Fadhil Sons of Iraq Leader Sentenced To Death

On November 20, 2009 the head of the Sons of Iraq (SOI) in Baghdad’s Fadhil district, Adil al-Mashhadani, was sentenced to death by an Iraqi court. He was charged with the murder of a girl whose mother complained to him about the violence in the neighborhood during the sectarian war. Mashhadani was originally arrested in late March 2009, which set off a day of fighting between Iraqi and U.S. forces, and Mashhadani’s SOI. The SOI leader shows both who the U.S. was willing to work with during the Surge as well as Baghdad’s ambivalent attitude towards the Sons of Iraq program.

In the summer of 2007 General David Petraeus and his top advisers met to discuss a new Sunni policy. It was decided that the U.S. would try to replicate the Anbar Awakening in Baghdad, and other Sunnis areas in central and northern Iraq. In 2005 the Sunni tribes of Anbar had begun to turn on Al Qaeda in Iraq because they no longer perceived them to be allies, but as a threat since the Islamists were attempting to take over the insurgency and impinge on many of the tribes’ businesses. This inspired the Sons of Iraq (SOI) program where American forces began creating ties with insurgents and tribal groups that were willing to fight Al Qaeda.

Fadhil is a small neighborhood in eastern Baghdad near the Tigris River. The area was known for having a very active insurgency in 2006-2007 that was battling Shiite militiamen from Sadr City, which was just to the northeast, and carrying out attacks on the Americans. Adil Mashhadani was a cell leader there. He was a former member of the Republican Guard, and originally joined the fight against the Americans in Fallujah in 2004. In April 2007 Mashhadani’s forces were devastated in a fight with the U.S., followed by Al Qaeda attempting to replace him. Faced with the triple pressure from the Islamists, the Shiites, and the Americans, he decided to switch sides and work with the last. By May the U.S. battalion in Fadhil had organized Mashhadani's men into a SOI unit, and had also been able to work out a deal with the Shiites in the surrounding areas. By June Mashhadani was in firm control, creating his own little fief supported by U.S. troops and reconstruction money. In October Al Qaeda tried to strike back at him with a failed suicide attack. That led to a month’s long battle that expelled the Islamists from the rest of the area. By December 2009 the U.S. got him to reluctantly work with the Iraqi Army and government. This earned Mashhadani the respect of the first two U.S. officers to work with him, who protected him from officials in Baghdad that wanted him arrested for murder.

At the very end of December 2008 things started to change. A new U.S. unit began receiving information about Mashhadani’s men taking part in extortion, rape, and insurgent activity, while it was transferring Fadhil to Iraqi control. This caused tensions with Mashhadani who didn’t want to give up his power. He also complained that hardly any of his men were getting jobs or being paid by the government as promised. That all ended at the end of March when he was arrested by Iraqi Special Forces. His SOI unit, which only numbered about 150 men, was disbanded afterward.

Mashhadani’s detention and the subsequent fighting set off alarm bells in the U.S., but got a much more mixed reaction within Iraq. Many American commentators feared that his arrest would set off a wave of fighting between the government and the SOI since the Prime Minister had never approved of the program since its inception. Sunnis expressed both fear and approval. An SOI commander in Dora, Baghdad for example, was afraid that Iraqi forces would arrest him, while another in Adhamiya said that Mashhadani had been killing people and extorting money and therefore deserved what he got. Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha of the Anbar Awakening chimed in that Mashhadani had been breaking the law, and called for an end to speculation that his arrest would undermine security in the country. His subsequent death sentence has created the same sort of mixed feelings amongst the SOI.

Adil Mashhadani was the type of man that the U.S. was willing to work with to bring an end to the sectarian war. The question has only been raised by a few like Nibras Kazimi of the Hudson Institute and Talisman Gate blog, but could the U.S. have avoided this whole ordeal if it had decided to crush the entire insurgency rather than attempting to divide and conquer it? After the Samarra bombing in February 2006, which set off the civil war, the Sunnis quickly realized that they were going to lose, as they were outnumbered 3 to 1 by the Shiites. At the same time Al Qaeda was focusing their violence on fellow insurgents who would not follow their lead. The Americans took advantage of this situation to cut a short-term deal with Sunnis like Mashhadani who were willing to turn on the Islamists to save their own skins, which created a long-term problem with the Iraqi government who never approved of the U.S. policy. Instead they could’ve let Mashhadani and Al Qaeda battle it out, and then swept up the remains. The problem for General Petraeus was that would’ve taken longer and led to more fighting at a time when he was under intense domestic pressure in the U.S. to show results as quickly as possible. The Sons of Iraq program appeared to be a way to do that, and the U.S. and Iraq are still facing the consequences as the Americans are trying to ensure the SOI get as many jobs as possible from a government that lacks both the will and capacity to do so.

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “Awakening council ex-leader sentenced to death,” 11/20/09
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Aswat al-Iraq, “Sahwa leader captured in central Baghdad on “terror” charges – spokesman,” 3/28/09

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Kazimi, Nibras, “How To Do A “Surge,”” Hudson Institute, 4/2/09

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Nordland, Rod and Rubin, Alissa, “Sunni Fighters Say Iraq Didn’t Keep Job Promises,” New York Times, 3/24/09

Parker, Ned and Ahmed, Caesar, “Sons of Iraq movement suffers another blow,” Los Angeles Times, 3/30/09

Raghavan, Sudarsan, “Baghdad Arrest Sets Off Clashes,” Washington Post, 3/29/09

Reuters, “Iraqi forces arrest more U.S.-allied Sunni guards,” 4/4/09

Rosen, Nir, “The big sleep,” The National, 4/24/09

Rubin, Alissa and Cave, Damien, “In a Force for Iraqi Calm, Seeds of Conflict,” New York Times, 12/23/07

Rubin, Alissa and Farrell, Stephen, “Awakening Councils by Region,” New York Times, 12/22/07

Rubin, Alissa and Nordland, Rod, “Troops Arrest an Awakening Council Leader in Iraq, Setting Off Fighting,” New York Times, 3/29/09

Ziezulewicz, Geoff, “Empowered by the U.S., imprisoned by Iraqis,” Stars and Stripes, 9/24/09
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Low Level Violence Persists in Anbar

Anbar was once the center of the Sunni insurgency. After the Awakening movement and the Surge however, violence there dropped dramatically. Every time there’s a mass casualty bombing in the province however, there are concerns that militants are making a comeback. The latest incident was an October 11, 2009 attack on the provincial council building in Ramadi, which ended up killing 23, and wounding 65, while members of the National Reconciliation Committee were meeting with local Anbar officials. This led to stories like “Iraq: Insurgency fears rise as bombs kill 19 in Ramadi,” by the Associated Press, “Iraq bombings target reconciliation meeting, killing 26” in the Los Angeles Times, “Triple bombing kills scores in Anbar Province” by the Christian Science Monitor, and “3 Bombings Target Police in Iraq” in the Washington Post, all of which asked whether the attack was a sign that the security situation in Anbar was worsening.

As reported before, trying to read Iraq based upon mass casualty bombings gives a very distorted view of the situation there. A look at security incidents and casualties shows that Anbar has hardly changed in the last year, and violence there has followed national trends.

The last set of comprehensive security statistics released by the U.S. in July 2009 showed that Anbar was the sixth most violent governorate in Iraq out of eighteen. Attacks went through a steady decline there from April 2008 to March 2009, as they did throughout the country, correlating to the January 2009 provincial elections, and the negotiations that took place afterward to form new governments. After that attacks crept back up from April to July 2009. From April 1 to July 1, 2008 for example, there were 275 security incidents recorded by the U.S. military in Anbar, which then dropped to 53 from January 1 to March 20, 2009. From April to July they increased to 92. In comparison, Ninewa province, the home to Mosul, probably the least stable city in the country, had 454 for those same months.

Security Incidents Reported In Anbar Province By U.S. Military
4/1/08-7/1/08: 275
7/1/08-9/30/08: 209
10/1/08-12/31/08: 162
1/1/09-3/20/09: 53
4/1/09-7/21/09: 92

When going through press accounts of casualties, Anbar followed the same trend. There was a dip in January and February 2009 compared to the end of 2008, and then the number of dead and wounded slowly went back up for the rest of 2009. Quarterly averages for example, show that there were an average of 8.66 monthly incidents in Anbar for the last quarter of 2008 resulting in 25.33 deaths per month and 77.66 wounded. That dropped to just 3.66 attacks per month, 8.66 deaths, and 9.66 wounded for the first quarter of 2009. By the 3rd quarter, the number of average monthly attacks had risen dramatically to 20.66, but the resulting deaths, 24.33, and wounded, 84.00, were about the same as the 4th quarter of 2008.

