Iraq is entering its seventh year since the U.S. invasion. Many things have changed in that time period, from the chaos that followed the collapse of the state after Saddam was overthrown, to the civil war that erupted, to the Surge. At the end of 2009 three Iraq analysts, Sam Parker of the United States Institute for Peace, Michael Hanna of the Century Foundation, and Reidar Visser of the Norwegian Institute of International Relations, wrote pieces speculating on what lay ahead for Iraq. All three agree that politics is the main forum for disputes within Iraq now, but don’t see much hope for the country’s elites to overcome their differences any time soon.
Sam Parker in his article “Is Iraq Back?” for Current History, and Michael Hanna in “Transitional state” in the Abu Dhabi newspaper The National start off by talking about Iraq’s current political situation. Both believe that politics has replaced violence as the main way groups in the country now resolve their problems. This started in early 2005 when some militants first began turning on Al Qaeda in Iraq, which would eventually snowball into most of the insurgency switching sides and giving up the fight to join the Anbar Awakening and the Sons of Iraq. Sunnis also greatly regretted boycotting the 2005 elections, which isolated them from local and national governments. In the 2009 provincial elections, Sunni turnout was very high as a result, and deaths have taken a sharp drop since then as a result. This process will continue in the 2010 vote, and has led Iraq from being a failed state to a fragile one.
What the central government now faces are three large and daunting problems, the first of which is sectarianism. Parker believes that this is now more about identity than religious differences, as Iraqis tend to vote for candidates of their own community. That means any future government will have to continue to include representatives of each of the major groups, the Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis. These large groups however, are breaking up into smaller factions. The Shiites for example, ran on one large list in 2005, the United Iraqi Alliance, but in 2010 will be competing in two lists, the State of Law led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, and the National Alliance made up of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and the Sadrists. Reidar Visser of the Norwegian Institute of International Relations in “COIN to Nowhere? Lesson from Iraq, Questions for Afghanistan” adds that he believes that these sectarian divisions have solidified rather than weakened. For example, while Maliki’s State of Law tried to create new cross-sectarian alliances after the 2009 elections and attempted to reach out to Sunnis and former Baathists, he was later stopped by criticisms by the other Shiite parties, pressure from Iran, and the Obama administration, which continues to stress a grand bargain between the three major groups. He then agrees with Parker and Hanna that any new Iraqi government will look and operate very much like the old one as a result.
The ethnosectarian groups also have long-standing differences over things like federalism versus centralism, oil policy, and the Arab-Kurd dispute. Hanna writes that there have been no serious efforts to deal with any of these issues, and that any new government is likely to be just as divided as the current one. Many of these problems have their origins in the 2005 constitution, which was drafted while the Iraqi state was weak and the sectarian war was just about to take off. The Arab-Kurd divide prevents any major changes to the document, leading to more deadlock. Hanna doesn’t believe that these divisions will lead the country back to civil war, and oddly adds that not dealing with them right now may be the best thing for Iraq right at the moment. He’s afraid that any move towards majority rule, and away from consensus could do more harm than good because the country’s weak institutions may not be able to deal with winners and losers. Visser has written extensively arguing the opposite, that the Iraqi system of consensus and quotas within the government should be ended because it only maintains the sectarian divisions.
The paralysis in Baghdad means that more mundane issues like basic governance, services, the displaced and refugees, corruption, jobs, poverty, etc. can’t be addressed. Technical issues like boosting oil production, and election laws for example get endlessly delayed because of the larger disputes between the ethnosectarian groups. The lack of development and the Arab-Kurd divide also allows militants to continue their attacks in Iraq.
All three analysts bring up important issues for Iraq’s future. Iraq is no longer a failed state as it once was. It is gaining back both its sovereignty and domestic standing. Violence is also down to its lowest level since the 2003 invasion, and the struggle for political power through peaceful means is now paramount. The inability of Baghdad to deliver on many basic needs however, its corruption, and sectarianism continue to eat away at its standing with the public. The continued factionalization of Iraq’s three major groups also means that it will be harder rather than easier to put together a new government and get things done. Parker and Hanna point out that this makes Iraq not much different from many other Third World countries who not only struggle with development, but also power sharing and ethnic differences. The problem is that public dissatisfaction with a government that seems dysfunctional can undermine a nascent democracy, and lead to a return to autocracy or worse, and that may be Iraq’s largest dilemma in the long-term.
SOURCES
Hanna, Michael, “Transitional state,” The National, 11/26/09
Parker, Sam, “Is Iraq Back?” Current History, December 2009
Visser, Reidar, “COIN to Nowhere? Lessons from Iraq, Questions for Afghanistan,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 12/1/09
Showing posts with label Constitution. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Constitution. Show all posts
Monday, January 04, 2010
Monday, August 17, 2009
International Crisis Group Report On Baghdad-Kurdish Divide
In early July 2009 the International Crisis Group issued its latest report on Iraq covering the simmering Baghdad-Kurdish dispute entitled “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line.” This has been one of the biggest problems in Iraq over the last two years, and has replaced the sectarian war as the major dividing line in the country. The U.S. is especially worried that it might blow up and lead to new violence as the administration is trying to draw down forces. Vice President Joe Biden, Defense Secretary Robert Gates, and U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Christopher Hill, have all talked recently about this issue needing to be resolved. There may not be enough of a commitment on the part of Washington, Baghdad, and Kurdistan however to fix this problem anytime soon.
The split between the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) began in the summer of 2008. Previous to that Baghdad was relatively weak, especially in the years immediately following the U.S. invasion. That allowed the Kurds to win a number of large concessions to protect their autonomy, while their peshmerga forces swept south into areas they claimed to be historically Kurdish. By 2008 however, Maliki and the central government were stronger, and the Prime Minister began trying to assert federal authority and limit the Kurds to Kurdistan. This led to a number of confrontations, some of which are still playing out today. In August 2008 Maliki confronted the Kurds in the disputed district of Khanaqin in Diyala province. That same month the Prime Minister began talking about the need for a strong central government, that the constitution should be changed, that ethnosectarian quotas should be done away with, that there was no need to find consensus on every law between the different groups in the country, and that majority rule should replace it. In September 2008 Maliki followed that up by moving the 12th Iraqi Army Division into Tamim, home of Kirkuk. These were all steps meant to improve Maliki’s image as a nationalist leader before the 2009 provincial elections. He could very use the same tactics in the run-up to the 2010 parliamentary vote.
As would be expected, Maliki’s actions set off alarm bells in Kurdistan. The Kurdish leadership began condemning the Prime Minister, and claiming he was acting like the new dictator of Iraq. The Kurds were also becoming increasingly frustrated that nothing was being done about Kirkuk, and began holding up major legislation in parliament as a result. The Kurds even flirted with having a no confidence vote against Maliki in December 2008, but a lack of a successor ended the idea. By 2009 then, the two sides had hardened their positions, and neither seemed willing to back down.
The Crisis Group points to five on-going issues that are contributing to the conflict between Baghdad and the KRG. First is Kirkuk, which remains in political limbo as none of the parties can agree upon how to resolves its future or hold elections there. Second is the Green Line, the former border between Iraq and Kurdistan established in 1991. That line disappeared after 2003 when the peshmerga moved south into the disputed areas. Even though the constitution says they should not be there, the Kurds claim that part of the constitution should be revised. Third is the United Nations’ attempt to mediate the disputed areas. In April 2009 the U.N. presented its findings on the territories, and in mid-June the first meeting was held to work out the details, but shortly afterwards the Kurds passed a draft of a regional constitution, which laid claim to Kirkuk and other the other areas the Kurds consider theirs. Fourth, is the increasing confrontation between the peshmerga and Iraqi security forces. This began in Khanaqin in August 2008, spread to Tamim, and then Ninewa. The U.S. has increased its presence in the north to try to mediate, and set up a joint committee of Kurdish and Iraqi forces in Kirkuk, but has been unsuccessful in creating similar groups in the rest of the conflicted areas. The Kurds and Baghdad are both apprehensive about what will happen after the U.S. withdrawal, and are thinking in terms of worst-case scenarios of a possible armed confrontation. Last is the control of Iraq’s oil and natural gas. This involves the constitution and who has the authority to issue contracts, Baghdad or Kurdistan. The two sides have held up work on fields in disputed areas, and even when there is an apparent break through like the recent okay for the Kurds to export some of their oil, there are major hindrances as well. The Kurds are looking for major oil companies to move into the region, and create stronger ties with Turkey and the European Union to pressure Baghdad into allowing the KRG to follow its own, autonomous resource development plan.
The International Crisis Group, the United Nations, and the U.S. all say that this is the major divide in Iraq today. The problem is that the dispute involves so many different issues, federalism, the constitution, the security forces, the disputed territories, and natural resources, that any negotiations will be long and difficult. The Crisis Group calls for a grand bargain between the two sides that would include all of these issues. In October 2008 they proposed just such a deal for Kirkuk, but there were so many steps that it seemed impossible to implement. There is also the added issue that this is an election year for Iraq with parliamentary elections due in January 2010, which leads politicians to harden their stances rather than seek compromise. U.S. influence is also weakening as Maliki is limiting their freedom of operation under the Status of Forces Agreement, and U.S. troops are set to withdraw in the coming months. All of these factors do not point to a breakthrough in this dispute. Unless the Americans make a major push to put all of these sides in a room together to talk out their differences, it seems like the Baghdad-KRG dispute could last for years. Despite recent trips and comments by leading administration officials, there does not appear to be this level of commitment by the White House. Instead they seem to be working at the local level to try to stop the peshmerga and Iraqi Army from shooting at each other, while standing behind the United Nations’ talk at the national level, rather than being in the forefront and being the initiator. Perhaps only Maliki being replaced as Prime Minister could change things in the short-term, and this will definitely be a goal of the Kurds after the 2010 elections.
SOURCES
International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09
- “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08
Khalil, Lydia, “Stability in Iraqi Kurdistan: Reality or Mirage?” Brookings Institution, June 2009
Kurdistan Regional Government, “Full Text of the KRG Response to Iraqi Prime Minister’s Accusations,” 12/1/08
Mahmoud, Amer, “controversy over Kurdish constitution,” Niqash, 7/6/09
Malazada, Hemin, “kurds dismiss talk of centralization,” Niqash, 11/24/08
Raghavan, Sudarsan, “Deaths of Iraqis in July Lower Than in May, June,” Washington Post, 8/2/08
Reuters, “Shi’ite Maliki calls for majority rule in Iraq,” 5/15/09
The split between the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) began in the summer of 2008. Previous to that Baghdad was relatively weak, especially in the years immediately following the U.S. invasion. That allowed the Kurds to win a number of large concessions to protect their autonomy, while their peshmerga forces swept south into areas they claimed to be historically Kurdish. By 2008 however, Maliki and the central government were stronger, and the Prime Minister began trying to assert federal authority and limit the Kurds to Kurdistan. This led to a number of confrontations, some of which are still playing out today. In August 2008 Maliki confronted the Kurds in the disputed district of Khanaqin in Diyala province. That same month the Prime Minister began talking about the need for a strong central government, that the constitution should be changed, that ethnosectarian quotas should be done away with, that there was no need to find consensus on every law between the different groups in the country, and that majority rule should replace it. In September 2008 Maliki followed that up by moving the 12th Iraqi Army Division into Tamim, home of Kirkuk. These were all steps meant to improve Maliki’s image as a nationalist leader before the 2009 provincial elections. He could very use the same tactics in the run-up to the 2010 parliamentary vote.
