We've Moved!
Tuesday, October 13, 2009
No SOFA Referendum?
SOURCES
Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Sunni Arab support key to US-Iraq security deal,” Associated Press, 11/25/08
Chon, Gina, “Iraq Vote on Pullout Put on Back Burner,” Wall Street Journal, 10/5/09
Domergue, Jeremy and Cochrane, Marisa, “Balancing Maliki,” Institute for Understanding War, June 2009
Sunday, September 20, 2009
U.S. Forces Restricted To Rural Areas and Reconstruction
Two and a half months since the June pullback, and U.S. troops find themselves concentrating on Iraq’s rural areas and reconstruction projects. Maliki’s restrictions on joint patrols in major cities are still in places with the exception of Mosul. Out in the countryside however, the rules are not as strict and U.S. troops have been going out with their Iraqi counterparts. Americans are also allowed to check on reconstruction projects with Iraqi approval, which gives them another way to get out of their bases.
The reason that Baghdad has placed such tight limits on the U.S. is because of Maliki’s 2010 re-election campaign. One of the issues that he is running on is the claim that he got the U.S. to leave Iraq. The Prime Minister is also pushing for the referendum on Status of Forces Agreement to coincide with the January voting. If Iraqis vote it down, U.S. combat troops will have to leave Iraq by January 2011, instead of the planned for December 31, 2011 date. Maliki’s plans have been complicated by the recent increase in deaths, but so far he seems willing to accept these casualties because asking for U.S. aid would be seen as a major reversal for him. This gamble may not pay off as the August 19, 2009 Baghdad bombings have brought into doubt his whole approach to security.
SOURCES
Alsumaria, “Iraq Commander: No need for US troops,” 7/21/09
Gatehouse, Gabriel, “US troops back on patrol in Iraq,” BBC, 7/28/09
Knights, Michael and Ali, Ahmed, “Putting Iraq’s Security Agreement to the Vote: Risks and Opportunities,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy,” 8/24/09
Lawrence, Quil, “To Many Iraqis, U.S. Troops Have Not Faded Away,” Morning Edition, NPR, 7/13/09
Londono, Ernesto, “U.S. Troops in Iraq Find Little Leeway,” Washington Post, 7/20/09
Londono, Ernesto and DeYoung, Karen, “Iraq Restricts U.S. Forces,” Washington Post, 7/18/09
Nordland, Rod, “Iraqis Take the Lead, With U.S. Trailing Closely,” New York Times, 8/9/09
Shabad, Rebecca, “Iraq City Security: ‘Uneven,’” Newsweek, 6/30/09
Sly, Liz, “In Iraq, U.S. troops learn to cope with rejection,” Los Angeles Times, 9/7/09
Tharp, Mike, “Iraqis have told U.S. military no patrols permitted in Baghdad,” McClatchy Newspapers, 7/14/09
Wednesday, September 09, 2009
The U.S. Needs To Save Iraq From Itself Says Analyst
Pollack begins with two conversations he had with Iraq politicians after the January 2009 provincial elections. The first was with a group that was opposed to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. They started off assuring Pollack that they had enough supporters for a no confidence vote against the Prime Minister in parliament, but in the end they admitted that Abdul Aziz al-Hakim of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council opposed this idea because it would go against the recent balloting that was in Maliki’s favor. The absence of Hakim’s support was considered a deal breaker. This represents one dynamic of the post sectarian war status quo in Iraq where many of the disputes are now political, and groups abide by the broad rules of the constitution and electoral system. On the other hand, Pollack met with a group of Dawa officials who were sure that Maliki would win in the 2010 parliamentary vote after his victory in 2009. They said the Prime Minister would run on services and security, and blame his opponents for any setbacks, something that’s actually happened recently. On the other hand when these politicians were asked about Maliki creating extra-judicial bodies and going outside standard procedures in the government they attempted to dodge the issues by saying that this was necessary because Iraq’s bureaucracy didn’t work and different political parties controlled the ministries and often didn’t listen to Maliki. This represented the other side of Iraq’s system where many believe that the Prime Minister is acting like leaders of the past and centralizing all authority around himself, which could intentionally or not lead to autocratic rule. To Pollack, this is the ying and the yang of Iraq. On the one hand democracy is taking root however precariously, on the other hand, there are plenty of forces in the country that threaten it.
There are two other issues that Pollack worries about. One is that Iraqi nationalism is making a comeback. This is helping to heal some of the wounds between Sunnis and Shiites created during the sectarian war. On the other hand, Iraqi nationalism is often interpreted as being solely Arab in character and anti-Kurdish. Maliki is playing on this by attempting to militarily confront the Kurds across the disputed territories in the north. There have been several times this has almost turned into shooting, only averted by the presence of U.S. forces. Pollack wonders if Maliki actually resents this outside interference, because he may want a confrontation with the Kurds so that he can rally the Arab public around him. Second, are the old Iraqi parties that have ruled Iraq since the 2005 elections. While he doesn’t name them, he is implying the Supreme Council, the Kurdistan Democratic Party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and the Iraqi Accordance Front, all of which either controlled their own militia or had contacts with the insurgency, and used these armed factions to gain political power. Pollack believes that these groups are trying to cling to power, and will do whatever it takes to do so. In the 2010 election for example, they are pushing for a closed list voting system where the electorate only gets to pick from coalitions instead of individuals because this gives party bosses, rather than the public, control over the politicians and government. Pollack thinks both of these are threats to stability and democracy, because Maliki and the old guard parties are only thinking about their own personal gain rather than the future of the country.
Pollack’s solution to all of these problems is a long-term American presence in Iraq. According to him, the U.S. needs to stay to provide support to the government and mediate conflicts. Only the U.S. he writes can help solve the problems between Baghdad and Kurdistan over disputed areas like Kirkuk and federalism. The U.S. needs to make sure that Iraqi prisoners and the Sons of Iraq are treated well. The U.S. needs to push the government to protect minorities. The U.S. needs to pressure Baghdad to increase its capacity and improve the bureaucracy. The Americans need to make sure that party bosses don’t take over the elections, and push for a closed list voting system. The U.S. needs to deal with Maliki’s attempt to centralize power, and corruption. In a nutshell, Pollack believes the U.S. is the only party in Iraq that will think about Iraq. The main lever of influence the U.S. has to achieve this laundry list of items is aid. U.S. advisors still partner with Iraqi units, the security forces are dependent upon the Americans for maintenance and supply, the Iraqi government has U.S. advisors throughout, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams are essential parts of the rebuilding provinces out in the governorates, and the U.S. still provides a large amount of economic aid and advice. All of this assistance needs to be made conditional based upon Baghdad’s compliance with the long list of reforms listed above. This is something many other American think tank writers have argued for over the last few years.
