirteen of Iraq’s eighteen provinces, excluding the three in Kurdistan, Anbar, and Ninewa. Anyone could run as long as they met an age and background requirement. The Sadrists claimed 1.5 million people participated, but the day before a spokesman said that only 250,000 had registered. There were also no voter roles to check the balloting against.
As reported before, the Sadrists had a very mixed showing in the 2009 provincial elections. They did badly in Sadr City and Basra, two of their strongholds, lost control of Maysan province, and received a lower percentage of votes compared to 2005. At the same time, they gained representation across almost four times as many governorates as before, and joined the governing councils in Babil, Dhi Qar, Karbala, got the governorship of Babil, and the head of the council there and in Karbala.
Since then the Sadrists have joined the new Iraqi National Alliance. The List also includes former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s National Reform Party, and the Sadrists’ archrival the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC). Working with the SIIC was probably due to the influence of Iran, which played a leading role in putting the coalition together, and a realization by Moqtada al-Sadr that he cannot go it alone, like his followers did in 2009. The National Alliance however, lacks any ideological consistently, other than being Shiite, and opposed to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.
The primaries were a preliminary move before the actual 2010 vote. It helped gauge how much support they had, rallied the faithful, and gave their candidates the air of popular support. This is all part of the Sadrists’ new strategy of focusing upon politics and society. Sadr is gambling that by running with the National Alliance, he can gain more seats in parliament, and help put together a new ruling coalition, which would give him control of ministries. In 2006 he withdrew from the government, and lost all of his cabinet positions. It’s unclear how the Alliance will do however, especially since it is a deeply flawed list to begin with. It’s also not clear whether this will be a successful approach overall. Sadr always held large sway with the Shiite street through his anti-establishment militancy, and armed opposition to the U.S. presence. Now he is attempting to give much of that up and rejoin the mainstream, as he tried to do after the 2005 elections. That had mixed results as many of his supporters are opposed to the government, and there’s no telling whether this will do any better.
SOURCES
Faraj, Salam, “Sadrists choose candidates for Iraqi poll,” Agence France Presse, 10/16/09
Hussein, Jenan and Al Dulaimy, Mohammad, “An Iraqi primary election draws crowds but lacks safeguards,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/16/09
Raghavan, Sudarsan, “Sadr Casts a Shadow Over Bush-Maliki Meeting,” Washington Post, 11/30/06
Sullivan, Marisa Cochrane, “Iraq’s Parliamentary Election,” Institute for the Study of War, 10/21/09
Sunday, October 25, 2009
Ruling Kurdish Parties Try To Co-Opt And Intimidate Opposition
The Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) July 2009 parliamentary elections were touted as a sea change in Kurdish politics. For the first time, the ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of KRG President Massoud Barzani and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani faced a real challenge from the new Change List headed by the co-founder of the PUK Nishurwan Mustafa. Change ran on greater transparency and democracy. They ended up winning 25 of 111 seats, while the Service and Reform List, a coalition of leftist and Islamist parties, won 13. Since then the KDP and PUK have tried to cajole and bully these new opposition groups.
First, the KDP and PUK have tried to co-opt the Service and Reform List. The list was always a strange mix. On the one hand there were two Islamist groups, the Kurdistan Islamic Union and the Kurdistan Islamic Group, and on the other were the Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party and the Future Party. The mixture of religious and secular parties always seemed to be a marriage of convenience. The KDP and PUK have tried to play on these divisions by offering ministries in the Kurdish government in return for them joining the ruling coalition. So far, the Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party and its two seats, and the Future Party with one seat are on the verge of joining the KDP and PUK, and the Kurdistan Islamic Group with four seats are in negotiations to do the same. That leaves only the Kurdistan Islamic Union and the Change List as being committed to being in the opposition. Together they have 31 of 111 seats in the Kurdish assembly.
The PUK and KDP are trying to do something similar for the January 2010 national parliamentary elections. The two parties form the Kurdish Alliance in the legislature, and want all the other Kurdish parties to run as one list in the coming vote. They argue that since there are so many unresolved issues between the KRG and Baghdad, the Kurds need to form a united front. The Change List however, said that they will run separately, but are open to working with the Kurdish Alliance after the balloting in parliament.
At the same time, the PUK and KDP are continuing with their intimidation campaign against the Change List. Before the vote, Change supporters were losing their government jobs, during the election there were all kinds irregularities reported, and afterwards the Change List offices in Irbil were attacked, and their followers got into fights in Sulaymaniya. Since then, the Change List is accusing the ruling parties of firing their members in the peshmerga militia and security forces. Teachers have also said that those who voted for the Change List have been let go or demoted as well.
Kurdistan has been ruled by the PUK and KDP since it got its autonomy from Saddam following the 1991 Gulf War. The administration of the KRG has been noted for cronyism, corruption, tribalism, and a lack of transparency. The 2009 Kurdish elections were widely hailed as a transformative vote since it was the first time that the opposition received a sizeable proportion of the vote. The actions of the ruling parties since then however show that they are still thinking the same way. They are still in control, and want to maintain their position by any means whether by buying off the opposition or threatening them.
SOURCES
AK News, “Kurdish involvement in polls: one list vs. numerous lists,” 10/7/09
Hamad, Qassim Khidhir, “kurdish election lists,” Niqash, 6/30/09
Taha, Yaseen, “kurdish opposition splinters,” Niqash, 10/7/09
Tahir, Wrya Hama, “Kurdish Opposition Say Supporters Targeted in Workplace,” Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 10/2/09
First, the KDP and PUK have tried to co-opt the Service and Reform List. The list was always a strange mix. On the one hand there were two Islamist groups, the Kurdistan Islamic Union and the Kurdistan Islamic Group, and on the other were the Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party and the Future Party. The mixture of religious and secular parties always seemed to be a marriage of convenience. The KDP and PUK have tried to play on these divisions by offering ministries in the Kurdish government in return for them joining the ruling coalition. So far, the Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party and its two seats, and the Future Party with one seat are on the verge of joining the KDP and PUK, and the Kurdistan Islamic Group with four seats are in negotiations to do the same. That leaves only the Kurdistan Islamic Union and the Change List as being committed to being in the opposition. Together they have 31 of 111 seats in the Kurdish assembly.
