The Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) July 2009 parliamentary elections were touted as a sea change in Kurdish politics. For the first time, the ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of KRG President Massoud Barzani and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani faced a real challenge from the new Change List headed by the co-founder of the PUK Nishurwan Mustafa. Change ran on greater transparency and democracy. They ended up winning 25 of 111 seats, while the Service and Reform List, a coalition of leftist and Islamist parties, won 13. Since then the KDP and PUK have tried to cajole and bully these new opposition groups.
First, the KDP and PUK have tried to co-opt the Service and Reform List. The list was always a strange mix. On the one hand there were two Islamist groups, the Kurdistan Islamic Union and the Kurdistan Islamic Group, and on the other were the Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party and the Future Party. The mixture of religious and secular parties always seemed to be a marriage of convenience. The KDP and PUK have tried to play on these divisions by offering ministries in the Kurdish government in return for them joining the ruling coalition. So far, the Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party and its two seats, and the Future Party with one seat are on the verge of joining the KDP and PUK, and the Kurdistan Islamic Group with four seats are in negotiations to do the same. That leaves only the Kurdistan Islamic Union and the Change List as being committed to being in the opposition. Together they have 31 of 111 seats in the Kurdish assembly.
The PUK and KDP are trying to do something similar for the January 2010 national parliamentary elections. The two parties form the Kurdish Alliance in the legislature, and want all the other Kurdish parties to run as one list in the coming vote. They argue that since there are so many unresolved issues between the KRG and Baghdad, the Kurds need to form a united front. The Change List however, said that they will run separately, but are open to working with the Kurdish Alliance after the balloting in parliament.
At the same time, the PUK and KDP are continuing with their intimidation campaign against the Change List. Before the vote, Change supporters were losing their government jobs, during the election there were all kinds irregularities reported, and afterwards the Change List offices in Irbil were attacked, and their followers got into fights in Sulaymaniya. Since then, the Change List is accusing the ruling parties of firing their members in the peshmerga militia and security forces. Teachers have also said that those who voted for the Change List have been let go or demoted as well.
Kurdistan has been ruled by the PUK and KDP since it got its autonomy from Saddam following the 1991 Gulf War. The administration of the KRG has been noted for cronyism, corruption, tribalism, and a lack of transparency. The 2009 Kurdish elections were widely hailed as a transformative vote since it was the first time that the opposition received a sizeable proportion of the vote. The actions of the ruling parties since then however show that they are still thinking the same way. They are still in control, and want to maintain their position by any means whether by buying off the opposition or threatening them.
SOURCES
AK News, “Kurdish involvement in polls: one list vs. numerous lists,” 10/7/09
Hamad, Qassim Khidhir, “kurdish election lists,” Niqash, 6/30/09
Taha, Yaseen, “kurdish opposition splinters,” Niqash, 10/7/09
Tahir, Wrya Hama, “Kurdish Opposition Say Supporters Targeted in Workplace,” Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 10/2/09
Showing posts with label Kurdish National Assembly Elections. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Kurdish National Assembly Elections. Show all posts
Sunday, October 25, 2009
Friday, August 14, 2009
Full Kurdish Election Results
The 2009 Kurdistan parliamentary and presidential elections resulted in the first real challenge to the ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). While their Kurdistan List still came in first with 69.57% of the vote, parties that claimed to be reformers received 39.43%. While most of the smaller parties in this group didn't qualify for seats in the 111-member Kurdish parliament, the largest one, the Change List, will control just under one-quarter of the legislature. The major reason for their success is that many Kurds wanted a real opposition to try to force the KDP-PUK alliance to end its corruption, provide greater transparency, allow more dissenting opinions, and develop the region.
The competition between the Kurdistan List and the Change List was intense. The Change List claimed that their followers were being fired from their government jobs by the PUK and KDP before the vote. A U.S. officer confirmed one such example when a Kurdish border patrol commander and his entire unit were fired by the PUK peshmerga because he supported the Change List. The ruling parties were also accused of hiring 2,500 government workers after a four year hiring freeze, all of whom were expected to vote for the Kurdistan List in return. The Change List and Kurdistan List accused each other of tearing down the others posters. In early June 2009 the Minister of Peshmerga was accused of attacking Change supporters at a rally. Finally, on election day, the opposition parties claimed that PUK and KDP followers were voting without IDs, blocking opposition observers from polling stations, campaigning after deadlines, and voting more than once. Afterwards the Change List said that their offices in Irbil were attacked by the KDP, and there were reports of violence between different supporters in Sulaymaniya.
As reported before, these election results are likely to have far ranging effects not only upon Kurdish politics, strengthening Barzani against Talabani, and creating the first real opposition, but also upon national ones, perhaps weakening the Kurds' unified position in Baghdad, and offering a new partner in the Change List for Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in the parliamentary balloting.
Kurdistan Regional Government Presidential Election Results
Massoud Barzani – Head of the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Re-Elected KRG President | 69.57% |
Kamal Mirawdeli – Independent scholar who won a majority in Sulaymaniya | 25.32% |
Halo Ibrahim Ahmed – Head of the Progress List and brother-in-law of the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and Iraqi President Jalal Talabani. His father was a famous PUK leader, and Halo was kicked out of the party for forming his own reform faction in 2008 | 3.49% |
Safin Sheikh Mohammed – Independent businessman and former PUK member who quit in 1995 over the KDP-PUK civil war to form his own party | 1.40% |
Hussein Karmiani – Another former PUK member who left the party in 2005 and runs agriculture business | 0.59% |
Seats Awarded In Kurdish Parliament – 111 seats total
Kurdish List 59 seats
Change List 25 seats
Service And Reform List 13 seats
Islamic Movement of Kurdistan List 2 seats
Social Justice and Freedom List 1 seat
Turkmen had a 5 seat quota
Turkmen Democratic Movement In Kurdistan 3 seats
Turkmen Reform List 1 seat
Irbil Turkmen List 1 seat
Christians had a 5 seat quota
National Council of Chaldean Syriac Assyrians 3 seats
Al-Rafidain List 2 seats
Armenians had a 1 seat quota
Aram Shahine Dawood Bakoyan
Kurdistan Parliamentary Election Results
Kurdistan List – KDP-PUK Coalition. Ran together in previous two Kurdish elections. PUK is now the weaker of the two parties as they lost in their own home province of Sulaymaniya | 69.57% |
Change List – Led by former PUK co-founder Nishurwan Mustafa, media magnet. Won Sulaymaniya and will be the first real opposition party if it can keep its disparate group of followers together | 23.75% |
Service And Reform List – Coalition of Islamists and Leftists, the Kurdistan Islamic Union, the Islamic Group of Kurdistan, the Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party, and Future Party. The Islamists were the previous opposition to the ruling parties, but had a history of cooperating with them | 12.8% |
Islamic Movement of Kurdistan List – Formed by Sunni mullahs in 1979 who call for Islamic government and greater transparency | 1.45% |
Turkmen Democratic Movement In Kurdistan – Calls for Turkmen unity, annexation of Kirkuk, and is opposed to Turkish influence. Won 3 of the 5 seats set aside for Turkmen | 0.99% |
Social Justice and Freedom List – Leftist coalition of the Kurdistan Communist Party, the Kurdistan Toilers Party, the Kurdistan Independent Work Party, the Kurdistan Pro-Democratic Party, and the Democratic Movement of Kurdistan People that calls for equal rights and secularism | 0.82% |
National Council of Chaldean Syriac Assyrians – Calls for the Ninewa Plains, a historically Christian area, to be annexed by Kurdistan. Is assured of at least one seat as 5 were reserved for Christians | 0.58% |
Turkmen Reform List – Wants more power for Turkmen and is against Turkish influence. Won 1 of 5 seats set aside for Turkmen | 0.38% |
Al-Rafidain List – Wants a greater role for Christians, especially in the security forces | 0.3% |
Aram Shahine Dawood Bakoyan – An Armenian politician assured of at least one seat as 2 were set aside for Armenians | 0.22% |
Irbil Turkmen List – Wants Kirkuk to be annexed and is against Turkish influence. Won the last of 5 seats set aside for Turkmen | 0.21% |
Kurdistan Toilers and Workers Party List – Calls for rule of law in Kurdistan | 0.18% |
Aertex Morses Sargisyan – Independent Armenian politician likely to receive other seat reserved for Armenians | 0.15% |
Kurdistan Conservative Party – A tribal party that has ties with the PUK | 0.13% |
Kurdistan Reform Movement – Led by Abdul Barzani, cousin of Massoud Barzani. Calls for an end to corruption, rule of law, and human rights | 0.11% |
Independent Youth List – Only includes ten people who call for more rights for the young | 0.1% |
Kurdistan Democratic National Party List – Calls for Kurdish unity throughout the region, plus more housing and women and youth rights in Kurdistan | 0.1% |
Unified Chaldean List – Made up of the Chaldean Union Party and the Chaldean National Council | 0.09% |
Chaldean Syriac Assyrian Autonomy List | 0.09% |
Kurdistan Bright Future List – Wants separation of political parties from administration and justice system | 0.05% |
Eshkhan Malkin Sargisyan – Independent Armenian candidate | 0.05% |
Progression List – Led by Jalal Talabani's brother-in-law and presidential candidate Halo Ibrahim Ahmed. Call for better standard of living | 0.05% |
Iraqi Constitutional Party – National party founded by Interior Minister Jawad Bolani | 0.04% |
Independent Turkmen List – Calls for Kirkuk to be an independent region | 0.02% |
SOURCES
Bakri, Nada, "Challengers Face an Uphill Battle in Elections in Iraq's Kurdish North," Washington Post, 7/19/09
Carpenter, J. Scott and Ali, Ahmed, "Iraqi Kurds Go to the Polls: Is Change Possible?" Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 7/23/09
Cocks, Tim, "Before polls, Iraq Kurds fret about graft not land," Reuters, 7/14/09
Druzin, Heath, "Iraqi border patrol officers fired by rival party supporters," Stars and Stripes, 7/25/09
Hamad, Qassim Khidhir, "kurdish election lists," Niqash, 6/30/09
- "kurds seek new political opposition," Niqash, 7/16/09
Institute for War & Peace Reporting, "KDP Flexes Muscles in Dohuk," 7/21/09
Kurdistan Regional Government, "Electoral Commission announces final results of Kurdistan Region elections," 8/8/09
Mahmoud, Shakhwan, "fired and hired for their political beliefs?" Niqash, 7/20/09
- "opposition claim kurdish election fraud," Niqash, 8/4/09
Monsters & Critics, "Official Iraqi Kurdish election results confirm incumbent victories," 8/8/09
Muhammad, Sardar, "kurdish presidential candidates," Niqash, 7/9/09
Rath, Tiare, "PUK and KDP Face Challenge," Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 7/17/09
Reuters, "Iraq's Kurdish Opposition Allege Poll Violations," 7/26/09
Sands, Phil, "Victory for Kurdistan opposition," The National, 7/30/09
United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, "UNAMI Focus," July 2009
Wednesday, August 05, 2009
Kurdish Election Results And Implications
The results of the Kurdistan parliamentary elections are in. As expected, the ruling Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Kurdistan Democratic Party’s (KDP) coalition, the Kurdistan List came in first place with 57.34% of the vote. However the new Change List, led by former PUK officials, came in second with 23.57%. The Service and Reform List came in third with 12%. They are a combination of two Islamic groups, which used to be the largest opposition parties, the Kurdistan Islamic Union and the Kurdistan Islamic Group, and two leftist groups, the Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party and the Future Party. Kurdistan ran a closed list election, counting all three provinces as a single district. This meant that voters could only pick from lists, and not individual candidates. In that system the parliamentarians are selected by and answer to their party bosses, not the electorate. There were 111 seats up for grabs, but five were set-aside for Christians, five for Turkmen, and one for Armenians. Voters also re-elected Massoud Barzani, the leader of the KDP, to be the region’s president. This election could have far-ranging effects on not only the politics within the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), but the rest of Iraq as well.