There is one major impediment to overcome to actually achieving this according to Pollack, Prime Minister Maliki. The Prime Minister seems to have an inflated sense of the capabilities of the Iraqi security forces and is playing politics with the U.S. presence. Maliki thinks that the Iraqi forces are going to be ready sooner rather than later so he wants to cut many of the public ties with the U.S. like joint patrols with U.S. forces and the blast walls in Baghdad. More importantly he is pushing for a referendum on the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) to coincide with the 2010 parliamentary vote. This will give Maliki a powerful tool to run on so he can portray himself as the leader that got the Americans to leave Iraq. He can also use it against his opposition since many support a longer stay for U.S. forces to protect against Maliki’s excesses. If the Iraqi public votes down the SOFA, a definite possibility, than Pollack is afraid U.S. influence will end that election day. A main priority then should be Washington lobbying Maliki to move the referendum to some other time.
Therein lies a major problem with Pollack and others who take this line of argument for a long-term U.S. role in Iraq. There is no real reason for Maliki to change the referendum date because holding it the same time as national balloting will benefit him the most. He has already given up many forms of American military assistance since the June 30, 2009 withdrawal from Iraq’s cities, and that is the greatest piece of leverage the U.S. holds. Iraqi domestic politics is a much greater force now than U.S. influence. The White House therefore, could make all kinds of assistance conditional, and the Iraqis might still not listen. Iraq may turn out to be the prodigal son for the United States, but Pollack and others can’t seem to let go. Ultimately, they seem afraid of Iraqis running their own affairs. Pollack in “The Battle for Baghdad” just happens to be the most explicit in voicing this opinion.
SOURCES
Biddle, Stephen, “Reversal in Iraq,” Center for Preventative Action Council on Foreign Relations, May 2009
Cordesman, Anthony, “Iraq: A Time To Stay?” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7/30/09
DPA, “Al-Maliki courts Iraqi Sunni tribal leaders,” 8/11/09
Nagl, John and Burton, Brian, “After the Fire: Shaping the Future U.S. Relationship with Iraq,” Center for a New American Security, June 2009
Nordland, Rod, “Bombs Hurt Maliki Case That Iraq Can Guard Itself,” New York Times, 8/21/09
Pollack, Kenneth, “The Battle for Baghdad,” The National Interest, September/October 2009
Monday, June 29, 2009
Don’t Expect Vote on SOFA Anytime Soon
Having the Americans go is popular in Iraq right now, and politicians like to talk about it to gain favor before the January 2010 parliamentary election, but in practice there is no real effort behind having the July referendum. In mid-May 2009 the Iraqi Election Commission said that it was ready to hold the vote, but that parliament needed to pass a law and budget for it. On July 9 it appeared that this was moving forward when the Councils of Ministers, Maliki’s cabinet, allocated $99.575 million for the referendum. It was then reported that the cabinet wanted to delay the vote for six months so that it would happen at the same time as the January 2010 parliamentary balloting. If Iraq’s legislature acts like normal, it could take six months or longer to pass a law to regulate the referendum. In addition, the U.S. is also working behind the scenes to try to have Baghdad cancel the vote altogether.
If the referendum is held, many American observers believe that it will not pass. That would mean U.S. combat troops would have one year to withdraw from Iraq after the voting day. The White House and Pentagon need to make contingency planning for this possible outcome. At the same time, given Iraq’s parliament’s recent history, it’s unlikely that they can pass any legislation on time. One that is political sensitive like a referendum on SOFA is likely to drag out even longer. At the same time, since Iraqi nationalism is on the rise the referendum could very likely correspond with the parliamentary elections, so Iraqi politicians could use it to their personal advantage. Also of importance is the fact that a large training/advising force will probably stay behind to provide logistics, air and sea support, and intelligence for the Iraqi forces whether the U.S. pulls out in January 2011 or December 2011.
SOURCES
Alsumaria, “IHEC ready to hold referendum on US pact,” 5/14/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Iraqi govt. allocates $100 million for referendum on security agreement,” 6/9/09
Rubin, Alissa, “Iraq Moves Ahead With Vote on U.S. Security Pact,” New York Times, 6/10/09
Rubin, Alissa, Robertson, Campbell and Farrell, Stephen, “Iraqi Parliament Approves U.S. Security Pact,” New York Times, 11/27/08
Wednesday, June 03, 2009
Baghdad Responds To Renewed Violence Pt. II: Baghdad Re-Arresting Prisoners Released By Americans
When the U.S. began releasing prisoners in 2007 it raised concerns of American commanders, and it now has become an issue with Iraq’s politicians. In February 2008, U.S. officers told the Christian Science Monitor that they were worried that the ex-detainees might jeopardize security. In October, the police chief in Ramadi said that he was keeping a close eye on former prisoners, and paying some of them to be spies. As more were released, an Iraqi police colonel in a town in Anbar said he was being overwhelmed by ex-prisoners, and had arrested 70 of them. The deputy police commander in Fallujah said they were looking for 10% of the detainees, while an intelligence officer at the Interior Ministry was worried about Shiite militants regrouping as Special Groups in Basra and Baghdad. He claimed 60% of the prisoners were returning to militancy. These were all local officials expressing their concerns.
When a spate of mass casualty bombings occurred in Baghdad however, the issue became a national one. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki gave an interview with the BBC at the end of April 2009 where he blamed the attacks on the Americans’ release program. It was then announced in May that the government was beginning a program to re-capture many of the people let go by the Americans. Later in the month the Prime Minister said that he wanted to amend the Amnesty Law passed in February 2008, claiming that it released too many prisoners. While Baghdad has announced that 132,838 people had been amnestied as of May 18, 2009 only around 6,300 were actual prisoners that were released. The rest were people on bail, parole or had warrants on them.
Freeing prisoners held by the U.S. was a major concern of the Iraqis during the negotiations over the SOFA. 85% were said to be Sunnis, and the main Sunni party the Iraqi Accordance Front and its leader Vice President Tariq Hashemi had been pushing for their release for years. The handover of prisoners by the Americans was also a sign of Iraq’s sovereignty. That symbolic gesture may now be coming to an end. It’s likely that some of these former prisoners are returning to their insurgent and militia pasts now that they are free. At the same time, Baghdad is searching for scapegoats to divert attention away from the increase in attacks and deaths. Together they give a powerful incentive for the government to begin rounding people up, at least for the time being, to show that the security forces are doing something to counter the rash of violence.
