August 26, 2009 saw the passing of Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, the leader of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC). Hakim was a symbol of Iraqi politics immediately after the 2003-invasion. He was an opportunist and pragmatist who was willing to align himself with various groups to gain power. He was widely successful in the early years following the overthrow of Saddam, but then his star began to fade in 2007.
The SIIC has its roots in the Dawa Party and Tehran. In the 1950s, Ayatollah Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr and Ayatollah Mohsen al-Hakim created the Dawa Party rallying Shiites to the cause of an Islamic state. Hakim eventually left Dawa, and in the 1980s fled to Iran during the Iran-Iraq War with his two sons, Mohammed Baqr al-Hakim and Abdul Aziz al-Hakim. In 1982 Tehran formed the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq to counter the Dawa Party, and assert more influence over the Iraqi opposition. The Hakims in turn, pledged allegiance to Ayatollah Khomeini and the Iranian Revolution. In 1983 Iran created the Badr Brigade, which was an official arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Qods Force. It fought on the Iranian side in the Iran-Iraq War, and recruited amongst Iraqi prisoners of war. After the Gulf War, Badr moved into southern Iraq and tried to unsuccessfully take over the Shiite uprising. These origins were always a major problem for the SIIC as many Iraqis resented the Hakims fleeing to Iran, their role in the Iran-Iraq War and the 1991 uprisings, and their pro-Khomeini stance.
Despite their Iranian origins, the Hakims were always pragmatic opportunists who would ally with any group that would give them a better chance at gaining power in Iraq. Beginning in the late-1980s they started quiet relations with the United States. In 1992 they joined the Iraqi National Congress, and its leader Ahmad Chalabi, was able to garner Washington’s support for the SIIC as the major Shiite party they would work with after the invasion. They also worked closely with the ruling Kurdish parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), to plan for a post-Saddam Iraq. The three had forged ties when they all fought on the Iranian side in the Iran-Iraq War.
When the 2003 invasion of Iraq occurred, the SIIC was able to sweep into power and assume a larger position than they had support. First, they took over a series of cities like Kut, Khanaqin, Baquba, Basra, Najaf, and Karbala because of the vacuum left from Saddam’s overthrow. They also sank early attempts to include internal Iraqi leaders in any new government put together by the U.S. They quickly aligned themselves with Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani as well to gain legitimacy and standing, and supported his call for elections to determine a new government and constitution, knowing that would benefit themselves since Iraq had a Shiite majority. Abdul al-Aziz al-Hakim ended up joining the Iraqi Governing Council, and assumed the leadership of the SIIC, when his brother Ayatollah Mohammed al-Hakim was killed in a car bombing in August 2003.
Beginning in 2005 Hakim and the SIIC were able to put together a string of ringing victories after the U.S. handed back sovereignty to Iraq. The SIIC was the driving force behind the United Iraqi Alliance in the 2005 elections, which came away with the most votes. It also joined with the Kurds to push through a new constitution, and together the SIIC, PUK, and KDP were the ruling coalitions behind the Ibrahim al-Jaafari and Nouri al-Maliki governments. The SIIC also took over the Interior Ministry under Jaafari, got their Badr Brigade integrated into the security forces, and set up death squads to begin the ethnic cleansing of Sunnis from Baghdad. In August 2005 they began promoting federalism, and a nine-province southern Shiite autonomous region. In 2006, the U.S. came to rely upon the SIIC to counter the Sadrists, who were their greatest rivals. The two had been having a long-running battle across southern Iraq. The SIIC was able to gain these victories because they were better organized than their rivals, the Sunnis and Sadrists boycotted the first two elections in 2005, and both Washington and Tehran supported them.
In 2007, the SIIC’s fortunes began to change. First, their call for an autonomous region proved to create more problems than good since many Shiites rejected the idea. The SIIC also controlled most of the southern provinces, and did a poor job governing and providing services. Third, the Hakim’s base was the middle class and merchants, who began to flee the country during the sectarian war. Fourth, the SIIC was never able to shake their image as tools of Tehran. To counter this the party tried to remake itself, dropping “Revolutionary” from their name becoming the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, claimed that they supported Ayatollah Sistani rather than Ayatollah Ali Khamanei in Iran, and said they had disbanded their militia the Badr Brigade, which they then called a social and political group. They also tried to provide social services to gain support amongst the poor, a move led by Abdul Hakim’s son, Ammar al-Hakim, who was being groomed as the successor to his father.
