On December 30, 2009 British computer technician Peter Moore was released from captivity by the Iranian backed League of the Righteous in return for the freeing of their leader, Qais Khazali. Moore and four British bodyguards, Alan McMenemy, Alec MacLachlan, Jason Swindlehurst, and Jason Creswell, were originally kidnapped from the Iraqi Finance Ministry building in downtown Baghdad on May 29, 2007. The Guardian claims that not only was this an Iranian organized operation led by their Revolutionary Guards Qods Force, but that the British hostages were held in Iran for most of their two and a half year captivity.
The events surrounding the kidnapping are a complicated one beginning with a series of American raids against Iranian operatives working within Iraq. In 2006, President George Bush okayed the killing and capturing of Iranians in Iraq who were supplying weapons and training to Shiite militias. In December 2006 that led to the arrest of General Mohsen Chirazi, the number 3 man in the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Qods Force, which is in charge of Tehran’s Iraq policy. That was followed by a speech by President Bush in January 2007 where he said that the U.S. would stop Iran’s interference in Iraqi affairs. Later, on January 11, five Iranians were arrested in Irbil, Kurdistan. The Americans actually missed their targets, Mohammed Jafari, the deputy of Iran’s National Security Council, and General Minojahar Frouzanda, the intelligence chief of the Revolutionary Guards, when Kurdish peshmerga stopped U.S. forces at the Irbil airport. Tehran retaliated by leading a raid on the Karbala Provincial Joint Coordination Center in conjunction with the League of the Righteous that led to the deaths of five U.S. soldiers in January. In March 2007, U.S. and U.K. forces detained the League’s leaders Qais and Latih Khazali in Basra in March 2007.
Qais Khazali was one of the leading figures in the Sadr movement when Moqtada’s father, Ayatollah Mohammed Sadeq al-Sadr, created it in the 1990s. Qais helped keep the movement alive underground after Saddam killed the elder Sadr. When Moqtada emerged as one of Iraq’s new leaders after the 2003 invasion, Qais was one of his top lieutenants. He would split and then rejoin Moqtada several times before creating his own group, the League of the Righteous in 2006. That year he was also selected to lead the Special Groups that Iran was creating to gain more direct control of Shiite gunmen in Iraq.
Iran planned the May 2007 raid on the Finance Ministry as part of the tit for tat exchange with the United Sates, while the League of the Righteous wanted hostages to gain the release of the Khazali brothers. 80-100 members of the League drove up to the Ministry’s buildings in SUVs in Baghdad, and kidnapped the five Britons in just about 15 minutes. Iraqi intelligence officers from the Defense Ministry who happened to be in the Ministry at the time told the Guardian that they followed the kidnappers to Sadr City where the captives were kept for one day before being transferred to Iran. They passed this information to the Defense Ministry who did nothing. In Iran, the Britons were moved around to several locations. General David Petraeus confirmed this in a recent interview with the BBC where he said he was 90% sure that Tehran held the captives for a time. All negotiations for the release of the hostages occurred in Qom, Iran, but the British Foreign Office refused to directly talk with them, which greatly complicated things.
Almost two years later, Iraq, England, the U.S., Iran, and the League worked out a release plan with Lebanon’s Hezbollah acting as a middleman. In March 2009 a deal was cut whereby the Americans would release all of the League of the Righteous members they held including Laith and Qais Khazali in return for the British captives. In that month a video was released of Moore, followed by the freeing of Laith Khazali. After that U.S. prisons were emptied of some 300 League followers they held under the guise of an Iraqi reconciliation program, along with some of the top Qods Force members that were arrested in 2006-2007, in return for the bodies of Jason Creswell, Jason Swindlehurst, and Alec MacLachlan. Alan McMenemy has yet to be released, but it’s believed that he is dead as well. Sources told the Guardian that the Iranians killed all four bodyguards because for one, they were not considered important since they were only security men, and two to show that they were serious to the British government. The process finally ended with the release of Peter Moore and Qais Khazali. Some American military officers were against this deal, but the Status of Forces Agreement signed between Washington and Baghdad at the very end of the Bush administration in December 2008 requires the U.S. to release all the detainees they hold unless they have broken Iraqi law.
The kidnapping and release of Moore, MacLachlan, Swindlehurst, Creswell, and McMenemy mark the end of one period of post-Saddam Iraq. Washington and Tehran were involved in a covert war for influence within Iraq after the 2003 invasion. The U.S. focused upon Iran’s Qods Force and their support for Special Groups like the League of the Righteous. The U.S. tried to kill or capture as many militiamen and Qods Force operatives as they could, but interference by Iraqi officials meant that this effort could only go so far. The smashing of Shiite militias by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s offensives in 2008, along with Iran’s greater interest in political influence through support of Shiite parties in the 2009 and coming 2010 elections, means that their military policy has been put on the back burner. The League even renounced violence in 2009, and briefly flirted with running in the upcoming vote, before withdrawing in early December. What that means for the League is unknown. Qais Khazali is said to still have sway with many Sadrists, which has made Moqtada very worried about his leadership, but its too late for them to run as a party in 2010, which would greatly limit their influence if they wished to join Iraqi politics. There’s a good chance that the League will fade from the scene just as the military confrontation between Iran and the U.S. in Iraq has.
SOURCES
Chulov, Martin, “Shia cleric’s release by US forces provided key to Peter Moore’s freedom,” Guardian, 12/30/09
CNN, “U.S. raid on Iranian consulate angers Kurds,” 1/11/07
Cochrane, Marisa, “The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement,” Institute for the Study of War, January 2009
Cockburn, Patrick, “The botched US raid that led to the hostage crisis,” The Independent, 4/3/07
Fordham, Alice, “Hostage Peter Moore’s fate tied to that of Laith and Qais al-Khazali,” Times of London, 12/31/09
- “Peter Moore freed after US hands over Iraqi insurgent,” Times of London, 12/31/09
Hines, Nico, “Peter Moore: 31 months of Iraqi captivity,” Times of London, 12/30/09
Lake, Eli, “GIs Raid Iranian Building in Irbil,” New York Sun, 1/12/07
Linzer, Dafna, “Troops Authorized to Kill Iranian Operatives in Iraq,” Washington Post, 1/26/07
Mahmood, Mona, O’Kane, Maggie, Grandjean, Guy, “Bush threats and an $18bn secret: why Iran’s kidnap squad struck,” Guardian, 12/31/09
Roggio, Bill, “US releases ‘dangerous’ Iranian proxy behind the murder of US troops,” Long War Journal, 12/31/09
Woodcock, Andrew and Johnson, Wesley, “Petraeus ‘90% certain’ that UK hostage was in Iran,” Independent, 12/31/09
Wright, Robin and Trejos, Nancy, “U.S. Troops Raid 2 Iranian Targets in Iraq, Detain 5 People,” Washington Post, 1/12/07
Showing posts with label Iran. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Iran. Show all posts
Sunday, January 03, 2010
Wednesday, December 23, 2009
Electricity Output Reaches Post-Invasion High, But System Still Plagued By Problems
The Special Inspector for Iraq Reconstruction reported that for the fifth straight quarter Iraq’s average electricity supply increased from August to October 2009. For the 3rd quarter of 2009 Iraq produced 6,439 megawatts, a post-invasion high. That was a 10% increase from the 2nd quarter. In 2007 Iraq produced 4,488 megawatts, with 4,198 coming from the Ministry of Electricity, and 290 being imported. In 2009 the Ministry was responsible for 5,209 megawatts, 669 megawatts came from other countries, and 560 were from private generators. Iraq saw a 1,951 megawatt increase over those two years.
The growth in power supply comes from multiple sources. Half of the increase came from working on existing power plants at a cost of more than $2 billion in U.S. reconstruction aid since 2003. 29% of the increase was from two new private power plants opening in the Kurdistan Regional Government. 19% of this quarter's increase came from importing electricity from Iran and Turkey. In 2007 Turkey was the main supplier, providing 60% of imports, but since then Iran was eclipsed them, now accounting for 80%. The Electricity Ministry has also been able to make some small increases in its capacity. It has added two power plants on boats in Basra in 2009 for example, run by a Turkish company. They have a combined capacity of 250 megawatts.
The Ministry has bigger plans in store as well. In 2009 they finally got funding to buy turbines from General Electric and Siemens. These will be installed in twenty locations throughout the country. Every province except the three in Kurdistan will get at least one new power plant out of the deal. Construction is expected to begin in late 2010 or early 2011, and the new capacity will come on line in 2-6 years. When finished, the turbines will add an estimated 10,000 megawatts. There is a major problem with this plan however. Iraq's power grid cannot handle this increase. The transmission and distribution systems need to be renovated, but there are no plans to do so. There are also questions about whether the government will be able to provide fuel for all of these new plants adequately. The Electricity's Ministry promises therefore, may never be fulfilled. Baghdad will also have a hard time coming up with any extra money as it is facing a second year of budget deficits due to moderate oil prices, which provide almost all of its revenue.
Despite the recent increases, the national grid still does not meet the country’s demands. The Special Inspector General believes that the gap between supply and demand is twice what it was in 2003, although it has been slightly reduced since 2007. Based upon estimates it’s believed that the Electricity Ministry served 69% of the national demand in the 3rd quarters of 2009. In the 3rd quarter of 2007, it only met 54%. In terms of the provinces, Sulaymaniya, Basra, Irbil, and Diyala in that order did the best supplying electricity, meeting anywhere from 83% to 99% of demand. That’s because those governorates either have their own power plants or import large amounts from Iran. At the opposite end of the spectrum, Wasit, 51%, Maysan, 53%, Babil 56%, Ninewa and Najaf at 58%, do the worst serving their people. Because Iraqis cannot rely upon the government for its power, most rely upon private generators.
Electricity Supply And Demand By Provinces
Iraq’s generators also do not operate up to their capabilities. Nameplate capacity is how much a generator should be able to produce in ideal conditions. Feasible capacity is how much it can produce given the actual conditions. Iraq has a nameplate generating capacity of 15,300 megawatts, and a feasible capacity of 11,150. Both were 4% increases from the 2nd quarter of 2009. However in the 3rd quarter Iraq only operated at 38% of nameplate capacity and 52% of feasible capacity. The Qudas power plant in Baghdad for example, which the U.S. spent $250 million to renovate, has a nameplate capacity of 910 megawatts, but only averages 429 megawatts of actual production, 47% of its nameplate capacity.
After the overthrow of Saddam, Iraqis went on a buying spree of consumer electronics. This has greatly increased demand for power, which has not been met by the increase in production. The lack of adequate funds, the inability of the Electricity Ministry to spend what it gets, not enough skilled and trained personnel, poor maintenance and aging equipment, along with subsidized energy and a large black market in generators encourages use rather than conservation. These all mean that demand will continue to increase in the near future, and even with the new power plants and renovations, the power system will still probably be running a deficit.
SOURCES
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, "Quarterly Report to the United States Congress," 10/30/09
The growth in power supply comes from multiple sources. Half of the increase came from working on existing power plants at a cost of more than $2 billion in U.S. reconstruction aid since 2003. 29% of the increase was from two new private power plants opening in the Kurdistan Regional Government. 19% of this quarter's increase came from importing electricity from Iran and Turkey. In 2007 Turkey was the main supplier, providing 60% of imports, but since then Iran was eclipsed them, now accounting for 80%. The Electricity Ministry has also been able to make some small increases in its capacity. It has added two power plants on boats in Basra in 2009 for example, run by a Turkish company. They have a combined capacity of 250 megawatts.
The Ministry has bigger plans in store as well. In 2009 they finally got funding to buy turbines from General Electric and Siemens. These will be installed in twenty locations throughout the country. Every province except the three in Kurdistan will get at least one new power plant out of the deal. Construction is expected to begin in late 2010 or early 2011, and the new capacity will come on line in 2-6 years. When finished, the turbines will add an estimated 10,000 megawatts. There is a major problem with this plan however. Iraq's power grid cannot handle this increase. The transmission and distribution systems need to be renovated, but there are no plans to do so. There are also questions about whether the government will be able to provide fuel for all of these new plants adequately. The Electricity's Ministry promises therefore, may never be fulfilled. Baghdad will also have a hard time coming up with any extra money as it is facing a second year of budget deficits due to moderate oil prices, which provide almost all of its revenue.
Despite the recent increases, the national grid still does not meet the country’s demands. The Special Inspector General believes that the gap between supply and demand is twice what it was in 2003, although it has been slightly reduced since 2007. Based upon estimates it’s believed that the Electricity Ministry served 69% of the national demand in the 3rd quarters of 2009. In the 3rd quarter of 2007, it only met 54%. In terms of the provinces, Sulaymaniya, Basra, Irbil, and Diyala in that order did the best supplying electricity, meeting anywhere from 83% to 99% of demand. That’s because those governorates either have their own power plants or import large amounts from Iran. At the opposite end of the spectrum, Wasit, 51%, Maysan, 53%, Babil 56%, Ninewa and Najaf at 58%, do the worst serving their people. Because Iraqis cannot rely upon the government for its power, most rely upon private generators.