Kurdish Parliamentary Election Results
111 seats up for election by 24 parties
Kurdistan List 57.34%
Change List 23.57%
Services and Reform List 12%
5 seats for Christians
5 seats for Turkmen
1 seat for Armenians
Kurdish Presidential Election Results
Massoud Barzani – Kurdistan List 69.57%
Dr. Kamal Mirawdeli 25.32%
Halo Ibrahim Ahmed – Progress List 3.49%
Safin Sheikh Mohammed 1.4%
Hussein Karmiani 0.59%
First, the vote is likely to change the power dynamics between the KDP and PUK. Since 1992 when Kurdistan got its autonomy the two parties have had a rough, and sometimes tense, joint rule over the KRG. In the first two elections in 1992 and 2005 the two evenly split their seats 50-50 in the Kurdish parliament. The two also signed a Unification Agreement in January 2006, which divided up the major positions in the region between them. The PUK however, has been breaking apart due to internal struggles for years now. In 2005 a reform wing was formed within the party that wanted greater say in decision-making, more transparency, and a crackdown on corruption. The head of the Change List and former PUK co-founder Nishurwan Mustafa came to head this faction, and eventually left the party in 2006. Dozens of others would join him or be kicked out of the party in the following years. In 2008 for example, a group called the Movement for Democratic Change was expelled from the party, and in February 2009 the secretary general of the PUK, who was also the vice president of the KRG, and several other leading members threatened to quit. PUK leader and Iraqi President Jalal Talabani is also old and ailing. Further weakening the party is the fact that the Change List allegedly won Sulaymaniya in the election, the stronghold of the PUK. All together this has greatly reduced Talabani’s standing in Kurdistan. He and his party may not be able to maintain their equal status with Barzani and the KDP as a result.
Barzani has already hinted at this change in dynamics. Under the Unification Agreement, the PUK is to take over the office of prime minister in the KRG from the KDP. Massoud Barzani’s nephew Nechirvan Barzani currently holds the post, and Iraqi deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih of the PUK is supposed to succeed him. However Massoud Barzani recently asked why the PUK should hold that post.
Barzani may be in an even stronger position if a referendum is held on the new Kurdish constitution. A draft of the document was passed by the Kurdish parliament on June 24, 2009, and gives the president new wide-ranging powers. These include the ability to dissolve parliament, pass and veto laws, remove ministers, and command over the peshmerga. For these reasons the Change List say they are opposed to the constitution and want it revised and have filed a motion in the Iraqi courts, but Barzani says they don’t have the two-thirds necessary in the parliament to do that. Joost Hilterman of the International Crisis Group recently noted that this is a paradox as Barzani is one of the great proponents of federalism and decentralization in Iraq, but is trying to centralize power in the KRG.
Finally, Barzani is one of the main opponents of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, so relations between Baghdad and Kurdistan are not likely to improve anytime soon. Kirkuk is one of the main disputes between them, and yesterday, July 28, 2009, he told the press that he rejected the United Nation’s recommendations on the disputed territories, and that the only solution was for Article 140 to be implemented that calls for a referendum. Earlier in July Barzani warned that Baghdad and Kurdistan were close to war over the issue. The KRG draft constitution also lays claims to all of these areas as part of a historical greater Kurdistan. To add to the problem, Barzani and Maliki have not talked to each other in more than a year. When they were things were no better as Barzani said the Prime Minister smelled like a dictator and was acting like a new Saddam.
The 2009 Kurdish elections look to be bringing good and bad results. On the positive side, Kurdistan will have a real opposition for the first time. That will hopefully make the PUK and KDP more responsive to the voters, develop the region, and reduce their corruption. On the negative side, the ruling parties will still hold control of the top political offices and security forces with the KDP looking to surpass the PUK. If the Kurdish constitution is passed that will cement the KDP’s position as the dominant Kurdish party with Barzani’s expanded executive authority. With this new sense of power and national elections due in January 2010, there is little reason for Barzani to compromise or make amends with Baghdad, maintaining the gridlock in Iraq’s politics.
SOURCES
Alaaldin, Ranj, “Troubled times in Iraqi Kurdistan,” Guardian, 7/23/09
Alsumaria, “Results of Kurdistan Presidential and Parliamentary Elections 2009,” 7/29/09
- “Talabani to share power within his party,” 2/18/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “IHEC says initial results to come out in 2 days,” 7/26/09
Carpenter, J. Scott and Ali, Ahmed, “Iraqi Kurds Go to the Polls: Is Change Possible?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 7/23/09
Dagher, Sam, “New Kurdish Leader Asserts Agenda,” New York Times, 7/29/09
- “Opposition Rattles a Governing Coalition in Iraqi Kurds’ Vote,” New York Times, 7/26/09
Danly, James, “The 2009 Kurdish Elections,” Institute for the Study of War,” 7/23/09
Hama-Tahir, Wrya, “Prominent former PUK leader accused of using dissident faction as proxy to settle political scores,” Institute of War & Peace Reporting, 12/5/08
Hamad, Qassim Khidhir, “Kurdish election lists,” Niqash, 6/30/09
Khalil, Lydia, “Stability in Iraqi Kurdistan: Reality or Mirage?” Brookings Institution, June 2009
Mahmoud, Amer, “controversy over Kurdish constitution,” Niqash, 7/6/09
Shadid, Anthony, “After Kurdish Vote, Talabani Pledges to Rebuild Party,” Washington Post, 7/29/09
- “Kurdish Leaders Warn Of Strains With Maliki,” Washington Post, 7/17/09
- “Worries About A Kurdish-Arab Conflict Moves To Fore in Iraq,” Washington Post, 7/27/09
Stansfield, Gareth Anderson, Liam, “Kurds in Iraq: the struggle between Baghdad and Erbil,” Middle East Policy, Spring 2009
Synovitz, Ron, “Expert Focuses On Significance Of Iraq’s Kurdish Regional Elections,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 7/25/09
Kurdish Parliamentary Election Results
111 seats up for election by 24 parties
Kurdistan List 57.34%
Change List 23.57%
Services and Reform List 12%
5 seats for Christians
5 seats for Turkmen
1 seat for Armenians
Kurdish Presidential Election Results
Massoud Barzani – Kurdistan List 69.57%
Dr. Kamal Mirawdeli 25.32%
Halo Ibrahim Ahmed – Progress List 3.49%
Safin Sheikh Mohammed 1.4%
Hussein Karmiani 0.59%
First, the vote is likely to change the power dynamics between the KDP and PUK. Since 1992 when Kurdistan got its autonomy the two parties have had a rough, and sometimes tense, joint rule over the KRG. In the first two elections in 1992 and 2005 the two evenly split their seats 50-50 in the Kurdish parliament. The two also signed a Unification Agreement in January 2006, which divided up the major positions in the region between them. The PUK however, has been breaking apart due to internal struggles for years now. In 2005 a reform wing was formed within the party that wanted greater say in decision-making, more transparency, and a crackdown on corruption. The head of the Change List and former PUK co-founder Nishurwan Mustafa came to head this faction, and eventually left the party in 2006. Dozens of others would join him or be kicked out of the party in the following years. In 2008 for example, a group called the Movement for Democratic Change was expelled from the party, and in February 2009 the secretary general of the PUK, who was also the vice president of the KRG, and several other leading members threatened to quit. PUK leader and Iraqi President Jalal Talabani is also old and ailing. Further weakening the party is the fact that the Change List allegedly won Sulaymaniya in the election, the stronghold of the PUK. All together this has greatly reduced Talabani’s standing in Kurdistan. He and his party may not be able to maintain their equal status with Barzani and the KDP as a result.
Barzani has already hinted at this change in dynamics. Under the Unification Agreement, the PUK is to take over the office of prime minister in the KRG from the KDP. Massoud Barzani’s nephew Nechirvan Barzani currently holds the post, and Iraqi deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih of the PUK is supposed to succeed him. However Massoud Barzani recently asked why the PUK should hold that post.
