Kirkuk And The 2010 Election Law

Kirkuk is again the leading issue in Iraq’s parliament as it discusses a new election law. Parliamentarians have agreed upon all the major points in the bill except for voting in Tamim province, the home of Kirkuk. The Kurdish Alliance is pushing for Tamim to vote as a regular governorate. Others, like the Iraqi Islamic Party, are suggesting creating quotas for the four major groups in Tamim, the Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, and Christians. There are other factions who are calling for a delay in voting in Kirkuk altogether.

In July 2008 when parliament was discussing the 2009 provincial vote, Kirkuk led to a walkout and veto of the original election law. The 2009 bill called for a delay in balloting in Tamim as a power sharing agreement was implemented. The Kurdish bloc walked out over it, and eventually President Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council vetoed it. The final version of law also postponed voting in Tamim until a special committee could come up with a deal between the major groups in the province. The committee did nothing, and provincial voting has never happened there yet.

National elections are much more important, so it’s unlikely that Kirkuk will hold up the vote. If parliament can’t pass a new bill by October 15, 2009, Iraq will simply revert to the old 2005 law. The major difference is that the proposed legislation includes an open list that allows voters to pick either lists or individual candidates, while the old one is a closed list where the public can only vote for lists, and the parties pick the politicians.

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “Kurds call not to adjourn elections in Kirkuk,” 9/25/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Kurdish Alliance rejects proposal to divide the Islamic Party of Kirkuk into four electoral districts,” 9/24/09
- “Kurdish lawmaker attributes hindering elections bill to ‘illegal demands,’” 9/24/09

Iraqi Pres Agency, “Delay adoption of the Law of the Iraqi elections may lead to delayed,” 9/29/09

Salloum, Sa’ad, “election committee head explains changes in new draft law,” Niqash, 9/28/09

Visser, Reidar, “The Elections Law: Who Will Stand Up for Kirkuk?” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 9/28/09

Political Parties Looking Towards 2010 Elections

Iraq’s political parties are moving into high gear looking for partners to run with in the January 2010 parliamentary elections. Some old alliances are being reformed, and new ones are in the process of forming. As before, however, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is at the center of things, and most organizations are thinking in terms of what to do in relation to him.

Sunnis

There are two main groups of Sunni politicians. First are the provincial parties that want to gain seats in Baghdad. Anbar’s sheikhs are one such group that has recently emerged. What was once the Anbar Awakening has now split into three main parties led by three leading sheikhs. There is the Anbar Awakening Council led by Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha, the Anbar Salvation Council of Sheikh Hamid al-Hayes, and Sheikh Hatim al-Suleiman’s Anbar Salvation National Front. After participating in the 2009 provincial elections, all three are now looking for national office. Sheikh Hayes has joined the new Shiite led National Alliance. Sheikh Suleiman has aligned himself with the Banners of Iraq list that includes Karbala’s Yousef al-Habboubi, who won the most votes there in 2009, but only got one seat, because he ran alone. Abu Risha, on the other hand is in negotiations with Maliki. All three are thus seeking ties with Shiites to ensure a better chance of victory.

Ninewa’s ruling al-Hadbaa is another new party. They came to power running on an anti-Kurdish, Iraqi nationalist platform, that also promised better services. They are now planning on running in the national elections as well in Ninewa, Salahaddin, Anbar, Baghdad, Wasit, Diyala, and Tamim. All of those have large Sunni populations, and three of them have disputed territories between Kurdistan and the central government, however Wasit is the exception since it is a majority Shiite province. Prime Minister Maliki could also reach out them since they have many similar ideas.

The other group is made up of Sunni politicians already in power in Baghdad. These include parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq, Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi, and the Iraqi Islamic Party and its Accordance Front list. Mutlaq recently had discussions with Maliki, but decided to run with former Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi instead. This repeats a similar set of negotiations after the 2009 elections when Maliki and Mutlaq flirted with forming ruling coalitions in a few provinces, but nothing came of it. The Islamic Party and Accordance Front are in disarray. In May 2009 Hashemi stepped down as the head of the Islamic Party, and is now talking about running on his own in the new Renewal List. The Islamic Party on the other hand wants to recreate the Accordance Front by trying to bring back the parties that left it. In 2008 the Accordance Front faced a series of defections that reduced it to only the Islamic Party and parliamentarian Adnan Dulaimi’s party. The Islamic Party is also said to be talking to Mutlaq, Allawi, al-Hadbaa, the Iraqi Scholars, some of the Anbar tribes, and Interior Minister Jawad Bolani’s Constitution Party. There are reportedly few willing to work with the Islamic Party however, which has members leaving, seen its Accordance Front collapse, and is considered a sectarian party of the past. If true, the other Sunni parties may surpass them.

Neo-Baathist

The new coalition of Saleh al-Mutlaq and Ilyad Allawi could be called the neo-Baathists. They appeal to many Sunnis of the former regime, and preach Iraqi nationalism and secularism. Interior Minister Jawad Bolani, who is an independent Shiite was supposed to run with them, but he may join the Shiite National Alliance instead. Allawi still has an outside chance of becoming prime minister as well.

Shiites

On the Shiite side, there are two main coalitions running in opposition to each other. First is the new Iraqi National Alliance. This is a revived version of the United Iraqi Alliance that won the most seats in parliament in the 2005 elections. The new Alliance is made up of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), the Sadrists, former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s National Reform Party, the Dawa-Iraq Party, and two Sunnis, Sheikh Hayes of Anbar and Khalid Abd al-Wahaab al-Mulla from Basra. The coalition was pushed hard by Tehran, but faced a major setback when the Supreme Council’s leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim passed. That has left a leadership vacuum. Hakim’s son Ammar succeeded him as head of the SIIC, but he doesn’t have the same standing. Jaafari, Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi, and perhaps Interior Minister Bolani may all emerge as its candidate for prime minister, but all those names alone show that it may be rudderless. The new alliance, despite the inclusion of two Sunni figures, is also seen as sectarian, since being Shiite is the only thing that really unites these parties that disagree on just about everything. The one issue that does bring them together is their opposition to Maliki.

Prime Minister Maliki’s State of Law is the other major list. Unlike the National Alliance, Maliki is running on a nationalist agenda, and stressing cross-sectarian ties. That didn’t stop the Prime Minister from seriously consider running with them however, but their refusal to assure him of being their only candidate for prime minister ended those talks. Maliki is now scrambling to find new allies. Former speaker of parliament Mahmoud al-Mashhadani, who was once part of the Accordance Front, was the first to formally announce he would run with the Prime Minister. Mashhadani brings with him some former members of the Basra based Fadhila party. As stated before, Sheikh Abu Risha of Anbar is also in talks with the State of Law. Other possible deals might be made with al-Hadbaa, the Islamic Party, and perhaps even the League of the Righteous, an Iranian-backed Special Group that has recently announced that it wants to join the political process.

Maliki’s greatest problem however, is not so much who he will run with but how he’s currently governing. His claim of securing the country have been shaken by the August 2009 bombings, and he has been unable to deliver better services with the large budget cuts Iraq is experiencing. He still has one ace up his sleeve the referendum on the Status of Forces Agreement with the Americans, which he is pushing to coincide with the 2010 vote. That could distract the Iraqi public from domestic issues.

Kurds

The two ruling Kurdish parties the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) have said that they will run together in 2010. At the same time, they have rejected any ideas of running with others. They still have a very close alliance with the Supreme Council however, so after the vote it’s likely that they will join together to try to put together a ruling coalition to elect a new prime minister. Both are actively opposed to Maliki as well. A new twist to Kurdish politics is the fact that the new Change Party has also announced that it will run in the national elections. The PUK and KDP still have a solid base, but the new Change List will cut into their monopoly on the Kurdish vote as they did in the recent Kurdish regional vote. Maliki may also make a run at convincing the Change List to run with him.