Security Incidents In Anbar October 2008-September 2009

October 08
Attacks/Incidents: 11
Deaths: 11
Wounded: 30

November 08
Attacks/Incidents: 6
Deaths: 20
Wounded: 31 + 2 Americans

December 08
Attacks/Incidents: 9
Deaths: 45
Wounded: 170

January 09
Attacks/Incidents: 3
Deaths: 13
Wounded: 13

February 09
Attacks/Incidents: 3
Deaths: 3
Wounded: 2

March 09
Attacks/Incidents: 5
Deaths: 10
Wounded: 14 + 2 Americans

April 09
Attacks/Incidents: 11
Deaths: 31
Wounded: 64

May 09
Attacks/Incidents: 9
Deaths: 12
Wounded: 11

June 09
Attacks/Incidents: 24
Deaths: 29
Wounded: 53+

July 09
Attacks/Incidents: 22
Deaths: 33
Wounded: 126

August 09
Attacks/Incidents: 23
Deaths: 16
Wounded: 62

September 09
Attacks/Incidents: 17
Deaths: 24
Wounded: 64

Averages
4th Quarter of 2008: 8.66 Attacks/Incidents/month, 25.33 deaths/month, 77.66 wounded/month
1st Quarter of 2009: 3.66 Attacks/Incidents/month, 8.66 deaths/month, 9.66 wounded/month
2nd Quarter of 2009: 14.66 Attacks/Incidents/month, 24.0 deaths/month, 42.66 wounded/month
3rd Quarter of 2009: 20.66 Attacks/Incidents/month, 24.33 deaths/months, 84.00 wounded/month

Violence in Anbar is largely due to two factors. First, there are still Al Qaeda in Iraq and other insurgent and tribal allies active in the province that are attempting to let the Awakening movement, and the Iraqi government know that they are still around. Second, the tribes that aligned themselves with the Americans have broken up into several factions, most of which are extreme rivals with each other. Divisions, feuds, and violence were common occurrences amongst the sheikhs in the past, so there’s no reason to believe that those same dynamics don’t still exist in Anbar today. Together, these two causes are likely to maintain the low level of attacks and casualties currently seen in the governorate.

SOURCES

Associated Press, “Iraq: Insurgency fears rise as bombs kill 19 in Ramadi,” Guardian, 10/11/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “2 cops wounded in Anbar blast,” 8/19/09
- “2 emergency personnel killed in blast near Ramadi,” 9/28/09
- “2 Iraqi soldiers wounded in blast in Falluja,” 8/16/09
- “2 Iraqi soldiers wounded in blast in Falluja,” 8/25/09
- “2 policemen wounded in blast near Anbar,” 9/8/09
- “2 roadside bombs defused, 4 suspects arrested in Falluja,” 8/25/09
- “3 cops injured in IED,” 3/31/09
- “3 policemen wounded in blast near Falluja,” 11/15/08
- “3 soldiers injured in eastern Falluja,” 9/23/09
- “4 killed in attack in Falluja,” 8/16/09
- “6 cops killed, wounded in 2nd Falluja blast,” 12/28/08
- “Blast hits Iraqi army patrol in Falluja,” 8/17/09
- “Car bomb seized in Falluja” 8/25/09
- “Cop killed, 3 wounded in accident in Anbar,” 10/17/08
- “Cop killed, 6 wounded in Falluja suicide bombing,” 12/28/08
- “Falluja blast kills, wounds 7,” 12/24/08
- “Falluja chieftain escapes attempt on his life,” 8/23/09
- “Gunman killed, 2 civilians injured in Ramadi,” 9/3/09
- “Gunman killed in blast in Falluja,” 9/17/09
- “IED defused in central Falluja,” 8/18/09
- “IED defused in Falluja,” 8/13/09
- “IED defused in Falluja without incident,” 10/27/08
- “IED wounds 3 civilians in Falluja,” 9/23/09
- “Police officer killed in Ramadi,” 11/13/08
- “Roadside bomb goes off in western Falluja,” 2/24/09
- “Roadside bomb wounds 3 cops in Falluja,” 8/11/09
- “Sticky bomb injures 2 civilians in Falluja,” 9/23/09
- “Suicide attack kills cop, injures 2 in Falluja,” 3/20/09
- “Tight security in Falluja after blasts,” 12/28/08
- “Toll from Falluja car bombing increases to 23,” 8/3/09
- “Toll of Anbar bombings increases to 8 dead, 22 injured,” 10/11/09
- “U.S. forces shoot mentally handicapped person in Falluja,” 9/16/09
- “URGENT/3 cops wounded in Falluja blast,” 10/18/08
- “Woman killed, 5 civilians injured in Falluja,” 9/16/09
- “Woman killed, 6 wounded in central Anbar,” 8/5/09

BBC, “Falluja car bomb blast ‘kills 13,’” 1/24/09

CNN, “7 prisoners, 6 officers killed in Iraqi jailbreak,” 12/26/08

DPA, “Iraqi tribal leader escapes assassination attempt south of Baghdad,” 3/22/09

Al Dulaimy, Mohammed, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 16 September, 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 9/16/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Sunday 16 August, 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 8/16/09

Hammoudi, Laith, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Friday 14 August, 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 8/14/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Friday 21 August, 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 8/21/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Sunday 27 September, 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 9/27/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 28 October, 2008,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/28/08

Iraq Today, December 2008
- September 2009

Issa, Sahar, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 28 September, 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 9/28/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Saturday 6 December, 2008,” McClatchy Newspapers, 12/6/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Saturday 8 November, 2008,” McClatchy Newspapers, 11/8/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 19 August, 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 8/19/09

Issa, Sahar and Kadhim, Hussein, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 24 March, 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 3/24/09

Kadhi, Hussein “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 09 October 2008,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/9/08
Kadhi, Hussein “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 19 February 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 2/19/09

Kropf, Schuyler, “Mount Pleasant solder killed,” The Post and Courier, 11/7/08

KUNA, “Woman suicide bomber sets off explosives at hospital entrance in Iraq,” 11/9/08

McCary, John, “The Anbar Awakening: An Alliance of Incentives,” Washington Quarterly, January 2009

Al-Mokhtar, Uthman and Bakri, Nada, “3 Bombings Target Police in Iraq,” Washington Post, 10/12/09

Perth Now, “’Imad the killer’ shot dead by cops,” 12/27/08

Press TV, “Car bomber kills 5, wounds 13 in Iraq,” 1/24/09

Reuters, “Double suicide bombing kills 8 in western Iraq,” 11/8/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 12,” 8/12/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 19,” 2/19/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 3,” 1/3/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, March 20,” 3/20/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 3,” 11/3/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 13,” 11/13/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 17,” 10/17/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 18,” 10/18/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 25,” 10/25/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 26,” 10/26/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 29,” 10/29/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 3,” 9/3/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 28,” 9/28/09
- “Gunmen attack, burn ballot station before Iraq vote,” 1/27/09

Shadid, Anthony, “In Anbar, U.S.-Allied Tribal Chiefs Feel Deep Sense of Abandonment,” Washington Post, 10/3/09

Sly, Liz, “Iraq bombings target reconciliation meeting, killing 26,” Los Angeles Times, 10/12/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, - "Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress," 1/30/09
-"Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress," 7/30/09
- "Quarterly Report to the United States Congress," 10/30/08
- "Quarterly Report to the United States Congress," 4/30/09

Williams, Timothy, “Bombings Outside Iraq Reconciliation Meeting Kill 23,” New York Times, 10/11/09

Xinhua, “Iraqi police foil suicide car bomb attack in W Iraq,” 8/12/09
- “Suicide bomber kills 2 security members in W Iraq,” 8/15/09
- “Up to 15 killed, 147 injured in Fallujah twin suicide attacks,” 12/4/08

Yusuf, Huma, “Triple bombing kills scores in Anbar Province,” Christian Science Monitor, 10/12/09

Maliki’s New State Of Law List May Not Be Enough

On October 1, 2009 Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki revealed his new State of Law List, which will run in the January 2010 parliamentary elections. Despite many reports of Maliki attempting to add new members to his coalition, especially Sunnis, the Prime Minister apparently struck out in his attempts. Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha, the head of the Awakening Conference in Anbar, talked about running with Maliki for the last six months, but instead formed a new alliance with Interior Minister Jawad Bolani’s Constitution Party, and several tribal groups in the new Iraqi Unity List. Former speaker of parliament Mahmud al-Mashhadani, an independent Sunni who heads the Nationalist Independent Trend, at first said that he had joined the State of Law, and then withdrew. Sunni Parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq of the Iraqi National Dialogue Front was another likely candidate, which Maliki had courted after the January 2009 parliamentary elections, said back in March that he was interested in working with the State of Law, but those talks fell apart by September. Mutlaq instead joined with former Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List, who also at one time expressed an interest in Maliki’s coalition. Member of parliament Mithal al-Alusi, Ninewa’s ruling al-Hadbaa party, and the new Kurdish opposition party, the Change List, were also not a part of the State of Law either. Maliki even went after Sunni tribal leaders in places like Salahaddin, Anbar, Tamim, and Ninewa, but nothing came of that. Maliki also made overtures to former Shiite rivals like the Sadrists when provincial governments were being put together earlier in the year, but they ended up joining the new Iraqi National Alliance instead.

The reason for these failures are largely unknown since the negotiations all occurred behind closed doors. It was reported that Maliki and al-Mutlaq agreed that their policies and constituencies would be contradictory. Maliki for example, has recently gone after Baathists for the August 2009 Baghdad bombings, while former regime members are exactly who Mutlaq appeals to. Sadr on the other hand, was probably pressured by Iran to join the National Alliance, since one of their main priorities is to maintain Shiite rule in Iraq.