Barzani may be in an even stronger position if a referendum is held on the new Kurdish constitution. A draft of the document was passed by the Kurdish parliament on June 24, 2009, and gives the president new wide-ranging powers. These include the ability to dissolve parliament, pass and veto laws, remove ministers, and command over the peshmerga. For these reasons the Change List say they are opposed to the constitution and want it revised and have filed a motion in the Iraqi courts, but Barzani says they don’t have the two-thirds necessary in the parliament to do that. Joost Hilterman of the International Crisis Group recently noted that this is a paradox as Barzani is one of the great proponents of federalism and decentralization in Iraq, but is trying to centralize power in the KRG.
Finally, Barzani is one of the main opponents of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, so relations between Baghdad and Kurdistan are not likely to improve anytime soon. Kirkuk is one of the main disputes between them, and yesterday, July 28, 2009, he told the press that he rejected the United Nation’s recommendations on the disputed territories, and that the only solution was for Article 140 to be implemented that calls for a referendum. Earlier in July Barzani warned that Baghdad and Kurdistan were close to war over the issue. The KRG draft constitution also lays claims to all of these areas as part of a historical greater Kurdistan. To add to the problem, Barzani and Maliki have not talked to each other in more than a year. When they were things were no better as Barzani said the Prime Minister smelled like a dictator and was acting like a new Saddam.
The 2009 Kurdish elections look to be bringing good and bad results. On the positive side, Kurdistan will have a real opposition for the first time. That will hopefully make the PUK and KDP more responsive to the voters, develop the region, and reduce their corruption. On the negative side, the ruling parties will still hold control of the top political offices and security forces with the KDP looking to surpass the PUK. If the Kurdish constitution is passed that will cement the KDP’s position as the dominant Kurdish party with Barzani’s expanded executive authority. With this new sense of power and national elections due in January 2010, there is little reason for Barzani to compromise or make amends with Baghdad, maintaining the gridlock in Iraq’s politics.
SOURCES
Alaaldin, Ranj, “Troubled times in Iraqi Kurdistan,” Guardian, 7/23/09
Alsumaria, “Results of Kurdistan Presidential and Parliamentary Elections 2009,” 7/29/09
- “Talabani to share power within his party,” 2/18/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “IHEC says initial results to come out in 2 days,” 7/26/09
Carpenter, J. Scott and Ali, Ahmed, “Iraqi Kurds Go to the Polls: Is Change Possible?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 7/23/09
Dagher, Sam, “New Kurdish Leader Asserts Agenda,” New York Times, 7/29/09
- “Opposition Rattles a Governing Coalition in Iraqi Kurds’ Vote,” New York Times, 7/26/09
Danly, James, “The 2009 Kurdish Elections,” Institute for the Study of War,” 7/23/09
Hama-Tahir, Wrya, “Prominent former PUK leader accused of using dissident faction as proxy to settle political scores,” Institute of War & Peace Reporting, 12/5/08
Hamad, Qassim Khidhir, “Kurdish election lists,” Niqash, 6/30/09
Khalil, Lydia, “Stability in Iraqi Kurdistan: Reality or Mirage?” Brookings Institution, June 2009
Mahmoud, Amer, “controversy over Kurdish constitution,” Niqash, 7/6/09
Shadid, Anthony, “After Kurdish Vote, Talabani Pledges to Rebuild Party,” Washington Post, 7/29/09
- “Kurdish Leaders Warn Of Strains With Maliki,” Washington Post, 7/17/09
- “Worries About A Kurdish-Arab Conflict Moves To Fore in Iraq,” Washington Post, 7/27/09
Stansfield, Gareth Anderson, Liam, “Kurds in Iraq: the struggle between Baghdad and Erbil,” Middle East Policy, Spring 2009
Synovitz, Ron, “Expert Focuses On Significance Of Iraq’s Kurdish Regional Elections,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 7/25/09
Monday, July 27, 2009
The Role Of The PUK And KDP In Kurdish Politics
On July 25, 2009 the residents of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) voted on a new regional parliament and president. While there are real challengers this time in the legislature, the election is unlikely to break the hold the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of KRG President Massoud Barzani and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani have over the region. The two parties have ruled Kurdistan since it gained its autonomy after the 1991 Gulf War. Since the 2003 U.S. invasion, the two once bitter enemies have united to maintain their power.
Mullah Mustafa Barzani, the father of Massoud, was the most prominent leader of the Kurdish independence movement. He formed the Mahabad Republic, a Kurdish state, in 1945, which was later crushed. He fled to Russia afterwards, while his son Massoud went to Iraq. In 1946 Mustafa formed the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and returned to Iraq in 1958, and started fighting against the government with the support of Iran. In the 1960s Jalal Talabani left the KDP, and formed his own Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).
In 1979 Mustafa died and Massoud assumed control of the KDP. He launched his own insurgency against the Iraqi government during the Iran-Iraq War. At the time, the Barzanis and the KDP were based out of Iran, and he and Talabani fought on the Iranian side during the war with Iraq. After the Gulf War Kurdistan gained its autonomy with the help of the United States, and Barzani and Talabani assumed leadership of the region.
In the mid-1990s a civil war broke out between the two parties with Talabani looking to Iran for help, and Barzani turning to Saddam. The Iraqi Army moved into Kurdistan in 1996 at the invitation of the KDP, and crushed the PUK. In 1998 the two sides stopped fighting after 500 civilians were killed.
In the wake of this conflict, two separate administrations were created in Kurdistan, the KDP in Irbil and the PUK in Sulaymaniya. These were informally called Barzanistan and Talabanistan because of the tight control the two families exerted over all facets of life. The judiciary and parliament were the only two bodies that were shared between the two. Otherwise, the two had separate militias, separate security forces, etc. In December 2002, with the U.S. invasion expected, the PUK and KDP signed an accord to end their rivalry, and provide a united front in the new Iraq. This eventually worked out well as the Kurds were able to ensure their autonomy, and a process to annex Kirkuk under the Transitional Administrative Law in 2004 and the Iraqi Constitution in 2005. The Kurds were also able to gain high positions in Baghdad such as Talabani becoming the Iraqi president.
In 2006 the KDP and PUK signed a unification agreement to bring together the two separate administrations. While many officers have been brought together, some of the most important ones, the Finance Ministry, the peshmerga, and the asayesh security forces, have not. There are many members of the old guard in both parties and their peshmerga who are still bitter over the civil war. The militias are also loyal to their political leaders, and not the Kurdish government or Baghdad. The two sides also have different cultures within their administrations, as well as divergent laws, especially on foreign investment, and have not agreed upon how to split revenues. The two Finance Ministries have also made long-term commitments and investments, which have to be completed before the budgets can be unified. These are all reasons why these institutions remain separate.
What the two parties have agreed upon is to maintain their power over the region. The unification agreement gives specific posts in the KRG only to PUK and KDP members for example. The two parties also have extensive patronage systems. For instance, it’s recently been reported that after a four-year hiring freeze the regional government has hired 2,500 new employees just as campaigning started for the Kurdish parliament. Many believe this is a political move to gain more voters in the election. Top positions throughout Kurdistan are also reserved for party members. University presidents, university councils, deans, heads of departments, and scholarships are all connected to the political parties.
Corruption and nepotism are also common complaints about the PUK and KDP. Business deals usually require a high level party official to be completed. The Barzani and Talabani clans have extensive business deals throughout the region, and the latter are said to be worth $2 billion. Family members are also found throughout the government. Massoud’s son Masrour, who is currently the party’s security chief, is going to be the next KDP leader, while his cousin Nechervan is the KRG Prime Minister.
The PUK and KDP’s control of the security forces have also allowed them to go after their political opponents. In May 2009 for example, the Committee to Protect Journalists released a letter to the KRG complaining about lawsuits against and arrests of journalists that criticized the government. The Committee found that while a new law was passed in September 2008 to protect journalists, government officials often use an older law from 1969 to sue reporters who are critical of the KRG. The Committee considered this unjust and a form of harassment. More serious were arrests of journalists and other critical voices, which was detailed in an April 2009 Amnesty International report. In the 2005 elections, the KDP was also accused of attacking the Kurdistan Islamic Union.
These have all become issues with voters in Kurdistan, and even within the ruling parties themselves. In late 2008 a group called the Movement for Democratic Change was formed within the PUK calling for political reform. Talabani kicked them out of the party. Later in February 2009 some of the top members of the party threatened to leave unless the PUK initiated internal reforms to fight corruption, nepotism, and provide greater transparency. Talabani agreed to their demands this time as regional elections were pending, and he couldn’t afford so many high level defections beforehand. Now as a date for that voting has been set, the PUK and KDP are facing their first real political challenge in the regional parliament. Domestic issues are also said to be more important than the Kurds’ dispute with Baghdad or Kirkuk. Voters are demanding better rule, services, and real reform.
Despite this development in the electorate, little is likely to change after the July 25 balloting. More seats will likely go to new parties in the Kurdish parliament, but Massoud Barzani is expected to be re-elected KRG president. The administration will still be run by the PUK and KDP. Their grip on education, business, government finances, and security will remain in place as well. The upcoming vote is an important step for the Kurdish region because a real opposition might be forming, but until the PUK and KDP loosen their hold on power, the status quo is likely to be preserved.
