VP Hashemi Shoots Himself In The Foot With Veto Of Iraqi Election Law

On November 8, 2009 Iraq’s parliament finally passed an election bill after weeks of delay. Ten days later Vice President Tarqi al-Hashemi vetoed it. Hashemi objected to the fact that Iraq’s refugees, the majority of which are Sunnis, would have their votes go towards only eight compensatory seats that would also be shared with smaller parties that didn’t get enough votes at the provincial level, but did well nationally. The Iraqi Election Commission says that there should be one seat in parliament for every 100,000 people, and it’s generally believed that there are at least 2 million Iraqi refugees. The problem was that the Vice President tried to portray his act as a line-item veto, demanding a change in the number of seats set aside for refugees, while claiming that the rest of the bill should not be touched. This is not allowed under Iraqi law however. What his veto did in effect, was open the election bill to the demands of other parties that undermined his own goals.

As reported before, the Kurdish Alliance in parliament objected to the proposed increase in the parliamentary seats from 275 to 323 because the three Kurdish provinces got few to no new seats. Kurdistan Regional Government President Massoud Barzani even went as far as to threaten a Kurdish boycott unless the arrangements were changed. By vetoing the election bill, Hashemi empowered the Kurds to negotiate this very issue.

They aligned with the two major Shiite blocks, the Prime Minister’s State of Law and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, to pass an amendment on November 23 to the election bill. It skips Hashemi’s request for an increase in seats for refugees, by counting their votes as part of the provinces they were originally from, and rearranges the parliamentary seat allocations by province by using older 2005 statistics with a 2.8% increase for recent population growth, rather than 2009 numbers. Using the 2009 figures, Sunni provinces such as Ninewa were due for large increases in seats, but those will now go the Kurds instead. This suits the Shiite parties as well that were not enthusiastic about any extra seats in Sunni provinces.

Vice President Hashemi’s veto has thus backfired. He not only didn’t get the increases he requested for refugees, but the amendment reduces Sunni chances to get a larger say in parliament. When the changes were voted on members of the Iraqi Accordance Front, former Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List, and some Sadrists walked out. This will likely lead to another veto by Hashemi. The head of the Iraqi Election Commission said on November 19 that elections would be delayed because they can’t happen at the end of January 2010 as planned because that would coincide with Shiite religious ceremonies, while the constitution says that voting must be held no later than January 31. What is probably going to happen is that parliament will attempt to overturn Hashemi’s second expected veto, they need a three-fifths vote and the bill will become law, balloting will be held in February, and a caretaker government will have to be announced in the meantime. This all shows that Iraq is barely a country of laws as its politicians rarely if ever meet any deadlines, whether they’re self-imposed or in the constitution.

SOURCES

Arraf, Jane, “Iraq election official: Even if Kurdish boycott averted, January deadline impossible,” Christian Science Monitor, 11/20/09

Bakri, Nada, “Iraq’s parliament approves amended election law,” Washinogton Post, 11/23/09

Ibrahim, Waleed, “Iraqi parliament fails to reach election deal,” Reuters, 11/22/09

Londono, Ernesto, and Mizher, Qais, “Iraqi parliament passes election law after reaching deal on Kirkuk,” Washington Post, 11/9/09

Nordland, Rod, “Veto of Iraq’s Election Law Could Force Delay in Vote,” New York Times, 11/19/09

Roads To Iraq, “What happened today?” 11/23/09

Visser, Reidar, “Constitutional Disintegration,” Iraq And Gulf Analysis, 11/19/09
- “The Hashemi Veto Backfires, Parliament Ups the Ante,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 11/23/09

Neo-Baathist-Nationalist Coalition Announced

October 31, 2009 was the deadline to register coalitions for the 2010 parliamentary elections. On that day a new list called the Iraqi National Movement was announced made up of parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq of the National Dialogue Council, former Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi of the Iraqi National List, and Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi. He was the former leader of the Iraqi Islamic Party, but left to form his own Renewal List. Hashemi had been in negotiations with Allawi and Mutlaq since August, and there were talks with Interior Minister Jawad Bolani and his Constitution Party. He chose to join Sheikh Ahmad Abu Risha of Anbar to form the Unity Alliance instead. Allawi was also courted by the major Shiite coalition, the Iraqi National Alliance. Hashemi may be responsible for the Awakening Councils of Diyala joining the Iraqi National Movement as well. The Islamic Party successfully co-opted the Sons of Iraq/Awakening movement in Diyala in 2007-2008, which helped their Iraqi Accordance Front List to come in first place in the 2009 elections there.

The Iraqi National Movement includes both Shiites, Allawi, and Sunnis, Mutlaq and Hashemi, but its main appeal is to Baathists and nationalists. Since the U.S. invasion Mutlaq and Allawi have consistently pushed for the inclusion and rehabilitation of former army officers from Saddam’s time along with Baathists. Hashemi on the other hand has roots with the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist group that originated in Egypt, which gave birth to the Iraqi Islamic Party. All three also call for a strong central government, and to limit outside influences, especially from Iran.

Overall, the Iraqi National Movement is a medium sized coalition. In the 2009 provincial elections, Mutlaq and Allawi won 45 seats, accounting for 10.2% of the total. Allawi’s List gained seats in both the largely Sunni west and north, and a spattering across Shiite southern Iraq as well, and became part of the ruling coalitions in Babil, Qadisiyah, and Salahaddin. Mutlaq only gained representation in Sunnis areas, and came in second in Anbar where his party got the head of the council. In comparison, Maliki’s State of Law list won 140 seats, 31.8%, the Supreme Council got 55 seats, 12.5%, the Sadrists 41 seats, 9.3%, and former Prime Minister Ibrahima al-Jaafari 23 seats, 5.2%. Together those last three have formed the new Iraqi National Alliance, and got 119 seats total, 27.0%. The real importance of the Iraqi National Movement will be seen after the election, as no coalition is likely to even come out with a plurality. That will mean a huge amount of back door dealing and negotiations to name a new government, which will likely take months as it did the last two times Iraq went through that process.

Allawi and Mutlaq’s Showing In The 2009 Provincial Elections

Total Provincial Seats: 440

Allawi’s Iraqi National List – Provinces (# of seats)
Anbar (2)
Babil (3)
Baghdad (5)
Basra (2)
Diyala (3)
Qadisiyah (3)
Salahaddin (5)
Wasit (3)
TOTAL: 26, 5.9%

Mutlaq’s Iraqi National Project – Provinces (# of seats)
Anbar (6)
Baghdad (4)
Diyala (6)
Salahaddin (3)
TOTAL: 19, 4.3%

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iraqi VP joins forces with ex-PM to form new bloc,” 10/28/09

Alsumaria, “New Iraq political coalition in the offing,” 8/24/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Iraq’s Unity Alliance formally announced,” 10/21/09
- “VP announces new list for upcoming parliamentary elections,” 9/12/09

Iraq The Model, “Accord Front Collapses, Sunni Tribes Seek Shiite Allies,” 8/15/09

Al Jazeera, “Iraqi parties form new coalition,” 10/31/09

Roads To Iraq, “The National Movement,” 10/31/09

Visser, Reidar, “Allawi-Mutlak: Consolidation at the Centre of Iraqi Politics,” Ira and Gulf Analysis, 10/27/09

Maliki Attempts To Forge New Ruling Coalition

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law list was the biggest winner after the January 2009 provincial elections. Since the results have been announced Maliki has been maneuvering to create a new ruling coalition that would participate in the 2009 parliamentary elections and be his new source of support.

When Maliki became Prime Minister in 2006 he was backed by a coalition of Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds that followed the “national unity” model propagated by the Americans. His main supporters were the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance made up of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), Dawa – Iraq, the Sadrist Trend, the Fadhila Party, Maliki’s own Dawa Party, the Sunni Iraqi Accordance Front, the Kurdish Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and Kurdistan Democratic Party, and smaller independent parties. Maliki was actually a compromise candidate as the Sadrists and SIIC could not initially agree on who was to replace Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari.

The ruling alliance quickly fractured because of these differences. By the end of 2006 the Kurds, Accordance Front, Dawa and the SIIC were all conspiring to push Sadr out of the government. The U.S. was also applying pressure to exclude him. Sadr had already sealed his own fate when he withdrew his six ministers from the cabinet at the end of November 2006, thereby denying him any real say in the government. The U.S. and Shiites parties were hoping that including Sadr in the government would turn him towards politics, and away from being a militia leader, but Sadr’s position always came from his ability to control the streets and violence, so one could not come without the other. Eventually both the Sadrists and Fadhila left the United Shiite Alliance and Maliki’s ruling coalition. A new alliance was then made consisting of the Dawa, the Supreme Council, and the two Kurdish parties. The Accordance Front was later brought on board as well.