Electricity Supply And Demand By Provinces
| Province | Avg. Daily Electricity Load Served (MW) | Avg. Daily Estimated Electricity Demand (MW) | Avg. Daily Demand Met |
| Sulaymaniya | 352 | 357 | 99% |
| Basra | 806 | 929 | 87% |
| Irbil | 356 | 411 | 86% |
| Diyala | 196 | 236 | 83% |
| Dhi Qar | 289 | 405 | 71% |
| Salahaddin | 275 | 385 | 71% |
| Tamim | 222 | 325 | 68% |
| Muthanna | 137 | 202 | 68% |
| Anbar | 219 | 329 | 67% |
| Baghdad | 1,718 | 2,571 | 67% |
| Dohuk | 132 | 203 | 65% |
| Karbala | 164 | 273 | 60% |
| Qadisiyah | 150 | 253 | 59% |
| Najaf | 216 | 375 | 58% |
| Ninewa | 491 | 851 | 58% |
| Babil | 240 | 425 | 56% |
| Maysan | 145 | 273 | 53% |
| Wasit | 155 | 304 | 51% |
Iraq’s generators also do not operate up to their capabilities. Nameplate capacity is how much a generator should be able to produce in ideal conditions. Feasible capacity is how much it can produce given the actual conditions. Iraq has a nameplate generating capacity of 15,300 megawatts, and a feasible capacity of 11,150. Both were 4% increases from the 2nd quarter of 2009. However in the 3rd quarter Iraq only operated at 38% of nameplate capacity and 52% of feasible capacity. The Qudas power plant in Baghdad for example, which the U.S. spent $250 million to renovate, has a nameplate capacity of 910 megawatts, but only averages 429 megawatts of actual production, 47% of its nameplate capacity.
After the overthrow of Saddam, Iraqis went on a buying spree of consumer electronics. This has greatly increased demand for power, which has not been met by the increase in production. The lack of adequate funds, the inability of the Electricity Ministry to spend what it gets, not enough skilled and trained personnel, poor maintenance and aging equipment, along with subsidized energy and a large black market in generators encourages use rather than conservation. These all mean that demand will continue to increase in the near future, and even with the new power plants and renovations, the power system will still probably be running a deficit.
SOURCES
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, "Quarterly Report to the United States Congress," 10/30/09
Tuesday, December 08, 2009
League Of Righteous Breaks Off Talks With Baghdad
On December 1, 2009 it was announced that the Iranian-backed, breakaway Sadrist group, the League of the Righteous, had ended its talks with Baghdad and would not run in the upcoming parliamentary elections. The cited reason was that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki refused to release the League’s leader Qais Khazali who is being held by the Americans at Camp Cropper outside of Baghdad. At the beginning of August 2009 Maliki met with members of the League and said that they had renounced violence, and that they wanted to run in the 2010 balloting. The two sides also agreed to release League members held by the U.S. as long as they hadn’t killed Iraqis. By the end of September over 100 had been set free.
Around the same time, the League’s spokesman, former Transport Minister Salam al-Maliki, unveiled the group’s list, the Covenant, which would run in the 2010 elections. This seemed to worry Moqtada al-Sadr, who was afraid that the new party would cut into his supporters, some of which were upset that he had decided to turn away from the Iraqi street and militancy to try to participate in the government again. It probably worried him even more when rumors spread that Maliki was thinking of having the Covenant join his State of Law list, and Sadr’s overtures to the League to get them to rejoin his movement were rejected. Those all seems over now that they are withdrawing from the voting.
The talks between the government and the League began months earlier when Baghdad was acting as a mediator between the British government that wanted the release of five of their nationals that were kidnapped by the League back in May 2007 during a raid on the Finance Ministry. In March 2009 the group said that it would exchange the British hostages in return for ten of their leaders being freed by the Americans. On June 20, the bodies of two of the Britons were released, Jason Swindlehurst and Jason Creswell who were security guards. On September 4, a third guard, Alec MacLachlan, was turned over, but he too was dead. Another guard is also believed to be deceased, but Peter Moore, an internet technician is thought to still be alive. His fate is now up in the air as the talks between the League and Baghdad have fallen apart.
Qais Khazali, a former leader in the Sadrist movement when it was led by Ayatollah Mohammed Sadeq al-Sadr, Moqtada’s father, formed the League of the Righteous in 2006. Khazali was chosen by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Qods Force to lure members of the Mahdi Army away from Sadr, and bring them closer under Tehran’s wing. The League quickly made a name for itself when it attacked the Karbala Joint Coordination Center in January 2007, killing five U.S. soldiers. That led to the March arrest of Qais, and his brother Laith, as well as a Lebanese Hezbollah commander Ali Musa Daqduq that was coordinating Iran’s financing and training of the League and other Special Groups. The group retaliated with its raid on the Finance Ministry in Baghdad in May 2007, which resulted in the five Britons being kidnapped. Some think they were pawns to be traded for the release of the Khazali brothers. That took far longer than they thought, as Laith was only just released in June 2009 as part of the deal worked out with the Prime Minister, two years and one month after the Baghdad attack. Qais is still in custody, which is why the talks with the government broke down. This leaves the group in limbo, as it does not have its leader, has renounced both violence and participation in the upcoming elections, and is probably not receiving much attention from Iran either as it is more focused upon the major Shiite parties that it wants to win the vote. It’s not even clear what constituency the League has, so this could be a sign of its demise.
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “2nd UPDATE: Iraqi PM Met Group Behind Kidnap Of Britons,” 8/3/09
- “Iraqi kidnappers abandon govt talks,” 12/1/09
- “Over 100 from Iraqi group who killed Britons freed,” 9/27/09
August, Oliver, “End the torment, says Brown as death of British hostage is confirmed,” Times of London, 9/4/09
Awan Daily, “Maliki announced next week, the electoral coalition,” 9/25/09
Cochrane, Marisa, “Asaib Ahl al-Haq and the Khazali Special Groups network,” Institute for the Study of War,” 1/13/09
Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08
Mohammed, Abeer, “Maliki’s Chess Game,” Institute of War & Peace Reporting, 9/10/09
Roads To Iraq, “Iraqi pre-election political map – The Shiites scene,” 9/21/09
Rubin, Alissa, and Gordon, Michael, “U.S. Frees Suspect in Killing of 5 G.I.’s,” New York Times, 6/9/09
Around the same time, the League’s spokesman, former Transport Minister Salam al-Maliki, unveiled the group’s list, the Covenant, which would run in the 2010 elections. This seemed to worry Moqtada al-Sadr, who was afraid that the new party would cut into his supporters, some of which were upset that he had decided to turn away from the Iraqi street and militancy to try to participate in the government again. It probably worried him even more when rumors spread that Maliki was thinking of having the Covenant join his State of Law list, and Sadr’s overtures to the League to get them to rejoin his movement were rejected. Those all seems over now that they are withdrawing from the voting.
The talks between the government and the League began months earlier when Baghdad was acting as a mediator between the British government that wanted the release of five of their nationals that were kidnapped by the League back in May 2007 during a raid on the Finance Ministry. In March 2009 the group said that it would exchange the British hostages in return for ten of their leaders being freed by the Americans. On June 20, the bodies of two of the Britons were released, Jason Swindlehurst and Jason Creswell who were security guards. On September 4, a third guard, Alec MacLachlan, was turned over, but he too was dead. Another guard is also believed to be deceased, but Peter Moore, an internet technician is thought to still be alive. His fate is now up in the air as the talks between the League and Baghdad have fallen apart.
Qais Khazali, a former leader in the Sadrist movement when it was led by Ayatollah Mohammed Sadeq al-Sadr, Moqtada’s father, formed the League of the Righteous in 2006. Khazali was chosen by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Qods Force to lure members of the Mahdi Army away from Sadr, and bring them closer under Tehran’s wing. The League quickly made a name for itself when it attacked the Karbala Joint Coordination Center in January 2007, killing five U.S. soldiers. That led to the March arrest of Qais, and his brother Laith, as well as a Lebanese Hezbollah commander Ali Musa Daqduq that was coordinating Iran’s financing and training of the League and other Special Groups. The group retaliated with its raid on the Finance Ministry in Baghdad in May 2007, which resulted in the five Britons being kidnapped. Some think they were pawns to be traded for the release of the Khazali brothers. That took far longer than they thought, as Laith was only just released in June 2009 as part of the deal worked out with the Prime Minister, two years and one month after the Baghdad attack. Qais is still in custody, which is why the talks with the government broke down. This leaves the group in limbo, as it does not have its leader, has renounced both violence and participation in the upcoming elections, and is probably not receiving much attention from Iran either as it is more focused upon the major Shiite parties that it wants to win the vote. It’s not even clear what constituency the League has, so this could be a sign of its demise.
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “2nd UPDATE: Iraqi PM Met Group Behind Kidnap Of Britons,” 8/3/09
- “Iraqi kidnappers abandon govt talks,” 12/1/09
- “Over 100 from Iraqi group who killed Britons freed,” 9/27/09
August, Oliver, “End the torment, says Brown as death of British hostage is confirmed,” Times of London, 9/4/09
Awan Daily, “Maliki announced next week, the electoral coalition,” 9/25/09
Cochrane, Marisa, “Asaib Ahl al-Haq and the Khazali Special Groups network,” Institute for the Study of War,” 1/13/09
Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08
Mohammed, Abeer, “Maliki’s Chess Game,” Institute of War & Peace Reporting, 9/10/09
Roads To Iraq, “Iraqi pre-election political map – The Shiites scene,” 9/21/09
Rubin, Alissa, and Gordon, Michael, “U.S. Frees Suspect in Killing of 5 G.I.’s,” New York Times, 6/9/09
Sunday, November 15, 2009
New Rumors Of Maliki-Iraqi National Alliance Talks
As the speaker of Iran’s parliament Ali Larijani came to Baghdad for a four-day visit beginning on November 4, 2009, rumors swirled in the Iraqi press that one of his main priorities was to get Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to join the major Shiite coalition, the Iraqi National Alliance. Iran was instrumental in putting the list together. Even after the National Alliance was announced in August 2009, talks continued with Maliki’s State of Law List. The sticking points were Maliki’s demand to get 50% of the alliance’s seats and be their only candidate for prime minister. The latest story to emerge of on-going negotiations was from Aswat al-Iraq who reported on November 8, 2009 that the Sadrists, members of the National Alliance, were demanding that the government release all of their followers from jail and death row in order for the State of Law to join. Members of the State of Law in parliament also said that talks were underway. This is all happening after Larijani denied that the point of his trip was to mediate between Maliki and the National Alliance, and Dawa lawmakers said they would not join the list or give into Iranian pressure.
One of Iran’s main priorities is to maintain Shiite power in Iraq. They do not favor one specific group, and have in fact, backed all of the major parties that are rivals with each other. Those divisions actually allow Tehran to maintain its influence as Shiite politicians go to them for assistance and mediation with the others. On the Iraqi side it seems unlikely that Maliki would agree to join the National Alliance. Its two major players, the Sadrists and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council have both been opponents of the prime minister in the past, and would like to replace him. On the other hand, the division of the Iraqi parties means that no list is likely to even get a plurality in the 2010 election. If the State of Law were to join with the National Alliance however, they would be assure of at least that many votes, which would give Maliki a greater chance of returning to the leadership. With the Byzantine nature of Iraqi politics, anything is possible.
SOURCES
Aswat al-Iraq, “Sadr says detainees’ release precondition for coalition,” 11/8/09
Al Jazeera, “Iraqi Shias form new alliance,” 8/24/09
Al-Sharq al-Awsat, “Larijani Denies Mediation Role In Iraq,” MEMRI Blog, 11/6/09
One of Iran’s main priorities is to maintain Shiite power in Iraq. They do not favor one specific group, and have in fact, backed all of the major parties that are rivals with each other. Those divisions actually allow Tehran to maintain its influence as Shiite politicians go to them for assistance and mediation with the others. On the Iraqi side it seems unlikely that Maliki would agree to join the National Alliance. Its two major players, the Sadrists and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council have both been opponents of the prime minister in the past, and would like to replace him. On the other hand, the division of the Iraqi parties means that no list is likely to even get a plurality in the 2010 election. If the State of Law were to join with the National Alliance however, they would be assure of at least that many votes, which would give Maliki a greater chance of returning to the leadership. With the Byzantine nature of Iraqi politics, anything is possible.
SOURCES
Aswat al-Iraq, “Sadr says detainees’ release precondition for coalition,” 11/8/09
Al Jazeera, “Iraqi Shias form new alliance,” 8/24/09
Al-Sharq al-Awsat, “Larijani Denies Mediation Role In Iraq,” MEMRI Blog, 11/6/09
Friday, October 30, 2009
Two Provinces Respond To The Drought
Basra in southern Iraq and Irbil in Kurdistan are responding to the drought in different ways. Basra wants to be declared a disaster area and is calling for immediate relief, while Irbil is thinking more long-term and trying to create a water policy.
According to the United Nations, 46-56% of Irbil’s cropland has been hit by the drought. Many farmers in the north rely upon rain to grow their crops, and that has been down 33-50% from 2007 to 2008. As a result, Irbil’s crop production dropped 80% last year. In response, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is attempting to create its first water policy. Currently, residents of the region pay $1 for unlimited water use per month, with the rest subsidized by the KRG. A Swedish company was hired to install 100 water meters in one area of Irbil and found that Kurds use more water than many countries. The KRG now plans on installing 100,000 water meters by the end of the year to start regulating water use. This would be a first in the entire country.
In Basra, not only has its farmland been hit by the drought, but its fresh water supply has as well. 6-25% of the province’s cropland has been affected by the drought. More important is the rising salinity levels, and the incursion of seawater inland. As a result, up to 5,000 villagers have left their land, and the governorate’s director of agriculture warned that farming might be wiped out. The situation is so bad that the local council has asked the province be declared a disaster area. Rather than move to conserve water like Irbil, Basra is in more of a crisis mode and thinking short-term. At the beginning of September 2009, the governor went to Baghdad to talk with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki who promised a $20 million project to build water pipes to Basra. That would obviously provide no immediate relief. For that the Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works initiated eight new water purification projects, and the province signed a deal with Iran to deliver 650,000 liters of drinking water every two days. On October 9, the first Iranian shipped docked in Basra’s harbor to deliver the water.
As reported before, Iraq’s drought is reaching disaster levels. Population growth, lack of rain, and no government water policy are the major causes. Iraq’s neighbors are also facing a drought, and they have built dams along many of the major waterways that flow into Iraq. The country’s crops and population have both been affected. Baghdad has still not come up with any real response even though the drought has lasted for two years. That has left the provinces to fend for themselves. Basra is looking short-term, while Irbil is taking the long view. Both approaches need to be considered and coordinated with the central government, but that is simply not happening even though conditions are getting worse.