As would be expected, Maliki’s actions set off alarm bells in Kurdistan. The Kurdish leadership began condemning the Prime Minister, and claiming he was acting like the new dictator of Iraq. The Kurds were also becoming increasingly frustrated that nothing was being done about Kirkuk, and began holding up major legislation in parliament as a result. The Kurds even flirted with having a no confidence vote against Maliki in December 2008, but a lack of a successor ended the idea. By 2009 then, the two sides had hardened their positions, and neither seemed willing to back down.
The Crisis Group points to five on-going issues that are contributing to the conflict between Baghdad and the KRG. First is Kirkuk, which remains in political limbo as none of the parties can agree upon how to resolves its future or hold elections there. Second is the Green Line, the former border between Iraq and Kurdistan established in 1991. That line disappeared after 2003 when the peshmerga moved south into the disputed areas. Even though the constitution says they should not be there, the Kurds claim that part of the constitution should be revised. Third is the United Nations’ attempt to mediate the disputed areas. In April 2009 the U.N. presented its findings on the territories, and in mid-June the first meeting was held to work out the details, but shortly afterwards the Kurds passed a draft of a regional constitution, which laid claim to Kirkuk and other the other areas the Kurds consider theirs. Fourth, is the increasing confrontation between the peshmerga and Iraqi security forces. This began in Khanaqin in August 2008, spread to Tamim, and then Ninewa. The U.S. has increased its presence in the north to try to mediate, and set up a joint committee of Kurdish and Iraqi forces in Kirkuk, but has been unsuccessful in creating similar groups in the rest of the conflicted areas. The Kurds and Baghdad are both apprehensive about what will happen after the U.S. withdrawal, and are thinking in terms of worst-case scenarios of a possible armed confrontation. Last is the control of Iraq’s oil and natural gas. This involves the constitution and who has the authority to issue contracts, Baghdad or Kurdistan. The two sides have held up work on fields in disputed areas, and even when there is an apparent break through like the recent okay for the Kurds to export some of their oil, there are major hindrances as well. The Kurds are looking for major oil companies to move into the region, and create stronger ties with Turkey and the European Union to pressure Baghdad into allowing the KRG to follow its own, autonomous resource development plan.
The International Crisis Group, the United Nations, and the U.S. all say that this is the major divide in Iraq today. The problem is that the dispute involves so many different issues, federalism, the constitution, the security forces, the disputed territories, and natural resources, that any negotiations will be long and difficult. The Crisis Group calls for a grand bargain between the two sides that would include all of these issues. In October 2008 they proposed just such a deal for Kirkuk, but there were so many steps that it seemed impossible to implement. There is also the added issue that this is an election year for Iraq with parliamentary elections due in January 2010, which leads politicians to harden their stances rather than seek compromise. U.S. influence is also weakening as Maliki is limiting their freedom of operation under the Status of Forces Agreement, and U.S. troops are set to withdraw in the coming months. All of these factors do not point to a breakthrough in this dispute. Unless the Americans make a major push to put all of these sides in a room together to talk out their differences, it seems like the Baghdad-KRG dispute could last for years. Despite recent trips and comments by leading administration officials, there does not appear to be this level of commitment by the White House. Instead they seem to be working at the local level to try to stop the peshmerga and Iraqi Army from shooting at each other, while standing behind the United Nations’ talk at the national level, rather than being in the forefront and being the initiator. Perhaps only Maliki being replaced as Prime Minister could change things in the short-term, and this will definitely be a goal of the Kurds after the 2010 elections.
SOURCES
International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09
- “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08
Khalil, Lydia, “Stability in Iraqi Kurdistan: Reality or Mirage?” Brookings Institution, June 2009
Kurdistan Regional Government, “Full Text of the KRG Response to Iraqi Prime Minister’s Accusations,” 12/1/08
Mahmoud, Amer, “controversy over Kurdish constitution,” Niqash, 7/6/09
Malazada, Hemin, “kurds dismiss talk of centralization,” Niqash, 11/24/08
Raghavan, Sudarsan, “Deaths of Iraqis in July Lower Than in May, June,” Washington Post, 8/2/08
Reuters, “Shi’ite Maliki calls for majority rule in Iraq,” 5/15/09
Thursday, August 13, 2009
The Constitutional Conundrum Of The Kurds
Officials of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) consistently claim that the Constitution and its Article 140 need to be followed when it comes to resolving Kirkuk and other disputed territories. Most recently KRG President Massoud Barzani said at the end of July 2009 that he rejected the United Nation’s recommendations for the disputed areas and any other plan that does away with Article 140. At the same time the Kurds maintain de facto control of the city and other areas of northern Iraq they claim is part of a historical greater Kurdistan. This despite the fact that the constitution says they should not be there. This is their dilemma, the Kurds demand that part of the constitution be followed so that they can annex the areas they want, while at the same time they are ignoring other parts of the constitution that stand in the way of this goal.
Article 140 called for normalization, a census and a referendum on the future of Kirkuk and other disputed territories in Iraq by December 31, 2007. When it appeared unlikely that the article would be implemented in time the Kurds agreed to a six-month extension. That June 2008 deadline came and passed as well with no resolution to the problem. This has caused a huge amount of frustration on the part of the Kurds, who have held up major legislation in parliament in protest.
Despite this, the Kurds still maintain control over a large area of northern Iraq including Kirkuk. With the overthrow of Saddam, Kurdish peshmerga forces swept south into the areas they claimed to be theirs. The U.S. also asked for their help when the insurgency took off. This allowed the Kurds to establish themselves in northern sections of Ninewa, Salahaddin, Tamim, and Diyala. The Kurds also call a swath of northern Wasit theirs as well. If annexed this land would almost double the size of Kurdistan from 15,400 square miles to 30,100 square miles.
The problem is the 2005 Iraqi constitution says that this presence is illegal. The 2004 Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) that was drafted by the Coalition Provisional Authority to govern Iraq until it drew up its own constitution included Article 53(A). It said that the Kurds only had authority over areas that they controlled before the 2003 U.S. invasion. This area was established in the wake of the 1991 Gulf War when Iraqi forces withdrew and the U.S. and England established a northern no fly zone. The border between Kurdistan and the rest of Iraq became known as the Green Line. Article 53(A) was later incorporated into the 2005 constitution.
Since 2007 Kurdish officials have said they no longer recognize the Green Line since they have de facto control of these disputed territories. In late 2007 for example, the KRG Natural Resources Minister said the Green Line was passé. The KRG also told oil and security companies working in Kurdistan to remove any maps that included the Green Line. In early 2009 Masrour Barzani, son of KRG President Massoud Barzani, and head of the KRG’s security forces, stated that the Green Line was a relic of Saddam’s time and that the KRG refused to abide by it. In May he told the International Crisis Group that everything in the constitution should be negotiated to resolve the fate of these areas.
This is the conundrum the Kurds now find themselves in. On the one hand, they demand that Article 140 and the constitution be followed when it comes to Kirkuk, and the disputed territories. At the same time the constitution says they have no right to be in those areas as they now are. The Kurds have increasingly rejected this part of the constitution, and said that everything in it needs to be discussed. They can’t have it both ways. They can’t insist on the constitution being followed when they are breaking it and demanding revisions of it. This dilemma is unlikely to be resolved any time soon, especially with U.S. forces withdrawing. Even though Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki recently traveled to Kurdistan to meet with top KRG officials, positions will probably harden as the 2010 parliamentary elections near.
SOURCES
Cordesman, Anthony, “Iraq’s Fracture Lines: Recidivism or Reassertion,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7/28/09
Dagher, Sam, “Arrests in Bank Robbery Create a Rift Between Iraqi Officials,” New York Times, 8/3/09
- “New Kurdish Leader Asserts Agenda,” New York Times, 7/29/09
International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09
- “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08
Iraqi Constitution
Janabi, Nazar, “Kirkuk’s Article 140: Expired or Not?,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1/30/08
Mohammed, Shwan, “Kurdish forces refuse to quit Iraq battlefield province,” Agence France Presse, 8/13/08
Paley, Amit, “Strip of Iraq ‘on the Verge of Exploding,’” Washington Post, 9/13/08
Article 140 called for normalization, a census and a referendum on the future of Kirkuk and other disputed territories in Iraq by December 31, 2007. When it appeared unlikely that the article would be implemented in time the Kurds agreed to a six-month extension. That June 2008 deadline came and passed as well with no resolution to the problem. This has caused a huge amount of frustration on the part of the Kurds, who have held up major legislation in parliament in protest.
Despite this, the Kurds still maintain control over a large area of northern Iraq including Kirkuk. With the overthrow of Saddam, Kurdish peshmerga forces swept south into the areas they claimed to be theirs. The U.S. also asked for their help when the insurgency took off. This allowed the Kurds to establish themselves in northern sections of Ninewa, Salahaddin, Tamim, and Diyala. The Kurds also call a swath of northern Wasit theirs as well. If annexed this land would almost double the size of Kurdistan from 15,400 square miles to 30,100 square miles.
The problem is the 2005 Iraqi constitution says that this presence is illegal. The 2004 Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) that was drafted by the Coalition Provisional Authority to govern Iraq until it drew up its own constitution included Article 53(A). It said that the Kurds only had authority over areas that they controlled before the 2003 U.S. invasion. This area was established in the wake of the 1991 Gulf War when Iraqi forces withdrew and the U.S. and England established a northern no fly zone. The border between Kurdistan and the rest of Iraq became known as the Green Line. Article 53(A) was later incorporated into the 2005 constitution.
Since 2007 Kurdish officials have said they no longer recognize the Green Line since they have de facto control of these disputed territories. In late 2007 for example, the KRG Natural Resources Minister said the Green Line was passé. The KRG also told oil and security companies working in Kurdistan to remove any maps that included the Green Line. In early 2009 Masrour Barzani, son of KRG President Massoud Barzani, and head of the KRG’s security forces, stated that the Green Line was a relic of Saddam’s time and that the KRG refused to abide by it. In May he told the International Crisis Group that everything in the constitution should be negotiated to resolve the fate of these areas.
This is the conundrum the Kurds now find themselves in. On the one hand, they demand that Article 140 and the constitution be followed when it comes to Kirkuk, and the disputed territories. At the same time the constitution says they have no right to be in those areas as they now are. The Kurds have increasingly rejected this part of the constitution, and said that everything in it needs to be discussed. They can’t have it both ways. They can’t insist on the constitution being followed when they are breaking it and demanding revisions of it. This dilemma is unlikely to be resolved any time soon, especially with U.S. forces withdrawing. Even though Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki recently traveled to Kurdistan to meet with top KRG officials, positions will probably harden as the 2010 parliamentary elections near.
SOURCES
Cordesman, Anthony, “Iraq’s Fracture Lines: Recidivism or Reassertion,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7/28/09
Dagher, Sam, “Arrests in Bank Robbery Create a Rift Between Iraqi Officials,” New York Times, 8/3/09
- “New Kurdish Leader Asserts Agenda,” New York Times, 7/29/09
International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09
- “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08
Iraqi Constitution
Janabi, Nazar, “Kirkuk’s Article 140: Expired or Not?,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1/30/08
Mohammed, Shwan, “Kurdish forces refuse to quit Iraq battlefield province,” Agence France Presse, 8/13/08
Paley, Amit, “Strip of Iraq ‘on the Verge of Exploding,’” Washington Post, 9/13/08
Thursday, July 30, 2009
Have The Kurds Painted Themselves Into A Corner Over Kirkuk?
