On November 27, 2008 Iraq’s parliament passed the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which set the future relationship between Iraq and the United States. The only real concession the Sunni Iraqi Accordance Front was able to get included in the agreement was a referendum on the deal to be held in July 2009. That date is quickly approaching, but there’s no rush in Baghdad to have the vote happen.
Having the Americans go is popular in Iraq right now, and politicians like to talk about it to gain favor before the January 2010 parliamentary election, but in practice there is no real effort behind having the July referendum. In mid-May 2009 the Iraqi Election Commission said that it was ready to hold the vote, but that parliament needed to pass a law and budget for it. On July 9 it appeared that this was moving forward when the Councils of Ministers, Maliki’s cabinet, allocated $99.575 million for the referendum. It was then reported that the cabinet wanted to delay the vote for six months so that it would happen at the same time as the January 2010 parliamentary balloting. If Iraq’s legislature acts like normal, it could take six months or longer to pass a law to regulate the referendum. In addition, the U.S. is also working behind the scenes to try to have Baghdad cancel the vote altogether.
If the referendum is held, many American observers believe that it will not pass. That would mean U.S. combat troops would have one year to withdraw from Iraq after the voting day. The White House and Pentagon need to make contingency planning for this possible outcome. At the same time, given Iraq’s parliament’s recent history, it’s unlikely that they can pass any legislation on time. One that is political sensitive like a referendum on SOFA is likely to drag out even longer. At the same time, since Iraqi nationalism is on the rise the referendum could very likely correspond with the parliamentary elections, so Iraqi politicians could use it to their personal advantage. Also of importance is the fact that a large training/advising force will probably stay behind to provide logistics, air and sea support, and intelligence for the Iraqi forces whether the U.S. pulls out in January 2011 or December 2011.
SOURCES
Alsumaria, “IHEC ready to hold referendum on US pact,” 5/14/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Iraqi govt. allocates $100 million for referendum on security agreement,” 6/9/09
Rubin, Alissa, “Iraq Moves Ahead With Vote on U.S. Security Pact,” New York Times, 6/10/09
Rubin, Alissa, Robertson, Campbell and Farrell, Stephen, “Iraqi Parliament Approves U.S. Security Pact,” New York Times, 11/27/08
Monday, June 29, 2009
Sunday, June 28, 2009
United Iraqi Alliance Ready To Be Reconstituted
As recently reported, both the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) and Iran are desperately trying to put together the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) before the 2010 parliamentary elections. Al-Hayat newspaper recently reported that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has agreed to rejoin the List as long as he gets to set the agenda. According to the paper, the coalition will be called the Coalition of the State of Law, after Maliki’s successful list in the 2009 provincial vote. The alliance will also be open to any party, and not just be a Shiite one like it was when it was originally formed. The Prime Minister has talked to Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani about creating such a list.
An SIIC member was also quoted in the Azzaman paper that they were consulting with the Sadrists to bring them back into the fold as well. Sadr’s followers left the alliance in September 2007 after there were efforts to push him out of the ruling coalition behind Maliki’s government. The Sadrists and SIIC are long-time rivals who carried out a running battle against each other across the south after the U.S. invasion. Maliki launched a crackdown on the Mahdi Army in March 2008 that largely broke up the militia. That didn’t stop the State of Law List from reaching out to the Sadrists after the January 2009 elections. The Sadrists have recently been protesting against their followers still being in prison, and being abused after the government’s offensives. They have blamed Maliki and the Supreme Council for these arrests, and their release may be a precondition for them to rejoin the alliance. Until then the Sadrists have said they will run on their own like they did in the provincial vote.
If Maliki goes ahead and rejoins the Supreme Council they could be a powerful force in the 2010 balloting. Maliki’s State of Law won the most seats in the provincial elections, but only came away with a majority in two provinces. Including the Supreme Council, and other parties would make the alliance a dominant force, and give Maliki say over any new coalition that was put together in parliament, thus cementing his role as kingmaker and center of Iraqi politics.
SOURCES
Mohsen, Amer, “Iraq Papers Sat: The I’tilaf is Back!” IraqSlogger.com, 6/19/09
Parker, Ned, “Sadr’s bloc quits Iraq’s ruling coalition,” Times of London, 9/16/07
Al-Sharqiyah Television, “Iraq Al-Sadr bloc leader speaks of unjustified detentions, views spat with Kuwait,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 6/11/09
- “Iraq detains Interior Ministry employee over prison rights violations; update,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 6/15/09
- “’Special groups’ leaders arrested in Iraq; political, security roundup,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 6/15/09
- “US troops start withdrawal from Al-Sadr City; Iraq roundup,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 5/29/09
Tavernise, Sabrina and Mizher, Qais, “In Iraq’s Mayhem, Town Finds Calm Through Its Tribal Links,” New York Times, 7/10/06
An SIIC member was also quoted in the Azzaman paper that they were consulting with the Sadrists to bring them back into the fold as well. Sadr’s followers left the alliance in September 2007 after there were efforts to push him out of the ruling coalition behind Maliki’s government. The Sadrists and SIIC are long-time rivals who carried out a running battle against each other across the south after the U.S. invasion. Maliki launched a crackdown on the Mahdi Army in March 2008 that largely broke up the militia. That didn’t stop the State of Law List from reaching out to the Sadrists after the January 2009 elections. The Sadrists have recently been protesting against their followers still being in prison, and being abused after the government’s offensives. They have blamed Maliki and the Supreme Council for these arrests, and their release may be a precondition for them to rejoin the alliance. Until then the Sadrists have said they will run on their own like they did in the provincial vote.
If Maliki goes ahead and rejoins the Supreme Council they could be a powerful force in the 2010 balloting. Maliki’s State of Law won the most seats in the provincial elections, but only came away with a majority in two provinces. Including the Supreme Council, and other parties would make the alliance a dominant force, and give Maliki say over any new coalition that was put together in parliament, thus cementing his role as kingmaker and center of Iraqi politics.
SOURCES
Mohsen, Amer, “Iraq Papers Sat: The I’tilaf is Back!” IraqSlogger.com, 6/19/09
Parker, Ned, “Sadr’s bloc quits Iraq’s ruling coalition,” Times of London, 9/16/07
Al-Sharqiyah Television, “Iraq Al-Sadr bloc leader speaks of unjustified detentions, views spat with Kuwait,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 6/11/09
- “Iraq detains Interior Ministry employee over prison rights violations; update,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 6/15/09
- “’Special groups’ leaders arrested in Iraq; political, security roundup,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 6/15/09
- “US troops start withdrawal from Al-Sadr City; Iraq roundup,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 5/29/09
Tavernise, Sabrina and Mizher, Qais, “In Iraq’s Mayhem, Town Finds Calm Through Its Tribal Links,” New York Times, 7/10/06
Update On Political Dispute In Ninewa
Things remain tense in Ninewa province. Since the January 2009 elections, the province has been divided between the ruling Al-Hadbaa party and the Ninewa Fraternal List. The Kurdish Fraternal List was previously in power, but was defeated by Al-Hadbaa who ran on a largely anti-Kurdish campaign. Since the new council was seated in April the Fraternal List has been boycotting it. They have been steadily upping the ante.
On June 9 there was a shootout between Kurdish peshmerga forces and police in Zammar as Al-Hadba council member Ahmed Awad al-Sheikh Issa was visiting. Issa claimed that he was seeing local officials there when peshmerga forces surrounded the building. When the police came, they exchanged gunfire with the peshmerga. According to IraqSlogger, the officials that Issa met with were later arrested by the peshmerga and taken to Dohuk in Kurdistan.
Four days later Al-Sharqiyah Television reported that the Fraternal List was considering setting up their own administration of districts and towns in Ninewa with Kurdish majorities that were refusing to cooperate with the Ninewa council. The head of the List Khisru Guran said that the move would be unconstitutional, but that there were all kinds of violations of the law such as not implementing Article 140 that is to resolve the future of disputed territories.
Finally, on June 20 former Deputy Governor of Ninewa and Fraternal List member Khasro Ghoran told teachers in Bashiqa that they should only run their classes in Kurdish from now on. The town was the sight of an earlier confrontation when Kurdish forces refused to allow the Al-Hadbaa governor of Ninewa Atheel al-Najafi to attend a sporting event there in early May.
As would be expected, the Al-Hadbaa party has condemned all of these moves. Various officials have said that the Kurds are trying to divide the people of Ninewa and sow dissent. They have also said any attempt to form a separate Kurdish led government in the province would be illegal. They have also accused the peshmerga of human rights abuses and violating the law. Overall, Governor Najafi has said he will only cooperate with the Kurds if they give up their aspirations to annex parts of Ninewa and withdraw their militia.
Outside forces are in the process of trying to mediate this dispute. At the beginning of June the Iraqi Islamic Party said they were sending officials to Ninewa to talk with both sides. The Islamic Party holds three seats on the Ninewa council, and has an alliance with the Kurds in parliament. The new U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Christopher Hill has also offered his assistance. The Kurds have talked to him, and the brother of Governor Najafi, a parliamentarian said that he hopes that the U.S. can help. Finally, the Sadrists in parliament have sent a delegation to meet with the parties.
Neither side seems willing to compromise in this dispute. While three different groups have gone to Ninewa, there has been no word of any breakthroughs or dialogue between Al-Hadbaa and the Fraternal List. The Kurds are demanding that they be given leading positions in the council, while Al-Hadbaa is asking that the Kurds given up any aspirations they might have over disputed areas in the province. The bigger threat of course, is that this might lead to violence. The shoot out in Zammar could’ve easily escalated. The Americans are especially worried about this as they withdraw. In the short-term at least, things look like they will only get worse in the province.