SOURCES
Alsumaria, “Iran provides Iraq with drinking water,” 10/9/09
- “Will Basra be announced a disaster area?” 9/30/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “8 new water projects in Basra,” 9/26/09
- “Basra governor vows drinking water to all Basra,” 9/6/09
- “Official says Basra’s agriculture may be wiped out,” 8/26/09
Blua, Antoine, “Iraq Tussles With Neighbors Over Water,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 9/13/09
Chulov, Martin, “Surge of seawater drives Iraqis from their homes in the south,” Guardian, 9/11/09
- “Water shortage threatens two million people in southern Iraq,” Guardian, 8/26/09
Hamad, Qassim Khidhir, “Kurdish authorities call for water restrictions,” Niqash, 10/8/09
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Iraq Humanitarian Update,” October 2008
Al-Wazzan, Saleem, “salt levels in shatt al-arab threaten environmental disaster,” Niqash, 9/2/09
Zavis, Alexandra, “First violence, now drought threatens Iraq farmers,” Los Angeles Times, 6/26/08
According to the United Nations, 46-56% of Irbil’s cropland has been hit by the drought. Many farmers in the north rely upon rain to grow their crops, and that has been down 33-50% from 2007 to 2008. As a result, Irbil’s crop production dropped 80% last year. In response, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is attempting to create its first water policy. Currently, residents of the region pay $1 for unlimited water use per month, with the rest subsidized by the KRG. A Swedish company was hired to install 100 water meters in one area of Irbil and found that Kurds use more water than many countries. The KRG now plans on installing 100,000 water meters by the end of the year to start regulating water use. This would be a first in the entire country.
In Basra, not only has its farmland been hit by the drought, but its fresh water supply has as well. 6-25% of the province’s cropland has been affected by the drought. More important is the rising salinity levels, and the incursion of seawater inland. As a result, up to 5,000 villagers have left their land, and the governorate’s director of agriculture warned that farming might be wiped out. The situation is so bad that the local council has asked the province be declared a disaster area. Rather than move to conserve water like Irbil, Basra is in more of a crisis mode and thinking short-term. At the beginning of September 2009, the governor went to Baghdad to talk with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki who promised a $20 million project to build water pipes to Basra. That would obviously provide no immediate relief. For that the Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works initiated eight new water purification projects, and the province signed a deal with Iran to deliver 650,000 liters of drinking water every two days. On October 9, the first Iranian shipped docked in Basra’s harbor to deliver the water.As reported before, Iraq’s drought is reaching disaster levels. Population growth, lack of rain, and no government water policy are the major causes. Iraq’s neighbors are also facing a drought, and they have built dams along many of the major waterways that flow into Iraq. The country’s crops and population have both been affected. Baghdad has still not come up with any real response even though the drought has lasted for two years. That has left the provinces to fend for themselves. Basra is looking short-term, while Irbil is taking the long view. Both approaches need to be considered and coordinated with the central government, but that is simply not happening even though conditions are getting worse.
SOURCES
Alsumaria, “Iran provides Iraq with drinking water,” 10/9/09
- “Will Basra be announced a disaster area?” 9/30/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “8 new water projects in Basra,” 9/26/09
- “Basra governor vows drinking water to all Basra,” 9/6/09
- “Official says Basra’s agriculture may be wiped out,” 8/26/09
Blua, Antoine, “Iraq Tussles With Neighbors Over Water,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 9/13/09
Chulov, Martin, “Surge of seawater drives Iraqis from their homes in the south,” Guardian, 9/11/09
- “Water shortage threatens two million people in southern Iraq,” Guardian, 8/26/09
Hamad, Qassim Khidhir, “Kurdish authorities call for water restrictions,” Niqash, 10/8/09
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Iraq Humanitarian Update,” October 2008
Al-Wazzan, Saleem, “salt levels in shatt al-arab threaten environmental disaster,” Niqash, 9/2/09
Zavis, Alexandra, “First violence, now drought threatens Iraq farmers,” Los Angeles Times, 6/26/08
Wednesday, September 30, 2009
More On Allawi-National Alliance Talks
Contradictory stories are swirling over whether former Interim Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi will join the new Iraqi National Alliance (INA). On Wednesday September 23, 2009 Allawi publicly denied that he had been talking with the National Alliance. The Iraq Pundit Blog also seems to think that the story is all rumors. Niqash however, talked with both a member from Allawi’s Iraqi National List and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, and they both said that the new coalition would be announced soon.
The main motivation for Allawi to join the National Alliance is to become prime minister again, a promise he has supposedly gotten from them. After the Supreme Council failed to bring Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki into the INA, they then turned to Allawi as a replacement candidate to try to unseat Maliki. Allawi also allegedly secretly went to Iran in August 2009 and got their blessing to become prime minister. According to Al-Quds Al-Arabi, Iran was putting heavy pressure on Maliki to join the new alliance, and when he refused, they threatened him by saying that he would be blocked from returning to his office. This is obviously their reason for backing Allawi if these rumors become true.
SOURCES
Iraq Pundit, “Bad News Papers,” 9/24/09
Ramzi, Kholoud, “shia coalition seeks allawi alliance,” Niqash, 9/25/09
Roads To Iraq, “Iran’s final warning to Maliki,” 9/24/09
The main motivation for Allawi to join the National Alliance is to become prime minister again, a promise he has supposedly gotten from them. After the Supreme Council failed to bring Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki into the INA, they then turned to Allawi as a replacement candidate to try to unseat Maliki. Allawi also allegedly secretly went to Iran in August 2009 and got their blessing to become prime minister. According to Al-Quds Al-Arabi, Iran was putting heavy pressure on Maliki to join the new alliance, and when he refused, they threatened him by saying that he would be blocked from returning to his office. This is obviously their reason for backing Allawi if these rumors become true.
SOURCES
Iraq Pundit, “Bad News Papers,” 9/24/09
Ramzi, Kholoud, “shia coalition seeks allawi alliance,” Niqash, 9/25/09
Roads To Iraq, “Iran’s final warning to Maliki,” 9/24/09
Thursday, September 10, 2009
Recent Iranian Military Operations In Iraq
As reported before, the Iranian backed Special Groups have resumed attacks in recent months after a short break. August 2009 also saw a number of reports about Tehran’s continued military interference in Iraq. On August 11, two Iranians were arrested in the Khanaqin district of Diyala after having infiltrated into Iraq. Iraqi officials said that other Iranians had recently been arrested in the area smuggling in weapons. On August 19 it was announced that 13-16 Iranian made rockets were seized along with three suspects after an attack on the U.S. base in Basra. This was part of the increase in Special Group activities in the south. Finally, on August 31 there was a story that Iraqi security forces were finding new caches of weapons in southern Iraq, some of which they believed originated in Iran.
The goal of these recent operations appears to be two pronged. First, the attacks in the south are a way for Iran and the Special Groups to let Washington and Baghdad know that they are still around and capable of disrupting things. Second, Iraqi officials loyal to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki think the weapons are going to his political rivals to stir up trouble in the run-up to the 2010 parliamentary elections. Maliki is running on law and order again, so any violence will help complicate that campaign. The increase in attacks in August 2009, for example, although mostly carried out by the insurgency and Al Qaeda in Iraq, made many Iraqis question the government and security forces. Some were also blaming political parties, so the Iranian tactic may backfire. Overall, the scope of this campaign seems far below what Iran has carried out in the past, and aimed at influencing Iraqi politics more than anything else, which has always been the top priority of Tehran.
SOURCES
Ashton, Adam and Issa, Sahar, “Iraqis remaining cool despite attacks on mosques, minorities,” McClatchy Newspapers, 8/14/09
Associated Press, “Iraqi Military Losing People’s Confidence,” 8/15/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “2 Iranians arrested after infiltrating into Iraq,” 8/11/09
Dagher, Sam, “Iranian Arms Seized in Iraq, Officials Say,” New York Times, 8/19/09
Reuters, “Arms Finds In Hitherto Quiet South Iraq Ring Alarms,” 8/31/09
The goal of these recent operations appears to be two pronged. First, the attacks in the south are a way for Iran and the Special Groups to let Washington and Baghdad know that they are still around and capable of disrupting things. Second, Iraqi officials loyal to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki think the weapons are going to his political rivals to stir up trouble in the run-up to the 2010 parliamentary elections. Maliki is running on law and order again, so any violence will help complicate that campaign. The increase in attacks in August 2009, for example, although mostly carried out by the insurgency and Al Qaeda in Iraq, made many Iraqis question the government and security forces. Some were also blaming political parties, so the Iranian tactic may backfire. Overall, the scope of this campaign seems far below what Iran has carried out in the past, and aimed at influencing Iraqi politics more than anything else, which has always been the top priority of Tehran.
SOURCES
Ashton, Adam and Issa, Sahar, “Iraqis remaining cool despite attacks on mosques, minorities,” McClatchy Newspapers, 8/14/09
Associated Press, “Iraqi Military Losing People’s Confidence,” 8/15/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “2 Iranians arrested after infiltrating into Iraq,” 8/11/09
Dagher, Sam, “Iranian Arms Seized in Iraq, Officials Say,” New York Times, 8/19/09
Reuters, “Arms Finds In Hitherto Quiet South Iraq Ring Alarms,” 8/31/09
Monday, August 31, 2009
The Passing Of Abdul Aziz al-Hakim
August 26, 2009 saw the passing of Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, the leader of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC). Hakim was a symbol of Iraqi politics immediately after the 2003-invasion. He was an opportunist and pragmatist who was willing to align himself with various groups to gain power. He was widely successful in the early years following the overthrow of Saddam, but then his star began to fade in 2007.
The SIIC has its roots in the Dawa Party and Tehran. In the 1950s, Ayatollah Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr and Ayatollah Mohsen al-Hakim created the Dawa Party rallying Shiites to the cause of an Islamic state. Hakim eventually left Dawa, and in the 1980s fled to Iran during the Iran-Iraq War with his two sons, Mohammed Baqr al-Hakim and Abdul Aziz al-Hakim. In 1982 Tehran formed the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq to counter the Dawa Party, and assert more influence over the Iraqi opposition. The Hakims in turn, pledged allegiance to Ayatollah Khomeini and the Iranian Revolution. In 1983 Iran created the Badr Brigade, which was an official arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Qods Force. It fought on the Iranian side in the Iran-Iraq War, and recruited amongst Iraqi prisoners of war. After the Gulf War, Badr moved into southern Iraq and tried to unsuccessfully take over the Shiite uprising. These origins were always a major problem for the SIIC as many Iraqis resented the Hakims fleeing to Iran, their role in the Iran-Iraq War and the 1991 uprisings, and their pro-Khomeini stance.
Despite their Iranian origins, the Hakims were always pragmatic opportunists who would ally with any group that would give them a better chance at gaining power in Iraq. Beginning in the late-1980s they started quiet relations with the United States. In 1992 they joined the Iraqi National Congress, and its leader Ahmad Chalabi, was able to garner Washington’s support for the SIIC as the major Shiite party they would work with after the invasion. They also worked closely with the ruling Kurdish parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), to plan for a post-Saddam Iraq. The three had forged ties when they all fought on the Iranian side in the Iran-Iraq War.
When the 2003 invasion of Iraq occurred, the SIIC was able to sweep into power and assume a larger position than they had support. First, they took over a series of cities like Kut, Khanaqin, Baquba, Basra, Najaf, and Karbala because of the vacuum left from Saddam’s overthrow. They also sank early attempts to include internal Iraqi leaders in any new government put together by the U.S. They quickly aligned themselves with Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani as well to gain legitimacy and standing, and supported his call for elections to determine a new government and constitution, knowing that would benefit themselves since Iraq had a Shiite majority. Abdul al-Aziz al-Hakim ended up joining the Iraqi Governing Council, and assumed the leadership of the SIIC, when his brother Ayatollah Mohammed al-Hakim was killed in a car bombing in August 2003.
Beginning in 2005 Hakim and the SIIC were able to put together a string of ringing victories after the U.S. handed back sovereignty to Iraq. The SIIC was the driving force behind the United Iraqi Alliance in the 2005 elections, which came away with the most votes. It also joined with the Kurds to push through a new constitution, and together the SIIC, PUK, and KDP were the ruling coalitions behind the Ibrahim al-Jaafari and Nouri al-Maliki governments. The SIIC also took over the Interior Ministry under Jaafari, got their Badr Brigade integrated into the security forces, and set up death squads to begin the ethnic cleansing of Sunnis from Baghdad. In August 2005 they began promoting federalism, and a nine-province southern Shiite autonomous region. In 2006, the U.S. came to rely upon the SIIC to counter the Sadrists, who were their greatest rivals. The two had been having a long-running battle across southern Iraq. The SIIC was able to gain these victories because they were better organized than their rivals, the Sunnis and Sadrists boycotted the first two elections in 2005, and both Washington and Tehran supported them.
In 2007, the SIIC’s fortunes began to change. First, their call for an autonomous region proved to create more problems than good since many Shiites rejected the idea. The SIIC also controlled most of the southern provinces, and did a poor job governing and providing services. Third, the Hakim’s base was the middle class and merchants, who began to flee the country during the sectarian war. Fourth, the SIIC was never able to shake their image as tools of Tehran. To counter this the party tried to remake itself, dropping “Revolutionary” from their name becoming the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, claimed that they supported Ayatollah Sistani rather than Ayatollah Ali Khamanei in Iran, and said they had disbanded their militia the Badr Brigade, which they then called a social and political group. They also tried to provide social services to gain support amongst the poor, a move led by Abdul Hakim’s son, Ammar al-Hakim, who was being groomed as the successor to his father.