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Iraqi detainees refusing to go home: US general,” 3/23/08
Alsumaria, “US Army releases about 3000 Iraqi detainees,” 3/18/08
Associated Press, “US military says number of detainees falling,” 3/3/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “132,838 inmates released so far under Amnesty Law,” 5/18/09
- “Some inmates released by U.S. are wanted by Iraqi authorities – official,” 4/24/09
Boot, Max, “We Are Winning. We Haven’t Won,” Weekly Standard, 1/28/08
Cordesman, Anthony, “Iraq’s Insurgency and Civil Violence,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/22/07
DPA, “US to transfer Iraqi prisoners to local authorities,” 12/11/08
Eisenstadt, Michael, “Populism, Authoritarianism, and National Security in al-Maliki’s Iraq,” Washington Institute for Near East Studies, 5/12/09
Haynes, Deborah, “US risks fanning violence as it opens gates of Iraqi detention camps,” Times of London, 4/20/09
IRIN, “IRAQ: Lawyers accuse government of concealing information about detainees’ UN Office For The Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 9/19/07
Kingsbury, Alex, “In Iraq, U.S. Marines Rely on Allies Like a Hatchet-Wielding Colonel to Keep the Peace,” U.S. News & World Report, 10/30/08
Lubold, Gordon, “A new U.S. push to release more detainees in Iraq,” Christian Science Monitor, 2/22/08
- “Do U.S. prisons in Iraq breed insurgency?” Christian Science Monitor, 12/20/07
Muir, John, “’No Delay’ in US withdrawal from Iraq,” BBC News, 4/27/09
Peter, Tom, “Iraqi courts to decide fate of America’s detainees,” Christian Science Monitor, 1/29/09
Pincus, Walter, “U.S. Working to Reshape Iraqi Detainees,” Washington Post, 9/19/07
Pincus, Walter and Greenwell, Megan, “U.S. Releases 260 Iraqi Detainees,” Washington Post, 9/23/07
Reilly, Corinne, “As clock ticks, U.S. letting thousands of Iraqi prisoners go,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/27/08
Reuters, “Iraq PM slams law pardoning mainly Sunni prisoners,” 5/23/09
San Francisco Chronicle, “U.S. military divided on troop withdrawal,” 8/25/07
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 4/30/09
Stone, Andrea, “Some worried about detainee transfer to Iraq,” USA Today, 1/26/09
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Humanitarian Update Iraq February 2009,” 2/28/09
Zair, Kareem, “Iraq to re-detain released prisoners,” Azzaman, 5/16/09
Sunday, May 17, 2009
U.S. Forces Staying Or Going From Iraq’s Cities?
At the end of the Bush administration in December 2008 the U.S. and Iraqi governments signed the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). The deal created a timetable for a U.S. withdrawal, which the Obama White House has said is binding. In February 2009 President Obama announced his plan to pull out of Iraq. Following the SOFA, all U.S. troops have to be out of Iraq’s cities and towns by June 30, 2009. After Iraq’s provincial elections, combat troops will be drawn down leaving behind a force of 35,000-50,000 that will ultimately leave by December 31, 2011. Either side can end the agreement or amend it if both sides agree. There is also supposed to be an Iraqi referendum on the SOFA in July 2009.
Taking advantage of the loophole in the SOFA the U.S. military began floating the idea of American forces staying in certain Iraqi cities past the June 2009 deadline. The U.S. commander in Iraq General Ray Odierno for example gave an interview with ABC News in early March 2009 saying that he planned on asking Baghdad to allow American troops to stay in Baquba, Diyala province, Mosul, Ninewa province, and Kirkuk, Tamim province. At the end of the month the U.S. general in charge of American ground forces in Iraq made similar statements, adding the city of Basra as another place where the Americans were hoping the Iraqis would ask them to stay longer. By May 8, Gen. Odierno had shorted the list to just Baghdad and Mosul. All of those cities except for Basra are some of the most violent in the country, and American commanders are worried about what will happen to security without their forces there. At the end of April, formal discussions began on extending the U.S. stay, and they are still on going.
What’s complicating the matter is domestic pressure within Iraq. First, American troops conducted a series of raids that resulted in several deaths of Iraqi civilians recently. In January 2009 U.S. soldiers shot a couple in a town near Kirkuk in Tamim province. In February another raid outside of Kirkuk led to the death of an Iraqi man. The local police chief and Iraqi Army commander claimed they knew nothing of the U.S. operation. In April two civilians in Kut, Wasit province were killed in their house by Americans. 100s of Iraqis protested the deaths. Maliki demanded that the soldiers responsible be turned over to Iraqi courts, that the attack violated the SOFA, and he told the BBC that he would not ask the U.S. to stay in urban areas past the June deadline. The same day a spokesman for the Defense Ministry repeated Maliki’s remarks, followed by the Prime Minister’s spokesman at the beginning of May.
The purpose of Maliki pushing for the SOFA in the first place was to prove his nationalist credentials to his population. Now Iraqi ire at Americans killing civilians is putting pressure on Baghdad to condemn any extensions on the agreement’s deadlines. It’s unknown whether Iraq will hold the July referendum on the SOFA, but if it does happen, the government needs to appear to be asserting Iraqi sovereignty whenever possible to get it passed. The country is also expected to have parliamentary elections within a year, and the agreement will be used by Maliki’s State of Law List to prove that they are for an independent Iraq that can defend itself. At the same time that Baghdad is playing politics, American forces will still be able to carry out operations in Iraqi cities, just from large bases on the periphery, and negotiations are still underway for staying in some cities. Maliki and American commanders are thus hoping for the best of both worlds, propping up popular support for the Prime Minister, while maintaining a U.S. presence.
