The latest edition of the Pentagon’s Measuring Stability and Security In Iraq report to Congress includes a public opinion poll of Iraqis done in April 2009 on security. The results showed that Iraqis felt that security in their neighborhood was good, but that they had apprehensions about the rest of the country, and that the Iraqi Security Forces had widespread support.
A majority of respondents said they felt secure in their neighborhoods and provinces, but less so in Iraq in general. 76% said security was calm in their neighborhood, and 60% said the same about security in their province. 90% said that security was the same or better in their neighborhood over the last six months. These numbers were relatively unchanged since August 2008. When asked about Iraq in general however, only 31% said security was calm. This was a 10% increase from August 2008. In November 2007, 23% felt that security was calm in the country. When asked whether they felt safe traveling outside their neighborhood only 42% said yes, largely unchanged since November 2007 when 39% said yes. A majority however, 56%, said they felt that the country was stable. These numbers reflect the new status quo in Iraq. The sectarian war ended in 2007, and the crackdown against the Shiite militias was over by the fall of 2008. That has led to relative stability in most Iraqis’ lives. There is still violence though, which could be the reason why so many are unsure of the security situation across the entire country, and have reservations about leaving their immediate area.
Said security was calm in neighborhood
April 09 76%
Jan. 09 77%
Oct. 08 76%
Aug. 08 73%
Said security was same or better in neighborhood over last 6 months
April 09 90%
Jan. 09 90%
Oct. 08 89%
Aug. 09 91%
Nov. 07 82%
Said security in province was calm
April 09 60%
Jan. 09 57%
Oct. 08 57%
Said security in Iraq was calm
April 09 31%
Jan. 09 29%
Oct. 08 28%
Aug. 08 21%
Nov. 07 23%
Said security was the same or better in Iraq in last 6 months
April 09 86%
Jan. 09 86%
Oct. 08 79%
Nov. 07 81%
Said Iraq was stable
April 09 56%
Jan. 09 51%
Oct. 08 45%
Nov. 07 38%
Said felt safe traveling outside of neighborhood
April 09 42%
Jan. 09 42%
Oct. 08 42%
Aug. 08 37%
Nov. 07 39%
One of the main changes in the security situation in Iraq has been the increasing size and abilities of the Iraqi security forces to conduct day-to-day operations, and the public’s confidence in them. In all the questions about the Iraqi Army and police, respondents had positive views. The same could not be said of the U.S. military that seemed to be considered in low regard, and tribes, militias, and other groups were largely not considered relevant to providing security. 72% said they felt secure around the army, and 75% said they were winning the war against terrorists. In contrast, in November 2007 only 51% said they felt safe around the army, and 52% said they were winning. 66% said they felt secure around the police, and 65% said they were winning against crime. 79% responded that the either the army or police were responsible for security in their neighborhood. The security forces were also trusted more than the local, provincial or national governments. A major change between the April 2009 survey and the October 2008 one was the complete disappearance of trust in militias and armed groups. This is important not only for the development of the Iraqi forces, but for the U.S. withdrawal as well, as security will eventually be turned completely over to Baghdad’s control, and they need the support of the public to operate effectively.
Said they felt secure around Iraqi Army
April 09 72%
Jan. 09 70%
Oct. 08 65%
Nov. 07 51%
Said Iraqi Army was winning battle against terrorists
April 09 75%
Jan. 09 72%
Oct. 08 70%
Nov. 07 52%
Said felt secure around police
April 09 66%
Jan. 09 62%
Oct. 08 61%
Nov. 07 53%
Said police winning against crime
April 09 65%
Jan. 09 61%
Oct. 08 61%
Nov. 07 60%
Who was responsible for security in your neighborhood?
Police 40%
Army 39%
Tribes 6%
Sons of Iraq 3%
Neighbors 2%
Religious leaders 2%
U.S. 2%
Militias 0%
Who did you trust to protect you? – April 09
Army 87%
Police 83%
Provincial government 74%
National government 72%
Local government 66%
U.S. 27%
Who did you trust to protect you? – October 2008
Army 85%
Police 81%
Provincial government 68%
National government 66%
Local government 64%
U.S. 26%
Armed groups 12%
Militias 12%
The Pentagon’s April 2009 survey had roughly the same results as a poll conducted by the international news agencies the BBC, ABC, and Japan’s NHK from March 2009. Both groups found an overwhelming majority of Iraqis felt safe and secure in their neighborhoods, but had questions about the situation in the rest of the country. Respondents in both surveys also said they had confidence in the Iraqi security forces to do their jobs, and felt that they were winning. Both of these polls were taken before the recent wave of bombings however. While overall deaths have gone up and down, the constant attacks and publicity take a psychological toll and could change perceptions. Those create reality for people, and could change opinions about the security situation. If it does, the first victim could be Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki who is running in the 2010 parliamentary election on the claim that he has brought security and stability to Iraq.
SOURCES
BBC, ABC, NHK, “Iraq Poll February 2009,” 3/16/09
Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” June 2009
- “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” December 2008
- “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” September 2008
Showing posts with label Iraqi Public Opinion. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Iraqi Public Opinion. Show all posts
Wednesday, August 26, 2009
Wednesday, April 22, 2009
Center For Strategic And International Studies Briefing On Iraq
In early April 2009 Anthony Cordesman, one of the top military analysts on Iraq, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, released the latest version of his briefing on the war, “The Changing Situation in Iraq: A Progress Report.” Cordesman comes from the camp of American think tank writers who believes that the U.S. needs to stay long-term in Iraq to ensure its stability. Under the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) however, Iraq’s military presence will end in 2011. This comes at a time when Iraq is facing a plethora of new issues including elections, power sharing, and a financial crisis, along with continuing violence. There is no telling whether the Iraq government will be able to maneuver through these problems, which means that the U.S. will have a lot to work on while they still have substantial forces in the country.
Iraq is a different place from what it was just a few years ago. A recent public opinion poll by ABC, NHK, and BBC from February 2009 detailed here shows that most Iraqis are feeling positive about their future. When asked how things were going in their life 65% said they were good compared to 35% who said that it was bad. This was the highest positive response since the poll was started back in 2005. Then 71% said things were going well in Iraq. After that the numbers dropped to 39% in February and August 2007, before climbing back up to 54% in March 2008. When asked how the entire country was doing at the time 58% said it was doing well in February 2009 compared to 43% in March 2008, 22% in August 2007, 35% in February 2007, and 44% in 2005. At the same time military and security issues dropped from being the most important issue at 58% in August 2007 to 33% in March 2008 to 22% by February 2009. Economic issues now predominate at 67% in February 2009. These match similar results found by polls coducted by the State and Defense Departments. As attacks and deaths have decreased since their peak during the sectarian war of 2006-2007 Iraqis are feeling better about their lives and the future of the country, while hoping that the economy, services, and government improve.
That doesn’t mean that security is not still a concern. Cordesman believes that Iraq could see violence for the next 4-5 years. He warns that Al Qaeda in Iraq, the Sunni insurgency, and the Shiiite militias are down, but not out. In March 2009 Interior Minister Jawad Bolani warned that there were still Al Qaeda sleeper cells in the country, and the recent spate of bombings shows that militants are still active in the country. What has changed is the number and intensity of the fighting. Attacks are now down to 2004 levels. Most of those are concentrated in just four provinces, Baghdad, Diyala, Ninewa and Salahaddin, whereas before they were across the entire nation. The February 2009 poll found that Iraqis are experiencing one-third less violence than they did in August 2008. IEDs and suicide attacks still persist, but crime, corruption, and the lack of rule of law are becoming more important.
The political arena is where most of Iraq’s rivalries and struggles are now taking place. Cordesman argues that the January 2009 provincial elections were the beginning of a political transition in Iraq. The balloting was important because it showed Iraqis that their votes counted as almost all of the ruling parties were replaced. It also raised expectations that the incoming councils would be more accountable, perform better, and provide services. The problem is that almost all of the provincial councils will require a coalition to rule. Some of these will not be stable and may break into factions. New politicians also don’t automatically mean better governance.