In 2008 and 2009 things got worse. Prime Minister Maliki began distancing himself from the SIIC by creating his own popular base with the Tribal Support Councils. Maliki also came out against federalism in both northern and southern Iraq, and called for a strong central government. In turn, the SIIC, KDP, and PUK talked about having a no confidence vote against the Prime Minister in December 2008, but they couldn’t decide upon a successor and were hoping that Maliki would trip up, and ruin his image. In the 2009 provincial elections, Maliki ran his own State of Law List against the SIIC, who was soundly beaten across the south and Baghdad. Despite these setbacks, Hakim tried to mend fences with Maliki by lobbying him to join a new version of the United Iraqi Alliance to run in the 2010 parliamentary balloting. This failed to materialize, as the Prime Minister wanted to lead the new list, something Hakim and the other parties refused to agree upon.
By the time of Hakim’s death, the SIIC was a shell of its former self. After the sweeping victories in 2005, the Supreme Council is now fading, and desperately trying to remake itself once again to return to power. They now talk about national unity, but they are remembered for their Iranian roots and pro-federalist stance. The death of Hakim could also lead to a power struggle within the organization. While Hakim’s son, Ammar, was the anointed successor, there are a number of possible rivals in the old guard like the head of the Badr Organization Hadi al-Ameri, Finance Minister Bayan Jabr, and Vice President Adel Abd al-Mahdi. The SIIC may be at a crossroads, lacking popular support and strong leadership with Hakim’s passing.
SOURCES
Abedin, Mahan, “The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI),” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, October 2003
Dagher, Sam, “Rising player with a vision for Shiite Iraq,” Christian Science Monitor, 11/20/07
Elkhamri, Mounir, “Iran’s Contribution to the Civil War in Iraq,” Jamestown Foundation, January 2007
Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08
Kemp, Geoffrey, “Iran and Iraq The Shia Connection, Soft Power, and the Nuclear Factor,” United States Institute of Peace, November 2005
International Crisis Group, “Shiite Politics In Iraq: The Role Of The Supreme Council,” 11/15/07
Packer, George, “War After The War,” New Yorker, 11/24/03
Raghavan, Sudarsan, “Shiite Clerics’ Rivalry Deepens In Fragile Iraq,” Washington Post, 12/21/06
- “Shiite Contest Sharpens In Iraq,” Washington Post, 12/26/07
Ramzi, Kholoud, “daawa-siic conflict splits Shiite unity,” Niqash,” 11/27/08
Santora, Marc, “Shiite Power Broker Dies, in Blow to Iraqi Party,” New York Times, 8/26/09
Semple, Kirk, “Heavy battle between shiite militias reveals deep split in ruling coalition,” San Francisco Chronicle, 10/22/06
Serwer, Daniel and Parker, Sam, “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2009
Visser, Reidar, “Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim Dies in Tehran,” Historiae.org, 8/26/09
Walt, Vivienne, “U.S. Ally: Shiite leader preached unity before attack,” San Francisco Chronicle, 8/30/03
The SIIC has its roots in the Dawa Party and Tehran. In the 1950s, Ayatollah Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr and Ayatollah Mohsen al-Hakim created the Dawa Party rallying Shiites to the cause of an Islamic state. Hakim eventually left Dawa, and in the 1980s fled to Iran during the Iran-Iraq War with his two sons, Mohammed Baqr al-Hakim and Abdul Aziz al-Hakim. In 1982 Tehran formed the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq to counter the Dawa Party, and assert more influence over the Iraqi opposition. The Hakims in turn, pledged allegiance to Ayatollah Khomeini and the Iranian Revolution. In 1983 Iran created the Badr Brigade, which was an official arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Qods Force. It fought on the Iranian side in the Iran-Iraq War, and recruited amongst Iraqi prisoners of war. After the Gulf War, Badr moved into southern Iraq and tried to unsuccessfully take over the Shiite uprising. These origins were always a major problem for the SIIC as many Iraqis resented the Hakims fleeing to Iran, their role in the Iran-Iraq War and the 1991 uprisings, and their pro-Khomeini stance.
Despite their Iranian origins, the Hakims were always pragmatic opportunists who would ally with any group that would give them a better chance at gaining power in Iraq. Beginning in the late-1980s they started quiet relations with the United States. In 1992 they joined the Iraqi National Congress, and its leader Ahmad Chalabi, was able to garner Washington’s support for the SIIC as the major Shiite party they would work with after the invasion. They also worked closely with the ruling Kurdish parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), to plan for a post-Saddam Iraq. The three had forged ties when they all fought on the Iranian side in the Iran-Iraq War.
When the 2003 invasion of Iraq occurred, the SIIC was able to sweep into power and assume a larger position than they had support. First, they took over a series of cities like Kut, Khanaqin, Baquba, Basra, Najaf, and Karbala because of the vacuum left from Saddam’s overthrow. They also sank early attempts to include internal Iraqi leaders in any new government put together by the U.S. They quickly aligned themselves with Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani as well to gain legitimacy and standing, and supported his call for elections to determine a new government and constitution, knowing that would benefit themselves since Iraq had a Shiite majority. Abdul al-Aziz al-Hakim ended up joining the Iraqi Governing Council, and assumed the leadership of the SIIC, when his brother Ayatollah Mohammed al-Hakim was killed in a car bombing in August 2003.
Beginning in 2005 Hakim and the SIIC were able to put together a string of ringing victories after the U.S. handed back sovereignty to Iraq. The SIIC was the driving force behind the United Iraqi Alliance in the 2005 elections, which came away with the most votes. It also joined with the Kurds to push through a new constitution, and together the SIIC, PUK, and KDP were the ruling coalitions behind the Ibrahim al-Jaafari and Nouri al-Maliki governments. The SIIC also took over the Interior Ministry under Jaafari, got their Badr Brigade integrated into the security forces, and set up death squads to begin the ethnic cleansing of Sunnis from Baghdad. In August 2005 they began promoting federalism, and a nine-province southern Shiite autonomous region. In 2006, the U.S. came to rely upon the SIIC to counter the Sadrists, who were their greatest rivals. The two had been having a long-running battle across southern Iraq. The SIIC was able to gain these victories because they were better organized than their rivals, the Sunnis and Sadrists boycotted the first two elections in 2005, and both Washington and Tehran supported them.
In 2007, the SIIC’s fortunes began to change. First, their call for an autonomous region proved to create more problems than good since many Shiites rejected the idea. The SIIC also controlled most of the southern provinces, and did a poor job governing and providing services. Third, the Hakim’s base was the middle class and merchants, who began to flee the country during the sectarian war. Fourth, the SIIC was never able to shake their image as tools of Tehran. To counter this the party tried to remake itself, dropping “Revolutionary” from their name becoming the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, claimed that they supported Ayatollah Sistani rather than Ayatollah Ali Khamanei in Iran, and said they had disbanded their militia the Badr Brigade, which they then called a social and political group. They also tried to provide social services to gain support amongst the poor, a move led by Abdul Hakim’s son, Ammar al-Hakim, who was being groomed as the successor to his father.
In 2008 and 2009 things got worse. Prime Minister Maliki began distancing himself from the SIIC by creating his own popular base with the Tribal Support Councils. Maliki also came out against federalism in both northern and southern Iraq, and called for a strong central government. In turn, the SIIC, KDP, and PUK talked about having a no confidence vote against the Prime Minister in December 2008, but they couldn’t decide upon a successor and were hoping that Maliki would trip up, and ruin his image. In the 2009 provincial elections, Maliki ran his own State of Law List against the SIIC, who was soundly beaten across the south and Baghdad. Despite these setbacks, Hakim tried to mend fences with Maliki by lobbying him to join a new version of the United Iraqi Alliance to run in the 2010 parliamentary balloting. This failed to materialize, as the Prime Minister wanted to lead the new list, something Hakim and the other parties refused to agree upon.
By the time of Hakim’s death, the SIIC was a shell of its former self. After the sweeping victories in 2005, the Supreme Council is now fading, and desperately trying to remake itself once again to return to power. They now talk about national unity, but they are remembered for their Iranian roots and pro-federalist stance. The death of Hakim could also lead to a power struggle within the organization. While Hakim’s son, Ammar, was the anointed successor, there are a number of possible rivals in the old guard like the head of the Badr Organization Hadi al-Ameri, Finance Minister Bayan Jabr, and Vice President Adel Abd al-Mahdi. The SIIC may be at a crossroads, lacking popular support and strong leadership with Hakim’s passing.
SOURCES
Abedin, Mahan, “The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI),” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, October 2003
Dagher, Sam, “Rising player with a vision for Shiite Iraq,” Christian Science Monitor, 11/20/07
Elkhamri, Mounir, “Iran’s Contribution to the Civil War in Iraq,” Jamestown Foundation, January 2007
Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08
Kemp, Geoffrey, “Iran and Iraq The Shia Connection, Soft Power, and the Nuclear Factor,” United States Institute of Peace, November 2005
International Crisis Group, “Shiite Politics In Iraq: The Role Of The Supreme Council,” 11/15/07
Packer, George, “War After The War,” New Yorker, 11/24/03
Raghavan, Sudarsan, “Shiite Clerics’ Rivalry Deepens In Fragile Iraq,” Washington Post, 12/21/06
- “Shiite Contest Sharpens In Iraq,” Washington Post, 12/26/07
Ramzi, Kholoud, “daawa-siic conflict splits Shiite unity,” Niqash,” 11/27/08
Santora, Marc, “Shiite Power Broker Dies, in Blow to Iraqi Party,” New York Times, 8/26/09
Semple, Kirk, “Heavy battle between shiite militias reveals deep split in ruling coalition,” San Francisco Chronicle, 10/22/06
Serwer, Daniel and Parker, Sam, “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2009
Visser, Reidar, “Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim Dies in Tehran,” Historiae.org, 8/26/09
Walt, Vivienne, “U.S. Ally: Shiite leader preached unity before attack,” San Francisco Chronicle, 8/30/03
Tuesday, August 04, 2009
The Return Of The Special Groups
Special Groups was a term coined by the U.S. during the Surge to identify Shiite militants that were supported by Iran and/or were not following Muqtada al-Sadr’s cease-fire decree. After Baghdad’s crackdown on militias in southern Iraq beginning with Basra in 2008, many of these Special Groups were scattered, arrested, or fled to Iran. Now they seem to be making their return. In a July 18 article in the Washington Post U.S. officials warned of a new spate of attacks on American forces by these armed groups. An official named three main culprits, the League of the Righteous, Khataib Hezbollah, and the Promised Day Brigades.
A review of English-language press reports shows that there has been a steady increase in incidents from March to July 2009. 1st these are only articles from southern Iraq. It’s difficult to determine who is behind many of the attacks in Baghdad. The southern section of the country however has been relatively peaceful, and has been a base of Special Groups and Mahdi Army activities in the past, so any attacks that occur there on the Americans are most likely done by one of these organizations.
In March 2009 there were only a few incidents involving the British in Basra and none with the United States, but since April there have been several attacks aimed at Americans across a variety of southern provinces. In March there were no attacks against American forces in the region. There were two rocket attacks on the English in the Basra airport however. In April things changed when five incidents were reported, and all involving U.S. troops in Maysan, Qadisiyah, Wasit, and Basra. Attacks went up in May to seven and were all concentrated in Basra, Babil, and Wasit. In June incidents went down to four, but again were spread out over the region in Dhi Qar, Muthanna, Basra, and Wasit. From July 1 to 28 there have been eight attacks on Americans occurring in Dhi Qar, Qadisiyah, Karbala, and Basra. The most dramatic was a roadside bomb that went off against U.S. Ambassador Christopher Hill’s convoy in Dhi Qar on July 13. In four and a half months there were a total of 26 attacks on U.S. forces, and only a few casualties. While that is not a large amount compared to the more violent areas of the country, it does constitute an increase from earlier in the year.
Iran has conducted a multi-layered political, military, economic, and cultural strategy in Iraq since 2003. Supporting Shiite militiamen is only one part of this, and is aimed at tying down U.S. forces so they don’t attack Iran, and making the Americans pay a price for invading. In the past, when important events came up in Iraq such as the 2009 provincial elections, Iran has limited the amount of weapons and money that it provides to dampen violence so that it might focus upon its more important political goals. Afterwards Special Group attacks and activities have traditionally gone up. That appears to be what is occurring now. This could be a message from Iran that they are still capable of fomenting instability in Iraq and challenging Coalition Forces. Iraqi domestic issues may also play a part in some of these attacks. The League of the Righteous for example, has said that it wishes to participate in the 2010 parliamentary vote, so a few of these incidents may be a way to show that it is still relevant. Others may be conducted by violent gangs, which are active in places like Basra. Whatever the ultimate motivation, the last few months have shown that there are still militants in southern Iraq capable of attacking U.S. forces.