In 2008 and 2009 things got worse. Prime Minister Maliki began distancing himself from the SIIC by creating his own popular base with the Tribal Support Councils. Maliki also came out against federalism in both northern and southern Iraq, and called for a strong central government. In turn, the SIIC, KDP, and PUK talked about having a no confidence vote against the Prime Minister in December 2008, but they couldn’t decide upon a successor and were hoping that Maliki would trip up, and ruin his image. In the 2009 provincial elections, Maliki ran his own State of Law List against the SIIC, who was soundly beaten across the south and Baghdad. Despite these setbacks, Hakim tried to mend fences with Maliki by lobbying him to join a new version of the United Iraqi Alliance to run in the 2010 parliamentary balloting. This failed to materialize, as the Prime Minister wanted to lead the new list, something Hakim and the other parties refused to agree upon.
By the time of Hakim’s death, the SIIC was a shell of its former self. After the sweeping victories in 2005, the Supreme Council is now fading, and desperately trying to remake itself once again to return to power. They now talk about national unity, but they are remembered for their Iranian roots and pro-federalist stance. The death of Hakim could also lead to a power struggle within the organization. While Hakim’s son, Ammar, was the anointed successor, there are a number of possible rivals in the old guard like the head of the Badr Organization Hadi al-Ameri, Finance Minister Bayan Jabr, and Vice President Adel Abd al-Mahdi. The SIIC may be at a crossroads, lacking popular support and strong leadership with Hakim’s passing.
SOURCES
Abedin, Mahan, “The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI),” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, October 2003
Dagher, Sam, “Rising player with a vision for Shiite Iraq,” Christian Science Monitor, 11/20/07
Elkhamri, Mounir, “Iran’s Contribution to the Civil War in Iraq,” Jamestown Foundation, January 2007
Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08
Kemp, Geoffrey, “Iran and Iraq The Shia Connection, Soft Power, and the Nuclear Factor,” United States Institute of Peace, November 2005
International Crisis Group, “Shiite Politics In Iraq: The Role Of The Supreme Council,” 11/15/07
Packer, George, “War After The War,” New Yorker, 11/24/03
Raghavan, Sudarsan, “Shiite Clerics’ Rivalry Deepens In Fragile Iraq,” Washington Post, 12/21/06
- “Shiite Contest Sharpens In Iraq,” Washington Post, 12/26/07
Ramzi, Kholoud, “daawa-siic conflict splits Shiite unity,” Niqash,” 11/27/08
Santora, Marc, “Shiite Power Broker Dies, in Blow to Iraqi Party,” New York Times, 8/26/09
Semple, Kirk, “Heavy battle between shiite militias reveals deep split in ruling coalition,” San Francisco Chronicle, 10/22/06
Serwer, Daniel and Parker, Sam, “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2009
Visser, Reidar, “Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim Dies in Tehran,” Historiae.org, 8/26/09
Walt, Vivienne, “U.S. Ally: Shiite leader preached unity before attack,” San Francisco Chronicle, 8/30/03
Showing posts with label United Iraqi Alliance. Show all posts
Showing posts with label United Iraqi Alliance. Show all posts
Monday, August 31, 2009
Friday, August 28, 2009
New National Iraqi Alliance
On August 24, 2009 the new Iraqi National Alliance was announced. This was the long-awaited revised version of the United Iraqi Alliance, which was the largest vote getter in the 2005 elections. The new grouping includes the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), the Sadrists, former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s National Reform Party, the Dawa-Iraq Party, and two Sunni figures, Sheikh Hamid al-Hayes of the Anbar Salvation Council and Khalid Abd al-Wahhab al-Mulla from Basra. It appears that the new list was unable to convince the Fadhila Party to join. In July 2009 they said they would not, and in August claimed they were going to form their own list, the Alliance for Integrity and Development. More importantly, the National Alliance did not include Prime Minster Nouri al-Maliki’s Dawa Party.
Dawa was said to be involved in negotiations right up to the last minute of the press conference of the new list, but couldn’t get their demands met. Maliki was asking for a majority of seats in the alliance and a promise that he would be their sole candidate to be prime minister, which the other parties objected to. The National Alliance however did leave the door open to Maliki joining the list at a later date.
As reported before, Maliki’s main reason for flirting with rejoining the alliance after running separately with his own State of Law List in the 2009 provincial balloting, was to secure the top post in the country. While Maliki was considered the biggest winner in the 2009 election, a breakdown of the results show that he was in no position to hold onto the prime ministership if he ran alone again. Of the fourteen provinces that held elections, Maliki’s State of Law only won majorities in two, Baghdad and Basra, and even then, came away with 38% and 37% of the vote respectively. Overall, State of Law won 15.1% of the ballots and took 27.5% of the 440 seats up for grabs. That was hardly a hold on the electorate to ensure that he be re-elected. In comparison, the new National Alliance members walked away with 17.1% of the vote and 27.7% of the seats.