Conclusion

Iraqi politics are in a period of flux. In 2005 the Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds ran in three large coalitions, and took in the majority of votes. Now all three of those groups are fragmenting. On the other hand, Iraqi Arabs at least, are moving away from sectarian politics. The Sunnis are seeing the greatest change with the Accordance Front disintegrating, and new parties and politicians emerging. The PUK and KDP are facing a new challenge from the Change List, while Prime Minister Maliki has broken with the other Shiite parties. The major question now is who else will Maliki align himself with, and will that give him enough votes to remain prime minister? On the other hand, will the National Alliance, PUK, and KDP be able to stop him? The real battle for power then, is likely to play out after the election in the backroom deals to form coalitions rather than the pre-voting negotiations over who will run with whom.

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “New coalitions arise ahead of Iraq elections,” 9/12/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Ammar al-Hakim unanimously elected as SIIC chief,” 9/1/09
- “IIP head to Aswat al-Iraq: Our doors are open to Hashemi, other blocs,” 9/1/09
- “VP announces new list for upcoming parliamentary elections,” 9/12/09

Iraq The Model, “Accord Front Collapses, Sunni Tribes Seek Shiite Allies,” 8/15/09

Kazimi, Nibras, “Coalitions,” Talisman Gate, 9/10/09

Mohammed, Abeer, “Maliki’s Chess Game,” Institute of War & Peace Reporting, 9/10/09

Niqash, “alliance building in anbar: sunnis join cross-sectarian trend,” 9/7/09

Rubin, Alissa, "Dark horse wins over one Iraqi city: Karbala," International Herald Tribune, 2/6/09

Visser, Reidar, “Al-Hadba Goes Regionalist?” Historiae.org, 9/2/09

USIP Report On Iraqi Politics and The 2010 Parliamentary Elections

In May 2009 two members of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Daniel Serwer and Sam Parker, traveled to Baghdad where they met with around 20 top Iraqi politicians and government officials. They wrote a report about their trip called “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections.” The major topic of discussion was the 2009 provincial elections, and its repercussions for the 2010 parliamentary vote. The Iraqi elites agreed that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki had stolen the stage of Iraqi politics. All of the major national parties now operate in relation to him. At the same time, the USIP group worked with the newly elected provincial council in Diyala, who were more concerned about getting their government working than what was going in the capital. The report believes that this could be the beginning of a major change in Iraq with the emergence of issue-based parties rather than sectarian ones. That’s likely to be a long-term process as the major parties with the money, organization, and power are likely to dominate the parliamentary vote, and are still caught up on what to do with Maliki.

The first issue dealt with was the impact of the January 2009 provincial elections. Most of the Iraqis felt that the vote had gone off well, and were now reflecting upon the lessons learned. One was that parties with a strong organization and that could get out the vote did well. Coalition building was also of importance since so many parties participated it was the only way to gain power. Many also talked about “wasted votes,” those that went to parties and candidates that didn’t garner enough ballots to gain seats on the councils. That amounted to about 30% of the overall vote. That compared to Maliki’s State of Law List, which only got 19% of the national returns. 50% of the electorate also did not participate. The major parties were interested in trying to win over some of these populations.

All of the politicians were also focused upon the Prime Minister. Everyone seemed to base their positions upon Maliki. Some want to oppose him, some want to ally with him, and others want to see what will happen after the 2010 vote. No one thought Maliki would face a no confidence vote in parliament before the parliamentary elections. That could make him a martyr, and also deny his critics the chance to blame him for the country’s problems. There are also no clear replacements for him.

This is quite a change from when Maliki first came into office. His Dawa party returned to Iraq in 2003 from exile, weak, divided, lacking support, money and a militia. He was picked for his position because of his weakness compared to the two major Shiite parties the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Party (SIIC) and the Sadrists that dominated the United Iraqi Alliance. His initial inaction in the face of the increasing violence and chaos reinforced his image as an ineffectual leader. This all changed with the Surge. The Americans went after all of Maliki’s opponents from Al Qaeda in Iraq to the Sunni insurgency to the Shiite militias. That made the Iraqi state and the Prime Minister stronger. In 2008 he launched his own security crackdowns on the Sadrists in Basra, Sadr City, and Maysan. This created a new view of the Prime Minister and government as strong and decisive. Maliki was quick to claim all of the success, and make himself synonymous with the state.

In the process Maliki has stepped away from his former friends, and attempted to forge new ones to gain all the glory of the improved situation in the country. Maliki’s main coalition is made up of the Iraqi Islamic Party, the Supreme Council, and the two Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Originally Moqtada al-Sadr was also part of that group, but was pushed out with the help of the Americans. In 2008 Maliki moved away from this alliance to establish his independence. That was signaled in the January 2009 provincial elections when he formed his own State of Law List. Afterwards, Maliki has reached out to all groups in preparation for the 2010 vote. The Prime Minister for example, has held discussions with Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Hiwar Party, Ninewa’s al-Hadbaa List, Sheikh Abu Risha’s Anbar Awakening, and attempted to reach out to Baathists in an attempt to find new Sunni partners. Maliki also talked to the Sadrists, and recently flew to Iran to meet with the head of the Supreme Council Abdul Aziz al-Hakim who is in Tehran for cancer treatment. In doing so, he hopes to be the main player in any new ruling coalition that might emerge. He also has everyone guessing as to whom he will run with in the elections, himself, rejoin the United Iraqi Alliance, or some new gathering.

The Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) has emerged as the strongest critic of the Prime Minister. Like the Dawa, they entered the new Iraqi political scene after the invasion with no real base, but were able to put together the main Sunni alliance the Iraqi Accordance Front, which has since disintegrated. During the Surge, they were able to take advantage of the new Sons of Iraq groups, and successfully co-opt many of them, thus gaining a grass roots organization. The IIP’s victory in Diyala in 2009 was an example of this. The party went on to win the most seats of any Sunni group in the provincial elections. To oppose Maliki they are trying to build up the power of the parliament. The election of Ayad al-Samarraie as speaker of the legislature on April 19, 2009 was the first step in their plan. He wants to make the parliament a check on Maliki’s authority. That was recently seen when the parliament forced the resignation of the Trade Minister, who was from the Dawa Party, over corruption. There are plans to question other members of Maliki’s cabinet about misdeeds as well. Parliament also blocked funding for the Tribal Support Councils, which was a patronage system put together by the Prime Minister in various provinces, and a reconciliation initiative that was aimed at co-opting Baathists. The Islamic Party is also pushing for constitutional reform to limit the Prime Minister’s office.

The Supreme Council has become another major opponent of Maliki, but seems to be turning inwards in the aftermath of their defeat in the provincial elections. In 2005 the SIIC walked away with eight governorships out of eighteen. In 2009 they won none. Since then they have been trying to deal with this loss. In the 2010 vote they want to portray themselves as being independent from Iran, and no longer advocating for a Shiite southern region. Despite their criticisms, they also want to try to convince Maliki to rejoin the United Iraqi Alliance, and run together in the election. Another major distraction is the fact that its leader, al-Hakim, is dying of cancer. When he passes, many think that the SIIC will split in two with old guard Badr Brigade militia leaders like Finance Minister Bayan Jabr running one faction, and newer officials like Vice President Adel Abd al-Mahdi the other.

The Kurds are also in conflict with Maliki. Beginning in 2008 the Prime Minister began moving the Iraqi Army into disputed territories of the north, which have largely been under Kurdish control since 2003. There have been several confrontations with the peshmerga as a result. The main Kurdish parties and the Americans are afraid that the dispute between Kurdistan and Baghdad will lead to violence. The United Nations is trying to mediate, but without strong U.S. support their work is likely to go nowhere. Surprisingly most of the Arab politicians in Baghdad were not that concerned about this issue. They believe that time is on the side of the central government, and as it gets stronger the Kurds will have to give way. Until then this division is likely to fester for the next couple years.