Attacks Against U.S. Forces In Southern Iraq
March 2009 – 0 Total
April 2009 – 5 Total
4/6/09 Rocket attack on U.S. base in Amarah, Maysan
4/20/09 IED attack on U.S. patrol in Basra
4/20/09 Rocket attack on U.S. base in Kut, Wasit
4/22/09 Rocket attack on U.S. base in Diwaniya, Qadisiyah
4/30/09 Sniper killed 2 U.S. soldiers in Amarah, Maysan
May 2009 – 7 Total
5/3/09 Rocket attack near U.S. consulate in Hilla, Babil
5/4/09 IED attack on U.S. patrol in Basra
5/11/09 IED attack on U.S. vehicle in Basra
5/14/09 IED attack on U.S. patrol in Wasit
5/14/09 IED attack on U.S. vehicle in Babil
5/16/09 One U.S. soldier killed in Basra
5/28/09 Rocket attack on U.S. base at Basra airport
June 2009 – 4 Total
6/1/09 Rocket attack on U.S. business in Wasit
6/7/09 Attack on U.S. patrol in Basra
6/16/09 IED attack on U.S. convoy in Muthanna
6/29/09 IED attack on joint Iraqi-U.S. patrol in Dhi Qar
July 1-28, 2009 - 8
7/5/09 Rocket attack on U.S. base in Diwaniya, Qadisiyah
7/10/09 Rocket attack near U.S. base in Basra
7/13/09 Rocket attack on U.S. base in Basra
7/13/09 Roadside bomb attack on U.S. Ambassador Christopher Hill’s convoy in Dhi Qar
7/17/09 Rocket attack on U.S. base in Basra
7/20/09 IED attack on U.S. convoy in Karbala
7/20/09 Bomb attack on U.S. convoy in Nassiriya, Dhi Qar
7/20/09 Rocket attack on U.S. base in Diwaniya, Qadisiyah
SOURCES
Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Anti-US Iraqi cleric facing leadership challenge,” Associated Press, 2/20/09
Adas, Basil, “Mahdi Army militia ‘going underground,’” Gulf News, 6/26/08
Aswat al-Iraq, “2 Katyushas land in U.S. camp in Diwaniya,” 7/20/09
- “2 Katyushas land in U.S. forces camp in Diwaniya,” 7/5/09
- “3 MNF soldiers injured in Basra,” 7/17/09
- “3 rockets land near U.S. consulate in Hilla,” 5/3/09
- “4 missiles fall near Echo camp in Diwaniya – spokesman,” 4/22/09
- “Blast in Nasseriya, no casualties, loses reported – U.S. spokesman,” 7/20/09
- “Bomb explodes on U.S. vehicle patrol in Wassit,” 5/14/09
- “British base in Basra rocketed,” 3/13/09
- “Hand grenade targets U.S. patrol, no casualties,” 6/7/09
- “IED explodes near joint convoy in Thi-Qar,” 6/29/09
- “IED targets U.S. convoy in Muthanna,” 6/16/09
- “IED targets U.S. convoy north of Karbala,” 7/20/09
- “IED targets U.S. patrol in Basra,” 5/4/09
- “MNF base in Kut rocketed,” 4/20/09
- “Roadside bomb hits MNF patrol in Basra,” 4/20/09
- “Rockets hit U.S. base in Amara,” 4/6/09
- “Sniper downs 2 U.S. soldiers in Amara,” 4/30/09
- “U.S. base at Basra airport rocketed,” 7/13/09
- “U.S. firm rocketed in Wassit,” 6/1/09
- “U.S. Hummer ablaze in Babel,” 5/14/09
- “U.S. vehicle damaged in IED blast in Basra,” 5/11/09
Gamel, Kim, “US military works to keep out Iraq militia leaders,” Associated Press, 8/6/08
Graff, Peter, "Influence wanes for followers of Iraq's Sadr," Reuters, 11/24/08
Haynes, Deborah, “Hope for British hostages in Iraq after release of Shia militant,” Times of London, 6/9/09
Issa, Sahar and Kadhim, Hussein, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 28 May 2009,” 5/28/09
Londono, Ernesto and DeYoung, Karen, “Iraq Restricts U.S. Forces,” Washington Post, 7/18/09
Multi-National Corps – Iraq, “MND-S Soldier dies from combat-related injures (Basra),” 5/16/09
- “U.S. Forces respond to rocket attack in Basra province,” 7/10/09
Peter, Tom, “After setbacks, Sadr redirects Mahdi Army,” Christian Science Monitor, 8/11/08
Reuters, “U.S. ambassador to Iraq unhurt by convoy bomb,” 7/13/09
Rubin, Alissa and Gordon, Michael, “U.S. Frees Suspect in Killing of 5 G.I.’s,” New York Times, 6/9/09
Small Wars Journal, “SWJ Interview with Bing West (Part 1),” 8/14/08
Weaver, Teri, “U.S. troops keeping a low profile in Basra,” Stars and Stripes, 6/1/09
Early Reports On Iran’s Activities In Iraq
One of the first reports that Iran was taking an anti-American stance in Iraq came from a UPI. It quoted a U.S. intelligence source that said in March 2003 Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamanei, President Mohammad Khatami, and others met to decide Tehran’s policy in the wake of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. They decided to make the U.S. pay a price for invading Iraq. Tehran set about implementing this decision through several means.
On the military side Iran sent in agents, friendly Iraqis, and Hezbollah into several Iraqi cities including Baghdad, Najaf, Karbala, Basra, and Kirkuk to organize against the Americans. 1000s of fighters from the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s (SIIC) militia the Badr Brigade flowed into Iraq after the invasion. At the time, Badr was a formal arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, and was also supervised by Iranian intelligence. Later in 2003 there were reports that Hezbollah operatives were also dispatched to Iraq to help as well.
On the political front, Iran made agreements with the Kurds and facilitated negotiations between them and the SIIC. First, Iran and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) agreed upon a non-aggression pact. There were also a series of meetings in the fall of 2001 between the Badr Brigade and KDP and PUK leaders to discuss how to deal with the United States and a post-Saddam Iraq. Iranian intelligence was involved in many of these meetings.
After the invasion, Iran also tried to rally Iraq’s Shiite clerics against the Americans. In late April 2003 Iraqi born, but Iranian based Ayatollah Kadhem al-Haeri issued a fatwa calling on Shiite imams to fill the power vacuum left by the fall of the old regime by taking over administration of Iraq’s cities. Al-Haeri also said clerics needed to oppose the United States. There were several examples of this. In the city of Kut in Wasit province for example, the SIIC took over the city hall and a local cleric Sayed Abbas Fadhil claimed to control the city. His followers staged two protests against the American presence there, and there were several drive-by shooting on U.S. troops as well. Jay Garner, the head of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs, who was the civilian administrator of Iraq at the time, said the events in Kut were all examples of Iran trying to interfere in Iraq.
These early reports show the different sides of Iran’s policy towards Iraq. Not only was it going to use military means to undermine the American presence, but it was also using its extensive contacts with the Iraqi opposition, many of whom had been based in Iran during the Saddam years, and religious ties to Iraq’s clerics to get a foothold in Iraq’s new political order.
For more on Iran’s policy towards Iraq see:
Overview of Iran’s Influence In Iraq
Combating Terrorism Center’s Report On Iran’s Role In Iraq
SOURCES
Ayman, Dr. Hashemi, “A detailed and dangerous report about the Iranian role in the destruction of Iraq,” Homeland Security US.net, 3/19/06
Elkhamri, Mounir, “Iran’s Contribution to the Civil War in Iraq,” Jamestown Foundation, January 2007
Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08
Phillips, James, “Deter Iranian and Syrian Meddling In Postwar Iraq,” Heritage Foundation, 4/4/03
Pound, Edward, “The Iran Connection,” U.S. News & World Report, 11/22/04
Risen, James, “A Region Inflamed: The Hand Of Tehran: Hezbollah, in Iraq, Refrains From Attacks on Americans,” New York Times, 11/24/03
Smith, Craig, “Iraqi in Iran urges Shiites to take power,” San Francisco Chronicle, 4/26/03
Strauss, Valerie, “Pentagon: Ex-Iraqi Leader Aziz Is in Custody,” Washington Post, 4/24/03
Tanter, Raymond, “Iran’s Threat to Coalition Forces in Iraq,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1/15/04
Thursday, July 23, 2009
Iran’s Role In The Revival Of The United Iraqi Alliance
On July 16, 2009 Al-Hayat newspaper reported that Moqtada al-Sadr visited Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, the leader of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) in his Tehran hospital. Sadr said he was interested in rejoining the United Iraqi Alliance, which the Sadrists left in September 2007. The new alliance is due to be announced later this month according to a Supreme Council member. In February 2009 Sadr issued a statement saying that he would come back to the Alliance as long as it was renamed, the SIIC was no longer leading it, and that it was non-sectarian. Those talks fell apart in May when the Sadrists said they would run independently in the January 2010 parliamentary vote. The change in the Sadrists' position could be due to the influence of Iran, which is applying strong pressure upon the leading Shiite parties to re-unite and run together in the next round of balloting in Iraq.
One of the main goals of Tehran is to ensure friendly Shiite rule in Iraq so that it never becomes a rival again. Following this Iran wants the main Shiite parties to be united during elections, so they stay in power. In 2005 Iran helped put together the United Iraqi Alliance, and gave them printing presses, advisors, broadcast equipment, and stuffed ballot boxes. Since the January 2009 provincial elections, Iran has been pushing for the Alliance to be revived. In January, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki ran his own State of Law List, which trumped the Supreme Council in most of southern Iraq. Iran was afraid of further fracturing by the Shiites, and began pressuring them to run together in 2010.
Iranian officials began traveling to Iraq shortly after the provincial vote. On February 11, Iran’s Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki came to Baghdad to mediate between the estranged Dawa Party and SIIC. On March 2 Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, the head of Iran’s Expediency Council came to Iraq for five days. He was followed by the speaker of Iran’s parliament Ali Larijani who came at the end of that month.
Domestic Iraqi politics also played into this Iranian policy. In early 2009 the Supreme Council and their allies in parliament were threatening a no confidence vote against Maliki. The Prime Minister was forced to reach out to them to stop this from happening. Their price was for Maliki to rejoin the United Alliance. This appealed to Maliki, because if he was given the leadership position in the list it could help his chances of maintaining his office. The SIIC was also hoping to ride Maliki’s coattails back into power after their loses in the provincial councils. There is still a lot of mistrust between the two, but mutual ambition appears to be bringing them back together with ample pressure from Tehran.
May 2009 saw a renewed drive by Tehran and SIIC leader Hakim to get the Shiite parties back together. On May 13, Hakim publicly announced that he wanted the United Alliance reformed. The chairman of the SIIC Humam Hammudi was given responsibility for re-organizing the List, while Ahmad Chalabi was tasked with bringing back the old members of the Alliance.
Most of the negotiations for the revival of the Alliance occurred in Hakim’s Tehran hospital where he is undergoing cancer treatment. On May 14 Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited Hakim. Six days later Ibrahim al-Jaafari of the National Reform Trend and Iraq’s Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari came to Hakim’s hospital. Hakim also met with Hadi al-Amiri, the head of the Badr Organization. At the end of the month Maliki flew to Tehran to consul with Hakim. Iran’s Foreign Minister Mottaki was present. Maliki then met with Supreme Iranian leader Ayatollah Ali Khamanei who also pressured him on the United Alliance.
These moves have apparently paid off for Iran for now. On June 19, al-Hayat reported that Maliki and the SIIC had agreed to revive the United Iraqi Alliance. It would now be called the Coalition of the State of Law, and the Prime Minister would be its leader. Sadr’s meeting with Hakim this month, almost completes the original line-up of the Alliance. If these parties do run together it would be a big victory for Iran’s policy, and a step backwards for Iraq. In the 2009 vote, Iraqi nationalism made a revival. The re-birth of the United Alliance would be a return to the sectarian politics of the past. Early reports that the new election law will also maintain the 2005 closed list system where voters only get to vote for lists and not individual candidates is another sign that the major parties are more interested in maintaining their positions rather than advancing the country’s interests. The leading Shiite parties also do not seem to have any problems with playing along with Iran, as long as it helps them win.
SOURCES
Allam, Hannah, Landay, Jonathan, and Strobel, Warren, “Is an Iranian general the most powerful man in Iraq?” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/28/08
Alsumaria, “Al Sadr agrees to reengage in Coalition,” 7/16/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Elections draft law completed without agreeing on Kirkuk – MP,” 7/15/09
Barzegar, Kayhan, “Iran’s Foreign Policy in Post-invasion Iraq,” Middle East Policy Council Journal, Winter 2008
Domergue, Jeremy and Cochrane, Marisa, “Balancing Maliki,” Institute for Understanding War, June 2009
Elkhamri, Mounir, “Iran’s Contribution to the Civil War in Iraq,” Jamestown Foundation, January 2007
Gwertzman, Bernard, “Iraq at Crossroads Amid U.S. Disengagement,” Council on Foreign Relations, 6/30/09
Kaplow, Larry, “Iraq Steps Out of Iran’s Shadow,” Newsweek, 6/6/09
Mohsen, Amer, “Iraq Papers Sat: The I’tilaf is Back!” IraqSlogger.com, 6/19/09
- “Iraq Papers Wed: Oil Contracts in Jeopardy,” IraqSlogger.com, 6/16/09
Parker, Ned, “Sadr’s bloc quits Iraq’s ruling coalition,” Times of London, 9/16/07
Press TV, “Iraq’s Maliki at Hakim’s bedside in Tehran,” 5/31/09
Al-Sharqiyah Television, “Iraq roundup: Al-Sadr Trend mediates in Ninawa; security incidents,” BBC Monitoring Service, 6/14/09
- “’Special groups’ leaders arrested in Iraq; political, security roundup,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 6/15/09
- “US troops start withdrawal from Al-Sadr City; Iraq roundup,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 5/29/09
One of the main goals of Tehran is to ensure friendly Shiite rule in Iraq so that it never becomes a rival again. Following this Iran wants the main Shiite parties to be united during elections, so they stay in power. In 2005 Iran helped put together the United Iraqi Alliance, and gave them printing presses, advisors, broadcast equipment, and stuffed ballot boxes. Since the January 2009 provincial elections, Iran has been pushing for the Alliance to be revived. In January, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki ran his own State of Law List, which trumped the Supreme Council in most of southern Iraq. Iran was afraid of further fracturing by the Shiites, and began pressuring them to run together in 2010.
Iranian officials began traveling to Iraq shortly after the provincial vote. On February 11, Iran’s Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki came to Baghdad to mediate between the estranged Dawa Party and SIIC. On March 2 Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, the head of Iran’s Expediency Council came to Iraq for five days. He was followed by the speaker of Iran’s parliament Ali Larijani who came at the end of that month.
Domestic Iraqi politics also played into this Iranian policy. In early 2009 the Supreme Council and their allies in parliament were threatening a no confidence vote against Maliki. The Prime Minister was forced to reach out to them to stop this from happening. Their price was for Maliki to rejoin the United Alliance. This appealed to Maliki, because if he was given the leadership position in the list it could help his chances of maintaining his office. The SIIC was also hoping to ride Maliki’s coattails back into power after their loses in the provincial councils. There is still a lot of mistrust between the two, but mutual ambition appears to be bringing them back together with ample pressure from Tehran.