SOURCES
Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Iraq wants US forces out of Mosul on time,” Associated Press, 4/27/09
Agence France Presse, “US on track to exit Iraqi cities by end June: commander,” 5/8/09
Arraf, Jane, “US general: American forces may not leave key Iraqi cities,” Christian Science Monitor, 3/27/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Bush, Maliki sign SOFA,” 12/14/08
Bumiller, Elisabeth, “General Sees a Longer Stay in Iraq Cities for U.S. Troops,” New York Times, 5/9/09
Faraj, Salam, “Iraq to hold referendum on US troops pact,” Agence France Presse, 11/26/08
Al Jazeera, “Iraq: US raid broke security pact,” 4/27/09
Muir, Joh, “’No Delay’ in US withdrawal from Iraq,” BBC News, 4/27/09
Nordland, Rod, “Exceptions to Iraq Deadline Are Proposed,” New York Times, 4/27/09
Raddatz, Martha and Martinez, Luis, “EXCLUSIVE: Top General in Iraq Says ‘If They Ask Us to Stay We Will Probably Stay,’” ABC, 3/9/09
Reuters, “Iraq rules out extension of U.S. withdrawal dates,” 5/3/09
Rubin, Alissa, "U.S. Military Violated Security Agreement Twice in 2 Weeks, Iraqi
Leaders Say," New York Times, 2/7/09
United States Government Accountability Office, “IRAQ Key Issues for Congressional Oversight,” March 2009
Wednesday, April 15, 2009
Are Iraqi Forces Ready?
The Obama administration has committed itself to a timetable for withdrawal. Following the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) signed between the Bush White House and Baghdad, American combat troops are to be out of the country's cities by June 2009, and then be completely withdrawn by the end of 2011. The question then is whether the Iraqi forces are up to the job of taking over security. There is little reporting on specific operations by Iraqi units, but the anecdotal stories that are available show a mixed bag.
In November 2008 the U.S. signed the SOFA with the government of Iraq. Under this agreement U.S. combat troops are to withdraw from major cities and towns to their bases by June 30, 2009. U.S. soldiers responsible for training Iraqis would remain, and American troops will still carry out operations within Iraq. There is some talk about Iraqis asking U.S. forces to stay in certain unstable areas such as Baquba in Diyala province and Mosul in Ninewa, in addition to Basra beyond the June deadline. American troop levels are also expected to drop from around 140,000 in March 2009 to approximately 128,000 by September. They would stay at that level until after the Iraqi parliamentary elections, which are scheduled for December. After the balloting is over and confirmed troops levels are supposed to drop to around 35,000-50,000 by August 2010, and then be completely out by December 31, 2011.
If this arrangement is followed through with, Iraqi forces will have primary responsibility for most of Iraq by this summer. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has repeatedly said that his forces are up to the challenge. The size of the Iraqi security forces has almost doubled from around 320,000 in January 2007 to 637,495 by December 31, 2008.
According to the Pentagon's quarterly reports to Congress the number of National Police battalions operating went from 27 to 34 from January 2007 to October 2008. The National Police are a paramilitary force that supports the military in counterinsurgency operations. In January 2007 23 battalions were partially capable of conducting operations in coordination with Coalition forces, and four could plan and carry out operations with U.S. support. None were considered independent yet. By October 2008 that had grown to 1 battalion being formed, 15 that were partially ready to operate with U.S. forces, 16 that could operate with U.S. support, and two that could work independently. That showed that during the process of expansion the National Police had been able to keep up with its training and readiness with the percentage of units capable of operating with some support going from 14.8% in January 2007 to 47% in October 2008, and the number of independent battalions going from zero to two.
From the beginning of 2007 to late 2008 the number of Army battalions went from 112 to 175. In January 2007 five were being formed and couldn't operate yet, 17 were dependent upon U.S. forces, 78 could operate but with Coalition support, and 12 were considered independent. By October 2008 five battalions were being formed, 54 were incapable of working without U.S. forces, 99 were semi-dependent, and 17 were considered independent. By December the Pentagon reported that 165 of 185 Iraqi battalions were in the lead or independent. The Army has gone through the most growth so its capabilities have been harder to keep up with. In October 2008 15.1% of the force were partially capable and in January 2009 that had increased to 30.8%. The number of battalions capable of operating with some Coalition support went down from 69.6% to 56.5%, while those considered independent dropped from 10.7% to 9.7%. What these numbers actually mean is still up to debate as Anthony Cordesman from the Center for Strategic and International Studies has often pointed out.
Status Of Iraqi Forces
Incapable of Operating | Partially Capable | Capable With Coalition Support | Independent | Totals | |
National Police Battalions | |||||
Jan 2007 | 0/0% | 23/85.1% | 4/14.8% | 0/0% | 27/100% |
Oct 2008 | 1/2.9% | 15/44.1% | 16/47% | 2/5.8% | 34/100% |
Iraqi Army Battalions | |||||
Jan 2007 | 5/4.4% | 17/15.1% | 78/69.6% | 12/10.7% | 112/100% |
Oct 2008 | 5/2.8% | 54/30.8% | 99/56.5% | 17/9.7% | 175/100% |
The Iraqi Army is considered farther along than the police. U.S. officers often say that their Iraqi counterparts are more capable of carrying out operations, however their quality still varies. An American commander told the Stars and Stripes in February 2009 that they still don't trust Iraqis with advance information on operations. The U.S. believes many Iraqi units are infiltrated with insurgents and militiamen. A U.S. commander found an Iraqi officer in southern Baghdad who was tipping off Shiite militias before raids for example. Rather than being fired or punished he was simply transferred to a Sunni area. U.S. soldiers and contractors are supposed to be partnered with all new Iraqi Army units. A U.S. officer that ran one of these Military Transition Teams meant to train Iraqis said there weren't enough Americans to advise all the Iraqi units so most of them have been okayed to operate whether they are ready or not. Another issue is the motivation of Iraqi troops. After the SOFA was passed all U.S. operations are supposed to be carried out jointly with Iraqi forces, although this does not always happen. There have been several stories that in practice, it is usually the Americans that initiate and lead patrols. The same Stars and Stripes article followed one patrol in Diyala that had the Americans doing all the work. A U.S. unit showed up and told the Iraqis that they were going on a mission. The Americans ended up arresting a suspected insurgent. The event was recorded as an Iraqi led patrol and nabbing. It's also still common for large numbers of Iraqi soldiers to be on leave at any given time.