SOURCES
Aswat al-Iraq, “IIP delegation to visit Ninewa to work out solutions to power sharing,” 6/2/09
- “Ninewa chieftains protest Peshmerga, Asayesh presence,” 5/12/09
- “Sadrist delegation in Mosul to defuse crisis,” 6/13/09
Dagher, Sam, “Tensions Stoked Between Iraqi Kurds and Sunnis,” New York Times, 5/18/09
Hamad, Qassim Khidhir, “arab domination rejected by kurds in makhmour,” Niqash, 5/22/09
Al-Hayat, “US ambassador to Iraq offers to mediate between Kurds, Arabs in Mosul – paper,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 6/4/09
Sbay, “Iraq Kurdish officials and Ninewa governor’s exchange accusations – website,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 5/30/09
Al-Sharqiyah Television, “Iraq roundup: Al-Sadr Trend mediates in Ninawa; security incidents,” BBC Monitoring Service, 6/14/09
Smith, Daniel, “Arabic Language Barred in Ba’shiqa Schools,” IraqSlogger.com, 6/20/09
- “Gunfire Between Pesh Merga and Al-Hadba Guards,” IraqSlogger.com, 6/12/09
On June 9 there was a shootout between Kurdish peshmerga forces and police in Zammar as Al-Hadba council member Ahmed Awad al-Sheikh Issa was visiting. Issa claimed that he was seeing local officials there when peshmerga forces surrounded the building. When the police came, they exchanged gunfire with the peshmerga. According to IraqSlogger, the officials that Issa met with were later arrested by the peshmerga and taken to Dohuk in Kurdistan.
Four days later Al-Sharqiyah Television reported that the Fraternal List was considering setting up their own administration of districts and towns in Ninewa with Kurdish majorities that were refusing to cooperate with the Ninewa council. The head of the List Khisru Guran said that the move would be unconstitutional, but that there were all kinds of violations of the law such as not implementing Article 140 that is to resolve the future of disputed territories.
Finally, on June 20 former Deputy Governor of Ninewa and Fraternal List member Khasro Ghoran told teachers in Bashiqa that they should only run their classes in Kurdish from now on. The town was the sight of an earlier confrontation when Kurdish forces refused to allow the Al-Hadbaa governor of Ninewa Atheel al-Najafi to attend a sporting event there in early May.
As would be expected, the Al-Hadbaa party has condemned all of these moves. Various officials have said that the Kurds are trying to divide the people of Ninewa and sow dissent. They have also said any attempt to form a separate Kurdish led government in the province would be illegal. They have also accused the peshmerga of human rights abuses and violating the law. Overall, Governor Najafi has said he will only cooperate with the Kurds if they give up their aspirations to annex parts of Ninewa and withdraw their militia.
Outside forces are in the process of trying to mediate this dispute. At the beginning of June the Iraqi Islamic Party said they were sending officials to Ninewa to talk with both sides. The Islamic Party holds three seats on the Ninewa council, and has an alliance with the Kurds in parliament. The new U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Christopher Hill has also offered his assistance. The Kurds have talked to him, and the brother of Governor Najafi, a parliamentarian said that he hopes that the U.S. can help. Finally, the Sadrists in parliament have sent a delegation to meet with the parties.
Neither side seems willing to compromise in this dispute. While three different groups have gone to Ninewa, there has been no word of any breakthroughs or dialogue between Al-Hadbaa and the Fraternal List. The Kurds are demanding that they be given leading positions in the council, while Al-Hadbaa is asking that the Kurds given up any aspirations they might have over disputed areas in the province. The bigger threat of course, is that this might lead to violence. The shoot out in Zammar could’ve easily escalated. The Americans are especially worried about this as they withdraw. In the short-term at least, things look like they will only get worse in the province.
SOURCES
Aswat al-Iraq, “IIP delegation to visit Ninewa to work out solutions to power sharing,” 6/2/09
- “Ninewa chieftains protest Peshmerga, Asayesh presence,” 5/12/09
- “Sadrist delegation in Mosul to defuse crisis,” 6/13/09
Dagher, Sam, “Tensions Stoked Between Iraqi Kurds and Sunnis,” New York Times, 5/18/09
Hamad, Qassim Khidhir, “arab domination rejected by kurds in makhmour,” Niqash, 5/22/09
Al-Hayat, “US ambassador to Iraq offers to mediate between Kurds, Arabs in Mosul – paper,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 6/4/09
Sbay, “Iraq Kurdish officials and Ninewa governor’s exchange accusations – website,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 5/30/09
Al-Sharqiyah Television, “Iraq roundup: Al-Sadr Trend mediates in Ninawa; security incidents,” BBC Monitoring Service, 6/14/09
Smith, Daniel, “Arabic Language Barred in Ba’shiqa Schools,” IraqSlogger.com, 6/20/09
- “Gunfire Between Pesh Merga and Al-Hadba Guards,” IraqSlogger.com, 6/12/09
Friday, June 26, 2009
Center for a New American Security – Maintain The Status Quo In Iraq
In June 2009 the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) released a position paper on what U.S. policy towards Iraq should be under the new administration entitled, “After the Fire: Shaping the Future U.S. Relationship with Iraq.” The two authors, John Nagl, a famous former Army officer, and Brian Burton argue that the U.S. should foster Iraq as a long-term ally in the Middle East. The problem is that the U.S. is pulling out, the American public has grown tired of the war, and there is a recession. The CNAS paper worries that short-term thinking will outweigh the long-term goal of the U.S. to have stability in the Middle East. Almost all of the paper’s recommendations however are already being implemented, so what it’s really about is asking for the status quo to be maintained in Iraq past the U.S. withdrawal.
The paper sees four major challenges for the U.S. in Iraq. First, is the increasing divide between Arabs and Kurds. As reported before, a recent journal piece in Middle East Policy argued that this dispute could lead to the fall of the government, become a new source of violence, and even break up the country. Second, is integration of the Sunnis, who still need to find their place in the new political order. Third, is whether Iraq will slide back to authoritarianism. As a paper by two United States Institute of Peace officials recently noted, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is now at the center of Iraqi politics. His opponents are worried that he may become an autocrat. Finally, Iraq’s future is threatened by its over reliance upon oil, which provides almost all of its revenue. The economic downturn has affected Baghdad’s hopes for development, jobs, services, and maintaining the security forces to name just a few.
To meet these challenges and ensure that Iraq is a long-term ally, the CNAS paper suggests five strategies Washington should follow. To deal with the Arab-Kurd divide, the U.S. should act as mediators, and support the United Nations effort to resolve the disputed territories, especially Kirkuk. The U.S. is already trying to help talks between the two sides across northern Iraq, and has stepped in to stop military confrontations. The U.S. also backs the U.N.’s plans for the disputed territories. With regards to the integration of the Sunnis, the writers believe supporting elections is the best course of action. The U.S. has been largely unsuccessful pushing Baghdad to reconcile with the Sunnis, so backing free and open voting where Sunni parties can gain power is the best alternative. This is something Washington has done since 2005. The U.S. also needs to help Iraq diversify its economy. CNAS suggests agriculture should be cultivated. The last few Defense Department quarterly reports to Congress have said the same thing. The problem is that Iraq’s farm sector faces so many institutional barriers such as a lack of tariffs and government support, inadequate irrigation, etc. that it could take over a decade for it to recover. To prevent the return of an autocratic leader in Iraq, the two writers suggest supporting institutions and professionalism. The U.S. already has advisers throughout the Iraqi military and ministries. Washington should also emphasize that it stands behind the Iraqi government, and not just Maliki, something that the Obama administration has already done as well. Finally, to encourage Iraq as a long-term ally the U.S. needs to re-integrate it into the region, and foster more ties between Washington and Baghdad. Getting Iraq’s neighbors to accept the Shiite led government in Baghdad has proven more difficult than expected. Countries like Saudi Arabia have given Iraq a cold shoulder since the invasion. Turkey on the other hand has changed its policy and become much closer recently. Other steps could be bringing more Iraqi military officers and students for training and education in the United States. The authors also believe that the U.S. needs to keep both civilian and military advisers in Iraq past the 2011 deadline for a U.S. withdrawal of combat troops.
Almost everything that the CNAS paper advocates is already being done by the U.S. administration. It is working with the Iraqi government and military, it is trying to mediate internal disputes, it is helping with the economy, it is trying to bring its allies in the region to open up to Baghdad, etc. The only question is whether President Obama will be open to keeping up this support for Iraq after 2011. That’s what “After the Fire” is really about, trying to ensure that all of these programs are maintained into 2012 and beyond.
SOURCES
Anatolia News Agency, “Turkish general says MoU between Turkey and Iraq to contribute to peace,” Today’s Zaman, 6/12/09
Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2009
- “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” September 2008
- “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” December 2008
Al-Hayat, “US ambassador to Iraq offers to mediate between Kurds, Arabs in Mosul – paper,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 6/4/09
International Crisis Group, “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08
Kazimi, Nibras, “Iraq: Trouble for Maliki,” Hudson New York, 4/24/09
Nagl, John and Burton, Brian, “After the Fire: Shaping the Future U.S. Relationship with Iraq,” Center for a New American Security, June 2009
Serwer, Daniel and Parker, Sam, “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2009
Stansfield, Gareth Anderson, Liam, “Kurds in Iraq: the struggle between Baghdad and Erbil,” Middle East Policy, Spring 2009
Williams, Timothy and al-Salhy, Saudad, “Allotting of Iraqi Oil Rights May Stoke Hostility,” New York Times, 5/29/09
The paper sees four major challenges for the U.S. in Iraq. First, is the increasing divide between Arabs and Kurds. As reported before, a recent journal piece in Middle East Policy argued that this dispute could lead to the fall of the government, become a new source of violence, and even break up the country. Second, is integration of the Sunnis, who still need to find their place in the new political order. Third, is whether Iraq will slide back to authoritarianism. As a paper by two United States Institute of Peace officials recently noted, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is now at the center of Iraqi politics. His opponents are worried that he may become an autocrat. Finally, Iraq’s future is threatened by its over reliance upon oil, which provides almost all of its revenue. The economic downturn has affected Baghdad’s hopes for development, jobs, services, and maintaining the security forces to name just a few.