SOURCES
Amnesty International, “Hope and Fear, Human rights in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq,” April 2009
Anderson, Liam, “Internationalizing Iraq’s Constitutional Dilemma,” will appear in The Kurdish Policy Imperative, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2009
Bakri, Nada, “Challengers Face an Uphill Battle in Elections in Iraq’s Kurdish North,” Washington Post, 7/19/09
Butters, Andrew Lee, “Trouble in Kurdistan,” Time, 3/17/06
Elliott, Michael and Calabresi, Massimo, “Inside The Secret Campaign To Topple Saddam,” Time, 12/2/02
Hamad, Qassim Khidhir, “kurds seek new political opposition,” Niqash, 7/16/09
Institute for War & Peace Reporting, “KDP Flexes Muscle in Dohuk,” 7/21/09
Khalil, Lydia, “Stability in Iraqi Kurdistan: Reality or Mirage?” Brookings Institution, June 2009
Mahmoud, Shakhwan, “fired and hired for their political beliefs?” Niqash, 7/20/09
Muhammad, Sardar, “KRG presidential candidates,” Niqash, 7/9/09
Simon, Joel, “CPJ alarmed by press violations in Iraqi Kurdistan,” Committee to Protect Journalists, 5/5/09
Mullah Mustafa Barzani, the father of Massoud, was the most prominent leader of the Kurdish independence movement. He formed the Mahabad Republic, a Kurdish state, in 1945, which was later crushed. He fled to Russia afterwards, while his son Massoud went to Iraq. In 1946 Mustafa formed the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and returned to Iraq in 1958, and started fighting against the government with the support of Iran. In the 1960s Jalal Talabani left the KDP, and formed his own Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).
In 1979 Mustafa died and Massoud assumed control of the KDP. He launched his own insurgency against the Iraqi government during the Iran-Iraq War. At the time, the Barzanis and the KDP were based out of Iran, and he and Talabani fought on the Iranian side during the war with Iraq. After the Gulf War Kurdistan gained its autonomy with the help of the United States, and Barzani and Talabani assumed leadership of the region.
In the mid-1990s a civil war broke out between the two parties with Talabani looking to Iran for help, and Barzani turning to Saddam. The Iraqi Army moved into Kurdistan in 1996 at the invitation of the KDP, and crushed the PUK. In 1998 the two sides stopped fighting after 500 civilians were killed.
In the wake of this conflict, two separate administrations were created in Kurdistan, the KDP in Irbil and the PUK in Sulaymaniya. These were informally called Barzanistan and Talabanistan because of the tight control the two families exerted over all facets of life. The judiciary and parliament were the only two bodies that were shared between the two. Otherwise, the two had separate militias, separate security forces, etc. In December 2002, with the U.S. invasion expected, the PUK and KDP signed an accord to end their rivalry, and provide a united front in the new Iraq. This eventually worked out well as the Kurds were able to ensure their autonomy, and a process to annex Kirkuk under the Transitional Administrative Law in 2004 and the Iraqi Constitution in 2005. The Kurds were also able to gain high positions in Baghdad such as Talabani becoming the Iraqi president.
In 2006 the KDP and PUK signed a unification agreement to bring together the two separate administrations. While many officers have been brought together, some of the most important ones, the Finance Ministry, the peshmerga, and the asayesh security forces, have not. There are many members of the old guard in both parties and their peshmerga who are still bitter over the civil war. The militias are also loyal to their political leaders, and not the Kurdish government or Baghdad. The two sides also have different cultures within their administrations, as well as divergent laws, especially on foreign investment, and have not agreed upon how to split revenues. The two Finance Ministries have also made long-term commitments and investments, which have to be completed before the budgets can be unified. These are all reasons why these institutions remain separate.
What the two parties have agreed upon is to maintain their power over the region. The unification agreement gives specific posts in the KRG only to PUK and KDP members for example. The two parties also have extensive patronage systems. For instance, it’s recently been reported that after a four-year hiring freeze the regional government has hired 2,500 new employees just as campaigning started for the Kurdish parliament. Many believe this is a political move to gain more voters in the election. Top positions throughout Kurdistan are also reserved for party members. University presidents, university councils, deans, heads of departments, and scholarships are all connected to the political parties.
Corruption and nepotism are also common complaints about the PUK and KDP. Business deals usually require a high level party official to be completed. The Barzani and Talabani clans have extensive business deals throughout the region, and the latter are said to be worth $2 billion. Family members are also found throughout the government. Massoud’s son Masrour, who is currently the party’s security chief, is going to be the next KDP leader, while his cousin Nechervan is the KRG Prime Minister.
The PUK and KDP’s control of the security forces have also allowed them to go after their political opponents. In May 2009 for example, the Committee to Protect Journalists released a letter to the KRG complaining about lawsuits against and arrests of journalists that criticized the government. The Committee found that while a new law was passed in September 2008 to protect journalists, government officials often use an older law from 1969 to sue reporters who are critical of the KRG. The Committee considered this unjust and a form of harassment. More serious were arrests of journalists and other critical voices, which was detailed in an April 2009 Amnesty International report. In the 2005 elections, the KDP was also accused of attacking the Kurdistan Islamic Union.
These have all become issues with voters in Kurdistan, and even within the ruling parties themselves. In late 2008 a group called the Movement for Democratic Change was formed within the PUK calling for political reform. Talabani kicked them out of the party. Later in February 2009 some of the top members of the party threatened to leave unless the PUK initiated internal reforms to fight corruption, nepotism, and provide greater transparency. Talabani agreed to their demands this time as regional elections were pending, and he couldn’t afford so many high level defections beforehand. Now as a date for that voting has been set, the PUK and KDP are facing their first real political challenge in the regional parliament. Domestic issues are also said to be more important than the Kurds’ dispute with Baghdad or Kirkuk. Voters are demanding better rule, services, and real reform.
Despite this development in the electorate, little is likely to change after the July 25 balloting. More seats will likely go to new parties in the Kurdish parliament, but Massoud Barzani is expected to be re-elected KRG president. The administration will still be run by the PUK and KDP. Their grip on education, business, government finances, and security will remain in place as well. The upcoming vote is an important step for the Kurdish region because a real opposition might be forming, but until the PUK and KDP loosen their hold on power, the status quo is likely to be preserved.
SOURCES
Amnesty International, “Hope and Fear, Human rights in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq,” April 2009
Anderson, Liam, “Internationalizing Iraq’s Constitutional Dilemma,” will appear in The Kurdish Policy Imperative, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2009
Bakri, Nada, “Challengers Face an Uphill Battle in Elections in Iraq’s Kurdish North,” Washington Post, 7/19/09
Butters, Andrew Lee, “Trouble in Kurdistan,” Time, 3/17/06
Elliott, Michael and Calabresi, Massimo, “Inside The Secret Campaign To Topple Saddam,” Time, 12/2/02
Hamad, Qassim Khidhir, “kurds seek new political opposition,” Niqash, 7/16/09
Institute for War & Peace Reporting, “KDP Flexes Muscle in Dohuk,” 7/21/09
Khalil, Lydia, “Stability in Iraqi Kurdistan: Reality or Mirage?” Brookings Institution, June 2009
Mahmoud, Shakhwan, “fired and hired for their political beliefs?” Niqash, 7/20/09
Muhammad, Sardar, “KRG presidential candidates,” Niqash, 7/9/09
Simon, Joel, “CPJ alarmed by press violations in Iraqi Kurdistan,” Committee to Protect Journalists, 5/5/09
Tuesday, July 21, 2009
Kurds Agree To Suspend Vote On Controversial Constitution
On July 10, 2009 the Kurdistan Regional parliament agreed to postpone a referendum on a new controversial constitution. The vote was to coincide with elections for the Kurdish parliament and president on July 25. The proposed constitution has been criticized from both within and without Kurdistan.
The Kurdish parliament passed the constitution at the very last minute. The legislature was supposed to end its term on June 4, 2009, but extended their session to pass the constitution on June 24. The document has two controversial parts to it. First it lays claim to the city of Kirkuk, and other areas in Diyala and Ninewa provinces. In June 2009 talks began behind the scenes between the United Nations, Baghdad, and Kurdistan over these disputed areas. The constitution was a signal that the Kurds were not going to give up on their territorial claims to a greater Kurdistan, which they say consists of areas that are historically theirs. One member of the Kurdish parliament said that they no longer had confidence in the national constitution because there had been no movement on the disputed areas. The Iraqi constitution includes Article 140, which called for normalization, a census, and then referendum on Kirkuk and the other disputed territories. The vote was supposed to happen by December 31, 2007, but that was extended to June 2008 and then abandoned. All sides have now agreed to let the United Nations mediate this issue, yet the Kurds still talk about implementing 140.
The move caused consternation in Baghdad and Washington. 50 members of Iraq’s parliament immediately signed a statement rejecting the Kurdish constitution. They claim that it is unconstitutional. Some claimed that it was the first move towards secession by the Kurds. On July 2 Vice President Joe Biden traveled to Iraq where he said that the new constitution was not helping the increasing divide between Baghdad and Kurdistan. The new U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Christopher Hill went to talk with the Kurds shortly afterwards, followed by a visit by Admiral Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Join Chiefs of Staff, to Kirkuk. All three U.S. officials said that Iraqis needed to negotiate and resolve these disputes themselves, and that the Americans would help if needed. The problem is that the U.S. has stood on the sidelines waiting for the U.N. to make progress on the issue, when the international body cannot really do anything without a strong U.S. role. At the same time the differences between Baghdad and Kurdistan have increased. The proposed Kurdish constitution then just added fuel to the fire.
The constitution has also caused protests within Kurdistan. The biggest problem is that it gives new powers to the regional president. The president would be allowed to dissolve the Kurdish parliament, gives the office executive power, command over the peshmerga, the ability to pass and veto laws, and remove any ministers. Opposition parties claim that the document is an attempt to preserve the power of the ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) that have ruled the autonomous region since 1991. In this year’s vote they are facing serious challengers for the first time. Incumbent Kurdish President Massoud Barzani of the KDP however, is expected to be re-elected. The belief is that if the KDP and PUK loose power to these new parties in parliament they will have a new trump card in the expanded powers of the president. In response, several social organizations in Sulaymaniya began a campaign against the new constitution in June 2009, and some of the opposition parties are talking about joining behind one candidate to oppose Barzani in the election.
The whole issue is now going to be postponed. Iraq’s Election Commission said that it couldn’t have an election for the Kurdish parliament and president at the same time as a referendum on the new constitution. The Commission said the soonest it could hold a vote for the constitution would be August 11, and the Kurdish parliament said they would have it no later than September 2009.