The PUK and KDP are trying to do something similar for the January 2010 national parliamentary elections. The two parties form the Kurdish Alliance in the legislature, and want all the other Kurdish parties to run as one list in the coming vote. They argue that since there are so many unresolved issues between the KRG and Baghdad, the Kurds need to form a united front. The Change List however, said that they will run separately, but are open to working with the Kurdish Alliance after the balloting in parliament.
At the same time, the PUK and KDP are continuing with their intimidation campaign against the Change List. Before the vote, Change supporters were losing their government jobs, during the election there were all kinds irregularities reported, and afterwards the Change List offices in Irbil were attacked, and their followers got into fights in Sulaymaniya. Since then, the Change List is accusing the ruling parties of firing their members in the peshmerga militia and security forces. Teachers have also said that those who voted for the Change List have been let go or demoted as well.
Kurdistan has been ruled by the PUK and KDP since it got its autonomy from Saddam following the 1991 Gulf War. The administration of the KRG has been noted for cronyism, corruption, tribalism, and a lack of transparency. The 2009 Kurdish elections were widely hailed as a transformative vote since it was the first time that the opposition received a sizeable proportion of the vote. The actions of the ruling parties since then however show that they are still thinking the same way. They are still in control, and want to maintain their position by any means whether by buying off the opposition or threatening them.
SOURCES
AK News, “Kurdish involvement in polls: one list vs. numerous lists,” 10/7/09
Hamad, Qassim Khidhir, “kurdish election lists,” Niqash, 6/30/09
Taha, Yaseen, “kurdish opposition splinters,” Niqash, 10/7/09
Tahir, Wrya Hama, “Kurdish Opposition Say Supporters Targeted in Workplace,” Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 10/2/09
Friday, October 16, 2009
Ayatollah Sistani’s Influence On The Open/Closed List Voting System Debate In Iraq
Iraq’s parliament missed its October 15, 2009 deadline to come up with a new election law for the January 2010 vote. There are two major issues holding up the bill. First, is the issue of how balloting will take place in Tamim province, home of the disputed city of Kirkuk. The second is whether the country will use an open or closed list voting system. In 2005, Iraq used a closed list system where voters could only pick from lists, which are coalitions, and parties. That gave more control to party bosses who got to choose the politicians that would actually take power. In the January 2009 provincial elections, Iraq used an open list, where people could select either lists or individual candidates. That gave more influence to the voters.
When debate first began on what kind of system was to be adopted for 2010, reports said that many politicians were pushing for a closed list. Those included members of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), and the two ruling Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was an early opponent.
The entire discussion changed at the beginning of October 2009 when a false story was spread about Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and the voting system. On October 5, it was reported that Ayatollah Sistani would urge a boycott of the 2010 election if parliament did not adopt an open list. That story was quickly denied by Sistani’s office, and Maliki was accused of spreading the rumor since so many of his opponents were for the closed list. The report had its affect however, as almost all of Iraq’s leading politicians and parties have now publicly come out for the open list. On October 6, the Sadrists said they would hold a walk out if parliament held a vote on a closed list. The next day, Vice Presidents Adel Abd Mahdi of the Supreme Council and Tariq al-Hashemi, formerly of the Iraqi Islamic Party, held a joint press conference where they too said they supported an open list. The day after that, the head of the SIIC, Ammar al-Hakim, also came out against the closed list. Finally, on October 10, the Constitution Part of Interior Minister Jawad Bolani, held a demonstration in Basra in support of Sistani’s call for an open list.
If Maliki’s office did spread the false rumor about Sistani and a boycott, then it served its purpose. Most of the major Arab leaders in Iraq are now talking about an open list system. It’s yet to be seen whether this is all just rhetoric or a real sea change in Iraqi politics. The truth will be revealed when parliament passed a new election bill.
SOURCES
Alsumaria, “Sadrists firmly reject closed list system,” 10/7/09
- “Sistani aide: Closed list affects democracy,” 10/7/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Elections draft law completed without agreeing on Kirkuk – MP,” 7/15/09
- “Iraqi Constitutional Party demonstrates for open-slate election,” 10/10/09
- “National blocs want to adopt closed-list system during elections,” 7/3/09
- “Sadrists threaten to walk out of session if vote on closed-list system is held,” 10/6/09
- “SIIC chief asserts adopting open-list system in elections,” 10/8/09
- “Sistani denies boycotting elections in case adopting close-list system,” 10/5/09
- “Vice presidents stress importance of adopting open-list system,” 10/7/09
Gwertzman, Bernard, “Iraq at Crossroads Amid U.S. Disengagement,” Council on Foreign Relations, 6/30/09
Pollack, Kenneth, “The Battle for Baghdad,” The National Interest, September/October 2009
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraqi Election Commission Urges Vote Law’s Approval,” 10/7/09
Roads To Iraq, “Election conflict puts Sistani in the middle,” 10/6/09
Synovitz, Ron, “Kurdish-Arab Power Struggle Leads To Calls For Iraq Census Delay,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 8/30/09
Zahra, Hassan Abdul, “Iraq’s top Shiite cleric may urge vote boycott,” Agence France Presse, 10/5/09
When debate first began on what kind of system was to be adopted for 2010, reports said that many politicians were pushing for a closed list. Those included members of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), and the two ruling Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was an early opponent.