To meet these challenges and ensure that Iraq is a long-term ally, the CNAS paper suggests five strategies Washington should follow. To deal with the Arab-Kurd divide, the U.S. should act as mediators, and support the United Nations effort to resolve the disputed territories, especially Kirkuk. The U.S. is already trying to help talks between the two sides across northern Iraq, and has stepped in to stop military confrontations. The U.S. also backs the U.N.’s plans for the disputed territories. With regards to the integration of the Sunnis, the writers believe supporting elections is the best course of action. The U.S. has been largely unsuccessful pushing Baghdad to reconcile with the Sunnis, so backing free and open voting where Sunni parties can gain power is the best alternative. This is something Washington has done since 2005. The U.S. also needs to help Iraq diversify its economy. CNAS suggests agriculture should be cultivated. The last few Defense Department quarterly reports to Congress have said the same thing. The problem is that Iraq’s farm sector faces so many institutional barriers such as a lack of tariffs and government support, inadequate irrigation, etc. that it could take over a decade for it to recover. To prevent the return of an autocratic leader in Iraq, the two writers suggest supporting institutions and professionalism. The U.S. already has advisers throughout the Iraqi military and ministries. Washington should also emphasize that it stands behind the Iraqi government, and not just Maliki, something that the Obama administration has already done as well. Finally, to encourage Iraq as a long-term ally the U.S. needs to re-integrate it into the region, and foster more ties between Washington and Baghdad. Getting Iraq’s neighbors to accept the Shiite led government in Baghdad has proven more difficult than expected. Countries like Saudi Arabia have given Iraq a cold shoulder since the invasion. Turkey on the other hand has changed its policy and become much closer recently. Other steps could be bringing more Iraqi military officers and students for training and education in the United States. The authors also believe that the U.S. needs to keep both civilian and military advisers in Iraq past the 2011 deadline for a U.S. withdrawal of combat troops.
Almost everything that the CNAS paper advocates is already being done by the U.S. administration. It is working with the Iraqi government and military, it is trying to mediate internal disputes, it is helping with the economy, it is trying to bring its allies in the region to open up to Baghdad, etc. The only question is whether President Obama will be open to keeping up this support for Iraq after 2011. That’s what “After the Fire” is really about, trying to ensure that all of these programs are maintained into 2012 and beyond.
SOURCES
Anatolia News Agency, “Turkish general says MoU between Turkey and Iraq to contribute to peace,” Today’s Zaman, 6/12/09
Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2009
- “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” September 2008
- “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” December 2008
Al-Hayat, “US ambassador to Iraq offers to mediate between Kurds, Arabs in Mosul – paper,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 6/4/09
International Crisis Group, “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08
Kazimi, Nibras, “Iraq: Trouble for Maliki,” Hudson New York, 4/24/09
Nagl, John and Burton, Brian, “After the Fire: Shaping the Future U.S. Relationship with Iraq,” Center for a New American Security, June 2009
Serwer, Daniel and Parker, Sam, “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2009
Stansfield, Gareth Anderson, Liam, “Kurds in Iraq: the struggle between Baghdad and Erbil,” Middle East Policy, Spring 2009
Williams, Timothy and al-Salhy, Saudad, “Allotting of Iraqi Oil Rights May Stoke Hostility,” New York Times, 5/29/09
Thursday, June 25, 2009
Iraqis Unwilling To Maintain Their Army
Nearly every official report on Iraq’s security forces notes that they do not have the ability to supply and support themselves. Few if any details however, are ever given on what exactly this means. In April 2009 the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) conducted an audit on the U.S. military’s effort to build up the Iraqi Army’s logistics capabilities. The SIGIR found that the Iraqi Defense Ministry has refused to take responsibility of the maintenance program created by the Americans, has not sent soldiers to be trained in these duties, and that the Iraqi Army cannot operate independently as a result.
Beginning in early 2005 the U.S. command in Iraq began working on Iraq’s supply system. The goal was to allow the Iraqi Army to act autonomously without U.S. support. The program focused upon maintenance, supply, transportation, and health services. The plan has gone through six phases, two of which are still operating. In total the program has received $682.2 million in funding, $572.0 million of which has been spent. The orders for the plan were never clear, they have been changed 161 times, there was little oversight, and has not been supported by the Ministry of Defense. The result is that costs have increased $420.5 million, and are expected to go up an additional $60 million until the last order expires in January 2010.
The SIGIR audit focused upon Orders 3, 5 and 6. Order 3 was started in May 2005 and completed in June 2007. It set up ten maintenance facilities, one for each Iraqi Army division. The order was also to provide training for Iraqi soldiers so that they could operate the bases. Order 5 was a follow up to provide training and maintain the ten facilities. It was supposed to end on May 31, 2009, but has been extended to November 30, 2009. Order 6 was for maintenance on 8,500 HUMVEES that were transferred from the Americans forces to the Iraqis. It is due to expire on July 6, 2009, but will be extended until January 6, 2010.
The three orders have faced daunting challenges since they began. On the American side, the U.S. never assigned enough personnel to oversee the orders, which could have led to corruption and waste. Many of the benchmarks were unclear, changed, or never followed. For example, 80% of the Iraqi vehicles were to be operational at all times, but this was never enforced. Order 3 and 5 had no details on how they were to be evaluated as successful or not. The U.S. has also transferred eight of the 10 maintenance facilities to Iraqi control, despite the fact that the Defense Ministry has not accepted responsibility for them. There is no agreed upon process for the handover of these bases, yet they are happening anyway. The Iraqi Army also only sent one class of soldiers to be trained. Many of them lacked the education for the training. That is not uncommon. An on-going Iraqi Army audit has found that 24% of the force is not qualified for their jobs, and that 15% are illiterate. This is mostly blamed on the Americans drive to increase the security forces as quickly as possible, which emphasized quantity over quality. Most of the soldiers that did show up for training complained about not getting paid for weeks, and quit before they were finished. The Defense Ministry has not sent any new soldiers since then. That was the major reason why Order 5 was issued when Order 3 ended, and why the U.S. military is looking to extend Order 5 and 6 as well.
In the end, the Special Inspector General does not believe that the Iraqi Army has improved at all under this program. There is no evidence that the Iraqi forces are any more capable of maintaining their equipment now than when the plan began in 2005. The main reason is that the Defense Ministry has given no support to the effort at all. That leaves the Iraqi armed forces almost completely dependent upon the Americans for their logistics. The two existing programs have already been extended, and will probably be again and again until Baghdad does something about this problem. This will likely be another cause for the U.S. military and the Iraqi government to ask President Obama to maintain a residual force in Iraq after the December 31, 2010 deadline for all combat troops to be withdrawn from Iraq. The Iraqi security forces still don’t have the equipment to protect themselves from outside threats. The SIGIR audit shows that they can’t even sustain their counterinsurgency campaign without the Americans as well.
SOURCES
Arraf, Jane, “Iraqi Army: almost one-quarter lacks minimum qualifications,” Christian Science Monitor, 5/22/09
Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2009
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 4/30/09
- “Security Forces Logistics Contract Experienced Certain Cost, Outcome, and Oversight Problems,” 4/26/09
Beginning in early 2005 the U.S. command in Iraq began working on Iraq’s supply system. The goal was to allow the Iraqi Army to act autonomously without U.S. support. The program focused upon maintenance, supply, transportation, and health services. The plan has gone through six phases, two of which are still operating. In total the program has received $682.2 million in funding, $572.0 million of which has been spent. The orders for the plan were never clear, they have been changed 161 times, there was little oversight, and has not been supported by the Ministry of Defense. The result is that costs have increased $420.5 million, and are expected to go up an additional $60 million until the last order expires in January 2010.
The SIGIR audit focused upon Orders 3, 5 and 6. Order 3 was started in May 2005 and completed in June 2007. It set up ten maintenance facilities, one for each Iraqi Army division. The order was also to provide training for Iraqi soldiers so that they could operate the bases. Order 5 was a follow up to provide training and maintain the ten facilities. It was supposed to end on May 31, 2009, but has been extended to November 30, 2009. Order 6 was for maintenance on 8,500 HUMVEES that were transferred from the Americans forces to the Iraqis. It is due to expire on July 6, 2009, but will be extended until January 6, 2010.
The three orders have faced daunting challenges since they began. On the American side, the U.S. never assigned enough personnel to oversee the orders, which could have led to corruption and waste. Many of the benchmarks were unclear, changed, or never followed. For example, 80% of the Iraqi vehicles were to be operational at all times, but this was never enforced. Order 3 and 5 had no details on how they were to be evaluated as successful or not. The U.S. has also transferred eight of the 10 maintenance facilities to Iraqi control, despite the fact that the Defense Ministry has not accepted responsibility for them. There is no agreed upon process for the handover of these bases, yet they are happening anyway. The Iraqi Army also only sent one class of soldiers to be trained. Many of them lacked the education for the training. That is not uncommon. An on-going Iraqi Army audit has found that 24% of the force is not qualified for their jobs, and that 15% are illiterate. This is mostly blamed on the Americans drive to increase the security forces as quickly as possible, which emphasized quantity over quality. Most of the soldiers that did show up for training complained about not getting paid for weeks, and quit before they were finished. The Defense Ministry has not sent any new soldiers since then. That was the major reason why Order 5 was issued when Order 3 ended, and why the U.S. military is looking to extend Order 5 and 6 as well.