The Iraqi police still have far more problems. Iraqi soldiers are drawn from across the country and are usually rotated. Police on the other hand, are locally recruited and serve in those same areas. That means they are more open to influence by political parties, militias, and others. There is also the issue of infiltration. On February 24, 2009 an Iraqi policeman shot and killed a U.S. soldier, an interpreter and two Iraqi policemen in Mosul. Three American soldiers and another interpreter were also wounded in the attack. In another incident in that city, a U.S. patrol was attacked with two grenades with Iraqi police looking on who did nothing. Abuse is often common in Iraqi jails as the judicial system relies upon confessions rather than evidence. A review of the Interior Ministry by the William and Mary College however said that the leadership is developing, and progress is being made fighting corruption and sectarianism. The Interior Minister claimed in March 2009 that he had fired 62,000 members of the Ministry since he took office in 2006 in an attempt to clean it up. The major problem the William and Mary researchers found was that the police and Interior were not institutions yet that followed rules and regulations, but were mainly driven by individuals. The National Police are the elite of the Interior Ministry, and have been largely cleaned up of militias, and are doing much better.
Does this mixed bag of reports make for a competent security force that is ready to protect the country? A phrase "Iraqi good enough" has often been mentioned as a response. Iraqi forces are not up to the quality or standards of American forces, but Iraq is not the United States. There will still be problems with outside influences, corruption, and abuses, but Iraq's police and army for the most part are probably competent enough to hold areas and fight insurgents or militiamen when confronted. They also have until 2011 to develop with American assistance. That may be good enough for Iraq.
Arraf, Jane, “US general: American forces may not leave key Iraqi cities,” Christian Science Monitor, 3/27/09
Associated Press, “Iraqis fear U.S. pullout of volatile Mosul,” 3/9/09
- “U.S. troops to remain active in Iraq after pullback,” 3/15/09
Cordesman Anthony, “The Changing Situation In Iraq,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 4/1/09
- “How Soon Is Safe? Iraqi Force Development And ‘Conditions-Based’ US Withdrawals, Final Pre-Publication Draft,” 2/17/09
Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” December 2008
DeYoung, Karen and Kornblut, Anne, “Obama to Announce U.S. Troop Withdrawal in Iraq,” Washington Post, 2/27/09
Druzin, Heath, “Coalition forces fight in insurgent stronghold while residents urge U.S. troops to leave Mosul,” Stars and Stripes, 3/8/09
- “Iraqis taking the lead? Yes and no,” Stars and Stripes, 2/22/09
- “Shooting of four U.S. troops highlights trust issues between two forces,” Stars and Stripes, 2/27/09
Engle, Richard, “The sixth war in Iraq,” NBC News, 3/20/09
Human Rights Watch, “The Quality of Justice, Failings of Iraq’s Central Criminal Court,” December 2008
Kaplow, Larry, “The Last Day of the Iraq War,” Newsweek, 1/12/09
Salaheddin, Sinan, “Iraqi security leader wants ‘war of intelligence,’” Associated Press, 3/14/09
Sherman, Matt and Carstens, Roger, “Cooling the Streets: Institutional Reforms in Iraq’s Ministry of Interior,” Institute for the Theory and Practice of International Relations at The College of William and Mary, 11/14/08
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09
United States Government Accountability Office, “IRAQ Key Issues for Congressional Oversight,” March 2009
Sunday, January 04, 2009
Concerns Over Transferring Prisoners To Iraqi Control
International organizations and Iraqi officials have all reported that human rights violations are common in Iraqi detention facilities. Amnesty International’s Middle East director told the Financial Times that charges of torture and abuse by Iraqi police and guards often occurred. In mid-December 2008 the Minister of Women Affairs Nawal al-Samarrai said women prisoners were routinely beaten and faced bad conditions. The United Nations December 2008 human rights report on Iraq found that mistreatment was common in Iraqi prisons. Many are tortured, stuffed into prisons beyond capacity, receive no legal aid, and wait for months to years before ever seeing a judge. In Kurdistan, it found that the Kurdish authorities moved prisoners to secret detention facilities before U.N. officials came to inspect their jails. The most recent and publicized case involving abuse is that of journalist Muntadar al-Zaidi who threw his shoes at President Bush. According to his brother guards beat al-Zaidi with metal pipes. Most importantly, these beatings have become an accepted part of Iraq’s justice system. Human Rights Watch found that courts and judges know that police and guards beat prisoners to gain confessions, yet accept the evidence anyway.
Iraq’s court system also lacks due process because of sectarianism and political influence. A group of U.S. funded Iraqi lawyers for example, working at the Rusafa Prison in Baghdad told the Los Angeles Times that the Ministry of Justice regularly bends the rules to keep prisoners behind bars. The attorneys said that because most of the prisoners were Sunni, the Justice Ministry did not trust them. That led officials to not follow release orders or they drummed up extra charges to keep detainees in jail. Minister Samarrai added that political parties and militias hold sway over the courts and judges. The result of both is that prisoners often remain in prison indefinitely.
It is into this milieu that thousands of Iraqi prisoners are about to be placed into. Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the International Red Cross are all calling for the United States to ensure the safety of the detainees they are transferred to the Iraqis. The U.S. is at least attempting to solve the overcrowding issue by funding the construction of six new prisons. Until then the Ministry of Justice is renovating the Abu Ghraib prison to hold the prisoners it gets from the United States.
Like many of Iraq’s institutions, the country’s justice system was rebuilt almost from scratch by the United States after the invasion. The number of judges has gone from zero in May 2003 to 1,180 in June 2008. The U.S. has spent millions on building a secure facility for them in Baghdad. The results have been disappointing however as just about every commentator has found that the courts simply don’t work. Even the Pentagon in its last quarterly report to Congress on Iraq in September 2008 found that American aid has done little to help Iraq’s problematic legal situation. Having Iraqis hold Iraqis is an important step towards sovereignty. The problem is that the country is still living with its legacy of abuse and mistreatment.
SOURCES
Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” September 2008
Dhiyab, Abdulrahman, “Iraqi prisons’ conditions appalling, says minister,” Azzaman, 12/18/08
Fifield, Anna, “Fears for Iraqi prisoners after handover,” Financial Times, 12/30/08
Human Rights Watch, “The Quality of Justice, Failings of Iraq’s Central Criminal Court,” December 2008
Jawad, Laith, “Iraq readies Abu Ghraib for U.S.-held detainees,” Azzaman, 12/27/08
Leinwand, Donna, “Wheels of justice slowly returning to Iraqi court,” USA Today, 2/26/08
O’Hanlon, Michael and Campbell, Jason, “Iraq Index,” Brookings Institution, 11/20/08
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/08
Susman, Tina, “Iraqi detainees languish in clogged justice system,” Los Angeles Times, 9/22/08
UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, “Human Rights Report 1 January – 30 June 2008,” December 2008
Tuesday, December 16, 2008
Missteps by Iraqi Spokesman and Commanding U.S. General On SOFA
First, while on a trip to the United States, Maliki’s spokesman al-Dabbagh gave a speech at the Pentagon on December 11 where he said U.S. forces might stay in Iraq for ten years. That was obviously past the 2011 withdrawal date set by the SOFA. Dabbagh believed that the Iraqi forces would not be ready in the three years set by the agreement, and would therefore need a continued U.S. military presence. This was especially true of the Iraqi forces’ logistics, air force, and navy. The Prime Minister quickly rejected his own spokesman’s comments. That didn’t stop political parties that had questions about the agreement from jumping on Dabbagh’s statements as proof that neither side believes in sticking to the SOFA’s timelines.