In June 2009 Lydia Khalil issued a report, “Stability in Iraqi Kurdistan: Reality or Mirage?” for the Brookings Institution. In it, she went over some of the major issues confronting the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), one of which was Kirkuk. In the years immediately following the 2003 U.S. invasion, the Kurds were in the ascendancy in Iraq, and set up a legal framework to annex Kirkuk. Both the 2004 Transitional Administration Law and the 2005 Constitution included procedures to add the area to the KRG. The problem is that neither of these was followed through with, and now the central government in Baghdad is stronger and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is asserting his power in the country. The Kurds have not adapted well to this new situation, and instead of adjusting their position accordingly, have clung to their old one and gone on the attack against Maliki. This may have painted the Kurds into a corner, as time is not on their side, and they may end up losing their dream of adding Kirkuk if they do not modify their approach.
The Kurdish leadership calls Kirkuk their Jerusalem, and after the U.S. invasion they set up a process to annex it by legal means. In the 2005 Constitution, the Kurds were able to add Article 140. It called for normalization, a census, and a referendum on the fate of Kirkuk by December 31, 2007. That deadline was extended to June 30, 2008, but that too came and passed and no new date for a referendum has been established. For all intense and purposes 140 is dead because no one else in parliament supports it, but the Kurds. All sides eventually agreed to abandon the article and defer the issue to the United Nations, but the Kurds still talk about implementing 140. On July 15, 2009 for example, KRG President Massoud Barzani said that Kirkuk was a Kurdish city and part of Kurdistan, and that Article 140 would never be disregarded.
At the same time, since 2003 the KRG has been working to create facts on the ground to support their claim to Kirkuk. They set up their own strategy to reverse Saddam’s Arabization policy, where he removed Kurds and Turkmen from Tamim province, home to Kirkuk, and replaced them with Arabs. Immediately after the U.S. invasion the Kurdish peshmerga militia began forcibly removing Arabs from the area. Later a formal process was created where the KRG would pay Arabs to leave the Kirkuk area. Around 8,000, mostly Shiites originally from southern Iraq, have taken up the offer. At the same time, the KRG moved in thousands of Kurds into the area offering money and aid, while intimidated others threatening to take away their jobs and support if they didn’t. The KRG has also changed the borders of Tamim to include more Kurdish towns from neighboring Kurdistan, and changed many signs and schools in the Kirkuk to be in Kurdish instead of Arabic. This altered the demographics and culture of Tamim to ensure that in any referendum Kirkuk would be annexed.
This policy has been ill received by the other groups in Tamim, and caused deep resentment against Kurdish aspirations on Kirkuk. During the 2003 invasion the Kurds swept south into Tamim and took over the top administrative and security duties there. After the 2005 elections, the Kurdish parties were victorious and refused to give the deputy governorship or council presidency to either the Arabs or Turkmen in the province. As a result, by November 2006, the Arabs began boycotting the provincial council. This deadlock was only broken in December 2007 when the Kurds gave 1/3 of the seats on the provincial council to the Arabs, and added an Arab deputy governor in a U.S. brokered deal. This concession did not heal the divisions however, and the Arabs and Turkmen eventually demanded that the provincial council seats be divided into rough thirds with 32% for the Kurds, 32% for the Arabs, 32% for the Turkmen, and the remaining seats for the Christians. The Provincial Powers Act passed in early 2008, and the Provincial Election law also called for power sharing in Tamim, but were never followed through with. Today, the Arabs and Turkmen of Tamim are set against Kurdish annexation. Many Turkmen are in favor of making Tamim an autonomous region, while Arabs want it to be a regular province under the control of Baghdad. Rather than allying with local groups, the Kurds have alienated many of them, and turned others into their political enemies.
With Article 140 deadlocked in Baghdad, and increasing opposition from non-Kurds at the provincial level, the KRG has turned to obstinacy. The Kurds are afraid that if they make any concessions they will lose Kirkuk, and therefore refuse to budge on any of their major demands. The Kurdish Alliance in parliament has also held up major legislation to protest against Article 140 not being implemented. In the KRG, the Kurdish leadership has pushed the issue so much that they are afraid of losing public support if they make any compromises. This stance has only added to the growing Arab-Kurdish divide within the country, because the more the Kurds refuse to make concessions the more opposition they garner. The Kurdish leadership has thus boxed themselves in. They may just continue with their current policy even if it fails, just to save face, and thus keep the status of Kirkuk in limbo.
SOURCES
Alsumaria, “Barazani: Kirkuk enjoys Kurdistani identity,” 7/15/09
Badkhen, Anna, “Kurds evicting Arabs in north Iraq,” San Francisco Chronicle, 4/19/03
Borden, Anthony, “Iraqi Governance Report,” Institute For War And Peace Reporting, August 2007
Chulov, Martin, “Kurds lay claim to oil riches in Iraq as old hatreds flare,” Observer, 6/14/09
Cocks, Tim, “U.N. wants Iraq Kurds to drop Kirkuk vote-diplomat,” Reuters, 7/21/09
Daragahi, Borzou, “Security may trump ethnicity in Kirkuk,” Los Angeles Times, 9/28/07
Farrell, Stephen, “As Iraqis View for Kirkuk’s Oil, Kurds Are Pawns,” New York Times, 12/9/07
Frayer, Lauren, “Kirkuk: Edging out its Arab migrants,” Associated Press, 12/8/07
International Crisis Group, “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08
Jakes, Lara, “Key UN report to suggest power-sharing plan in Iraq’s divided Kirkuk,” Associated Press, 3/29/09
Khalil, Lydia, “Stability in Iraqi Kurdistan: Reality or Mirage?” Brookings Institution, June 2009
Paley, Amit, “Iraqi Urges Refugees To Stay Put,” Washington Post, 12/5/07
Stansfield, Gareth Anderson, Liam, “Kurds in Iraq: the struggle between Baghdad and Erbil,” Middle East Policy, Spring 2009
Susman, Tina and Ahmed, Asso, “Iraqi Kurds delay Kirkuk vote,” Los Angeles Times, 12/27/07
Warden, James, “Disagreements over Kirkuk’s status could sideline voters,” Stars and Stripes, 7/14/08
The Kurdish leadership calls Kirkuk their Jerusalem, and after the U.S. invasion they set up a process to annex it by legal means. In the 2005 Constitution, the Kurds were able to add Article 140. It called for normalization, a census, and a referendum on the fate of Kirkuk by December 31, 2007. That deadline was extended to June 30, 2008, but that too came and passed and no new date for a referendum has been established. For all intense and purposes 140 is dead because no one else in parliament supports it, but the Kurds. All sides eventually agreed to abandon the article and defer the issue to the United Nations, but the Kurds still talk about implementing 140. On July 15, 2009 for example, KRG President Massoud Barzani said that Kirkuk was a Kurdish city and part of Kurdistan, and that Article 140 would never be disregarded.
At the same time, since 2003 the KRG has been working to create facts on the ground to support their claim to Kirkuk. They set up their own strategy to reverse Saddam’s Arabization policy, where he removed Kurds and Turkmen from Tamim province, home to Kirkuk, and replaced them with Arabs. Immediately after the U.S. invasion the Kurdish peshmerga militia began forcibly removing Arabs from the area. Later a formal process was created where the KRG would pay Arabs to leave the Kirkuk area. Around 8,000, mostly Shiites originally from southern Iraq, have taken up the offer. At the same time, the KRG moved in thousands of Kurds into the area offering money and aid, while intimidated others threatening to take away their jobs and support if they didn’t. The KRG has also changed the borders of Tamim to include more Kurdish towns from neighboring Kurdistan, and changed many signs and schools in the Kirkuk to be in Kurdish instead of Arabic. This altered the demographics and culture of Tamim to ensure that in any referendum Kirkuk would be annexed.
This policy has been ill received by the other groups in Tamim, and caused deep resentment against Kurdish aspirations on Kirkuk. During the 2003 invasion the Kurds swept south into Tamim and took over the top administrative and security duties there. After the 2005 elections, the Kurdish parties were victorious and refused to give the deputy governorship or council presidency to either the Arabs or Turkmen in the province. As a result, by November 2006, the Arabs began boycotting the provincial council. This deadlock was only broken in December 2007 when the Kurds gave 1/3 of the seats on the provincial council to the Arabs, and added an Arab deputy governor in a U.S. brokered deal. This concession did not heal the divisions however, and the Arabs and Turkmen eventually demanded that the provincial council seats be divided into rough thirds with 32% for the Kurds, 32% for the Arabs, 32% for the Turkmen, and the remaining seats for the Christians. The Provincial Powers Act passed in early 2008, and the Provincial Election law also called for power sharing in Tamim, but were never followed through with. Today, the Arabs and Turkmen of Tamim are set against Kurdish annexation. Many Turkmen are in favor of making Tamim an autonomous region, while Arabs want it to be a regular province under the control of Baghdad. Rather than allying with local groups, the Kurds have alienated many of them, and turned others into their political enemies.
With Article 140 deadlocked in Baghdad, and increasing opposition from non-Kurds at the provincial level, the KRG has turned to obstinacy. The Kurds are afraid that if they make any concessions they will lose Kirkuk, and therefore refuse to budge on any of their major demands. The Kurdish Alliance in parliament has also held up major legislation to protest against Article 140 not being implemented. In the KRG, the Kurdish leadership has pushed the issue so much that they are afraid of losing public support if they make any compromises. This stance has only added to the growing Arab-Kurdish divide within the country, because the more the Kurds refuse to make concessions the more opposition they garner. The Kurdish leadership has thus boxed themselves in. They may just continue with their current policy even if it fails, just to save face, and thus keep the status of Kirkuk in limbo.
SOURCES
Alsumaria, “Barazani: Kirkuk enjoys Kurdistani identity,” 7/15/09
Badkhen, Anna, “Kurds evicting Arabs in north Iraq,” San Francisco Chronicle, 4/19/03
Borden, Anthony, “Iraqi Governance Report,” Institute For War And Peace Reporting, August 2007
Chulov, Martin, “Kurds lay claim to oil riches in Iraq as old hatreds flare,” Observer, 6/14/09
Cocks, Tim, “U.N. wants Iraq Kurds to drop Kirkuk vote-diplomat,” Reuters, 7/21/09
Daragahi, Borzou, “Security may trump ethnicity in Kirkuk,” Los Angeles Times, 9/28/07
Farrell, Stephen, “As Iraqis View for Kirkuk’s Oil, Kurds Are Pawns,” New York Times, 12/9/07
Frayer, Lauren, “Kirkuk: Edging out its Arab migrants,” Associated Press, 12/8/07
International Crisis Group, “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08
Jakes, Lara, “Key UN report to suggest power-sharing plan in Iraq’s divided Kirkuk,” Associated Press, 3/29/09
Khalil, Lydia, “Stability in Iraqi Kurdistan: Reality or Mirage?” Brookings Institution, June 2009
Paley, Amit, “Iraqi Urges Refugees To Stay Put,” Washington Post, 12/5/07
Stansfield, Gareth Anderson, Liam, “Kurds in Iraq: the struggle between Baghdad and Erbil,” Middle East Policy, Spring 2009
Susman, Tina and Ahmed, Asso, “Iraqi Kurds delay Kirkuk vote,” Los Angeles Times, 12/27/07
Warden, James, “Disagreements over Kirkuk’s status could sideline voters,” Stars and Stripes, 7/14/08
Friday, June 19, 2009
Baghdad-Kurdistan Divide Could Lead To Break Up Of Iraq Argues Journal Piece
In the Spring 2009 edition of the journal Middle East Policy, Professors Gareth Stansfield and Liam Anderson in their article “Kurds in Iraq: the struggle between Baghdad and Erbil,” argue that the growing conflict between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) could bring down the government, and possibly lead to the break-up of Iraq. Many commentators have pointed out the seriousness of this issue, but still think that the sectarian conflict between Sunnis and Shiites is more important. Stansfield and Anderson believe that no other problem is as central to the future of Iraq. The oil law, the constitution, Kirkuk and other disputed territories, and federalism are all tied to the differences between the central government and Kurdistan. The relations between the two sides has only grown worse since 2008 as both have become distrustful of the others’ intentions. That leaves little room for compromise, and increases the chance for violence.