While the ruling parties were generally united in getting rid of Sadr they had some fundamental differences on the future of the country as well. The Kurds and Supreme Council both supported federalism. The Kurds wanted more autonomy for Kurdistan, while the SIIC were pushing for a nine province Shiite region in the south. Maliki on the other hand wanted a stronger central government based in Baghdad. As the Prime Minister began exerting more of his power with the improved security situation in 2008, these differences began coming to the fore. By the fall both parties were criticizing and making moves against Maliki, and he was replying in turn.

Since the January 2009 provincial elections, the Prime Minister has been attempting to forge a new alliance to run in the parliamentary elections and back him afterwards. Although the coalition has not been finalized the broad outlines of it are apparent. The new grouping looks to be made up of Maliki’s State of Law List with the Dawa Party at its core, the Sadrists, the Sunni Iraqi National Dialogue Front who ran as the Iraqi National Project in the provincial balloting, and perhaps Ilyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List. This group has already made a deal to rule Wasit province. Saleh al-Mutlaq, the head of the Dialogue Front has also said he is open to joining with the State of Law list in Diyala, Salahaddin, Baghdad, and Babil. According to the Al-Qatan paper, Maliki is also courting the Fadhila party, Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s Reform List, and Ahmad Chalabi. Originally, Allawi looked to be joining with the SIIC, but he has apparently changed his mind as the State of Law offers the chance to rule. While Saleh and the Sadrists are both apprehensive of working with Maliki since they have had major differences with him in the past, what unites them is opposition to the Supreme Council and the Kurds, and of course the chance to hold power.

The SIIC and Kurds, along with the Iraqi Accordance Front have attempted to keep their old alliance together. In Diyala for example, the Accordance Front, the Supreme Council, and the Kurdish Alliance have agreed to work together to run the provincial council.

Whether Maliki’s attempt to re-arrange Iraq’s political map succeeds or not is yet to be seen. The ruling provincial councils have not even been announced yet, and there is still plenty of negotiating to be done. What is for sure is that the old coalitions are mostly dead. The United Iraqi Alliance, which was the largest victor in the 2005 parliamentary elections, has now broken apart. The Sunni Accordance Front has also split. The Kurdish alliance is the only one that remains, and they are now diametrically opposed to Maliki and his attempt to centralize power. This is all part of the new status quo that is still emerging after the end of the sectarian war of 2006-2007.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Sadr renews idea of local alliances with Iraq PM,” 2/20/09

Alsumaria, “Iraq parties form alliances after elections,” 2/13/09

Asharq al-Awsat, “Al Maliki Wants An Alternative To The Current Shiite Alliance That Will Support The Central Government And Reject The Sectarian Quota System,” 2/16/09

Associated Press, “Shiites, Kurds form alliance; 4 Iraqi kids found in rubble of bombed area,” 8/16/07

Aswat al-Iraq, “KA, IAF agree to share leading posts in Diala,” 2/24/09
- “PM Accuses Kurdish Leadership of ‘violating’ the Constitution,” 11/20/08

Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08

International Crisis Group, “Iraq After The Surge II: The Need for a New Political Strategy,” 4/30/08

Parker, Ned, “Sadr’s bloc quits Iraq’s ruling coalition,” Times of London, 9/16/07

Roads To Iraq Blog, “American delegation met with former Iraqi army officers,” 2/20/09
- “The upcoming confrontation, Maliki and the Kurdish Coalition,” 11/14/08
- “Reconciliation without reconciliation,” 3/10/09

Rossmiller, Alex, “The Bush administration’s four-year history of erratic meddling in search of an Iraqi ‘savior.’” American Prospect, 4/11/07

Al-Sa’dawi, Ahmad, “post-election analysis: real change or more of the same?” Niqash, 2/19/09

Shadid, Anthony, “New Alliance In Iraq Cross Sectarian Lines,” Washington Post, 3/20/09

Visser, Reidar, “Maliki, Hakim, and Iran’s Role in the Basra Fighting,” Historiae.org, 4/9/08
- “Two Very Different Takes on Centralism,” Historiae.org, 9/20/08

Al-Wazzan, Saleem, “al-maliki angles for broad alliance in basra,” Niqash, 3/20/09

Wong, Edward, “Iraqis weigh alliance to marginalize Sadr and bolster Maliki,” International Harold Tribune, 12/11/06

Possible Ruling Coalitions In The Provinces

Now that Iraq’s Election Commission has announced the final results and seat allocations the winning parties have two weeks to form coalitions to rule. They need 51% of the seats to appoint the governor, deputy governor, head of council, and the provincial police chief. Only in Basra and Ninewa did the victors, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law and the Al-Hadbaa List respectively, gain enough seats to have outright majorities. Three possible set of partners have already been reported. First, Moqtada al-Sadr has told his followers to consult with Maliki’s State of Law. The Awakening of Iraq and Independents has formed an alliance with Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Iraq National Project. Finally, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s Al-Mihrab Martyr List is talking with Ilyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List.

If these deals work out Maliki’s list could have majorities in Baghdad, Dhi Qar, Maysan, and Wasit. The Awakening would also rule Anbar. In Karbala, Muthanna, Najaf, and Qadisiyah the State of Law and the Sadrists would have to bring in one more party to rule. Babil, Diyala, and especially Salahaddin are much more fragmented, especially the last one, and will take several parties to come together to run those.

Overall, the elections have revealed three things about the current state of Iraqi politics. First, the Dawa has surpassed the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) as the predominate Shiite party. Second, the Kurds’ loss of control of Ninewa and Salahaddin shows their declining position within the country. They once had a winning combination with the SIIC, but after both lost in the provincials their hopes of greater federalism is probably dead. The Kurds will be coming under increasing pressure to give up their hopes of annexing territories outside of Kurdistan as a result. Finally, the vote showed that Sunni politics is as fragmented as ever. The Iraqi Islamic Party ran in 2005 despite the Sunni boycott, gaining a head start on their competitors. This time they will have to form coalitions with newer parties to rule in Diyala and Salahaddin, and lost control of Anbar.

Provinces Currently With Majorities

Basra: Maliki’s State of Law 20 of 30 seats
Ninewa: Al-Hadbaa 19 of 37 seats

Possible Ruling Coalitions

Anbar: Sheikh Abu Risha’s Awakening of Iraq and Independents – 8 seats plus parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Iraq National Project – 6 seats. Total of 14 of 29 seats
Baghdad: Maliki’s State of Law – 28 seats plus Sadr’s Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – 5 seats. Total of 33 of 57 seats
Dhi Qar: Maliki’s State of Law – 13 seats plus Sadr’s Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – 7 seats. Total of 20 of 31 seats
Maysan: Maliki’s State of Law – 8 seats plus Sadr’s Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – 7 seats. Total of 15 of 27 seats
Wasit: Maliki’s State of Law – 13 seats plus Sadr’s Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – 3 seats. Total of 20 of 28 seats

Provinces Up In The Air

Babil: State of Law – 8 seats plus Sadr’s Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – 3 seats. Needs five more seats for majority of 16 of 30 seats
Diyala: Iraqi Accordance Front – 9 seats. Needs six more seats for majority of 15 of 29 seats
Karbala: Youssef al-Habboubi – 1 seat plus Maliki’s State of Law – 9 seats plus Sadr’s Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – 4 seats. Needs one more seat for majority of 14 of 27 seats
Muthanna: Maliki’s State of Law – 5 seats plus Sadr’s Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – 2 seats. Needs seven more seats for majority of 14 of 26 seats
Najaf: Maliki’s State of Law – 7 seats plus Sadr’s Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – 6 seats. Needs two more seats for majority of 15 of 28 seats
Qadisiyah: Maliki’s State of Law – 11 seats plus Sadr’s Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – 2 seats. Needs two more seats for majority of 15 of 28 seats
Salahaddin: Iraqi Accordance Front – 5 seats. Needs ten seats for majority of 15 of 28 seats

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Sadr renews idea of local alliances with Iraq PM,” 2/20/09

Alsumaria, “Iraq parties form alliances after elections,” 2/13/09

Associated Press, “Iraqi provincial election results,” 2/19/09

Fadel, Leila, “Volatile Anbar province a test of Iraq’s future,” McClatchy Newspapers, 2/17/09

Rubin, Alissa, “Prime Minister’s Party Wins in Iraqi Vote but Will Need to Form Coalitions,” New York Times, 2/6/09

Visser, Reidar, “The Provincial Elections: The Seat Allocation Is Official and the Coalition-Forming Process Begins,” Historiae.org, 2/19/09

Official Iraqi Election Results

Iraq’s Election Commission finally released its official results for the January 2009 Provincial Elections. The report broke down how many seats each list received. As noted before, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law List came away the victor in nine of the fourteen provinces that voted. Those were Babil, Baghdad, Basra, Dhi Qar, Najaf, Qadisiyah, and Wasit. In Maysan and Muthanna they were tied for first. The List also finished third in Karbala, and tied for fifth in Diyala and Salahaddin.