The entire discussion changed at the beginning of October 2009 when a false story was spread about Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and the voting system. On October 5, it was reported that Ayatollah Sistani would urge a boycott of the 2010 election if parliament did not adopt an open list. That story was quickly denied by Sistani’s office, and Maliki was accused of spreading the rumor since so many of his opponents were for the closed list. The report had its affect however, as almost all of Iraq’s leading politicians and parties have now publicly come out for the open list. On October 6, the Sadrists said they would hold a walk out if parliament held a vote on a closed list. The next day, Vice Presidents Adel Abd Mahdi of the Supreme Council and Tariq al-Hashemi, formerly of the Iraqi Islamic Party, held a joint press conference where they too said they supported an open list. The day after that, the head of the SIIC, Ammar al-Hakim, also came out against the closed list. Finally, on October 10, the Constitution Part of Interior Minister Jawad Bolani, held a demonstration in Basra in support of Sistani’s call for an open list.
If Maliki’s office did spread the false rumor about Sistani and a boycott, then it served its purpose. Most of the major Arab leaders in Iraq are now talking about an open list system. It’s yet to be seen whether this is all just rhetoric or a real sea change in Iraqi politics. The truth will be revealed when parliament passed a new election bill.
SOURCES
Alsumaria, “Sadrists firmly reject closed list system,” 10/7/09
- “Sistani aide: Closed list affects democracy,” 10/7/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Elections draft law completed without agreeing on Kirkuk – MP,” 7/15/09
- “Iraqi Constitutional Party demonstrates for open-slate election,” 10/10/09
- “National blocs want to adopt closed-list system during elections,” 7/3/09
- “Sadrists threaten to walk out of session if vote on closed-list system is held,” 10/6/09
- “SIIC chief asserts adopting open-list system in elections,” 10/8/09
- “Sistani denies boycotting elections in case adopting close-list system,” 10/5/09
- “Vice presidents stress importance of adopting open-list system,” 10/7/09
Gwertzman, Bernard, “Iraq at Crossroads Amid U.S. Disengagement,” Council on Foreign Relations, 6/30/09
Pollack, Kenneth, “The Battle for Baghdad,” The National Interest, September/October 2009
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraqi Election Commission Urges Vote Law’s Approval,” 10/7/09
Roads To Iraq, “Election conflict puts Sistani in the middle,” 10/6/09
Synovitz, Ron, “Kurdish-Arab Power Struggle Leads To Calls For Iraq Census Delay,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 8/30/09
Zahra, Hassan Abdul, “Iraq’s top Shiite cleric may urge vote boycott,” Agence France Presse, 10/5/09
Sunday, October 11, 2009
Maliki’s New State Of Law List May Not Be Enough
On October 1, 2009 Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki revealed his new State of Law List, which will run in the January 2010 parliamentary elections. Despite many reports of Maliki attempting to add new members to his coalition, especially Sunnis, the Prime Minister apparently struck out in his attempts. Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha, the head of the Awakening Conference in Anbar, talked about running with Maliki for the last six months, but instead formed a new alliance with Interior Minister Jawad Bolani’s Constitution Party, and several tribal groups in the new Iraqi Unity List. Former speaker of parliament Mahmud al-Mashhadani, an independent Sunni who heads the Nationalist Independent Trend, at first said that he had joined the State of Law, and then withdrew. Sunni Parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq of the Iraqi National Dialogue Front was another likely candidate, which Maliki had courted after the January 2009 parliamentary elections, said back in March that he was interested in working with the State of Law, but those talks fell apart by September. Mutlaq instead joined with former Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List, who also at one time expressed an interest in Maliki’s coalition. Member of parliament Mithal al-Alusi, Ninewa’s ruling al-Hadbaa party, and the new Kurdish opposition party, the Change List, were also not a part of the State of Law either. Maliki even went after Sunni tribal leaders in places like Salahaddin, Anbar, Tamim, and Ninewa, but nothing came of that. Maliki also made overtures to former Shiite rivals like the Sadrists when provincial governments were being put together earlier in the year, but they ended up joining the new Iraqi National Alliance instead.
The reason for these failures are largely unknown since the negotiations all occurred behind closed doors. It was reported that Maliki and al-Mutlaq agreed that their policies and constituencies would be contradictory. Maliki for example, has recently gone after Baathists for the August 2009 Baghdad bombings, while former regime members are exactly who Mutlaq appeals to. Sadr on the other hand, was probably pressured by Iran to join the National Alliance, since one of their main priorities is to maintain Shiite rule in Iraq.
Instead, what Prime Minister Maliki is going to run with is leftovers. The leadership of the State of Law is still with his Dawa Party. The Dawa-Iraq Organization is also a core member. After that it’s a number of ministers and government officials, such as Oil Minister Hussain al-Shahristani, and independent Shiite politicians that follow him, Minister of Displacement and Migration, Abdul Samad Sultan, an independent Kurd, and government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh. Maliki was able to get some members of Allawi’s Iraqi National List to defect, such as the deputy speaker of parliament, and a group from al-Hadbaa in the Sinjar district in Ninewa. The only prominent Sunni that agreed to join was Sheikh Ali Hatem Sulaiman from Anbar who was formerly with the Abu Risha’s Awakening. The Iraqi Communist Party was originally announced as a member as well, but then denied it.
Maliki is facing an uphill battle to return to the prime ministership. He’s running on security, which has been questioned after the August Baghdad bombings, better services, which are not coming, and getting the Americans to leave. The individual members of the Iraqi National Alliance did far worse than Maliki’s State of Law in the provincial elections, but all together they did slightly better. The Kurds are still a relatively unified bloc of voters as well, and may be kingmakers in Iraq after the elections in whatever ruling coalition is put together. They have had repeated run-ins with Maliki. What he has going for him is that he is far better known and popular than any other Iraqi politician. His nationalist, and strong central government platform, also appeals to many. His inability to bring in any new major figures or parties however may show the limit of his power. As it stands, he probably has a 50-50 chance to hold onto his position.