Many western views of Iraq are based upon past experiences, which makes analysis of newer ones sometimes difficult. For example, many believe that reconciliation between Sunnis and Shiites is the most important issue due to the sectarian war of 2006-2007. If that’s not resolved many believe that Iraq will fall back into civil war. Iraqi nationalism is also making a comeback, which some hope will unify the country and balance outside influences like Iran’s. Commentators do note the conflict between Baghdad and Kurdistan, but think its secondary to sectarianism. They also think that because Turkey and Iran are opposed to Kurdish independence, that it will never happen. Stansfield and Anderson counter that no other issue as important as this one.
After the 2005 provincial and parliamentary elections the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) and the two main Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) emerged as the dominant forces in Iraqi politics. The two had been allies since the Iran-Iraq War when both joined with Iran to fight against Saddam Hussein. The U.S. also played a role, supporting the Kurds after the Gulf War, and selecting the SIIC as their main Shiite partner after the 2003 invasion. Together the SIIC and Kurdish parties became the backbone of the Ibrahim al-Jaafari premiership. They were also the main authors of the 2005 constitution, which included federalism, an issue dear to both, and Article 140 that created a process to annex Kirkuk. Later they helped put Nouri al-Maliki in power.
Maliki was considered weak and ineffectual at first, but after the Surge took care of his main rivals, Al Qaeda in Iraq, the Sunni insurgency, and Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia, the state was strengthened, and the Prime Minister began flexing his muscle in 2008. In the process he began moving away from the SIIC, KDP and PUK to assert his independence. He has now fashioned himself as an Iraqi nationalist that wants to stop the Kurds from annexing the disputed territories, including Kirkuk, and amend the constitution to strengthen the central government. Sunni Arabs, Turkmen, and independent Shiites have supported Maliki’s efforts. This has led to increasing tensions with the Kurds, who feel threatened by Maliki’s actions.
The first real confrontation between Baghdad and Kurdistan occurred in the summer of 2008. In July Maliki launched Operation Promise of Good in Diyala. It was supposed to target insurgents and Al Qaeda in Iraq, but quickly turned into a political move by the Prime Minister. In August 2008 he sent the Iraqi Army into the Khanaqin district in northern Diyala. That area had been under Kurdish control since March 2003, and was home to about 4,000 peshmerga. Kurdistan considered it a disputed territory, which they wished to annex. On August 10, the Iraqi Army told the peshmerga they had 24 hours to leave the area, and a week later began forcing out Kurdish parties from government owned buildings. Finally, on September 27 Iraqi police and peshmerga got into a shoot out in the town of Jalawlaa. Things seemed headed for a military confrontation until KRG President Massoud Barzani flew to Baghdad to hold talks with Maliki. With the assistance of the Americans they came up with a deal where the peshmerga and Iraqi security forces would withdraw from the town of Khanaqin, turning over duties there to the local police, while the Iraqi Army would take up patrolling the Arab areas to the south, and the peshmerga the Kurdish areas of the north.
This was the opening shot in changing the dynamic between Baghdad and Kurdistan. After Khanaqin, Maliki went on to confront the Kurds across the disputed territories that stretch from Diyala to Ninewa, to Tamim to Salahaddin. In Mosul, Maliki ordered the Interior Ministry to take over responsibility for security from the peshmerga in November 2008, and began reaching out to the Arab population by offering them reconstruction money. He also set up tribal support councils across all four provinces, and began transferring predominately Kurdish units and Kurdish officers out, and replacing them with Arab ones. This was not only a way to push the Kurds, but for Maliki to build up his own independent power base and armed supporters independent of both the government and the SIIC and Kurds.
The major disputed territory of course is Tamim province, home of Kirkuk. The Kurds claim that Kirkuk is historically theirs, and was Turkified under the Ottomans. When Iraq gained independence the Arab governments, and especially Saddam went on to Arabize the area. Since 2003 the Kurdish leadership has promised their constituency that they would annex the area. During the U.S. invasion they occupied Kirkuk, and then handed it over to the Americans when local Arabs and Turkmen complained about their presence. In 2004 they set up a process of normalization, a census, and then a referendum on the future of Kirkuk in Article 58 of the Transitional Administration Law created by the Coalition Provisional Authority. Then the Kurds had the same measures included in the 2005 constitution in Article 140. The Kurds claim this was a huge sacrifice for them because they could have just kept Kirkuk after 2003. Instead they have tried to work within Iraq’s new political system to legally annex it. The referendum on Kirkuk was supposed to happen by December 31, 2007, but didn’t. It was then extended until June 2008 but with nothing done again. Now the United Nations is supposed to handle Tamim’s future.
The Kurds say the solution to Kirkuk is for Article 140 to be implemented, but other groups in the province would not be happy with that. If there were a referendum, Kirkuk would assuredly be annexed. The problem is that Arabs and Turkmen there would object. They favor equal power sharing amongst the three main groups in the provincial council, and making Tamim an autonomous region. They have become increasingly angered by the Kurds’ expansionist ideas, and treatment by the Kurdish peshmerga and security service the asayesh. Rather than gaining friends to support their aims, the Kurds have created enemies with their policies in the province.
Maliki has inserted himself into this process as well. He has come to the side of the Arabs and Turkmen to frustrate the Kurds’ aspirations for Kirkuk. Like the other disputed areas, the Prime Minister began setting up tribal support councils and Sons of Iraq units in Tamim. This especially angered the Kurds because the councils included many Arab tribes that had fought alongside Saddam’s troops during the Anfal campaign in the 1980s where the government tried to ethnically cleanse the Kurds from northern regions. To drive the point home even more, Maliki helped orchestrate a demonstration of Arabs in two of Tamim’s districts in November 2008 where they chanted an old Baathist slogan replacing Saddam’s name with Kirkuk, “With our souls, with our blood, we sacrifice for you, Kirkuk.” The result of Maliki’s actions has been to ignore Article 140.
This has increasingly frustrated the Kurdish leadership. The KRG has run an extensive public relations campaign in Kurdistan assuring their constituency that Kirkuk would be annexed, and to a lesser extent the other disputed areas. Beginning with Khanaqin, then the other disputed territories, and finally Kirkuk, the Kurds came to distrust Maliki. They openly compared him to Saddam, and said the Prime Minister could no longer be trusted since he wasn’t following the constitution and Article 140. At one meeting, President Barzani even told Maliki, “You smell like a dictator.” As a form of protest, the Kurds held up major legislation in parliament like the provincial election law, the oil law, and amending the constitution. The Kurds were eventually successful in making Maliki back off, but the relationship between Baghdad and Kurdistan, especially between the Prime Minister and President Barzani were ruined in the process. By December 2008, ties between the two sides were at an all time low.
The other major conflict is over politics. Beginning in 2008 Maliki began calling for revisions to the constitution that would strengthen the central government vis a vis the provinces and the KRG. He claims that the constitution reflects the sectarian divide and instability of 2003-2005, and should therefore be amended to reflect the new status quo in Iraq. Maliki would especially like to curtail the Kurds’ oil policy, where they have passed their own law and signed over 20 independent contracts. For the Kurds’ part, they and their allies the Supreme Council were able to dominate the drafting process, and include provisions in it to ensure federalism and Article 140. They claim that this was a major sacrifice because they agreed to a legal framework to annex Kirkuk, rather than take it by force, and shows that they wish to remain part of Iraq in a federal system.
It seems unlikely that Maliki and the Kurds will be able to reconcile on any of these issues. The Prime Minister has pushed and shoved the Kurds over the disputed territories, and allied himself with many of the anti-Kurdish forces in the north, including ones that evoke a dark memory for the Kurds. This has allowed Maliki to create an independent base as well that he used well in the provincial elections. He is also challenging the Kurds’ autonomy by calling for amending the constitution. It’s believed that the 2010 parliamentary elections will only strengthen the Prime Minister more. The question then is what will happen next?
Many believe that Maliki has time on his side. Eventually the central government will have the power to force the Kurds out of the disputed areas for example. Stansfield and Anderson write that ironically, in fashioning himself as the nationalist leader of Iraq, calling for the unity and strength of his country, Maliki may actually lead to its break-up. The Kurds have repeatedly said that they want to stay part of Iraq, but if they are losing on every front, then what motivation will they have to remain part of the country? They will only take losing out on their aspirations and power for so long. Add to this the fact that the conflict could lead to violence. Iraqi forces and the peshmerga have faced off several times since Khanaqin. So far, nothing has come of it, but each time the two sides practice brinkmanship it increases the likelihood of something going wrong.
This is an obvious situation where the United States could play a mediating role. The U.S. has tried to calm nerves in military situations, but on the political side there’s little evidence of much pressure to resolve this growing dispute. On Kirkuk for example, the Americans are now deferring to the United Nations, but they have no hope of bringing the various sides together without the U.S. The policy seems to consist of keeping a lid on possible flashpoints, while letting the Iraqis try to solve their own problems. If something is not done, this feud will only grow in intensity until it reaches the breaking point, and that could either lead to the fall of the Maliki government, or worse, the secession of Kurdistan from Iraq.
SOURCES
Aswat al-Iraq, “Kurdish official condemns Iraqi army raid on Peshmerga HQ,” 8/24/08
- “Military units should be under central govt. control,” 8/19/08
International Crisis Group, “Iraq After The Surge II: The Need for a New Political Strategy,” 4/30/08
- “Shiite Politics In Iraq: The Role Of The Supreme Council,” 11/15/07
Jakes, Lara, “Key UN report to suggest power-sharing plan in Iraq’s divided Kirkuk,” Associated Press, 3/29/09
Paley, Amit, “Strip of Iraq ‘on the Verge of Exploding,’” Washington Post, 9/13/08
Parker, Sam, “Guest Post: Behind the Curtain in Diyala,” Abu Muqawama Blog, 8/20/08
Peterson, Scott, “US referees Iraq’s troubled Kurdish-Arab fault line,” Christian Science Monitor, 10/21/08
Serwer, Daniel and Parker, Sam, “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2009
Stansfield, Gareth Anderson, Liam, “Kurds in Iraq: the struggle between Baghdad and Erbil,” Middle East Policy, Spring 2009
Many western views of Iraq are based upon past experiences, which makes analysis of newer ones sometimes difficult. For example, many believe that reconciliation between Sunnis and Shiites is the most important issue due to the sectarian war of 2006-2007. If that’s not resolved many believe that Iraq will fall back into civil war. Iraqi nationalism is also making a comeback, which some hope will unify the country and balance outside influences like Iran’s. Commentators do note the conflict between Baghdad and Kurdistan, but think its secondary to sectarianism. They also think that because Turkey and Iran are opposed to Kurdish independence, that it will never happen. Stansfield and Anderson counter that no other issue as important as this one.