Instead, what Prime Minister Maliki is going to run with is leftovers. The leadership of the State of Law is still with his Dawa Party. The Dawa-Iraq Organization is also a core member. After that it’s a number of ministers and government officials, such as Oil Minister Hussain al-Shahristani, and independent Shiite politicians that follow him, Minister of Displacement and Migration, Abdul Samad Sultan, an independent Kurd, and government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh. Maliki was able to get some members of Allawi’s Iraqi National List to defect, such as the deputy speaker of parliament, and a group from al-Hadbaa in the Sinjar district in Ninewa. The only prominent Sunni that agreed to join was Sheikh Ali Hatem Sulaiman from Anbar who was formerly with the Abu Risha’s Awakening. The Iraqi Communist Party was originally announced as a member as well, but then denied it.

Maliki is facing an uphill battle to return to the prime ministership. He’s running on security, which has been questioned after the August Baghdad bombings, better services, which are not coming, and getting the Americans to leave. The individual members of the Iraqi National Alliance did far worse than Maliki’s State of Law in the provincial elections, but all together they did slightly better. The Kurds are still a relatively unified bloc of voters as well, and may be kingmakers in Iraq after the elections in whatever ruling coalition is put together. They have had repeated run-ins with Maliki. What he has going for him is that he is far better known and popular than any other Iraqi politician. His nationalist, and strong central government platform, also appeals to many. His inability to bring in any new major figures or parties however may show the limit of his power. As it stands, he probably has a 50-50 chance to hold onto his position.

SOURCES

Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Maliki’s coalition blurs Iraq’s sectarian lines,” Associated Press, 10/2/09

Alsumaria, “New coalitions arise ahead of Iraq elections,” 9/12/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Sunni leader envisions alliance with Maliki in next polls,” 7/26/09
- “Urgent/Maliki’s Dawlat al-Qaneen list announced,” 10/1/09

BBC, “Maliki launches pan-Iraqi bloc,” 10/1/09

Chon, Gina, “Maliki Coalition Tries to Bridge Iraq’s Deep Sectarian Divisions,” Wall Street Journal, 10/2/09

Domergue, Jeremy and Cochrane, Marisa, “Balancing Maliki,” Institute for Understanding War, June 2009

Al Dulaimy, Mohammad, “Maliki unveils new national, nonsectarian Iraqi party,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/1/09

Fox News, “Iraqi Clan Leader May Hold Key to Lasting Political Stability After U.S. Exit,” 4/4/09

Haddad, Subhy and Ahmed, Shaalan, “Iraqi PM approaches Sunnis for nationwide elections,” Xinhua, 10/1/09

Kazimi, Nibras, “Iraq: Alliances Galore,” Hudson Institute, 7/17/09
- “Coalitions,” Talisman Gate, 9/10/09

Lando, Ben, “In Iraq, Maliki Banks on a New ‘Unity’ Coalition,” Time, 10/1/09

Myers, Steven Lee, “Iraqi Leader Creates Broad Coalition,” New York Times, 10/1/09
- “Unity Is Rallying Cry Ahead of Iraq Elections,” New York Times, 10/1/09

Niqash, “alliance building in anbar: sunnis join cross-sectarian trend,” 9/7/09

Parker, Ned, “Maliki remakes himself ahead of elections,” Los Angeles Times, 7/21/09

Parker, Ned and Salman, Raheem, “Maliki presents his own electoral bloc,” Los Angeles Times, 10/2/09

Roads To Iraq, “Election update – various other news,” 9/29/09
- “Iraq pre-election political map – The Sunni scene,” 9/19/09
- “Last news from the election campaign,” 10/4/09

Serwer, Daniel and Parker, Sam, “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2009

Shadid, Anthony, “In Iraq, Political Ambiguity,” Washington Post, 4/4/09
- “Maliki Creates Coalition To Compete in Iraqi Vote,” Washington Post, 10/2/09
- “New Alliance In Iraq Cross Sectarian Lines,” Washington Post, 3/20/09

Visser, Reidar, “Maliki Re-Launches the State of Law List: Beautiful but Is It Powerful Enough?” Historiae.org, 10/1/09

Update On Political Maneuvers Before 2010 Elections

Iraqi political parties and figures continue to make new coalitions and conduct negotiations with each other in preparation for the January 2010 parliamentary elections. The two major coalitions, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law and the new Iraqi National Alliance are both seeking a wide variety of new partners, some completely unexpected, which might engulf the smaller lists.

First, the new head of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) Ammar al-Hakim gave a sermon on September 21, 2009 during the Eid al-Fitr holiday aimed at bringing Maliki into the Iraqi National Alliance. Hakim said that the coalition was working to bring in new members and widen its base, and that he supported the Prime Minister’s call for an international tribunal to investigate the August bombings in Baghdad. Hakim also promised better delivery of water and electricity if his list won, something that Maliki is also running on. If the Prime Minister joined the National Alliance, it would become the largest and most popular list in the country, which could muster a plurality of the votes. Maliki however, is intent on running on his own, since the Alliance would not give in to his demands to be their only candidate for Prime Minister.

The National Alliance and Maliki are also competing over the loyalty of former speaker of parliament Mahmoud al-Mashhadani and his Independent National Trend. Mashhadani, an independent Sunni, was the first well-known politician to say that he would run with Maliki. Mashhadani has since said he is reconsidering that move, and is now being courted by the National Alliance.

In a completely unexpected move, former Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi of the Iraqi National List is now flirting with the National Alliance. Allawi is currently aligned with parliamentary Saleh al-Mutlaq in what could be called the neo-Baathists since they are secular, nationalists that appeal to many former regime elements. If Allawi were to join the National Alliance, and they accepted him, it would show that they only care about power and nothing else. There is already no ideological coherence to the list as is. The Sadrists and former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari for example, preach nationalism, a strong central government, and are critical of the ruling Kurdish parties. The SIIC on the other hand, are proponents of federalism and the closest allies of the Kurds in the country. The Sadrists and Supreme Council do agree on excluding Baathist from government, and yet that is exactly who Allawi appeals to. If he agreed to join his Iraqi National List would probably break apart, and he would be overwhelmed by the larger parties in return for a nominal ministership.

In Anbar, Sheikh Ahmad Abu Risha has formed a new coalition called the Iraqi Unity List. It mostly consists of small tribal groups, but pulled a coup in bringing in the Constitution Party of Interior Minister Jawad Bolani. Both the National Alliance and Maliki have talked with the Minister, and many think Bolani was going to run for prime minister. Abu Risha has been flirting about running with Maliki for months now however, so that could mean Bolani does not aspire to the top spot in Iraq.

Overall, the fracturing of the Sunnis into smaller parties, may mean that they will be overwhelmed by the larger Shiite ones. Former head of the Iraqi Islamic Party Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi for example, may run with Maliki. All of the leading Anbar sheikhs are trying to make ties with Shiites as well. Like Allawi, they may gain a few nominal ministerial positions, but be subordinate to the Shiite parties.

SOURCES

Ahmed, Hamid, “Iraqi Shiite leader appeals for unity before vote,” Associated Press, 9/21/09

Alsumaria, “New coalitions arise ahead of Iraq elections,” 9/12/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “National Current may reconsider alliance with State of Law,” 9/19/09

Najm, Hayder, “al-maliki faces shia election threat,” Niqash, 9/15/09

Roads To Iraq, “Iraq pre-election political map – The Sunni scene,” 9/19/09

Visser, Reidar, “Why an Allawi-Hakim Alliance would Mean Retrogression in Iraq,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 9/21/09

Political Parties Looking Towards 2010 Elections

Iraq’s political parties are moving into high gear looking for partners to run with in the January 2010 parliamentary elections. Some old alliances are being reformed, and new ones are in the process of forming. As before, however, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is at the center of things, and most organizations are thinking in terms of what to do in relation to him.

Sunnis

There are two main groups of Sunni politicians. First are the provincial parties that want to gain seats in Baghdad. Anbar’s sheikhs are one such group that has recently emerged. What was once the Anbar Awakening has now split into three main parties led by three leading sheikhs. There is the Anbar Awakening Council led by Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha, the Anbar Salvation Council of Sheikh Hamid al-Hayes, and Sheikh Hatim al-Suleiman’s Anbar Salvation National Front. After participating in the 2009 provincial elections, all three are now looking for national office. Sheikh Hayes has joined the new Shiite led National Alliance. Sheikh Suleiman has aligned himself with the Banners of Iraq list that includes Karbala’s Yousef al-Habboubi, who won the most votes there in 2009, but only got one seat, because he ran alone. Abu Risha, on the other hand is in negotiations with Maliki. All three are thus seeking ties with Shiites to ensure a better chance of victory.

Ninewa’s ruling al-Hadbaa is another new party. They came to power running on an anti-Kurdish, Iraqi nationalist platform, that also promised better services. They are now planning on running in the national elections as well in Ninewa, Salahaddin, Anbar, Baghdad, Wasit, Diyala, and Tamim. All of those have large Sunni populations, and three of them have disputed territories between Kurdistan and the central government, however Wasit is the exception since it is a majority Shiite province. Prime Minister Maliki could also reach out them since they have many similar ideas.

The other group is made up of Sunni politicians already in power in Baghdad. These include parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq, Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi, and the Iraqi Islamic Party and its Accordance Front list. Mutlaq recently had discussions with Maliki, but decided to run with former Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi instead. This repeats a similar set of negotiations after the 2009 elections when Maliki and Mutlaq flirted with forming ruling coalitions in a few provinces, but nothing came of it. The Islamic Party and Accordance Front are in disarray. In May 2009 Hashemi stepped down as the head of the Islamic Party, and is now talking about running on his own in the new Renewal List. The Islamic Party on the other hand wants to recreate the Accordance Front by trying to bring back the parties that left it. In 2008 the Accordance Front faced a series of defections that reduced it to only the Islamic Party and parliamentarian Adnan Dulaimi’s party. The Islamic Party is also said to be talking to Mutlaq, Allawi, al-Hadbaa, the Iraqi Scholars, some of the Anbar tribes, and Interior Minister Jawad Bolani’s Constitution Party. There are reportedly few willing to work with the Islamic Party however, which has members leaving, seen its Accordance Front collapse, and is considered a sectarian party of the past. If true, the other Sunni parties may surpass them.