The other big winners were the Iraqi Islamic Party and its larger Iraqi Accordance Front coalition that came in first in Diyala, tied for first in Salahaddin, and came in second in Baghdad, tied for second in Anbar, third in Ninewa, and fifth in largely Shiite Basra. The Iraqi National List of former Interim Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi also had one victory tying for first in Salahaddin, and also coming in tied for third in Babil, Baghdad, Qadisiyah, Wasit, and fourth in Diyala, and tied for fifth in Anbar. That was much better than the preliminary results.

There were three new victors as well. The coalition Al-Hadbaa List won in Ninewa running on a largely anti-Kurdish ticket. Youssef Majid al-Habboubi, an independent Shiite and former Baathist won in Karbala. Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha, one of the leaders of the tribal Anbar Awakening won the most seats in Anbar.

The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) also did better than originally predicted. They tied for most seats in Maysan and Muthanna with the State of Law List, and also got second place in Babil, Basra, Najaf, Qadisiyah, and Wasit, third in Dhi Qar, tied for fourth in Karbala, tied for fifth in Diyala and Qadisiyah. They did finish a disappointing sixth in Baghdad after having controlled that province since the 2005 elections.

Independent Sunni parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Iraq National Project also did well for a small party. They came in tied for second in Anbar and Diyala, and tied for third in Salahaddin.

The Kurds were expecting to lose control of Ninewa and Salahaddin because of the larger Sunni turnout. They did, but their lists got the second most seats in Ninewa and Diyala. They got no representation in Salahaddin.

The Sadrists, former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s National Reform Party, and the Fadhila Party fared the worst of the major parties. Initially Sadr’s followers were said to have finished second in Maysan, Dhi Qar, Baghdad, and Babil, third in Najaf and Wasit, fourth in Basra and Karbala, fifth in Qadisiyah and Muthanna, and eighth in Diyala. When all was said and done they came out second in Dhi Qar, third in Maysan and Najaf, tied for third in Babil, Baghdad, and Wasit, tied for fourth in Karbala and Muthanna, tied for fifth in Basra, and no seats in Diyala. Al-Jaafari’s list tied for third place in Babil, Muthanna, and Qadisiyah, fourth in Dhi Qar and Maysan, tied for fifth in Baghdad and Najaf, and a distant seventh in Baghdad and Diyala. The biggest loser had to be the Fadhila Party however. Not only did they lose control of Basra finishing seventh, but they only did slightly better with two fifth place results in Dhi Qar and Qadisiyah.

Parties or alliances need to hold 51% of the seats to name the top positions such as governor, deputy governor, head of council, provincial police chief, etc. After the seat allotment was announced, Maliki’s State of Law list and the al-Hadbaa List came out with majorities in Basra and Ninewa. In the other twelve provinces ruling coalitions need to be formed. The talk is that Maliki’s State of Law list will form an alliance with Sadr’s followers, while the Supreme Council is reaching out to Allawi’s Iraqi National List. In Anbar, the tribes have formed a coalition with al-Mutlaq’s Iraq National Project to shut out the Iraqi Islamic Party from power. This after Sheikh Abu Risha joined with them in a coalition at the end of 2008. Salahaddin, which was formerly ruled by the Kurds had the greatest fragmentation. Ten parties finished with enough votes to receive seats at the council. In Karbala independent Shiite Youssef Majid al-Habboubi won the most votes, but because he did not run as part of a party or list he only received one of 27 seats. That left the independent Hope of Rafidain list and Maliki’s State of Law with the most representation with nine seats each. Habboubi could become governor, but the real powers would be with the parties behind him.

Below is a breakdown of the major parties that won seats, how they fared, and then how many seats were allotted by province.

Major Parties & Candidates
Awakening of Iraq and Independents – Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha. One of the leaders of the tribal Awakening movement in Anbar
Coalition of Diyala – Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s Diyala list
Fadhila Party – Ayatollah Mohammed al-Yaccoubi. Claims the mantle of Moqtada al-Sadr’s father’s movement
Al-Hadbaa Party – Coalition of four parties in Ninewa that ran an anti-Kurdish campaign
Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Moqtada al-Sadr. Sadr supported a group of independents that called ran on a nationalist, strong central government, and non-sectarian list
Iraqi Islamic Party/Iraqi Accordance Front – Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi. Main Islamic Sunni party that split apart just before the election. Called for a withdrawal of the U.S., and revising laws that are considered anti-Sunni like the DeBaathification policy
Iraqi National List – Former Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi. Appealed to nationalists and former Baathists
Iraq National Project – Parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq. Independent Sunni politician that ran on a secular and nationalist campaign
Kurdish Alliance – Made up of two major Kurdish parties, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Kurdish President Massoud Barzani, plus several other smaller parties
Al-Mihrab Martyr List - Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC). Islamic party formed in Iran. Ran on religion and federalism
National Movement for Development and Reform – Jamal al-Karbouli. Made up of former Baathists and insurgents
National Reform Party – Former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari. Broke away from the Dawa party
Ninewa Brotherhood List – Kurdish Alliance list for Ninewa
State of Law – Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s Islamic Dawa Party. Islamic party that ran on a nationalist and strong central government platform
Tribes Of Iraq – Sheikh Hamid al-Hayes. Led by one of the Anbar Awakening leaders
Youssef Majid al-Habboubi – Independent Shiite and former Baathist

Finishes By Party
State of Law – Maliki: 1st Babil, Baghdad, Basra, Dhi Qar, Najaf, Qadisiyah, Wasit, tied 1st Maysan, Muthanna, 3rd Karbala, tied 5th Diyala, Salahaddin
Iraqi Islamic Party/Iraqi Accordance Front/ Alliance of Intellectuals and Tribes – 1st Diyala, tied 1st Salahaddin, 2nd Baghdad, tied 2nd Anbar, 3rd Ninewa, tied 5th Basra
Iraqi National List – Allawi: Tied 1st Salahaddin, Tied 3rd Babil, Baghdad, Qadisiyah, Wasit, 4th Diyala, tied 5th Anbar
Al-Hadbaa Party: 1st Ninewa
Youssef Majid al-Habboubi: 1st Karbala
Awakening of Iraq and Independents – Sheikh Abu Risha: 1st Anbar
Al-Mihrab Martyr List/Diyala Coalition – SIIC: Tied 1st Maysan, Muthanna, 2nd Babil, Basra, Najaf, Qadisiyah, Wasit, 3rd Dhi Qar, tied 4th Karbala, tied 5th Diyala, Qadisiyah, 6th Baghdad
Ninewa Brotherhood List/Kurdish Alliance: 2nd Ninewa, tied 2nd Diyala
Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadr: 2nd Dhi Qar, 3rd Maysan, Najaf, tied 3rd Babil, Baghdad, Wasit, tied 4th Karbala, Muthanna, tied 5th Basra
Iraq National Project – al-Mutlaq: Tied 2nd Anbar, Diyala, tied 3rd Salahaddin
National Reform Party – Jaafari: Tied 3rd Babil, Muthanna, Qadisiyah, 4th Dhi Qar, Maysan, tied 5th Baghdad, Najaf, 7th Baghdad, Diyala
Fadhila Party: 5th Dhi Qar, tied 5th Qadisiyah, 7th Basra

Results By Province:

Anbar (29 seats)
1. Awakening of Iraq and Independents – Sheikh Abu Risha: 8
2. Iraq National Project – al-Mutlaq: 6
2. Alliance of Intellectuals and Tribes – Iraqi Islamic Party: 6
4. National Movement for Development and Reform - al-Karbouli: 3
5. Iraqi National List - Allawi: 2
5. Iraqi Tribes List – Sheikh al-Hayes: 2
5. Iraqi National Unity: 2

Babil (30 seats)
1. State of Law - Maliki: 8
2. Al-Mihrab Martyr List - SIIC: 5
3. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadr: 3
3. National Reform Party – Jaafari: 3
3. Civil Society List: 3
3. Iraqi National List - Allawi: 3
3. Independent Justice Association: 3
8. Independent Ansar List: 2

Baghdad (57 seats)
1. State of Law – Maliki: 28
2. Iraqi Accordance Front: 7
3. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadr: 5
3. Iraqi National List – Allawi: 5
5. Iraq National Project – al-Mutlaq: 4
6. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 3
7. National Reform Party – Jaafari: 3
8. Christian: 1 – through quota
8. Mandean: 1 – through quota

Basra (35 seats)
1. State of Law - Maliki: 20
2. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 5
3. Gathering of Justice and Unity: 2
3. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones - Sadr: 2
5. Iraqi National List - Allawi: 2
5. Iraqi Islamic Party: 2
7. Fadhila Party: 1
8. Christians: 1 – through quota

Dhi Qar (31 seats)
1. State of Law - Maliki: 13
2. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones - Sadr: 7
3. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 5
4. National Reform Trend – Jaafari: 4
5. Fadhila Party: 2