In the end, the Special Inspector General does not believe that the Iraqi Army has improved at all under this program. There is no evidence that the Iraqi forces are any more capable of maintaining their equipment now than when the plan began in 2005. The main reason is that the Defense Ministry has given no support to the effort at all. That leaves the Iraqi armed forces almost completely dependent upon the Americans for their logistics. The two existing programs have already been extended, and will probably be again and again until Baghdad does something about this problem. This will likely be another cause for the U.S. military and the Iraqi government to ask President Obama to maintain a residual force in Iraq after the December 31, 2010 deadline for all combat troops to be withdrawn from Iraq. The Iraqi security forces still don’t have the equipment to protect themselves from outside threats. The SIGIR audit shows that they can’t even sustain their counterinsurgency campaign without the Americans as well.
SOURCES
Arraf, Jane, “Iraqi Army: almost one-quarter lacks minimum qualifications,” Christian Science Monitor, 5/22/09
Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2009
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 4/30/09
- “Security Forces Logistics Contract Experienced Certain Cost, Outcome, and Oversight Problems,” 4/26/09
Wednesday, June 24, 2009
Iraq’s Lack Of Budget Execution
In April 2009 Iraq passed its latest budget. It is larger than the 2008 one, but not as big as originally planned. The increases that individual ministries have received are largely for operational costs that go towards things like salaries and pensions, rather than for investing in the future. Another problem is that the major ministries responsible for revenues and services are still incapable of spending most of their capital budgets. This comes at a time when Iraq desperately needs to boost its growth.
Iraq’s 2009 budget is for $58.6 billion. That’s a 25.8% cut from the original amount of $79.8 billion, but still a 17% increase from the 2008 budget of $49.9 billion. Both Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the Finance Minister Bayan Jabr were against the cuts saying that it would hamper services and the development of the economy, which is still mostly state run. It would have been impossible for Iraq to cover that original amount however. Even with the lower figure, Iraq is still expected to have a $20 billion deficit.
Most of the 2009 budget is for operational costs, with a cut in capital spending. The operational budget is for $45.9 billion, 78% of the total. The capital budget went down from $13.1 billion in 2008 to $12.7 billion in 2009, a 3% cut. In 2008 oil revenues were so large that a supplemental budget was passed, which increased the overall capital budget to $21.1 billion.
With U.S. reconstruction funding coming to an end, Iraq’s capital spending is the largest source of funding for rebuilding the country. Appropriately than, most of this year’s money will go to the Oil, Electricity, Finance, Water, and Industry and Minerals Ministries. Iraq’s Oil Ministry’s capital budget went up slightly from $2 billion in 2008 to $2.2 billion in 2009. The Electricity Ministry on the other hand, will face a 17% decrease in its capital spending from $1.3 billion in 2008 to $1.08 billion in 2009. The Ministry is worried that it won’t be able to increase capacity with that amount, as they originally asked for $7 billion. The Health Ministry will have the largest capital increase at +489%, going from $83.3 million to $408.1 million.
The problem is that Iraq has rarely been able to spend its capital budget. In 2005, when Iraq formally got its sovereignty back from the United States, it only spent 23% of its capital budget. That went down to 19% in 2006, and then up to 28% in 2007. In 2008 Baghdad made a huge leap when it expended 39% of its capital budget. Iraq’s main revenue, budget, and services ministries did worse however. The Oil, Water, and Electricity Ministries for example, appropriated $11.9 billion for capital spending from 2005 to 2007, but only spent $985 million of it. In 2007 Oil and Electricity only expended $1 million each from their capital budgets.
What are skyrocketing instead are the operational budgets. Nearly every ministry will see an increase in that department. The Oil Ministry for example will see a jump from $103.7 million in 2008 to $954.4 million this year in its operational account. The Electricity Ministry’s operational budget will go from $89.1 million in 2008 to $2.31 billion in 2009. The Health Ministry’s will increase from $1.872 billion in 2008 to $3.095 billion in 2009. Most of this money will be spent if Iraq follows its past trends. From 2005 to 2007 it spent $67 billion, 90% of which went to operating costs.
Iraq’s poor budget execution has led to massive surpluses. In 2005 Iraq had a $6.5 billion surplus. That went up to $29 billion leftover from the 2008 budget. The GAO estimated that Iraq built up a $47.3 billion surplus from 2005 to 2008. When parliament was drafting the 2009 budget they believed that they could tap into this money to pay for the expected deficit, but after the bill was passed the Finance Ministry and Central Bank of Iraq let them know that they were not obligated to use the surplus to cover the budget. Baghdad has had to get a loan from the International Monetary Fund instead to cover the difference.
Each year Iraq has passed a larger budget, and each year it has been able to spend more of its money. The major ministries however, are still only spending a measly portion of their budgets, and most of that is going towards salaries and pensions, rather than investing in Iraq’s future. The 2009 budget will pose an additional problem for Iraq, as it still has not earned enough from oil to pay its bills. Many ministries did not get the money they requested either, and each still needs billions. The Ministry of Oil said it requires $25 to $75 billion to reach its target of 6 million barrels per day. The Electricity Ministry estimated that it needs $27 billion over the next 6 to 10 years to meet all of the country’s demand by 2015. The U.S. thinks the actual amount might be twice as high. The World Bank believes that Iraq has to have $14.4 billion to fix its water system. These amounts will largely have to come from Baghdad from now on as foreign investors are still largely staying away, while U.S. and international donations are coming to an end. The inability to spend its capital budget, while operational costs are skyrocketing do not point to meeting these goals anytime soon in Iraq.
Major Revenue And Service Ministries’ Budgets 2008-2009
Oil Ministry
2008: $103.7 mil operational, $2 bil capital. TOTAL $2.103 bil, 16% spent
2009: $954.4 mil operational, $2.2 bil capital. TOTAL: $3.160 bil
2008-2009 Changes: +920% operational, +10% capital
Electricity Ministry
2008: $89.1 mil operational, $1.3 bil capital. TOTAL: $1.389 bil, 12% spent
2009: $2.31 bil operational, $1.08 bil capital. TOTAL: $3.39 bil
2008-2009 Changes: +259% operational, -16% capital
Water Ministry
2008: $109.6 mil operational, $375 mil capital. TOTAL: $484. mil. 48% spent
2009: $168.6 mil operational, $563.5 mil capital. TOTAL: $732.1 mil
2008-2009 Changes: +53% operational, +50% capital
Municipalities and Public Works Ministry
2008: $42.6 mil operational, $416.7 mil capital. TOTAL: $459.3 mil, 22% spent
2009: $479.6 mil operational, $468.2 mil capital. TOTAL: $947.8 mil
2008-2009 Changes: +1125% operational, +12% capital
Transportation Ministry
2008: $121.6 mil operational, $250 mil capital. TOTAL: $371.6 mil, 29% spent
2009: $209.7 mil operational, $324.2 mil capital. TOTAL: $533.8 mil
2008-2009 Changes: +72% operational, +29% capital
Communications Ministry
2008: $14.4 mil operational, $250 mil capital. TOTAL: $264.4 mil, 30% spent
2009: $88.2 mil operational, $216.1 mil capital. TOTAL: $304.3 mil
2008-2009 Changes: +612% operational, -15% capital
Health Ministry
2008: $1.872 bil operational, $83.3 mil capital. TOTAL: $1.956 bil
2009: $3.095 bil operational, $408.1 mil capital. TOTAL: $3.503 bil
2008-2009 Changes: +65% operational, +489% capital
Budget Expenditures 2005-2007
Iraqi Budget Expenditures 2005-2007
2005: $16.151 bil operational, $1.432 bil capital. TOTAL: $17.583 bil
2006: $21.173 bil operational, $1.615 bil capital. TOTAL: $22.788 bil
2007: $23.164 bil operational, $3.434 bil capital. TOTAL: $26.599 bil
Oil, Water, Electricity Ministries’ Capital Appropriations Versus Spending
2005: $3,482 mil appropriated, $373 mil spent
2006: $4,473 mil appropriated, $502 mil spent
2007: $4.034 mil appropriated, $110 mil spent
TOTAL: $11,990 mil appropriated, $985 mil spent
Oil Ministry Spending
2005: $160 mil spent, $49 mil operational, $111 mil capital
2006: $191 mil spent, $48 mil operational, $143 mil capital
2007: $36 mil spent, $35 mil operational, $1 mil capital
Water Ministry Spending
2005: $163 mil spent, $42 mil operational, $120 mil capital
2006: $145 mil spent, $54 mil operational, $91 mil capital
2007: $236 mil spent, $128 mil operational, $109 mil capital
Electricity Ministry Spending
2005: $147 mil spent, $5 mil operational, $142 mil capital
2006: $281 mil spent, $13 mil operational, $268 mil capital
2007: $78 mil spent, $77 mil operational, $1 mil capital
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Iraq presidency approves slashed budget,” 4/3/09
Cordesman, Anthony, “The Changing Situation in Iraq: A Progress Report,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 4/1/09
Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2009
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 4/30/09
United States Government Accountability Office, “IRAQ Key Issues for Congressional Oversight,” March 2009
- “Iraqi Revenues, Expenditures, and Surplus,” August 2008
Iraq’s 2009 budget is for $58.6 billion. That’s a 25.8% cut from the original amount of $79.8 billion, but still a 17% increase from the 2008 budget of $49.9 billion. Both Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the Finance Minister Bayan Jabr were against the cuts saying that it would hamper services and the development of the economy, which is still mostly state run. It would have been impossible for Iraq to cover that original amount however. Even with the lower figure, Iraq is still expected to have a $20 billion deficit.
Most of the 2009 budget is for operational costs, with a cut in capital spending. The operational budget is for $45.9 billion, 78% of the total. The capital budget went down from $13.1 billion in 2008 to $12.7 billion in 2009, a 3% cut. In 2008 oil revenues were so large that a supplemental budget was passed, which increased the overall capital budget to $21.1 billion.