After the 2005 provincial and parliamentary elections the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) and the two main Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) emerged as the dominant forces in Iraqi politics. The two had been allies since the Iran-Iraq War when both joined with Iran to fight against Saddam Hussein. The U.S. also played a role, supporting the Kurds after the Gulf War, and selecting the SIIC as their main Shiite partner after the 2003 invasion. Together the SIIC and Kurdish parties became the backbone of the Ibrahim al-Jaafari premiership. They were also the main authors of the 2005 constitution, which included federalism, an issue dear to both, and Article 140 that created a process to annex Kirkuk. Later they helped put Nouri al-Maliki in power.
Maliki was considered weak and ineffectual at first, but after the Surge took care of his main rivals, Al Qaeda in Iraq, the Sunni insurgency, and Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia, the state was strengthened, and the Prime Minister began flexing his muscle in 2008. In the process he began moving away from the SIIC, KDP and PUK to assert his independence. He has now fashioned himself as an Iraqi nationalist that wants to stop the Kurds from annexing the disputed territories, including Kirkuk, and amend the constitution to strengthen the central government. Sunni Arabs, Turkmen, and independent Shiites have supported Maliki’s efforts. This has led to increasing tensions with the Kurds, who feel threatened by Maliki’s actions.
The first real confrontation between Baghdad and Kurdistan occurred in the summer of 2008. In July Maliki launched Operation Promise of Good in Diyala. It was supposed to target insurgents and Al Qaeda in Iraq, but quickly turned into a political move by the Prime Minister. In August 2008 he sent the Iraqi Army into the Khanaqin district in northern Diyala. That area had been under Kurdish control since March 2003, and was home to about 4,000 peshmerga. Kurdistan considered it a disputed territory, which they wished to annex. On August 10, the Iraqi Army told the peshmerga they had 24 hours to leave the area, and a week later began forcing out Kurdish parties from government owned buildings. Finally, on September 27 Iraqi police and peshmerga got into a shoot out in the town of Jalawlaa. Things seemed headed for a military confrontation until KRG President Massoud Barzani flew to Baghdad to hold talks with Maliki. With the assistance of the Americans they came up with a deal where the peshmerga and Iraqi security forces would withdraw from the town of Khanaqin, turning over duties there to the local police, while the Iraqi Army would take up patrolling the Arab areas to the south, and the peshmerga the Kurdish areas of the north.
This was the opening shot in changing the dynamic between Baghdad and Kurdistan. After Khanaqin, Maliki went on to confront the Kurds across the disputed territories that stretch from Diyala to Ninewa, to Tamim to Salahaddin. In Mosul, Maliki ordered the Interior Ministry to take over responsibility for security from the peshmerga in November 2008, and began reaching out to the Arab population by offering them reconstruction money. He also set up tribal support councils across all four provinces, and began transferring predominately Kurdish units and Kurdish officers out, and replacing them with Arab ones. This was not only a way to push the Kurds, but for Maliki to build up his own independent power base and armed supporters independent of both the government and the SIIC and Kurds.
The major disputed territory of course is Tamim province, home of Kirkuk. The Kurds claim that Kirkuk is historically theirs, and was Turkified under the Ottomans. When Iraq gained independence the Arab governments, and especially Saddam went on to Arabize the area. Since 2003 the Kurdish leadership has promised their constituency that they would annex the area. During the U.S. invasion they occupied Kirkuk, and then handed it over to the Americans when local Arabs and Turkmen complained about their presence. In 2004 they set up a process of normalization, a census, and then a referendum on the future of Kirkuk in Article 58 of the Transitional Administration Law created by the Coalition Provisional Authority. Then the Kurds had the same measures included in the 2005 constitution in Article 140. The Kurds claim this was a huge sacrifice for them because they could have just kept Kirkuk after 2003. Instead they have tried to work within Iraq’s new political system to legally annex it. The referendum on Kirkuk was supposed to happen by December 31, 2007, but didn’t. It was then extended until June 2008 but with nothing done again. Now the United Nations is supposed to handle Tamim’s future.
The Kurds say the solution to Kirkuk is for Article 140 to be implemented, but other groups in the province would not be happy with that. If there were a referendum, Kirkuk would assuredly be annexed. The problem is that Arabs and Turkmen there would object. They favor equal power sharing amongst the three main groups in the provincial council, and making Tamim an autonomous region. They have become increasingly angered by the Kurds’ expansionist ideas, and treatment by the Kurdish peshmerga and security service the asayesh. Rather than gaining friends to support their aims, the Kurds have created enemies with their policies in the province.
Maliki has inserted himself into this process as well. He has come to the side of the Arabs and Turkmen to frustrate the Kurds’ aspirations for Kirkuk. Like the other disputed areas, the Prime Minister began setting up tribal support councils and Sons of Iraq units in Tamim. This especially angered the Kurds because the councils included many Arab tribes that had fought alongside Saddam’s troops during the Anfal campaign in the 1980s where the government tried to ethnically cleanse the Kurds from northern regions. To drive the point home even more, Maliki helped orchestrate a demonstration of Arabs in two of Tamim’s districts in November 2008 where they chanted an old Baathist slogan replacing Saddam’s name with Kirkuk, “With our souls, with our blood, we sacrifice for you, Kirkuk.” The result of Maliki’s actions has been to ignore Article 140.
This has increasingly frustrated the Kurdish leadership. The KRG has run an extensive public relations campaign in Kurdistan assuring their constituency that Kirkuk would be annexed, and to a lesser extent the other disputed areas. Beginning with Khanaqin, then the other disputed territories, and finally Kirkuk, the Kurds came to distrust Maliki. They openly compared him to Saddam, and said the Prime Minister could no longer be trusted since he wasn’t following the constitution and Article 140. At one meeting, President Barzani even told Maliki, “You smell like a dictator.” As a form of protest, the Kurds held up major legislation in parliament like the provincial election law, the oil law, and amending the constitution. The Kurds were eventually successful in making Maliki back off, but the relationship between Baghdad and Kurdistan, especially between the Prime Minister and President Barzani were ruined in the process. By December 2008, ties between the two sides were at an all time low.
The other major conflict is over politics. Beginning in 2008 Maliki began calling for revisions to the constitution that would strengthen the central government vis a vis the provinces and the KRG. He claims that the constitution reflects the sectarian divide and instability of 2003-2005, and should therefore be amended to reflect the new status quo in Iraq. Maliki would especially like to curtail the Kurds’ oil policy, where they have passed their own law and signed over 20 independent contracts. For the Kurds’ part, they and their allies the Supreme Council were able to dominate the drafting process, and include provisions in it to ensure federalism and Article 140. They claim that this was a major sacrifice because they agreed to a legal framework to annex Kirkuk, rather than take it by force, and shows that they wish to remain part of Iraq in a federal system.
It seems unlikely that Maliki and the Kurds will be able to reconcile on any of these issues. The Prime Minister has pushed and shoved the Kurds over the disputed territories, and allied himself with many of the anti-Kurdish forces in the north, including ones that evoke a dark memory for the Kurds. This has allowed Maliki to create an independent base as well that he used well in the provincial elections. He is also challenging the Kurds’ autonomy by calling for amending the constitution. It’s believed that the 2010 parliamentary elections will only strengthen the Prime Minister more. The question then is what will happen next?
Many believe that Maliki has time on his side. Eventually the central government will have the power to force the Kurds out of the disputed areas for example. Stansfield and Anderson write that ironically, in fashioning himself as the nationalist leader of Iraq, calling for the unity and strength of his country, Maliki may actually lead to its break-up. The Kurds have repeatedly said that they want to stay part of Iraq, but if they are losing on every front, then what motivation will they have to remain part of the country? They will only take losing out on their aspirations and power for so long. Add to this the fact that the conflict could lead to violence. Iraqi forces and the peshmerga have faced off several times since Khanaqin. So far, nothing has come of it, but each time the two sides practice brinkmanship it increases the likelihood of something going wrong.
This is an obvious situation where the United States could play a mediating role. The U.S. has tried to calm nerves in military situations, but on the political side there’s little evidence of much pressure to resolve this growing dispute. On Kirkuk for example, the Americans are now deferring to the United Nations, but they have no hope of bringing the various sides together without the U.S. The policy seems to consist of keeping a lid on possible flashpoints, while letting the Iraqis try to solve their own problems. If something is not done, this feud will only grow in intensity until it reaches the breaking point, and that could either lead to the fall of the Maliki government, or worse, the secession of Kurdistan from Iraq.
SOURCES
Aswat al-Iraq, “Kurdish official condemns Iraqi army raid on Peshmerga HQ,” 8/24/08
- “Military units should be under central govt. control,” 8/19/08
International Crisis Group, “Iraq After The Surge II: The Need for a New Political Strategy,” 4/30/08
- “Shiite Politics In Iraq: The Role Of The Supreme Council,” 11/15/07
Jakes, Lara, “Key UN report to suggest power-sharing plan in Iraq’s divided Kirkuk,” Associated Press, 3/29/09
Paley, Amit, “Strip of Iraq ‘on the Verge of Exploding,’” Washington Post, 9/13/08
Parker, Sam, “Guest Post: Behind the Curtain in Diyala,” Abu Muqawama Blog, 8/20/08
Peterson, Scott, “US referees Iraq’s troubled Kurdish-Arab fault line,” Christian Science Monitor, 10/21/08
Serwer, Daniel and Parker, Sam, “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2009
Stansfield, Gareth Anderson, Liam, “Kurds in Iraq: the struggle between Baghdad and Erbil,” Middle East Policy, Spring 2009
Monday, March 23, 2009
Norwegian Institute’s Policy Paper On The Way Forward In Iraq
In February 2009 the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs released a report entitled “More than ‘Shiites and ‘Sunnis,’ How a Post-Sectarian Strategy Can Change the Logic and Facilitate Sustainable Political Reform In Iraq.” The paper was written by members of the Norwegian Institute, including Reidar Visser, who is a research fellow there and runs the blog Historiae. It also included input from a group of Iraqi academics and professionals. The paper is a policy proposal for the U.S. government on how to overcome Iraq’s problems before it withdraws. Overall, the report believes that the Surge brought about dramatic security improvements, but no real political change. The Norwegian Institute argues that unless the U.S. reforms its policy before it leaves, Iraq will be plagued by long-term problems. What the paper advocates is that the U.S. move away from supporting Iraq’s current political system, and support revising the constitution to strengthen the central government. The Institute believes that the 2009 parliamentary election should be the center of this new policy. It argues that this will unite Iraqis and push nationalism to the fore.
“More than ‘Shiites’ and ‘Sunnis’” argues that the root of Iraq’s current problems is sectarianism. They believe that this is enshrined in the 2005 Constitution. Although 80% of voters ratified the document, the Institute thinks that it was rushed through with few Iraqis actually knowing what it was about. When it was passed it included a clause promising that it would be revised in the future, but this has never happened. The constitutional review committee is just as sectarian and deadlocked as the rest of the government. The effect of the Constitution was to empower a small group of mostly exile politicians who claimed they spoke for their sect or ethnic group. These leaders oppose any change to the system because it would endanger their positions. The result, the Institute writes is that a majority of Iraqis do not believe in this system and feel that it is illegitimate as a result.
The Institute believes that the main opponents of Iraq’s sectarian system come from parties in parliament that are loosely called the July 22 movement. They successfully pushed through the provincial election law despite the opposition of the Kurds and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council. Reidar Visser has been arguing that this bloc represents the true Iraqi nationalists as it includes a variety of parties such as the Sadrists, Ilyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List, Fadhila, and others that cuts across sect.