Diyala (29 Seats)
1. Iraqi Accordance Front: 9
2. Iraq National Project – al-Mutlaq: 6
2. Kurdish Alliance: 6
4. Iraqi National List - Allawi: 3
5. State of Law - Maliki: 2
5. Diyala Coalition – SIIC: 2
7. National Reform Party – Jaafari: 1

Karbala (27 seats)
1. Youssef Majid al-Habboubi: 1
2. Hope of Rafidain: 9
2. State of Law - Maliki: 9
4. Al-Mihrab Martyr List - SIIC: 4
4. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones - Sadr: 4

Maysan (27 seats)
1. State of Law - Maliki: 8
1. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 8
3. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadr: 7
4. National Reform Party – Jaafari: 4

Muthanna (26 seats)
1. State of Law – Maliki: 5
1. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 5
3. The People’s List: 3
3. National Reform Party – Jaafari: 3
4. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadr: 2
4. Gathering of Muthanna: 2
4. Independent National List: 2
4. Gathering of Iraqi Professionals: 2
4. Gathering of Middle Euphrates: 2

Najaf (28 seats)
1. State of Law – Maliki: 7
1. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 7
3. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadr: 6
4. Loyalty to Najaf: 4
5. National Reform Party – Jaafari: 2
5. Union of Independent Najaf: 2

Ninewa (37 seats)
1. Al-Hadbaa Party: 19
2. Ninewa Brotherhood List – Kurdish Alliance: 12
3. Iraqi Islamic Party: 3
4. Shabak: 1 – through quota
4. Christian: 1 – through quota
4. Yazidi: 1 – through quota

Qadisiyah (28 seats)
1. State of Law – Maliki: 11
2. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 5
3. Iraqi National List – Allawi: 3
3. National Reform Party – Jaafari: 3
5. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadr: 2
5. Islamic Loyalty Party: 2
5. Fadhila Party: 2

Salahaddin (28 seats)
1. Iraqi Accordance Front: 5
1. Iraqi National List – Allawi: 5
3. Iraq National Project – al-Mutlaq: 3
3. National Project of Iraq: 3
5. Group of Intellectuals and Scientists: 2
5. Iraqi Turkoman Front: 2
5. Front of Liberation and Building: 2
5. Salahaddin Patriotic List: 2
5. Brotherhood and Peaceful Coexistence: 2
5. State of Law – Maliki: 2

Wasit (28 seats)
1. State of Law – Maliki: 13
2. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 6
3. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadr: 3
3. Iraqi National List – Allawi: 3
3. Iraqi Constitutional Party: 3

SOURCES

Associated Press, “Iraqi provincial election results,” 2/19/09

Farrell, Stephen, “Election: Preliminary Results,” Baghdad Bureau Blog, New York Times, 2/5/09

Hamid, Nirmeen, “anbar’s Islamic party and tribes vie for power,” Niqash, 12/12/08

Madhani, Aamer, "In Anbar, new partnership are taking root," USA Today, 2/8/09

Rubin, Alissa, “Prime Minister’s Party Wins in Iraqi Vote but Will Need to Form Coalitions,” New York Times, 2/6/09

Al-Sa’dawi, Ahmad, “post-election analysis: real change or more of the same?” Niqash, 2/19/09

Early Returns For Provincial Elections

The early results for the January 2009 provincial elections are in. The Iraqi Election Commission claims they have counted 90% of the votes in the fourteen provinces that took part. There are two sets of differing numbers available, one from the New York Times, the other from Alsumaria TV. The numbers from the Times are used below because they seem more comprehensive.

Overall, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law list was the biggest winner. They came in first in eight provinces, Baghdad, Basra, Dhi Qar, Qadisiyah, Maysan, and Najaf, second in Wasit, third in Karbala, fifth in Diyala, and tenth in Salahaddin. The List did not win a majority in any of those governorates however. They did the best in Baghdad with 38% and Basra 37%. That will mean they will have to form coalitions with other parties to rule.

That could be the Sadrists, who lost control of Maysan, but came in second there and in Dhi Qar, Baghdad, and Babil, and third in Najaf and Wasit. Although Maliki launched military campaigns against them in early 2008, they both have a common animosity towards the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) that once ruled most of the south.

The rest of the Shiite lists had mixed results. The SIIC won no provinces, but finished second in Najaf, Qadisiyah, Basra, Wasit, Muthanna, and Babil, and third in Maysan and Dhi Qar. Former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari created the Reform Party after he left the Dawa. His best results were third in Qadisiyah, and then several fourth places in the south. Finally, the Fadhila Party lost Basra finishing sixth there. That symbolized their finish across the rest of the country.

There was also the Sunni Iraqi Accordance Front and its major party the Iraqi Islamic Party and the Kurdish Alliance. The Accordance Front came in 1st in Diyala and Salahaddin, third in Anbar, Baghdad and Ninewa, and a surprising fifth in Basra, a largely Shiite province. The Kurdish Alliance lost control of Ninewa but finished a respectable second there, and the same in Diyala. They did much worse in Salahaddin.

A few new parties and independents also emerged. The Iraq National Project, led by independent Sunni parliamentarian Mithal al-Alusi came in first in Anbar, third in Diyala and Salahaddin, fourth in Baghdad, and fifth in Ninewa. Alusi did better than former Interim Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi’s secular Iraqi National List. They did finish second in Salahaddin appealing to the largely Sunni population by criticizing American policies like the deBaathification law and disbanding the armed forces. Otherwise they had a lot of fourth place finishes in provinces like Diyala and Baghdad. Amongst the tribal Awakening groups in Anbar, Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha’s Awakening and National Independent List finished second, while his former ally now rival Sheikh Amid al-Hayes’ Tribes of Iraq finished a distant seventh. The mayor of Karbala City Yousef Majid al-Haddoubi carried Karbala itself, but with only 13.3% of the vote, while the Iraqi nationalist newcomers al-Hadbaa Party discussed before won in Ninewa, but with 38.4% instead of the 66% predicted by an American official earlier. That will mean they will have to join with their rivals the Kurdish Alliance to run the province. That might force al-Hadbaa to tone down their anti-Kurdish rhetoric or conversely freeze the entire process.

The next several weeks will really show what this election was about. The State of Law and every other List that took first place will have to find other parties to rule because none walked away with a majority of the votes. That could lead to joint governance where no single party will be able to impose their will, intense infighting that will incapacitate the process, or a mixture of both where parties will carve up the provincial offices much like the provinces and the central government are currently run.

The major parties and candidates:

Awakening and National Independents List – Led by Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha, one of the Anbar Awakening leaders. Aligned with Iraqi Accordance Front
Coalition Of Diyala – Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s Diyala List
Constitutional Party – Led by Interior Minister Jawa al-Bulani
Fadhila Party – Formed by Ayatollah Mohammed al-Yacoubi who claimed the legacy of Mohammed Sadeq al-Sadr’s movement, Moqtada al-Sadr’s father, after the U.S. invasion
Yousef Maid al-Habboubi – Independent Shiite mayor of Karbala
Al-Hadbaa Party – Coalition of four parties in Ninewa
Independent Free Movement List – One of two independent lists supported by the Sadrists
Iraq National Project – Led by independent Sunni Parliamentarian Mithal al-Alusi
Iraqi Accordance Front – Major Sunni list led by Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi’s Iraqi Islamic Party
Iraqi Communist Party – Led by Hamid Majid Mousa
Kurdish Allliance – Made up of two major Kurdish parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Kurdish President Massoud Barzani, and other smaller parties
Al-Mihrab Martyr List – Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council List
National Movement for Development and Reform – Led by Jamal al-Karbouli. Made up of former Baathists and insurgents
National Reform Party – Headed by former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari who broke away from the Dawa Party
State Of Law List – Headed by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s Islamic Dawa Party
Tribes Of Iraq – Led by Sheikh Hamid al-Hayes, one of the Anbar Awakening leaders

ANBAR
Iraqi National Project: 17.6%
Awakening and National Independents List: 17.1%
Accordance Front: 15.9%
National Movement for Reform and Development: 7.8%
Iraqi National List: 6.6%
Iraqi Unity: 4.6%
Tribes of Iraq: 4.5%
Group of Scholars And Intellectuals: 3.3%
Justice Movement: 3.2%
National Bloc: 2.3%
Constitutional Party: 2%
TURNOUT: 40%

BABIL
State of Law: 12.5%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 8.2%
Independent Free Movement List: 6.2%
National Reform Party: 4.4%
Iraqi Commission for NGOs: 4.1%
Independent Justice: 3.7%
Independent Ansar: 3.4%
Iraqi National List: 3.4%
National Unity: 3.3%
TURNOUT: 56%

BAGHDAD
State Of Law: 38%
Independent Free Movement List: 9%
Iraqi Accordance Front: 9%
Iraqi National Project: 8.6%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 5.4%
National Reform Party: 4.3%
Iraq Nation List: 1.6%
Fadhila: 1.3%
Iraqi Communist Party: 1.2%
TURNOUT: 40%