With U.S. reconstruction funding coming to an end, Iraq’s capital spending is the largest source of funding for rebuilding the country. Appropriately than, most of this year’s money will go to the Oil, Electricity, Finance, Water, and Industry and Minerals Ministries. Iraq’s Oil Ministry’s capital budget went up slightly from $2 billion in 2008 to $2.2 billion in 2009. The Electricity Ministry on the other hand, will face a 17% decrease in its capital spending from $1.3 billion in 2008 to $1.08 billion in 2009. The Ministry is worried that it won’t be able to increase capacity with that amount, as they originally asked for $7 billion. The Health Ministry will have the largest capital increase at +489%, going from $83.3 million to $408.1 million.
The problem is that Iraq has rarely been able to spend its capital budget. In 2005, when Iraq formally got its sovereignty back from the United States, it only spent 23% of its capital budget. That went down to 19% in 2006, and then up to 28% in 2007. In 2008 Baghdad made a huge leap when it expended 39% of its capital budget. Iraq’s main revenue, budget, and services ministries did worse however. The Oil, Water, and Electricity Ministries for example, appropriated $11.9 billion for capital spending from 2005 to 2007, but only spent $985 million of it. In 2007 Oil and Electricity only expended $1 million each from their capital budgets.
What are skyrocketing instead are the operational budgets. Nearly every ministry will see an increase in that department. The Oil Ministry for example will see a jump from $103.7 million in 2008 to $954.4 million this year in its operational account. The Electricity Ministry’s operational budget will go from $89.1 million in 2008 to $2.31 billion in 2009. The Health Ministry’s will increase from $1.872 billion in 2008 to $3.095 billion in 2009. Most of this money will be spent if Iraq follows its past trends. From 2005 to 2007 it spent $67 billion, 90% of which went to operating costs.
Iraq’s poor budget execution has led to massive surpluses. In 2005 Iraq had a $6.5 billion surplus. That went up to $29 billion leftover from the 2008 budget. The GAO estimated that Iraq built up a $47.3 billion surplus from 2005 to 2008. When parliament was drafting the 2009 budget they believed that they could tap into this money to pay for the expected deficit, but after the bill was passed the Finance Ministry and Central Bank of Iraq let them know that they were not obligated to use the surplus to cover the budget. Baghdad has had to get a loan from the International Monetary Fund instead to cover the difference.
Each year Iraq has passed a larger budget, and each year it has been able to spend more of its money. The major ministries however, are still only spending a measly portion of their budgets, and most of that is going towards salaries and pensions, rather than investing in Iraq’s future. The 2009 budget will pose an additional problem for Iraq, as it still has not earned enough from oil to pay its bills. Many ministries did not get the money they requested either, and each still needs billions. The Ministry of Oil said it requires $25 to $75 billion to reach its target of 6 million barrels per day. The Electricity Ministry estimated that it needs $27 billion over the next 6 to 10 years to meet all of the country’s demand by 2015. The U.S. thinks the actual amount might be twice as high. The World Bank believes that Iraq has to have $14.4 billion to fix its water system. These amounts will largely have to come from Baghdad from now on as foreign investors are still largely staying away, while U.S. and international donations are coming to an end. The inability to spend its capital budget, while operational costs are skyrocketing do not point to meeting these goals anytime soon in Iraq.
Major Revenue And Service Ministries’ Budgets 2008-2009
Oil Ministry
2008: $103.7 mil operational, $2 bil capital. TOTAL $2.103 bil, 16% spent
2009: $954.4 mil operational, $2.2 bil capital. TOTAL: $3.160 bil
2008-2009 Changes: +920% operational, +10% capital
Electricity Ministry
2008: $89.1 mil operational, $1.3 bil capital. TOTAL: $1.389 bil, 12% spent
2009: $2.31 bil operational, $1.08 bil capital. TOTAL: $3.39 bil
2008-2009 Changes: +259% operational, -16% capital
Water Ministry
2008: $109.6 mil operational, $375 mil capital. TOTAL: $484. mil. 48% spent
2009: $168.6 mil operational, $563.5 mil capital. TOTAL: $732.1 mil
2008-2009 Changes: +53% operational, +50% capital
Municipalities and Public Works Ministry
2008: $42.6 mil operational, $416.7 mil capital. TOTAL: $459.3 mil, 22% spent
2009: $479.6 mil operational, $468.2 mil capital. TOTAL: $947.8 mil
2008-2009 Changes: +1125% operational, +12% capital
Transportation Ministry
2008: $121.6 mil operational, $250 mil capital. TOTAL: $371.6 mil, 29% spent
2009: $209.7 mil operational, $324.2 mil capital. TOTAL: $533.8 mil
2008-2009 Changes: +72% operational, +29% capital
Communications Ministry
2008: $14.4 mil operational, $250 mil capital. TOTAL: $264.4 mil, 30% spent
2009: $88.2 mil operational, $216.1 mil capital. TOTAL: $304.3 mil
2008-2009 Changes: +612% operational, -15% capital
Health Ministry
2008: $1.872 bil operational, $83.3 mil capital. TOTAL: $1.956 bil
2009: $3.095 bil operational, $408.1 mil capital. TOTAL: $3.503 bil
2008-2009 Changes: +65% operational, +489% capital
Budget Expenditures 2005-2007
Iraqi Budget Expenditures 2005-2007
2005: $16.151 bil operational, $1.432 bil capital. TOTAL: $17.583 bil
2006: $21.173 bil operational, $1.615 bil capital. TOTAL: $22.788 bil
2007: $23.164 bil operational, $3.434 bil capital. TOTAL: $26.599 bil
Oil, Water, Electricity Ministries’ Capital Appropriations Versus Spending
2005: $3,482 mil appropriated, $373 mil spent
2006: $4,473 mil appropriated, $502 mil spent
2007: $4.034 mil appropriated, $110 mil spent
TOTAL: $11,990 mil appropriated, $985 mil spent
Oil Ministry Spending
2005: $160 mil spent, $49 mil operational, $111 mil capital
2006: $191 mil spent, $48 mil operational, $143 mil capital
2007: $36 mil spent, $35 mil operational, $1 mil capital
Water Ministry Spending
2005: $163 mil spent, $42 mil operational, $120 mil capital
2006: $145 mil spent, $54 mil operational, $91 mil capital
2007: $236 mil spent, $128 mil operational, $109 mil capital
Electricity Ministry Spending
2005: $147 mil spent, $5 mil operational, $142 mil capital
2006: $281 mil spent, $13 mil operational, $268 mil capital
2007: $78 mil spent, $77 mil operational, $1 mil capital
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Iraq presidency approves slashed budget,” 4/3/09
Cordesman, Anthony, “The Changing Situation in Iraq: A Progress Report,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 4/1/09
Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2009
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 4/30/09
United States Government Accountability Office, “IRAQ Key Issues for Congressional Oversight,” March 2009
- “Iraqi Revenues, Expenditures, and Surplus,” August 2008
Tuesday, June 23, 2009
Open Season On Out-Going Provincial Officials
In January 2009 Iraq conducted its second provincial elections since the U.S. invasion. All of the new provincial councils and governors have been named. As national leaders in Baghdad have been caught up in an anti-corruption fury, so too have these new local politicians. Several have gone after their outgoing peers, but for much different reasons than their counterparts in the capital.
In early June 2009 the new Diyala council issued arrest warrants for the two former deputy governors Razzaq al-Khalisi and Aouf Rahoumi. Both were accused of stealing money. Rahoumi, who belonged to the Iraqi Islamic Party, fled to Germany as soon as he found out about the charges. Khalisi, an independent Shiites, escaped to Kurdistan. The Public Integrity Committee, the main anti-corruption agency in Iraq, believes that the two were involved in stealing up to $130 million from the province. In April the former head of the Diyala council Ibrahim Hassan Bajilan of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan also had a warrant put out for him. He is allegedly involved with embezzling up to $128 million. The former provincial council was ruled by the Coalition of Islamic & National Forces in Diyala, an alliance of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and the Dawa Party, the Iraqi Islamic Party, and the Kurdish Arabic Turkmen Democratic Coalition – Diyala, made up of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party.
At the same time Salahaddin went after its health director, while the former head of the Karbala council was arrested. On June 8, Salahaddin fired the provincial director of the health department Hassan Zein al-Abedeen Naqi. He was accused of signing fake contracts, making illegal deals over medicine purchases, and housing relatives in Health Ministry buildings. The council said that his case was being sent to the Integrity Committee. On June 1, police arrested the outgoing head of the Karbala provincial council Abdulaal al-Yasseri for corruption as well. The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council controlled the governorate after the 2005 elections.
Baghdad is currently embroiled in corruption investigations as well. In May 2009 the Trade Minister Abdulfalah al-Sudani was forced to resign, and later arrested. Sudani and his two brothers were accused of misappropriating money meant for the country’s food ration system, the largest in the world. Parliament, and its new speaker Ayad al-Samarraie of the Iraqi Islamic Party forced Sudani’s resignation. Samarraie is intent on increasing the power of the legislature to provide a check on Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s power. Sudani was a member of Maliki’s Dawa Party and reportedly close to the Prime Minister. In response, Maliki has promised a crackdown on corruption as well. It’s likely that he will use this against his opponents in retaliation for Sudani’s arrest.
National and local leaders appear to have different intentions when it comes to corruption. The leaders of the main political parties in Baghdad seem most concerned about obtaining power at each other’s expense. The main struggle now appears to be between Maliki and the Iraqi Islamic Party, which has become the Prime Minister’s main critic. At the provincial level, many politicians are more concerned about getting their governments working. In Diyala for example, the three major parties that ruled the province after 2005 still rule it today. That didn’t stop them from going after some of their own. Politics are so divided in Iraq that it’s likely this difference will continue for quite some time.