SOURCES
Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Maliki’s coalition blurs Iraq’s sectarian lines,” Associated Press, 10/2/09
Alsumaria, “New coalitions arise ahead of Iraq elections,” 9/12/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Sunni leader envisions alliance with Maliki in next polls,” 7/26/09
- “Urgent/Maliki’s Dawlat al-Qaneen list announced,” 10/1/09
BBC, “Maliki launches pan-Iraqi bloc,” 10/1/09
Chon, Gina, “Maliki Coalition Tries to Bridge Iraq’s Deep Sectarian Divisions,” Wall Street Journal, 10/2/09
Domergue, Jeremy and Cochrane, Marisa, “Balancing Maliki,” Institute for Understanding War, June 2009
Al Dulaimy, Mohammad, “Maliki unveils new national, nonsectarian Iraqi party,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/1/09
Fox News, “Iraqi Clan Leader May Hold Key to Lasting Political Stability After U.S. Exit,” 4/4/09
Haddad, Subhy and Ahmed, Shaalan, “Iraqi PM approaches Sunnis for nationwide elections,” Xinhua, 10/1/09
Kazimi, Nibras, “Iraq: Alliances Galore,” Hudson Institute, 7/17/09
- “Coalitions,” Talisman Gate, 9/10/09
Lando, Ben, “In Iraq, Maliki Banks on a New ‘Unity’ Coalition,” Time, 10/1/09
Myers, Steven Lee, “Iraqi Leader Creates Broad Coalition,” New York Times, 10/1/09
- “Unity Is Rallying Cry Ahead of Iraq Elections,” New York Times, 10/1/09
Niqash, “alliance building in anbar: sunnis join cross-sectarian trend,” 9/7/09
Parker, Ned, “Maliki remakes himself ahead of elections,” Los Angeles Times, 7/21/09
Parker, Ned and Salman, Raheem, “Maliki presents his own electoral bloc,” Los Angeles Times, 10/2/09
Roads To Iraq, “Election update – various other news,” 9/29/09
- “Iraq pre-election political map – The Sunni scene,” 9/19/09
- “Last news from the election campaign,” 10/4/09
Serwer, Daniel and Parker, Sam, “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2009
Shadid, Anthony, “In Iraq, Political Ambiguity,” Washington Post, 4/4/09
- “Maliki Creates Coalition To Compete in Iraqi Vote,” Washington Post, 10/2/09
- “New Alliance In Iraq Cross Sectarian Lines,” Washington Post, 3/20/09
Visser, Reidar, “Maliki Re-Launches the State of Law List: Beautiful but Is It Powerful Enough?” Historiae.org, 10/1/09
The reason for these failures are largely unknown since the negotiations all occurred behind closed doors. It was reported that Maliki and al-Mutlaq agreed that their policies and constituencies would be contradictory. Maliki for example, has recently gone after Baathists for the August 2009 Baghdad bombings, while former regime members are exactly who Mutlaq appeals to. Sadr on the other hand, was probably pressured by Iran to join the National Alliance, since one of their main priorities is to maintain Shiite rule in Iraq.
Instead, what Prime Minister Maliki is going to run with is leftovers. The leadership of the State of Law is still with his Dawa Party. The Dawa-Iraq Organization is also a core member. After that it’s a number of ministers and government officials, such as Oil Minister Hussain al-Shahristani, and independent Shiite politicians that follow him, Minister of Displacement and Migration, Abdul Samad Sultan, an independent Kurd, and government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh. Maliki was able to get some members of Allawi’s Iraqi National List to defect, such as the deputy speaker of parliament, and a group from al-Hadbaa in the Sinjar district in Ninewa. The only prominent Sunni that agreed to join was Sheikh Ali Hatem Sulaiman from Anbar who was formerly with the Abu Risha’s Awakening. The Iraqi Communist Party was originally announced as a member as well, but then denied it.
Maliki is facing an uphill battle to return to the prime ministership. He’s running on security, which has been questioned after the August Baghdad bombings, better services, which are not coming, and getting the Americans to leave. The individual members of the Iraqi National Alliance did far worse than Maliki’s State of Law in the provincial elections, but all together they did slightly better. The Kurds are still a relatively unified bloc of voters as well, and may be kingmakers in Iraq after the elections in whatever ruling coalition is put together. They have had repeated run-ins with Maliki. What he has going for him is that he is far better known and popular than any other Iraqi politician. His nationalist, and strong central government platform, also appeals to many. His inability to bring in any new major figures or parties however may show the limit of his power. As it stands, he probably has a 50-50 chance to hold onto his position.