This delay is only holding off the inevitable. Annexing Kirkuk and other disputed areas is widely popular in Kurdistan. Many Kurds have not even heard or read the constitution either, and will probably be unaware of the changes that it will make in the power of the president before the vote. That means the constitution will likely be passed. If it does it will ensure the continued rule of the PUK-KDP alliance no matter what the outcome of the Kurdistan parliamentary vote is, and add to the growing Arab-Kurdish divide within the country. It also shows the obstinacy of the Kurdish ruling parties to not budge on either domestic Kurdish issues, or national ones.
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Iraq panel rejects Kirkuk vote on same day as Kurd polls,” 7/6/09
Alsumaria, “Kurdistan keeps on elections, delays referendum,” 7/10/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Kurdistan presidential hopeful slams Talabani’s promotion of Barzani,” 7/13/09
Dagher, Sam, “Kurds Defy Baghdad, Laying Claim to Land and Oil,” New York Times, 7/10/09
Khalil, Lydia, “Stability in Iraqi Kurdistan: Reality or Mirage?” Brookings Institution, June 2009
Mahmoud, Amer, “controversy over Kurdish constitution,” Niqash, 7/6/09
Muhammad, Sardar, “KRG presidential candidates,” Niqash, 7/9/09
Stansfield, Gareth Anderson, Liam, “Kurds in Iraq: the struggle between Baghdad and Erbil,” Middle East Policy, Spring 2009
UPI, “’Figure it out,’ Mullen tells Kirkuk,” 7/14/09
The Kurdish parliament passed the constitution at the very last minute. The legislature was supposed to end its term on June 4, 2009, but extended their session to pass the constitution on June 24. The document has two controversial parts to it. First it lays claim to the city of Kirkuk, and other areas in Diyala and Ninewa provinces. In June 2009 talks began behind the scenes between the United Nations, Baghdad, and Kurdistan over these disputed areas. The constitution was a signal that the Kurds were not going to give up on their territorial claims to a greater Kurdistan, which they say consists of areas that are historically theirs. One member of the Kurdish parliament said that they no longer had confidence in the national constitution because there had been no movement on the disputed areas. The Iraqi constitution includes Article 140, which called for normalization, a census, and then referendum on Kirkuk and the other disputed territories. The vote was supposed to happen by December 31, 2007, but that was extended to June 2008 and then abandoned. All sides have now agreed to let the United Nations mediate this issue, yet the Kurds still talk about implementing 140.
The move caused consternation in Baghdad and Washington. 50 members of Iraq’s parliament immediately signed a statement rejecting the Kurdish constitution. They claim that it is unconstitutional. Some claimed that it was the first move towards secession by the Kurds. On July 2 Vice President Joe Biden traveled to Iraq where he said that the new constitution was not helping the increasing divide between Baghdad and Kurdistan. The new U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Christopher Hill went to talk with the Kurds shortly afterwards, followed by a visit by Admiral Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Join Chiefs of Staff, to Kirkuk. All three U.S. officials said that Iraqis needed to negotiate and resolve these disputes themselves, and that the Americans would help if needed. The problem is that the U.S. has stood on the sidelines waiting for the U.N. to make progress on the issue, when the international body cannot really do anything without a strong U.S. role. At the same time the differences between Baghdad and Kurdistan have increased. The proposed Kurdish constitution then just added fuel to the fire.
The constitution has also caused protests within Kurdistan. The biggest problem is that it gives new powers to the regional president. The president would be allowed to dissolve the Kurdish parliament, gives the office executive power, command over the peshmerga, the ability to pass and veto laws, and remove any ministers. Opposition parties claim that the document is an attempt to preserve the power of the ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) that have ruled the autonomous region since 1991. In this year’s vote they are facing serious challengers for the first time. Incumbent Kurdish President Massoud Barzani of the KDP however, is expected to be re-elected. The belief is that if the KDP and PUK loose power to these new parties in parliament they will have a new trump card in the expanded powers of the president. In response, several social organizations in Sulaymaniya began a campaign against the new constitution in June 2009, and some of the opposition parties are talking about joining behind one candidate to oppose Barzani in the election.
The whole issue is now going to be postponed. Iraq’s Election Commission said that it couldn’t have an election for the Kurdish parliament and president at the same time as a referendum on the new constitution. The Commission said the soonest it could hold a vote for the constitution would be August 11, and the Kurdish parliament said they would have it no later than September 2009.
This delay is only holding off the inevitable. Annexing Kirkuk and other disputed areas is widely popular in Kurdistan. Many Kurds have not even heard or read the constitution either, and will probably be unaware of the changes that it will make in the power of the president before the vote. That means the constitution will likely be passed. If it does it will ensure the continued rule of the PUK-KDP alliance no matter what the outcome of the Kurdistan parliamentary vote is, and add to the growing Arab-Kurdish divide within the country. It also shows the obstinacy of the Kurdish ruling parties to not budge on either domestic Kurdish issues, or national ones.
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Iraq panel rejects Kirkuk vote on same day as Kurd polls,” 7/6/09
Alsumaria, “Kurdistan keeps on elections, delays referendum,” 7/10/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Kurdistan presidential hopeful slams Talabani’s promotion of Barzani,” 7/13/09
Dagher, Sam, “Kurds Defy Baghdad, Laying Claim to Land and Oil,” New York Times, 7/10/09
Khalil, Lydia, “Stability in Iraqi Kurdistan: Reality or Mirage?” Brookings Institution, June 2009
Mahmoud, Amer, “controversy over Kurdish constitution,” Niqash, 7/6/09
Muhammad, Sardar, “KRG presidential candidates,” Niqash, 7/9/09
Stansfield, Gareth Anderson, Liam, “Kurds in Iraq: the struggle between Baghdad and Erbil,” Middle East Policy, Spring 2009
UPI, “’Figure it out,’ Mullen tells Kirkuk,” 7/14/09
Sunday, July 12, 2009
Campaigning For Kurdistan’s Regional Parliament Begins
On July 25, 2009 the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) will hold elections for not only its parliament, but also a new constitution. 24 lists are running for 111 seats in the Kurdistan legislature. This year’s vote looks to be the most competitive since the first Kurdish election held in 1992. Then only seven parties ran, followed by thirteen in 2005. The two sets of balloting confirmed the dominant role of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Both times they ran together, and took 104 of 111 seats in the last vote in 2005. This time the two are facing a serious challenge from PUK co-founder Nishurwan Mustafa and his Change List. He has a powerful media company, Wisha that he has run since 2006 to get out his message of reform. The PUK has also gone through a series of internal revolts over corruption, autocratic rule, and lack of transparency that have led to many defections. Wisha claims that 30,000 PUK members have been fired for associating with the Change List, while 200 officials have been expelled from the party as well for doing the same. Some early estimates believe that Mustafa could get 20% of the vote. Even that amount, could break the hegemony of the PUK-KDP alliance within the Kurdish parliament.
There are several other smaller reform parties running, along with a host of candidates for the regional president. Among those are the Service and Reform List made up of Islamic groups like the Kurdistan Islamic Group and the Kurdistan Islamic Union. The Progress List headed by Halo Ibrahim Ahmed, the brother-in-law of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, and the Kurdish Reform Movement with its leader Abdul Musawer Barzani, cousin of KRG President Massoud Barzani. He is running for re-election to that post, along with Ahmed of the Progress List, London scholar Kamal Mirawdeli, and two businessmen, Hussein Karmiani and Safin Sheikh Mohammed.
In July Kurds will also vote for a controversial new constitution. The Kurdish parliament passed a draft of the document in mid-June. Among other things, it lays claim to Kirkuk, and other disputed territories in Ninewa and Diyala, calling them part of greater Kurdistan. These areas are one of the major divisions between Kurdistan and Baghdad. It is also playing out at the provincial level between the ruling al-Hadbaa party and the PUK-KDP led Fraternal List in Ninewa.
The 2009 election in Kurdistan could be a turning point for the region. If the Change List and the other reform tickets are able to gain a sizeable amount of seats they could break the strangle hold the KDP and PUK have over the legislature. That would only be a first step however. It’s been said that the parliament is only a rubber stamp as the PUK and KDP leaders make all the major decisions behind the scenes. Each party also runs its own peshmerga militia and Aseyash security force that have been accused of going after their opponents. This is part of separate administrations the two parties have, and a unification agreement between the two reserves all top posts in the government only for themselves. Presidents and councils of universities and scholarships are also only open to PUK and KDP party members, and any large business dealings in the region have to include party members, usually relatives or tribal members of the Barzani and Talabani families. Despite the image that the Kurdistan Regional Government likes to portray of itself, it still has a very long way to go to become an actual democratic region of Iraq.
Kurdish Lists Participating In The July 2009 Election
KURDISTAN LIST
Made up of the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. The list is headed by Barham Saleh of the PUK and current Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq. The Kurdistan List calls for maintain the status quo. The KDP was founded in 1946 by Mullah Mustafa Barzani, the father of KRG President Massoud Barzani. Massoud Barzani is the current head of the KPD, Fadhil Mirani is the leader of the KDP politburo, and Nechirvan Barzani is the KRG Prime Minister. The PUK was formed b Jalal Tabani when he broke from the KDP in 1975. Kosrat Rasul, the KRG’s Vice President, is the head of the PUK’s politburo. Saleh is number three in the PUK.
CHANGE LIST
Former PUK co-founder Nishurwan Mustafa is the head of the Change List. He left the PUK in December 2006 criticizing it for not reforming itself. Most of the list is made up of former PUK officials. They want to separate political parties from the government and economy, resolve the dispute between Baghdad and Kurdistan through dialogue, and provide more transparency in the administration and budget.
SERVICE AND REFORM LIST
The List is made up of the Kurdistan Islamic Union, the Islamic Group of Kurdistan, the Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party and the Future Party. It says it is fighting against corruption in the current government, claims disputed areas as part of Kurdistan, and wants to rule guided by Islam. Ali Bapir heads the Islamic Group of Kurdistan. He was arrested by the Americans in 2003 for ties with terrorist groups, and is said to be close to Iran. The Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party is led by Muhammad Haji Mahmud, the Future Party is headed by Qadir Aziz. It is related to the Muslim Brotherhood.
