Showing posts with label Turkey. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Turkey. Show all posts

Wednesday, December 23, 2009

Electricity Output Reaches Post-Invasion High, But System Still Plagued By Problems

The Special Inspector for Iraq Reconstruction reported that for the fifth straight quarter Iraq’s average electricity supply increased from August to October 2009. For the 3rd quarter of 2009 Iraq produced 6,439 megawatts, a post-invasion high. That was a 10% increase from the 2nd quarter. In 2007 Iraq produced 4,488 megawatts, with 4,198 coming from the Ministry of Electricity, and 290 being imported. In 2009 the Ministry was responsible for 5,209 megawatts, 669 megawatts came from other countries, and 560 were from private generators. Iraq saw a 1,951 megawatt increase over those two years.

The growth in power supply comes from multiple sources. Half of the increase came from working on existing power plants at a cost of more than $2 billion in U.S. reconstruction aid since 2003. 29% of the increase was from two new private power plants opening in the Kurdistan Regional Government. 19% of this quarter's increase came from importing electricity from Iran and Turkey. In 2007 Turkey was the main supplier, providing 60% of imports, but since then Iran was eclipsed them, now accounting for 80%. The Electricity Ministry has also been able to make some small increases in its capacity. It has added two power plants on boats in Basra in 2009 for example, run by a Turkish company. They have a combined capacity of 250 megawatts.

The Ministry has bigger plans in store as well. In 2009 they finally got funding to buy turbines from General Electric and Siemens. These will be installed in twenty locations throughout the country. Every province except the three in Kurdistan will get at least one new power plant out of the deal. Construction is expected to begin in late 2010 or early 2011, and the new capacity will come on line in 2-6 years. When finished, the turbines will add an estimated 10,000 megawatts. There is a major problem with this plan however. Iraq's power grid cannot handle this increase. The transmission and distribution systems need to be renovated, but there are no plans to do so. There are also questions about whether the government will be able to provide fuel for all of these new plants adequately. The Electricity's Ministry promises therefore, may never be fulfilled. Baghdad will also have a hard time coming up with any extra money as it is facing a second year of budget deficits due to moderate oil prices, which provide almost all of its revenue.

Despite the recent increases, the national grid still does not meet the country’s demands. The Special Inspector General believes that the gap between supply and demand is twice what it was in 2003, although it has been slightly reduced since 2007. Based upon estimates it’s believed that the Electricity Ministry served 69% of the national demand in the 3rd quarters of 2009. In the 3rd quarter of 2007, it only met 54%. In terms of the provinces, Sulaymaniya, Basra, Irbil, and Diyala in that order did the best supplying electricity, meeting anywhere from 83% to 99% of demand. That’s because those governorates either have their own power plants or import large amounts from Iran. At the opposite end of the spectrum, Wasit, 51%, Maysan, 53%, Babil 56%, Ninewa and Najaf at 58%, do the worst serving their people. Because Iraqis cannot rely upon the government for its power, most rely upon private generators.

Electricity Supply And Demand By Provinces

Province
Avg. Daily Electricity Load Served (MW)
Avg. Daily Estimated Electricity Demand (MW)
Avg. Daily Demand Met
Sulaymaniya
352
357
99%
Basra
806
929
87%
Irbil
356
411
86%
Diyala
196
236
83%
Dhi Qar
289
405
71%
Salahaddin
275
385
71%
Tamim
222
325
68%
Muthanna
137
202
68%
Anbar
219
329
67%
Baghdad
1,718
2,571
67%
Dohuk
132
203
65%
Karbala
164
273
60%
Qadisiyah
150
253
59%
Najaf
216
375
58%
Ninewa
491
851
58%
Babil
240
425
56%
Maysan
145
273
53%
Wasit
155
304
51%

Iraq’s generators also do not operate up to their capabilities. Nameplate capacity is how much a generator should be able to produce in ideal conditions. Feasible capacity is how much it can produce given the actual conditions. Iraq has a nameplate generating capacity of 15,300 megawatts, and a feasible capacity of 11,150. Both were 4% increases from the 2nd quarter of 2009. However in the 3rd quarter Iraq only operated at 38% of nameplate capacity and 52% of feasible capacity. The Qudas power plant in Baghdad for example, which the U.S. spent $250 million to renovate, has a nameplate capacity of 910 megawatts, but only averages 429 megawatts of actual production, 47% of its nameplate capacity.