SOURCES
Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Maliki’s coalition blurs Iraq’s sectarian lines,” Associated Press, 10/2/09
Alsumaria, “New coalitions arise ahead of Iraq elections,” 9/12/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Sunni leader envisions alliance with Maliki in next polls,” 7/26/09
- “Urgent/Maliki’s Dawlat al-Qaneen list announced,” 10/1/09
BBC, “Maliki launches pan-Iraqi bloc,” 10/1/09
Chon, Gina, “Maliki Coalition Tries to Bridge Iraq’s Deep Sectarian Divisions,” Wall Street Journal, 10/2/09
Domergue, Jeremy and Cochrane, Marisa, “Balancing Maliki,” Institute for Understanding War, June 2009
Al Dulaimy, Mohammad, “Maliki unveils new national, nonsectarian Iraqi party,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/1/09
Fox News, “Iraqi Clan Leader May Hold Key to Lasting Political Stability After U.S. Exit,” 4/4/09
Haddad, Subhy and Ahmed, Shaalan, “Iraqi PM approaches Sunnis for nationwide elections,” Xinhua, 10/1/09
Kazimi, Nibras, “Iraq: Alliances Galore,” Hudson Institute, 7/17/09
- “Coalitions,” Talisman Gate, 9/10/09
Lando, Ben, “In Iraq, Maliki Banks on a New ‘Unity’ Coalition,” Time, 10/1/09
Myers, Steven Lee, “Iraqi Leader Creates Broad Coalition,” New York Times, 10/1/09
- “Unity Is Rallying Cry Ahead of Iraq Elections,” New York Times, 10/1/09
Niqash, “alliance building in anbar: sunnis join cross-sectarian trend,” 9/7/09
Parker, Ned, “Maliki remakes himself ahead of elections,” Los Angeles Times, 7/21/09
Parker, Ned and Salman, Raheem, “Maliki presents his own electoral bloc,” Los Angeles Times, 10/2/09
Roads To Iraq, “Election update – various other news,” 9/29/09
- “Iraq pre-election political map – The Sunni scene,” 9/19/09
- “Last news from the election campaign,” 10/4/09
Serwer, Daniel and Parker, Sam, “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2009
Shadid, Anthony, “In Iraq, Political Ambiguity,” Washington Post, 4/4/09
- “Maliki Creates Coalition To Compete in Iraqi Vote,” Washington Post, 10/2/09
- “New Alliance In Iraq Cross Sectarian Lines,” Washington Post, 3/20/09
Visser, Reidar, “Maliki Re-Launches the State of Law List: Beautiful but Is It Powerful Enough?” Historiae.org, 10/1/09
Friday, October 09, 2009
Sadr Tries To Reconcile With Breakaway League Of The Righteous
Awan Daily reported that Moqtada al-Sadr is attempting to reconcile with the League of the Righteous before the January 2010 elections. A delegation from the League is set to travel to Qom, Iran to meet personally with Sadr. According to Awan, they are likely to reject rejoining the Sadr movement before the vote, and are planning to run on their own, led by former Transport Minister Salam al-Maliki. Currently al-Maliki is the spokesman for the League.
Sadr may not be the only suitor for the League. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law may also court them. In March 2009 it was revealed that Baghdad was acting as a middleman in negotiations between England and the League to release five British hostages that the group kidnapped in 2007. The deal was to release members of the League in return for the Britons. By May the League said they wanted to run in the parliamentary elections. The Maliki government stated that it was important for Iraq’s future for the group to renounce violence. In August the Prime Minister met with representatives of the League who said that they had given up on violence and wanted to be integrated into the political process. In turn, Baghdad has been requesting the U.S. free dozens of League members in their custody. Sadr condemned this move, saying that anyone who was involved in resistance to the government should be excluded from politics. He’s obviously changed his mind as the elections are drawing nearer. For Maliki, if he were to run with the League it would cut into Sadr’s base, which is a key part of the new Iraqi National Alliance.
Qais Khazali is the leader of the League of the Righteous, and is still in U.S. custody. Khazali was a follower of Sadr’s father Ayatollah Mohammed Sadeq al-Sadr, and helped keep the movement alive after his death at the hands of Saddam’s government in 1999. Khazali later became a follower of Moqtada after the U.S. invasion, but quickly broke away. In 2004 after the second Sadrist uprising against the Coalition, Khazali refused to follow the cease-fire and formed his own militia in Sadr City. By early 2005 Sadr was able to bring him back into the fold, and named Khazali one of the heads of his organization. The next year Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Qods Force picked Khazali to head its network of Iranian supported and trained militias, which became known as Special Groups. That was when the League was formed. They carried out two spectacular attacks. The first was the January 2007 raid on the Karbala Joint Coordination Center in which five U.S. soldiers were killed. This led to the arrest of Qais and Laith Khazali in Basra in March. Second, the League kidnapped the five Britons from the Finance Ministry in Baghdad in May 2007. In 2008, the League was scattered after Maliki’s crackdown on militias. Moqtada has tried to hold talks with them off and on before, but to no avail, and may not be any more successful this time.
SOURCES
Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Report: Deal close to free Britons seized in Iraq,” Associated Press, 3/29/09
Agence France Presse, “2nd UPDATE: Iraqi PM Met Group Behind Kidnap Of Britons,” 8/3/09
- “Over 100 from Iraqi group who killed Britons freed,” 9/27/09
- “US sees confrontation with Sadr splinter factions,” 10/12/04
Associated Press, “Baghdad’s blast walls to come down,” 8/6/09
- “More Shiite militants freed by US in Iraq,” 9/28/09
Awan Daily, “Maliki announced next week, the electoral coalition,” 9/25/09
Chulov, Martin, “Split among captors hits hope of freedom for British hostages in Iraq,” Guardian, 5/28/09
Cochrane, Marisa, “Asaib Ahl al-Haq and the Khazali Special Groups network,” Institute for the Study of War,” 1/13/09
- “The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement,” Institute for the Study of War, January 2009
Dagher, Sam, “Sadr reins in Shiite militiamen, sends mixed signals,” Christian Science Monitor, 3/31/08
Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08
Howard, Michael, “Iraqi minister incensed by airport display bans alcohol,” Guardian, 8/5/05
Nordland, Rod and Dagher, Sam, “U.S. Will Release More Members of an Iraqi Militia,” New York Times, 8/17/09
Roads To Iraq, “Iraqi pre-election political map – The Shiites,” 9/21/09
Rubin, Alissa and Gordon, Michael, “U.S. Frees Suspect in Killing of 5 G.I.’s,” New York Times, 6/9/09
Xinhua, “Iraq frees 147 prisoners linked to abduction of 5 Britons: newspaper,” 9/28/09
Sadr may not be the only suitor for the League. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law may also court them. In March 2009 it was revealed that Baghdad was acting as a middleman in negotiations between England and the League to release five British hostages that the group kidnapped in 2007. The deal was to release members of the League in return for the Britons. By May the League said they wanted to run in the parliamentary elections. The Maliki government stated that it was important for Iraq’s future for the group to renounce violence. In August the Prime Minister met with representatives of the League who said that they had given up on violence and wanted to be integrated into the political process. In turn, Baghdad has been requesting the U.S. free dozens of League members in their custody. Sadr condemned this move, saying that anyone who was involved in resistance to the government should be excluded from politics. He’s obviously changed his mind as the elections are drawing nearer. For Maliki, if he were to run with the League it would cut into Sadr’s base, which is a key part of the new Iraqi National Alliance.