A few days later on December 13, commander General Ray Odierno made a similar statement contradicting the SOFA. He told the press that U.S. troops would stay in Iraq’s cities as advisors past the summer 2009 deadline set by the SOFA. He said that would mean that U.S. forces would stay in most of the security stations that are now being turned over to the Iraqis. Part of the reason why General Odierno wanted to keep these soldiers in Iraq was to help secure the upcoming Iraqi elections.
Together, in the span of just three days, a major Iraqi official and the commander of U.S. forces might have threatened passage of the SOFA in the July referendum. That doesn’t mean what they said wasn’t true. Iraqi forces probably won’t be ready in just six months to fully patrol all of the country’s cities, nor be ready for full independence three years later either. As military analysts such as Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies have often pointed out, the Iraqi armed forces and police still face major obstacles before they are truly capable of defending their country on their own. These limitations were probably known by the Iraqis and Americans who worked on the SOFA, but the agreement was as much a symbolic one about Iraq’s sovereignty as anything else. Maliki was especially satisfied with the conclusion of the negotiations because it boosted his nationalist standing. He can now claim that he set the date for the U.S. to leave Iraq before the provincial elections in 2009. Dabbagh’s and Odierno’s statements pierce this newly created façade, and may set an early tone with the Iraqi public who have given little credit to the U.S. for the improved security situation, and only went from a negative to a positive view of the SOFA after Maliki was able to get major concessions from the United States. If statements continue like those of Dabbagh and Odierno, they could turn Iraqis against the agreement once again, which would mean a no vote during the referendum.
SOURCES
Aswat al-Iraq, “Bush, Maliki sign SOFA,” 12/14/08
Baldor, Lolita, “Commander: Troops to stay in cities past deadline,” Associated Press, 12/13/08
Cordesman, Anthony, “How Soon Is Safe? Iraqi Force Development and Conditions-Based US Withdrawals,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 12/1/08
Iraq Centre For Research & Strategic Studies, “Public Opinion Survey in Iraq; The Security & Political Situation in Iraq,” October 2008
Reid, Robert, “US troops to stay in Iraqi cities after June,” Boston Globe, 12/13/08
Reuters, “Iraq may need U.S. troops for decade: Iraqi official,” 12/11/08
Al-Sabah, “Poll: 46% of Iraqis Support Security Agreement,” 11/23/08
Sunday, November 30, 2008
July SOFA Referendum
The first hurtle Maliki will face is informing the politicians and public of what the SOFA/SFA actually entail. During the parliamentary debate, an Iraqi reporter for the New York Times noted that 70% of the legislatures didn’t appear to know what was in the agreement. One said the deal didn’t give the government the right to search U.S. mail and cargo coming into Iraq, but it did. Another complained that it didn’t end the U.N.’s Chapter VII, which was passed during the Saddam years saying that Iraq was a threat to international security. That status is in fact terminated. A Sadrist parliamentarian claimed that the agreement didn’t stop the United States from using Iraq as a base to attack other countries, but there is an article that bars this, although there is some disagreement about its interpretation between the two sides.
The general public was even less informed. An October 2008 public opinion poll by the Iraq Centre For Research & Strategic Studies that did face to face interviews with 3,000 Iraqis from all 18 provinces found that 49.8% of respondents didn’t know about the SOFA. Of the 46.2% that had heard of the agreement, opinions were evenly split over whether it would be good or bad for the country. In the end though, 61.3% disagreed with the deal, compared to only 28.5% being for it. The poll was conducted in September and October however, before the government had been able to get a series of concessions from the United States that greatly increased its power over American forces within Iraq. The government run Al-Sabah paper published another poll on November 23 that found 46% of Iraqis for the SOFA, 34.5% against, and 19.4% replying that they didn’t know. Their poll asked 5,576 Iraqis from 10 provinces. Of those, the majority of respondents in Babil, Qadisiyah, and Diyala were against the agreement, while Baghdad, Dhi Qar, Basra, Karbala, Wasit, Maysan, and Irbil were for it.
In the run up to the parliamentary vote, the government tried to inform the public about the agreement to garner support, which will continue to be its job. Officials released copies of the SOFA to reporters and began reading parts of it on government owned TV. Whether this public relations campaign was responsible for the shift in opinion between the two polls is unknown. The Iraq Centre is a non-partisan Iraqi based think tank, while Al-Sabah operates out of the Green Zone, so the latter could’ve been propaganda. Either way, there is still not a majority in favor of the agreement according to the two, which is necessary to get pass the July referendum. Maliki’s government will then have its hands full trying to win over more people, while the United States needs to make sure it doesn’t have any breaches of the agreement that will turn Iraqis against the SOFA.
SOURCES
Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Sunni Arab support key to US-Iraq security deal,” Associated Press, 11/25/08
Ashton, Adam, Landay, Jonathan and Youssef, Nancy, “U.S. staying silent on its view of Iraq pact until after vote,” McClatchy Newspapers, 11/26/08
Baker, Peter and Tyson, Ann Scott, “Bush, Maliki Sign Pact on Iraq’s Future,” Washington Post, 11/27/07
Fox News, “Iraqi Parliament Approves U.S. Security Pact, 11/27/08
Rubin, Alissa, Robertson, Campbell and Farrell, Stephen, “Iraqi Parliament Approves U.S. Security Pact,” New York Times, 11/27/08
Rubin, Alissa, Robertson, Campbell and Farrell, Stephen, “Iraqi Parliament Approves U.S. Security Pact,” New York Times, 11/27/08
Al-Sabah, “Poll: 46% of Iraqis Support Security Agreement,” 11/23/08
al-Salhy, Suadad, “Analysis on the Spot: SOFA, From Inside Parliament,” Baghdad Bureau – Iraq From the Inside Blog, New York times, 11/24/08
Thursday, November 27, 2008
SOFA Passes
At 2 P.M. Baghdad time Iraq’s parliament passed the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). There are 275 members of parliament, but only 198 showed up today November 27. Out of those approximately 144 or 149 depending upon the source, voted for the SOFA. At the same time, the legislators also voted for a resolution on political reforms that the Sunnis demanded in return for their votes. The bill said that the government needed to work towards revising the constitution, allowing more Sunnis in the security forces, integrating the Sons of Iraq, and general reconciliation. The act had no specifics to it however, and was more a statement of purpose rather than an actual law that had to be implemented.