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Former Iraqi officials accused of corruption flee to Germany via Kurdistan,” 6/10/09
Alsumaria, “Diyala former governor deputies to be held,” 6/10/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Ex-trade minister appears before Samawa court on corruption charges,” 6/1/09
- “Former deputy governor escapes to Germany following corruption charges,” 6/8/09
- “Karbala provincial council ex-chairman arrested,” 6/1/09
- “Salah el-Din council sacks health official over financial corruption,” 6/8/09
Bakri, Nada, “Iraqi Leader Sees Fraud as a Top Worry,” Washington Post, 5/10/09
Chon, Gina, “Graft Case Against Ex-Minister Splits Iraq Parties,” Wall Street Journal, 6/1/09
Serwer, Daniel and Parker, Sam, “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2009
Sly, Liz, “Ex-trade minister arrested after attempting to flee Iraq,” Los Angeles Times, 5/31/09
In early June 2009 the new Diyala council issued arrest warrants for the two former deputy governors Razzaq al-Khalisi and Aouf Rahoumi. Both were accused of stealing money. Rahoumi, who belonged to the Iraqi Islamic Party, fled to Germany as soon as he found out about the charges. Khalisi, an independent Shiites, escaped to Kurdistan. The Public Integrity Committee, the main anti-corruption agency in Iraq, believes that the two were involved in stealing up to $130 million from the province. In April the former head of the Diyala council Ibrahim Hassan Bajilan of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan also had a warrant put out for him. He is allegedly involved with embezzling up to $128 million. The former provincial council was ruled by the Coalition of Islamic & National Forces in Diyala, an alliance of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and the Dawa Party, the Iraqi Islamic Party, and the Kurdish Arabic Turkmen Democratic Coalition – Diyala, made up of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party.
At the same time Salahaddin went after its health director, while the former head of the Karbala council was arrested. On June 8, Salahaddin fired the provincial director of the health department Hassan Zein al-Abedeen Naqi. He was accused of signing fake contracts, making illegal deals over medicine purchases, and housing relatives in Health Ministry buildings. The council said that his case was being sent to the Integrity Committee. On June 1, police arrested the outgoing head of the Karbala provincial council Abdulaal al-Yasseri for corruption as well. The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council controlled the governorate after the 2005 elections.
Baghdad is currently embroiled in corruption investigations as well. In May 2009 the Trade Minister Abdulfalah al-Sudani was forced to resign, and later arrested. Sudani and his two brothers were accused of misappropriating money meant for the country’s food ration system, the largest in the world. Parliament, and its new speaker Ayad al-Samarraie of the Iraqi Islamic Party forced Sudani’s resignation. Samarraie is intent on increasing the power of the legislature to provide a check on Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s power. Sudani was a member of Maliki’s Dawa Party and reportedly close to the Prime Minister. In response, Maliki has promised a crackdown on corruption as well. It’s likely that he will use this against his opponents in retaliation for Sudani’s arrest.
National and local leaders appear to have different intentions when it comes to corruption. The leaders of the main political parties in Baghdad seem most concerned about obtaining power at each other’s expense. The main struggle now appears to be between Maliki and the Iraqi Islamic Party, which has become the Prime Minister’s main critic. At the provincial level, many politicians are more concerned about getting their governments working. In Diyala for example, the three major parties that ruled the province after 2005 still rule it today. That didn’t stop them from going after some of their own. Politics are so divided in Iraq that it’s likely this difference will continue for quite some time.
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Former Iraqi officials accused of corruption flee to Germany via Kurdistan,” 6/10/09
Alsumaria, “Diyala former governor deputies to be held,” 6/10/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Ex-trade minister appears before Samawa court on corruption charges,” 6/1/09
- “Former deputy governor escapes to Germany following corruption charges,” 6/8/09
- “Karbala provincial council ex-chairman arrested,” 6/1/09
- “Salah el-Din council sacks health official over financial corruption,” 6/8/09
Bakri, Nada, “Iraqi Leader Sees Fraud as a Top Worry,” Washington Post, 5/10/09
Chon, Gina, “Graft Case Against Ex-Minister Splits Iraq Parties,” Wall Street Journal, 6/1/09
Serwer, Daniel and Parker, Sam, “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2009
Sly, Liz, “Ex-trade minister arrested after attempting to flee Iraq,” Los Angeles Times, 5/31/09
Monday, June 22, 2009
Baghdad Hoping For Supplemental Budget Later In 2009
World oil prices have slowly crept back up in recent months. A barrel of oil is selling for around $70 per barrel on international markets. Iraq crude sells at a lower price, but it has been going up as well, along with exports. Baghdad is hoping that if the trend continues, the government will be able to pass a supplemental budget later in 2009 that will help alleviate some of the country’s financial problems.
At the beginning of April Iraq passed its 2009 budget. The budget went through three revisions before it was finally passed, and was still expected to run a $20 billion deficit. That was because it was based upon 2 million barrels a day average in exports and a $50 a barrel price, neither of which Iraq was achieving at that time. By May the Oil Ministry claimed Iraqi crude had reached the $50 mark, but was still only selling 1.905 million barrels a day. To make up the difference the Finance Ministry took out a two-year $7 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund.
The budget crunch is being felt already in the provinces. At the end of May, Maysan officials announced that they were going to run a deficit in 2009, and had no new money for development projects. They were looking for outside investment to fund growth. At the beginning of June, IraqSlogger reported a similar situation in Basra. The head of the reconstruction committee there said they too had no money for new projects, and were short about $84 million for what they needed.
With oil prices going up, Baghdad is now more optimistic about its money problems. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki recently said that he was hoping that the central government could pass a supplementary budget later this year if Iraqi crude continued to accrue in price. That would hopefully add much needed money to the ministries and provinces, all of which have had to cut their budgets. Of course, there’s also the issue of spending their funds, something Baghdad and the provinces still struggle with.
Iraq needs billions of dollars to improve its governance, services, and economy. U.S. reconstruction is coming to an end, so Iraq is increasingly on its own to provide money for development. The 2009 budget problems then, come at a bad time. Even if Iraq is able to meet its oil production and price goals, it will still be in debt to the IMF, and many of Iraq’s provinces will be left wanting until if and when a supplemental budget is passed. That will mean much needed rebuilding will be delayed.
SOURCES
Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Iraq passes sharply reduced budget for 2009,” Associated Press, 3/5/09
Agence France Presse, “Iraq presidency approves slashed budget,” 4/3/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Finance ministry to sign new agreements with IMF,” 5/27/09
- “Increase in oil exports contributes to budget balance – ministry,” 6/2/09
Iraq Directory, “Maysan province seeks to attract foreign investment to compensate the fiscal deficit in budget,” 5/30/09
- “New supplementary budget with the rise of oil prices,” 6/10/09
IraqSlogger.com, “Basra: Moritorium on New Development Projects,” 6/3/09
Reuters, “As oil prices rise, Iraq nurtures budget hopes,” 6/8/09
At the beginning of April Iraq passed its 2009 budget. The budget went through three revisions before it was finally passed, and was still expected to run a $20 billion deficit. That was because it was based upon 2 million barrels a day average in exports and a $50 a barrel price, neither of which Iraq was achieving at that time. By May the Oil Ministry claimed Iraqi crude had reached the $50 mark, but was still only selling 1.905 million barrels a day. To make up the difference the Finance Ministry took out a two-year $7 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund.
The budget crunch is being felt already in the provinces. At the end of May, Maysan officials announced that they were going to run a deficit in 2009, and had no new money for development projects. They were looking for outside investment to fund growth. At the beginning of June, IraqSlogger reported a similar situation in Basra. The head of the reconstruction committee there said they too had no money for new projects, and were short about $84 million for what they needed.
With oil prices going up, Baghdad is now more optimistic about its money problems. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki recently said that he was hoping that the central government could pass a supplementary budget later this year if Iraqi crude continued to accrue in price. That would hopefully add much needed money to the ministries and provinces, all of which have had to cut their budgets. Of course, there’s also the issue of spending their funds, something Baghdad and the provinces still struggle with.
Iraq needs billions of dollars to improve its governance, services, and economy. U.S. reconstruction is coming to an end, so Iraq is increasingly on its own to provide money for development. The 2009 budget problems then, come at a bad time. Even if Iraq is able to meet its oil production and price goals, it will still be in debt to the IMF, and many of Iraq’s provinces will be left wanting until if and when a supplemental budget is passed. That will mean much needed rebuilding will be delayed.
SOURCES
Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Iraq passes sharply reduced budget for 2009,” Associated Press, 3/5/09
Agence France Presse, “Iraq presidency approves slashed budget,” 4/3/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Finance ministry to sign new agreements with IMF,” 5/27/09
- “Increase in oil exports contributes to budget balance – ministry,” 6/2/09
Iraq Directory, “Maysan province seeks to attract foreign investment to compensate the fiscal deficit in budget,” 5/30/09
- “New supplementary budget with the rise of oil prices,” 6/10/09
IraqSlogger.com, “Basra: Moritorium on New Development Projects,” 6/3/09
Reuters, “As oil prices rise, Iraq nurtures budget hopes,” 6/8/09
Sunday, June 21, 2009
One American Attempt At Building Democracy In Iraq Looks To Be Fading
One goal of the United States before it departs Iraq is to leave it a functioning democracy. The U.S. has facilitated four national elections, two provincial, one parliamentary, and a referendum on the 2005 constitution, since the U.S. invasion. In January 2010 Iraq is to have its fifth balloting for a new parliament. Voting is only the most visible form of democracy. Since 2003 the Americans have been building up local councils to give everyday Iraqis a say in their government. These look to disappear however when the U.S. leaves.