Qais Khazali is the leader of the League of the Righteous, and is still in U.S. custody. Khazali was a follower of Sadr’s father Ayatollah Mohammed Sadeq al-Sadr, and helped keep the movement alive after his death at the hands of Saddam’s government in 1999. Khazali later became a follower of Moqtada after the U.S. invasion, but quickly broke away. In 2004 after the second Sadrist uprising against the Coalition, Khazali refused to follow the cease-fire and formed his own militia in Sadr City. By early 2005 Sadr was able to bring him back into the fold, and named Khazali one of the heads of his organization. The next year Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Qods Force picked Khazali to head its network of Iranian supported and trained militias, which became known as Special Groups. That was when the League was formed. They carried out two spectacular attacks. The first was the January 2007 raid on the Karbala Joint Coordination Center in which five U.S. soldiers were killed. This led to the arrest of Qais and Laith Khazali in Basra in March. Second, the League kidnapped the five Britons from the Finance Ministry in Baghdad in May 2007. In 2008, the League was scattered after Maliki’s crackdown on militias. Moqtada has tried to hold talks with them off and on before, but to no avail, and may not be any more successful this time.
SOURCES
Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Report: Deal close to free Britons seized in Iraq,” Associated Press, 3/29/09
Agence France Presse, “2nd UPDATE: Iraqi PM Met Group Behind Kidnap Of Britons,” 8/3/09
- “Over 100 from Iraqi group who killed Britons freed,” 9/27/09
- “US sees confrontation with Sadr splinter factions,” 10/12/04
Associated Press, “Baghdad’s blast walls to come down,” 8/6/09
- “More Shiite militants freed by US in Iraq,” 9/28/09
Awan Daily, “Maliki announced next week, the electoral coalition,” 9/25/09
Chulov, Martin, “Split among captors hits hope of freedom for British hostages in Iraq,” Guardian, 5/28/09
Cochrane, Marisa, “Asaib Ahl al-Haq and the Khazali Special Groups network,” Institute for the Study of War,” 1/13/09
- “The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement,” Institute for the Study of War, January 2009
Dagher, Sam, “Sadr reins in Shiite militiamen, sends mixed signals,” Christian Science Monitor, 3/31/08
Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08
Howard, Michael, “Iraqi minister incensed by airport display bans alcohol,” Guardian, 8/5/05
Nordland, Rod and Dagher, Sam, “U.S. Will Release More Members of an Iraqi Militia,” New York Times, 8/17/09
Roads To Iraq, “Iraqi pre-election political map – The Shiites,” 9/21/09
Rubin, Alissa and Gordon, Michael, “U.S. Frees Suspect in Killing of 5 G.I.’s,” New York Times, 6/9/09
Xinhua, “Iraq frees 147 prisoners linked to abduction of 5 Britons: newspaper,” 9/28/09
Tuesday, October 06, 2009
Referendum On Kurdish Constitution Moves Forward
As reported before, on July 10, 2009 the Kurdistan regional parliament postponed a referendum on a new draft constitution. Now, on September 23 the Iraqi Election Commission said that it was ready to hold the vote. It still needs a referendum law and a budget to carry out the process. Originally, the election on the constitution was to happen at the same time as the Kurdish parliamentary and presidential balloting on July 25. According to reports, Vice President Joe Biden and Defense Secretary Robert Gates who traveled to Iraq in July 2009 led to the delay.
The document has been controversial for a number of reasons. For one, it lays claim to Kirkuk and other disputed areas. Second, it gives the regional president greatly expanded powers including executive authority, control over the peshmerga, the ability to pass and veto laws, dissolve parliament, and remove ministers. (5) It also says that the Kurdistan Regional Government has the authority to veto any international treaties signed by Baghdad that impact the region. The new Kurdish opposition group the Change List has said they oppose the constitution as well, and want it revised. However Regional President Massoud Barzani said that it would require a two-thirds vote in the Kurdish parliament to amend it, which the Change List does not possess. If the regional constitution is passed as is, it could increase tensions with the central government in Baghdad, as well as cause dissension within Kurdistan.
SOURCES
Aziz, Ardalan, “controversy over kurdish constitution,” Niqash, 7/6/09
Dagher, Sam, “New Kurdish Leader Asserts Agenda,” New York Times, 7/29/09
Mahmoud, Amer, “controversy over Kurdish constitution,” Niqash, 7/6/09
PUK Media, “IHEC Source: Ready to hold referendum on Kurdistan Region Constitution,” 9/23/09
Sands, Phil and Latif, Nazir, “Talk of war as Kurdish tension increase,” The National, 8/1/09
The document has been controversial for a number of reasons. For one, it lays claim to Kirkuk and other disputed areas. Second, it gives the regional president greatly expanded powers including executive authority, control over the peshmerga, the ability to pass and veto laws, dissolve parliament, and remove ministers. (5) It also says that the Kurdistan Regional Government has the authority to veto any international treaties signed by Baghdad that impact the region. The new Kurdish opposition group the Change List has said they oppose the constitution as well, and want it revised. However Regional President Massoud Barzani said that it would require a two-thirds vote in the Kurdish parliament to amend it, which the Change List does not possess. If the regional constitution is passed as is, it could increase tensions with the central government in Baghdad, as well as cause dissension within Kurdistan.