The problem is that the U.S. perpetuates Iraq’s sectarian system, and supports those that are currently in power. The Institute writes that this has led to a series of misplaced policies such as calling for a national compact between the major sects, the Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds, rather than pushing for Iraqi unity. This began with the Coalition Provisional Authority who created an Iraqi governing council based upon a sectarian quota system. The Americans have also pushed for an oil law that is supposed to ensure a share for Sunnis. The U.S. then allowed the ascendancy of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and the Kurds that pushed for decentralization. When the Surge started, the Bush White House gave unconditional support to the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. As Bush left office he signed the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which included no clauses to encourage Iraq to move towards political change. Maliki and other leaders have taken advantage of this to stay in office. The U.S. has therefore caused rather than solved the divisions within Iraq.
The differences between the U.S. and Iran have also perpetuated Iraq’s problems. Some Americans have argued that Iraqi leaders secretly want the U.S. to stay to protect their positions. This ignores the fact that Iraq could turn to Iran instead of relying upon the U.S. As long as Iran and the U.S. are opposing each other in Iraq, that will lead Teheran to support Iraq’s current political system. After all, sectarianism means that Shiites will always be in the lead, which gives Iran the most influence.
The Institute argues that sectarianism is a foreign idea throughout most of Iraq’s history. They count only three times before, in 1508, 1623, and 1801 when sectarian differences were in the forefront in the country. This leads the Institute to believe that the sectarian war of 2006-2007 was the exception not the rule. From their point of view, Iraqi nationalism and the belief in a strong central government are much stronger beliefs in Iraq’s past.
Because the U.S. helped create this system, they should be the ones to try to fix it before they leave. The paper includes a long list of proposals to accomplish this. By couching these moves in nationalist rhetoric, the Institute believes that it could be a unifying policy that will assist with the American withdrawal, and create long-lasting stability. The suggestions are to place a limit on federalism. Kurdistan should be the only area where an autonomous region should be allowed. Instead, power should be centered in Baghdad. This should be enshrined in revisions to the Constitution. As part of this the Oil Ministry should control the development of Iraq’s oil and gas resources. Revenues from these should be distributed solely on a per capita basis, not by sect. Instead of federalism, ministries could be decentralized with oil being based in Basra for example. All sectarian quotas in the government should be ended with officials appointed according to their competency and professionalism. While the Institute was open to negotiating over the future of Kirkuk, it emphasized that it should be Iraqi. Finally, political influence over the security forces should be ended.
“More than ‘Shiites’ and ‘Sunnis’” also argues that the U.S. should clearly state its mistakes and long-term plans in Iraq. This means announcing that it stands for the unity of Iraq, that it supports a strong central government, that it rejects the partition of the country, and will oppose undue influence by regional powers in the country. The Institute also believes that the Americans need to admit that they were wrong in creating a sectarian system, and that it has not worked. The U.S. also should publicly state that it does not want permanent bases in Iraq, and that it is committed to withdrawing even if Iraq’s government runs into problems.
The first step in this restructuring of Iraq can begin with the 2009 parliamentary elections, which are scheduled for the end of the year. The U.S. should stress constitutional reform as the main issue, and America’s commitment to democracy in Iraq. The U.S. also needs to work towards ensuring that they are free and fair, and organize a massive international effort to monitor the voting. Iraq refugees should also be allowed to vote, something that happened in the 2005 vote, but not in the recent provincial elections.
To prepare the environment for the vote, the paper has another list of suggestions. First the U.S. should encourage a freeze on all major work by parliament so that laws will be held off until a new, hopefully improved group of legislators takes office. The U.S. should also threaten sanctions on Baghdad if it takes any authoritarian measures before the election. America should also stop encouraging Iraq’s neighbors from opening up embassies, freeze working with the international compact on Iraq’s debt because it sets no conditions on Iraq, deter investment in Iraq’s oil sector, and open negotiations with Iran in an attempt to offer them deals on other areas so they will not focus on Iraq. Oddly the Institute also advocates giving aid to parties that stress the constitution. The thrust of the paper is that the U.S. needs to push Iraqi nationalism to the fore, but then giving direct aid to Iraq parties could undermine their chances because they could be seen as being American puppets.
Selecting a new parliament should then be followed by a revision of the Constitution. To encourage that the U.S. should offer debt relief, withdrawing its troops, and guarantee Kurdish autonomy as rewards for a successful constitutional process, but also continue to deter foreign investment, including in Kurdistan, hold off any regional conferences, and try to end the United Nations work on disputed territories to apply pressure on Iraqis to finish the task.
Holding successful elections and revising the Iraqi Constitution have been long sought after goals by a wide variety of groups ranging from the U.S., and other governments, to various think tanks. Iraqi nationalism is also an important ingredient, especially after the country fractured after the U.S. invasion. The Norwegian Institute’s paper however has some major flaws, which undermine its argument. First, it gives undue influence to the July 22 bloc. While the opposition parties were able to pass an election law before the Supreme Council and the Kurds wanted, it was something supported by the Prime Minister. That was actually one of its only major accomplishments. The provincial election law for example maintained the status quo in Kirkuk by setting up a committee to figure out how to conduct elections there, but all that did was maintain the status quo, something that suited the Kurds who control the province. The Institute claims this was a victory for the July 22 bloc, but it was actually a defeat of their earlier proposal that would have forced the Kurds to share power before the vote. Second, it believes that the parliamentary elections will lead to a new set of nationalist politicians that will want fundamental changes in Iraq’s government and constitution. That’s not guaranteed. Nationalist parties did do well in the 2009 provincial elections, but it was still mostly the ruling parties that came out on top, the very ones the Institute is advocating against. Also Shiites tended to vote for Shiite parties, Sunnis for Sunnis, and Kurds for Kurds. More importantly, Prime Minister Maliki could champion most of the paper’s main points such as a strong central government and constitutional reform, yet Maliki is also the type of exile politician that the paper condemns. More importantly his moves are meant to ensure his power over the country. Another point is that in all political systems, the ruling parties want their people to take up positions of power in the government after they win. That would make non-political appointments to the bureaucracy and military nearly impossible. Fourth, the paper believes that the Americans are the major perpetrators of Iraqi sectarianism. That overlooks the fact that rule under Saddam, which lasted for decades, was also sectarian as he went after the Shiites and Kurds. The report says that the U.S. supported the ascendancy of the Supreme Council and the Kurds who pushed for decentralization. The U.S. also supported Ilyad Allawi of the Iraqi National List and currently backs Nouri al-Maliki of the Islamic Dawa party, both of which were nationalists who wanted a strong central government. Finally, “More than ‘Shiites’ and ‘Sunnis’” also largely ignores the current major divide in Iraq, that between Arabs and Kurds. Iraqi nationalism is being created on the basis of opposition to the Kurds. This stretches from the Prime Minister to the July 22 bloc. While the report says that the U.S. should ensure Kurdistan’s autonomy that overlooks the fact that the Kurds would oppose almost every other proposal made by the Institute. That includes revising the constitution, shoring up a strong central government, empowering the Oil Ministry, ending work on the disputed territories, stressing that Kirkuk should be Iraqi, etc. The Institute argues that their proposals will unite Iraqis and are ideas shared across sectarian lines, but that’s probably mostly true of Iraqi Arabs. “More than ‘Shiites’ and ‘Sunnis’” is good at pointing out the levers the U.S. can still use to influence Iraqi politics before it withdraws, but ironically if the paper’s plans were followed it could actually increase the new divisions in the country as it attempts to solve an old one.
SOURCES
Associated Press, “Iraqi parliament passes election law,” 7/22/08
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, “More than “Shiites” and “Sunnis,” How a Post-Sectarian Strategy Can Change the Logic and Facilitate Sustainable Political Reform in Iraq,” February 2009
Visser, Reidar, “A Litmus Test for Iraq,” Middle East Report Online, 1/30/09
- “Debating Devolution in Iraq,” Middle East Report Online, 3/10/08
- “The Law on the Powers of Governorates Not Organised in a Region: Washington’s ‘Moderate’ Allies Show Some Not-So-Moderate Tendencies,” Historiae.org, 2/11/08
“More than ‘Shiites’ and ‘Sunnis’” argues that the root of Iraq’s current problems is sectarianism. They believe that this is enshrined in the 2005 Constitution. Although 80% of voters ratified the document, the Institute thinks that it was rushed through with few Iraqis actually knowing what it was about. When it was passed it included a clause promising that it would be revised in the future, but this has never happened. The constitutional review committee is just as sectarian and deadlocked as the rest of the government. The effect of the Constitution was to empower a small group of mostly exile politicians who claimed they spoke for their sect or ethnic group. These leaders oppose any change to the system because it would endanger their positions. The result, the Institute writes is that a majority of Iraqis do not believe in this system and feel that it is illegitimate as a result.
The Institute believes that the main opponents of Iraq’s sectarian system come from parties in parliament that are loosely called the July 22 movement. They successfully pushed through the provincial election law despite the opposition of the Kurds and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council. Reidar Visser has been arguing that this bloc represents the true Iraqi nationalists as it includes a variety of parties such as the Sadrists, Ilyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List, Fadhila, and others that cuts across sect.
The problem is that the U.S. perpetuates Iraq’s sectarian system, and supports those that are currently in power. The Institute writes that this has led to a series of misplaced policies such as calling for a national compact between the major sects, the Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds, rather than pushing for Iraqi unity. This began with the Coalition Provisional Authority who created an Iraqi governing council based upon a sectarian quota system. The Americans have also pushed for an oil law that is supposed to ensure a share for Sunnis. The U.S. then allowed the ascendancy of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and the Kurds that pushed for decentralization. When the Surge started, the Bush White House gave unconditional support to the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. As Bush left office he signed the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which included no clauses to encourage Iraq to move towards political change. Maliki and other leaders have taken advantage of this to stay in office. The U.S. has therefore caused rather than solved the divisions within Iraq.
The differences between the U.S. and Iran have also perpetuated Iraq’s problems. Some Americans have argued that Iraqi leaders secretly want the U.S. to stay to protect their positions. This ignores the fact that Iraq could turn to Iran instead of relying upon the U.S. As long as Iran and the U.S. are opposing each other in Iraq, that will lead Teheran to support Iraq’s current political system. After all, sectarianism means that Shiites will always be in the lead, which gives Iran the most influence.
The Institute argues that sectarianism is a foreign idea throughout most of Iraq’s history. They count only three times before, in 1508, 1623, and 1801 when sectarian differences were in the forefront in the country. This leads the Institute to believe that the sectarian war of 2006-2007 was the exception not the rule. From their point of view, Iraqi nationalism and the belief in a strong central government are much stronger beliefs in Iraq’s past.
Because the U.S. helped create this system, they should be the ones to try to fix it before they leave. The paper includes a long list of proposals to accomplish this. By couching these moves in nationalist rhetoric, the Institute believes that it could be a unifying policy that will assist with the American withdrawal, and create long-lasting stability. The suggestions are to place a limit on federalism. Kurdistan should be the only area where an autonomous region should be allowed. Instead, power should be centered in Baghdad. This should be enshrined in revisions to the Constitution. As part of this the Oil Ministry should control the development of Iraq’s oil and gas resources. Revenues from these should be distributed solely on a per capita basis, not by sect. Instead of federalism, ministries could be decentralized with oil being based in Basra for example. All sectarian quotas in the government should be ended with officials appointed according to their competency and professionalism. While the Institute was open to negotiating over the future of Kirkuk, it emphasized that it should be Iraqi. Finally, political influence over the security forces should be ended.