Cordesman noticed several trends in the provincial balloting that are different than other commentaries on them. First Arab nationalism rather than Iraqi nationalism was a winning theme. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law list and new parties like al-Hadbaa in Ninewa ran on this platform championing a strong central government, but general opposition to the Kurds. As a result, they were the biggest losers. There were many reports that the election was a defeat for the religious parties and a move towards secularism, but Cordesman believes it was actually ones promising technocrats and better management that were successful. Maliki of course was the biggest winner, having rode into the voting with a 70% approval rating. Even his standing amongst Sunnis increased from 10% in February 2008 to 33% before the election. Maliki’s State of Law List won in Baghdad and across the south except for Karbala as a result. The Iraqi Islamic Party and and the Sadrists also did well despite some writing them off. The Sadrists will play an important role in coalitions in the south, while the Sunnis got greater representation after having boycotted the 2005 provincial vote.
The election also brought out the on-going struggle for control of the south and leadership of the Shiites. After the 2005 elections the Supreme Council was dominant. They suffered a crushing defeat after they claimed they would win Najaf, Babil, Qadisiyah, and Dhi Qar, and be the largest bloc in the rest of the south. They ran on a religious and federalist platform that was largely rejected for Maliki’s call for good governance and strong control.
More problematic is the increasing Arab-Kurdish divide. Only 44% of Iraqis say that relations between the two groups are good. In the provincial elections the Kurds lost control of Ninewa and Salahaddin. That will probably mean that there will be more tension there. This is already being seen in Ninewa where the Kurds are boycotting the al-Hadbaa headed council. The issue also threatens the unity of the Iraqi security forces. In the summer of 2008 for example, when Maliki sent the Iraqi Army into the Khanaqin district of Diyala a Kurdish battalion commander and 200 of his soldiers in Ninewa deserted and went to Irbil in Kurdistan in protest. A Kurdish brigade in Diyala also refused to take orders from the central government at that time. The fact that the insurgency is now largely based in the north in those exact same provinces is only making the matter worse. Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani has not helped the situation either as he has made monthly attacks on Baghdad and Maliki. The U.S. believes that this is the number one source of instability in the country, and could lead to new violence in the future.
The provincial elections were just the opening salvo of these two struggles. Cordesman thinks that they will continue up to and after the parliamentary elections. They are scheduled for December 2009, but it could take up to six months afterwards for a new government to be formed and take office. There is also the added issue of dissatisfaction with Maliki’s rise to power. Some think that he has too much strength. The Prime Minister has direct control over the special forces and counterterrorism units for example. These fears could be moderated by the necessity for coalitions to rule. Maliki will have to have a Sunni party in this alliance, and might also join with the Iraqi National List of former Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi. On the other hand, Maliki may reject compromising with his foes if he comes out victorious. None of these problems is really being address, but are rather being exploited by political parties for votes and support.
On top of all this Iraq is running into a budget crisis. This will affect all the other problems in the country. Cordesman argues that money was one of the main things that held Iraq together over the last couple years. Each year Iraq’s budget increased as oil prices rose. This money was distributed to the various ministries, each of which is controlled by a different political party, and used for patronage and to garner support. Now Iraq is expected to run a $24 billion deficit in the 2009-2010 fiscal year, and a $13 billion one in 2010-2011. Security will be affected as the Interior Ministry announced that it is having a hiring freeze, and is canceling its plan to hire 66,000 new police. This will also hold up crime prevention and the establishment of rule of law, which are increasingly becoming important to the Iraqi public. The rest of the armed forces will also not be able to buy new equipment and weapons. While the Iraqi forces are getting better at counterinsurgency operations, Cordesman believes that they are still 3-5 years away from being able to defend their own country from other nations. Some U.S. commanders are worried that the U.S. will leave Iraq before the Iraqi forces are capable. U.S. advisors will still remain with Iraqi units after the June 2009 deadline to be out of Iraq’s cities, and have until 2011 to conduct training operations. The Iraqis can also extend those dates if they want.
With better security and new elections Iraqis are also expecting better services. This too will be slowed down by the budget problems. The political divisions have slowed developing Iraq’s oil resources, and many Iraqis are opposed to foreign companies doing business in the country fearing exploitation. The government is also the largest employer in the country. The budget deficit will mean few new hires. Salaries and pensions that form the backbone of the operational budget take up 90% of spending, leaving only 10% for development and investment, known as the capital budget. The amount of money Iraq has been able to spend overall has increased each year since 2005, but capital budget expenditures remain anemic. In 2007 Iraqi spent 80% of its $29 billion operational budget, but only 28% of its $12 billion capital budget. That increased to 39% of the $24 billion capital budget in 2008. That year the core ministries that raise revenues and provide services only spent 23% of their $16 billion capital budget.
Foreign investment has also been slow due to laborious government regulations. The World Bank’s 2009 Ease of Doing Business Report for example, ranked Iraq 152 out of 181 countries in ease of investment. That was down six spots from 2008. The 2006 National Investment Law doesn’t have a means to implement it, the National Investment Commission doesn’t have a chair, and the provincial investment commissions are weak. Kurdistan is the only region of the country that has large-scale investment coming in at about $15 billion. The country overall still needs billions of dollars to reach its targets for oil, electricity, and water production. That’s not likely to come any time soon.
Cordesman finishes by saying that real success in Iraq requires political reconciliation. While he provides a checklist of the benchmarks set by the American Congress during the Surge on key legislation, he seems more concerned about the actual actions of Iraq’s political parties. There the struggle for power is intensifying with the elections. That could last for years. Not only are the Shiite parties competing with each other, but the Sunnis still lack strong leadership, and the Arab-Kurdish dispute is only growing in intensity. At the same time, with violence down, average Iraqis are thinking more positive about their current and future situation. According to the February 2009 public opinion poll 59% of Sunnis and Shiites say relations between them are good. That’s up from 48% in 2008. At the same time, only 33% of Sunnis say they feel safe in their neighborhoods compared to 67% of Shiites and 85% of Kurds. That reflects the fact that the Sunnis were the losers politically with the fall of Saddam Hussein, and were then defeated by the Shiites in the sectarian war. Economic issues are also coming to the fore at just the time that the country is running out of money with the collapse of oil prices. As stated before, Cordesman is one of many American think tankers that believes Americans need to stay for the long-term in Iraq until its problems are solved. In practice that means an open ended commitment, and Cordesman’s report is part of that argument as it outlines the myriad issues facing the country that are not going to be resolved anytime soon. Cordesman does now seems to have come to terms with the fact that American forces will be out by the end of 2011 with the Status of Forces Agreement. That means that while American military forces will eventually be out, U.S. diplomats will still be working there for years.
SOURCES
Abouzeid, Rania, “Arabs-Kurd Tensions Could Threaten Iraq’s Peace,” Time, 3/24/09
BBC, ABC, NHK, “Iraq Poll February 2009,” 3/16/09
Cordesman, Anthony, “The Changing Situation in Iraq: A Progress Report,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 4/1/09
Derhally, Massoud, “Iraq Freezes 66,000 New Police Hires, Minister Says,” Bloomberg, 3/22/09
Gamel, Kim, “Iraqi budget woes force security hiring freeze,” Associated Press, 3/20/09
Zelikow, Philip, “The new strategic situation in Iraq,” Foreign Policy Online, 2/9/09
Iraq is a different place from what it was just a few years ago. A recent public opinion poll by ABC, NHK, and BBC from February 2009 detailed here shows that most Iraqis are feeling positive about their future. When asked how things were going in their life 65% said they were good compared to 35% who said that it was bad. This was the highest positive response since the poll was started back in 2005. Then 71% said things were going well in Iraq. After that the numbers dropped to 39% in February and August 2007, before climbing back up to 54% in March 2008. When asked how the entire country was doing at the time 58% said it was doing well in February 2009 compared to 43% in March 2008, 22% in August 2007, 35% in February 2007, and 44% in 2005. At the same time military and security issues dropped from being the most important issue at 58% in August 2007 to 33% in March 2008 to 22% by February 2009. Economic issues now predominate at 67% in February 2009. These match similar results found by polls coducted by the State and Defense Departments. As attacks and deaths have decreased since their peak during the sectarian war of 2006-2007 Iraqis are feeling better about their lives and the future of the country, while hoping that the economy, services, and government improve.