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was the first government agency in the U.S. to seriously contemplate democracy building in Iraq. It joined the post-war planning in August 2002. The State Department was supposed to be in charge of governance in Iraq after the invasion, but never came up with anything concrete. That left the USAID to create a policy on its own. They wanted to decentralize power away from Baghdad to the local level. Under Saddam, the Baath party was in control of all levels of government. The USAID wanted to break that hold. They wanted to create neighborhood councils that would create jobs, be in charge of reconstruction, and give common Iraqis a say in their government. When they presented their plans to a National Security Council subgroup on humanitarian issues in Iraq, their ideas were rejected. The official stance was the U.S. was not going to be doing nation building in Iraq, and USAID had just crossed that line.
The situation in Iraq after the invasion proved so chaotic, that the U.S. military began implementing some of the USAID’s plans without knowing it. American units wanted Iraqi partners in their area of operation. To find some they began building up local councils across the country. This was done on an ad hoc basis, as there were no orders from above on how to do it. In Mosul for example, General David Petraeus, who was then the commander of the 101st Airborne Division, set up a convention of 270 delegates from the city representing its diverse population, who in turn elected 24 city council members and a mayor. In Najaf, General James Conway of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force started organizing provincial elections, registering parties, finding candidates, etc. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) had to step in at that point letting the general know that he could not carry out such a large undertaking because Iraq did not have an election law to legalize any voting. Some were far less representative and participatory. In the Karkh district of Baghdad only around 2,500 Iraqis of 30,000-35,000 showed up to vote for their council. In al-Kindi, fifty-five Iraqis elected 12 members to the council there. The U.S. military funded all of the councils they created, but believed that they would eventually hand them over to some other government body. That never happened, as the USAID lacked the money and personnel to deal with them. The U.S. military is still in charge of running these councils to this day.
The USAID was doing a similar job independent of the military. Iraq’s bureaucracy disappeared with the invasion. The tie between Baghdad and the rest of the country was severed in the process. The USAID tried to step in, offering three contracts to companies to create local councils. One company set up 22 offices across Iraq in the spring and summer of 2003 to complete this task. In April, the USAID also allocated $120 million to start local reconstruction that would assist these local groups. $61.7 million was spent in the end on 1,700 projects.
The U.S. military and USAID’s work eventually clashed with the CPA and the fledgling new Iraqi government. By 2005 437 neighborhood, 195 sub-district, and 96 district councils had been created by the Americans. CPA head Pual Bremer wanted to build a democracy in Iraq and decentralize power as well, but was more focused upon the provincial governments than local councils. The councils also ended up clashing with the Iraqi ministries and director generals over priorities and power.
This became more complicated after the two Iraqi elections in 2005. The provincial and parliamentary votes were closed list, meaning Iraqis voted for coalitions, which in turn picked the politicians. This was a blow to the U.S. military and USAID’s effort to empower local forces as the large national parties were in control of the process. The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) and the two main Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) came out the major winners in both votes. They too wanted to disperse power outside of Baghdad, but into their hands. As the new rulers of the provincial councils and ministries they too came into conflict with the U.S. created councils over authority. A mid-2006 report by the Americans for example noted that the SIIC and its militia the Badr Brigade had tightened their grip on the provincial governments, and were against any new elections or reforms that would weaken their power. The result was that provinces and ministries largely refused to work with the U.S.-backed local councils.
By the time the Surge started in 2007, the situation had grown no better. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were created to build up local and provincial governance, reconciliation, and reconstruction. They spread out across Iraq and began working with the local and district councils. They still had no real authority in the Iraqi government however. They had a small budget to pay salaries, which they got from the Americans, and some small scale U.S.-funded rebuilding projects, but no real say in ordinances, taxes, larger reconstruction efforts, provincial councils, or Baghdad.
Today it seems like only the U.S. military still considers these councils relevant. Stars and Stripes reported that few Iraqis go to the councils. The Iraqi political parties ignore them as well. If Iraqis want something done they go to the U.S. or Iraqi security forces, sheikhs, or other local leaders. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is also intent upon recentralizing authority in his hands. The attempt to give everyday Iraqis a say in their government was an admirable move. Simply voting does not make a democracy. A culture and norms also have to be created. The local councils were a move in that direction, but they were another sign that the Americans cannot dictate to the Iraqis how to develop their society. For better or worse, the post-invasion Iraqi elites are now in control of this process. That will mean these councils will all but disappear when the U.S. leaves. After all, they will have no more money to run, and have never been able to integrate into the new Iraqi political system.
SOURCES
Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09
Warden, James, “Focus turns to matching old, new Iraqi institutions,” Stars and Stripes, 3/1/09
- “Local leaders are making a comeback in Iraq,” Stars and Stripes, 3/2/09
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was the first government agency in the U.S. to seriously contemplate democracy building in Iraq. It joined the post-war planning in August 2002. The State Department was supposed to be in charge of governance in Iraq after the invasion, but never came up with anything concrete. That left the USAID to create a policy on its own. They wanted to decentralize power away from Baghdad to the local level. Under Saddam, the Baath party was in control of all levels of government. The USAID wanted to break that hold. They wanted to create neighborhood councils that would create jobs, be in charge of reconstruction, and give common Iraqis a say in their government. When they presented their plans to a National Security Council subgroup on humanitarian issues in Iraq, their ideas were rejected. The official stance was the U.S. was not going to be doing nation building in Iraq, and USAID had just crossed that line.
The situation in Iraq after the invasion proved so chaotic, that the U.S. military began implementing some of the USAID’s plans without knowing it. American units wanted Iraqi partners in their area of operation. To find some they began building up local councils across the country. This was done on an ad hoc basis, as there were no orders from above on how to do it. In Mosul for example, General David Petraeus, who was then the commander of the 101st Airborne Division, set up a convention of 270 delegates from the city representing its diverse population, who in turn elected 24 city council members and a mayor. In Najaf, General James Conway of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force started organizing provincial elections, registering parties, finding candidates, etc. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) had to step in at that point letting the general know that he could not carry out such a large undertaking because Iraq did not have an election law to legalize any voting. Some were far less representative and participatory. In the Karkh district of Baghdad only around 2,500 Iraqis of 30,000-35,000 showed up to vote for their council. In al-Kindi, fifty-five Iraqis elected 12 members to the council there. The U.S. military funded all of the councils they created, but believed that they would eventually hand them over to some other government body. That never happened, as the USAID lacked the money and personnel to deal with them. The U.S. military is still in charge of running these councils to this day.
The USAID was doing a similar job independent of the military. Iraq’s bureaucracy disappeared with the invasion. The tie between Baghdad and the rest of the country was severed in the process. The USAID tried to step in, offering three contracts to companies to create local councils. One company set up 22 offices across Iraq in the spring and summer of 2003 to complete this task. In April, the USAID also allocated $120 million to start local reconstruction that would assist these local groups. $61.7 million was spent in the end on 1,700 projects.
The U.S. military and USAID’s work eventually clashed with the CPA and the fledgling new Iraqi government. By 2005 437 neighborhood, 195 sub-district, and 96 district councils had been created by the Americans. CPA head Pual Bremer wanted to build a democracy in Iraq and decentralize power as well, but was more focused upon the provincial governments than local councils. The councils also ended up clashing with the Iraqi ministries and director generals over priorities and power.
This became more complicated after the two Iraqi elections in 2005. The provincial and parliamentary votes were closed list, meaning Iraqis voted for coalitions, which in turn picked the politicians. This was a blow to the U.S. military and USAID’s effort to empower local forces as the large national parties were in control of the process. The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) and the two main Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) came out the major winners in both votes. They too wanted to disperse power outside of Baghdad, but into their hands. As the new rulers of the provincial councils and ministries they too came into conflict with the U.S. created councils over authority. A mid-2006 report by the Americans for example noted that the SIIC and its militia the Badr Brigade had tightened their grip on the provincial governments, and were against any new elections or reforms that would weaken their power. The result was that provinces and ministries largely refused to work with the U.S.-backed local councils.
By the time the Surge started in 2007, the situation had grown no better. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were created to build up local and provincial governance, reconciliation, and reconstruction. They spread out across Iraq and began working with the local and district councils. They still had no real authority in the Iraqi government however. They had a small budget to pay salaries, which they got from the Americans, and some small scale U.S.-funded rebuilding projects, but no real say in ordinances, taxes, larger reconstruction efforts, provincial councils, or Baghdad.
Today it seems like only the U.S. military still considers these councils relevant. Stars and Stripes reported that few Iraqis go to the councils. The Iraqi political parties ignore them as well. If Iraqis want something done they go to the U.S. or Iraqi security forces, sheikhs, or other local leaders. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is also intent upon recentralizing authority in his hands. The attempt to give everyday Iraqis a say in their government was an admirable move. Simply voting does not make a democracy. A culture and norms also have to be created. The local councils were a move in that direction, but they were another sign that the Americans cannot dictate to the Iraqis how to develop their society. For better or worse, the post-invasion Iraqi elites are now in control of this process. That will mean these councils will all but disappear when the U.S. leaves. After all, they will have no more money to run, and have never been able to integrate into the new Iraqi political system.
SOURCES
Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09
Warden, James, “Focus turns to matching old, new Iraqi institutions,” Stars and Stripes, 3/1/09
- “Local leaders are making a comeback in Iraq,” Stars and Stripes, 3/2/09
Intentions Of Iraq's Displaced
On June 1, 2009 the International Organization for Migration (IOM) released a report on the intentions of Iraq's internal refugees. The IOM is the main non-governmental organization working with Iraq's displaced. They work as partners with the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration, and have done extensive polling of Iraqis. Their main focus is upon the estimated 1.6 million people who lost their homes after the February 2006 Samarra bombing, which set off the sectarian war. While this report finds that the majority of Iraqis wish to return to their homes, they are finding problems doing so.
The majority of displacement in Iraq happened after February 2006. Of those surveyed, only 4.5% said they had lost their homes before 2006. In contrast, 67.8% were displaced in 2006, followed by 25.6% in 2007. Only 2.0% reported that they were displaced in 2008. Sulaymaniya and Tamim were the only two provinces that broke that pattern with the 49% or more being displaced in 2007 instead of 2006.