KURDISTAN CONSERVATIVE PARTY
Zaid Surchi, a tribal leader is the head of the party. It has ties with the PUK.
ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF KURDISTAN LIST
Shaykh Uthman Abdul-Aziz formed the list with other Sunni mullahs in 1979. It is based in Halabja, and headed by Sidiq Abdul Aziz and Ahmed Warte. It calls for the government to be based upon Islam, and wants greater transparency.
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND FREEDOM LIST
It is made up of the Kurdistan Communist Party, the Kurdistan Toilers Party, the Kurdistan Independent work Party, the Kurdistan Pro-Democratic Party, and the Democratic Movement of Kurdistan People. It calls for equal rights, rights for farmers, more housing, and secularism.
INDEPENDENT YOUTH LIST
Hiwa Abdul Karim Aziz, a journalist is the leader of the list, which only includes 10 people. It says it is standing for the young people of the KRG.
KURDISTAN REFORM MOVEMENT
Abdul Musawwar al-Barzani, cousing of Massoud Barzani, heads the movement. It calls for an end to corruption, rule of law, and human rights
PROGRESSION LIST
Jalal Talabani’s brother-in-law Halo Ibrahim Ahmed heads the list. They call for better living conditions. Ahmed was part of a dissident PUK group that was kicked out of the party.
KURDISTAN DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL PARTY LIST
Was founded in 1995 and calls for uniting Kurds across Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria. It wants more housing and women and youth rights.
KURDISTAN TOILERS AND WORKERS PARTY LIST
Calls for rule of law in the KRG.
IRAQI CONSTITUTIONAL PARTY
Was founded by Iraqi Interior Minister Jawad Bolani, who says he is no longer its official leader.
KURDISTAN BRIGHT FUTURE LIST
Is headed by Muhammad Saleh Hama Faraj, who lived in England until 2008. He wants the political parties out of administration and the justice system.
5 seats have been reserved for Turkmen
IRBIL TURKMEN LIST
Is led by Sherdil Tahsin Arsalan, Tafa Rostman Qasab, Thaura Saleh, Nafeh Rostam, and Artham Abdul Karim. It wants Kirkuk to be annexed, and it is against Turkish influence.
TURKMEN REFORM LIST
Is headed by Abdul Qadir Zangana. It wants more power for Turkmen and is against Turkish influence.
TURKMEN DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT IN KURDISTAN
Is led by Karkhi Alti Barmak, who calls for Turkmen unity. It also wants Kirkuk to be annexed, and is against Turkish influence.
INDEPENDENT TURKMEN LIST
Is led by Kanhan Shakir Aziz. It calls for Kirkuk to be an independent region
5 seats have been reserved for Christians
UNIFIED CHALDEAN LIST
Is made up of the Chaldean Union Party and the Chaldean National Council
CHALDEAN SYRIAC ASSYRIAN AUTONOMY LIST
AL-RAFIDAIN LIST
Is led by Iraqi parliamentarian Yunadam Kanna. It wants a greater role for Christians in the peshmerga and Asayesh.
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHALDEAN SYRIAC ASSYRIANS
Is led by Sarkis Aghajan Mamendo. He calls for the Ninewa plaints to be annexed.
2 seats have been set aside for Armenians
Aram Shahine Dawood Bakoyan, Eshkhan Malkin Sargisyan, and Aertex Morses Sargisyan are running for these seats.
SOURCES
Abdulqadir, Mohammed Amin, “Kurds Still Without Govt After January Poll,” Inter Press Service, 5/26/05
Agence France Presse, “Iraq Kurds pass new constitution to include Kirkuk,” 6/24/09
Amnesty International, “Hope and Fear, Human rights in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq,” April 2009
Hamad, Qassim Khidhir, “kdp and puk face election challenge,” Niqash, 5/12/09
- “Kurdish election lists,” Niqash, 6/30/09
Jumani, Kamal, “kurdistan prepares for elections,” Niqash, 6/25/09
Khalil, Lydia, “Stability in Iraqi Kurdistan: Reality or Myth,” Brookings Institution, June 2009
Mahmoud Rebaz, “Election Fever Rises in Kurdistan,” Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 6/17/09
There are several other smaller reform parties running, along with a host of candidates for the regional president. Among those are the Service and Reform List made up of Islamic groups like the Kurdistan Islamic Group and the Kurdistan Islamic Union. The Progress List headed by Halo Ibrahim Ahmed, the brother-in-law of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, and the Kurdish Reform Movement with its leader Abdul Musawer Barzani, cousin of KRG President Massoud Barzani. He is running for re-election to that post, along with Ahmed of the Progress List, London scholar Kamal Mirawdeli, and two businessmen, Hussein Karmiani and Safin Sheikh Mohammed.
In July Kurds will also vote for a controversial new constitution. The Kurdish parliament passed a draft of the document in mid-June. Among other things, it lays claim to Kirkuk, and other disputed territories in Ninewa and Diyala, calling them part of greater Kurdistan. These areas are one of the major divisions between Kurdistan and Baghdad. It is also playing out at the provincial level between the ruling al-Hadbaa party and the PUK-KDP led Fraternal List in Ninewa.
The 2009 election in Kurdistan could be a turning point for the region. If the Change List and the other reform tickets are able to gain a sizeable amount of seats they could break the strangle hold the KDP and PUK have over the legislature. That would only be a first step however. It’s been said that the parliament is only a rubber stamp as the PUK and KDP leaders make all the major decisions behind the scenes. Each party also runs its own peshmerga militia and Aseyash security force that have been accused of going after their opponents. This is part of separate administrations the two parties have, and a unification agreement between the two reserves all top posts in the government only for themselves. Presidents and councils of universities and scholarships are also only open to PUK and KDP party members, and any large business dealings in the region have to include party members, usually relatives or tribal members of the Barzani and Talabani families. Despite the image that the Kurdistan Regional Government likes to portray of itself, it still has a very long way to go to become an actual democratic region of Iraq.
Kurdish Lists Participating In The July 2009 Election
KURDISTAN LIST
Made up of the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. The list is headed by Barham Saleh of the PUK and current Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq. The Kurdistan List calls for maintain the status quo. The KDP was founded in 1946 by Mullah Mustafa Barzani, the father of KRG President Massoud Barzani. Massoud Barzani is the current head of the KPD, Fadhil Mirani is the leader of the KDP politburo, and Nechirvan Barzani is the KRG Prime Minister. The PUK was formed b Jalal Tabani when he broke from the KDP in 1975. Kosrat Rasul, the KRG’s Vice President, is the head of the PUK’s politburo. Saleh is number three in the PUK.
CHANGE LIST
Former PUK co-founder Nishurwan Mustafa is the head of the Change List. He left the PUK in December 2006 criticizing it for not reforming itself. Most of the list is made up of former PUK officials. They want to separate political parties from the government and economy, resolve the dispute between Baghdad and Kurdistan through dialogue, and provide more transparency in the administration and budget.
SERVICE AND REFORM LIST
The List is made up of the Kurdistan Islamic Union, the Islamic Group of Kurdistan, the Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party and the Future Party. It says it is fighting against corruption in the current government, claims disputed areas as part of Kurdistan, and wants to rule guided by Islam. Ali Bapir heads the Islamic Group of Kurdistan. He was arrested by the Americans in 2003 for ties with terrorist groups, and is said to be close to Iran. The Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party is led by Muhammad Haji Mahmud, the Future Party is headed by Qadir Aziz. It is related to the Muslim Brotherhood.
KURDISTAN CONSERVATIVE PARTY
Zaid Surchi, a tribal leader is the head of the party. It has ties with the PUK.
ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF KURDISTAN LIST
Shaykh Uthman Abdul-Aziz formed the list with other Sunni mullahs in 1979. It is based in Halabja, and headed by Sidiq Abdul Aziz and Ahmed Warte. It calls for the government to be based upon Islam, and wants greater transparency.
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND FREEDOM LIST
It is made up of the Kurdistan Communist Party, the Kurdistan Toilers Party, the Kurdistan Independent work Party, the Kurdistan Pro-Democratic Party, and the Democratic Movement of Kurdistan People. It calls for equal rights, rights for farmers, more housing, and secularism.
INDEPENDENT YOUTH LIST
Hiwa Abdul Karim Aziz, a journalist is the leader of the list, which only includes 10 people. It says it is standing for the young people of the KRG.
KURDISTAN REFORM MOVEMENT
Abdul Musawwar al-Barzani, cousing of Massoud Barzani, heads the movement. It calls for an end to corruption, rule of law, and human rights
PROGRESSION LIST
Jalal Talabani’s brother-in-law Halo Ibrahim Ahmed heads the list. They call for better living conditions. Ahmed was part of a dissident PUK group that was kicked out of the party.
KURDISTAN DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL PARTY LIST
Was founded in 1995 and calls for uniting Kurds across Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria. It wants more housing and women and youth rights.
KURDISTAN TOILERS AND WORKERS PARTY LIST
Calls for rule of law in the KRG.
IRAQI CONSTITUTIONAL PARTY
Was founded by Iraqi Interior Minister Jawad Bolani, who says he is no longer its official leader.
KURDISTAN BRIGHT FUTURE LIST
Is headed by Muhammad Saleh Hama Faraj, who lived in England until 2008. He wants the political parties out of administration and the justice system.
5 seats have been reserved for Turkmen
IRBIL TURKMEN LIST
Is led by Sherdil Tahsin Arsalan, Tafa Rostman Qasab, Thaura Saleh, Nafeh Rostam, and Artham Abdul Karim. It wants Kirkuk to be annexed, and it is against Turkish influence.
TURKMEN REFORM LIST
Is headed by Abdul Qadir Zangana. It wants more power for Turkmen and is against Turkish influence.
TURKMEN DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT IN KURDISTAN
Is led by Karkhi Alti Barmak, who calls for Turkmen unity. It also wants Kirkuk to be annexed, and is against Turkish influence.
