Hilterman and Gabaudan strongly agree that Iraq’s stability can be improved by addressing the displacement crisis. The ICG Report describes how the forced exodus of millions of Iraqis profoundly impacts the security situation, an interaction generally overlooked by the American public.
Triggered by the violence in Iraq, the refugee crisis indirectly helps sustain and finance it [insurgency]. Armed groups whose actions led Iraqis to flee eagerly seized the properties they abandoned, either allocating them to supporters and co-religionists or selling them to generate funds. Such large-scale expropriation likely will fuel future strife if and when refugees return and try to reclaim their homes. As refugees fled, they often were robbed by armed militias and criminal gangs or charged levies at unofficial checkpoints manned by armed groups. Moreover, the exodus contributed to the sectarian homogenization of formerly mixed neighborhoods; this enabled armed groups to consolidate their control, recruit new fighters and levy taxes and fees to bankroll their violent activities. All in all, militias and armed groups exploited the refugee crisis for self-enrichment and war racketeering.
As the ICG Report demonstrates, the humanitarian crisis and security situation are directly connected and both must be addressed to create stability. Furthermore, the panelists discussed how, at play in Iraq right now is a destabilizing and vicious cycle with violence causing displacement, which incites further violence. The report examines other ways in which the cycle manifests itself:
The mass exodus jeopardized Iraq's stability in yet another way. Many who left are professionals and administrators from the middle class. A shortage of such skilled laborers and managers inevitably hinders reconstruction. The reverse also is true: among those who remained are many who benefited from patronage or political protection. Having taken de facto control of the state's mid-management levels, they will not readily relinquish their gains. In other words, the refugee crisis further politicized the bureaucracy. Overall, these dynamics have given rise to a vicious economic cycle: violence triggers flight, flight hampers reconstruction, and faltering reconstruction in turn fuels violence.
Hiltermann and Gabaudan stressed that the humanitarian crisis in Iraq is directly linked to security conditions, and therefore national stability. During the forum, Hiltermann noted that this serves as the perfect example of a "crossover issue where humanitarian issues have a great impact on the issue of stability and peace."
To create a more peaceful and secure Iraq, this destabilizing cycle of violence and displacement must be halted. Actively confronting the humanitarian crisis and addressing the needs of vulnerable Iraqis will help bring about stability and security to the nation and facilitate a safe environment for all Iraqis.
Today in The Washington Post, David Ignatius, calls attention to a threat that, if not adequately addressed, will pose yet another serious danger to the security of Iraq. Kurdistan, which had been viewed by many as one of the few successes the United States has had in Iraq, could now be the center of further destabilization in the country. According to Ignatius, historic tensions between Turkey and the Kurdish north have become heightened over the past year, and Washington's attempts to stabilize a potential confrontation may not be enough. There are many factors that are contributing to this already sensitive relationship, one of them being the oil-rich city of Kirkuk that Kurds have claimed, but which Turks regard as a protectorate because of the large Turkmen population residing there. Both sides have made serious verbal threats recently:
"Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani warned that if the Turks meddled in Kirkuk, 'then we will take action for the 30 million Kurds in Turkey.' Turkish General Yasar Buyukanit responded that he favored an invasion of Iraq to clean out the militant Kurdish political party (PKK)."
EPIC, along with others, has supported a political solution to the dispute over Kirkuk. The December 2007 referendum on the future of the city, which Kurds are confident they will win, could be a catalyst for furthering anxieties on both sides if conflict resolution strategies are not an integral part of resolving the problem. Addressing the dispute is essential in the stabilization and reconciliation of Iraq, but it is a problem that has been neglected for far too long. According to the International Crisis Group (ICG) in a July 2006 report:
"Given the high stakes, the international community cannot afford to stand by, allowing the situation to slip into chaos by default. It needs to step-in and propose a solution that addresses all sides' core concerns without crossing their existential red lines."
Click here to read the rest of ICG's recommendations on Kirkuk.
UPDATE: ICG just released a new report called "Iraq and the Kurds: Resolving the Kirkuk Crisis."
One of the most important contributions of the Iraq Study Group was that it cleared the way for a more honest debate on Iraq. The International Crisis Group has joined the debate with its recently released report, "After Baker-Hamilton: What to do in Iraq." ICG's premise is that while the ISG report is important it is insufficiently radical if Iraq’s collapse and an unprecedented regional war are to be avoided. Here are the report's main recommendations:
1. A new forceful multilateral approach that puts real pressure on all Iraqi parties. The Baker-Hamilton report is right to advocate a broad International Support Group; it should comprise the five permanent Security Council members and Iraq’s six neighbours. But its purpose must not be to support the Iraqi government. It must support Iraq, which means pressing the government, along with all other constituencies, to make necessary compromises. Contrary to the Baker-Hamilton report’s suggestion, the government and security forces should not be treated as privileged allies to be bolstered. They are but one among many parties to the conflict and not innocent of responsibility for much of the trouble. It also means agreeing on rules of conduct and red-lines for third-party involvement. Sustained multilateral diplomacy, not a one-off international conference is needed.
2. A conference of all Iraqi and international stakeholders to forge a new political compact. This is not a military challenge in which one side needs to be strengthened and another defeated. It is a political challenge in which new consensual understandings need to be reached. A new, more equitable and inclusive national compact needs to be agreed upon by all relevant actors, including militias and insurgent groups, on issues such as federalism, resource allocation, de-Baathification, the scope of the amnesty and the timetable for a U.S. withdrawal. This can only be done if the International Support Group brings all of them to the negotiating table, and if its members steer their deliberations, deploying a mixture of carrots and sticks to influence those on whom they have particular leverage.
3. A new U.S. regional strategy, including engagement with Syria and Iran, end of efforts at regime change, revitalisation of the Arab-Israeli peace process and altered strategic goals. Mere engagement of Iraq’s neighbours will not do; Washington must clearly redefine its objectives in the region to enlist regional, and particularly Iranian and Syrian help. The goal is not to bargain with them, but to seek compromise agreement on an end-state for Iraq and the region that is no one’s first choice, but with which all can live.
This is a very important report as it completely eviscerates any illusions that Washington may still have about Iraq after the Baker-Hamilton report. And it goes beyond the ISG's recommendation to engage Iraq's neighbors by explaining how the U.S. can realistically achieve this. For more on this I would direct you to my recent entry on "Dealing with Iran" which highlights a paper written by Flynt Levrett of the New America Foundation.
Last week, we attended an panel discussion with Joost Hiltermann of the International Crisis Group (ICG) and Michel Gabaudan of UNHCR: the UN Refugee Agency at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. They discussed the findings of ICG's new report, "Failed Responsibility: Iraqi Refugees in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon", which underscores the deepening crisis and failure of the Iraqi government and wider international community to meet the needs of vulnerable Iraqis.