After those three major groups there are a series of smaller Shiite, Sunni, and secular parties that are also related to Maliki. What the paper called the Shiite center is made up of Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani’s Constitutional Party, government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh Competents Party, and ex-Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s National Reform Trend. The Sadrists are still a force in Shiite politics as well. The main secular leader is ex-Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi and his Iraqi National List. Finally there are Sunnis like parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Hiwar Party, the al-Hadbaa List of Ninewa, former Islamic Party member Dhafir al-Ani, and Deputy Prime Minister Rafi al-Issawi. All of these parties ran in the 2009 election as nationalists, arguing for a strong central government. That was similar to Maliki’s State of Law platform, so they had mixed results. The Shiite centrists, Sadrists, and Allawi got some provincial seats, but didn’t do as well as they had hoped. The smaller Sunni parties actually did surprisingly well. Maliki also courted all of these groups as potential new allies.

Finally the USIP traveled to Diyala to help the new provincial council there forge a position paper on what their goals would be while in office. There the USIP found that the politicians were much more interested in getting the local government working, especially because the previous one was considered a failure, rather than national politics. The Diyala council members didn’t pay much attention to their party bosses in Baghdad, and were more issue based. The Americans saw this as an important development in Iraqi politics, as the Diyala council was likely to meet the needs of average Iraqis compared to the power struggles going on in the capital.

“Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections” points out the dynamics of Iraq’s national and local politics. In Baghdad, the major parties are involved in a prolonged struggle for power as Maliki has successfully placed himself as the public face of the government. His former allies have been left out in the cold, and are either challenging him, like the Islamic Party and Kurds, or trying to re-organize like the SIIC. At the same time, this has opened up opportunities for newer and smaller parties by allying with one side or the other. It also appears that this struggle is more important than actually improving the country for many politicians. At the provincial level however, the USIP found different parties, sects, and ethnicities working together on the newly elected council, trying to address their constituents’ needs. The USIP paper believes that the 2010 election could be a turning point if Maliki decides to run on issues like he did in 2009. There is also the possibility that he will go back to sectarian politics and rejoin the United Iraqi Alliance. The USIP hopes for the former outcome, but if it doesn’t happen they believe there will probably be more opportunities in the future to change the political culture of Iraq. It seems likely that this will stay at the local level, and take quite some time to bubble up to the top. The major parties including Maliki are caught up in a serious struggle for the right to rule, which will have to play out before issues become the prime focus of the government, if ever. Until then finding new friends and shifting alliances will continue to dominate the capital.

SOURCES

Bakri, Nada, “In Iraq, Assertive Parliament Emerges Under New Speaker,” Washington Post, 5/27/09

Domergue, Jeremy, “Selection of Speaker Reveals Shifting Coalitions in Iraqi Parliamentary Politics,” Institute for the Study of War, 4/28/09

Press TV, “Iraq’s Maliki at Hakim’s bedside in Tehran,” 5/31/09

Serwer, Daniel and Parker, Sam, “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2009

Visser, Reidar, “Maliki Suffers Setbacks as Samarrai is Confirmed as New Speaker and More Governors Are Elected South of Baghdad,” Historiae.org, 4/19/09

Wong, Edward, “Iraqis weigh alliance to marginalize Sadr and bolster Maliki,” International Harold Tribune, 12/11/06

How Did The Outgoing Provincial Councils Do?

All of Iraq’s new provincial councils have now been seated. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) released its quarterly report to Congress on April 30, which contains the latest data on how those outgoing politicians did. The previous councils were in office from 2005 to 2009. Most came to power with little to no experience in government. Their last two years should be their best performance because they were able to learn on the job, had the benefit of U.S. and international training, and saw a dramatic drop in violence.

In 2008 the provinces were budgeted $9,830.69 million. They spent 67% of it, or $6,596.8 million. The three Kurdish provinces of Dohuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniya received almost a third of the overall amount, $3,701.49 million. The Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) does not provide information about its spending however, so both Baghdad and the U.S. tend to count all of the money sent north as spent. In 2008 the SIGIR said Kurdistan spent 100% of their budget, which skews the overall number for Iraq’s provinces upwards. Without the KRG, the remaining fifteen governorates were budgeted $6,129.2 million, and only spent 47% of it, $2,894.7 million. This was an improvement over 2007 when the provinces were budgeted $3,631 million and spent over $2,137 million, 58%+. Minus Kurdistan the provinces spent $650 mil of their $2,071 budget, 31.3% however. While getting better, these numbers show that Iraq’s local governments still have a ways to go in appropriating and investing their money. The public sector is the largest part of the economy, so it’s important that the provinces expend as much as possible. 47% in 2008, especially with the dramatic drop in violence, is still an inadequate amount given the demands of average Iraqis.

In terms of individual provinces, outside of Kurdistan, Maysan, Karbala, Najaf, Babil, and Anbar did the best in executing their budget in that order in 2008. Maysan, which was controlled by the Sadrists, spent 86.4% of their 2008 budget. The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) controlled Karbala, 85.3%, Najaf, 75.7%, and Babil 63.5%. The Iraqi Islamic Party ran Anbar, which rounded out the top five, spending 54.4% of its budget. In 2007 many of the same provinces and parties were at the top, starting with Najaf, 64%, Maysan, 51%, Babil, 49%, Karbala, 41%, and Wasit, 41%, the last of which had a Sadrist governor and a provincial council run by the Iraq Elites Gathering.

Ninewa, 36.6%, Dhi Qar, 33.1%, Qadisiyah, 31.5%, Diyala, 28.2%, and Muthanna, 26.8%, were at the bottom last year. The Supreme Council ran Qadisiyah alone. In Dhi Qar, the council was split between the Fadhila Party and the SIIC, and Diyala and Muthanna had a SIIC-Dawa coalition. Ninewa was controlled by the Kurdish Alliance of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), with an independent Arab governor. In 2007 Baghdad, 31%, Ninewa, 26%, Basra, 21%, Muthanna, 19%, and Anbar, 3.7%, did the worst. The Supreme Council controlled Baghdad, and all of them except for Muthanna were some of the most violent in the country that year, which greatly complicated governing them. The provinces that did the best and worst in this category show that the ruling party had little to do with performance. The Supreme Council for example controlled three of the top five governorates that spent the most money, but also had a hand in ruling four of the bottom five. It seems that local officials, and their training and expertise would be much more important factors than what national parties they belonged to when it came to executing their budgets.

2008 Provincial Budget Execution – Ruling Parties

Total: Budgeted $9,830.69 mil, Spent $6,596.8 mil, 67%
Not Including Kurdistan: Budgeted $6,129.2 mil, Spent $2,894.7 mil, 47%

Kurdistan - Budgeted: $3,701.49 mil, Spent $3,702.1 mil, 100% - KDP-PUK
Maysan - Budgeted $194.59 mil, Spent $168.09 mil, 86.4% - Sadrists
Karbala - Budgeted $164.03 mil, Spent $139.86 mil, 85.3% - SIIC
Najaf - Budgeted $328.18 mil, Spent $248.41 mil, 75.7% - SIIC
Babil - Budgeted $409.09 mil, Spent $259.83 mil, 63.5% - SIIC
Anbar - Budgeted $367.15 mil, Spent $199.68 mil, 54.4% - Iraqi Islamic Party
Wasit - Budgeted $217.59 mil, Spent $117.16 mil, 53.8% - Iraq Elites Gathering-Sadrists
Baghdad - Budgeted $1,433.52 mil, Spent $670.66 mil, 46.8% - SIIC
Salahaddin - Budgeted $243.47 mil, Spent $112.25 mil, 46.1% - KDP-PUK
Basra - Budgeted $660.04 mil, Spent $287.37 mil, 43.5% - SIIC-Fadhila
Tamim - Budgeted $285.52 mil, Spent $108.19 mil, 37.9% - KDP-PUK
Ninewa - Budgeted $538.43 mil, Spent $197.11 mil, 36.6% - KDP-PUK
Dhi Qar - Budgeted $377.09 mil, Spent $124.84 mil, 33.1% - Fadhila-SIIC
Qadisiyah - Budgeted $240.45 mil, Spent $75.67 mil, 31.5% - SIIC
Diyala - Budgeted $443.11 mil, Spent $124.81 mil, 28.2% - Dawa-SIIC
Muthanna - Budgeted $226.94 mil, Spent $60.77 mil, 26.8% - Dawa-SIIC