SOURCES
Aziz, Ardalan, “controversy over kurdish constitution,” Niqash, 7/6/09
Dagher, Sam, “New Kurdish Leader Asserts Agenda,” New York Times, 7/29/09
Mahmoud, Amer, “controversy over Kurdish constitution,” Niqash, 7/6/09
PUK Media, “IHEC Source: Ready to hold referendum on Kurdistan Region Constitution,” 9/23/09
Sands, Phil and Latif, Nazir, “Talk of war as Kurdish tension increase,” The National, 8/1/09
Monday, October 05, 2009
Kirkuk And The 2010 Election Law
Kirkuk is again the leading issue in Iraq’s parliament as it discusses a new election law. Parliamentarians have agreed upon all the major points in the bill except for voting in Tamim province, the home of Kirkuk. The Kurdish Alliance is pushing for Tamim to vote as a regular governorate. Others, like the Iraqi Islamic Party, are suggesting creating quotas for the four major groups in Tamim, the Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, and Christians. There are other factions who are calling for a delay in voting in Kirkuk altogether.
In July 2008 when parliament was discussing the 2009 provincial vote, Kirkuk led to a walkout and veto of the original election law. The 2009 bill called for a delay in balloting in Tamim as a power sharing agreement was implemented. The Kurdish bloc walked out over it, and eventually President Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council vetoed it. The final version of law also postponed voting in Tamim until a special committee could come up with a deal between the major groups in the province. The committee did nothing, and provincial voting has never happened there yet.
National elections are much more important, so it’s unlikely that Kirkuk will hold up the vote. If parliament can’t pass a new bill by October 15, 2009, Iraq will simply revert to the old 2005 law. The major difference is that the proposed legislation includes an open list that allows voters to pick either lists or individual candidates, while the old one is a closed list where the public can only vote for lists, and the parties pick the politicians.
SOURCES
Alsumaria, “Kurds call not to adjourn elections in Kirkuk,” 9/25/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Kurdish Alliance rejects proposal to divide the Islamic Party of Kirkuk into four electoral districts,” 9/24/09
- “Kurdish lawmaker attributes hindering elections bill to ‘illegal demands,’” 9/24/09
Iraqi Pres Agency, “Delay adoption of the Law of the Iraqi elections may lead to delayed,” 9/29/09
Salloum, Sa’ad, “election committee head explains changes in new draft law,” Niqash, 9/28/09
Visser, Reidar, “The Elections Law: Who Will Stand Up for Kirkuk?” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 9/28/09
In July 2008 when parliament was discussing the 2009 provincial vote, Kirkuk led to a walkout and veto of the original election law. The 2009 bill called for a delay in balloting in Tamim as a power sharing agreement was implemented. The Kurdish bloc walked out over it, and eventually President Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council vetoed it. The final version of law also postponed voting in Tamim until a special committee could come up with a deal between the major groups in the province. The committee did nothing, and provincial voting has never happened there yet.
National elections are much more important, so it’s unlikely that Kirkuk will hold up the vote. If parliament can’t pass a new bill by October 15, 2009, Iraq will simply revert to the old 2005 law. The major difference is that the proposed legislation includes an open list that allows voters to pick either lists or individual candidates, while the old one is a closed list where the public can only vote for lists, and the parties pick the politicians.
SOURCES
Alsumaria, “Kurds call not to adjourn elections in Kirkuk,” 9/25/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Kurdish Alliance rejects proposal to divide the Islamic Party of Kirkuk into four electoral districts,” 9/24/09
- “Kurdish lawmaker attributes hindering elections bill to ‘illegal demands,’” 9/24/09
Iraqi Pres Agency, “Delay adoption of the Law of the Iraqi elections may lead to delayed,” 9/29/09
Salloum, Sa’ad, “election committee head explains changes in new draft law,” Niqash, 9/28/09
Visser, Reidar, “The Elections Law: Who Will Stand Up for Kirkuk?” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 9/28/09
Wednesday, September 30, 2009
Will The Kurds Be Kingmakers In Iraq?
Iraq’s Kurds remain the most unified ethnosectarian voting bloc in Iraq. As the Sunnis and Shiites split up into smaller factions, the two major Kurdish parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) remain largely popular amongst their constituency, and in control of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the majority Kurdish regions within the disputed territories in northern Iraq.
In the January 2005 national elections, the Kurdish Alliance of the PUK and KDP won 26% of the vote, and 90% of the Kurdish electorate, which earned them 75 seats out of 275 in parliament. In the December 2005 elections they received 21% of the vote, which gave them 53 seats, making them the second largest bloc in parliament after the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance. In comparison, Maliki’s State of Law List that was the big winner in the 2009 provincial elections only won 15.1% of the vote in fourteen of Iraq’s eighteen provinces.
Recently they did face a challenge from the Change List that won 23% of the vote in the 2009 Kurdish elections. As the January 2010 national elections approach, the KDP and PUK are going to run together in a Kurdish Alliance again, but the Change List will compete independently. Afterward they are supposed to form one Kurdish bloc in parliament. That may not happen however as there are plenty of stories about Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki being interested in the Change List joining his State of Law coalition.