Neo-Baathist

The new coalition of Saleh al-Mutlaq and Ilyad Allawi could be called the neo-Baathists. They appeal to many Sunnis of the former regime, and preach Iraqi nationalism and secularism. Interior Minister Jawad Bolani, who is an independent Shiite was supposed to run with them, but he may join the Shiite National Alliance instead. Allawi still has an outside chance of becoming prime minister as well.

Shiites

On the Shiite side, there are two main coalitions running in opposition to each other. First is the new Iraqi National Alliance. This is a revived version of the United Iraqi Alliance that won the most seats in parliament in the 2005 elections. The new Alliance is made up of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), the Sadrists, former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s National Reform Party, the Dawa-Iraq Party, and two Sunnis, Sheikh Hayes of Anbar and Khalid Abd al-Wahaab al-Mulla from Basra. The coalition was pushed hard by Tehran, but faced a major setback when the Supreme Council’s leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim passed. That has left a leadership vacuum. Hakim’s son Ammar succeeded him as head of the SIIC, but he doesn’t have the same standing. Jaafari, Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi, and perhaps Interior Minister Bolani may all emerge as its candidate for prime minister, but all those names alone show that it may be rudderless. The new alliance, despite the inclusion of two Sunni figures, is also seen as sectarian, since being Shiite is the only thing that really unites these parties that disagree on just about everything. The one issue that does bring them together is their opposition to Maliki.

Prime Minister Maliki’s State of Law is the other major list. Unlike the National Alliance, Maliki is running on a nationalist agenda, and stressing cross-sectarian ties. That didn’t stop the Prime Minister from seriously consider running with them however, but their refusal to assure him of being their only candidate for prime minister ended those talks. Maliki is now scrambling to find new allies. Former speaker of parliament Mahmoud al-Mashhadani, who was once part of the Accordance Front, was the first to formally announce he would run with the Prime Minister. Mashhadani brings with him some former members of the Basra based Fadhila party. As stated before, Sheikh Abu Risha of Anbar is also in talks with the State of Law. Other possible deals might be made with al-Hadbaa, the Islamic Party, and perhaps even the League of the Righteous, an Iranian-backed Special Group that has recently announced that it wants to join the political process.

Maliki’s greatest problem however, is not so much who he will run with but how he’s currently governing. His claim of securing the country have been shaken by the August 2009 bombings, and he has been unable to deliver better services with the large budget cuts Iraq is experiencing. He still has one ace up his sleeve the referendum on the Status of Forces Agreement with the Americans, which he is pushing to coincide with the 2010 vote. That could distract the Iraqi public from domestic issues.

Kurds

The two ruling Kurdish parties the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) have said that they will run together in 2010. At the same time, they have rejected any ideas of running with others. They still have a very close alliance with the Supreme Council however, so after the vote it’s likely that they will join together to try to put together a ruling coalition to elect a new prime minister. Both are actively opposed to Maliki as well. A new twist to Kurdish politics is the fact that the new Change Party has also announced that it will run in the national elections. The PUK and KDP still have a solid base, but the new Change List will cut into their monopoly on the Kurdish vote as they did in the recent Kurdish regional vote. Maliki may also make a run at convincing the Change List to run with him.

Conclusion

Iraqi politics are in a period of flux. In 2005 the Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds ran in three large coalitions, and took in the majority of votes. Now all three of those groups are fragmenting. On the other hand, Iraqi Arabs at least, are moving away from sectarian politics. The Sunnis are seeing the greatest change with the Accordance Front disintegrating, and new parties and politicians emerging. The PUK and KDP are facing a new challenge from the Change List, while Prime Minister Maliki has broken with the other Shiite parties. The major question now is who else will Maliki align himself with, and will that give him enough votes to remain prime minister? On the other hand, will the National Alliance, PUK, and KDP be able to stop him? The real battle for power then, is likely to play out after the election in the backroom deals to form coalitions rather than the pre-voting negotiations over who will run with whom.

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “New coalitions arise ahead of Iraq elections,” 9/12/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Ammar al-Hakim unanimously elected as SIIC chief,” 9/1/09
- “IIP head to Aswat al-Iraq: Our doors are open to Hashemi, other blocs,” 9/1/09
- “VP announces new list for upcoming parliamentary elections,” 9/12/09

Iraq The Model, “Accord Front Collapses, Sunni Tribes Seek Shiite Allies,” 8/15/09

Kazimi, Nibras, “Coalitions,” Talisman Gate, 9/10/09

Mohammed, Abeer, “Maliki’s Chess Game,” Institute of War & Peace Reporting, 9/10/09

Niqash, “alliance building in anbar: sunnis join cross-sectarian trend,” 9/7/09

Rubin, Alissa, "Dark horse wins over one Iraqi city: Karbala," International Herald Tribune, 2/6/09

Visser, Reidar, “Al-Hadba Goes Regionalist?” Historiae.org, 9/2/09

New National Iraqi Alliance

On August 24, 2009 the new Iraqi National Alliance was announced. This was the long-awaited revised version of the United Iraqi Alliance, which was the largest vote getter in the 2005 elections. The new grouping includes the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), the Sadrists, former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s National Reform Party, the Dawa-Iraq Party, and two Sunni figures, Sheikh Hamid al-Hayes of the Anbar Salvation Council and Khalid Abd al-Wahhab al-Mulla from Basra. It appears that the new list was unable to convince the Fadhila Party to join. In July 2009 they said they would not, and in August claimed they were going to form their own list, the Alliance for Integrity and Development. More importantly, the National Alliance did not include Prime Minster Nouri al-Maliki’s Dawa Party.

Dawa was said to be involved in negotiations right up to the last minute of the press conference of the new list, but couldn’t get their demands met. Maliki was asking for a majority of seats in the alliance and a promise that he would be their sole candidate to be prime minister, which the other parties objected to. The National Alliance however did leave the door open to Maliki joining the list at a later date.

As reported before, Maliki’s main reason for flirting with rejoining the alliance after running separately with his own State of Law List in the 2009 provincial balloting, was to secure the top post in the country. While Maliki was considered the biggest winner in the 2009 election, a breakdown of the results show that he was in no position to hold onto the prime ministership if he ran alone again. Of the fourteen provinces that held elections, Maliki’s State of Law only won majorities in two, Baghdad and Basra, and even then, came away with 38% and 37% of the vote respectively. Overall, State of Law won 15.1% of the ballots and took 27.5% of the 440 seats up for grabs. That was hardly a hold on the electorate to ensure that he be re-elected. In comparison, the new National Alliance members walked away with 17.1% of the vote and 27.7% of the seats.

January 2009 Provincial Election Results Comparison
Maliki’s State of Law: 15.1% of vote, 121 seats, 27.5%
SIIC’s Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 6.6% of vote, 58 seats, 13.1%
Sadrists’ Independent Free Movement List: 6.3% of vote, 41 seats, 9.3%
Jaafari’s National Reform Party: 4.2% of vote, 23 seats, 5.2%
Iraqi National Alliance members together: 17.1% of vote, 122 seats, 27.7%

This leaves the Prime Minister in a quandary because there are few other major parties left for him to align with. The Fadhila Party and Dawa have not gotten along. The State of Law List did not include it in any of its ruling coalitions after the 2009 provincial elections, and Fadhila had a poor showing in the voting. Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha of the Awakening and National Independents List has repeatedly expressed a desire to run with Maliki in 2010. The al-Hadbaa Party of Ninewa, the Change List in Kurdistan, and Mithal al-Alusi’s Ummah Party may also be new partners. Those together would still probably not deliver a plurality of the vote. Maliki flirted with allying with parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq’s National Dialogue Front after the 2009 balloting, but was attacked for it by the other Shiite parties who claimed Mutlaq was a Baathist. Mutlaq is now in discussions with former speaker of parliament Mahmoud al-Mashhadani of the National Dialogue Council, Vice President Tariq Hashemi of the Iraqi Islamic Party, former Prime Miniser Ilyad Allawi of the Iraqi National List, and Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani of the Constitution Party to form a new alliance. Bolani is said to be a candidate for prime minister, so it’s unlikely that Maliki would want to work with this grouping. After that there are only a plethora of smaller parties that tend to have very localized support.

Iraqi politics are in a state of flux. The Shiites along with the other ethnosectarian groups are fragmenting into smaller parties as the 2009 elections showed. This makes it much harder to form winning coalitions. Maliki may have to cobble together an ad hoc group of parties and hope for the best if he wants to be prime minister again. Even if he ran with the National Iraqi Alliance there was no guarantee he would hold onto the spot as the SIIC was only hoping to ride Maliki’s coattails back into power and then drop him afterwards. After the 2010 vote is completed and negotiations begin for a ruling coalition, the Prime Minister will also have to contend with the fact that the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (KDP) alliance is set against him, along with many in the Islamic Party. No matter what then, Maliki is facing an uphill battle after his spate of military and political victories in 2008 and 2009.