May 2009 saw a renewed drive by Tehran and SIIC leader Hakim to get the Shiite parties back together. On May 13, Hakim publicly announced that he wanted the United Alliance reformed. The chairman of the SIIC Humam Hammudi was given responsibility for re-organizing the List, while Ahmad Chalabi was tasked with bringing back the old members of the Alliance.
Most of the negotiations for the revival of the Alliance occurred in Hakim’s Tehran hospital where he is undergoing cancer treatment. On May 14 Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited Hakim. Six days later Ibrahim al-Jaafari of the National Reform Trend and Iraq’s Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari came to Hakim’s hospital. Hakim also met with Hadi al-Amiri, the head of the Badr Organization. At the end of the month Maliki flew to Tehran to consul with Hakim. Iran’s Foreign Minister Mottaki was present. Maliki then met with Supreme Iranian leader Ayatollah Ali Khamanei who also pressured him on the United Alliance.
These moves have apparently paid off for Iran for now. On June 19, al-Hayat reported that Maliki and the SIIC had agreed to revive the United Iraqi Alliance. It would now be called the Coalition of the State of Law, and the Prime Minister would be its leader. Sadr’s meeting with Hakim this month, almost completes the original line-up of the Alliance. If these parties do run together it would be a big victory for Iran’s policy, and a step backwards for Iraq. In the 2009 vote, Iraqi nationalism made a revival. The re-birth of the United Alliance would be a return to the sectarian politics of the past. Early reports that the new election law will also maintain the 2005 closed list system where voters only get to vote for lists and not individual candidates is another sign that the major parties are more interested in maintaining their positions rather than advancing the country’s interests. The leading Shiite parties also do not seem to have any problems with playing along with Iran, as long as it helps them win.
SOURCES
Allam, Hannah, Landay, Jonathan, and Strobel, Warren, “Is an Iranian general the most powerful man in Iraq?” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/28/08
Alsumaria, “Al Sadr agrees to reengage in Coalition,” 7/16/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Elections draft law completed without agreeing on Kirkuk – MP,” 7/15/09
Barzegar, Kayhan, “Iran’s Foreign Policy in Post-invasion Iraq,” Middle East Policy Council Journal, Winter 2008
Domergue, Jeremy and Cochrane, Marisa, “Balancing Maliki,” Institute for Understanding War, June 2009
Elkhamri, Mounir, “Iran’s Contribution to the Civil War in Iraq,” Jamestown Foundation, January 2007
Gwertzman, Bernard, “Iraq at Crossroads Amid U.S. Disengagement,” Council on Foreign Relations, 6/30/09
Kaplow, Larry, “Iraq Steps Out of Iran’s Shadow,” Newsweek, 6/6/09
Mohsen, Amer, “Iraq Papers Sat: The I’tilaf is Back!” IraqSlogger.com, 6/19/09
- “Iraq Papers Wed: Oil Contracts in Jeopardy,” IraqSlogger.com, 6/16/09
Parker, Ned, “Sadr’s bloc quits Iraq’s ruling coalition,” Times of London, 9/16/07
Press TV, “Iraq’s Maliki at Hakim’s bedside in Tehran,” 5/31/09
Al-Sharqiyah Television, “Iraq roundup: Al-Sadr Trend mediates in Ninawa; security incidents,” BBC Monitoring Service, 6/14/09
- “’Special groups’ leaders arrested in Iraq; political, security roundup,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 6/15/09
- “US troops start withdrawal from Al-Sadr City; Iraq roundup,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 5/29/09
Wednesday, July 22, 2009
5 Revolutionary Guards Members Let Go By U.S.
On July 10, 2009 the U.S. released five Iranian operatives that had been in custody for two and a half years. They were let go under the Status of Forces Agreement, which says all prisoners held by the U.S. must be freed or turned over to the Iraqis by 2011. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki requested that the Iranians be released, and he met with them before they were turned over to the Iranian embassy in Baghdad. The Iranians were originally rounded up as part of an American plan to break-up Tehran’s lethal support of Shiite militias that missed Iran’s main goal in Iraq.
On January 11, 2007 the U.S. raided the Iranian Liaison Offices in Irbil and arrested the five Iranians. At that time President Bush ordered that Iranian agents operating within Iraq be killed or captured. The office was a local headquarters for the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Qods Force. At the Irbil airport the Kurdish peshmerga stopped the Americans from arresting two other Iranians, who were the real target of the operation. The five captured at the Liaison Office were junior offices, while the two that got away at the airport were Mohammed Jafari, the deputy on the Iranian National Security Council, and General Minojahar Frouzanda, the head of the Revolutionary Guards’ intelligence service. Jafari and Frouzanda were on an official visit to Kurdistan, and met with Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and Kurdistan Regional Government President Massoud Barzani. The Kurds immediately protested the detentions, and demanded that the 5 Iranians be released. The U.S. refused saying they were involved in attacks on American and Iraqi forces.
Iranians had been operating in Kurdistan for twenty years, and had offices in Irbil and Sulaymaniya. The two ruling Kurdish parties were based in Iran during Saddam’s time, and both fought on the Iranian side during the Iran-Iraq War. It was at that time that the Revolutionary Guards began operating out of Kurdistan.
The offensive against Iran’s Qods Force began the month before. In December 2006, the U.S. arrested Iranian General Mohsen Chirazi and Colonel Abu Amad Davari. They were arrested in the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s (SIIC) compound in Baghdad. The two had invitations to be in Iraq from Pres. Talabani. Chirazi was the number three man in the Qods Force, and the highest Iranian captured by the U.S. Both were released a week later after protests by Iraqi officials.
Again, it was no surprise that Iranians were found at this location. The Supreme Council was created by Iran during the Iran-Iraq War, and recognized Ayatollah Khomeini as their leader. The SIIC’s militia the Badr Brigade was an official arm of the Qods Force, and fought on the Iranian side during the war like the two Kurdish parties. In fact, Chirazi and Davari were at the SIIC compound to meet the leader of the Badr Brigade when the Americans arrested them.
Later in September 2007, the U.S. arrested the Iranian trade delegate in Sulaymaniya. Iraqi President Talabani protested again and demanded his release. The Kurds claimed the Iranian had been in town for a week working on a new border crossing between Kurdistan and Iran. The Iranian was Mahmud Farhadi. He was a commander in the Qods Force Ramadan Corps. The Corps was one of four created to operate within neighboring countries. The Ramadan Corps set up three regional commands along the Iraqi border known as Nasr, Zafar, and Fajr, to deal with different parts of Iraq. Farhadi was in charge of the Nasr command. He was probably in Sulaymaniya for what the Kurds said as the Qods Force is also in charge of economic ties with Iraq.
When the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003 it was seen as a great threat and opportunity by Tehran. They sent in their operatives and friendly Iraqi parties to shape the facts on the ground to their advantage. The SIIC had been able to win over the Americans before the war, and became the main Shiite party they supported. The Qods Force helped put together the United Iraqi Alliance, which won the most seats in the 2005 parliamentary elections, and broke the deadlock to put Nouri al-Maliki into office in 2006. This was all to ensure Shiite rule in Iraq, and maximize Iranian influence. At the same time, the Qods Force began funneling money and weapons to any and all Shiite militias that would fight the Americans to hold them down in Iraq so that they wouldn’t attack Iran, and hopefully eventually make them leave. The arrest of the Iranians was aimed at that military effort. While the U.S. was successful in arresting some Qods Force members and the militias they supported, it’s questionable whether these had any real effect upon Iran’s support for Shiite militants. That didn’t really seem to change until Maliki’s crackdown in Basra in March 2008. More importantly, the U.S. never addressed Tehran’s political policy, and in fact supported the SIIC, the most pro-Iranian Shiite party, and helped integrate their Badr Brigade into the Iraqi security forces. In forging this strategy, the Bush administration got caught up on the security situation, and ignored Iran’s main goal, to ensure that Iraq never became a rival again by putting their allies in power. While the Americans were understandably mad at having to release these five Qods Force operatives, it was another sign of their misinterpretation of Iran’s true motives and goals in Iraq.
SOURCES
Allam, Hannah, Landay, Jonathan, and Strobel, Warren, “Is an Iranian general the most powerful man in Iraq?” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/28/08
Beehner, Lionel, Bruno, Greg, “Iran’s Involvement in Iraq,” Council on Foreign Relations, 3/3/08
CNN, “U.S. raid on Iranian consulate angers Kurds,” 1/11/07
Cockburn, Patrick, “The botched US raid that led to the hostage crisis,” Independent, 4/3/07
Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08
Kagan, Kimberly, “Iran’s Proxy War against the United States and the Iraqi Government,” Institute for the Study of War, 8/20/07
Kaplow, Larry, “Iraq Steps Out of Iran’s Shadow,” Newsweek, 6/6/09
Lake, Eli, “GIs Raid Iranian Building in Irbil,” New York Sun, 1/12/07
Linzer, Dafna, “Troops Authorized to Kill Iranian Operatives in Iraq,” Washington Post, 1/26/07
Myers, Steven Lee, “Americans Release Iranian Detainees to Iraq,” New York Times, 7/10/09
Parker, Ned, “Iraqi militia leader’s death shatters truce,” Los Angeles Times, 9/23/07
Phillips, James, “Iran’s Hostile Policies in Iraq,” Heritage Foundation, 4/30/07
Price, Jay and Taha, Yaseen, “Kurds denounce U.S. detention of Iranian,” McClatchy Newspapers, 9/20/07
Roggio, Bill, “Captured Iranian agent identified, 15 Special Groups operatives captured in Iraq,” Long War Journal.org, 9/30/07
- “Iran’s Ramazan Corps and the ratlines into Iraq,” Long War Journal.org, 12/5/07
- “Iranian involvement in Iraq: an old or a new case?” Long War Journal.org, 10/15/07
- “US releases Iranian Qods Force agents,” Long War Journal, 7/9/09
Roug, Louise and Daragahi, Borzou, “Iraq Edges Closer to Iran, With or Without the US,” Los Angeles Times, 1/16/07
Sanger, David, “Opening a New Front in the War, Against Iranians in Iraq,” New York Times, 1/15/07
Tehran Times, “Barzani vows to seek release of Iranian diplomats,” 10/23/08
Wright, Robin and Trejos, Nancy, “U.S. Troops Raid 2 Iranian Targets in Iraq, Detain 5 People,” Washington Post, 1/12/07
On January 11, 2007 the U.S. raided the Iranian Liaison Offices in Irbil and arrested the five Iranians. At that time President Bush ordered that Iranian agents operating within Iraq be killed or captured. The office was a local headquarters for the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Qods Force. At the Irbil airport the Kurdish peshmerga stopped the Americans from arresting two other Iranians, who were the real target of the operation. The five captured at the Liaison Office were junior offices, while the two that got away at the airport were Mohammed Jafari, the deputy on the Iranian National Security Council, and General Minojahar Frouzanda, the head of the Revolutionary Guards’ intelligence service. Jafari and Frouzanda were on an official visit to Kurdistan, and met with Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and Kurdistan Regional Government President Massoud Barzani. The Kurds immediately protested the detentions, and demanded that the 5 Iranians be released. The U.S. refused saying they were involved in attacks on American and Iraqi forces.
Iranians had been operating in Kurdistan for twenty years, and had offices in Irbil and Sulaymaniya. The two ruling Kurdish parties were based in Iran during Saddam’s time, and both fought on the Iranian side during the Iran-Iraq War. It was at that time that the Revolutionary Guards began operating out of Kurdistan.
The offensive against Iran’s Qods Force began the month before. In December 2006, the U.S. arrested Iranian General Mohsen Chirazi and Colonel Abu Amad Davari. They were arrested in the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s (SIIC) compound in Baghdad. The two had invitations to be in Iraq from Pres. Talabani. Chirazi was the number three man in the Qods Force, and the highest Iranian captured by the U.S. Both were released a week later after protests by Iraqi officials.
Again, it was no surprise that Iranians were found at this location. The Supreme Council was created by Iran during the Iran-Iraq War, and recognized Ayatollah Khomeini as their leader. The SIIC’s militia the Badr Brigade was an official arm of the Qods Force, and fought on the Iranian side during the war like the two Kurdish parties. In fact, Chirazi and Davari were at the SIIC compound to meet the leader of the Badr Brigade when the Americans arrested them.
Later in September 2007, the U.S. arrested the Iranian trade delegate in Sulaymaniya. Iraqi President Talabani protested again and demanded his release. The Kurds claimed the Iranian had been in town for a week working on a new border crossing between Kurdistan and Iran. The Iranian was Mahmud Farhadi. He was a commander in the Qods Force Ramadan Corps. The Corps was one of four created to operate within neighboring countries. The Ramadan Corps set up three regional commands along the Iraqi border known as Nasr, Zafar, and Fajr, to deal with different parts of Iraq. Farhadi was in charge of the Nasr command. He was probably in Sulaymaniya for what the Kurds said as the Qods Force is also in charge of economic ties with Iraq.
When the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003 it was seen as a great threat and opportunity by Tehran. They sent in their operatives and friendly Iraqi parties to shape the facts on the ground to their advantage. The SIIC had been able to win over the Americans before the war, and became the main Shiite party they supported. The Qods Force helped put together the United Iraqi Alliance, which won the most seats in the 2005 parliamentary elections, and broke the deadlock to put Nouri al-Maliki into office in 2006. This was all to ensure Shiite rule in Iraq, and maximize Iranian influence. At the same time, the Qods Force began funneling money and weapons to any and all Shiite militias that would fight the Americans to hold them down in Iraq so that they wouldn’t attack Iran, and hopefully eventually make them leave. The arrest of the Iranians was aimed at that military effort. While the U.S. was successful in arresting some Qods Force members and the militias they supported, it’s questionable whether these had any real effect upon Iran’s support for Shiite militants. That didn’t really seem to change until Maliki’s crackdown in Basra in March 2008. More importantly, the U.S. never addressed Tehran’s political policy, and in fact supported the SIIC, the most pro-Iranian Shiite party, and helped integrate their Badr Brigade into the Iraqi security forces. In forging this strategy, the Bush administration got caught up on the security situation, and ignored Iran’s main goal, to ensure that Iraq never became a rival again by putting their allies in power. While the Americans were understandably mad at having to release these five Qods Force operatives, it was another sign of their misinterpretation of Iran’s true motives and goals in Iraq.