January 2009 Provincial Election Results Comparison
Maliki’s State of Law: 15.1% of vote, 121 seats, 27.5%
SIIC’s Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 6.6% of vote, 58 seats, 13.1%
Sadrists’ Independent Free Movement List: 6.3% of vote, 41 seats, 9.3%
Jaafari’s National Reform Party: 4.2% of vote, 23 seats, 5.2%
Iraqi National Alliance members together: 17.1% of vote, 122 seats, 27.7%
This leaves the Prime Minister in a quandary because there are few other major parties left for him to align with. The Fadhila Party and Dawa have not gotten along. The State of Law List did not include it in any of its ruling coalitions after the 2009 provincial elections, and Fadhila had a poor showing in the voting. Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha of the Awakening and National Independents List has repeatedly expressed a desire to run with Maliki in 2010. The al-Hadbaa Party of Ninewa, the Change List in Kurdistan, and Mithal al-Alusi’s Ummah Party may also be new partners. Those together would still probably not deliver a plurality of the vote. Maliki flirted with allying with parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq’s National Dialogue Front after the 2009 balloting, but was attacked for it by the other Shiite parties who claimed Mutlaq was a Baathist. Mutlaq is now in discussions with former speaker of parliament Mahmoud al-Mashhadani of the National Dialogue Council, Vice President Tariq Hashemi of the Iraqi Islamic Party, former Prime Miniser Ilyad Allawi of the Iraqi National List, and Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani of the Constitution Party to form a new alliance. Bolani is said to be a candidate for prime minister, so it’s unlikely that Maliki would want to work with this grouping. After that there are only a plethora of smaller parties that tend to have very localized support.
Iraqi politics are in a state of flux. The Shiites along with the other ethnosectarian groups are fragmenting into smaller parties as the 2009 elections showed. This makes it much harder to form winning coalitions. Maliki may have to cobble together an ad hoc group of parties and hope for the best if he wants to be prime minister again. Even if he ran with the National Iraqi Alliance there was no guarantee he would hold onto the spot as the SIIC was only hoping to ride Maliki’s coattails back into power and then drop him afterwards. After the 2010 vote is completed and negotiations begin for a ruling coalition, the Prime Minister will also have to contend with the fact that the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (KDP) alliance is set against him, along with many in the Islamic Party. No matter what then, Maliki is facing an uphill battle after his spate of military and political victories in 2008 and 2009.
SOURCES
Alsumaria, “New Iraq political coalition in the offing,” 8/24/09
Associated Press, “New Shiite alliance excludes Iraqi prime minister,” 8/24/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Fadhila party announces new alliance for next elections,” 8/10/09
- “Sunni leader envisions alliance with Maliki in next polls,” 7/26/09
Domergue, Jeremy and Cochrane, Marisa, “Balancing Maliki,” Institute for Understanding War, June 2009
Fox News, “Iraqi Clan Leader May Hold Key to Lasting Political Stability After U.S. Exit,” 4/4/09
Iraq The Model, “Accord Front Collapses, Sunni Tribes Seek Shiite Allies,” 8/15/09
- “Maliki promises a crackdown that could reach political figures,” 8/23/09
Kazimi, Nibras, “Announcing the ‘New’ UIA,” Talisman Gate, 8/24/09
- “Iraq: Alliances Galore,” Hudson Institute, 7/17/09
- “Iraq: Rumors Swirl,” Hudson Institute, 8/6/09
Londono, Ernesto, “Iraqi Shiite Parties Form Coalition Without Maliki,” Washington Post, 8/24/09
Myers, Steven Lee, “Iraqi Shiite Leaders Create Alliance, Minus Maliki,” New York times, 8/24/09
Parker, Ned, “Maliki remakes himself ahead of elections,” Los Angeles Times, 7/21/09
Parker, Ned and Salman, Raheem, “In Basra, political skirmishing heats up as elections near,” Los Angeles Times, 12/28/08
Shadid, Anthony, “In Iraq, Political Ambiguity,” Washington Post, 4/4/09
Visser, Reidar, “After Sadr-Badr Compromise in Tehran, the Iraqi National Alliance (INA) Is Declared,” Historiae.org, 8/24/09
- “Claiming Nothing Has Really Changed, Fadila Rejects the Offer to Rejoin a ‘Reformed’ UIA,” Historiae.org, 7/17/09
Dawa was said to be involved in negotiations right up to the last minute of the press conference of the new list, but couldn’t get their demands met. Maliki was asking for a majority of seats in the alliance and a promise that he would be their sole candidate to be prime minister, which the other parties objected to. The National Alliance however did leave the door open to Maliki joining the list at a later date.