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “New Iraq political coalition in the offing,” 8/24/09

Associated Press, “New Shiite alliance excludes Iraqi prime minister,” 8/24/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Fadhila party announces new alliance for next elections,” 8/10/09
- “Sunni leader envisions alliance with Maliki in next polls,” 7/26/09

Domergue, Jeremy and Cochrane, Marisa, “Balancing Maliki,” Institute for Understanding War, June 2009

Fox News, “Iraqi Clan Leader May Hold Key to Lasting Political Stability After U.S. Exit,” 4/4/09

Iraq The Model, “Accord Front Collapses, Sunni Tribes Seek Shiite Allies,” 8/15/09
- “Maliki promises a crackdown that could reach political figures,” 8/23/09

Kazimi, Nibras, “Announcing the ‘New’ UIA,” Talisman Gate, 8/24/09
- “Iraq: Alliances Galore,” Hudson Institute, 7/17/09
- “Iraq: Rumors Swirl,” Hudson Institute, 8/6/09

Londono, Ernesto, “Iraqi Shiite Parties Form Coalition Without Maliki,” Washington Post, 8/24/09

Myers, Steven Lee, “Iraqi Shiite Leaders Create Alliance, Minus Maliki,” New York times, 8/24/09

Parker, Ned, “Maliki remakes himself ahead of elections,” Los Angeles Times, 7/21/09

Parker, Ned and Salman, Raheem, “In Basra, political skirmishing heats up as elections near,” Los Angeles Times, 12/28/08

Shadid, Anthony, “In Iraq, Political Ambiguity,” Washington Post, 4/4/09

Visser, Reidar, “After Sadr-Badr Compromise in Tehran, the Iraqi National Alliance (INA) Is Declared,” Historiae.org, 8/24/09
- “Claiming Nothing Has Really Changed, Fadila Rejects the Offer to Rejoin a ‘Reformed’ UIA,” Historiae.org, 7/17/09

Not So Fast On A New United Iraqi Alliance

As reported before, the major Shiite parties including Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s Dawa party, with ample support from Iran, have agreed in principle to reform the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA). The UIA was the major vote getter in the 2005 elections, but has since broken apart. The announcement of the new UIA line-up has been delayed several times, most recently August 13, 2009. Officially, members of the Dawa party say there are three holds ups. First, Dawa is asking for more parties to be added to the list. Second, Members of the UIA want it to be a Shiite coalition first and foremost, while Dawa disagrees. Last, there is a debate about how parliamentary seats will be awarded within the alliance. The real reason, as always is what role Prime Minister Maliki will play.

Maliki’s greatest desire is to maintain his position as prime minister, which is why he agreed to rejoin the UIA after forming his own State of Law List for the 2009 provincial elections. According to Nibras Kazimi of the Hudson Institute, Maliki wants to be assured that he will be the only UIA candidate for prime minister. The problem is the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) only want to ride Maliki’s coattails back into power and then drop him. There are rumors that Interior Minister Jawad Bolani of the Constitution Party may be an alternative candidate within the alliance to Maliki. His other possible rival, Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi of the SIIC, has been politically wounded by members of his security detail robbing the Rafidain Bank, one of the three largest in the country. Bolani and Mahdi are also political rivals, and the Interior Minister has been trying to take credit for the arrests, while implicating the Vice President. Maliki has joined the fray as well saying that Mahdi’s office has turned over the stolen money, but not the guards involved in the heist.

If Maliki does not get the nod for prime minister from the UIA, he is threatening to run alone. Sheikh Abu Risha of the Anbar Awakening has consistently said that he wants to run with Maliki in 2010. Maliki also recently gave a speech in Anbar to tribal sheikhs where he praised their work, called for Iraqi nationalism, and an end to sectarian politics. Other possible allies mentioned are Sheikh Ahmad Abdul Ghafoor Samarraei who runs a series of Sunni mosques, and parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq, who Maliki courted after the 2009 elections. Running with independent Sunnis like these would fit Maliki’s rhetoric of forming a truly nationalist and cross-sectarian alliance, something he promised after the provincial elections but failed to follow through on.

Either way Maliki decides to go he may have found himself caught in a Catch-22. If he runs with the United Iraqi Alliance he will be taking a step backwards in Iraqi politics, and will be accused of returning to sectarianism after promoting nationalism. On the other hand, if he chooses to run his own list, and brings in Sunnis he will be accused of collaborating with Baathists, something that still resonates with the Shiite public. The Prime Minister actually tried to reach out to former regime elements after the provincial elections, but was forced to back off because of constant attacks of trying to bring back the Baath party. Maliki’s negotiations also show that his ultimate goal is holding onto power, and he will use anything, nationalism, sectarianism, etc. to maintain his position.

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “Bank robbers not handed over yet Maliki says,” 8/11/09
- “Iraq’s new coalition on the agenda,” 8/13/09
- “New Unified Iraqi Coalition put off,” 8/8/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Baath should not be allowed in Iraq – Hakim,” 3/14/09
- “Sunni leader envisions alliance with Maliki in next polls,” 7/26/09

August, Oliver, “Iraq bank robbers were Vice-President’s security guards, police say,” Times of London, 8/3/09

Dagher, Sam, “Arrests in Bank Robbery Create a Rift Between Iraqi Officials,” New York Times, 8/3/09

Kazimi, Nibras, “Catching Up on Iraq Stuff,” Talisman Gate Blog, 8/13/09
- “Iraq: Rumors Swirl,” Hudson Institute, 8/6/09
- “Iraq: Trouble for Maliki,” Hudson New York, 4/24/09

Parker, Ned, “Maliki remakes himself ahead of elections,” Los Angeles Times, 7/21/09

Al-Salhy, Suadad, “Iraq Shi’ite alliance may split, other allies eyed,” Reuters, 8/7/09

Visser, Reidar, “Maliki Under Pressure as He Visits DC,” Historiae.org, 7/21/09

Overview of Iraq’s Tribes

Much of the commentary about Iraq is driven by U.S. experiences, which are not always the reality in Iraq. When the sectarian war took off in 2006 for example, much of the writing about the country was focused upon the Sunni-Shiite divide. A common argument was that these two interpretations of Islam had always been in conflict, and could not coexist in Iraq. Later, when the U.S. began working with the tribes in Anbar, which became known as the Awakening, a new line of thinking opened up claiming that Iraq was at heart a tribal society. This ignored the fact that many of the country’s largest tribes were a mix of Sunnis and Shiites. If the first argument held true, than the sectarian fighting should’ve destroyed many of Iraq’s tribes. Neither was completely true nor false. A quick review of Iraq’s tribal history shows that they are but one form of social organization and identity within the country amongst others. Their influence is usually directly related to the power of the state.

Many of Iraq’s tribes migrated there from the Arabian peninsula. Iraq’s tribes are divided into sub-tribes, clans, and their most basic unit, the extended family. Sheikhs are leaders within these communities. They control local economies, settle disputes, etc. The problem is there are so many it’s hard to determine which ones have real standing. About 75% of Iraq’s 26 million people belong to a tribe. There were originally nine tribes in Iraq, the Mutafiz, Zubayd, Dulaym, Ubayd, Khazal, Bani Lam, Al Bu Muhammad, Rabia, and Kab. By the 1800s there were several new groups included the Shammar, Anaza, Bani Tamim, and Zafire. Many of these groups have divided over the years leading to about 150 different tribes in the country, and around 2,000 clans today. The larger tribes are usually a mix of Sunnis and Shiites.

The power and role of Iraq’s tribes have gone up and down depending upon the rulers of the country. When the Ottomans originally ruled Iraq they had very loose control over the area, so the tribes held the real authority. By the mid-19th Century however, the Ottomans began encouraging people to give up their semi-nomadic lifestyle by settling in towns and cities, and instituted land reform, both of which diluted the standing of the tribes. That changed when the British took over and created Iraq in the wake of World War I. They turned to sheikhs as local partners to institute a form of indirect rule in the country. Many tribes became connected to specific villages at this time based upon extended families. Beginning in the 1920s when the monarchy tried to establish itself that again withered the power of the tribes. In 1968 when the Baathists took power they had a mixed policy towards the tribes. On the one hand the party wanted to modernize the state, and banned tribal names, encouraged migration from rural areas to the cities, again instituted land reform, which broke up the traditional structures many tribes relied upon, and emphasized Iraqi nationalism over other identities. At the same time, top Baathist leaders privileged their own personal kinsmen and gave them top positions in the new government.

Saddam ended up turning to the country’s tribes in the 1980s because of the wars and uprisings he faced, which eventually came back on him. First he looked to the tribes to organize soldiers to fight in the Iran-Iraq war. It was during this time that the Dulaym tribe in Anbar for example, gained privileged status from the government. After the 1991 Gulf War, Saddam relied even more upon the tribes to control the country after the Kurdish and Shiite uprisings. He gave tribes more autonomy and services, and in return, they agreed to provide security in their areas. He also played the tribal leaders off against each other, and created new tribes in a divide and rule policy. The sheikhs’ authority then was dependent upon the amount of support they received from the state. At the same time, their growing power was a sign that the Iraqi state was crumbling from the wars and sanctions. By the 1990s in fact, there were at least two tribal coup attempts against Saddam.