Date of Displacement
Province | Before 2006 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 |
Iraq | 4.5% | 67.8% | 25.6% | 2.0% |
Anbar | 0.5% | 87.2% | 9.9% | 1.9% |
Babil | 7.4% | 85.0% | 7.3% | 0.3% |
Baghdad | 1.4% | 75.4% | 22.5% | 0.7% |
Basra | 1.1% | 70.9% | 27.9% | 0.0% |
Diyala | 1.9% | 54.1% | 42.7% | 1.1% |
Dohuk | 5.5% | 53.5% | 35.4% | 5.7% |
Dhi Qar | 2.1% | 90.6% | 6.7% | 0.1% |
Irbil | 9.3% | 49.0% | 39.8% | 1.3% |
Karbala | 0% | 85.2% | 14.5% | 0.0% |
Maysan | 1.0% | 94.8% | 4.0% | 0.1% |
Muthanna | 19.5% | 46.3% | 33.8% | 0.1% |
Najaf | 23.0% | 63.1% | 13.9% | 0% |
Ninewa | 1.0% | 67.5% | 23.7% | 7.7% |
Qadisiyah | 1.6% | 92.9% | 5.6% | 0% |
Salahaddin | 18.2% | 56.0% | 25.6% | 0.1% |
Sulaymaniya | 4.5% | 41.7% | 50.1% | 3.2% |
Tamim | 8.6% | 22.9% | 49.3% | 19.2% |
Wasit | 1.3% | 50.5% | 48.1% | 0.1% |
63.2% of the internal refugees came from Baghdad, which was ground zero for the sectarian war. Central, western, and northern Iraq were the other violent areas where people were forced to leave. Southern Iraq was a distant third since it was mostly Shiite. The fighting there largely revolved around disputes between Shiite militias, such as the Badr Brigade and the Mahdi Army.
Origins of Displacement By Province
Baghdad | 63.2% |
Diyala | 18.7% |
Ninewa | 6.0% |
Salahaddin | 3.3% |
Tamim | 3.0% |
Anbar | 2.6% |
Basra | 1.6% |
Babil | 1.0% |
Irbil | 0.2% |
Wasit | 0.2% |
Dhi Qar | 0.1% |
Ethnicity/Religion of Displaced
Shiite Arab | 56.8% |
Sunni Arab | 30.8% |
Sunni Kurd | 4.1% |
Assyrian Christian | 2.9% |
Chaldean Christian | 1.8% |
Shiite Turkmen | 1.2% |
Sunni Turkmen | 0.9% |
Shiite Kurd | 0.6% |
Armenian Christian | 0.1% |
Arab Yazidi | 0.1% |
Kurd Yazidi | 0.1% |
Displacement in Iraq followed a broad pattern. 56.8% of Iraq's internal refugees are Shiite. The majority of them were displaced either within Baghdad or moved south to Babil, Basra, Karbala, Maysan, Muthanna, Najaf, Qadisiya, Dhi Qar, or Wasit. 34.9% of the displaced are Sunni, either Arab or Kurd. They tended to move west to Anbar or north to Irbil, Salahaddin, Sulaymaniya, or Tamim. Finally, the northern provinces of Diyala, Dohuk, and Ninewa have a mixed population of Iraqi refugees. In Diyala, the majority, 57.9%, are Sunni Arabs, but almost a third of the rest, 31.7% are Shiite Arabs. 50% of Dohuk's displaced are either Sunni Kurds, 39.3%, or Chaldean Christians, 30.6%. Finally Ninewa was one of only two provinces where the largest displaced group was not Arab. There 40.4% were Assyrian Christians, followed by Sunni Arabs, 24.4%, Sunni Turkmen, 12.3%, and Chaldean Christians, 11.2%. That province is known for its large minority population.
Provinces With Predominately Displaced Shiites
Babil | 94.8% Shiite Arab, 81.5% from Baghdad |
Baghdad | 72.4% Shiite Arab, 83.2% from Baghdad |
Basra | 99.7% Shiite Arab, 52.4% from Baghdad, 26.0% from Salahaddin |
Dhi Qar | 99.5% Shiite Arab, 65.5% from Baghdad, 14.0% from Salahaddin |
Karbala | 98.5% Shiite Arab, 57.0% from Baghdad, 27.6% from Diyala |
Maysan | 99.9% Shiite Arab, 83.4% from Baghdad |
Muthanna | 99.5% Shiite Arab, 69.6% from Baghdad, 13.6% from Diyala |
Najaf | 97.8% Shiite Arab, 84.1% from Baghdad |
Qadisiyah | 99.6% Shiite Arab, 77.7% from Baghdad |
Wasit | 98.3% Shiite Arab, 66.8% from Baghdad |
Provinces With Predominately Displaced Sunnis
Anbar | 98.4% Sunni Arab, 74.9% from Baghdad |
Irbil | 39.4% Sunni Kurd, 34.4% Sunni Arab, 15.3% Chaldean Christian, 50.3% from Baghdad, 43.1% from Ninewa |
Salahaddin | 96.7% Sunni Arab, 50.1% from Baghdad, 14.6% from Tamim, 11.9% from Basra, 10.6% from Diyala |
Sulaymaniya | 60.1% Sunni Arab, 24.7% Sunni Kurd, 46.9% from Baghdad, 44.9% from Diyala |
Tamim | 53.5% Sunni Arab, 19.5% Sunni Kurd, 16.0% Shiite Turkmen, 24.4% from Diyala, 23.7% from Tamim, 15.8% from Salahaddin, 15.4% from Ninewa, 14.8% from Baghdad |
Provinces With Mixed Displaced Populations
Diyala | 57.9% Sunni Arab, 31.7% Shiite Arab, 92.8% form Diyala, 16.1% from Baghdad |
Dohuk | 39.3% Sunni Kurd, 30.6% Chaldean Christian, 52.5% from Baghdad, 46.0% from Ninewa |
Ninewa | 40.4% Assyrian Christian, 24.4% Sunni Arab, 12.3% Sunni Turkmen, 11.2% Chaldean Christian, 47.5% from Baghdad, 42.5% from Ninewa |
The major point of the June 2009 IOM report was to note the intentions of Iraq's displaced. 58.0% said they wanted to return to their place of origin. 21.4% said they wanted to stay where they were, 19.1% wanted to settle in some new location, either within Iraq or in another country, while 1.4% said they didn't know yet. This varied across the country however. Najaf, 94.1%, Diyala, 81.7%, and Anbar 81.3%, had the most responses for people that wanted to go back to their homes. Basra, 5.5%, and Wasit, 5.8%, had the least. 82.9% of the displaced in Basra said they wanted to stay there, while only 2.3% of the people in Anbar wanted to do so.
Intentions Of The Displaced
Province | Integrate into Location of Displacement | Settle in New Location | Return to Place of Origin | Waiting to Make Decision |
Iraq | 21.4% | 19.1% | 58.0% | 1.4% |
Anbar | 2.3% | 13.8% | 81.3% | 2.0% |
Babil | 26.2% | 28.6% | 44.5% | 0.6% |
Baghdad | 8.2% | 11.3% | 79.1% | 1.2% |
Basra | 82.9% | 11.1% | 5.5% | 0.3% |
Dhi Qar | 57.6% | 11.3% | 30.7% | 0.2% |
Diyala | 7.3% | 10.9% | 81.7% | 0.0% |
Dohuk | 57.0% | 23.1% | 19.7% | 0.2% |
Irbil | 18.3% | 13.5% | 67.4% | 0.1% |
Karbala | 26.3% | 26.6% | 46.4% | 0.6% |
Maysan | 28.1% | 28.0% | 40.7% | 3.1% |
Muthanna | 34.8% | 18.1% | 45.1% | 1.9% |
Najaf | 4.5% | 0.1% | 94.1% | 1.0% |
Ninewa | 7.0% | 33.0% | 59.2% | 0.7% |
Qadisiyah | 40.9% | 35.3% | 23.7% | 0.1% |
Salahaddin | 12.5% | 39.0% | 43.5% | 4.7% |
Sulaymaniya | 27.1% | 8.3% | 64.4% | 0.2% |
Tamim | 22.2% | 3.5% | 71.3% | 3.0% |
Wasit | 54.4% | 37.8% | 5.8% | 2.0% |
While 58.0% of displaced Iraqis want to return to their homes, the previous May 2009 report by the IOM worried that many of them may never have this opportunity. According to the United Nations' latest estimates, only 600,830 displaced Iraqis have gone back so far from 2003 to 2008. Almost 200,000 of these were Iraqis that had lost their homes during Saddam, the U.S. invasion, or subsequent fighting in places like Fallujah. That would mean only about 400,000 of the 1.6 million that lost their homes after the Samarra bombing have returned so far. The plight of the displaced in Iraq is an important indicator of the general situation within the country. So few displaced coming back, shows that Iraq is still an unstable country. There is still violence, although at much lower levels than before. The 2009 Iraqi elections did not settle much politically, but instead marked a new struggle for power between Maliki, his former allies, and independents. The government is still unable to provide many basic services, and the economy is especially bad for young people and women. All together this has given only a small fraction of Iraq's displaced a reason to go back home, even though a majority want to. The IOM and other groups are increasingly fearful that Iraq's refugees may become a permanent class of displaced people if things do not progress inside Iraq.
SOURCES
International Organization for Migration, "IOM Emergency Needs Assessments Post February 2006 Displacement In Iraq 1 June 2009 Monthly Report," 6/1/09
- "IOM Monitoring And Needs Assessments of Iraqi Return, May 2009," May 2009
United Nations High Commission for Refugees, "UNHCR Iraq Operation Monthly Statistical Update on Return – March 2009," UNHCR, March 2009
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