SOURCES
Allam, Hannah, Landay, Jonathan, and Strobel, Warren, “Is an Iranian general the most powerful man in Iraq?” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/28/08
Beehner, Lionel, Bruno, Greg, “Iran’s Involvement in Iraq,” Council on Foreign Relations, 3/3/08
CNN, “U.S. raid on Iranian consulate angers Kurds,” 1/11/07
Cockburn, Patrick, “The botched US raid that led to the hostage crisis,” Independent, 4/3/07
Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08
Kagan, Kimberly, “Iran’s Proxy War against the United States and the Iraqi Government,” Institute for the Study of War, 8/20/07
Kaplow, Larry, “Iraq Steps Out of Iran’s Shadow,” Newsweek, 6/6/09
Lake, Eli, “GIs Raid Iranian Building in Irbil,” New York Sun, 1/12/07
Linzer, Dafna, “Troops Authorized to Kill Iranian Operatives in Iraq,” Washington Post, 1/26/07
Myers, Steven Lee, “Americans Release Iranian Detainees to Iraq,” New York Times, 7/10/09
Parker, Ned, “Iraqi militia leader’s death shatters truce,” Los Angeles Times, 9/23/07
Phillips, James, “Iran’s Hostile Policies in Iraq,” Heritage Foundation, 4/30/07
Price, Jay and Taha, Yaseen, “Kurds denounce U.S. detention of Iranian,” McClatchy Newspapers, 9/20/07
Roggio, Bill, “Captured Iranian agent identified, 15 Special Groups operatives captured in Iraq,” Long War Journal.org, 9/30/07
- “Iran’s Ramazan Corps and the ratlines into Iraq,” Long War Journal.org, 12/5/07
- “Iranian involvement in Iraq: an old or a new case?” Long War Journal.org, 10/15/07
- “US releases Iranian Qods Force agents,” Long War Journal, 7/9/09
Roug, Louise and Daragahi, Borzou, “Iraq Edges Closer to Iran, With or Without the US,” Los Angeles Times, 1/16/07
Sanger, David, “Opening a New Front in the War, Against Iranians in Iraq,” New York Times, 1/15/07
Tehran Times, “Barzani vows to seek release of Iranian diplomats,” 10/23/08
Wright, Robin and Trejos, Nancy, “U.S. Troops Raid 2 Iranian Targets in Iraq, Detain 5 People,” Washington Post, 1/12/07
Thursday, March 26, 2009
Iran-Iraq Trade To Increase
While recent headlines reported that U.S. forces shot down an Iranian drone in February 2009, economic ties between Iraq and Iran have continued to increase in the last few months. Iran is already one of Iraq’s largest trade partners, accounting for almost 50% of the country’s imports. Recently the two countries have signed a number of memorandums of understandings meant to boost trade to $5 billion by the end of the year.
On March 15, 2009 the Iraqi Ministry of Trade signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) for Iranian companies to provide products for Iraq’s Central Markets Company. This took place as part of an Iraqi trade delegation visit to Iran. The agreement would have Iranian businesses provide goods for state-run shopping centers that already sell almost exclusively Iranian products. The MoU was the latest part of a plan agreed to by both countries to boost trade to $5 billion by the end of 2009, with the goal of $10 billion by 2010.
In the previous month several other MoUs and deals were inked. One was with the Iraqi Trade Ministry. Another was with the Ministry of Housing to increase aid on construction. This occurred while Iraqi President Jalal Talabani was visiting Iran on his way back from South Korea. Earlier in February Iran won a $1.5 billion contract to construct a new town south of Basra that would include 5,000 housing units, schools, parks, and shops. It was the largest deal signed with Iran so far. All of the building supplies are supposed to come from Iran. The contract occurred just after Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki visited Iraq. It was during that trip that Iran and Iraq agreed to try to boost trade to $5 billion.
Iran represents almost half of all of Iraq’s imports. The head of the Iran-Iraq Economic Development Headquarters said in January 2009 that the two countries had traded over $3 billion in goods in 2008. UPI said that trade is at $4 billion now. The Wall Street Journal recently reported that in 2007 Iraq imported $2.7 billion from Iran. That was 48% of Iraq’s total, and 30% of Iran’s trade.
As reported before, Iraq has been flooded by imports since the U.S. invasion. This began when the Coalition Provisional Authority did away with Iraq’s tariffs and duties in an attempt to boost demand and get the economy going after the war. Iran stepped in, along with Syria, China, and others. Iranian products have a distinct advantage as Tehran heavily subsidizes its businesses. The effect on Iraq has been largely detrimental, as it has undercut many domestic industries. Iraqi companies have complained about the cheap imports, and demanded some protection, but the trade agreements have only increased.
SOURCES
Aswat al-Iraq, “Iraq, Iran sign MoUs in different spheres,” 2/28/09
- “Iraq, Iran sign MoUs to enhance trade,” 3/15/09
- “Iraq, Iran to up economic cooperation to $10b,” 1/4/09
Azzaman, “Iran wins $1.5 billion Basra construction contract,” 2/16/09
- “Trade Ministry signs deals to expand imports from Iran,” 3/17/09
Chon, Gina, “Iran’s Cheap Goods Stifle Iraq Economy,” Wall Street Journal, 3/18/09
Iran Daily, “Trade Between Iraq, Iran Hits $3b in 9 Months,” 1/6/09
Nordland, Rod and Rubin, Alissa, “U.S. Says It Shot Down an Iranian Drone Over Iraq,” New York Times, 3/17/09
Rath, Tiare, “Iraq Looks to Iran,” Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 1/15/09
Roads To Iraq Blog, “Iran’s new policy towards Iraq,” 3/8/09
UPI, “Iraq-Iran trade meeting pledges $5 billion,” 2/12/09
Xinhua, “Iraqi Factories Fight to Survive Turbulence,” 11/23/08
On March 15, 2009 the Iraqi Ministry of Trade signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) for Iranian companies to provide products for Iraq’s Central Markets Company. This took place as part of an Iraqi trade delegation visit to Iran. The agreement would have Iranian businesses provide goods for state-run shopping centers that already sell almost exclusively Iranian products. The MoU was the latest part of a plan agreed to by both countries to boost trade to $5 billion by the end of 2009, with the goal of $10 billion by 2010.
In the previous month several other MoUs and deals were inked. One was with the Iraqi Trade Ministry. Another was with the Ministry of Housing to increase aid on construction. This occurred while Iraqi President Jalal Talabani was visiting Iran on his way back from South Korea. Earlier in February Iran won a $1.5 billion contract to construct a new town south of Basra that would include 5,000 housing units, schools, parks, and shops. It was the largest deal signed with Iran so far. All of the building supplies are supposed to come from Iran. The contract occurred just after Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki visited Iraq. It was during that trip that Iran and Iraq agreed to try to boost trade to $5 billion.
Iran represents almost half of all of Iraq’s imports. The head of the Iran-Iraq Economic Development Headquarters said in January 2009 that the two countries had traded over $3 billion in goods in 2008. UPI said that trade is at $4 billion now. The Wall Street Journal recently reported that in 2007 Iraq imported $2.7 billion from Iran. That was 48% of Iraq’s total, and 30% of Iran’s trade.
As reported before, Iraq has been flooded by imports since the U.S. invasion. This began when the Coalition Provisional Authority did away with Iraq’s tariffs and duties in an attempt to boost demand and get the economy going after the war. Iran stepped in, along with Syria, China, and others. Iranian products have a distinct advantage as Tehran heavily subsidizes its businesses. The effect on Iraq has been largely detrimental, as it has undercut many domestic industries. Iraqi companies have complained about the cheap imports, and demanded some protection, but the trade agreements have only increased.
SOURCES
Aswat al-Iraq, “Iraq, Iran sign MoUs in different spheres,” 2/28/09
- “Iraq, Iran sign MoUs to enhance trade,” 3/15/09
- “Iraq, Iran to up economic cooperation to $10b,” 1/4/09
Azzaman, “Iran wins $1.5 billion Basra construction contract,” 2/16/09
- “Trade Ministry signs deals to expand imports from Iran,” 3/17/09
Chon, Gina, “Iran’s Cheap Goods Stifle Iraq Economy,” Wall Street Journal, 3/18/09
Iran Daily, “Trade Between Iraq, Iran Hits $3b in 9 Months,” 1/6/09
Nordland, Rod and Rubin, Alissa, “U.S. Says It Shot Down an Iranian Drone Over Iraq,” New York Times, 3/17/09
Rath, Tiare, “Iraq Looks to Iran,” Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 1/15/09
Roads To Iraq Blog, “Iran’s new policy towards Iraq,” 3/8/09
UPI, “Iraq-Iran trade meeting pledges $5 billion,” 2/12/09
Xinhua, “Iraqi Factories Fight to Survive Turbulence,” 11/23/08
Friday, March 20, 2009
Iran’s Policy Towards Iraq
In the winter 2008 addition of the Middle East Policy Council Journal, Iranian academic Kayhan Barzegar published an article entitled, “Iran’s Foreign Policy in Post-invasion Iraq.” It was a refutation of many common ideas about Tehran’s stance towards Iraq held by Americans and westerners. Barzegar is a professor of international relations at Azad University in Tehran, who is currently at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. Barzegar argues that rather than being offensive and ideological in nature, Iran’s Iraq policy is historically based upon long-standing ideas about Iranian-Arab relations, defensive in response to the new American military presence, and pragmatic, taking advantage of new opportunities that have evolved since the overthrow of Saddam.
Iran’s Worldview
Iran’s worldview has a major impact on its policy towards Iraq. Iran has a long history of conflict and rivalry with the Arab world. Iranian nationalism also says that Iranians are different from Arabs. Together this has led to a common belief that Arabs will always oppose Iran. The period of Saddam’s rule only re-enforced this belief. At the same time pan-Islamic ideas exist that say Iran needs to be involved in the Islamic world. For the decade after the Iranian Revolution this meant trying to spread the ideals of Ayatollah Khomeini, but since the 1990s, Tehran has been trying to reach out to Arab countries in a friendlier manner. Both of these factors have led the Iranian leadership to want to increase ties with the new Iraqi government so that they don’t develop into a rival again, and ensure Iran’s place in the region.
Iran’s Immediate Concerns In Iraq
Iran also has several immediate concerns in Iraq that shape policy. These include security, the history of the Iran-Iraq War, cultural ties, and economics. All of these together lead to a pragmatic approach to Iraq to make sure that there will not be conflict between the two again, that there can be a free flow of people across the border, and an increase in business opportunities.
The first is security. Iran wants to ensure the unity of Iraq, which is divided between Kurds, Sunnis, and Shiites. A break-up of Iraq could destabilize Iran. Iran and Iraq have also been historical rivals, and many Iranians believe that it could return to this role in the future. There is therefore an urge to improve ties between the two so that this won’t happen anytime soon. The Iranian opposition group Mujahadeen e-Khalq is also based in Iraq, which Tehran wants to keep in check.
Second are the lingering affects of the Iran-Iraq War. Many Iranians want to make sure that they did not fight the war for nothing. This has led to popular support for good relations so that another war might be prevented. According to the United Nations Iraq also owes Iran $149 billion in reparations. This has not been brought up by Iran lately, but it is a domestic issue. There are on-going disputes about the border between the two countries as well. Either or both issues could lead to conflicts in the future.
Third, is the desire amongst many Iranians to have good cultural relations with Iraq. This is tied up with access to the Shiite shrines in Karbala and Najaf in Iraq. Thousands of Iranians cross the border every month to go to these holy sites. Large numbers of Iraqis also go to Iran to visit Mashhad and Qom. Having open borders is important so that people can access to these areas.
Fourth Iran sees tremendous potential for economic gain in Iraq. Before the U.S. invasion most of Iran’s trade was through Jordan, Turkey and Russia. Now that Saddam is gone Iran has increased trade, tourism, and energy connections with Iraq. In February 2009 for example, the two countries signed a number of Memorandums of Understanding on industry, electricity, trade, and housing. They have also signed a deal to develop joint border oil fields. Every month similar announcements are made as the economic connections between the two are increasing.
Conflict With The U.S.
Just as important for Iran’s policy in Iraq is its conflict with the United States. For the last several decades, security in the Middle East has been largely defined by outside powers. From the 1970s on the U.S. tried to play Iran off of Iraq. The 2003 invasion disrupted this balance of power, and the U.S. has been attempting to rebuild it ever since. Iran has been adamantly opposed to re-creating this system, preferring a friendly Iraq rather than a new enemy. This conflict over ideas about security is at the heart of the dispute between Iran and the U.S.
This has led Iran to see the U.S. moves in Iraq as a threat. Initially, Tehran was afraid of the Bush administration’s talk of pre-emptive strikes and regime change. Having permanent American bases in Iraq was another major concern. The U.S. then began to blame Iran for instability in Iraq. The U.S. also portrayed itself as the arbitrator between the various factions in Iraq, which Iranians perceived as an invitation for a long-term presence. Finally, the U.S. has been emphasizing that if it leaves Iraq pre-maturely Iran will fill the vacuum and change the balance of the Middle East. This has led the U.S. to pressure neighboring Arab countries to improve ties with Iraq to counter Iran. Since Iraq is now Iran’s number one foreign concern, it can’t live with an American position that is attempting to turn Baghdad against Tehran. It has thus rejected cooperation with the U.S. because they have diametrically opposed visions. This has meant Iranian policy is as much defensive as pragmatic.