Immediately after the invasion in 2003, the U.S. had a contradictory attitude towards Iraq’s tribes. On the one hand, Paul Bremer wanted to get rid of the old order, which included the tribes. At the same time, in an attempt to create a sectarian and ethnically balanced Iraqi Governing Council and interim Iraqi government the Coalition Provisional Authority selected a few sheikhs to represent the Sunnis. Ghazi Ajil al-Taware of the Shammar tribe for example, was appointed Iraq’s interim president in 2004. The U.S. military also reached out to selected tribes to provide security, but many of those efforts proved futile. Many of the leaders the U.S. worked with proved largely powerless, unpopular, or were playing both sides in the conflict.

In the provinces, the overthrow of Saddam not only led to resistance, but the collapse of the Iraqi state. The situation was made worse when the Sunnis decided to boycott the January 2005 elections. Only 2% of Anbar for example, participated. The Iraqi Islamic Party came to power despite lacking any mandate or legitimacy. The provincial government only operated where U.S. forces could protect them, which was few and far between. Into this vacuum stepped in the insurgency and Al Qaeda in Iraq. Playing upon a sense of loss by the Sunni community, Iraqi nationalism, anti-Americanism, and cash, the militants recruited many young men to fight.

At first the tribes of Anbar aligned themselves with the insurgents, but then came to see Al Qaeda in Iraq as a threat. At first both had a common enemy in the Americans, but then a few tribes felt that the Islamists were attempting to take control of Anbar for themselves. This eventually led to the Anbar Awakening, which aligned itself with the United States. The Americans in turn gave them jobs in the local security forces, and directed reconstruction money to them. This gave rise to a new generation of sheikhs who replaced the old ones. The U.S. in fact, became the new patrons of the tribal leaders, playing a similar role to what Saddam did.

In the south, many tribes were co-opted by the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) and of Shiite parties. When the U.S. tried to replicate the Awakening with Shiite tribes during the Surge they met stiff resistance by the Supreme Council who controlled many of the provincial governments in the region, and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Both considered the tribes their constituents. Maliki began winning over many from the Supreme Council in 2008 with his Tribal Support Councils. Like Saddam and the Americans, the Prime Minister created a patronage system to keep these tribes under his control.

The majority of Iraqis claim membership in tribes, but that is not their only identity. Urbanism, Islam, and Iraqi nationalism are other factors that shape Iraqis. Throughout the country’s history the tribes have risen and fallen in relation to the power of the central authorities. During the early Ottoman period, British rule, and after the U.S. invasion, the government was weak and the tribes were strong, while in the other periods their power was diluted. Today, the tribes have found a new space in Iraq, but it appears still conditional. In Anbar the Awakening tribes are trying to form themselves into a new political force, but in southern Iraq many have been co-opted by Prime Minister Maliki. Again, it is the strength of the government that seems to determine the influence of the tribes.

SOURCES

Burns, John and Glanz, James, “Iraqi Shiites Win, but Margin Is less Than Projection,” New York Times, 2/14/05

Byman, Daniel, “An Autopsy of the Iraq Debacle: Policy Failure or Bridge Too Far?” Security Studies, October 2008

Eisenstadt, Lieutenant Colonel Michael, “Iraq Tribal engagement Lessons Learned,” Military Review, September-October 2007

Gordon, Michael, “The Last Battle,” New York Times, 8/3/08

Hassan, Hussein, “Iraq: Tribal Structure, Social, and Political Activities,” Congressional Research Service, 4/7/08

International Crisis Group, “Iraq After The Surge I: The New Sunni Landscape,” 4/30/08

Long, Austin, “The Anbar Awakening,” Survival, April 2008

McCary, John, “The Anbar Awakening: An Alliance of Incentives,” Washington Quarterly, January 2009

Otterman, Sharon, “IRAQ: The Role of Tribes,” Council on Foreign Relations, 11/14/03

Smith, Major Neil and MacFarland, Colonel Sean, “Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point,” Military Review, March-April 2008

Anbar’s Forgotten Sheikh

Out of the Anbar Awakening emerged three young and ambitious tribal sheikhs, each of which wanted both provincial and national power. One was Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha, the brother of the slain founder of the Anbar Salvation Council. The second was Sheikh Hameed al-Hayes who split from the Salvation Council to join with the third figure Grand Sheikh Ali Hatem al-Sulaiman. He was the head of the Dulaim tribe, one of the largest in the country. Sulaiman founded the Al-Anbar Tribal Council. All three once worked together, but then went their own separate paths looking to make a name for themselves. All of them worked with the Americans to fight the insurgency, reached out to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to establish themselves as Sunni leaders, and then each formed his own political party to run in the January 2009 provincial elections. Abu Risha and Hayes were victorious, while Sulaiman failed to gain a single seat on Anbar’s provincial council. Now the Sheikh is talking about leading a nationwide tribal revolt against the Maliki government. This seems more an effort to regain face however, as Sulaiman probably feels like the forgotten Sheikh of Anbar.

In April 2009, Sheikh Sulaiman told the Los Angeles Times that he was organizing a national tribal meeting. He said he wanted to organize tribes from across the country to make demands on the government. He didn’t say what they were, but threatened an uprising against Maliki if they were not met. Sulaiman and his former partner Sheikh Hayes were famous for making such inflammatory statements in the past, but nothing ever came of them. It was simply a way to make a name for themselves. That is probably what Sulaiman is doing now.

Sheikh Sulaiman was from the Dulaim tribe, the largest in Anbar, and one of the most prominent in Iraq. His grandfather was the most powerful sheikh in Anbar, and he has strived to attain that position himself. He, along with Sheikh Hayes formed the al-Anbar Tribal Council as a breakaway group from Abu Risha’s Anbar Salvation Council. They were famous for threatening their opponents. In February 2008 for example, the two sheikhs told the Iraqi Islamic Party who controlled Anbar’s provincial council that they had 30 days to leave or they would be attacked. At the same time, he showed a willingness to work with Baghdad, forming a Tribal Support Council in Anbar that were meant to back-up Maliki.

All three sheikhs went their own ways in 2008 when the provincial elections were announced. Sulaiman formed the National Front for the Salvation of Iraq. He and the other tribal chiefs argued with the Islamic Party over the timing and security of the elections, at one time saying that the voting should be postponed, and then warning that his patience was wearing thin with delays. Personally, he ran a campaign based upon nationalism and his prominence in the fight with Al Qaeda in Iraq, along with promising better governance and services. When the final results were announced in February 2009 however, his party failed to gain a single seat in the elections. Abu Risha was the victor with eight seats, and he formed an alliance with Sheikh Hayes who’s party, the Iraqi Tribes List, walked away with two seats.

It’s probably out of frustration that Sulaiman is now threatening the government. Seeing his former friends turned rivals gain power in Anbar is a bitter pill for the head of the largest tribe in the province. His alliance with Maliki through the Support Council apparently didn’t help, so now he has turned to attacking the government as a way to regain notoriety and put his name back on the political map. This is a tactic that Sulaiman and Hayes perfected in the days when they worked together. Sulaiman’s poor showing in the provincials is probably a bad sign for his chances if he chose to run in the parliamentary vote. If he couldn’t win in the local elections, he’s unlikely to gain more votes in the balloting for national office.

SOURCES

Ali, Fadhil, “Sunni Rivalries in al-Anbar Province Threaten Iraq’s Security,” Terrorism Focus, Jamestown Foundation, 3/11/08

Associated Press, “Iraqi provincial election results,” 2/19/09

Hamid, Nirmeen, “al-suleiman: awakening movement is over,” Niqash, 10/24/08

Ibrahim, Waleed, “Iraq Sunni Arab dispute may delay Anbar handover,” Reuters, 7/16/08

Lynch, Marc, “Iraqi Sunnis after the Awakening,” Abu Aardvark Blog, 6/20/08

Parker, Ned, “Iraq’s Nouri Maliki may gain power with U.S. security agreement,” Los Angeles Times, 11/24/08

Robertson, Campbell and Oppel, Richard, “Iraqis Fail to Agree on Provincial Election Law,” New York Times, 8/7/08

Sly, Liz, “IRAQ: Mutterings of tribal revolt,” Babylon & Beyond Blog, Los Angeles Times, 4/28/09

Anbar Sheikhs Reach Out To Shiites

The dispute over naming the Anbar governor reported here before has ended. Muhammad Qassem, the candidate nominated by Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha of the Awakening of Iraq and Independents List was finally elected governor. After being criticized by other tribes, Qassem was reportedly elected by all the major blocs in the province. Now that that dispute has been resolved, the two main Awakening leaders from Anbar Sheikh Abu Risha and Sheikh Hameed al-Hayes are apparently positioning themselves for the parliamentary elections planned for the end of 2009 by reaching to Shiite parties.

On April 9, followers of Moqtada al-Sadr led a protest to mark the fall of Baghdad and to call for the U.S. to withdraw. While Sadr wanted one million to show up, only about 30,000 actually participated. One of those was Sheikh Hameed al-Hayes. Hayes told McClatchy Newspapers that Sadr had a clear vision for Iraq, and that the government should release his followers. Hayes went on to say that he agreed with Sadr that the U.S. should leave the country, and blamed them for creating sectarianism. This was a clear move by Hayes to reach out to the Sadr Trend.

At the same time Sheikh Abu Risha said that he was open to an alliance with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law list before the parliamentary elections. Abu Risha said that he and Maliki had the same vision of a unified Iraq of both Shiites and Sunnis working together.