“More than ‘Shiites’ and ‘Sunnis’” also argues that the U.S. should clearly state its mistakes and long-term plans in Iraq. This means announcing that it stands for the unity of Iraq, that it supports a strong central government, that it rejects the partition of the country, and will oppose undue influence by regional powers in the country. The Institute also believes that the Americans need to admit that they were wrong in creating a sectarian system, and that it has not worked. The U.S. also should publicly state that it does not want permanent bases in Iraq, and that it is committed to withdrawing even if Iraq’s government runs into problems.
The first step in this restructuring of Iraq can begin with the 2009 parliamentary elections, which are scheduled for the end of the year. The U.S. should stress constitutional reform as the main issue, and America’s commitment to democracy in Iraq. The U.S. also needs to work towards ensuring that they are free and fair, and organize a massive international effort to monitor the voting. Iraq refugees should also be allowed to vote, something that happened in the 2005 vote, but not in the recent provincial elections.
To prepare the environment for the vote, the paper has another list of suggestions. First the U.S. should encourage a freeze on all major work by parliament so that laws will be held off until a new, hopefully improved group of legislators takes office. The U.S. should also threaten sanctions on Baghdad if it takes any authoritarian measures before the election. America should also stop encouraging Iraq’s neighbors from opening up embassies, freeze working with the international compact on Iraq’s debt because it sets no conditions on Iraq, deter investment in Iraq’s oil sector, and open negotiations with Iran in an attempt to offer them deals on other areas so they will not focus on Iraq. Oddly the Institute also advocates giving aid to parties that stress the constitution. The thrust of the paper is that the U.S. needs to push Iraqi nationalism to the fore, but then giving direct aid to Iraq parties could undermine their chances because they could be seen as being American puppets.
Selecting a new parliament should then be followed by a revision of the Constitution. To encourage that the U.S. should offer debt relief, withdrawing its troops, and guarantee Kurdish autonomy as rewards for a successful constitutional process, but also continue to deter foreign investment, including in Kurdistan, hold off any regional conferences, and try to end the United Nations work on disputed territories to apply pressure on Iraqis to finish the task.
Holding successful elections and revising the Iraqi Constitution have been long sought after goals by a wide variety of groups ranging from the U.S., and other governments, to various think tanks. Iraqi nationalism is also an important ingredient, especially after the country fractured after the U.S. invasion. The Norwegian Institute’s paper however has some major flaws, which undermine its argument. First, it gives undue influence to the July 22 bloc. While the opposition parties were able to pass an election law before the Supreme Council and the Kurds wanted, it was something supported by the Prime Minister. That was actually one of its only major accomplishments. The provincial election law for example maintained the status quo in Kirkuk by setting up a committee to figure out how to conduct elections there, but all that did was maintain the status quo, something that suited the Kurds who control the province. The Institute claims this was a victory for the July 22 bloc, but it was actually a defeat of their earlier proposal that would have forced the Kurds to share power before the vote. Second, it believes that the parliamentary elections will lead to a new set of nationalist politicians that will want fundamental changes in Iraq’s government and constitution. That’s not guaranteed. Nationalist parties did do well in the 2009 provincial elections, but it was still mostly the ruling parties that came out on top, the very ones the Institute is advocating against. Also Shiites tended to vote for Shiite parties, Sunnis for Sunnis, and Kurds for Kurds. More importantly, Prime Minister Maliki could champion most of the paper’s main points such as a strong central government and constitutional reform, yet Maliki is also the type of exile politician that the paper condemns. More importantly his moves are meant to ensure his power over the country. Another point is that in all political systems, the ruling parties want their people to take up positions of power in the government after they win. That would make non-political appointments to the bureaucracy and military nearly impossible. Fourth, the paper believes that the Americans are the major perpetrators of Iraqi sectarianism. That overlooks the fact that rule under Saddam, which lasted for decades, was also sectarian as he went after the Shiites and Kurds. The report says that the U.S. supported the ascendancy of the Supreme Council and the Kurds who pushed for decentralization. The U.S. also supported Ilyad Allawi of the Iraqi National List and currently backs Nouri al-Maliki of the Islamic Dawa party, both of which were nationalists who wanted a strong central government. Finally, “More than ‘Shiites’ and ‘Sunnis’” also largely ignores the current major divide in Iraq, that between Arabs and Kurds. Iraqi nationalism is being created on the basis of opposition to the Kurds. This stretches from the Prime Minister to the July 22 bloc. While the report says that the U.S. should ensure Kurdistan’s autonomy that overlooks the fact that the Kurds would oppose almost every other proposal made by the Institute. That includes revising the constitution, shoring up a strong central government, empowering the Oil Ministry, ending work on the disputed territories, stressing that Kirkuk should be Iraqi, etc. The Institute argues that their proposals will unite Iraqis and are ideas shared across sectarian lines, but that’s probably mostly true of Iraqi Arabs. “More than ‘Shiites’ and ‘Sunnis’” is good at pointing out the levers the U.S. can still use to influence Iraqi politics before it withdraws, but ironically if the paper’s plans were followed it could actually increase the new divisions in the country as it attempts to solve an old one.
SOURCES
Associated Press, “Iraqi parliament passes election law,” 7/22/08
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, “More than “Shiites” and “Sunnis,” How a Post-Sectarian Strategy Can Change the Logic and Facilitate Sustainable Political Reform in Iraq,” February 2009
Visser, Reidar, “A Litmus Test for Iraq,” Middle East Report Online, 1/30/09
- “Debating Devolution in Iraq,” Middle East Report Online, 3/10/08
- “The Law on the Powers of Governorates Not Organised in a Region: Washington’s ‘Moderate’ Allies Show Some Not-So-Moderate Tendencies,” Historiae.org, 2/11/08
Monday, November 24, 2008
Could Maliki Be Deposed?
The following commentary originally appeared in Musings On Iraq
Since March 2008 Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has been forming Tribal Support Councils. Originally, these were created to help the security forces crackdown on the Mahdi Army militia of Moqtada al-Sadr. Beginning in the summer however, Maliki has been creating councils across the south and north to establish his control over the country, and increasingly to challenge the rule of his main coalition partners, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) and the Kurdish parties, in the provinces. This is coming to a boiling point as both groups are increasingly criticizing Maliki’s rule, and rumors are beginning that they might even make a move to unseat him from power.
There have been several reports that the SIIC and Kurds might be looking to replace Maliki as prime minister of Iraq. First, Nibras Kazimi, former Iraqi National Congress member, New York based writer, member of the Hudson Institute, and operator of the Talisman Gate blog, wrote that he had heard that the Kurds and Supreme Council were considering replacing Maliki with either current Vice President Adel Abdel-Mahdi of the SIIC, former prime minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari who broke away from the Dawa Party and formed his own National Reform Party this summer, or Ali al-Adeeb of the Dawa Party. Al-Quds al-Rubi reported that while Iraq’s President Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan was meeting with members of parliament he said that Maliki’s government needed to be reformed, while Iraq-Ina wrote that Talabani was trying to depose the Prime Minister.
That followed a public dispute between Maliki and the Presidential Council, which consists of President Talabani, Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi of the Iraqi Islamic Party, and Vice President Abdel-Mahdi. On November 18, they sent a letter to Maliki suggesting that the government should stop wasting money forming Tribal Support Councils, and instead use the funds on the existing security forces. They also said that the Prime Minister should stop forming the councils until there is a formal framework to integrate them into the government. Two days later, Maliki gave a televised speech in which he said that Talabani was picking on the Support Councils, while the Kurds were breaking the constitution by deploying their Peshmerga militia outside of Kurdistan, and signing oil contracts without government approval. Maliki also said that the constitution needed to be amended so that the central government could have more power, implying that the Kurdish Regional Government needed its authority to be curtailed. That was an empty threat since the changes to the constitution have been held up for over a year, but upped the war of words between the two sides. The Presidential Council was not pleased by Maliki’s comments, and told him on November 21 that he shouldn’t have made their differences public.
Tribal Support Councils have been formed in 4. Wasit, 5. Maysan, 6. Basra, 7. Dhi Qar, 8. Muthanna, 9. Qadisiyah, 10. Babil, 11. Karbala, 12. Najaf, 17. Tamim, and others to support Prime Minster Maliki
All of this began back in March 2008 when the government moved against the Sadrists. During the crackdowns in the south, Maliki reached out to various tribes to help deal with the Mahdi Army. This first happened in Basra when Maliki gave 10,000 tribesman jobs in the provincial police in return for fighting the militias. Tribal Support Councils were also formed in Babil, Karbala, Maysan, and Dhi Qar as the fighting spread across the south. After that initial wave, the Prime Minister moved ahead creating councils in Qadisiyah Wasit, Najaf, Kirkuk, Muthanna, and other areas. Each was paid $21,000 by the government, and then $10,000 a month afterwards. They reported to the Committee for National Reconciliation in Baghdad, although there is talk of forming a National Tribal Support Council. Tribal sheikhs have been eager to join these councils because it gives them power and new standing, as well as jobs for their followers. As reported earlier, many of the country’s tribes were weak after the invasion because they had become dependent upon Saddam and his patronage to maintain their positions. Working for Maliki then, is an all too familiar relationship for many of these sheikhs. Many of these tribes are also national in character, which means that the Prime Minister is building up support not only in the individual provinces where the councils are, but across the country.
The Supreme Council was the first to object to this policy. As they rule most of the south, they saw the Support Councils as a brazen attempt by Maliki to build up his support and challenge their authority in the upcoming provincial elections, scheduled for the end of January 2009. SIIC officials in Babil, Wasit, Karbala, Dhi-Qar, Basra, Muthanna, and Qadisiyah have all protested the tribal groups. Governors and provincial councils have all complained that Maliki never consulted with them when forming the Support Councils, and that they are not part of the local governments, answering to Baghdad rather to them.
The Kurds became concerned later in the year when Maliki began focusing upon the north. As mentioned several times before, in August 2008 government forces moved into the disputed Khanaqin district in Diyala province, which the Kurds have occupied since the 2003 invasion. That caused a confrontation between Baghdad and the Kurdish Regional Government that could have led to violence. By September, Kurdish President Massoud Barzani gave an interview where he accused Maliki of acting like an autocrat, never following through with their promises to the Kurds, and questioning whether Kurds should stand behind the Prime Minister’s government. Maliki then set up Support Councils in Kirkuk and Mosul, and attempted to form one in Khanaqin, while also trying to move Kurdish forces out of Mosul.
As a result, the Kurds have stepped up their attacks upon Maliki. Beginning in November, they have said that Maliki is acting like a totalitarian, and that the Support Councils are illegal and unconstitutional. The Patriot Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party issued a joint statement that compared the tribal groups to Kurds that fought for Saddam in the 1980s and 90s. Kurdish President Barzani followed that up with a TV interview with al-Jazeera in which he said that the the councils were mercenaries and would be treated as enemies by the Kurds. Maliki responded by organizing two days of protests by his new tribal allies. On November 15, tribes came out on the streets to support Maliki and the Support Councils and protest against the Kurds in Tikrit in Salahaddin, Hawijah in Tamim, Karbala, Najaf, Nasiriyah in Dhi Qar, Samawah in Muthanna, and Hilla in Babil. Demonstrators said that Kirkuk, Mosul, and Diyala were parts of Iraq, responding to the Kurd desire to annex districts in those areas.
The Kurds and SIIC have been close allies since before the 2003 U.S. invasion. They were the main reason why Maliki was able to stay in power in 2007 when various factions were trying to unseat him. The Prime Minister has been emboldened after his successful crackdowns on the Sadrists earlier this year however, and now feels as if he can take on his allies in the provinces that they control. He is building up support across the country before the provincial elections, but it could come at a cost. If the Kurds and SIIC want, they can depose him in parliament with a no confidence vote. Worse, his moves could lead to violence between the Tribal Support Councils and local police and Peshmerga controlled by the SIIC and Kurds. So far these disputes have stayed verbal, but the rhetoric is increasing, and shows the deep divisions that remain in Iraq.