After the overthrow of Saddam, Iraqis went on a buying spree of consumer electronics. This has greatly increased demand for power, which has not been met by the increase in production. The lack of adequate funds, the inability of the Electricity Ministry to spend what it gets, not enough skilled and trained personnel, poor maintenance and aging equipment, along with subsidized energy and a large black market in generators encourages use rather than conservation. These all mean that demand will continue to increase in the near future, and even with the new power plants and renovations, the power system will still probably be running a deficit.

SOURCES

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, "Quarterly Report to the United States Congress," 10/30/09

Sunday, November 22, 2009

How Did Kirkuk Become Such A Divisive Issue? A Portrait of The City In 2003

The Pre-War Situation

As recent events have shown, Kirkuk remains one of the outstanding issues in Iraqi politics. Not only does it have a national dynamic between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Baghdad, but a local one between Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, and Christians who live there and are all arguing over who has the right to control it. How did it get that way? A portrait of Kirkuk and Tamim province immediately after the U.S. invasion helps explain at least a part of the story.

In the weeks just before the war began in March 2003 hundreds of Kurds were being driven out of Kirkuk by Saddam’s forces. The goal was to prepare for the American invasion and suppress the Kurds who were expected to help them. This followed a long trend of Baghdad trying to change the demographics of the area. Saddam’s Anfal campaign that started in the 1980s, and his Arabization policy that displaced around 150,000 Kurds, Turkmen, and Assyrian Christians were the most famous examples, but the Iraqi government had been trying to move Arabs into Tamim since at least the 1950s. It’s believed that up to 350,000 Kurds and Turkmen were forced to leave as a result. The population was also changed by the fact that Kirkuk was the hub of the northern oil industry that attracted workers from around the country.

This has led to all kinds of claims to the city by each of the three major ethnicities there. For example, the Kurds say they were and are presently the majority, while the Turkmen point to the 1947 census that showed they were the largest group. A reporter from PBS’ Frontline that entered Kirkuk right after the invasion said that at that time the Kurds were 45% of city, Turkmen 25%, and the remaining 30% were split between Arabs and Christians.

Human Rights Watch warned in late March 2003 that Kirkuk was a disaster waiting to happen. They said unless the U.S. made plans for all of the people that were expected to return to the province after being pushed out by Saddam there would be a crisis. U.S., Turkish, and Iraqi opposition officials actually did meet that month, and said they would set up a committee to deal with northern Iraq, but it never materialized. This was no different from the rest of Iraq, where the U.S. also failed to adequately plan for the post-war situation.

Kirkuk During The U.S. Invasion

As soon as the U.S. war began in March 2003 Iraqi forces began abandoning their positions along the border with Kurdistan. This opened the road to Kirkuk, which the Kurds had promised the Americans they would not enter. The melting away of Saddam’s army was too tempting however, and the Kurdish peshmerga rushed to fill the vacuum. Looting was immediately reported in northern Tamim as the Kurds took out their anger at the Iraqi government. The situation was completely fluid and under Kurdish control, as there were only 2,000 U.S. paratroops in all of northern Iraq, and 50 Green Berets with the frontline peshmerga.

On April 10, the Iraqi forces withdrew from Kirkuk after heavy U.S. bombing, and Kurdish militiamen and civilians moved in. This set off alarm bells in Turkey that was afraid of Kurdish independence. Ankara warned that they would send in their troops if necessary to prevent that from happening, and the Turkish Foreign Minister demanded that observers be sent in at the minimum. He later talked to Secretary of State Colin Powell to get assurances that the Kurds would not be in control of Kirkuk.

Pillaging began in the city as well. There were lines of trucks and cars going back and forth from Irbil and Sulaymaniya to Kirkuk, full of looted goods. While most of the stealing appeared to be happening in Kurdish and government areas, the Turkmen claimed that they were being victimized by the Kurds as well. A day after Kirkuk fell, the Turkmen even held a demonstration against the looting. U.S. soldiers said they were powerless to stop it because they did not have control of the situation, very similar to what happened in other Iraqi cities after the fall of the government. The U.S. commander in Tamim later said that his unit had no plans for dealing with Kirkuk when they went into the country. They were originally tasked with just protecting the oil fields in the province, and were to stay out of the city. They were compelled to break those orders when Kirkuk descended into chaos.