BASRA
State of Law: 37%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 11.6%
Gathering of Justice and Unity: 5.5%
Independent Free Movement List: 5%
Iraqi Accordance Front: 3.8%
Fadhila: 3.2%
Iraqi National List: 3.2%
National Reform Party: 2.5%
TURNOUT: 48%

DHI QAR
State of Law: 23.1%
Independent Free Movement List: 14.1%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 11.1%
National Reform Party: 7.6%
Fadhila: 6.1%
Constitutional Party: 3.2%
Iraqi National List: 2.8%
TURNOUT: 50%

DIYALA
Iraqi Accordance Front: 21.1%
Kurdish Alliance: 17.2%
Iraqi National Project: 15%
Iraqi National List: 9.5%
State of Law: 6%
Coalition of Diyala: 5.3%
National Reform Party: 4.3%
Independent Free Movement List: 3.1%
National Movement: 2.6%
Fadhila: 2.3%
TURNOUT: 57%

KARBALA
Yousef Majid al-Haddoubi: 13.3%
Hope of Rafidain: 8.8%
State of Law: 8.5%
Independent Free Movement List: 6.8%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 6.4%
Justice and Reform: 3.6%
National Reform Project: 2.5%
Fadhila: 2.5%
TURNOUT: 60%

MAYSAN
State of Law: 17.7%
Independent Free Movement List: 15.2%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 14.6%
National Reform Project: 8.7%
Fadhila: 3.2%
TURNOUT: 46%

MUTHANNA
State of Law: 10.9%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 9.3%
Jumhouriyoun: 7.1%
National Reform Project: 6.3%
Independent Free Movement List: 5.1%
National List: 5%
Gathering of Muthanna: 4.9%
Academics: 4.4%
Middle Euphrates: 3.9%
Fadhila: 3.7%
Iraqi National List: 3.5%
TURNOUT: 61%

NAJAF
State of Law: 16.2%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 14.8%
Independent Free Movement List: 12.2%
Loyalty to Najaf: 8.3%
National Reform Project: 7%
Union of Independent Najaf: 3.7%
Tribes and Sons of Najaf: 2.6%
TURNOUT: 55%

NINEWA
Al-Hadbaa: 38.4%
Kurdish Alliance: 25.5%
Iraqi Islamic Party: 6.7%
Turkomen Front: 2.8%
Iraqi National Project: 2.6%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 1.9%
TURNOUT: 60%

QADISIYAH
State of Law: 23.1%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 11.7%
National Reform Project: 8.2%
Iraqi National List: 8%
Independent Free Movement List: 6.7%
Islamic Loyalty: 4.3%
Fadhila: 4.1%
Development of Diwaniya: 3.4%
Iraqi National Congress: 3%
TURNOUT: 58%

SALAHADDIN
Iraqi Accordance Front: 14.5%
Iraqi National List: 13.9%
Iraqi National Project: 8.7%
Jumuaa: 8.5%
Scholars and Intellectuals: 6.6%
Turkomen Front: 4.8%
Salahaddin List: 4.6%
Taaqi List: 4.5%
Tahrir wa-Binaa: 4.5%
State of Law: 3.5%
Constitution Party: 3.2%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 2.9%
TURNOUT: 65%

WASIT
State of Law: 15.3%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 10%
Independent Free Movement List: 6%
Iraqi National List: 4.6%
Constituion Party: 3.9%
National Reform Party: 3.2%
Independence: 3%
TURNOUT: 54%

SOURCES
Abdullah, Muahmmed, “Diyala Sees Early Campaigning,” Niqash, 12/8/08
Agence France Presse, “Iraqi Shiite Factions Face Intimidation Claims,” 2/5/09
Alsumaria, “Iraq provincial elections preliminary results,” 2/5/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Dawlat al-Qanoon coalition dominates 9 of 14 provinces,” 2/5/09
- “MP accuses Kurds of ‘illegitimate’ campaigning,” 1/24/09
- “URGENT / IHEC announces 90% of election results,” 2/5/09
- “URGENT / PM’s list garners 38% of votes in Baghdad,” 2/5/09
Dagher, Sam, “Tribal Rivalries Persist as Iraqis Seek Local Posts,” New York Times, 1/20/09
Daniel, Trenton, “Pro-Iran party loses big in Iraq local elections, returns show,” McClatchy Newspapers, 2/5/09
Farrell, Stephen, “Election: Preliminary Results,” Baghdad Bureau Blog, New York Times, 2/5/09
Hamid, Nirmeen, “anbar’s Islamic party and tribes vie for power,” Niqash, 12/12/08
Al-Jazeera, “Strong poll showing by Iraqi PM,” 2/5/09
Lynch, Marc, “Iraqi Sunnis after the Awakening,” Abu Aardvark Blog, 6/20/08
O’Rourke, Brian, “Prime Minister’s Bloc Wins In Baghdad, Southern Iraq,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2/5/09
Rubin, Alissa, “Iraqi Prime Minister’s Party Dominates Vote,” New York Times, 2/6/09
Rubin, Alissa and Myers, Steven Lee, “As Iraqis Tally Votes, Former Leader Re-emerges,” New York Times, 2/4/09
UPI, “Maliki’s party tops provincial election,” 2/5/09
Visser, Reidar, “The Candidate Lists Are Out: Basra More Fragmented, Sadrists Pursuing Several Strategies?,” Historiae.org, 12/22/08

New Iraqi Opinion Poll On Preferences And Federalism Before Provincial Elections

The government run National Media Center (NMC) released another public opinion poll recently, this time asking 4,500 Iraqis on their preference for parties and their views on federalism. The results closely follow an October 2008 survey conducted by the Iraq Center for Research & Strategic Studies reported on before. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his State of Law Coalition got the most responses, while there was little support for federal regions outside of Kurdistan.

Prime Minister Maliki has fashioned himself into the most popular Iraqi politician, however two former leaders of Iraq closely follow him. The NMC questionnaire found Prime Minister Maliki’s Coalition of the State of Law had the most support at 23%, followed by former Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List 12.6%, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) 11.4%, former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s National Reform Party 11.3%, the Iraqi Accordance Front 4.5%, and the Iraqi National Dialogue Front 3.6%. When asked whom they wanted as Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki came in first at 23%, Allawi was second 17.7%, and Jaafari third 10%. It’s been widely reported that Maliki is popular with the Iraqi public because of his offensives against the Sadrists in Basra, Sadr City and Maysan along with his increasing use of nationalism. Allawi’s and Jaafari parties however, have hardly been mentioned in the English language reporting on Iraq. Allawi was the interim prime minister after the Coalition Provisional Authority returned sovereignty to Iraq in 2004. His Iraqi National List is a secular and nationalist one. Other Iraqi polls have found growing support for just such parties. Jaafari was the Prime Minister after the 2005 elections. He was originally one of the leaders of the Dawa party, but was replaced by Maliki in 2007 after coming under increasing criticism for the country’s decent into sectarian war in 2006. In June 2008 he announced that he was leaving Dawa to form the National Reform Party made up of his wing of the Dawa, independent Shiites, and some Sadrists. Jaafari has been working with the loosely organized opposition since then consisting of the Sadr Bloc, the Fadhila Party, the National Dialogue Front, and Allawi’s Iraqi National List.

The second half of the National Media Center poll asked Iraqis about their views on federalism. 72% rejected the idea. As would be expected, 78% of Kurds supported it as they have the Kurdistan Regional Government. 80% were opposed to the partition of the country, 80% were against autonomy for Basra, while 94% of those surveyed within Basra were against turning it into a federal region.

These results were very similar to an October 2008 survey conducted by the Iraq Center for Research & Strategic Studies. In that poll Maliki again was the most popular politician at 17.2%, followed by Allawi 16.7%, and Jaafari 7.9%. When asked what political party they would vote for Maliki’s Dawa Party came out on top 14.7%, and the Iraqi National List was second 13.3%. Don’t know 8.5% and no answer 7.4% were the next results, followed by the two Kurdish parties, and then Jaafari’s at 4.3%. Likewise, there were few in favor of federalism with 69.9% saying they wanted a strong central government, with only 17.7% saying they would prefer more power in the provinces. 70.0% said they were against forming another regional government outside of Kurdistan.

It should be noted that while these two polls show a realignment in preferences, and the collapse of the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance, they are both national polls. They may not transfer directly to the provincial elections where parties need organization and money to launch campaigns across the governorates to gain enough votes to win seats on the provincial councils. While its often been repeated that over 14,000 candidates are running in the upcoming election, few of these newcomers can compete with the Supreme Council’s two satellite TV channels, dozens of local channels and newspapers, five women’s organization, three student groups, and over 1,000 offices in the south. Maliki has shored up his popularity by forming Tribal Support Councils across Iraq. Allawi and Jaafari may not have the resources to match these two. What they do have going for them is the rising popularity of secularism and nationalism, and resentment against the poor governing by the ruling parties. How things turn out will soon be known when voting begins at the end of January.