INDEPENDENT TURKMEN LIST
Is led by Kanhan Shakir Aziz. It calls for Kirkuk to be an independent region
5 seats have been reserved for Christians
UNIFIED CHALDEAN LIST
Is made up of the Chaldean Union Party and the Chaldean National Council
CHALDEAN SYRIAC ASSYRIAN AUTONOMY LIST
AL-RAFIDAIN LIST
Is led by Iraqi parliamentarian Yunadam Kanna. It wants a greater role for Christians in the peshmerga and Asayesh.
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHALDEAN SYRIAC ASSYRIANS
Is led by Sarkis Aghajan Mamendo. He calls for the Ninewa plaints to be annexed.
2 seats have been set aside for Armenians
Aram Shahine Dawood Bakoyan, Eshkhan Malkin Sargisyan, and Aertex Morses Sargisyan are running for these seats.
SOURCES
Abdulqadir, Mohammed Amin, “Kurds Still Without Govt After January Poll,” Inter Press Service, 5/26/05
Agence France Presse, “Iraq Kurds pass new constitution to include Kirkuk,” 6/24/09
Amnesty International, “Hope and Fear, Human rights in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq,” April 2009
Hamad, Qassim Khidhir, “kdp and puk face election challenge,” Niqash, 5/12/09
- “Kurdish election lists,” Niqash, 6/30/09
Jumani, Kamal, “kurdistan prepares for elections,” Niqash, 6/25/09
Khalil, Lydia, “Stability in Iraqi Kurdistan: Reality or Myth,” Brookings Institution, June 2009
Mahmoud Rebaz, “Election Fever Rises in Kurdistan,” Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 6/17/09
Wednesday, June 03, 2009
Kurdish Parliamentary Elections Announced For July
At the beginning of May 2009 the President of the Kurdistan Regional Government Massoud Barzani announced that Kurdish parliamentary elections will be held on July 25. Originally they were planned for May. 42 parties and alliances with a total of 509 candidates will run for 111 seats. That’s an increase from previous elections. In 1992 only seven parties ran, and in 2005 thirteen. Since the 1990s Kurdish politics have been dominated by the two major parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of Barzani. They plan on running together again in the 2009 vote. This year’s balloting may be the start of a sea change in Kurdish politics however as the former co-founder of the PUK his own party, which could break the monopoly on power held by the ruling groups.
2.5 million Kurds are registered to vote. Only those that reside in the three Kurdish provinces of Dohuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniya are eligible. Eleven of the 111 seats are reserved for minorities. Five are to go to Turkmen, five for Christians, and one for Armenians. 30% are also to go to women. Despite some earlier controversy, the Iraqi Election Commission will supervise the voting. Currently the KDP holds 40 seats, followed by the 38 of the PUK. The next two parties, the Kurdistan Islamic Union only holds nine followed by the Turkmen Party with four.
Current Seats Held In The Kurdish Parliament
Kurdistan Democratic Party: 40
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan: 38
Kurdistan Islamic Union: 9
Turkmen Party: 4
Kurdistan Communist Party: 3
Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party: 2
Assyrian Democratic Movement: 2
Chaldean Cultural Society: 1
Bet Nahrain Democratic Party: 1
Chaldean Democratic Union Party: 1
Farmers Movement Party: 1
Kurdistan Democratic National Union: 1
Independent Nouri Talabany: 1
Islamic Group of Kurdistan: 6
Kurdistan Toilers Party: 1
The biggest change in this year’s election is the fact that PUK co-founder Nishurwan Mustafa will run as the head of the Change List. Mustafa co-founded the PUK with Talabani, but later resigned in December 2006. Mustafa plans on running against the domination of the PUK and KDP, claiming that they are corrupt, autocratic, and have not provided services. Mustafa has a decided advantage heading into the balloting because he owns a large media company called Wisha, and is popular in Sulaymaniya. Since the KDP and PUK are roughly equal, Mustafa could play the insurgent and break that balance of power.
This comes on the heels of a number of defections and dissension within the PUK. In February 2009 a group of leading officials in the PUK politburo led by Deputy Secretary General Kosrat Rasoul Ali, who is also the Vice President of the Kurdistan Regional Government, threatened to resign unless Talabani instituted reforms in the party to make it more democratic, end corruption, and work towards greater transparency over its finances. Talabani ended up giving into their demands, and replaced the Interior Minister and Deputy Prime Minister of Kurdistan as well.
The next few months will be an interesting election cycle in Kurdistan. Mustafa will have to prove that he can use his media power and popularity to form a credible opposition party and sway voters to his cause. The PUK and KDP will also have to bring out the vote as they have come under increasing criticism from everyday Kurds along with their own party officials. This could be the beginning of a major change in the region’s politics if the hold of the PUK and KDP are really challenged.
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Five Iraqi Kurdish Party Officials Resign,” 2/13/09
- “Iraqi Kurds to hold election on July 25,” 5/5/09
Alsumaria, “Talabani to share power within his party,” 2/18/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “509 candidates run for Kurdish elections – IHEC,” 5/21/09
- “Kurdish interior ministry to resign – ministry,” 3/10/09
- “Kurdistan’s deputy PM resigns after relieved of duties,” 2/24/09
- “Main Kurdish parties announce alliance in elections,” 5/7/09
Azzaman, “Talabani Tries To Prevent His Party From Splitting And Rejects The Resignation Of Rasul,” 2/17/09
Barzanji, Yahya, “New candidate emerges among Iraq’s Kurds,” Associated Press, 5/2/09
Hamad, Qassim Khidhir, “kdp and puk face election challenge,” Niqash, 5/12/09
Kurdish Media.com, “Barzani rejects IHEC to supervise KRG Elections, Hawlati,” 2/26/09
Ose, Oshnag, “talabani battles new calls for reform,” Niqash, 3/4/09
Zagros, Roman and Mahmood, Azeez, “Third Force in Kurdish Politics Mooted,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 3/30/09
2.5 million Kurds are registered to vote. Only those that reside in the three Kurdish provinces of Dohuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniya are eligible. Eleven of the 111 seats are reserved for minorities. Five are to go to Turkmen, five for Christians, and one for Armenians. 30% are also to go to women. Despite some earlier controversy, the Iraqi Election Commission will supervise the voting. Currently the KDP holds 40 seats, followed by the 38 of the PUK. The next two parties, the Kurdistan Islamic Union only holds nine followed by the Turkmen Party with four.
Current Seats Held In The Kurdish Parliament
Kurdistan Democratic Party: 40
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan: 38
Kurdistan Islamic Union: 9
Turkmen Party: 4
Kurdistan Communist Party: 3
Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party: 2
Assyrian Democratic Movement: 2
Chaldean Cultural Society: 1
Bet Nahrain Democratic Party: 1
Chaldean Democratic Union Party: 1
Farmers Movement Party: 1
Kurdistan Democratic National Union: 1
Independent Nouri Talabany: 1
Islamic Group of Kurdistan: 6
Kurdistan Toilers Party: 1
The biggest change in this year’s election is the fact that PUK co-founder Nishurwan Mustafa will run as the head of the Change List. Mustafa co-founded the PUK with Talabani, but later resigned in December 2006. Mustafa plans on running against the domination of the PUK and KDP, claiming that they are corrupt, autocratic, and have not provided services. Mustafa has a decided advantage heading into the balloting because he owns a large media company called Wisha, and is popular in Sulaymaniya. Since the KDP and PUK are roughly equal, Mustafa could play the insurgent and break that balance of power.
This comes on the heels of a number of defections and dissension within the PUK. In February 2009 a group of leading officials in the PUK politburo led by Deputy Secretary General Kosrat Rasoul Ali, who is also the Vice President of the Kurdistan Regional Government, threatened to resign unless Talabani instituted reforms in the party to make it more democratic, end corruption, and work towards greater transparency over its finances. Talabani ended up giving into their demands, and replaced the Interior Minister and Deputy Prime Minister of Kurdistan as well.
The next few months will be an interesting election cycle in Kurdistan. Mustafa will have to prove that he can use his media power and popularity to form a credible opposition party and sway voters to his cause. The PUK and KDP will also have to bring out the vote as they have come under increasing criticism from everyday Kurds along with their own party officials. This could be the beginning of a major change in the region’s politics if the hold of the PUK and KDP are really challenged.
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Five Iraqi Kurdish Party Officials Resign,” 2/13/09
- “Iraqi Kurds to hold election on July 25,” 5/5/09
Alsumaria, “Talabani to share power within his party,” 2/18/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “509 candidates run for Kurdish elections – IHEC,” 5/21/09
- “Kurdish interior ministry to resign – ministry,” 3/10/09
- “Kurdistan’s deputy PM resigns after relieved of duties,” 2/24/09
- “Main Kurdish parties announce alliance in elections,” 5/7/09
Azzaman, “Talabani Tries To Prevent His Party From Splitting And Rejects The Resignation Of Rasul,” 2/17/09
Barzanji, Yahya, “New candidate emerges among Iraq’s Kurds,” Associated Press, 5/2/09
Hamad, Qassim Khidhir, “kdp and puk face election challenge,” Niqash, 5/12/09
Kurdish Media.com, “Barzani rejects IHEC to supervise KRG Elections, Hawlati,” 2/26/09
Ose, Oshnag, “talabani battles new calls for reform,” Niqash, 3/4/09
Zagros, Roman and Mahmood, Azeez, “Third Force in Kurdish Politics Mooted,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 3/30/09
Wednesday, March 25, 2009
Kurdish Elections Planned for May
When Iraq’s parliament passed the provincial election law in September 2008 it delayed voting in the three provinces of Kurdistan, Dohuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniyah. The date for balloting there was to be determined by the Kurdish Regional Government’s parliament. That has now been announced as May 19, 2009. For more than two decades, politics there have been dominated by the two major parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of Kurdish President Massoud Barzani and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by Iraqi President Jalal Talabani. Those two organizations will probably continue in that position, but there are increasing challenges to the PUK.