Because of pressure from Washington and Turkey, the Kurdish leadership announced that the peshmerga would withdraw from Kirkuk. At the same time though, Kurdish police from Sulaymaniya were entering the city to assert law and order, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) was attempting to take over the administration. A contingent from the U.S. 173rd Airborne Brigade also arrived, and Ankara sent in a small group of Turkish Special Forces as observers.

As the looting was being brought under control, there were the first reports of Arabs being expelled from the city and surrounding rural areas. Divas, a middle class neighborhood in Kirkuk that was built for Iraqi army officers was found largely abandoned after Kurds told them they had 24 hours to leave or be shot. On orders from local PUK officials, 2,000 members of the Shamar tribe who had been moved into Tamim in 1973 with the promise of free land by the government were also forced out of four villages. A PUK official in a neighboring town said this was part of his party’s policy to remove all the Arabs that moved into the province under Saddam. Senior PUK leaders denied this claim however.

Most Arabs actually fled before the U.S. invasion even began. According to interviews conducted by Human Rights Watch, the main reasons why they left were to escape the U.S. bombings and fighting, fear of the Kurds’ revenge, and a belief that much of the property they occupied actually belonged to the Kurds. Many relocated to Kirkuk at first, but then moved south. There were already refugee camps full of Arabs just a week after the fall of the city, and those who tried to return to their homes said Kurdish civilians and peshmerga stopped them.

The Turkmen were also singled out. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) gave an eviction notice to the Iraqi Turkmen Front’s headquarters in Kirkuk on April 13. The party said that the KDP warned them that there would be trouble if they didn’t leave.

Post-War Kirkuk

By May there were sporadic outbursts of violence between the different ethnic groups in Tamim. In that month, around 500 Arabs from the town of Hawija attacked the Kurdish part of Kirkuk, starting 36 hours of fighting. Five people were killed in the process. The cause was Kurdish harassment of some Arabs at a market and a bridge in the city two days beforehand. The Kurdish police also reported that Arabs had killed four Kurds in another neighborhood, and 40 people had been wounded since the fall of the city. American troops were later shot at in Hawija, showing that some elements were also mad at the U.S. for how things were going.

That anger increased when the Americans put together a governing council in Tamim. On May 25, a 300-member assembly of local leaders elected 30 delegates to the council. The Kurds, Turkmen, Arabs, and Christians got six delegates each, plus there were six independent members. That council went on to pick a governor. The day the council was seated the U.S. arrested five Arab members saying that they were Baathists. Two days before American forces arrested two other Arab leaders on the same charges. The Kurds ended up winning the mayor of Kirkuk, and got the majority of seats on the council when the Americans gave them five of the six independent positions.

In August 2003 violence flared up between Turkmen and Kurds. On August 22, Turkmen held a parade for a rebuilt Shiite shrine in the town of Tuz Khumato, south of Kirkuk. They got into an argument with Kurdish residents, who then tried to destroy the shrine with rocket-propelled grenades. The Turkmen rioted, burning down a police station. Eight Turkmen were killed as a result, two by U.S. forces. The Turkmen were mad at the Kurds and the Americans beforehand because they had appointed a Kurdish mayor and chief of police, even though the Turkmen were a majority there. The next day, Turkmen held a protest in Kirkuk that also led to rioting. Three Turkmen were killed, 15-20 demonstrators and police were wounded, and Kurds set about attacking Turkmen statues in the city. There the Turkmen were accusing the Kurds of flooding the city to create a majority to take it over, while Kurdish officials accused the Turkmen of being manipulated by Turkey.

These bursts of violence continued for the rest of the year, with no one willing to back down. On November 20, the PUK headquarters in Kirkuk was bombed and the Islamist Ansar al-Islam was suspected of being responsible. A month later demonstrations and counter-demonstrations by Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen for and against federalism in Kirkuk led to a shootout on December 31 leaving five dead. U.S. raids were also turning up illegal weapons in all of the major political parties’ offices including those of the KDP, PUK and Turkmen Front, as all sides seemed to be gearing up for a fight.

The Kurdish parties were also trying to create facts on the ground to support their call for Kirkuk to be annexed by Kurdistan. They encouraged people to move back to Kirkuk, and even offered money to each family that did. Once there, these returnees tended to live in tent camps or squatted on government property. By March 2004, there were around 25,000 Kurds living in these conditions. None of them said they’d gotten any money from the Kurdish parties however, and they were desperate to find work, and were relying upon the government food ration system. There were thousands more still in Kurdistan who said they would not go back unless they knew they had housing and jobs. Others said they were simply too poor to make the trip. While many of these people had a legitimate desire to return to Kirkuk, the Kurdish parties were also manipulating them in their attempt to rest control of the city for themselves.