Below are the results of the National Media Center and Iraq Center for Research & Strategic Studies polls.

National Media Center January 2009 Poll

What party would you vote for?
State of Law Coalition 23%
Iraqi National List 12.6%
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council 11.4%
National Reform Party 11.3%
Iraqi Accordance Front 4.5%
Iraqi National Dialogue Front 3.6%

Who would be the best prime minister?
Nouri al-Maliki 23%
Ilyad Allawi 17.7%
Ibrahim al-Jaafari 10%

Ideas on federalism
Opposed 72%
Kurds in favor of 78%
Opposed to partition of country 80%
Opposed to autonomy for Basra 80%
Basrans opposed to autonomy for the province 94%

Iraq Center for Research & Strategic Studies October 2008 Poll

Which one of the following person could make the most positive change in country?
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki 17.2%
Former Interim Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi 16.7%
None 13.2%
Former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari7.9%
President of Kurdish Regional Government Masooud Barzani 6.3%
President Jalal Talabani 4.3%
Don’t know 4.2%
Moqtada al-Sadr 3.8%
Vice President Adil Abdul Mahdi 3.6%
Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi 3.6%
Iraqi National Dialogue Front head Saleh al-Mutlaq 2.9%
Head of Anbar Awakening Council Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha 2.2%
Deputy Prime Minister Barhem Salih 1.9%
Prime Minister of Kurdish Regional Government Neachirevan Barzani 0.9%
Kusart Ali 0.7%
Ummah Iraqi Party Mithal al-Alusi 0.7%
Assyrian Democratic Movement Younadim Kanah 0.5%
Iraqi National Congress Ahmed al-Chalabi 0.5%
Iraqi National List Ayad Jamal al-Deen 0.5%
General Council for the People of Iraq Adnan al-Dulaimi 0.4%
Iraqi National Dialogue Council Khalaf al-Ulayyan 0.4%
Association of Muslim Scholars Harith al-Dhari 0.4%
Former speaker of parliament Mahmoud al-Mashhadani 0.3%

Who will you vote for in next election?
None 17.9%
Dawa 14.7%
Iraqi National List 13.3%
Don’t know 8.5%
No answer 7.4%
Kurdistan Democratic Party 7.2%
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 6.4%
National Reform Party 4.3%
Sadr Movement 4.1%
Islamic Party of Iraq 3.4%
Ummah Iraqi Party 2.5%
Anbar Awakening Council 2.4%
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council 2.4%
Iraqi National Dialogue Front 2.4%
Iraqi National Dialogue Council 0.9%
Islamic Dawa Party-Iraq 0.6%
Iraqi National Congress 0.4%

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iraqi PM Calls for Strong Central Government,” 1/22/09
- “Iraqi PM’s Allies On Course To Win Provincial Elections – Poll,” 1/21/09

Associated Press, “Six parliamentary factions to coordinate efforts in Iraqi parliament, lawmakers say,” 6/8/08

Daniel, Trenton, “Iraqi candidates stumping for Jan. 31 provincial elections,” McClatchy Newspapers, 1/23/09

Iraq Centre For Research & Strategic Studies, “Public Opinion Survey in Iraq; The Security & Political Situation in Iraq,” October 2008

Hardy, Roger, “Iraq conflict thwarts PM Jaafari,” BBC, 4/21/06

Mohsen, Amer, “Iraq Papers Mon: Australian Troops to Depart,” IraqSlogger.com, 6/1/08

Shadid, Anthony, “Despite Discontent and Fragmentation, Islamic Parties Dominate,” Washington Post, 1/19/09

Who Speaks For The Sunnis?

Yesterday, January 14, the major Sunni bloc the Iraqi Accordance Front (IAF) boycotted parliament. They claimed that it was illegal to hold sessions without a speaker. The real reason was because they have been unable to fill the position as their coalition has collapsed and opposition parties have challenged their right to the spot.

The Accordance Front began disintegrating last month. As reported earlier, on December 24 the Iraqi National Dialogue Council and the Independents Bloc left the Accordance Front, charging that the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) was attempting to monopolize power within the coalition. On January 12, four parliamentarians from the Independent Democratic Gathering also departed for the same reason. The Front that once had 44 seats in parliament, and the majority of Sunni lawmakers, was reduced to just 25. The Islamic Party held 22 of those seats, with the remaining 3 coming from Adnan Dulaimi’s General Council for the People of Iraq Party. There are a total of 69 Sunnis in the 275-member parliament.

With their weakened position, the IAF has not been able to build consensus over a replacement for the speaker of parliament. The former speaker, Mahmoud al-Mashhadani was forced to resign on December 23 after his comments about shoe throwing journalist Muntadar al-Zaidi. Since then the Iraqi National Dialogue Council as well as the secular Iraqi National List (INL) of former Interim Prime Minister Ilyad Alawi have presented candidates, to compete with the Islamic Party’s two. The National List actually put up three parliamentarians, a woman, a Shiite, and a Sunni. Both they and the Dialogue Council, which are now both part of the loosely connected opposition, are challenging the sectarian and big party quotas that have dominated the body since its creation after the U.S. invasion. Under this system, the prime minister was to be a Shiite from the United Iraqi Alliance, the president was a Kurd from the Kurdish Alliance, and the speaker was a Sunni from the Accordance Front. The Dialogue Council claims that since Mashhadani came from their party, they are entitled to the position, while the National List is saying it doesn’t even have to be a Sunni. The INL also took up the position of the defecting Sunni parties by criticizing the Islamic Party for holding the speakership, one vice president, one deputy premier, and a number of ministers. The Iraqi paper Azzaman also reported that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki might have also objected to the IIP’s domination of most of the Sunni offices in government. Shocked by this turn of events, the United Iraqi Alliance and Kurds have tried to stand by the Accordance Front by saying they deserve the speaker position.

From the beginning the Islamic Party was always the strongest of the Sunni parties. It was formed in 1960 modeled after the Muslim Brotherhood. It was quickly outlawed by the government and became largely an underground opposition group. After the U.S. invasion the party’s secretary general Mohsen Abdel Hamid was named to the Iraqi Governing Council. In 2005 they were the only major party to defy the Sunni boycott and were elected to several provincial councils. It later helped form the Iraqi Accordance Front and went on to win the largest single number of seats in parliament of any Sunni party. Heading into the January 2009 provincial elections they were initially predicted to lose control of Anbar province, but have since been able to break apart the tribal Awakening probably meaning they will have joint rule there. They have also built up ties with Sons of Iraq groups in Baghdad, are part of the main Sunni coalition in Diyala, and are running in Ninewa.

The battle over the speaker of parliament and the break-up of the Accordance Front is largely about who will speak for the Sunnis. Right now, no one can say. The Islamic Party is still the best organized, and appears to be well positioned in the provincial elections. They may come out the winners with the Accordance Front existing only in name. This also happened with the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance, as the Fadhila Party and Sadrists left in 2007, and the Dawa Party and Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council are running against each other. These two coalitions were created at a time of extreme sectarianism and fighting. That is now changing. That may still leave the Islamic Party as a winner after elections as Iraqis tend to vote by sect, but they also benefit from their size, breadth, and money, as the old coalitions past by the wayside.

For more on the break up of the Iraqi Accordance Front see:

Accordance Front Breaks Apart

SOURCES:

Abdullah, Muahmmed, “Diyala Sees Early Campaigning,” Niqash, 12/8/08

Alsumaria, “Accordance Front boycotts Parliament session,” 1/14/09
- “Iraq Parliament speaker post under debate,” 1/8/08

Aswat al-Iraq, “2 IIP candidates for parliament speaker post – MP,” 1/2/09
- “Democratic Grouping quits IAF,” 1/10/09
- “IAF represents only IIP – MP,” 1/8/09
- “INDC puts forward candidates for parliament’s speakership,” 12/24/08
- “INL nominates 3 MPs for parliament’s speakership,” 1/13/09
- “NDF puts forward candidate for speaker,” 1/13/09
- “Lawmaker announces nomination for parliamentary speakership,” 1/6/09
- “Parliament’s speaker position for IAF – VP,” 12/31/08
- “Parliament’s speaker should be IAF nominee – Kurdish MP,” 1/6/09
- “UIA, KA agree to IAF’s candidate for speaker,” 1/11/09

BBC, “Iraqi Governing Council members,” 7/14/03

Dagher, Sam, “Dispute Weakens Iraqi Sunni Coalition,” New York Times, 1/11/09

Dalli, Hussein, “Iraq Awakening Councils form party,” Al Jazeera, 4/14/08

IraqSlogger.com, “Iraq Papers Tue: 124,000 Bodyguards in Iraq!” 12/29/08

Niqash, “irqai Islamic party (iip),” 11/7/05

Parker, Ned, “Iraq looks ahead to provincial, national elections,” Los Angeles Times, 11/5/08

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraq To Replace Parliament Speaker Deemed Offensive,” 1/9/09

Reuters, “Iraq’s main Sunni Arab bloc splinters,” 12/24/08

UPI, “Sunnis marginalized in Iraqi politics,” 1/8/09

Yoshino, Kim and Hameed, Ali, “More Iraq parliament members pull out of Sunni bloc,” Los Angeles Times, 1/12/09

Controversy Could Be Growing Over Ban On Using Religious Symbols During Provincial Elections

When the provisional election law was passed by parliament in September 2008 it banned the use of religious figures on campaign materials, and limited the use of mosques. This was seen as a defeat for the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) that had been pushing hard to defeat this restriction. The SIIC argued that using religious images was important for electioneering because of the high rate of illiteracy amongst Iraqis. During the 2005 elections, the SIIC and the United Iraqi Alliance had relied heavily on photos of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. The ayatollah is the highest-ranking Shiite cleric in Iraq, and is highly revered. Many Shiites interviewed after the vote on ratifying the constitution for example, said they were casting ballots for it because Ayatollah Sistani had endorsed it. Moqtada al-Sadr had also used images of himself and his father in 2005.