The opposition to the SOFA, which never had the votes to stop it from passing in the first place, split. Followers of Moqtada al-Sadr protested while hands were being counted in parliament. Afterwards they said they would continue with their objections to the pact. The Fadhila party representatives boycotted the proceedings entirely. They said they did not vote for the agreement because there were no guarantees that it would actually be implemented. The Iraqi National List of former Interim Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi that was originally against the agreement, ended up supporting it.
More importantly, the Sunnis voted for the SOFA, but their demands may never be met. The Iraqi Accordance Front, the largest Sunni coalition, and the National Dialogue Bloc, an independent Sunni party, all voted in favor of it. They held out for their concessions because they are afraid of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s growing power. They fear that after the U.S. leaves, Maliki will be able to do as he pleases and continue to politically isolate them, so they wanted guarantees that the government would continue to work towards reconciliation. Shiite politicians however were resentful of the fact that the Sunnis were able to hold the SOFA vote hostage to their demands. Members of the United Iraqi Alliance repeatedly went to Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani asking if they could ignore the Sunnis, and carry on the vote without them, but he told them they needed a national consensus on the agreement. The fact that the Shiites were angry with the Sunnis doesn’t fare well for how their demands will be treated in the future. Maliki already looks at the Accordance Front as a stepchild, and the government has not followed any of the reconciliation acts that have passed the way they were legislated. That will probably mean that the bill calling for political compromise that was voted on along with the SOFA will remain a resolution, rather than lead to actual action.
There are several more steps that Baghdad has to follow now on the SOFA. The agreement is to be sent to the Presidential Council, which is made up of President Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Vice President Adel Abdul-Mahdi of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, and Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi of the Iraqi Islamic Party, for final ratification. The Council is expected to pass it. The SOFA will then go into affect on January 1, 2009. The parliament also passed a bill calling for a referendum on the agreement to be held in July 2009. If the Iraqi public votes against it, Iraq will have one year to withdraw from the agreement, and U.S. troops will have to leave. That will be the real test of the SOFA.
Winners And Losers
There are some clear winners and losers of this entire process. Although the Sunnis got their bill passed, they will probably come out on the bottom again as the Kurds and Shiites still monopolize most of the power in the government. The Sadrists also remain on the outside. They have promised to continue their protests against the agreement, but that will have little actual affect, as the Sadr Trend appears to be a fading movement at this time. Fadhila was the other party that was in the opposition, but remains a small regional Shiite party. The U.S. also turned out to be a major loser. President Bush once rejected any timeline for a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. Now he has agreed to one. The White House was always in a position of weakness in the negotiations because Bush wanted an agreement before he left office, so he gave in on almost every demand that Iraq made.
On the other hand, the biggest winner was Prime Minister Maliki. He has established himself as the nationalist leader of Iraq. He can now claim that he got the U.S. to agree to pull out of the country. He will use this to his advantage in the January 2009 provincial elections and the parliamentary ones that are to follow. As reported earlier, Maliki is already the most popular politician in the country. He now appears to be on a role after cracking down on his opponents within the country, and taking on his allies, he has now won a victory against the Americans. He still has to worry about his coalition members the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and the Kurds who were making moves to remove him before the SOFA vote. This may accelerate now that Maliki has improved his position again, but might run into opposition from Grand Ayatollah Sistani and the United States who stand behind him. Either way, they are dealing with a strengthened Prime Minister who was almost pushed out of office in late 2007.
SOURCES
Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Iraq Shiites, Kurds meet Sunni demand on US pact,” Associated Press, 11/26/08
Arraf, Jane, “On brink of vote, Iraqi parliament makes new demands,” Christian Science Monitor, 11/28/08
Ashton, Adam, “Iraqi parliament approves pact to end U.S. occupation,” McClatchy Newspapers, 11/27/08
Associated Press, “Iraqi parliament approves U.S. security pact,” USA Today, 11/27/08
Aswat al-Iraq, “Communist party, IAF, dialogue bloc to vote to accept SOFA,” 11/27/08
- “Fadila party supports government in dealing with pact violation,” 11/27/08
- “INL urges blocs to vote to approve U.S. pact,” 11/27/08
- “Will use legal authorizations to degrade pact – Sadarist MP,” 11/27/08
BBC News, “Iraqi parliament backs US pullout,” 11/27/08
Faraj, Salam, “Iraqi parliament approves landmark US military pact,” Agence France Presse, 11/27/08
Haynes, Deborah, “Iraq approves US security pact amid noisy debate,” Times of London, 11/27/08
Al Jazeera, “Iraq parliament approves US pact,” 11/27/08
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraqi Parliament Passes U.S. Security Pact,” 11/27/08
Raghavan, Sudarsan, “Iraqi Lawmakers Extend Agreement With U.S. Military for 3 Years,” Washington Post, 11/27/08
Rasheed, Ahmed and al-Ansary, Khalid, “Iraq parliament passes U.S. security pact,” Reuters, 11/27/08
Rubin, Alissa, Robertson, Campbell and Farrell, Stephen, “Iraqi Parliament Approves U.S. Security Pact,” New York Times, 11/27/08
Al-Salhy, Suadad, “Analysis: SOFA, the View from Parliament,” Iraq From the Inside Blog, Baghdad Bureau New York Times, 11/27/08
Smith, Daniel, “Parliament Passes Security Agreement,” IraqSlogger.com, 11/27/08
Steele, Jonathan, “This is no sop. It is a vote to end the occupation of Iraq,” Guardian, 11/27/08
Visser, Rediar, “The ‘Withdrawal Treaty’ Is Passed,” Historiae.org, 11/27/08
The Status Of Forces Agreement
Was Opposed By A Small Minority…
In November 2007, the U.S. and Iraq signed a Declaration of Principles that was to set up the long-term security relationship between the two countries. That agreement was to be the basis for the SOFA. Originally, the deal was to be signed by the end of July 2008. As that date approached, Moqtada al-Sadr began calling for weekly protests against the SOFA. Sadr has always preached Iraqi nationalism, and objected to any agreement that would legitimize the U.S. presence in the country. Instead, he demanded that the U.S. withdraw immediately. His call for protests was also motivated by a need to rebuild his movement and maintain his supporters after the government launched successive military operations against them in Basra, Sadr City, and Maysan province. The Sadrists were joined by the Fadhila party, which is based in Basra, and former Interim Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List in opposing the agreement. The Sadrists hold 30 seats in parliament, the Fadhila 15, and the Iraqi National List 25. Together they do not have enough votes to block the agreement from passing, and the National List might change sides and support it if the Sunnis’ demands are met.