That doesn’t mean that security is not still a concern. Cordesman believes that Iraq could see violence for the next 4-5 years. He warns that Al Qaeda in Iraq, the Sunni insurgency, and the Shiiite militias are down, but not out. In March 2009 Interior Minister Jawad Bolani warned that there were still Al Qaeda sleeper cells in the country, and the recent spate of bombings shows that militants are still active in the country. What has changed is the number and intensity of the fighting. Attacks are now down to 2004 levels. Most of those are concentrated in just four provinces, Baghdad, Diyala, Ninewa and Salahaddin, whereas before they were across the entire nation. The February 2009 poll found that Iraqis are experiencing one-third less violence than they did in August 2008. IEDs and suicide attacks still persist, but crime, corruption, and the lack of rule of law are becoming more important.
The political arena is where most of Iraq’s rivalries and struggles are now taking place. Cordesman argues that the January 2009 provincial elections were the beginning of a political transition in Iraq. The balloting was important because it showed Iraqis that their votes counted as almost all of the ruling parties were replaced. It also raised expectations that the incoming councils would be more accountable, perform better, and provide services. The problem is that almost all of the provincial councils will require a coalition to rule. Some of these will not be stable and may break into factions. New politicians also don’t automatically mean better governance.
Cordesman noticed several trends in the provincial balloting that are different than other commentaries on them. First Arab nationalism rather than Iraqi nationalism was a winning theme. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law list and new parties like al-Hadbaa in Ninewa ran on this platform championing a strong central government, but general opposition to the Kurds. As a result, they were the biggest losers. There were many reports that the election was a defeat for the religious parties and a move towards secularism, but Cordesman believes it was actually ones promising technocrats and better management that were successful. Maliki of course was the biggest winner, having rode into the voting with a 70% approval rating. Even his standing amongst Sunnis increased from 10% in February 2008 to 33% before the election. Maliki’s State of Law List won in Baghdad and across the south except for Karbala as a result. The Iraqi Islamic Party and and the Sadrists also did well despite some writing them off. The Sadrists will play an important role in coalitions in the south, while the Sunnis got greater representation after having boycotted the 2005 provincial vote.
The election also brought out the on-going struggle for control of the south and leadership of the Shiites. After the 2005 elections the Supreme Council was dominant. They suffered a crushing defeat after they claimed they would win Najaf, Babil, Qadisiyah, and Dhi Qar, and be the largest bloc in the rest of the south. They ran on a religious and federalist platform that was largely rejected for Maliki’s call for good governance and strong control.
More problematic is the increasing Arab-Kurdish divide. Only 44% of Iraqis say that relations between the two groups are good. In the provincial elections the Kurds lost control of Ninewa and Salahaddin. That will probably mean that there will be more tension there. This is already being seen in Ninewa where the Kurds are boycotting the al-Hadbaa headed council. The issue also threatens the unity of the Iraqi security forces. In the summer of 2008 for example, when Maliki sent the Iraqi Army into the Khanaqin district of Diyala a Kurdish battalion commander and 200 of his soldiers in Ninewa deserted and went to Irbil in Kurdistan in protest. A Kurdish brigade in Diyala also refused to take orders from the central government at that time. The fact that the insurgency is now largely based in the north in those exact same provinces is only making the matter worse. Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani has not helped the situation either as he has made monthly attacks on Baghdad and Maliki. The U.S. believes that this is the number one source of instability in the country, and could lead to new violence in the future.
The provincial elections were just the opening salvo of these two struggles. Cordesman thinks that they will continue up to and after the parliamentary elections. They are scheduled for December 2009, but it could take up to six months afterwards for a new government to be formed and take office. There is also the added issue of dissatisfaction with Maliki’s rise to power. Some think that he has too much strength. The Prime Minister has direct control over the special forces and counterterrorism units for example. These fears could be moderated by the necessity for coalitions to rule. Maliki will have to have a Sunni party in this alliance, and might also join with the Iraqi National List of former Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi. On the other hand, Maliki may reject compromising with his foes if he comes out victorious. None of these problems is really being address, but are rather being exploited by political parties for votes and support.
On top of all this Iraq is running into a budget crisis. This will affect all the other problems in the country. Cordesman argues that money was one of the main things that held Iraq together over the last couple years. Each year Iraq’s budget increased as oil prices rose. This money was distributed to the various ministries, each of which is controlled by a different political party, and used for patronage and to garner support. Now Iraq is expected to run a $24 billion deficit in the 2009-2010 fiscal year, and a $13 billion one in 2010-2011. Security will be affected as the Interior Ministry announced that it is having a hiring freeze, and is canceling its plan to hire 66,000 new police. This will also hold up crime prevention and the establishment of rule of law, which are increasingly becoming important to the Iraqi public. The rest of the armed forces will also not be able to buy new equipment and weapons. While the Iraqi forces are getting better at counterinsurgency operations, Cordesman believes that they are still 3-5 years away from being able to defend their own country from other nations. Some U.S. commanders are worried that the U.S. will leave Iraq before the Iraqi forces are capable. U.S. advisors will still remain with Iraqi units after the June 2009 deadline to be out of Iraq’s cities, and have until 2011 to conduct training operations. The Iraqis can also extend those dates if they want.
With better security and new elections Iraqis are also expecting better services. This too will be slowed down by the budget problems. The political divisions have slowed developing Iraq’s oil resources, and many Iraqis are opposed to foreign companies doing business in the country fearing exploitation. The government is also the largest employer in the country. The budget deficit will mean few new hires. Salaries and pensions that form the backbone of the operational budget take up 90% of spending, leaving only 10% for development and investment, known as the capital budget. The amount of money Iraq has been able to spend overall has increased each year since 2005, but capital budget expenditures remain anemic. In 2007 Iraqi spent 80% of its $29 billion operational budget, but only 28% of its $12 billion capital budget. That increased to 39% of the $24 billion capital budget in 2008. That year the core ministries that raise revenues and provide services only spent 23% of their $16 billion capital budget.
Foreign investment has also been slow due to laborious government regulations. The World Bank’s 2009 Ease of Doing Business Report for example, ranked Iraq 152 out of 181 countries in ease of investment. That was down six spots from 2008. The 2006 National Investment Law doesn’t have a means to implement it, the National Investment Commission doesn’t have a chair, and the provincial investment commissions are weak. Kurdistan is the only region of the country that has large-scale investment coming in at about $15 billion. The country overall still needs billions of dollars to reach its targets for oil, electricity, and water production. That’s not likely to come any time soon.
Cordesman finishes by saying that real success in Iraq requires political reconciliation. While he provides a checklist of the benchmarks set by the American Congress during the Surge on key legislation, he seems more concerned about the actual actions of Iraq’s political parties. There the struggle for power is intensifying with the elections. That could last for years. Not only are the Shiite parties competing with each other, but the Sunnis still lack strong leadership, and the Arab-Kurdish dispute is only growing in intensity. At the same time, with violence down, average Iraqis are thinking more positive about their current and future situation. According to the February 2009 public opinion poll 59% of Sunnis and Shiites say relations between them are good. That’s up from 48% in 2008. At the same time, only 33% of Sunnis say they feel safe in their neighborhoods compared to 67% of Shiites and 85% of Kurds. That reflects the fact that the Sunnis were the losers politically with the fall of Saddam Hussein, and were then defeated by the Shiites in the sectarian war. Economic issues are also coming to the fore at just the time that the country is running out of money with the collapse of oil prices. As stated before, Cordesman is one of many American think tankers that believes Americans need to stay for the long-term in Iraq until its problems are solved. In practice that means an open ended commitment, and Cordesman’s report is part of that argument as it outlines the myriad issues facing the country that are not going to be resolved anytime soon. Cordesman does now seems to have come to terms with the fact that American forces will be out by the end of 2011 with the Status of Forces Agreement. That means that while American military forces will eventually be out, U.S. diplomats will still be working there for years.