Both Hayes and Abu Risha appear to be angling to become the leading voice of Iraq’s Sunnis. In 2005 the Sunnis largely boycotted the provincial elections, allowing the Iraqi Islamic Party to get most of the votes from Sunnis that did participate. Later in the parliamentary elections, the Islamic Party led Accordance Front won the most votes of the Sunni parties, and went on to become part of Maliki’s ruling coalition. Since then, the Accordance Front has broken apart. The Prime Minister has been working to get Parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Iraqi National Dialogue Front to join him as a new Sunni partner. This fragmentation of the Sunnis, who have never really had strong leadership since the fall of Saddam, allows room for the Anbar sheikhs to maneuver. Both Hayes and Abu Risha are willing to do just about anything to gain power. Hayes has been known for threatening violence to get his way, while Abu Risha has formed alliances and then broken them to further his cause. That should make Sadr and Maliki weary of joining alliances with either one of them, but with Iraqi politics now in flux after the January 2009 provincial elections, anything seems possible.

SOURCES

Abbas, Mohammed, “Iraq Sunni anti-Qaeda leader eyes Shi’ite alliance,” Reuters, 4/12/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “New governor picked for Anbar,” 4/11/09

Fadel, Leila, “Volatile Anbar province a test of Iraq’s future,” McClatchy Newspapers, 2/17/09

Al-Hafoth, Wail, “Thousands march in Baghdad against US presence,” Times of London, 4/9/09

Hamid, Nirmeen, “anbar’s Islamic party and tribes vie for power,” Niqash, 12/12/08

Lawrence, Quil, “Political Rift In Iraq's Anbar Province,” Morning Edition, NPR, 4/8/09

Reilly, Corinne and Issa, Sahar, “Celebrating freedom: Thousands of Iraqis rally against U.S.,” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/9/09

Rubin, Alissa and Myers, Steven Lee, “As Iraqis Tally Votes, Former Leader Re-emerges,” New York Times, 2/4/09

Shadid, Anthony, “New Alliance In Iraq Cross Sectarian Lines,” Washington Post, 3/20/09

Possible Ruling Coalitions In The Provinces

Now that Iraq’s Election Commission has announced the final results and seat allocations the winning parties have two weeks to form coalitions to rule. They need 51% of the seats to appoint the governor, deputy governor, head of council, and the provincial police chief. Only in Basra and Ninewa did the victors, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law and the Al-Hadbaa List respectively, gain enough seats to have outright majorities. Three possible set of partners have already been reported. First, Moqtada al-Sadr has told his followers to consult with Maliki’s State of Law. The Awakening of Iraq and Independents has formed an alliance with Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Iraq National Project. Finally, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s Al-Mihrab Martyr List is talking with Ilyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List.

If these deals work out Maliki’s list could have majorities in Baghdad, Dhi Qar, Maysan, and Wasit. The Awakening would also rule Anbar. In Karbala, Muthanna, Najaf, and Qadisiyah the State of Law and the Sadrists would have to bring in one more party to rule. Babil, Diyala, and especially Salahaddin are much more fragmented, especially the last one, and will take several parties to come together to run those.

Overall, the elections have revealed three things about the current state of Iraqi politics. First, the Dawa has surpassed the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) as the predominate Shiite party. Second, the Kurds’ loss of control of Ninewa and Salahaddin shows their declining position within the country. They once had a winning combination with the SIIC, but after both lost in the provincials their hopes of greater federalism is probably dead. The Kurds will be coming under increasing pressure to give up their hopes of annexing territories outside of Kurdistan as a result. Finally, the vote showed that Sunni politics is as fragmented as ever. The Iraqi Islamic Party ran in 2005 despite the Sunni boycott, gaining a head start on their competitors. This time they will have to form coalitions with newer parties to rule in Diyala and Salahaddin, and lost control of Anbar.

Provinces Currently With Majorities

Basra: Maliki’s State of Law 20 of 30 seats
Ninewa: Al-Hadbaa 19 of 37 seats

Possible Ruling Coalitions

Anbar: Sheikh Abu Risha’s Awakening of Iraq and Independents – 8 seats plus parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Iraq National Project – 6 seats. Total of 14 of 29 seats
Baghdad: Maliki’s State of Law – 28 seats plus Sadr’s Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – 5 seats. Total of 33 of 57 seats
Dhi Qar: Maliki’s State of Law – 13 seats plus Sadr’s Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – 7 seats. Total of 20 of 31 seats
Maysan: Maliki’s State of Law – 8 seats plus Sadr’s Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – 7 seats. Total of 15 of 27 seats
Wasit: Maliki’s State of Law – 13 seats plus Sadr’s Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – 3 seats. Total of 20 of 28 seats

Provinces Up In The Air

Babil: State of Law – 8 seats plus Sadr’s Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – 3 seats. Needs five more seats for majority of 16 of 30 seats
Diyala: Iraqi Accordance Front – 9 seats. Needs six more seats for majority of 15 of 29 seats
Karbala: Youssef al-Habboubi – 1 seat plus Maliki’s State of Law – 9 seats plus Sadr’s Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – 4 seats. Needs one more seat for majority of 14 of 27 seats
Muthanna: Maliki’s State of Law – 5 seats plus Sadr’s Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – 2 seats. Needs seven more seats for majority of 14 of 26 seats
Najaf: Maliki’s State of Law – 7 seats plus Sadr’s Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – 6 seats. Needs two more seats for majority of 15 of 28 seats
Qadisiyah: Maliki’s State of Law – 11 seats plus Sadr’s Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – 2 seats. Needs two more seats for majority of 15 of 28 seats
Salahaddin: Iraqi Accordance Front – 5 seats. Needs ten seats for majority of 15 of 28 seats

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Sadr renews idea of local alliances with Iraq PM,” 2/20/09

Alsumaria, “Iraq parties form alliances after elections,” 2/13/09

Associated Press, “Iraqi provincial election results,” 2/19/09

Fadel, Leila, “Volatile Anbar province a test of Iraq’s future,” McClatchy Newspapers, 2/17/09

Rubin, Alissa, “Prime Minister’s Party Wins in Iraqi Vote but Will Need to Form Coalitions,” New York Times, 2/6/09

Visser, Reidar, “The Provincial Elections: The Seat Allocation Is Official and the Coalition-Forming Process Begins,” Historiae.org, 2/19/09

Official Iraqi Election Results

Iraq’s Election Commission finally released its official results for the January 2009 Provincial Elections. The report broke down how many seats each list received. As noted before, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law List came away the victor in nine of the fourteen provinces that voted. Those were Babil, Baghdad, Basra, Dhi Qar, Najaf, Qadisiyah, and Wasit. In Maysan and Muthanna they were tied for first. The List also finished third in Karbala, and tied for fifth in Diyala and Salahaddin.

The other big winners were the Iraqi Islamic Party and its larger Iraqi Accordance Front coalition that came in first in Diyala, tied for first in Salahaddin, and came in second in Baghdad, tied for second in Anbar, third in Ninewa, and fifth in largely Shiite Basra. The Iraqi National List of former Interim Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi also had one victory tying for first in Salahaddin, and also coming in tied for third in Babil, Baghdad, Qadisiyah, Wasit, and fourth in Diyala, and tied for fifth in Anbar. That was much better than the preliminary results.

There were three new victors as well. The coalition Al-Hadbaa List won in Ninewa running on a largely anti-Kurdish ticket. Youssef Majid al-Habboubi, an independent Shiite and former Baathist won in Karbala. Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha, one of the leaders of the tribal Anbar Awakening won the most seats in Anbar.

The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) also did better than originally predicted. They tied for most seats in Maysan and Muthanna with the State of Law List, and also got second place in Babil, Basra, Najaf, Qadisiyah, and Wasit, third in Dhi Qar, tied for fourth in Karbala, tied for fifth in Diyala and Qadisiyah. They did finish a disappointing sixth in Baghdad after having controlled that province since the 2005 elections.

Independent Sunni parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Iraq National Project also did well for a small party. They came in tied for second in Anbar and Diyala, and tied for third in Salahaddin.

The Kurds were expecting to lose control of Ninewa and Salahaddin because of the larger Sunni turnout. They did, but their lists got the second most seats in Ninewa and Diyala. They got no representation in Salahaddin.

The Sadrists, former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s National Reform Party, and the Fadhila Party fared the worst of the major parties. Initially Sadr’s followers were said to have finished second in Maysan, Dhi Qar, Baghdad, and Babil, third in Najaf and Wasit, fourth in Basra and Karbala, fifth in Qadisiyah and Muthanna, and eighth in Diyala. When all was said and done they came out second in Dhi Qar, third in Maysan and Najaf, tied for third in Babil, Baghdad, and Wasit, tied for fourth in Karbala and Muthanna, tied for fifth in Basra, and no seats in Diyala. Al-Jaafari’s list tied for third place in Babil, Muthanna, and Qadisiyah, fourth in Dhi Qar and Maysan, tied for fifth in Baghdad and Najaf, and a distant seventh in Baghdad and Diyala. The biggest loser had to be the Fadhila Party however. Not only did they lose control of Basra finishing seventh, but they only did slightly better with two fifth place results in Dhi Qar and Qadisiyah.