2007 Provincial Budget Execution – Ruling Parties

Total: Budgeted $3,631 mil, Spent $2,137+ mil, 58%+
Not Including Kurdistan: Budgeted $2,071 mil, Spent $650 mil, 31.3%+

Kurdistan - Budgeted $1,560 mil, Spent $1,487, 95% - KDP-PUK
Najaf – Budgeted $88 mil, Spent $54.6 mil, 64% - SIIC
Maysan – Budgeted $76 mil, Spent $39 mil, 51% - Sadrists
Babil – Budgeted $127 mil, Spent $61.9 mil, 49% - SIIC
Karbala – Budgeted $71 mil, Spent $29.4 mil, 41% - SIIC
Wasit – Budgeted $83 mil, Spent $33.7 mil, 41% - Iraq Elites Gathering-Sadrists
Dhi Qar – Budgeted $138 mil, Spent $54.8 mil, 40% - Fadhila-SIIC
Qadisiyah – Budgeted $64 mil, Spent $24.7 mil, 39% - SIIC
Salahaddin – Budgeted $93 mil, Spent $31.5 mil, 34% - KDP-PUK
Tamim – Budgeted $91 mil, Spent $31 mil, 34% - KDP-PUK
Baghdad – Budgeted $560 mil, Spent $174.4 mil, 31% - SIIC
Ninewa – Budgeted $226 mil, Spent $58.5 mil, 26% - KDP-PUK
Basra – Budgeted $195 mil, Spent $40.8 mil, 26% - SIIC-Fadhila
Muthanna – Budgeted $52 mil, Spent $9.9 mil, 19% - Dawa-SIIC
Anbar – Budgeted $107 mil, Spent $4 mil, 3.7% - Iraqi Islamic Party
Diyala – Budgeted $100 mil, Spent N/A – Dawa-SIIC

The aggregate numbers on the amount budgeted and spent in each province only tells half of the story. In 2008, Maysan was ranked the top province in spending its budget outside of Kurdistan at 86.4%. However that money only led to 41 of 241 projects being completed there. For another view, the SIGIR report also included assessments of the U.S.-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which operate in each of Iraq’s governorates. They rated Maysan as the least developed of all of Iraq’s provincial economies.

The PRTs assess governance, political development, reconciliation, economic development, and rule of law. These topics are ranked beginning, developing, sustaining, performing, or self-reliant. From February 2008 to February 2009 Kurdistan was given the highest rating, Wasit, Babil, and Karbala had the most improvement, while Ninewa, Anbar, Diyala, Baghdad, Muthanna, and Basra all saw reversals. Karbala, run by the SIIC, was rated the most successful province outside of Kurdistan, progressing from developing to performing in political development, reconciliation, and rule of Law, and from developing to sustaining in governance and economic development. Wasit was the only province that was given a self-reliant mark, and that was in reconciliation. Muthanna had a similar rating in February 2008, but fell back to sustaining a year later.

PRT Rankings:
Beginning: Little progress on decision-making, provision of services, political participation, fighting corruption, basic freedoms, infrastructure, and unemployment.
Developing: Small improvements in economic development, government, and security. Still lack budget spending, basic freedoms, political participation, jobs, banks, and effort against corruption.
Sustaining: Getting better at working with national government, building political parties, political participation, and police. Still lacks coordination, appropriations, banks, and still has tribal influences.
Performing: Social and financial institutions and infrastructure working, coordination, political participation, and transparency exists. Banks opening, appropriations improving, transportation available, police and legal system building, security forces in the lead, and tribes deferring to government.
Self-Reliant: Independent government with basic freedoms, security, political and economic institutions working, religious tolerance, working legal system, and self-sufficient security forces.

Anbar
Governance – Sustaining
Political Development – Sustaining
Reconciliation – Sustaining
Economic Development – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Rule of Law – Moved down from Sustaining to Developing

Babil
Governance – Developing
Political Development – Advanced from Beginning to Performing
Reconciliation – Advanced from Beginning to Sustaining
Economic Development – Sustaining
Rule of Law – Advanced from Sustaining to Performing

Baghdad
Governance – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Political Development – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Reconciliation – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Economic Development – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Rule of Law – Moved down from Sustaining to Developing

Basra
Governance – Moved down from Sustaining to Developing
Political Development – Advanced from Sustaining to Performing
Reconciliation – Sustaining
Economic Development – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Rule of Law – Developing

Dhi Qar
Governance – Sustaining
Political Development – Sustaining
Reconciliation – Sustaining
Economic Development – Sustaining
Rule of Law - Sustaining

Diyala
Governance – Moved down from Sustaining to Developing
Political Development – Developing
Reconciliation – Developing
Economic Development – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Rule of Law – Beginning to Developing

Karbala
Governance – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Political Development – Advanced from Developing to Performing
Reconciliation – Advanced from Developing to Performing
Economic Development – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Rule of Law – Advanced from Developing to Performing

Kurdistan
Governance – Sustaining
Political Development – Performing
Reconciliation – Performing
Economic Development – Advanced from Sustaining to Performing
Rule of Law – Advanced from Sustaining to Performing

Maysan
Governance – Advanced from Beginning to Developing
Political Development – Developing
Reconciliation – Sustaining
Economic Development – Beginning
Rule of Law – Developing

Muthanna
Governance – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Political Development – Advanced from Beginning to Performing
Reconciliation- Moved down from Self-Reliant to Sustaining
Economic Development – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Rule of Law – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining

Najaf
Governance – Sustaining
Political Development – Advanced from Developing to Performing
Reconciliation – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Economic Development – Sustaining
Rule of Law – Sustaining

Ninewa
Governance – Developing
Political Development – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Reconciliation – Advanced from Beginning to Developing
Economic Development – Developing
Rule of Law – Moved down from Sustaining to Developing

Qadisiyah
Governance – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Political Development – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Reconciliation – Beginning
Economic Development – Advanced from Beginning to Sustaining
Rule of Law – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining

Salahaddin
Governance – Sustaining
Political Development – Advanced from Sustaining to Performing
Reconciliation – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Economic Development – Developing
Rule of Law – Developing

Tamim
Governance – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Political Development – Sustaining
Reconciliation – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Economic Development – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Rule of Law – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining

Wasit
Governance – Developing
Political Development – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Reconciliation – Advanced from Beginning to Self-Reliant
Economic Development – Advanced from Beginning to Sustaining
Rule of Law – Advanced from Developing to Performing

The SIGIR also provided the unemployment figures for each province. A recent January 2009 United Nations survey of Iraqis found the jobless rate at 18%. The SIGIR’s numbers were close at 19.5%. Wasit had the lowest unemployment rate at 13.6%. It also spent more than half of its budget at 53.8%, and had one of the largest jumps in economic development from beginning to sustaining according to the PRTs. Wasit was followed by Baghdad, 14.5%, Tamim, 15.7%, Babil, 15.9%, and Qadisiyah, 15.9%. Those four provinces were all over the place in spending their budgets from Qadisiyah that was third from last, only executing 31.5% of its money, to Babil, which spent 63.5% of its budget. The PRTs also ranked all of them at the sustaining level as well. At the opposite end of the spectrum were Karbala, 19.1%, Ninewa 20.9%, Salahaddin, 21.9%, Muthanna, 30.5%, and Dhi Qar, 36.5%, that had the highest unemployment. Ninewa and Salahaddin were both given developing marks in economics by the PRTs, the second to last rating, and were in the middle to bottom in spending their money. Muthanna and Dhi Qar were given sustaining ranks by the PRTs, but barely executed their budgets, with Muthanna in last place.