As reported before, President Talabani was recently forced into agreeing to a series of concessions about how he runs the PUK. Those included greater transparency over finances, fighting corruption, and more democratic practices. Talabani agreed to these changes after the Deputy Secretary General of the PUK Kosrat Rassoul, and four other politburo members threatened to resign. According to the on-line magazine Niqash, 16 of the 39 politburo and central committee members of the PUK supported their move. Seeking party unity before the elections, Talabani agreed to their demands. There are some who doubt that he will implement these promises though, because it would mean a loss of power for him and his followers.
The PUK’s problems may not be over either. According to the Iraqi paper Azzaman, the former Deputy Party leader Nishurawn Mustafa may form his own party to run in the May elections. Mustafa helped found the PUK with Talabani in 1975. In December 2006 he resigned, criticizing the Kurdistan Regional Government for being autocratic. Since then he has gone on to create a powerful media company that includes newspapers, a TV station, and a website. He has used these outlets to criticize the PUK for not improving the Kurdish economy, failing to raise the standard of living, and for attempting to control business. Under the agreement with the dissidents Talabani has agreed to open dialogue with Mustafa to try to bring him back into the PUK’s fold. If he agrees to create his own party, he could be a serious challenger.
Massoud Barzani of the KDP on the other hand has been demanding Kurdish authority over the vote. In late February 2009, Barzani announced that the Iraqi High Electoral Commission would not supervise the Kurdish elections. At the time the Kurdish parliament approved an election law that said the Iraqi Election Commission should organize the vote, but Barzani rejected it and demanded an independence Kurdish body have that duty.
The May 2009 elections will be the third held in Kurdistan. Previously voting was held in 1992 and 2005. Those two and the coming one will use a closed list system. That means the estimated 2.5 million eligible voters can only vote for parties and coalitions of parties called lists, not individuals. The victors will then select the politicians that will serve in the provincial governments. Iraq as a whole used this system in 2005. Some smaller Kurdish parties have complained about the closed list, but they have little power to change things.
Below are the results of the 1992 and 2005 votes for Kurdistan’s National Assembly (Parliament)
1992 Results
Votes:
Total Votes Cast: 971,953
Invalid Votes: 4,724
Votes By Party:
Kurdistan Democratic Party: 438,979 votes, 45.3%
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan: 423,833 votes, 43.8%
Islamic Movement: 49,108 votes, 5.1%
Kurdistan Socialist Party: 24,882 votes, 2.6%
Iraqi Communist Party: 21,123 votes, 2.2%
Kurdistan Popular Democratic Party: 9,903 votes, 1.0%
Independent Democrats: 501 votes
Seats:
Kurdistan Democratic Party: 51
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan: 49
2005 Results
Votes:
Total Votes Cast: 1,753,919
Invalid Votes: 23,067
Votes By Party:
Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan (Kurdistan Democratic Party, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and 11 smaller parties): 1,570,663 votes, 89.5%
Islamic Group of Kurdistan: 85,237 votes, 4.86%
Kurdistan Toilers Party: 20,585 votes
Democratic People’s Democratic Movement: 11,748 votes
Kurdistan People’s Democratic Movement: 10,953
Independent List: 10,262 votes
Others: 44,471 votes
Seats:
Members of the Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan:
Kurdistan Democratic Party: 40
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan: 38
Kurdistan Islamic Union: 9
Turkmen Party: 4
Kurdistan Communist Party: 3
Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party: 2
Assyrian Democratic Movement: 2
Chaldean Cultural Society: 1
Bet Nahrain Democratic Party: 1
Chaldean Democratic Union Party: 1
Farmers Movement Party: 1
Kurdistan Democratic National Union: 1
Independent Nouri Talabany: 1
Islamic Group of Kurdistan: 6
Kurdistan Toilers Party: 1
SOURCES
AK News, “Kurdistan parliament elections between closed and open lists,” 3/4/09
Azzaman, “Talabani Tries To Prevent His Party From Splitting And Rejects The Resignation Of Rasul,” 2/17/09
Goode, Erica, “Iraq Passes Provincial Elections Law,” New York Times, 9/25/08
Knights, Michael, “Significance of the Provincial Elections,” Arab Reform Bulletin, December, 2008
Knights, Michael and McCarthy, Eamon, “Provincial Politics in Iraq: Fragmentation or New Awakening?” Washington Institute for Near East Studies, April 2008
Kurdish Media.com, “Barzani rejects IHEC to supervise KRG Elections, Hawlati,” 2/26/09
Kurdistan National Assembly webpage
NINA, “Presidency reserved over IHEC supervising Kurdistan elections,” 2/25/09
Ose, Oshnag, “talabani battles new calls for reform,” Niqash, 3/4/09
Osman, Twana and Zagros, Roman, “Ex-Kurdish Leader Takes On Old Allies,” Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 11/12/08
PUKmedia, “President Barzani recommends establishing Election Committee in Kurdistan,” 2/27/09
Reuters, “Iraq’s Kurds to elect parliament on May 19,” 2/2/09
Wikipedia, “Iraqi Kurdistan legislative election, 2005”
As reported before, President Talabani was recently forced into agreeing to a series of concessions about how he runs the PUK. Those included greater transparency over finances, fighting corruption, and more democratic practices. Talabani agreed to these changes after the Deputy Secretary General of the PUK Kosrat Rassoul, and four other politburo members threatened to resign. According to the on-line magazine Niqash, 16 of the 39 politburo and central committee members of the PUK supported their move. Seeking party unity before the elections, Talabani agreed to their demands. There are some who doubt that he will implement these promises though, because it would mean a loss of power for him and his followers.
The PUK’s problems may not be over either. According to the Iraqi paper Azzaman, the former Deputy Party leader Nishurawn Mustafa may form his own party to run in the May elections. Mustafa helped found the PUK with Talabani in 1975. In December 2006 he resigned, criticizing the Kurdistan Regional Government for being autocratic. Since then he has gone on to create a powerful media company that includes newspapers, a TV station, and a website. He has used these outlets to criticize the PUK for not improving the Kurdish economy, failing to raise the standard of living, and for attempting to control business. Under the agreement with the dissidents Talabani has agreed to open dialogue with Mustafa to try to bring him back into the PUK’s fold. If he agrees to create his own party, he could be a serious challenger.
Massoud Barzani of the KDP on the other hand has been demanding Kurdish authority over the vote. In late February 2009, Barzani announced that the Iraqi High Electoral Commission would not supervise the Kurdish elections. At the time the Kurdish parliament approved an election law that said the Iraqi Election Commission should organize the vote, but Barzani rejected it and demanded an independence Kurdish body have that duty.
The May 2009 elections will be the third held in Kurdistan. Previously voting was held in 1992 and 2005. Those two and the coming one will use a closed list system. That means the estimated 2.5 million eligible voters can only vote for parties and coalitions of parties called lists, not individuals. The victors will then select the politicians that will serve in the provincial governments. Iraq as a whole used this system in 2005. Some smaller Kurdish parties have complained about the closed list, but they have little power to change things.
Below are the results of the 1992 and 2005 votes for Kurdistan’s National Assembly (Parliament)
1992 Results
Votes:
Total Votes Cast: 971,953
Invalid Votes: 4,724
Votes By Party:
Kurdistan Democratic Party: 438,979 votes, 45.3%
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan: 423,833 votes, 43.8%
Islamic Movement: 49,108 votes, 5.1%
Kurdistan Socialist Party: 24,882 votes, 2.6%
Iraqi Communist Party: 21,123 votes, 2.2%
Kurdistan Popular Democratic Party: 9,903 votes, 1.0%
Independent Democrats: 501 votes
Seats:
Kurdistan Democratic Party: 51
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan: 49
2005 Results
Votes:
Total Votes Cast: 1,753,919
Invalid Votes: 23,067
Votes By Party:
Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan (Kurdistan Democratic Party, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and 11 smaller parties): 1,570,663 votes, 89.5%
Islamic Group of Kurdistan: 85,237 votes, 4.86%
Kurdistan Toilers Party: 20,585 votes
Democratic People’s Democratic Movement: 11,748 votes
Kurdistan People’s Democratic Movement: 10,953
Independent List: 10,262 votes
Others: 44,471 votes
Seats:
Members of the Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan:
Kurdistan Democratic Party: 40
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan: 38
Kurdistan Islamic Union: 9
Turkmen Party: 4
Kurdistan Communist Party: 3
Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party: 2
Assyrian Democratic Movement: 2
Chaldean Cultural Society: 1
Bet Nahrain Democratic Party: 1
Chaldean Democratic Union Party: 1
Farmers Movement Party: 1
Kurdistan Democratic National Union: 1
Independent Nouri Talabany: 1
Islamic Group of Kurdistan: 6
Kurdistan Toilers Party: 1
SOURCES
AK News, “Kurdistan parliament elections between closed and open lists,” 3/4/09
Azzaman, “Talabani Tries To Prevent His Party From Splitting And Rejects The Resignation Of Rasul,” 2/17/09
Goode, Erica, “Iraq Passes Provincial Elections Law,” New York Times, 9/25/08
Knights, Michael, “Significance of the Provincial Elections,” Arab Reform Bulletin, December, 2008
Knights, Michael and McCarthy, Eamon, “Provincial Politics in Iraq: Fragmentation or New Awakening?” Washington Institute for Near East Studies, April 2008
Kurdish Media.com, “Barzani rejects IHEC to supervise KRG Elections, Hawlati,” 2/26/09
Kurdistan National Assembly webpage
NINA, “Presidency reserved over IHEC supervising Kurdistan elections,” 2/25/09
Ose, Oshnag, “talabani battles new calls for reform,” Niqash, 3/4/09
Osman, Twana and Zagros, Roman, “Ex-Kurdish Leader Takes On Old Allies,” Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 11/12/08
PUKmedia, “President Barzani recommends establishing Election Committee in Kurdistan,” 2/27/09
Reuters, “Iraq’s Kurds to elect parliament on May 19,” 2/2/09
Wikipedia, “Iraqi Kurdistan legislative election, 2005”
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