SOURCES
Abouzeid, Rania, “Arabs-Kurd Tensions Could Threaten Iraq’s Peace,” Time, 3/24/09
BBC, ABC, NHK, “Iraq Poll February 2009,” 3/16/09
Cordesman, Anthony, “The Changing Situation in Iraq: A Progress Report,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 4/1/09
Derhally, Massoud, “Iraq Freezes 66,000 New Police Hires, Minister Says,” Bloomberg, 3/22/09
Gamel, Kim, “Iraqi budget woes force security hiring freeze,” Associated Press, 3/20/09
Zelikow, Philip, “The new strategic situation in Iraq,” Foreign Policy Online, 2/9/09
Sunday, March 22, 2009
New Opinion Poll of Iraqis
In mid-March 2009 the BBC, ABC, and NHK news departments released their latest public opinion poll of Iraqis. This was the seventh one they have conducted. A Turkish and an American company interviewed 2,228 Iraqis in person in February 2009. The questions were about security, services, the government, society, sectarianism, and the recent January 2009 provincial elections. A majority of Iraqis thought that security and life in general were improving, but still had questions about the country such as the economy, services, and the competence of the government.
Life In General
The poll began by asking people what they thought about their life and community. 65% said they thought their life was good compared to 35% that said it was bad. That was a slight increase from the last survey conducted in March 2008 when 54% said things were good and 45% said they were bad. During 2007 60% of respondents thought life was going badly in Iraq, while in 2004 and 2005 70% or more thought things were well. When broken down by group Shiites and Kurds had the most positive outlook on their lives, while Sunnis were split 50-50. That was an improvement however, because in the March 2008 poll only 34% of Sunnis said things were good.
When asked how Iraq in general was doing 58% had a positive view saying things were going well, compared to 40% that thought not. That was the best response since the question was asked over five polls beginning in 2005. Similarly when questioned about how things had changed in the country in the last six months 52% said things had gotten better, 39% said things were the same, with only 8% saying it had gotten worse. That was a dramatic turnaround from March 2008 and August 2007 when the same question was asked. In March only 36% said things were better. In August 2007 only 11% felt that way, while 61% thought things were worse.
When asked about the future, the majority of respondents had a favorable view as well. When questioned about how their area would be a year from now 65% said it would continue to be good, compared to 35% that said it would be bad. That was a huge increase from March 2008 when only 44% thought things would improve, but not up to the 2004 and 2005 levels when 70% and 71% respectively said things would be positive. When asked how their children's live would be, respondents weren't as optimistic with 44% saying it would be better, 26% saying it would be worse, and 29% claiming it would be about the same. Thoughts about the country overall were positive with 60% saying Iraq would be doing better within a year compared to 26% who said it would be the same, and only 12% who believed things would turn for the worse. Responses like that hadn't been seen since 2005 when 69% thought things would be better in a year, 11% though it would be the same, and 11% said the country would be worse off.
How are things in your life? Feb. 09 Mar. 08 Aug. 07 Feb. 07 2005 2004 Very Good 21% 13% 8% 8% 22% 13% Quite Good 44% 41% 31% 31% 49% 57% Quite Bad 19% 29% 34% 32% 18% 14% Quite Bad 16% 16% 26% 28% 11% 15% Refused/Don't know - - - - 1% 1% By community comparing Feb. 09/March 08 Kurds Shiite Sunni Very Good 32%/24% 25%/14% 8%/7% Quite Good 41%/49% 46%/48% 42%/27% Quite Bad 23%/20% 16%/27% 23%/38% Very Bad 4%/7% 13%/11% 28%/28%
How do you think Iraq is doing today?
Feb. 09 | Mar. 08 | Aug. 07 | Feb. 07 | 2005 | |
Very Good | 20% | 7% | 3% | 4% | 14% |
Quite Good | 38% | 36% | 19% | 31% | 30% |
Quite Bad | 25% | 36% | 40% | 35% | 23% |
Quite Bad | 15% | 20% | 38% | 31% | 30% |
Refused/Don't know | - | 1% | - | - | 3% |
In the last six months how has the situation in Iraq changed?
Feb. 09 | Mar. 08 | Aug. 07 | |
Became better | 52% | 36% | 11% |
Became worse | 8% | 26% | 61% |
Stayed the same | 39% | 37% | 28% |
What is your expectation for how things overall in your area will be a year from now? Feb. 09 Mar. 08 Aug. 07 Feb. 07 2005 2004 Very Good 21% 13% 8% 8% 22% 13% Quite Good 44% 41% 31% 31% 49% 57% Quite Bad 19% 29% 34% 32% 18% 14% Quite Bad 16% 16% 26% 28% 11% 15% Refused/Don't know - - - - 1% 1% How will your children's life be?
Feb. 09 | March 08 | Aug. 07 | Feb. 07 | |
Better | 44% | 39% | 33% | 42% |
Worse | 26% | 28% | 42% | 37% |
About the same | 29% | 31% | 25% | 21% |
Refused/don't now | 2% | 1% | - | - |
How do you think Iraq will be doing a year from now?
Feb. 09 | Mar. 08 | Aug. 07 | Feb. 07 | 2005 | |
Much Better | 30% | 14% | 4% | 14% | 41% |
Somewhat Better | 30% | 32% | 19% | 26% | 28% |
About the Same | 26% | 33% | 35% | 26% | 11% |
Somewhat Worse | 10% | 13% | 25% | 21% | 6% |
Much Worse | 2% | 7% | 17% | 13% | 5% |
Refused/Don't know | 2% | 2% | - | - | - |
Security
The positive view of life in Iraq and its future is largely due to the improved security situation. 85% of Iraqis said they thought security in their area was good. That was a huge increase from 62% in March 2008 and 43% in August 2007. Most thought that security had also improved or stayed the same in their area over the last six months. When asked about their personal safety in their neighborhoods 59% said they felt very safe, 35% said not very safe, and 6% said not safe at all. That was a reversal of the March 2008 numbers when 37% said they felt very safe, and 53% said not very safe. Positive numbers had not really been seen since 2005 when 63% said they felt very safe, and 30% said not very safe.
The improved security situation was also shown when Iraqis were asked whether they had personally encountered violence in their life. Overall, around 40% of respondents from 2007 on had some kind of situation happen in their area. By February 2009 the number were down in every category. 18% for example had seen a car bomb or suicide attack compared to 35% in March 2008 and 32% in September 2007. 18% had witnessed sectarian fighting, compared to 35% in March 2008, and 27% in September 2007. What was still high was kidnappings, which were usually done for profit with 32% saying they had seen it, down from 45% in March 2008 and 40% in September 2007, but up from 25% in February 2007. Seeing abuses by Iraqi and American forces were also down.
The two slight exceptions were when Iraqis were asked about the future of the security situation, and their freedom to move and live where they wanted. On those questions people seemed a little apprehensive, but still positive. 74% of those that said the security situation was better thought that it would stay that way in the future, compared to 21% that were not confident. That was down however from March 2008 when 82% said they were confident. When asked could they go where they wanted 74% said they felt safe, and 25% said not. That trend began in March 2008 when 44% said the situation was good, and 56% said it was bad. In February and August 2007 the answers were only 24% and 25% good respectively. When Iraqis were questioned about whether they thought they could live where they wanted without persecution however, things were more mixed. 43% said they felt good, compared to 56% who felt bad. That was only a slight change from March 2008 when 40% felt good about being able to live where they wanted, compared to 60% who felt the situation was bad. That was a big improvement from 2007 however when only 23% felt good.
Security in your neighborhood Feb. 09 Mar. 08 Aug. 07 Feb. 07 2005 2004 Very good 46% 20% 15% 17% 31% 20% Quite good 39% 42% 28% 30% 30% 29% Quite bad 14% 27% 24% 21% 17% 21% Very bad 1% 12% 32% 32% 21% 29% Refused/Don't know - - 1% 1% Last six months has the security situation in your area changed?