Unemployment By Province
Wasit 13.6%
Baghdad 14.5%
Tamim 15.7%
Babil 15.9%
Qadisiyah 15.9%
Kurdistan 16.7%
Maysan 17.3%
Anbar 17.4%
Najaf 18.6%
Basra 18.8%
Diyala 19.0%
Karbala 19.1%
Ninewa 20.9%
Salahaddin 21.9%
Muthanna 30.5%
Dhi Qar 36.5%
Avg. 19.5%

The budget execution and unemployment numbers provided by the SIGIR and the PRT assessments are some of the best available information on Iraq’s provinces. They can point out the overall economic situation of each area, and give hints at how they were governed. Overall, the statistics show that party affiliation does not translate into either good or bad policies. The Supreme Council for example ran half of Iraq’s provinces, but that only meant they were both at the top and bottom in terms of developing their areas. The real difference was the growth and performance of local officials, many of which were amateurs when they were elected in 2005. Some provinces showed great improvement according to the PRTs, and that was reflected in their spending and unemployment situation. All eighteen governorates however still needed to get much better at appropriating their money and providing jobs. The problem is that many of the new incoming councils are novices as well, which could mean another long process of learning the nuts and bolts of governing and budgeting with the provinces suffering in the meantime.

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “41 out of 241 projects implemented in Missan,” 12/30/08

Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit, “Iraq Labour Force Analysis 2003-2008,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, January 2009

Knights, Michael and McCarthy, Eamon, “Provincial Politics in Iraq: Fragmentation or New Awakening?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2008

Robertson, Campbell and Glanz, James, “Iraqi Figures Back U.S. View on Low Spending for Reconstruction,” New York Times, 8/21/08

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 7/30/08
- “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 4/30/09

The Islamic Party’s Victory In Diyala

There was a time when many observers believed that the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) would be one of the big losers in the January 2009 provincial election. The IIP had broken the Sunni boycott in 2005 and run anyway causing resentment amongst many. The formation of the Anbar Awakening, and then the Sons of Iraq across many of the Sunni areas directly challenged their rule as they had a popular base the IIP lacked. Instead the IIP and its Accordance Front coalition finished first in two provinces in the January balloting, and third in three others, plus a surprising fifth in Basra. One of those victories came in northern Diyala. The turn of events there showed how the IIP was able to turn the Sons of Iraq program to their electoral advantage.

Diyala province is in northern Iraq, and remains one of the most violent in Iraq. The population is roughly 55% Sunni Arabs, 30% Shiite Arabs, and 15% Kurds. In 2005 the Sunnis boycotted the election there allowing an alliance of the Dawa Party and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council to take power with twenty of the 41 council seats. The Islamic Party did run there, coming in second with fourteen seats. That led to sectarian fighting and the growth of Al Qaeda in Iraq in Diyala. In April 2006 Abu Musab al-Zarqawi announced Diyala as the center of his Islamic Caliphate. That brought in Shiite militias from Baghdad to fight for their brethren, who began receiving arms and weapons from Iran. The Kurdish peshmerga had also moved into the Khanaqin district shortly after the U.S. invasion.

Things looked bleak in Diyala until 2007. That was the year members of the 1920s Revolution Brigades, and several other insurgent groups, along with the Karki and Shimouri tribes began turning on their former allies Al Qaeda in Iraq. These became the first Sons of Iraq (SOI) units in the province. What was at first seen as a threat by the Islamic Party to their claim to stand for the Sunni population, turned into an opportunity. In February 2007 Hussein al-Zubaydi the head of security in the Diyala provincial council and a member of the Islamic Party volunteered to work with the Americans to help organize the SOI. Zubaydi’s position allowed him to determine the make-up of the SOI. Later, when the U.S. began distributing aid through the SOI, the Islamic Party took advantage of that as well claiming responsibility. Through their maneuverings they were able to co-opt the SOI program, and build up a popular base that they never had before. This put them in a good position heading into the provincial elections that were originally scheduled for 2008.

It was just then that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki became concerned about the growth of Sunni power there. In mid-2007 Baghdad created the Diyala Support Council that was supposed to ensure security in the province. It was not connected to the provincial council or security forces however, and worked explicitly to build up support for the Prime Minister. They were given control of recruiting locals into the security forces, which was a major form of patronage at Maliki’s disposal. The purpose of the council was to win over members of the SOI and weaken the Islamic Party’s new base. The U.S. quickly became concerned about the council's activities and complained to Baghdad about it saying that it might destabilize Diyala even more. In late October 2007 for example, the U.S. general in command of northern Iraq complained that Baghdad refused to take in 6,000 Sunnis into the Diyala provincial police. The general said that the Interior Ministry had turned down his request. Of course, the Diyala Support Council was able to deliver names directly to the Ministry and get them hired.

In 2008 Maliki upped the ante in Diyala. In January 2008 Baghdad formed the first Tribal Support Council in the province. Like the Diyala Support Council, the new Tribal Councils were meant to take fighters away from the SOI, create support for Maliki, divide the Sunnis, and weaken the Islamic Party. In July the Prime Minister launched the Omens of Prosperity security offensive there. The operation was aimed as much at the insurgents as the Islamic Party and their Sons of Iraq allies. By the end of August five top SOI leaders had been arrested along with hundreds of their followers, while others had fled the province. In the provincial capital Baquba for example, all of the SOI checkpoints were shut down by August, along with all but one of their offices. Members of the Islamic Party were also rounded and harassed. To underline the political nature of Omens of Prosperity the government arrested three SOI members as they were going to register as candidates for the provincial election. Their arrest made them ineligible to run. The SOI went to the U.S. for help, but they weren’t able to stop Maliki. This was a classic use of the carrot and the stick. At first, Maliki offered SOI jobs through the Diyala and Tribal Support Council programs in return for their support. He then went after those that had not joined him using the Iraqi Army and police.

The Islamic Party headed into the 2009 elections at a seeming disadvantage. There were over forty-five parties and lists running in Diyala, but the four major ones were expected to take most of the votes. Those were the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s Diyala Coalition, Maliki’s Rule of Law List, the Kurdistan Alliance, and the Accordance and Reform Front. The last was led by Ezze Addeen Ibrahim Yaseen Muhammed, and was made up of the Iraqi Islamic Party, the Iraqi Commission for Civil Society, the General Conference of Iraqi People, and the Iraqi Arab Assembly. It also included many members of the SOI. Concerned about their political future the SIIC controlled provincial council called for a delay in the election there for six months in December. That didn’t happen and the Islamic Party’s list began campaigning. That was tough in a province where there are still insurgent pockets. The List’s candidates rarely crossed sectarian lines, and one was kidnapped and killed. The Reform Front was also competing with Tribal Support Councils that were expected to deliver the tribes to Maliki’s list, along with Saleh al-Mutlak, a Sunni independent who was appealing mostly to Baathists.

When January 31, 2009 came along, the Islamic Party came out victorious. Despite the insurgency, and Maliki’s moves 57% of the province’s voters turned out, one of the highest in the country. They gave the Islamic Party’s list 21.1% of the vote, good enough for first place. The Kurdish Alliance came in second with 17.2%, Saleh al-Mutlak’s Iraqi National Project got 15%, while former Interim Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List was fourth at 9.5%. Maliki’s State of Law list came in fifth with 6%. That means the Islamic Party’s List will have to cut deals with at least two others to gain a majority to rule the province.

The Islamic Party’s moves allowed it to take advantage of Iraq’s two provincial elections. In 2005 they ran basically uncontested in Diyala because of the Sunni boycott and came in second place. In 2009 they were able to come in first. Their size, organization, access to money and the media, and the election law, which favored large parties all worked to the IIP’s advantage. More importantly they were able to co-opt the former insurgents that became the Sons of Iraq as they were first being organized in 2007, while surviving Maliki’s crackdown in 2008. The IIP can now claim that they speak for many of Iraq’s Sunnis having done well in two ballots. They have to exert their power in Diyala carefully however, as they will have coalition partners and be ever vigilant of Maliki’s willingness to use the security forces for his political gain.