Either way, the Kurdish Alliance alone is still likely to be one of the most powerful groups in parliament, and crucial to any new government created after the 2010 vote. They will probably walk away with around 40 seats, and perhaps 50 if the Change List does follow through with their promise to become a united Kurdish front in parliament. In 2005 the Kurdish Alliance was a key component in the creation of both the governments of Ibrahim al-Jaafari and Nouri al-Maliki. Since then the PUK, and especially the KDP have turned into some of the harshest critics of Maliki’s rule. In January and December 2008 they even threatened no confidence votes against the Prime Minister. With an expected 40-50 members in the new legislature, they could be the greatest impediment to Maliki returning as Iraq’s leader. Iraqi politics are in a period of flux however, so deals are still to be made before and after the 2010 election that could dramatically transform the situation. The Kurds however, are in a position to be one of the king makers in Iraqi politics.
SOURCES
BBC News, “Guide to Iraqi political parties,” 1/20/06
Boot, Max and West, Bing, “Iraq’s Number 1 Problem,” Los Angeles Times, 1/28/08
International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09
Katzman, Kenneth, “Iraq: Elections and New Government,” Congressional Research Service, 6/24/05
Knights, Michael, “National Implications of the Kurdish Elections,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 2009
Kurdistan Regional Government, "Electoral Commission announces final results of Kurdistan Region elections," 8/8/09
Najm, Hayder, “kurdish opposition points to potential rapproachement with Baghdad,” Niqash, 8/17/09
Wikipedia.org, “Iraqi legislative election, December 2005”
In the January 2005 national elections, the Kurdish Alliance of the PUK and KDP won 26% of the vote, and 90% of the Kurdish electorate, which earned them 75 seats out of 275 in parliament. In the December 2005 elections they received 21% of the vote, which gave them 53 seats, making them the second largest bloc in parliament after the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance. In comparison, Maliki’s State of Law List that was the big winner in the 2009 provincial elections only won 15.1% of the vote in fourteen of Iraq’s eighteen provinces.
Recently they did face a challenge from the Change List that won 23% of the vote in the 2009 Kurdish elections. As the January 2010 national elections approach, the KDP and PUK are going to run together in a Kurdish Alliance again, but the Change List will compete independently. Afterward they are supposed to form one Kurdish bloc in parliament. That may not happen however as there are plenty of stories about Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki being interested in the Change List joining his State of Law coalition.
Either way, the Kurdish Alliance alone is still likely to be one of the most powerful groups in parliament, and crucial to any new government created after the 2010 vote. They will probably walk away with around 40 seats, and perhaps 50 if the Change List does follow through with their promise to become a united Kurdish front in parliament. In 2005 the Kurdish Alliance was a key component in the creation of both the governments of Ibrahim al-Jaafari and Nouri al-Maliki. Since then the PUK, and especially the KDP have turned into some of the harshest critics of Maliki’s rule. In January and December 2008 they even threatened no confidence votes against the Prime Minister. With an expected 40-50 members in the new legislature, they could be the greatest impediment to Maliki returning as Iraq’s leader. Iraqi politics are in a period of flux however, so deals are still to be made before and after the 2010 election that could dramatically transform the situation. The Kurds however, are in a position to be one of the king makers in Iraqi politics.
SOURCES
BBC News, “Guide to Iraqi political parties,” 1/20/06
Boot, Max and West, Bing, “Iraq’s Number 1 Problem,” Los Angeles Times, 1/28/08
International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09
Katzman, Kenneth, “Iraq: Elections and New Government,” Congressional Research Service, 6/24/05
Knights, Michael, “National Implications of the Kurdish Elections,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 2009
Kurdistan Regional Government, "Electoral Commission announces final results of Kurdistan Region elections," 8/8/09
Najm, Hayder, “kurdish opposition points to potential rapproachement with Baghdad,” Niqash, 8/17/09
Wikipedia.org, “Iraqi legislative election, December 2005”
More On Allawi-National Alliance Talks
Contradictory stories are swirling over whether former Interim Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi will join the new Iraqi National Alliance (INA). On Wednesday September 23, 2009 Allawi publicly denied that he had been talking with the National Alliance. The Iraq Pundit Blog also seems to think that the story is all rumors. Niqash however, talked with both a member from Allawi’s Iraqi National List and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, and they both said that the new coalition would be announced soon.
The main motivation for Allawi to join the National Alliance is to become prime minister again, a promise he has supposedly gotten from them. After the Supreme Council failed to bring Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki into the INA, they then turned to Allawi as a replacement candidate to try to unseat Maliki. Allawi also allegedly secretly went to Iran in August 2009 and got their blessing to become prime minister. According to Al-Quds Al-Arabi, Iran was putting heavy pressure on Maliki to join the new alliance, and when he refused, they threatened him by saying that he would be blocked from returning to his office. This is obviously their reason for backing Allawi if these rumors become true.
SOURCES
Iraq Pundit, “Bad News Papers,” 9/24/09
Ramzi, Kholoud, “shia coalition seeks allawi alliance,” Niqash, 9/25/09
Roads To Iraq, “Iran’s final warning to Maliki,” 9/24/09
The main motivation for Allawi to join the National Alliance is to become prime minister again, a promise he has supposedly gotten from them. After the Supreme Council failed to bring Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki into the INA, they then turned to Allawi as a replacement candidate to try to unseat Maliki. Allawi also allegedly secretly went to Iran in August 2009 and got their blessing to become prime minister. According to Al-Quds Al-Arabi, Iran was putting heavy pressure on Maliki to join the new alliance, and when he refused, they threatened him by saying that he would be blocked from returning to his office. This is obviously their reason for backing Allawi if these rumors become true.
SOURCES
Iraq Pundit, “Bad News Papers,” 9/24/09
Ramzi, Kholoud, “shia coalition seeks allawi alliance,” Niqash, 9/25/09
Roads To Iraq, “Iran’s final warning to Maliki,” 9/24/09
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