Several parties that opposed the ruling coalition successfully pushed through this article during debate on the law. This consisted of former Interim Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List, the Basra based Fadhila party, the Sadrists, the Sunni National Dialogue Council and National Dialogue Front, the National Reform Party of former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari, and a few others. They represented the main opposition parties in parliament to the coalition behind Maliki’s government that consists of the Kurdish Democratic Party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, the Supreme Council, the Dawa Party, and the Iraqi Islamic Party. In early July the SIIC dropped their opposition to the article, but after the first version of the law was vetoed by the Presidential Council, the SIIC brought up using religious symbols and mosques again.

Now that the law has been passed, members of the Supreme Council and Dawa parties are violating the religious ban. The SIIC and Oil Minister Hussain al-Shahristani who has joined the Dawa Party claim that Grand Ayatollah Sistani supports them. The Iraqi Election Commission has charged both with using the cleric’s pictures in their campaign material. An SIIC candidate said that was not true, but that they would continue to use Sistani’s image regardless. This has apparently raised the ire of the Ayatollah, as IraqSlogger reported that a source close to him recently announced that Sistani does not want his photo used by any political party in the run-up to the provincial elections. It will have to be seen whether the Election Commission has the ability to enforce the election law, and if they issue any punishments against the two parties for breaking it. The Commission would have to exercise a large amount of independence and daring to do so as they would be going up against the newfound popularity and standing of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his political party, and the largest Shiite party, the Supreme Council who are battling it out for power in the southern half of the country.

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “Parliamentary blocs demand solving provincial elections pending issues,” 6/22/08

Filkins, Dexter and Worth, Robert, “Monitors in Iraq Review Votes Where ‘Yes’ Ballots Hit 90%,” New York Times, 10/18/05

IraqSlogger.com, “Sistani: No Pictures of Me in Election Campaign,” 12/3/08

Lynch, Marc, “definitely, maybe,” Abu Aardvark Blog, 9/24/08

Ramzi, Kholoud, “daawa-siic conflict splits Shiite unity,” Niqash,” 11/27/08

Robertson, Campbell, “Iraqi Forces Raid Mosque With Links to Sadrists,” New York Times, 7/12/08

Visser, Reidar, “Hakim’s Insincerity on the Local Elections,” Historiae.org, 9/11/08
- “Iraq’s Provincial Elections: Another D-Day Approaching,” Historiae.com, 6/16/08
- “The Kirkuk Issue Exposes Weaknesses in Iraq’s Ruling Coalition,” Historiae.org, 8/7/08

Yacoub, Sameer, “Iraq bans pictures of non-candidates in vote,” Associated Press, 7/3/08

SOFA Passes

Iraq’s parliament passed the Status of Forces Agreement today (Source: Alsumaria TV)

At 2 P.M. Baghdad time Iraq’s parliament passed the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). There are 275 members of parliament, but only 198 showed up today November 27. Out of those approximately 144 or 149 depending upon the source, voted for the SOFA. At the same time, the legislators also voted for a resolution on political reforms that the Sunnis demanded in return for their votes. The bill said that the government needed to work towards revising the constitution, allowing more Sunnis in the security forces, integrating the Sons of Iraq, and general reconciliation. The act had no specifics to it however, and was more a statement of purpose rather than an actual law that had to be implemented.

The opposition to the SOFA, which never had the votes to stop it from passing in the first place, split. Followers of Moqtada al-Sadr protested while hands were being counted in parliament. Afterwards they said they would continue with their objections to the pact. The Fadhila party representatives boycotted the proceedings entirely. They said they did not vote for the agreement because there were no guarantees that it would actually be implemented. The Iraqi National List of former Interim Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi that was originally against the agreement, ended up supporting it.

More importantly, the Sunnis voted for the SOFA, but their demands may never be met. The Iraqi Accordance Front, the largest Sunni coalition, and the National Dialogue Bloc, an independent Sunni party, all voted in favor of it. They held out for their concessions because they are afraid of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s growing power. They fear that after the U.S. leaves, Maliki will be able to do as he pleases and continue to politically isolate them, so they wanted guarantees that the government would continue to work towards reconciliation. Shiite politicians however were resentful of the fact that the Sunnis were able to hold the SOFA vote hostage to their demands. Members of the United Iraqi Alliance repeatedly went to Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani asking if they could ignore the Sunnis, and carry on the vote without them, but he told them they needed a national consensus on the agreement. The fact that the Shiites were angry with the Sunnis doesn’t fare well for how their demands will be treated in the future. Maliki already looks at the Accordance Front as a stepchild, and the government has not followed any of the reconciliation acts that have passed the way they were legislated. That will probably mean that the bill calling for political compromise that was voted on along with the SOFA will remain a resolution, rather than lead to actual action.

There are several more steps that Baghdad has to follow now on the SOFA. The agreement is to be sent to the Presidential Council, which is made up of President Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Vice President Adel Abdul-Mahdi of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, and Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi of the Iraqi Islamic Party, for final ratification. The Council is expected to pass it. The SOFA will then go into affect on January 1, 2009. The parliament also passed a bill calling for a referendum on the agreement to be held in July 2009. If the Iraqi public votes against it, Iraq will have one year to withdraw from the agreement, and U.S. troops will have to leave. That will be the real test of the SOFA.

Winners And Losers

There are some clear winners and losers of this entire process. Although the Sunnis got their bill passed, they will probably come out on the bottom again as the Kurds and Shiites still monopolize most of the power in the government. The Sadrists also remain on the outside. They have promised to continue their protests against the agreement, but that will have little actual affect, as the Sadr Trend appears to be a fading movement at this time. Fadhila was the other party that was in the opposition, but remains a small regional Shiite party. The U.S. also turned out to be a major loser. President Bush once rejected any timeline for a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. Now he has agreed to one. The White House was always in a position of weakness in the negotiations because Bush wanted an agreement before he left office, so he gave in on almost every demand that Iraq made.

On the other hand, the biggest winner was Prime Minister Maliki. He has established himself as the nationalist leader of Iraq. He can now claim that he got the U.S. to agree to pull out of the country. He will use this to his advantage in the January 2009 provincial elections and the parliamentary ones that are to follow. As reported earlier, Maliki is already the most popular politician in the country. He now appears to be on a role after cracking down on his opponents within the country, and taking on his allies, he has now won a victory against the Americans. He still has to worry about his coalition members the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and the Kurds who were making moves to remove him before the SOFA vote. This may accelerate now that Maliki has improved his position again, but might run into opposition from Grand Ayatollah Sistani and the United States who stand behind him. Either way, they are dealing with a strengthened Prime Minister who was almost pushed out of office in late 2007.