Feb. 09 | Mar. 08 | Aug. 07 | |
Became better | 50% | 46% | 24% |
Became worse | 3% | 17% | 31% |
Stayed the same | 47% | 36% | 45% |
Refused/Don't know | - | 1% | - |
How safe do you feel in your neighborhood? Feb. 09 Mar. 08 Aug. 07 Feb. 07 2005 2004 Very safe 59% 37% 26% 26% 63% 40% Not very safe 35% 53% 47% 41% 30% 40% Not safe at all 6% 10% 28% 33% 6% 18% Refused/Don't know - - - - 1% 3% Which of the following have occurred near you?
Car bombs/suicide attacks | Have occurred near you | Have not occurred by you |
Feb. 09 | 18% | 82% |
March 08 | 35% | 64% |
Sep. 07 | 32% | 68% |
Sniper, crossfire | Have occurred near you | Have not occurred by you |
Feb. 09 | 21% | 79% |
March 08 | 34% | 66% |
Sep. 07 | 30% | 70% |
Feb. 07 | 30% | 70% |
Sectarian fighting | Have occurred near you | Have not occurred by you |
Feb. 09 | 18% | 82% |
March 08 | 35% | 64% |
Sep. 07 | 27% | 72% |
Feb. 07 | 25% | 75% |
Kidnapping | Have occurred near you | Have not occurred by you |
Feb. 09 | 32% | 68% |
March 08 | 45% | 54% |
Sep. 07 | 40% | 59% |
Feb. 07 | 25% | 75% |
Fighting between government and insurgents | Have occurred near you | Have not occurred by you |
Feb. 09 | 20% | 79% |
March 08 | 37% | 62% |
Sep. 07 | 34% | 66% |
Feb. 07 | 34% | 66% |
Unnecessary violence against citizens by U.S. of Coalition | Have occurred near you | Have not occurred by you |
Feb. 09 | 25% | 74% |
March 08 | 42% | 57% |
Sep. 07 | 41% | 57% |
Feb. 07 | 44% | 55% |
Unnecessary violence against citizens by Iraqi police | Have occurred near you | Have not occurred by you |
Feb. 09 | 17% | 83% |
March 08 | 20% | 79% |
Sep. 07 | 21% | 79% |
Feb. 07 | 24% | 76% |
Unnecessary violence against citizens by Iraqi Army | Have occurred near you | Have not occurred by you |
Feb. 09 | 18% | 81% |
March 08 | 20% | 79% |
Sep. 07 | 19% | 81% |
Feb. 07 | 24% | 76% |
Unnecessary violence against citizens by militias | Have occurred near you | Have not occurred by you |
Feb. 09 | 18% | 81% |
March 08 | 36% | 63% |
Sep. 07 | 30% | 70% |
Feb. 07 | 31% | 69% |
Assassination or attempted assassination | Have occurred near you | Have not occurred by you |
Feb. 09 | 22% | 78% |
If the security situation has improved do you think it will stay that way?
Feb. 09 | March 08 | |
Very confident | 30% | 32% |
Somewhat confident | 44% | 50% |
Not so confident | 19% | 15% |
Not all confident | 2% | - |
Freedom of movement in your neighborhood
Feb. 09 | Mar. 08 | Aug. 07 | Feb. 07 | |
Very good | 28% | 21% | 8% | 8% |
Quite good | 46% | 23% | 17% | 16% |
Quite bad | 19% | 29% | 32% | 40% |
Very bad | 6% | 27% | 42% | 35% |
Refused/Don't know | 1% | - | - | - |
How do you feel about your freedom to live where you want without persecution in your neighborhood?
Feb. 09 | Mar. 08 | Aug. 07 | Feb. 07 | |
Very good | 12% | 16% | 8% | 8% |
Quite good | 31% | 24% | 15% | 15% |
Quite bad | 36% | 32% | 32% | 39% |
Very bad | 20% | 28% | 45% | 38% |
Refused/Don't know | 1% | - | - | - |
Economy and Services
When asked what was the biggest problem facing them in their own lives, economic issues outweighed security ones, something that was noted in the March 2008 poll. The top five personal concerns in the recent survey were high prices 9%, no jobs 9%, crime 5%, terrorist attacks 5%, economic problems 5%, lack of services 5%, and poor electricity 5%. That compared to the March 2008 survey where the top concerns were electricity 11%, no jobs 10%, high prices 6%, lack of security 6%, social disintegration 5%, fuel shortages 5%, and the U.S. occupation 5%. Some of the top concerns were thus the same, but just changed in importance, and security and the U.S. were more important.
What is the biggest problem you face?
February 2009 – Top 5 | ||
1. | High prices | 9% |
2. | No jobs/unemployment | 9% |
3. | Common crime | 5% |
3. | Terrorist attacks | 5% |
3. | Economic problems | 5% |
3. | Lack of goods and services/problems with food rations | 5% |
3. | Poor electricity supply | 5% |
March 2008 | ||
1. | Poor electricity supply | 11% |
2. | No jobs/unemployment | 10% |
3. | High prices | 6% |
3. | Lack of security | 6% |
5. | Can't trust people/social disintegration | 5% |
5. | Fuel shortages | 5% |
5. | U.S. occupation | 5% |
When asked about individual issues in their neighborhood, the situation was mixed. Jobs, electricity, water, and health care were felt to be inadequate, while education, basic needs, crime prevention, general economic situation, and fuel supply were good. 34% said access to jobs in their area was good, compared to 66% who thought it was bad. That was up from the March 2008 and 2007 polls, but not as high as 38% recorded in 2005. Similar numbers were found for electricity supply with 37% saying it was good, and 62% saying it was bad. That was the best response since 2005 however. In August 2007 positive responses were in single digits. 38% said the water situation was good, compared to 61% who said it was bad, which was similar to March 2008 responses. Medical care was also seen as inadequate with 40% saying it was good, 60% saying it was bad. Schools were seen as doing much better with 64% saying they were good, and 35% saying they were bad. Basic needs were also being met with 62% saying the situation was positive, 39% saying it was negative. 78% said they felt protected from crime, 60% said their family's general economic situation was good, and 67% said they had good access to fuel. Those were all improvements from March 2008 with the last having the largest increase.
Iraqis were also divided on how things had gone over the last six months. 33% said things had gotten better for their family economically over that period, 23% said things were worse, and 44% said things had stayed the same. Only 14% said the job situation had changed for the better, compared to 35% who said it was worse, and 50% who said it had stayed the same. Those were almost the exact same responses found in March 2008.