But The Sunnis Were The Real Swing Voters …
While Sadr was trying to rally his followers against the SOFA, the real deciders on the matter were the Sunni parties. In the summer of 2008 Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani said that he would sign off on the agreement if it protected Iraq’s sovereignty, was passed by parliament, and all major parties agreed upon it. By November the Kurdish Alliance and the United Iraqi Alliance, the two largest coalitions in parliament, had come out for the SOFA. Together they had enough votes for a straight majority, 138 votes, to pass the agreement. However, because of Sistani’s insistence on national consensus on the SOFA, the Shiites and Kurds had to bring the Sunnis on board. That put the Iraqi Accordance Front in the driver's seat. They demanded that they receive more say in the government and the security forces, that prisoners held by the U.S. that are not charged with a crime be released, and a national referendum is held on the SOFA. As the vote on the agreement came down to the wire, they were able to get these concessions.
Whose Demand For A National Referendum May Undermine the SOFA …
Tomorrow when parliament reconvenes they will vote on the SOFA, and a separate bill that includes the Sunnis’ demands. If the bill is passed there will be a special election on the SOFA in July 2009. The problem is that U.S. forces are operating in Iraq under a United Nations mandate that expires on December 31, 2008. If the referendum bill is passed, that means the agreement won’t come to a conclusion until the summer of 2009, and even then the Iraqi public may veto it. That would mean the Americans would have to go back to the U.N. for another yearlong authorization, undermining whole point of the SOFA, which is to take the place of the U.N. deal.
Which Highlights The Weak American Position …
The U.S. finds itself in an unenviable position. This has been true since the beginning of the negotiations however. From the start, the Iraqis knew that President Bush wanted an agreement before he left office. It never appeared that the White House tried to convince the Iraqis of why they needed the U.S. Instead, Baghdad made more and more demands, and the Americans gave in, especially as time passed, deadlines were not met, and the end of the U.N. mandate lurked. The Iraqis were able to set a specific deadline, 2009, for when U.S. troops would be out of Iraq’s cities, and a 2011 date for when U.S. troops would be out of the entire country. They also got the administration to agree to Iraqis checking American cargo and mail coming to Iraq, ending immunity for foreign contractors and security guards, having a say over intelligence gathering and U.S. military operations, control over the Green Zone, requiring American soldiers to get an Iraqi warrant to conduct searches, not allowing the U.S. to use Iraq to attack any other country, turning over anyone arrested to the Iraqis within 24 hours, and control of Iraqi air space. This has upset some in the U.S. military and Pentagon, but after Barak Obama took the lead in the presidential race, and eventually won the election, President Bush was even more determined to sign the SOFA rather than leave it to his successor. Now they may have to reconfigure all of their plans if the Iraqi legislature agrees to hold a referendum in 2009.
And The Strength Of Iran’s Position…
Iran appears to have several different positions on the SOFA, but may be finally signing off on it. From the beginning, Iran has seen the U.S. presence in Iraq as a threat to its security. They were therefore against the SOFA that would maintain the American military in Iraq. Many Iranian newspapers along with the country’s leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, speaker of Iran’s parliament Ali Larijani, among others have publicly said that Iraq should not sign the agreement. At the same time others such as the head of Iran’s judiciary Ayatollah Hashemi Shahroudi and Iranian TV have made statements supporting the deal. Attacks by Special Groups and other Iranian backed militants are also down across the country, which Tehran has tempered before during important political decisions it has supported in the past. While there are recent statements in the Iranian press against the agreement, it appears that Tehran has acquiesced to the SOFA especially after Baghdad was able to get the U.S. to agree to not use the country as a base for attacks upon its neighbors, and that it sets a specific date for an American withdrawal. Both would be considered wins for Iran.
But Parts Of The Agreement May Be More Symbolic Anyway
The last major problem with the SOFA is how the Americans and Iraqis interpret the SOFA when and if it is passed. Many of the concessions that Baghdad was able to gain may be more symbolic than real. McClatchy Newspapers for example, pointed out three articles in the agreement that the U.S. sees differently than Baghdad. First, the Americans have agreed to allow U.S. soldiers that commit crimes when they are off duty and off base to be tried by joint U.S. and Iraqi courts. This is a largely meaningless article meant to appease Iraqis because U.S. forces rarely go off base when they are off duty, not to mention that Baghdad and Washington have to negotiate over how these joint courts would work, which could take years. By that time, the U.S. may be out of the country. Second, the agreement says that the U.S. cannot use Iraq as a base to attack other countries. The Americans believe this does not prohibit hot pursuit and the right of self-defense, which could make the point mean nothing. Finally, the U.S. military believes that the Iraqi security forces are full of insurgents, Sadrists, and people who simply want to make a buck, and therefore do not trust them with advance warning and detailed information on military operations. This is becoming less of an issue as the U.S. is moving from conducting their own operations to supporting Iraqi ones. Still, the Pentagon does not want to give Baghdad control over their planning. These last two could make many Iraqis and Iran mad if they are implemented in the way the U.S. sees them. The White House in fact, is withholding its version of the agreement until it is passed by Iraq’s parliament because they are afraid it will undermine support for the SOFA.
Conclusion
Tomorrow will be another important date in the process of passing the SOFA, but it will not be the last. The agreement still needs to go to the Presidential Council for approval, and if the parliament agrees on it, there will be a referendum in July 2009. That may force Iraq to go back to the United Nations for a new mandate to legalize America’s presence in the country, something that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has said he is loath to do. Either that or the U.S. and Iraq may have to come up with some kind of ad hoc interpretation of the SOFA. That means there is still much to watch for as the agreement proceeds along.
SOURCES
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