SOURCES

Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Iraq Shiites, Kurds meet Sunni demand on US pact,” Associated Press, 11/26/08

Arraf, Jane, “On brink of vote, Iraqi parliament makes new demands,” Christian Science Monitor, 11/28/08

Ashton, Adam, “Iraqi parliament approves pact to end U.S. occupation,” McClatchy Newspapers, 11/27/08

Associated Press, “Iraqi parliament approves U.S. security pact,” USA Today, 11/27/08

Aswat al-Iraq, “Communist party, IAF, dialogue bloc to vote to accept SOFA,” 11/27/08
- “Fadila party supports government in dealing with pact violation,” 11/27/08
- “INL urges blocs to vote to approve U.S. pact,” 11/27/08
- “Will use legal authorizations to degrade pact – Sadarist MP,” 11/27/08

BBC News, “Iraqi parliament backs US pullout,” 11/27/08

Faraj, Salam, “Iraqi parliament approves landmark US military pact,” Agence France Presse, 11/27/08

Haynes, Deborah, “Iraq approves US security pact amid noisy debate,” Times of London, 11/27/08

Al Jazeera, “Iraq parliament approves US pact,” 11/27/08

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraqi Parliament Passes U.S. Security Pact,” 11/27/08

Raghavan, Sudarsan, “Iraqi Lawmakers Extend Agreement With U.S. Military for 3 Years,” Washington Post, 11/27/08

Rasheed, Ahmed and al-Ansary, Khalid, “Iraq parliament passes U.S. security pact,” Reuters, 11/27/08

Rubin, Alissa, Robertson, Campbell and Farrell, Stephen, “Iraqi Parliament Approves U.S. Security Pact,” New York Times, 11/27/08

Al-Salhy, Suadad, “Analysis: SOFA, the View from Parliament,” Iraq From the Inside Blog, Baghdad Bureau New York Times, 11/27/08

Smith, Daniel, “Parliament Passes Security Agreement,” IraqSlogger.com, 11/27/08

Steele, Jonathan, “This is no sop. It is a vote to end the occupation of Iraq,” Guardian, 11/27/08

Visser, Rediar, “The ‘Withdrawal Treaty’ Is Passed,” Historiae.org, 11/27/08

The Status Of Forces Agreement

Today November 26, Iraq’s parliament showed up to work expecting to vote on the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) in the morning, which would set military relations between the U.S. and Iraq for the next several years. Instead they were told that they would vote on the agreement tomorrow November 27, along with a separate bill put forward by the Sunni Iraqi Accordance Front. The recent negotiations over the deal point to several important facts. First, the Sadrists recently received a lot of press for demonstrating against the SOFA, but they really had no say on whether it would pass or not. It was the Sunni parties that were the real swing votes. Second, the Sunni demands may derail the entire process. Third, the fact that the Americans gave in to so many concessions showed that the White House was always working from a position of weakness vis-a-vis the Iraqis. Fourth, the Iranians may have finally agreed to the deal, and last, many of the compromises Baghdad recently was able to gain may be largely symbolic and upset many later on.

Was Opposed By A Small Minority…

In November 2007, the U.S. and Iraq signed a Declaration of Principles that was to set up the long-term security relationship between the two countries. That agreement was to be the basis for the SOFA. Originally, the deal was to be signed by the end of July 2008. As that date approached, Moqtada al-Sadr began calling for weekly protests against the SOFA. Sadr has always preached Iraqi nationalism, and objected to any agreement that would legitimize the U.S. presence in the country. Instead, he demanded that the U.S. withdraw immediately. His call for protests was also motivated by a need to rebuild his movement and maintain his supporters after the government launched successive military operations against them in Basra, Sadr City, and Maysan province. The Sadrists were joined by the Fadhila party, which is based in Basra, and former Interim Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List in opposing the agreement. The Sadrists hold 30 seats in parliament, the Fadhila 15, and the Iraqi National List 25. Together they do not have enough votes to block the agreement from passing, and the National List might change sides and support it if the Sunnis’ demands are met.

But The Sunnis Were The Real Swing Voters …

While Sadr was trying to rally his followers against the SOFA, the real deciders on the matter were the Sunni parties. In the summer of 2008 Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani said that he would sign off on the agreement if it protected Iraq’s sovereignty, was passed by parliament, and all major parties agreed upon it. By November the Kurdish Alliance and the United Iraqi Alliance, the two largest coalitions in parliament, had come out for the SOFA. Together they had enough votes for a straight majority, 138 votes, to pass the agreement. However, because of Sistani’s insistence on national consensus on the SOFA, the Shiites and Kurds had to bring the Sunnis on board. That put the Iraqi Accordance Front in the driver's seat. They demanded that they receive more say in the government and the security forces, that prisoners held by the U.S. that are not charged with a crime be released, and a national referendum is held on the SOFA. As the vote on the agreement came down to the wire, they were able to get these concessions.

Whose Demand For A National Referendum May Undermine the SOFA …

Tomorrow when parliament reconvenes they will vote on the SOFA, and a separate bill that includes the Sunnis’ demands. If the bill is passed there will be a special election on the SOFA in July 2009. The problem is that U.S. forces are operating in Iraq under a United Nations mandate that expires on December 31, 2008. If the referendum bill is passed, that means the agreement won’t come to a conclusion until the summer of 2009, and even then the Iraqi public may veto it. That would mean the Americans would have to go back to the U.N. for another yearlong authorization, undermining whole point of the SOFA, which is to take the place of the U.N. deal.

Which Highlights The Weak American Position …

The U.S. finds itself in an unenviable position. This has been true since the beginning of the negotiations however. From the start, the Iraqis knew that President Bush wanted an agreement before he left office. It never appeared that the White House tried to convince the Iraqis of why they needed the U.S. Instead, Baghdad made more and more demands, and the Americans gave in, especially as time passed, deadlines were not met, and the end of the U.N. mandate lurked. The Iraqis were able to set a specific deadline, 2009, for when U.S. troops would be out of Iraq’s cities, and a 2011 date for when U.S. troops would be out of the entire country. They also got the administration to agree to Iraqis checking American cargo and mail coming to Iraq, ending immunity for foreign contractors and security guards, having a say over intelligence gathering and U.S. military operations, control over the Green Zone, requiring American soldiers to get an Iraqi warrant to conduct searches, not allowing the U.S. to use Iraq to attack any other country, turning over anyone arrested to the Iraqis within 24 hours, and control of Iraqi air space. This has upset some in the U.S. military and Pentagon, but after Barak Obama took the lead in the presidential race, and eventually won the election, President Bush was even more determined to sign the SOFA rather than leave it to his successor. Now they may have to reconfigure all of their plans if the Iraqi legislature agrees to hold a referendum in 2009.

And The Strength Of Iran’s Position…

Iran appears to have several different positions on the SOFA, but may be finally signing off on it. From the beginning, Iran has seen the U.S. presence in Iraq as a threat to its security. They were therefore against the SOFA that would maintain the American military in Iraq. Many Iranian newspapers along with the country’s leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, speaker of Iran’s parliament Ali Larijani, among others have publicly said that Iraq should not sign the agreement. At the same time others such as the head of Iran’s judiciary Ayatollah Hashemi Shahroudi and Iranian TV have made statements supporting the deal. Attacks by Special Groups and other Iranian backed militants are also down across the country, which Tehran has tempered before during important political decisions it has supported in the past. While there are recent statements in the Iranian press against the agreement, it appears that Tehran has acquiesced to the SOFA especially after Baghdad was able to get the U.S. to agree to not use the country as a base for attacks upon its neighbors, and that it sets a specific date for an American withdrawal. Both would be considered wins for Iran.

But Parts Of The Agreement May Be More Symbolic Anyway

The last major problem with the SOFA is how the Americans and Iraqis interpret the SOFA when and if it is passed. Many of the concessions that Baghdad was able to gain may be more symbolic than real. McClatchy Newspapers for example, pointed out three articles in the agreement that the U.S. sees differently than Baghdad. First, the Americans have agreed to allow U.S. soldiers that commit crimes when they are off duty and off base to be tried by joint U.S. and Iraqi courts. This is a largely meaningless article meant to appease Iraqis because U.S. forces rarely go off base when they are off duty, not to mention that Baghdad and Washington have to negotiate over how these joint courts would work, which could take years. By that time, the U.S. may be out of the country. Second, the agreement says that the U.S. cannot use Iraq as a base to attack other countries. The Americans believe this does not prohibit hot pursuit and the right of self-defense, which could make the point mean nothing. Finally, the U.S. military believes that the Iraqi security forces are full of insurgents, Sadrists, and people who simply want to make a buck, and therefore do not trust them with advance warning and detailed information on military operations. This is becoming less of an issue as the U.S. is moving from conducting their own operations to supporting Iraqi ones. Still, the Pentagon does not want to give Baghdad control over their planning. These last two could make many Iraqis and Iran mad if they are implemented in the way the U.S. sees them. The White House in fact, is withholding its version of the agreement until it is passed by Iraq’s parliament because they are afraid it will undermine support for the SOFA.

Conclusion

Tomorrow will be another important date in the process of passing the SOFA, but it will not be the last. The agreement still needs to go to the Presidential Council for approval, and if the parliament agrees on it, there will be a referendum in July 2009. That may force Iraq to go back to the United Nations for a new mandate to legalize America’s presence in the country, something that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has said he is loath to do. Either that or the U.S. and Iraq may have to come up with some kind of ad hoc interpretation of the SOFA. That means there is still much to watch for as the agreement proceeds along.

SOURCES

Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Iraq Shiites, Kurds meet Sunni demand on US pact,” Associated Press, 11/26/08

Alsumaria, “Iraq parties divided over US security pact,” 11/20/08
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Farrell, Stephen, “Protests in Baghdad on U.S. Pact,” New York Times, 11/21/08

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Oppel, Richard and Farrell, Stephen, “Growing Opposition to Iraq Security Pact,” New York Times, 5/31/08

Roads To Iraq Blog, “Final amended SOFA version,” 11/16/08
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Robertson, Campbell and Al-Salhy, Suadad, “Cleric Calls for Resistance to U.S. Presence in Iraq,” New York Times, 11/15/08

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