Jobs in your neighborhood
Feb. 09 | Mar. 08 | Aug. 07 | Feb. 07 | 2005 | 2004 | |
Very good | 7% | 7% | 4% | 3% | 11% | 7% |
Quite good | 27% | 22% | 17% | 17% | 27% | 19% |
Quite bad | 32% | 35% | 37% | 44% | 23% | 23% |
Very bad | 34% | 35% | 43% | 35% | 34% | 46% |
Refused/Don't know | - | 1% | - | - | 5% | 6% |
Electricity in your neighborhood Feb. 09 Mar. 08 Aug. 07 Feb. 07 2005 2004 Very good 7% 1% 2% 2% 11% 8% Quite good 30% 11% 6% 11% 35% 27% Quite bad 32% 43% 35% 37% 30% 28% Very bad 30% 45% 58% 51% 25% 37% Refused/Don't know - - - - 1% 1% Clean water in your neighborhood Feb. 09 Mar. 08 Aug. 07 Feb. 07 2005 2004 Very good 13% 8% 9% 9% 19% 20% Quite good 25% 23% 16% 22 39% 31% Quite bad 29% 37% 35% 35% 27% 22% Very bad 32% 31% 40% 34% 15% 26% Refused/Don't know - 1% - - - 1%
Medical care in your neighborhood
Feb. 09 | Mar. 08 | Aug. 07 | Feb. 07 | 2005 | 2004 | ||||
Very good | 14% | 10% | 9% | 8% | 27% | 17% | |||
Quite good | 26% | 27% | 23% | 23% | 35% | 34% | |||
Quite bad | 28% | 32% | 37% | 35% | 23% | 24% | |||
Very bad | 32% | 30% | 30% | 34% | 13% | 22% | |||
Refused/Don't know | - | - | - | - | 2% | 3% | |||
Schools in your neighborhood
Feb. 09 | Mar. 08 | Aug. 07 | Feb. 07 | 2005 | 2004 | |
Very good | 18% | 15% | 15% | 12% | 43% | 37% |
Quite good | 46% | 48% | 36% | 31% | 31% | 35% |
Quite bad | 28% | 29% | 30% | 35% | 17% | 15% |
Very bad | 7% | 8% | 19% | 21% | 7% | 11% |
Refused/Don't know | - | 1% | - | - | 1% | 3% |
Availability of basic needs in your neighborhood
Feb. 09 | Mar. 08 | Aug. 07 | Feb. 07 | 2005 | 2004 | |
Very good | 18% | 19% | 9% | 8% | 22% | 18% |
Quite good | 44% | 46% | 30% | 30% | 38% | 38% |
Quite bad | 25% | 27% | 34% | 39% | 23% | 24% |
Very bad | 14% | 8% | 27% | 23% | 15% | 17% |
Refused/Don't know | - | - | - | - | 2% | 2% |
Protection from crime in your neighborhood
Feb. 09 | Mar. 08 | Aug. 07 | Feb. 07 | 2005 | 2004 | |
Very good | 24% | 19% | 13% | 14% | 33% | 21% |
Quite good | 54% | 35% | 22% | 26% | 33% | 31% |
Quite bad | 17% | 28% | 28% | 32% | 19% | 20% |
Very bad | 4% | 18% | 37% | 28% | 14% | 23% |
Refused/Don't know | - | - | 1% | 4% |
Family's economic situation
Feb. 09 | Mar. 08 | Aug. 07 | Feb. 07 | 2005 | |
Very good | 19% | 15% | 7% | 7% | 22% |
Quite good | 41% | 42% | 30% | 29% | 48% |
Quite bad | 23% | 27% | 37% | 41% | 20% |
Very bad | 17% | 16% | 26% | 23% | 10% |
Refused/Don't know | - | - | - | - | 1% |
Availability of fuel for cooking and driving Feb. 09 March 08 Aug. 07 Feb. 07 Very good 26% 2% 1% 1% Quite good 41% 17% 8% 11% Quite bad 24% 40% 33% 40% Very bad 8% 41% 59% 48% Refused/Don't know - - - - In the past six months how has your family's economic situation changed?
Feb. 09 | March 08 | |
Became better | 33% | 31% |
Became worse | 23% | 24% |
Stayed the same | 44% | 45% |
Refused/Don't know | - | 1% |
In the last six months how has the job situation changed? Feb. 09 March 08 Became better 14% 18% Became worse 35% 35% Stayed the same 50% 46% Refused/Don't know - 1%
The government was seen as the main provider of services compared to others, but they were not believed to be competent. Only 16% said the national government was doing a good job providing services, compared to 67% who said they were doing something to little. 17% said they were doing nothing at all. The provincial governments did a little better with 15% saying they did a great deal, 73% saying they did something to a little, and 11% saying nothing at all. After that the Sons of Iraq, Awakenings, foreign aid groups, and the U.S. and Iraqi security forces were grouped together. For all those 9% said they were doing a great deal. Last were mosques and religious charities at 6% who thought they were doing a lot, and militias at 5%.
How is each group doing providing services to your neighborhood? National Government Provincial Government Sons of Iraq/ Awakening Militia Mosque/ Religious charity Foreign aid U.S.-Iraqi security forces A great deal 16% 15% 9% 5% 6% 9% 9% Some 37% 39% 18% 11% 24% 11% 24% A little 30% 34% 24% 17% 30% 25% 27% Nothing at all 17% 11% 45% 64% 38% 53% 38% Refused/Don't know - 1% 4% 4% 2% 2% 2%
What is the biggest problem Iraq is facing?
Feb. 09 | ||
1. | Lack of security | 8% |
2. | Terrorist attacks | 7% |
2. | U.S. occupation | 7% |
4. | War/civil war | 6% |
4. | Ethnic/religious tensions | 6% |
4. | Economic problems | 6% |
4. | High prices | 6% |
4. | Political instability/weak government/bad leaders | 6% |
March 08 | ||
1. | Lack of security | 13% |
2. | Terrorist attacks | 12% |
3. | Sectarian violence | 7% |
4. | War/civil war | 6% |
4. | Ethnic/religious tensions | 6% |
4. | U.S. occupation | 6% |
Government, Groups, and Provincial Elections
As shown in the recent provincial elections, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is riding on a wave of popularity. 55% said they approved of his performance, his highest rating over four surveys. Views on him amassing power were mixed however with 41% saying he had too much, 25% saying he had too little, and 31% thinking he had the right amount. Opinions of the Iraqi parliament weren't as positive, and actually declined from the March 2008 poll. 47% said the parliament was willing to pass an oil law, down from 53% in March 2008, 46% said they were promoting reconciliation, down from 48%, and 38% said they were willing to fight corruption, down from 46%. Local governments were seen in a much better light with 59% saying they were doing a good job, compared to 40% saying they were bad. That was the highest rating since ABC, BBC, and the NHK started conducting the polls.
Thoughts on Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki? Feb. 09 Mar. 08 Aug. 07 Feb. 07 Approve 55% 40% 33% 43% Disapprove 43% 58% 66% 57% Refused/Don't know 2% 2% 1% - What do you think about Maliki's power?
Feb. 09 | |
Too much power | 41% |
Too little power | 25% |
Right amount of power | 31% |
Refused/Don't know | 3% |
Opinions of Iraqi parliament
Sharing oil wealth with all parts of the country
Feb. 09 | March 08 | |
Willing | 47% | 53% |
Not willing | 51% | 46% |
Refused/Don't know | 2% | 1% |
Promoting reconciliation
Feb. 09 | March 08 | |
Willing | 46% | 48% |
Not willing | 53% | 51% |
Refused/Don't know | 1% | 1% |
Fighting corruption
Feb. 09 | March 08 | |
Willing | 38% | 46% |
Not willing | 61% | 53% |
Refused/Don't know | 1% | 1% |
Government in your neighborhood Feb. 09 Mar. 08 Aug. 07 Feb. 07 2005 2004 Very good 16% 11% 11% 12% 21% 18% Quite good 43% 35% 28% 31% 30% 32% Quite bad 25% 33% 32% 31% 24% 20% Very bad 15% 21% 29% 26% 18% 18% Refused/Don't know - 1% - - 7% 12%
When asked their opinions on groups in Iraq, the security forces rated the best, with militias doing the worst. 73% said they had confidence in the Iraqi Army, and 74% said the same about the police. That was followed by the legal system 68%, the national government 61%, community leaders 44%, and Awakening councils 43%. The U.S. at 26%, and local militias with 18% were at the bottom. 67% also said that the security forces were loyal to the country. 30% said they followed individual factions. There was also suspicions about religious groups with 44% said they had too much power.
How do you feel about each group?