Ties With Iraq’s Shiite Factions
To ensure their interests, Iran has tried to establish friendly ties with all three major Shiite factions in Iraq, the Islamic Dawa party, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), and the Sadrists. Tehran’s main emphasis is upon relations with the government and the ruling parties. The Dawa and SIIC have long standing connections with Iran as many members lived in exile in Iran for years during the Saddam era. A lot of Shiites in the government also feel that they need Iranian support for now because the neighboring Sunni governments were none too friendly to Shiites taking power. It also allows for a counterweight to American influence.
Tehran also has ties with the Sadrists, but Barzegar believes this has been mostly tactical and short term to oppose the U.S. presence. The Sadrists are nationalists that have never expressed any desire for strategic relations with Iran. As the recent report by the Combating Terrorism Center revealed, many Sadrists saw aid from Iran as a marriage of convenience as well to gain weapons and money. The reason why the two cooperated was their mutual animosity at the American troop presence. The chances for long-term ties are therefore limited. In Basra for example, Iran supported various militia groups, but when the government launched its offensive against them in March 2008, Tehran stepped in to moderate the cease-fire rather than perpetuate the fighting because ties with Baghdad were more important than the Shiite gunmen. Iran will probably continue to work with factions that work with them such as the Special Groups, but it is not as important as Iran’s other concerns in Iraq.
Stance Towards Iraq’s Other Factions
Iran also has a policy towards Iraq’s nationalist, Sunni, and Kurdish parties. Tehran is not friendly with former Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi. He is a former Baathist that would probably attempt stronger ties with Sunni countries. Tehran also believes that many Sunnis are still deeply anti-Iranian and want to make sure they do not create another Iran-Iraq rivalry. The Kurds have had friendly relations with Iran, but it is worried about Kurdish independence. Any Kurdish state could be pro-Israel and pro-American, which would be a strategic threat to Iran. Tehran has thus tried to balance the Sunni and Kurdish parties in the government with the Shiites.
Refuting American Views of Iran’s Policy
One of Barzegar’s major arguments is that Americans and westerners have misinterpreted Tehran’s policy in Iraq. Many believe that Iran is driven by ideology and is following an offensive program in Iraq. Supporters of this view point to Iran’s ties with the Sadrists. There has also been much written about emerging Shiite power with Iran in its lead. While its true that Iran’s ideals do play a role in its foreign policy, and that for a decade after the overthrow of the Shah Iran tried to promote its revolution in the region, Barzegar believes that Iran has become much more strategic and opportunistic in the last few years. The ability to form an ideological alliance with Iraq’s Shiites for example is unlikely as the SIIC, Dawa, and the Sadrists all have different views of Iraq’s future and their relationship with Iran.
Conclusion
Overall, Iran wants to confront the American presence in Iraq, while taking advantage of the opportunities presented by the post-Saddam environment. Rather than being driven by ideology, Iraq’s worldview, and immediate cultural, political, and economic concerns according to Barzegar are driving Iran’s policy. They want friendly relations with Baghdad to prevent another rivalry, the free flow of people across the Iran-Iraq border, to increase business ties, see the U.S. leave, and stop their plans of creating an anti-Iranian Iraq. Tehran has largely been successful in all of these endeavors. For example, the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) signed between the U.S. and Iraq includes a withdrawal date for U.S. troops, and a promise not to use Iraq as a base to attack its neighbors, two clauses that were supported by Iran. In the January 2009 provincial elections many American analysts said that Tehran was a loser because their allies the SIIC lost, but Maliki still wants a unified Iraq and friendly relations with Iran. Those both fit Iran’s strategic goals. The point being that both Barzegar and the Combating Terrorism Center report argue that Iran is not attached to any individual, Sadr, or party, the SIIC, but rather wants influence within the government no matter who is at the helm. If Barzegar is right, then the question now is if the new Obama administration can accept an Iraqi government that is both friendly with the U.S. and Iran, and find some common ground with Tehran. If not, Iran will continue to oppose the Americans in Iraq, and reject cooperation.
SOURCES
Aswat al-Iraq, “Iraq, Iran sign MoUs in different spheres,” 2/28/09
Barzegar, Kayhan, “Iran’s Foreign Policy in Post-invasion Iraq,” Middle East Policy Council Journal, Winter 2008
Eggen, Dan and DeYoung, Karen, “Senior Iraqi Leader Says Pact With U.S. Is Unlikely to Pass,” Washington Post, 10/30/08
Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08
Hiltermann, Joost, “Iraq’s elections: winners, losers, and what’s next,” Global Democracy, 2/10/09
Peterson, Scott, “At Iraqi border outpost, signs of improving ties with Iran,” Christian Science Monitor, 12/22/08
Reuters, “Iraq says still at odds with Iran over border,” 3/9/09
Tehran Times, “Iran, Iraq ink energy cooperation deal,” 2/21/09
Zelikow, Philip, “The new strategic situation in Iraq,” Foreign Policy Online, 2/9/09
Iran’s Worldview
Iran’s worldview has a major impact on its policy towards Iraq. Iran has a long history of conflict and rivalry with the Arab world. Iranian nationalism also says that Iranians are different from Arabs. Together this has led to a common belief that Arabs will always oppose Iran. The period of Saddam’s rule only re-enforced this belief. At the same time pan-Islamic ideas exist that say Iran needs to be involved in the Islamic world. For the decade after the Iranian Revolution this meant trying to spread the ideals of Ayatollah Khomeini, but since the 1990s, Tehran has been trying to reach out to Arab countries in a friendlier manner. Both of these factors have led the Iranian leadership to want to increase ties with the new Iraqi government so that they don’t develop into a rival again, and ensure Iran’s place in the region.
Iran’s Immediate Concerns In Iraq
Iran also has several immediate concerns in Iraq that shape policy. These include security, the history of the Iran-Iraq War, cultural ties, and economics. All of these together lead to a pragmatic approach to Iraq to make sure that there will not be conflict between the two again, that there can be a free flow of people across the border, and an increase in business opportunities.
The first is security. Iran wants to ensure the unity of Iraq, which is divided between Kurds, Sunnis, and Shiites. A break-up of Iraq could destabilize Iran. Iran and Iraq have also been historical rivals, and many Iranians believe that it could return to this role in the future. There is therefore an urge to improve ties between the two so that this won’t happen anytime soon. The Iranian opposition group Mujahadeen e-Khalq is also based in Iraq, which Tehran wants to keep in check.
Second are the lingering affects of the Iran-Iraq War. Many Iranians want to make sure that they did not fight the war for nothing. This has led to popular support for good relations so that another war might be prevented. According to the United Nations Iraq also owes Iran $149 billion in reparations. This has not been brought up by Iran lately, but it is a domestic issue. There are on-going disputes about the border between the two countries as well. Either or both issues could lead to conflicts in the future.
Third, is the desire amongst many Iranians to have good cultural relations with Iraq. This is tied up with access to the Shiite shrines in Karbala and Najaf in Iraq. Thousands of Iranians cross the border every month to go to these holy sites. Large numbers of Iraqis also go to Iran to visit Mashhad and Qom. Having open borders is important so that people can access to these areas.
Fourth Iran sees tremendous potential for economic gain in Iraq. Before the U.S. invasion most of Iran’s trade was through Jordan, Turkey and Russia. Now that Saddam is gone Iran has increased trade, tourism, and energy connections with Iraq. In February 2009 for example, the two countries signed a number of Memorandums of Understanding on industry, electricity, trade, and housing. They have also signed a deal to develop joint border oil fields. Every month similar announcements are made as the economic connections between the two are increasing.
Conflict With The U.S.
Just as important for Iran’s policy in Iraq is its conflict with the United States. For the last several decades, security in the Middle East has been largely defined by outside powers. From the 1970s on the U.S. tried to play Iran off of Iraq. The 2003 invasion disrupted this balance of power, and the U.S. has been attempting to rebuild it ever since. Iran has been adamantly opposed to re-creating this system, preferring a friendly Iraq rather than a new enemy. This conflict over ideas about security is at the heart of the dispute between Iran and the U.S.
This has led Iran to see the U.S. moves in Iraq as a threat. Initially, Tehran was afraid of the Bush administration’s talk of pre-emptive strikes and regime change. Having permanent American bases in Iraq was another major concern. The U.S. then began to blame Iran for instability in Iraq. The U.S. also portrayed itself as the arbitrator between the various factions in Iraq, which Iranians perceived as an invitation for a long-term presence. Finally, the U.S. has been emphasizing that if it leaves Iraq pre-maturely Iran will fill the vacuum and change the balance of the Middle East. This has led the U.S. to pressure neighboring Arab countries to improve ties with Iraq to counter Iran. Since Iraq is now Iran’s number one foreign concern, it can’t live with an American position that is attempting to turn Baghdad against Tehran. It has thus rejected cooperation with the U.S. because they have diametrically opposed visions. This has meant Iranian policy is as much defensive as pragmatic.
Ties With Iraq’s Shiite Factions
To ensure their interests, Iran has tried to establish friendly ties with all three major Shiite factions in Iraq, the Islamic Dawa party, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), and the Sadrists. Tehran’s main emphasis is upon relations with the government and the ruling parties. The Dawa and SIIC have long standing connections with Iran as many members lived in exile in Iran for years during the Saddam era. A lot of Shiites in the government also feel that they need Iranian support for now because the neighboring Sunni governments were none too friendly to Shiites taking power. It also allows for a counterweight to American influence.
Tehran also has ties with the Sadrists, but Barzegar believes this has been mostly tactical and short term to oppose the U.S. presence. The Sadrists are nationalists that have never expressed any desire for strategic relations with Iran. As the recent report by the Combating Terrorism Center revealed, many Sadrists saw aid from Iran as a marriage of convenience as well to gain weapons and money. The reason why the two cooperated was their mutual animosity at the American troop presence. The chances for long-term ties are therefore limited. In Basra for example, Iran supported various militia groups, but when the government launched its offensive against them in March 2008, Tehran stepped in to moderate the cease-fire rather than perpetuate the fighting because ties with Baghdad were more important than the Shiite gunmen. Iran will probably continue to work with factions that work with them such as the Special Groups, but it is not as important as Iran’s other concerns in Iraq.
Stance Towards Iraq’s Other Factions
Iran also has a policy towards Iraq’s nationalist, Sunni, and Kurdish parties. Tehran is not friendly with former Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi. He is a former Baathist that would probably attempt stronger ties with Sunni countries. Tehran also believes that many Sunnis are still deeply anti-Iranian and want to make sure they do not create another Iran-Iraq rivalry. The Kurds have had friendly relations with Iran, but it is worried about Kurdish independence. Any Kurdish state could be pro-Israel and pro-American, which would be a strategic threat to Iran. Tehran has thus tried to balance the Sunni and Kurdish parties in the government with the Shiites.
Refuting American Views of Iran’s Policy
One of Barzegar’s major arguments is that Americans and westerners have misinterpreted Tehran’s policy in Iraq. Many believe that Iran is driven by ideology and is following an offensive program in Iraq. Supporters of this view point to Iran’s ties with the Sadrists. There has also been much written about emerging Shiite power with Iran in its lead. While its true that Iran’s ideals do play a role in its foreign policy, and that for a decade after the overthrow of the Shah Iran tried to promote its revolution in the region, Barzegar believes that Iran has become much more strategic and opportunistic in the last few years. The ability to form an ideological alliance with Iraq’s Shiites for example is unlikely as the SIIC, Dawa, and the Sadrists all have different views of Iraq’s future and their relationship with Iran.
Conclusion
Overall, Iran wants to confront the American presence in Iraq, while taking advantage of the opportunities presented by the post-Saddam environment. Rather than being driven by ideology, Iraq’s worldview, and immediate cultural, political, and economic concerns according to Barzegar are driving Iran’s policy. They want friendly relations with Baghdad to prevent another rivalry, the free flow of people across the Iran-Iraq border, to increase business ties, see the U.S. leave, and stop their plans of creating an anti-Iranian Iraq. Tehran has largely been successful in all of these endeavors. For example, the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) signed between the U.S. and Iraq includes a withdrawal date for U.S. troops, and a promise not to use Iraq as a base to attack its neighbors, two clauses that were supported by Iran. In the January 2009 provincial elections many American analysts said that Tehran was a loser because their allies the SIIC lost, but Maliki still wants a unified Iraq and friendly relations with Iran. Those both fit Iran’s strategic goals. The point being that both Barzegar and the Combating Terrorism Center report argue that Iran is not attached to any individual, Sadr, or party, the SIIC, but rather wants influence within the government no matter who is at the helm. If Barzegar is right, then the question now is if the new Obama administration can accept an Iraqi government that is both friendly with the U.S. and Iran, and find some common ground with Tehran. If not, Iran will continue to oppose the Americans in Iraq, and reject cooperation.
SOURCES
Aswat al-Iraq, “Iraq, Iran sign MoUs in different spheres,” 2/28/09
Barzegar, Kayhan, “Iran’s Foreign Policy in Post-invasion Iraq,” Middle East Policy Council Journal, Winter 2008
Eggen, Dan and DeYoung, Karen, “Senior Iraqi Leader Says Pact With U.S. Is Unlikely to Pass,” Washington Post, 10/30/08
Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08
Hiltermann, Joost, “Iraq’s elections: winners, losers, and what’s next,” Global Democracy, 2/10/09
Peterson, Scott, “At Iraqi border outpost, signs of improving ties with Iran,” Christian Science Monitor, 12/22/08
Reuters, “Iraq says still at odds with Iran over border,” 3/9/09
Tehran Times, “Iran, Iraq ink energy cooperation deal,” 2/21/09
Zelikow, Philip, “The new strategic situation in Iraq,” Foreign Policy Online, 2/9/09
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