Early Election Results In Diyala
Iraqi Accordance Front: 21.1%
Kurdish Alliance: 17.2%
Iraqi National Project: 15%
Iraqi National List: 9.5%
State of Law: 6%
Coalition of Diyala: 5.3%
National Reform Party: 4.3%
Independent Free Movement List: 3.1%
National Movement: 2.6%
Fadhila: 2.3%
TURNOUT: 57%

SOURCES

Abdullah, Muhammed, “calls to postpone diyala election,” Niqash, 12/10/08
- “Diyala Sees Early Campaigning,” Niqash, 12/8/08

Alsumaria, “Iraq Awakening Councils in Diyala end strike,” 3/4/08

Dagher, Sam, “Risky US alliances in Iraq,” Christian Science Monitor, 7/17/07

DPA, “Head of Iraqi provincial council calls for elections postponement,” 12/9/08

DVIDS News, “Paramount Sheiks Sign Peace Agreement,” 5/2/07

Farrell, Stephen, “Election: Preliminary Results,” Baghdad Bureau Blog, New York Times, 2/5/09

Garcia-Navarro, Lourdes, “Iraq Paramilitary Group Targeted, Despite Success,” Morning Edition, NPR, 9/4/08
- “Sunni Group Says It’s Being Harassed,” Morning Edition, 9/29/08

Goetze, Katharina and Salman, Daud and Naji, Zaineb, “Could Awakening Fighters Rejoin Insurgency?” Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 10/31/08

Gordon, Michael, “Iraq Hampers U.S. Bid to Widen Sunni Police Role,” New York Times, 10/28/07

Hendawi, Hamza, “Iraq moves against some US-backed Sunni fighters,” Associated Press, 8/18/08

Iraqi News, “Three Support Councils established in Diala,” 1/24/08

Kagan, Kimberly, “The Anbar Awakening: Displacing al Qaeda from Its Stronghold in Western Iraq,” Institute For The Study of War and WeeklyStandard.com, 8/21/06-3/30/07

Kimmons, Sean, “Hashing out their differences,” Stars and Stripes, 8/29/08

Knights, Michael and McCarthy, Eamon, “Provincial Politics in Iraq: Fragmentation or New Awakening?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2008

Levinson, Charles, “Awakening Councils in hiding as arrests on rise,” USA Today, 9/22/08

Multi-National Corps – Iraq, “Diyala leaders meet to establish tribal support councils (Diyala),” 3/21/08

Niqash, “accord and reform bloc,” 1/28/09

Oppel, Richard, “Iraq Takes Aim at Leaders of U.S.-Tied Sunni Groups,” New York Times, 8/22/08

Parker, Ned, “Baqubah a minefield of Iraqi sectarian tensions,” Los Angeles Times, 12/7/08
Parker, Ned, “Iraq seeks breakup of U.S.-funded Sunni fighters,” Los Angeles Times, 8/23/08

Roggio, Bill, “1920s Revolution Brigades turns on al Qaeda in Diyala,” Long War Journal.org, 6/12/07
- “Operation Omens of Prosperity begins in Diyala,” Long War Journal.org, 7/29/08

Russo, Claire, “Countdown To Diyala’s Provincial Election: Maliki & The IIP,” Institute for the Study of War, 1/30/09
- “The Maliki Government Confronts Diyala,” Institute for the Study of War,” 9/23/08

Shadid, Anthony, “Iraq’s Diyala Province Puts Power of Ballot to the Test,” Washington Post, 2/1/09

Al-Tuawijri, Ali, “Iraq’s anti-Qaeda fighters fear for their future,” Agence France Presse, 9/6/08

Tyson, Ann Scott, “Iraq Is Criticized for Slow Hire of Police,” Washington Post, 10/27/07
- “Sunni Fighters Find Strategic Benefits in Tentative Alliance With U.S.,” Washington Post, 8/9/07
- “Tribal Members Join in Effort To Assist U.S., Iraqi Forces,” Washington Post, 9/30/07

Zavis, Alexandra, “Residents wary as Iraq police blanket Baqubah,” Los Angeles Times, 7/31/08

Who Speaks For The Sunnis?

Yesterday, January 14, the major Sunni bloc the Iraqi Accordance Front (IAF) boycotted parliament. They claimed that it was illegal to hold sessions without a speaker. The real reason was because they have been unable to fill the position as their coalition has collapsed and opposition parties have challenged their right to the spot.

The Accordance Front began disintegrating last month. As reported earlier, on December 24 the Iraqi National Dialogue Council and the Independents Bloc left the Accordance Front, charging that the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) was attempting to monopolize power within the coalition. On January 12, four parliamentarians from the Independent Democratic Gathering also departed for the same reason. The Front that once had 44 seats in parliament, and the majority of Sunni lawmakers, was reduced to just 25. The Islamic Party held 22 of those seats, with the remaining 3 coming from Adnan Dulaimi’s General Council for the People of Iraq Party. There are a total of 69 Sunnis in the 275-member parliament.

With their weakened position, the IAF has not been able to build consensus over a replacement for the speaker of parliament. The former speaker, Mahmoud al-Mashhadani was forced to resign on December 23 after his comments about shoe throwing journalist Muntadar al-Zaidi. Since then the Iraqi National Dialogue Council as well as the secular Iraqi National List (INL) of former Interim Prime Minister Ilyad Alawi have presented candidates, to compete with the Islamic Party’s two. The National List actually put up three parliamentarians, a woman, a Shiite, and a Sunni. Both they and the Dialogue Council, which are now both part of the loosely connected opposition, are challenging the sectarian and big party quotas that have dominated the body since its creation after the U.S. invasion. Under this system, the prime minister was to be a Shiite from the United Iraqi Alliance, the president was a Kurd from the Kurdish Alliance, and the speaker was a Sunni from the Accordance Front. The Dialogue Council claims that since Mashhadani came from their party, they are entitled to the position, while the National List is saying it doesn’t even have to be a Sunni. The INL also took up the position of the defecting Sunni parties by criticizing the Islamic Party for holding the speakership, one vice president, one deputy premier, and a number of ministers. The Iraqi paper Azzaman also reported that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki might have also objected to the IIP’s domination of most of the Sunni offices in government. Shocked by this turn of events, the United Iraqi Alliance and Kurds have tried to stand by the Accordance Front by saying they deserve the speaker position.

From the beginning the Islamic Party was always the strongest of the Sunni parties. It was formed in 1960 modeled after the Muslim Brotherhood. It was quickly outlawed by the government and became largely an underground opposition group. After the U.S. invasion the party’s secretary general Mohsen Abdel Hamid was named to the Iraqi Governing Council. In 2005 they were the only major party to defy the Sunni boycott and were elected to several provincial councils. It later helped form the Iraqi Accordance Front and went on to win the largest single number of seats in parliament of any Sunni party. Heading into the January 2009 provincial elections they were initially predicted to lose control of Anbar province, but have since been able to break apart the tribal Awakening probably meaning they will have joint rule there. They have also built up ties with Sons of Iraq groups in Baghdad, are part of the main Sunni coalition in Diyala, and are running in Ninewa.

The battle over the speaker of parliament and the break-up of the Accordance Front is largely about who will speak for the Sunnis. Right now, no one can say. The Islamic Party is still the best organized, and appears to be well positioned in the provincial elections. They may come out the winners with the Accordance Front existing only in name. This also happened with the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance, as the Fadhila Party and Sadrists left in 2007, and the Dawa Party and Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council are running against each other. These two coalitions were created at a time of extreme sectarianism and fighting. That is now changing. That may still leave the Islamic Party as a winner after elections as Iraqis tend to vote by sect, but they also benefit from their size, breadth, and money, as the old coalitions past by the wayside.