Iraqi Army
Feb. 09 | Mar. 08 | Aug. 07 | Feb. 07 | 2005 | 2004 | 2003 | |
Great deal of confidence | 37% | 28% | 23% | 24% | 36% | 18% | 13% |
Quite a lot of confidence | 36% | 37% | 43% | 37% | 31% | 38% | 25% |
Not very much confidence | 24% | 24% | 21% | 25% | 18% | 25% | 29% |
None at all | 3% | 11% | 12% | 14% | 12% | 10% | 16% |
Refused/Don't know | - | - | - | - | 3% | 9% | 17% |
Iraqi police
Feb. 09 | March 08 | Aug. 07 | Feb. 07 | 2005 | 2004 | 2003 | |
Great deal of confidence | 36% | 33% | 33% | 32% | 38% | 26% | 18% |
Quite a lot of confidence | 38% | 34% | 36% | 32% | 31% | 41% | 28% |
Not very much confidence | 20% | 20% | 17% | 16% | 18% | 20% | 30% |
None at all | 5% | 13% | 15% | 20% | 12% | 8% | 15% |
Refused/Don't know | - | 1% | - | - | 2% | 4% | 10% |
U.S. military Feb. 09 Mar. 08 Aug. 07 Feb. 07 2005 2004 2003 Great deal of confidence 12% 4% 4% 6% 7% 8% 7% Quite a lot of confidence 14% 16% 11% 12% 11% 17% 12% Not very much confidence 28% 33% 27% 30% 23% 23% 20% None at all 45% 46% 58% 52% 55% 43% 52% Refused/Don't know 1% 1% - - 5% 8% 9% Community leaders
Feb. 09 | Mar. 08 | Aug. 07 | Feb. 07 | 2005 | 2004 | 2003 | |
Great deal of confidence | 10% | 12% | 11% | 11% | 17% | 17% | 19% |
Quite a lot of confidence | 34% | 35% | 36% | 34% | 23% | 34% | 26% |
Not very much confidence | 33% | 32% | 34% | 34% | 29% | 22% | 21% |
None at all | 23% | 20% | 20% | 21% | 21% | 16% | 17% |
Refused/Don't know | 1% | 1% | - | - | 10% | 12% | 18% |
National government
Feb. 09 | Mar. 08 | Aug. 07 | Feb. 07 | 2005 | |
Great deal of confidence | 26% | 17% | 11% | 18% | 23% |
Quite a lot of confidence | 35% | 31% | 28% | 31% | 30% |
Not very much confidence | 26% | 26% | 31% | 27% | 25% |
None at all | 13% | 25% | 30% | 24% | 16% |
Refused/Don't know | 1% | 1% | - | - | 6% |
Local militia Feb. 09 Mar. 08 Aug. 07 Feb. 07 Great deal of confidence 4% 7% 11% 16% Quite a lot of confidence 14% 15% 13% 20% Not very much confidence 25% 24% 26% 26% None at all 56% 47% 43% 38% Refused/Don't know 1% 8% 8% - Awakening Council
Feb. 09 | Mar. 08 | |
Great deal of confidence | 15% | 16% |
Quite a lot of confidence | 28% | 40% |
Not very much confidence | 28% | 27% |
None at all | 25% | 9% |
Refused/Don't know | 4% | 7% |
Legal system
Feb. 09 | |
Great deal of confidence | 28% |
Quite a lot of confidence | 40% |
Not very much confidence | 24% |
None at all | 8% |
Refused/Don't know | 1% |
Who are the Iraqi security forces loyal to?
Feb. 09 | |
Loyal to individual factions | 30% |
Loyal to Iraq | 67% |
Refused/Don't know | 2% |
Opinion on role of religious groups in society
Feb. 09 | |
Too much | 44% |
Too little | 29% |
The right amount | 26% |
Refused/Don't know | 2% |
When asked about Iraq's governmental system, a strong central authority and democracy seem to have taken hold. 70% said Iraq power should be centered in the capital. 20% believed in regional governments, while 7% thought Iraq should break apart into separate states. Since 2004 Iraqis have said they support power being based in Baghdad. A democratic system also received the highest mark with 64% supporting it. That was a large jump from February 2007 when only 43% believed in it. Next was an Islamic state at 19%, then a strongman at 14%. Regardless of what type of government they wanted, a majority also believed in voting.
How should Iraq be governed in the future?
Feb. 09 | Mar. 08 | Aug. 07 | Feb. 07 | 2005 | 2004 | |
Unified Iraq under a central government | 70% | 66% | 62% | 58% | 70% | 79% |
Regional governments | 20% | 23% | 28% | 28% | 18% | 14% |
Separate independent states | 7% | 9% | 9% | 14% | 9% | 4% |
Refused/Don't know | 3% | 1% | 1% | - | 3% | 3% |
Which political system would be best for Iraq?
Feb. 09 | Feb. 07 | 2005 | 2004 | |
Strong leader for life | 14% | 34% | 26% | 28% |
Islamic state | 19% | 22% | 14% | 21% |
Democracy | 64% | 43% | 57% | 49% |
Refused/Don't know | 3% | - | 3% | 4% |
Regardless of type of government you prefer, are you confident that voting can work in Iraq?
Feb. 09 | |
Very confident | 28% |
Somewhat confident | 38% |
Not so confident | 25% |
Not confident at all | 7% |
Refused/Don't know | 2% |
The January 2009 provincial elections also seem to have had a positive affect on the public. 43% said the election increased their confidence in voting. 47% also said they felt that they were free and fair, as opposed to 37% who said they were not. When asked how the elections would affect a variety of issues, all the results were positive. 56% said it would make the political situation better, 40% said it would improve cooperation amongst sectarian groups, 48% said it would help with security, 44% believed it would improve services, 45% thought it would improve the economy. The only issue that most did not think the elections would change were rights for women with 44% saying it would have no effect. One big change in the 2009 voting was that more Sunnis participated compared to the last ones in January 2005. Over two-thirds thought this was a positive development.
How did the Jan. 09 provincial elections affect your view of voting working in Iraq?
Feb. 09 | |
Increased confidence | 43% |
Decreased confidence | 18% |
Made no difference | 37% |
Refused/Don't know | 2% |
Opinion of Jan. 09 provincial elections
Feb. 09 | |
Were free and fair | 47% |
Were not free or fair | 37% |
Depends on province | 14% |
Refused/Don't know | 3% |
Effect of provincial elections on the following
Political situation Feb. 09 Better 56% Worse 12% No real effect 29% Refused/Don't know 3% Cooperation amongst sectarian groups
Feb. 09 | |
Better | 40% |
Worse | 27% |
No real effect | 31% |
Refused/Don't know | 1% |
Security
Feb. 09 | |
Better | 48% |
Worse | 22% |
No real effect | 28% |
Refused/Don't know | 1% |
Public services
Feb. 09 | |
Better | 44% |
Worse | 26% |
No real effect | 28% |
Refused/Don't know | 2% |
Economic opportunity
Feb. 09 | |
Better | 45% |
Worse | 22% |
No real effect | 31% |
Refused/Don't know | 1% |
Rights for women
Feb. 09 | |
Better | 27% |
Worse | 26% |
No real effect | 44% |
Refused/Don't know | 3% |
Opinion on more Sunnis participating in Jan. 09 provincial elections than Jan. 05 vote
Feb. 09 | |
Positive | 67% |
Negative | 10% |
No real effect | 20% |
Refused/Don't know | 3% |
Many Iraqis believed that the sectarian and ethnic tensions were improving in the country. 60% said relations between Shiites and Sunnis were excellent to good. 79% believed that Sunnis and Shiites would reconcile, with only 17% believing that they would separate.
Thoughts on Arab-Kurdish relations were not as positive, but still good with 53% believing in reconciliation, compared to 43% who believed separation was in the future. 44% thought relations between the two groups were excellent to good. Iraqis tended to oppose the Kurds' aspirations however. 78% for example said Kirkuk should not become part of Kurdistan. 58% thought that the Kurds would eventually declare independence, an idea that only 23% would support.
How are relations between Shiites and Sunnis today in Iraq?
Feb. 09 | March 08 | |
Excellent | 27% | 9% |
Good | 33% | 38% |
Not so good | 21% | 33% |
Poor | 18% | 19% |
How are relations between Arabs and Kurds in Iraq today?
Feb. 09 | March 08 | |
Excellent | 20% | 11% |
Good | 24% | 31% |
Not so good | 29% | 33% |
Poor | 26% | 24% |
What is in Iraq's future between Sunnis and Shiites?
Feb. 09 | |
Reconciliation | 79% |
Separation | 17% |
Refused/Don't know | 3% |
What is in the future for Arabs and Kurds?
Feb. 09 | |
Reconciliation | 53% |
Separation | 43% |
Refused/Don't know | 4% |
Should Kirkuk become part of Kurdistan?
Feb. 09 | Mar. 08 | |
Should | 20% | 27% |
Should not | 78% | 72% |
Refused/Don't know | 1% | 1% |
How likely is it that Kurdistan will declare independence?