There were Turkmen and Arabs in a very similar situation. Turkmen were also attempting to return to Kirkuk, and were forced to live in tent camps too, as well as Arabs that had fled the city before the invasion. By 2004 the Mahdi Army was organizing Shiite Arabs and Turkmen in the city against the Kurdish claims, and threatening people to not leave.

The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was very worried about the situation. Paul Bremer, the head of the CPA, was so concerned that he talked twice with Kurdish leaders asking them to drop their claims to Kirkuk, but to no avail. In September 2003 for example, the Kurdish President and head of the KDP Massoud Barzani said that all Arabs who had moved to Kirkuk and other Kurdish areas since 1961 had to leave. The CPA was panicking as a result, and did not offer any assistance to any of the Kurds that returned to Tamim, fearing that it would legitimize the Kurdish strategy.

By early 2004 the situation in Kirkuk and Tamim province were quickly deteriorating just as Human Rights Watch had warned about before the opening of hostilities. Reports of Arabs being expelled by Kurds after the fall of Kirkuk didn’t capture the fact that the majority had fled even before the war started. By June 2003 the Kurdish parties had cracked down on many of their members and there were no more stories of displacement. Much more important were the occasional flashes of violence, and the growing dispute over the governance of Kirkuk and Tamim. A year after the invasion, Kirkuk had grown from a local and regional problem to a national one as insurgents and the Mahdi Army were operating in the city, and the CPA was being drawn in. It seems that the divide and conquer strategy of Saddam Hussein was so effective that it continued to play out even after he was disposed. The Kurds, Turkmen, and Arabs were so tied up in their conflicting claims to Kirkuk that cooperation was nearly impossible. The lack of U.S. forces in the north also created a security vacuum that left every group to fend for itself, and the absence of U.S. planning for post-war Iraq allowed the PUK and KDP to become the de facto sovereigns of Kirkuk and many surrounding areas through their police and control of the administration. The subsequent years have only increased these divisions in the city, just as it has become more of an issue in Iraqi politics.

SOURCES

Badkhen, Anna, “Kurds evicting Arabs in north Iraq,” San Francisco Chronicle, 4/19/03

Baker, Luke, “Ancient Rivalries Vie for Dominance of Iraq’s Kirkuk,” Reuters, 2/5/04

BBC, “Kurds flee Iraqi town,” 3/15/03

Bruni, Frank, “A Nation At War: Northern Iraq; Turkey Sending Military Observers to Watch Kurds; U.S. Warns Against Further Moves,” New York Times, 4/11/03

Chivers, C.J., “A Nation At War: In The Field – Kirkuk; Iraqis Abandon Post And Kurds Advance,” New York Times, 3/28/03
- “A Nation At War: In The Field l Northern Iraq; Kirkuk on the Horizon, and a Falcon and Shells Nearby,” New York Times, 4/2/03
- “A Nation At War: Northern Front; Attention Now Shifts to the Role of the Kurds,” New York Times, 4/10/03
- “A Nation At War: Northern Iraq; Paratroopers Find Suspicious Warheads and Rocket Parts in Kirkuk,” New York Times, 4/13/03
- “A Nation At War: The Kurds; Kirkuk’s Swift Collapse Leaves a City in Chaos,” New York Times, 4/11/03

CNN, “U.S. reinforcements arrive in Kirkuk,” 4/10/03

Fleishman, Jeffrey, “Kirkuk Rises to Uneasy Freedom,” Los Angeles Times, 4/12/03

Human Rights Watch, “Claims in Conflict,” 8/2/04
- “Iraq: Impending Inter-Ethnic Violence in Kirkuk,” 3/27/03
- “Iraq: Killings, Expulsions on the Rise in Kirkuk,” 4/14/03

Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, “IDP News Alert: 16 April 2003,” 4/16/03
- “IDP News Alert: 23 April 2003,” 4/23/03