Parties or alliances need to hold 51% of the seats to name the top positions such as governor, deputy governor, head of council, provincial police chief, etc. After the seat allotment was announced, Maliki’s State of Law list and the al-Hadbaa List came out with majorities in Basra and Ninewa. In the other twelve provinces ruling coalitions need to be formed. The talk is that Maliki’s State of Law list will form an alliance with Sadr’s followers, while the Supreme Council is reaching out to Allawi’s Iraqi National List. In Anbar, the tribes have formed a coalition with al-Mutlaq’s Iraq National Project to shut out the Iraqi Islamic Party from power. This after Sheikh Abu Risha joined with them in a coalition at the end of 2008. Salahaddin, which was formerly ruled by the Kurds had the greatest fragmentation. Ten parties finished with enough votes to receive seats at the council. In Karbala independent Shiite Youssef Majid al-Habboubi won the most votes, but because he did not run as part of a party or list he only received one of 27 seats. That left the independent Hope of Rafidain list and Maliki’s State of Law with the most representation with nine seats each. Habboubi could become governor, but the real powers would be with the parties behind him.

Below is a breakdown of the major parties that won seats, how they fared, and then how many seats were allotted by province.

Major Parties & Candidates
Awakening of Iraq and Independents – Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha. One of the leaders of the tribal Awakening movement in Anbar
Coalition of Diyala – Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s Diyala list
Fadhila Party – Ayatollah Mohammed al-Yaccoubi. Claims the mantle of Moqtada al-Sadr’s father’s movement
Al-Hadbaa Party – Coalition of four parties in Ninewa that ran an anti-Kurdish campaign
Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Moqtada al-Sadr. Sadr supported a group of independents that called ran on a nationalist, strong central government, and non-sectarian list
Iraqi Islamic Party/Iraqi Accordance Front – Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi. Main Islamic Sunni party that split apart just before the election. Called for a withdrawal of the U.S., and revising laws that are considered anti-Sunni like the DeBaathification policy
Iraqi National List – Former Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi. Appealed to nationalists and former Baathists
Iraq National Project – Parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq. Independent Sunni politician that ran on a secular and nationalist campaign
Kurdish Alliance – Made up of two major Kurdish parties, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Kurdish President Massoud Barzani, plus several other smaller parties
Al-Mihrab Martyr List - Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC). Islamic party formed in Iran. Ran on religion and federalism
National Movement for Development and Reform – Jamal al-Karbouli. Made up of former Baathists and insurgents
National Reform Party – Former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari. Broke away from the Dawa party
Ninewa Brotherhood List – Kurdish Alliance list for Ninewa
State of Law – Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s Islamic Dawa Party. Islamic party that ran on a nationalist and strong central government platform
Tribes Of Iraq – Sheikh Hamid al-Hayes. Led by one of the Anbar Awakening leaders
Youssef Majid al-Habboubi – Independent Shiite and former Baathist

Finishes By Party
State of Law – Maliki: 1st Babil, Baghdad, Basra, Dhi Qar, Najaf, Qadisiyah, Wasit, tied 1st Maysan, Muthanna, 3rd Karbala, tied 5th Diyala, Salahaddin
Iraqi Islamic Party/Iraqi Accordance Front/ Alliance of Intellectuals and Tribes – 1st Diyala, tied 1st Salahaddin, 2nd Baghdad, tied 2nd Anbar, 3rd Ninewa, tied 5th Basra
Iraqi National List – Allawi: Tied 1st Salahaddin, Tied 3rd Babil, Baghdad, Qadisiyah, Wasit, 4th Diyala, tied 5th Anbar
Al-Hadbaa Party: 1st Ninewa
Youssef Majid al-Habboubi: 1st Karbala
Awakening of Iraq and Independents – Sheikh Abu Risha: 1st Anbar
Al-Mihrab Martyr List/Diyala Coalition – SIIC: Tied 1st Maysan, Muthanna, 2nd Babil, Basra, Najaf, Qadisiyah, Wasit, 3rd Dhi Qar, tied 4th Karbala, tied 5th Diyala, Qadisiyah, 6th Baghdad
Ninewa Brotherhood List/Kurdish Alliance: 2nd Ninewa, tied 2nd Diyala
Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadr: 2nd Dhi Qar, 3rd Maysan, Najaf, tied 3rd Babil, Baghdad, Wasit, tied 4th Karbala, Muthanna, tied 5th Basra
Iraq National Project – al-Mutlaq: Tied 2nd Anbar, Diyala, tied 3rd Salahaddin
National Reform Party – Jaafari: Tied 3rd Babil, Muthanna, Qadisiyah, 4th Dhi Qar, Maysan, tied 5th Baghdad, Najaf, 7th Baghdad, Diyala
Fadhila Party: 5th Dhi Qar, tied 5th Qadisiyah, 7th Basra

Results By Province:

Anbar (29 seats)
1. Awakening of Iraq and Independents – Sheikh Abu Risha: 8
2. Iraq National Project – al-Mutlaq: 6
2. Alliance of Intellectuals and Tribes – Iraqi Islamic Party: 6
4. National Movement for Development and Reform - al-Karbouli: 3
5. Iraqi National List - Allawi: 2
5. Iraqi Tribes List – Sheikh al-Hayes: 2
5. Iraqi National Unity: 2

Babil (30 seats)
1. State of Law - Maliki: 8
2. Al-Mihrab Martyr List - SIIC: 5
3. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadr: 3
3. National Reform Party – Jaafari: 3
3. Civil Society List: 3
3. Iraqi National List - Allawi: 3
3. Independent Justice Association: 3
8. Independent Ansar List: 2

Baghdad (57 seats)
1. State of Law – Maliki: 28
2. Iraqi Accordance Front: 7
3. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadr: 5
3. Iraqi National List – Allawi: 5
5. Iraq National Project – al-Mutlaq: 4
6. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 3
7. National Reform Party – Jaafari: 3
8. Christian: 1 – through quota
8. Mandean: 1 – through quota

Basra (35 seats)
1. State of Law - Maliki: 20
2. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 5
3. Gathering of Justice and Unity: 2
3. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones - Sadr: 2
5. Iraqi National List - Allawi: 2
5. Iraqi Islamic Party: 2
7. Fadhila Party: 1
8. Christians: 1 – through quota

Dhi Qar (31 seats)
1. State of Law - Maliki: 13
2. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones - Sadr: 7
3. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 5
4. National Reform Trend – Jaafari: 4
5. Fadhila Party: 2

Diyala (29 Seats)
1. Iraqi Accordance Front: 9
2. Iraq National Project – al-Mutlaq: 6
2. Kurdish Alliance: 6
4. Iraqi National List - Allawi: 3
5. State of Law - Maliki: 2
5. Diyala Coalition – SIIC: 2
7. National Reform Party – Jaafari: 1

Karbala (27 seats)
1. Youssef Majid al-Habboubi: 1
2. Hope of Rafidain: 9
2. State of Law - Maliki: 9
4. Al-Mihrab Martyr List - SIIC: 4
4. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones - Sadr: 4

Maysan (27 seats)
1. State of Law - Maliki: 8
1. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 8
3. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadr: 7
4. National Reform Party – Jaafari: 4

Muthanna (26 seats)
1. State of Law – Maliki: 5
1. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 5
3. The People’s List: 3
3. National Reform Party – Jaafari: 3
4. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadr: 2
4. Gathering of Muthanna: 2
4. Independent National List: 2
4. Gathering of Iraqi Professionals: 2
4. Gathering of Middle Euphrates: 2

Najaf (28 seats)
1. State of Law – Maliki: 7
1. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 7
3. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadr: 6
4. Loyalty to Najaf: 4
5. National Reform Party – Jaafari: 2
5. Union of Independent Najaf: 2

Ninewa (37 seats)
1. Al-Hadbaa Party: 19
2. Ninewa Brotherhood List – Kurdish Alliance: 12
3. Iraqi Islamic Party: 3
4. Shabak: 1 – through quota
4. Christian: 1 – through quota
4. Yazidi: 1 – through quota

Qadisiyah (28 seats)
1. State of Law – Maliki: 11
2. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 5
3. Iraqi National List – Allawi: 3
3. National Reform Party – Jaafari: 3
5. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadr: 2
5. Islamic Loyalty Party: 2
5. Fadhila Party: 2

Salahaddin (28 seats)
1. Iraqi Accordance Front: 5
1. Iraqi National List – Allawi: 5
3. Iraq National Project – al-Mutlaq: 3
3. National Project of Iraq: 3
5. Group of Intellectuals and Scientists: 2
5. Iraqi Turkoman Front: 2
5. Front of Liberation and Building: 2
5. Salahaddin Patriotic List: 2
5. Brotherhood and Peaceful Coexistence: 2
5. State of Law – Maliki: 2

Wasit (28 seats)
1. State of Law – Maliki: 13
2. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 6
3. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadr: 3
3. Iraqi National List – Allawi: 3
3. Iraqi Constitutional Party: 3

SOURCES

Associated Press, “Iraqi provincial election results,” 2/19/09

Farrell, Stephen, “Election: Preliminary Results,” Baghdad Bureau Blog, New York Times, 2/5/09

Hamid, Nirmeen, “anbar’s Islamic party and tribes vie for power,” Niqash, 12/12/08

Madhani, Aamer, "In Anbar, new partnership are taking root," USA Today, 2/8/09

Rubin, Alissa, “Prime Minister’s Party Wins in Iraqi Vote but Will Need to Form Coalitions,” New York Times, 2/6/09

Al-Sa’dawi, Ahmad, “post-election analysis: real change or more of the same?” Niqash, 2/19/09