Feb. 09 | |
Very likely | 31% |
Somewhat likely | 27% |
Somewhat unlikely | 23% |
Very unlikely | 17% |
Would you support or oppose Kurdish independence?
Feb. 09 | |
Support strongly | 11% |
Support somewhat | 12% |
Oppose somewhat | 27% |
Oppose strongly | 48% |
Finally, opinions on whether Iraq's refugees should return reversed from the earlier March 2008 poll. Then 45% said it as not time to return, as opposed to 54% who thought it was. In the newest poll 57% believed it was time, compared to 40% who said it was not.
Should Iraqi refugees return
Feb. 09 | Mar. 08 | |
Yes | 57% | 45% |
No | 40% | 54% |
Refused/Don't know | 3% | 1% |
Opinions Of The U.S. And Coalition
Iraqis did not have a positive view of the U.S. or the Coalition. The low opinion of the American presence has been recorded in other polls. The Pentagon's quarterly report to Congress on Iraq for example, has consistently reported that few Iraqis are willing to give the U.S. military credit for security in their area.
In the ABC, BBC, NHK poll 53% said that the Americans controlled Iraq compared to 32% who said it was the government. When asked about the job the U.S. and other Coalition forces had done in Iraq only 30% said it had been good, with 69% saying they had done a bad job. That was the highest positive mark since 2005 however. Opinions of the U.S. invasion are also mostly negative with 56% saying it was wrong, compared to 42% who thought it was right. That was a decrease from the March 2008 poll. In February 2007 and 2004 however, there were higher positive marks. This might be the reason why 62% believed that journalist Muntadar al-Zaidi was a hero for throwing his shoes at President Bush. Iraqis didn't seem impressed by new President Obama either with only 35% saying he would have a positive effect on Iraq. 19% thought he would make things worse, while 38% said he would make no difference.
Who controls things in Iraq?
Feb. 09 | Feb. 07 | 2005 | |
Iraqi government | 32% | 34% | 44% |
U.S. | 53% | 59% | 24% |
Somebody else | 9% | 4% | 17% |
No one | 3% | 3% | 6% |
Refused/Don't know | 3% | - | 9% |
Opinion on how the U.S. and other Coalition forces have done in Iraq
Feb. 09 | Mar. 08 | Aug. 07 | Feb. 07 | 2005 | |
A very good job | 11% | 6% | 3% | 6% | 10% |
Quite a good job | 19% | 23% | 15% | 18% | 27% |
Quite a bad job | 30% | 35% | 32% | 30% | 19% |
A very bad job | 39% | 35% | 48% | 46% | 40% |
Refused/Don't know | 1% | 1% | 1% | - | 5% |
Opinion of U.S. invasion
Feb. 09 | Mar. 08 | Aug. 07 | Feb. 07 | 2005 | 2004 | |
Absolutely Right | 19% | 21% | 12% | 22% | 19% | 20% |
Somewhat Right | 23% | 28% | 25% | 25% | 28% | 29% |
Somewhat Wrong | 28% | 23% | 28% | 19% | 17% | 13% |
Absolutely Wrong | 28% | 27% | 35% | 34% | 33% | 26% |
Refused/Don't know | 2% | - | - | - | 4% | 13% |
What is your opinion of journalist Muntadar al-Zaidi who threw his shoe at President Bush
Feb. 09 | |
A hero | 62% |
A criminal | 24% |
Both equally | 10% |
Refused/Don't know | 4% |
How will President Obama affect Iraq
Feb. 09 | |
Better | 35% |
Worse | 19% |
No difference | 38% |
Depends | 5% |
Refused/Don't know | 3% |
Iraqis are also waiting for the U.S. to leave. 46% said the U.S. should leave before the 2011 deadline set by the Status of Forces Agreement. 59% thought that Iraqi forces were ready now to take over from the U.S. as well. Even so, there were some Iraqis who were worried about security after the U.S. left. 42% said they were concerned, compared to 57% who said they were not.
Should the U.S. leave before the 2011 deadline?
Feb. 09 | |
Leaver sooner than 2011 | 46% |
Stay longer than 2011 | 16% |
The timetable for withdrawal is right | 35% |
Refused/Don't know | 2% |
Are the Iraqi forces ready now to take over from the U.S.?
Feb. 09 | |
Ready | 59% |
Not Ready | 40% |
Refused/Don't know | 1% |
How concerned are you that security will worsen after the U.S. leaves?
Feb. 09 | |
Very concerned | 7% |
Somewhat concerned | 35% |
Not so concerned | 36% |
Not concerned at all | 21% |
Refused/Don't know | 1% |
The British who controlled southern Iraq fared no better with a few exceptions. 42% said they had a negative affect, compared to 36% who thought they were a positive influence. 19% said they did both good and bad. 57% said the Iraqi forces were ready to take over from the English. 57% also thought that the security situation would not change much after the British left. When asked about the British impact upon the south overall, there were mixed reviews. 47% thought they helped with long-term security compared to 49% who thought they were a hindrance. 51% did say that the British helped rebuilding the government and police of the region, but only 42% said they helped with reconstruction.
Opinion of British forces in the south
Feb. 09 | |
Generally positive | 36% |
Generally negative | 42% |
Some of both | 19% |
Refused/Don't know | 3% |
Are Iraqi forces ready to take over security in Basra from the British?
Feb. 09 | |
Ready | 57% |
Not ready | 38% |
Refused/Don't know | 5% |
How concerned are you that security in Basra will worsen after British leave
Feb. 09 | |
Very concerned | 12% |
Somewhat concerned | 28% |
Not so concerned | 37% |
Not concerned at all | 20% |
Refused/Don't know | 2% |
Opinion of British impact on each of the following:
Long-term security
Feb. 09 | |
Help | 47% |
Hindrance | 49% |
Refused/Don't know | 4% |
Rebuilding government and police in the south
Feb. 09 | |
Help | 51% |
Hindrance | 47% |
Refused/Don't know | 3% |
Rebuilding infrastructure
Feb. 09 | |
Help | 42% |
Hindrance | 55% |
Refused/Don't know | 4% |
Foreign Relations
Iraqis didn't seem to have a positive few of very many countries overall. Only Turkey garnered a positive view with 35%. Even then 30% had a negative view of it. All of the other countries asked about were seen as negative. Those included Russia, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and England. The U.S. at 64% and Iran at 68% had the most negative responses.
Opinion of role of each country
Russia Feb. 09 Feb. 07 Positive 18% 15% Neutral 57% 72% Negative 22% 13% Saudi Arabia Feb. 09 Feb. 07 Positive 21% 20% Neutral 45% 28% Negative 32% 52%
Iran
Feb. 09 | Feb. 07 | |
Positive | 12% | 17% |
Neutral | 19% | 16% |
Negative | 68% | 67% |
Syria
Feb. 09 | Feb. 07 | |
Positive | 23% | 7% |
Neutral | 38% | 30% |
Negative | 38% | 63% |
Turkey
Feb. 09 | Feb. 07 | |
Positive | 35% | 10% |
Neutral | 34% | 44% |
Negative | 30% | 46% |
U.S.
Feb. 09 | Feb. 07 | |
Positive | 18% | 12% |
Neutral | 17% | 11% |
Negative | 64% | 77% |
Britain
Feb. 09 | Feb. 07 | |
Positive | 22% | 11% |
Neutral | 18% | 14% |
Negative | 59% | 75% |
Conclusion
This poll represents the new status quo in Iraq. The sectarian war of 2006-2007 is over. Violence is down. Iraqis feel much safer in their own neighborhood, although they are more apprehensive about the situation across the entire country. Still, the survey shows that many Iraqis feel that the situation is sustainable, and that the future holds promise. Economic issues have now eclipsed security as the most important issues for individuals when asked about their own neighborhoods. The U.S. and England have also set a date for withdrawal, something that is widely popular. Belief in a strong central government, and voting also appeared to have taken hold in the country. The two major complaints now appear to be about the government's inability to provide services, the economic outlook, and the claims of the Kurds for Kirkuk and possible independence.
BBC, ABC, NHK, “Iraq Poll February 2009,” 3/16/09
Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” December 2008
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