IRIN, “IRAQ: Focus on IDPs in Kirkuk living in poor conditions,” 3/1/04

Kiley, Sam, “IRAQ: The Road to Kirkuk,” Frontline, May 2003

Mite, Valentinas, “Turkomans Say Kirkuk’s Growing Kurdish Population A Threat,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 11/13/03

Mufti, Hania, Stover, Eric, “Troubles in Kirkuk,” San Francisco Chronicle, 4/30/03

Oppel, Richard with MacFarquhar, Neil, “After the War: Southern Iraq; 3 British Soldiers Are Killed in Basra Attack,” New York Times, 8/24/03

PBS Frontline, “Interview Col. William Mayville,” Beyond Baghdad, 2/12/04

Rhode, David, “A Nation At War: The North; As Kurds Move Into Kirkuk, Arabs Fear Revenge,” New York Times, 4/11/03

Sachs, Susan, “A Region Inflamed: Attacks; Truck Bomb Kills 5 in a Pro-U.S. Kurdish Stronghold in Northern Iraq,” New York Times, 11/21/03

Travernise, Sabrina, “After The War: The North; Kurds Celebrate Election of Mayor in Kirkuk,” New York Times, 5/29/03
- “After The War: Northern Iraq; U.S. Detains 5 Suspected Baath Loyalists at Kirkuk Elections,” New York Times, 5/25/03
- “Aftereffects: The North; Arabs and Kurds Clash in Kirkuk, and at Least 5 Are Killed,” New York Times, 5/18/03

Tyler, Patrick, “A Nation At War: Combat; Allies Widen Hold on Iraq; Civil Strife on Rise,” New York Times, 4/11/03

Voice of America, “Iraqi Kurds Return to Kirkuk,” 5/29/03

Washington Times, “Insurgents stir up strife in Kirkuk,” 5/17/04

Wong, Edward, “The Struggle for Iraq: Northern Iraq; Back From Exile, Kurds Demand Political Power and Reparations for Seized Property,” New York Times, 1/19/04

Friday, March 27, 2009

Possible End To The PKK-Turkish Conflict

The President of Turkey Abdullah Gul arrived in Iraq today, March 23, 2009. His started goal was to work with the government of Iraq to end the Kurdistan Workers Party’s (PKK) insurgency against Ankara. Iraqi President Jalal Talabani recently announced that he expected the PKK to end their fighting with Turkey in the coming months, and called on them to lay down their arms while meeting with President Gul. In April or May a meeting is planned in Irbil, Iraq of Kurds from throughout the region including Iraq, Iran, Syria, Turkey, and Europe. Talabani believes that the conference, in conjunction with moves by the Turkish government will lead the PKK to give up their armed struggle.

Talabani made his prediction while attending a water conference in Turkey in mid-March. There he met with President Gul and Turkish Prime Minster Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Both times, the leaders discussed the plight of the PKK. Specifically, Turkey is constructing a new reconciliation program with its Kurdish population. Already the Turks have given Kurds more rights, and opened a Kurdish language TV station. With regards to the PKK, Ankara is considering a new amnesty program that would allow PKK fighters to return to Turkey, and its leaders travel to other parts of Europe if they wish. Turkey is also trying to ensure Iraq’s cooperation on this matter as it has increased ties with both Baghdad and Kurdistan. Gul’s visit to Iraq was part of this effort. The PKK’s leader, Abdullah Ocalan, who is imprisoned in Turkey, said that he looks forward to this new proposal.

The PKK has been fighting the Turks since 1984. They claim that they do not want independence, but rights for Kurds in Turkey. The group has an estimated 4,000-5,000 fighters who are based in Iraq’s Kurdistan. Although the PKK is considered a terrorist group by many countries, Iraq’s Kurdish officials have given them unofficial support.

If Talabani’s statement comes true, the Kurdish meeting in Irbil could be an important turning point. The PKK presence in Iraq has complicated its relations with Turkey, made other regional countries worry that the Kurdistan Regional Government is allowing its territory to be used by various Kurdish guerrilla and independence movements, and been another source of tension with Baghdad. Every few months the Turks have attacked PKK bases as a result, the most recent having occurred this month. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has also demanded that the PKK camps be shut down, but the Kurdish authorities have refused. An amnesty program and cessation of attacks could be the political solution to this complicated matter.