For more on the break up of the Iraqi Accordance Front see:

Accordance Front Breaks Apart

SOURCES:

Abdullah, Muahmmed, “Diyala Sees Early Campaigning,” Niqash, 12/8/08

Alsumaria, “Accordance Front boycotts Parliament session,” 1/14/09
- “Iraq Parliament speaker post under debate,” 1/8/08

Aswat al-Iraq, “2 IIP candidates for parliament speaker post – MP,” 1/2/09
- “Democratic Grouping quits IAF,” 1/10/09
- “IAF represents only IIP – MP,” 1/8/09
- “INDC puts forward candidates for parliament’s speakership,” 12/24/08
- “INL nominates 3 MPs for parliament’s speakership,” 1/13/09
- “NDF puts forward candidate for speaker,” 1/13/09
- “Lawmaker announces nomination for parliamentary speakership,” 1/6/09
- “Parliament’s speaker position for IAF – VP,” 12/31/08
- “Parliament’s speaker should be IAF nominee – Kurdish MP,” 1/6/09
- “UIA, KA agree to IAF’s candidate for speaker,” 1/11/09

BBC, “Iraqi Governing Council members,” 7/14/03

Dagher, Sam, “Dispute Weakens Iraqi Sunni Coalition,” New York Times, 1/11/09

Dalli, Hussein, “Iraq Awakening Councils form party,” Al Jazeera, 4/14/08

IraqSlogger.com, “Iraq Papers Tue: 124,000 Bodyguards in Iraq!” 12/29/08

Niqash, “irqai Islamic party (iip),” 11/7/05

Parker, Ned, “Iraq looks ahead to provincial, national elections,” Los Angeles Times, 11/5/08

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraq To Replace Parliament Speaker Deemed Offensive,” 1/9/09

Reuters, “Iraq’s main Sunni Arab bloc splinters,” 12/24/08

UPI, “Sunnis marginalized in Iraqi politics,” 1/8/09

Yoshino, Kim and Hameed, Ali, “More Iraq parliament members pull out of Sunni bloc,” Los Angeles Times, 1/12/09

Basra Federal Region Update

December 27, up to 3,000 people marched in the city of Basra in support of a federal region for the province. Parliamentarian and former governor of Basra Wail Abd al-Latif has proposed the idea. In November 2008 he turned in an initial petition with enough signatures for the Iraqi Election Commission to move forward on the plan. Latif and his followers now have to get 10% of the province’s voting population, approximately 140,939 people, to sign a second petition. That effort started on December 14, and they have until January 14 to finish. If they accomplish that there has to be an election within 15 days. The initiative will pass with 51% of the vote. A Basra federal region has been on the mind of Latif and others for quite some time, but will face opposition from many powerful parties.

Latif has been pushing the idea of a separate Basra region for several years now. In 2005 he first presented the plan as an amendment to the constitution. At the heart of the proposal is the deep-seated conviction amongst many Basrans that the central authorities and Baghdad have ignored them for generations. In turn, Latif has said that Basra needs a share of its vast oil wealth so that it can develop. This is a sizeable amount as the province has 60% of Iraq’s oil reserves, produces 1.8 million of Iraq’s 2.6 million barrels a day of crude, has the only major port through which the majority of the country’s petroleum exports pass through. He noted that the region would not be like Kurdistan however, and sign its own oil contracts, something he has been critical of the Kurdistan Regional Government in the past. Latif just wants Basra to receive a share of the oil profits.

The proposal has already gained a wide variety of supporters and detractors. The head of the Basra provincial council and the governor of the province were the first to publicly state they were for the idea. Their party, Fadhila, has had a similar plan for quite some time as well. In 2007 they said one dollar from each barrel of oil from Basra should go into a development fund for the province, while the governor twice called for a Basra federal region in 2008. They are already organizing social groups, and using their control of the provincial government to rally support. Several Shiite independents and tribes from the area are also pro-region. Finally, a parliamentarian from the Kurdish Alliance voiced support for the idea in November 2008 as well. Those opposed are the major Shiite and Sunni parties. First, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has been centralizing power around him in 2008. He would be against a lessoning of Baghdad’s power, especially over the majority of the country’s oil reserves. Oil Minister Hussein Sharhistani, who is running with Maliki’s Dawa party in the provincial elections, has repeatedly stated that all oil profits must go through the central government as well. He recently opposed the Kurds' call for a share of the oil profits. Moqtada al-Sadr also believes in authority being centralized in Baghdad, and one of his spokesmen in Najaf said the Basra idea would be bad for the country. There have even been discussions between Dawa and the Sadrists, two deep-seated foes, to work together in the province to block the proposal. The Iraqi Islamic Party is also against, reflecting the fears of many Sunnis that the Shiites and Kurds will control much of the country’s oil. The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), although having little influence in Basra itself, has proposed a southern Shiite region before. A separate Basra area would hamper that idea. The Communist Party in Basra, and former Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List are also in opposition.

Whether the Basra federal region goes up for a vote or not in January 2009 is a huge gamble for Latif and the Fadhila Party. It will happen just before the provincial elections on January 31. If the proposal passes both Latif and Fadhila will benefit. If it fails however, they will be going into the elections from a position of weakness. The Fadhila party is already widely unpopular for its lack of providing services and growth in Basra, and was a target of the government’s crackdown in March. The proposal also pits centralists like the Prime Minister against regionalists. Not only that, but local parties like Fadhila are against larger sectarian region backers such as the SIIC. The Oil Minister is also trying to fend off the Kurds' aspirations to control their oil, while building up the state’s capacity at a time when profits are dropping, and the country’s petroleum infrastructure is in dire need of repair. Having a Basra region with most of the oil reserves and the main pipeline and port could derail his plan. All of these factors have already pitted the major national parties against the local Basra ones. Intimidation, bribery, and the use of the security forces for political ends could all ensue to sway the process.

SOURCES

Abouzeid, Rania, “A New Twist in Iraq’s Shi’ite Power Struggle,” Time, 11/16/08

Agence France Presse, “Basra vote aims to benefit from Iraq oil wealth: planner,” 12/8/08

Alsumaria, “Basra heading towards independent region,” 11/17/08
- “Lights shed on federalism in Iraq Basra,” 11/13/08

Amara, Mostafa, “Kurds cannot collect oil royalties, says minister,” Azzaman, 12/22/08

Aswat al-Iraq, “Establishing Basra region easing off political congestion – MP,” 11/14/08
- “Sunni scholars, seculars object Basra federacy,” 11/15/08

Mohammed, Aref, “Thousands demand separate region for Iraq’s Basra,” Reuters, 12/27/08

Visser, Reidar, “The Basra Federalism Initiative Enters Stage Two,” Historiae.org, 12/15/08

Al-Wazzan, Saleem, “basra’s dominant parties expect to maintain power,” Niqash, 12/15/08

Iraqi Accordance Front Breaks Apart

On Wednesday December 24, the Iraqi National Dialogue Council (INDC) withdrew from the Iraqi Accordance Front (IAF), the major Sunni coalition in parliament. The IAF was made up of three main parties, the Iraqi Islamic Party, the General Council for the People of Iraq, and the Iraqi National Dialogue Council. A group of independent Sunni members of parliament known as the Independents Bloc also left. The IAF originally held 44 seats in parliament. It now has 28 left. This comes just a month before the January 2009 provincial elections. The defection points towards the increasing divisions within Sunni politics that began in 2007.

The split within the IAF was due to the arguments between the Dialogue Council and the Islamic Party. The INDC said they were leaving the Front because the Islamic Party was trying to monopolize power. Back in April 2008 the INDC made a similar accusation and threatened to leave the bloc. At that time, the Accordance Front was negotiating with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to return to the cabinet, which they had been boycotting since August 2007. The INDC said that the Islamic Party was trying to take all six ministry positions the Front had left absent. The Dialogue Council was dividing itself then with some legislators leaving the party in May to form the Independents’ Bloc. When the Accordance Front finally did return to the government in July, the Islamic Party received four ministers, and the National Dialogue Council two. That apparently didn’t overcome the problems between the two parties, as the same differences re-emerged and led to the break up of the coalition in December. The Dialogue Council now appears to be allying itself with the opposition parties that consist of the Sadrists, the Fadhila Party, the Iraqi National List, the National Reform Movement, and several other independent parties not aligned with the major coalitions.

The split also comes as the speaker of parliament and INDC member Mahmoud al-Mashhadani resigned his position. The Dialogue Council claims that they and their new allies the opposition parties have the right to name Mashhadani’s replacement. The Accordance Front says that they will name the new speaker, pointing to more conflict between these former allies.