For more on the Tribal Support Councils, Inter-Shiite Power Struggles, and the Kurdish-Baghdad Dispute see:
Cold War Between Baghdad and Kurds Turns Hot
Deal Struck To Defuse Kahanqin Issue
Disputes Over Tribal Support Councils
Khanaqin Deal Off?
Kurdish-Baghdad Tensions Over Diyala
The Kurds Come Out Swinging
Maliki Responds To His Critics On Tribal Support Councils
Maliki Still Pushing The Kurds On Khanaqin District
Maliki Ups the Ante in Khanaqin District of Diyala
Maliki’s Tribal Support Councils Appear To Be Paying Off
Shiite Rivalries Increasing As Provincial Elections Near
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Iraqi Sunni And Shiites Demonstrate In Favour Of US Pact,” 11/19/08
Alsumaria, “Al Maliki defends tribal awakening councils,” 10/9/08
- “Maliki meets Kirkuk’s tribes’ leaders,” 11/5/08
- “Rows growing between two major Iraqi parties,” 9/18/08
Aswat al-Iraq, “Barazani criticizes al-Maliki on al-Jazeera,” 11/16/08
- “Diwaniya sahwa council meets in defiance of protests,” 11/10/08
- “Gov’t seeks national support council,” 11/6/08
- “Karbala governor says no-confidence vote proposal is political pressure tool,” 10/1/08
- “Meeting to Discuss Disagreement over Forming Support Councils,” 11/12/08
- “MP’s decision to cancel partisan support councils welcomed,” 10/9/08
- “PM Accuses Kurdish Leadership of ‘violating’ the Constitution,” 11/20/08
- “Premier to cancel partisan support councils,” 10/9/08
- “Pro-sahwa protests in Thi-Qar,” 11/15/08
- “Sahwa councils could stir sedition, says key legislator,” 11/12/08
- “Thi-Qar governor slams govt’s plan of installing support councils,” 10/3/08
- “Tribal chieftain announces opening 20 Supports Councils offices in Thi-Qar,” 10/1/08
- “Wassit province refuses to establish support councils,” 9/24/08
Farrell, Stephen and Glanz, James, “More Than 1,000 in Iraq’s Forces Quit Basra Fight,” New York Times, 4/4/08
Garcia-Navarro, Lourdes, “Competition Between Iraqi Shiites Gains Strength,” All Things Considered, NPR, 10/22/08
IraqSlogger.com, “Najaf Forms Tribal ‘Support Council,’” 10/27/08
- “New Tribal Groups Buck Wishes of Wasit Council,” 10/23/08
Kazimi, Nibras, “Ousting Maliki, Maybe,” Talisman Gate Blog, 11/21/08
Krauss, Joseph, “Iraqi PM feuds with Kurds over militias,” Agence France Presse, 11/12/08
KurdishMedia, “Massoud Barzani on Kurdistan Region’s conflict with Baghdad,” 9/5/08
Levinson, Charles and Nabhan, Ali, “Iraqi tribes caught between rival Shiite parties,” USA Today, 10/20/08
Missing Links Blog, “What’s up with Maliki’s latest tribal-council proposal,” 7/1/08
Mohsen, Amer, “Iraq Papers Mon: Australian Troops to Depart,” IraqSlogger.com, 6/1/08
Muhammed, Ako, “Kirkuk Tribal Militias Trouble for Kurds,” Kurdish Globe, 11/13/08
Niqash, “southern tribes: security or politics?” 11/6/08
al-Obeidi, Hassan, “Thousands of Iraqi Arabs attend anti-Kurdish protests,” Agence France Presse, 11/15/08
Parker, Sam, “ISCI/Da’wa alliance showing strain,” Abu Muqawama Blog, 9/17/08
Roads To Iraq Blog, “Talabani’s attempt to oust Maliki, demonstrators hanged a statue of George Bush,” 11/21/08
Rubin, Alissa, “Rejection of Oil Law and Move to Create Tribal Councils Add to Tensions With Kurds,” New York Times, 10/28/08
Russo, Claire, “The Maliki Government Confronts Diyala,” Institute for the Study of War, 9/23/08
Ryan, Missy, “Kurd-Arab tension may threaten Iraq calm,” Reuters, 11/12/08
Weiner, Scott, “Maliki Makes a Play for the Southern Tribes,” Institute for the Study of War, 11/6/08
Since March 2008 Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has been forming Tribal Support Councils. Originally, these were created to help the security forces crackdown on the Mahdi Army militia of Moqtada al-Sadr. Beginning in the summer however, Maliki has been creating councils across the south and north to establish his control over the country, and increasingly to challenge the rule of his main coalition partners, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) and the Kurdish parties, in the provinces. This is coming to a boiling point as both groups are increasingly criticizing Maliki’s rule, and rumors are beginning that they might even make a move to unseat him from power.
There have been several reports that the SIIC and Kurds might be looking to replace Maliki as prime minister of Iraq. First, Nibras Kazimi, former Iraqi National Congress member, New York based writer, member of the Hudson Institute, and operator of the Talisman Gate blog, wrote that he had heard that the Kurds and Supreme Council were considering replacing Maliki with either current Vice President Adel Abdel-Mahdi of the SIIC, former prime minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari who broke away from the Dawa Party and formed his own National Reform Party this summer, or Ali al-Adeeb of the Dawa Party. Al-Quds al-Rubi reported that while Iraq’s President Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan was meeting with members of parliament he said that Maliki’s government needed to be reformed, while Iraq-Ina wrote that Talabani was trying to depose the Prime Minister.
That followed a public dispute between Maliki and the Presidential Council, which consists of President Talabani, Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi of the Iraqi Islamic Party, and Vice President Abdel-Mahdi. On November 18, they sent a letter to Maliki suggesting that the government should stop wasting money forming Tribal Support Councils, and instead use the funds on the existing security forces. They also said that the Prime Minister should stop forming the councils until there is a formal framework to integrate them into the government. Two days later, Maliki gave a televised speech in which he said that Talabani was picking on the Support Councils, while the Kurds were breaking the constitution by deploying their Peshmerga militia outside of Kurdistan, and signing oil contracts without government approval. Maliki also said that the constitution needed to be amended so that the central government could have more power, implying that the Kurdish Regional Government needed its authority to be curtailed. That was an empty threat since the changes to the constitution have been held up for over a year, but upped the war of words between the two sides. The Presidential Council was not pleased by Maliki’s comments, and told him on November 21 that he shouldn’t have made their differences public.
Tribal Support Councils have been formed in 4. Wasit, 5. Maysan, 6. Basra, 7. Dhi Qar, 8. Muthanna, 9. Qadisiyah, 10. Babil, 11. Karbala, 12. Najaf, 17. Tamim, and others to support Prime Minster Maliki
All of this began back in March 2008 when the government moved against the Sadrists. During the crackdowns in the south, Maliki reached out to various tribes to help deal with the Mahdi Army. This first happened in Basra when Maliki gave 10,000 tribesman jobs in the provincial police in return for fighting the militias. Tribal Support Councils were also formed in Babil, Karbala, Maysan, and Dhi Qar as the fighting spread across the south. After that initial wave, the Prime Minister moved ahead creating councils in Qadisiyah Wasit, Najaf, Kirkuk, Muthanna, and other areas. Each was paid $21,000 by the government, and then $10,000 a month afterwards. They reported to the Committee for National Reconciliation in Baghdad, although there is talk of forming a National Tribal Support Council. Tribal sheikhs have been eager to join these councils because it gives them power and new standing, as well as jobs for their followers. As reported earlier, many of the country’s tribes were weak after the invasion because they had become dependent upon Saddam and his patronage to maintain their positions. Working for Maliki then, is an all too familiar relationship for many of these sheikhs. Many of these tribes are also national in character, which means that the Prime Minister is building up support not only in the individual provinces where the councils are, but across the country.
The Supreme Council was the first to object to this policy. As they rule most of the south, they saw the Support Councils as a brazen attempt by Maliki to build up his support and challenge their authority in the upcoming provincial elections, scheduled for the end of January 2009. SIIC officials in Babil, Wasit, Karbala, Dhi-Qar, Basra, Muthanna, and Qadisiyah have all protested the tribal groups. Governors and provincial councils have all complained that Maliki never consulted with them when forming the Support Councils, and that they are not part of the local governments, answering to Baghdad rather to them.
The Kurds became concerned later in the year when Maliki began focusing upon the north. As mentioned several times before, in August 2008 government forces moved into the disputed Khanaqin district in Diyala province, which the Kurds have occupied since the 2003 invasion. That caused a confrontation between Baghdad and the Kurdish Regional Government that could have led to violence. By September, Kurdish President Massoud Barzani gave an interview where he accused Maliki of acting like an autocrat, never following through with their promises to the Kurds, and questioning whether Kurds should stand behind the Prime Minister’s government. Maliki then set up Support Councils in Kirkuk and Mosul, and attempted to form one in Khanaqin, while also trying to move Kurdish forces out of Mosul.
As a result, the Kurds have stepped up their attacks upon Maliki. Beginning in November, they have said that Maliki is acting like a totalitarian, and that the Support Councils are illegal and unconstitutional. The Patriot Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party issued a joint statement that compared the tribal groups to Kurds that fought for Saddam in the 1980s and 90s. Kurdish President Barzani followed that up with a TV interview with al-Jazeera in which he said that the the councils were mercenaries and would be treated as enemies by the Kurds. Maliki responded by organizing two days of protests by his new tribal allies. On November 15, tribes came out on the streets to support Maliki and the Support Councils and protest against the Kurds in Tikrit in Salahaddin, Hawijah in Tamim, Karbala, Najaf, Nasiriyah in Dhi Qar, Samawah in Muthanna, and Hilla in Babil. Demonstrators said that Kirkuk, Mosul, and Diyala were parts of Iraq, responding to the Kurd desire to annex districts in those areas.
The Kurds and SIIC have been close allies since before the 2003 U.S. invasion. They were the main reason why Maliki was able to stay in power in 2007 when various factions were trying to unseat him. The Prime Minister has been emboldened after his successful crackdowns on the Sadrists earlier this year however, and now feels as if he can take on his allies in the provinces that they control. He is building up support across the country before the provincial elections, but it could come at a cost. If the Kurds and SIIC want, they can depose him in parliament with a no confidence vote. Worse, his moves could lead to violence between the Tribal Support Councils and local police and Peshmerga controlled by the SIIC and Kurds. So far these disputes have stayed verbal, but the rhetoric is increasing, and shows the deep divisions that remain in Iraq.
For more on the Tribal Support Councils, Inter-Shiite Power Struggles, and the Kurdish-Baghdad Dispute see:
Cold War Between Baghdad and Kurds Turns Hot
Deal Struck To Defuse Kahanqin Issue
Disputes Over Tribal Support Councils
Khanaqin Deal Off?
Kurdish-Baghdad Tensions Over Diyala
The Kurds Come Out Swinging
Maliki Responds To His Critics On Tribal Support Councils
Maliki Still Pushing The Kurds On Khanaqin District
Maliki Ups the Ante in Khanaqin District of Diyala
Maliki’s Tribal Support Councils Appear To Be Paying Off
Shiite Rivalries Increasing As Provincial Elections Near
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