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “Talabani expects Kurds to lay down arms,” 3/19/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Gul’s Iraq visit aims to ‘liquidate’ PKK rebels-official,” 3/23/09

Calvan, Bobby Caina and Taha, Yaseen, “Maliki can’t stop PKK attacks, officials say,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/24/07

Al Jazeera, “Iraq calls on PKK to disarm,” 3/23/09

Partlow, Joshua, “A Kurdish Society of Soldiers,” Washington Post, 3/8/08

Seibert, Thomas, “New steps seen to end Turkish war on Kurds,” The National, 3/17/09

Tavernise, Sabrina, “In the Rugged North of Iraq, Kurdish Rebels Flout Turkey,” New York Times, 10/29/07

Xinhua, “Iraqi president: Independent Kurdish state in Iraq ‘impossible,’” 3/17/09

Monday, April 23, 2007

An Update on Kirkuk

Following-up on a blog entry last week where I discussed the sensitive situation in Kirkuk, there has been yet another update worth checking out. Along with last week's ICG report, today's Washington Post has a piece that supports what Ignatius was saying last week. Al Kamen explains that:
"While everyone's been focusing on Baghdad as the key to getting things calmed down in Iraq, the situation in Kirkuk to the north is edging toward serious trouble."
The Arabs are a third party involved in the dispute over Kirkuk, which makes matters even more complicated. The history of an Arab presence there dates back to the Saddam regime, when he had them relocate from the south to occupy the oil rich city. Today, Kurds are worried about the impact the Arab vote will have on the upcoming referendum to decide who will control the city. Kamen explains that, "Arabs are being encouraged to go back 'home,' wherever that is. Kurds whom Saddam kicked out are coming back...and Turkey continues to be concerned about the large Turkmen population in the city."

The army is trying to deal with the potential problem, and has put forth a "request for information" from contractors and urban planners for "the design of the Kirkuk Master Plan" according to Kamen. This plan is meant to target problems concerning land use and "other developments." There is still no mention of conflict resolution strategies and as Epic has said before, there must be a diplomatic effort for real reconciliation to take place. It seems Kamen agrees that there is more to the problem in Kirkuk than just devising a plan that urban planners and contractors can address:
"'Other developments'? Well, unless the tensions can be defused, this might include congestion created by troop movements, tank routes and battery placements...Planners might want to widen streets for evacuation routes...But at least there'll be a plan."

Again, a diplomatic resolution is long over-due for the complex situation in Kirkuk. A diplomatic resolution will ensure that all parties can be content with the outcome, and that these tensions don't spill over into more destabilization in the country. Washington should be a leader in fostering that dialogue between all parties. "If a ray of hope shines through this dismal tangle, it is that all sides in Kirkuk currently seem to agree on the need for dialogue" (ICG 2007).

Wednesday, April 18, 2007

Dispute Over Kirkuk Could Lead to Further Destabilization

Today in The Washington Post, David Ignatius, calls attention to a threat that, if not adequately addressed, will pose yet another serious danger to the security of Iraq. Kurdistan, which had been viewed by many as one of the few successes the United States has had in Iraq, could now be the center of further destabilization in the country. According to Ignatius, historic tensions between Turkey and the Kurdish north have become heightened over the past year, and Washington's attempts to stabilize a potential confrontation may not be enough.

There are many factors that are contributing to this already sensitive relationship, one of them being the oil-rich city of Kirkuk that Kurds have claimed, but which Turks regard as a protectorate because of the large Turkmen population residing there. Both sides have made serious verbal threats recently:
"Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani warned that if the Turks meddled in Kirkuk, 'then we will take action for the 30 million Kurds in Turkey.' Turkish General Yasar Buyukanit responded that he favored an invasion of Iraq to clean out the militant Kurdish political party (PKK)."
EPIC, along with others, has supported a political solution to the dispute over Kirkuk. The December 2007 referendum on the future of the city, which Kurds are confident they will win, could be a catalyst for furthering anxieties on both sides if conflict resolution strategies are not an integral part of resolving the problem. Addressing the dispute is essential in the stabilization and reconciliation of Iraq, but it is a problem that has been neglected for far too long. According to the International Crisis Group (ICG) in a July 2006 report:
"Given the high stakes, the international community cannot afford to stand by, allowing the situation to slip into chaos by default. It needs to step-in and propose a solution that addresses all sides' core concerns without crossing their existential red lines."
Click here to read the rest of ICG's recommendations on Kirkuk.

UPDATE: ICG just released a new report called "Iraq and the Kurds: Resolving the Kirkuk Crisis."
 
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