The break-up of the Accordance Front comes as Sunni politics in general have become more fractured and diverse. The Anbar Awakening and the creation of the Sons of Iraq across central and northern Iraq challenged the IAF’s claim that they stood for their community. In the 2005 provincial elections, all the major Sunni parties boycotted except for the Islamic Party, which took control of Anbar. The Accordance Front ran together in the parliamentary election later that year and received 44 seats. The new Sunni organizations claimed that the IAF gained their power illegitimately, and many are planning on challenging them in the 2009 provincial elections.

Maliki has also played the Sunni politicians against the tribes in a divide and conquer policy to keep the Sunnis weak. It apparently worked as the Accordance Front got none of their demands met when they returned to the cabinet after months of boycotting, and still don’t have any real say in decision-making. They also wanted to rejoin the government before the 2009 elections because they were afraid that the new Sunni groups like the Awakening would take their places in the cabinet if they didn’t, a fear stoked by Maliki’s maneuverings.

No one can say for sure who speaks for the Sunnis today. The Islamic Party won control of Anbar by default because the rest of the community was largely boycotting the vote. The 2005 parliamentary election was noted for its sectarian and ethnic divisions. Now there are more independents and nationalists planning on running in the upcoming voting such as the Sunni tribes and the Sons of Iraq. The Accordance Front division follows the de facto split of the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance as parties that were once allied together in coalitions, are now seeing each other as rivals. The split between the National Dialogue Council and the Islamic Party can be seen within this context. Disagreements and resentments against the larger parties are coming to the fore now that sectarianism is lessoning across the country. The 2009 elections may provide clarity about these parties and their popularity, Sunni or otherwise, but they could also increase the divisions as the new and the old wrangle for power.

SOURCES

Ahmed, Farook, “The Iraqi Accord Front’s Return to Government,” Institute for the Study of War, 5/16/08

Alsumaria, “Iraqi governmental crisis to further snag,” 5/5/08

Aswat al-Iraq, “IAF has the right to Parliament’s speakership,” 12/24/08
- “IAF tabled single candidate list, not concerned with any other – MP,” 5/23/08
- “INDC puts forward candidates for parliament’s speakership,” 12/24/08
- “NDC approves its withdrawal from Sunni IAF bloc – MP,” 4/15/08
- “Soon: IAF meeting to nominate replacement for speaker,” 12/25/08
- “Urgent/INDC, Independents bloc withdraw from IAF,” 12/24/08

BBC News, “Guide to Iraqi political parties,” 1/20/06

Cordesman, Anthony, “Iraq’s Insurgency and Civil Violence,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/22/07

Hendawi, Hamza, “ANALYSIS: Al-Maliki weathering crisis,” Associated Press, 9/25/07

Katulis, Brian, Juul, Peter, and Moss, Ian, “Awakening to New Dangers in Iraq,” Center for American Progress, February 2008

Mohammed, Riyadh and Williams, Timothy, “Former Iraqi Parliament Speaker Spreads Blame,” New York Times, 12/25/08

Raghavan, Sudarsan, “Sunni Bloc Rejoins Iraqi Government, Amid Reconciliation Hopes,” Washington Post, 7/20/08

Reuters, “Iraq’s main Sunni Arab bloc splinters,” 12/24/08

The Anbar Awakening Splits

As Iraq’s provincial elections approached it was widely believed that the Anbar tribes would unseat the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) from power. The IIP was the only major Sunni party to take part in the provincial balloting back in 2005, and took all of the seats in Anbar as a result. When the province’s tribes began turning on Al Qaeda in Iraq later that year, and became known as the Anbar Awakening it was assumed they would eventually take over the province. Now the tribal groups have split, making the outcome of the January 2009 elections unpredictable.

The Anbar tribes were always divided between a variety of leaders and groups. Sheikh Abdl Sattar Abu Risha founded the Anbar Salvation Council in September 2006. He successfully organized 41 of the provinces tribes behind him to fight Al Qaeda in Iraq. In September 2007 the Islamists assassinated him. His death led to the first major split amongst the Anbaris. Sattar’s brother Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha formed the Awakening Conference of Iraq, while Sheikh Ali Hatem al-Suleiman of the al-Anbar Tribal Council and Sheikh Hameed Farhan al-Hayes formed the National Front for the Salvation of Iraq. By June 2008 the two groups had come together under the umbrella of the Al-Anbar Salvation Council expressly to run in the upcoming elections.

Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha on the right has decided to join with the Islamic Iraqi Party in the upcoming January 2009 elections

This alliance has now broken apart due to the maneuverings of the Islamic Party. Seeing their demise on the horizon, the IIP successfully played a divide and conquer strategy. They convinced Sheikh Abu Risha and his Awakening Conference to join them in the National Gathering of Independents. In October 2008, the Islamic Party also formed the Intellectuals and Tribes for Development that includes the Gathering of Anbar’s Tribal Leaders and Intellectuals, Iraq’s People’s Conference, and the Independent Tribal National Gathering. Abu Risha’s defection led 40 tribal leaders to walk out of his group and join al-Suleiman and al-Hayes. They in turn formed a rival coalition, the Iraq’s Tribes List, which is made up of Risha’s original group the Anbar Salvation Council, the Ambition Party, and Hayes’ and Suleiman’s National Front for the Salvation of Iraq. Sheikh Suleiman is also trying to reach out to Baghdad for support. He formed a Tribal Support Council aligned with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

The divisions amongst the tribes could complicate the voting in January. A member of Iraq’s Election Commission said that while a large number of people registered to vote, he feared a low turnout. He told the Berlin and Amman based on-line weekly Niqash that many people don’t trust the Islamic Party because of their poor rule of Anbar, but also don’t believe in the tribes because they are divided, and always bicker with each other. He continued that voters couldn’t tell one tribal group from another, and this confusion will lead them to select none of them as a result.

Because of these divisions, there might not be a clear winner come January in Anbar. The Tribes List and the Islamic Party coalition will probably split the vote. That will likely mean a power sharing deal between two bitter rivals. Neither side trusts nor respects the other, so this will be a real test. The Islamic Party has not done a god job running the province. In 2007 it only spent 3.7% of its budget. By October 2008 they had improved to 42%. There is also widespread poverty with six of the province’s seven districts having 25-50% of the population living in the poorest of six wealth groups according to the United Nations’ World Food Program, and the seventh with 50-75% in poverty. With divided rule, and budget cuts expected, it’s unlikely that the province will do any better in the immediate future.

For more on Anbar see:

Iraqi Weekly Interviews Sheikh Ali Hatem

Finding A Historical Precedent For The Sons Of Iraq, But Not A Solution

A More Complicated Picture of Iraq’s Tribes

Anbar Under Iraqi Control, But Political Disputes Continue

Anbar Dispute Between Sunnnis Growing

The Demise, But Not Death of Al Qaeda In Iraq

SOURCES

Ali, Fadhil, “Sunni Rivalries in al-Anbar Province Threaten Iraq’s Security,” Terrorism Focus, Jamestown Foundation, 3/11/08

Fayad, Ma’ad, “Al-Anbar Salvation Council to Run in Parliamentary Elections,” Asharq Al-Awsat, 9/21/08

Hamid, Nirmeen, “anbar’s Islamic party and tribes vie for power,” Niqash, 12/12/08
- “Political Fight Threatens Anbar Peace,” Niqash, 11/20/08

Lynch, Marc, “Iraqi Sunnis after the Awakening,” Abu Aardvark Blog, 6/20/08

Parker, Ned, “Iraq’s Nouri Maliki may gain power with U.S. security agreement,” Los Angeles Times, 11/24/08

Partlow, Joshua, Tyson, Ann Scott and Wright, Robin, “Bomb Kills a Key Sunni Ally of U.S.,” Washington Post, 9/14/07

Pitman, Todd, “Sunni Sheiks Join Fight Vs. Insurgency,” Associated Press, 3/25/07

Raghavan, Sudarsan, “A New Breed Grabs Reins in Anbar,” Washington Post, 10/21/08

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/08

World Food Programme, “Comprehensive Food Security And Vulnerability Analysis In Iraq,” November 2008