As reported before, Maliki’s main reason for flirting with rejoining the alliance after running separately with his own State of Law List in the 2009 provincial balloting, was to secure the top post in the country. While Maliki was considered the biggest winner in the 2009 election, a breakdown of the results show that he was in no position to hold onto the prime ministership if he ran alone again. Of the fourteen provinces that held elections, Maliki’s State of Law only won majorities in two, Baghdad and Basra, and even then, came away with 38% and 37% of the vote respectively. Overall, State of Law won 15.1% of the ballots and took 27.5% of the 440 seats up for grabs. That was hardly a hold on the electorate to ensure that he be re-elected. In comparison, the new National Alliance members walked away with 17.1% of the vote and 27.7% of the seats.
January 2009 Provincial Election Results Comparison
Maliki’s State of Law: 15.1% of vote, 121 seats, 27.5%
SIIC’s Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 6.6% of vote, 58 seats, 13.1%
Sadrists’ Independent Free Movement List: 6.3% of vote, 41 seats, 9.3%
Jaafari’s National Reform Party: 4.2% of vote, 23 seats, 5.2%
Iraqi National Alliance members together: 17.1% of vote, 122 seats, 27.7%
This leaves the Prime Minister in a quandary because there are few other major parties left for him to align with. The Fadhila Party and Dawa have not gotten along. The State of Law List did not include it in any of its ruling coalitions after the 2009 provincial elections, and Fadhila had a poor showing in the voting. Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha of the Awakening and National Independents List has repeatedly expressed a desire to run with Maliki in 2010. The al-Hadbaa Party of Ninewa, the Change List in Kurdistan, and Mithal al-Alusi’s Ummah Party may also be new partners. Those together would still probably not deliver a plurality of the vote. Maliki flirted with allying with parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq’s National Dialogue Front after the 2009 balloting, but was attacked for it by the other Shiite parties who claimed Mutlaq was a Baathist. Mutlaq is now in discussions with former speaker of parliament Mahmoud al-Mashhadani of the National Dialogue Council, Vice President Tariq Hashemi of the Iraqi Islamic Party, former Prime Miniser Ilyad Allawi of the Iraqi National List, and Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani of the Constitution Party to form a new alliance. Bolani is said to be a candidate for prime minister, so it’s unlikely that Maliki would want to work with this grouping. After that there are only a plethora of smaller parties that tend to have very localized support.
Iraqi politics are in a state of flux. The Shiites along with the other ethnosectarian groups are fragmenting into smaller parties as the 2009 elections showed. This makes it much harder to form winning coalitions. Maliki may have to cobble together an ad hoc group of parties and hope for the best if he wants to be prime minister again. Even if he ran with the National Iraqi Alliance there was no guarantee he would hold onto the spot as the SIIC was only hoping to ride Maliki’s coattails back into power and then drop him afterwards. After the 2010 vote is completed and negotiations begin for a ruling coalition, the Prime Minister will also have to contend with the fact that the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (KDP) alliance is set against him, along with many in the Islamic Party. No matter what then, Maliki is facing an uphill battle after his spate of military and political victories in 2008 and 2009.
SOURCES
Alsumaria, “New Iraq political coalition in the offing,” 8/24/09
Associated Press, “New Shiite alliance excludes Iraqi prime minister,” 8/24/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Fadhila party announces new alliance for next elections,” 8/10/09
- “Sunni leader envisions alliance with Maliki in next polls,” 7/26/09
Domergue, Jeremy and Cochrane, Marisa, “Balancing Maliki,” Institute for Understanding War, June 2009
Fox News, “Iraqi Clan Leader May Hold Key to Lasting Political Stability After U.S. Exit,” 4/4/09
Iraq The Model, “Accord Front Collapses, Sunni Tribes Seek Shiite Allies,” 8/15/09
- “Maliki promises a crackdown that could reach political figures,” 8/23/09
Kazimi, Nibras, “Announcing the ‘New’ UIA,” Talisman Gate, 8/24/09
- “Iraq: Alliances Galore,” Hudson Institute, 7/17/09
- “Iraq: Rumors Swirl,” Hudson Institute, 8/6/09
Londono, Ernesto, “Iraqi Shiite Parties Form Coalition Without Maliki,” Washington Post, 8/24/09
Myers, Steven Lee, “Iraqi Shiite Leaders Create Alliance, Minus Maliki,” New York times, 8/24/09
Parker, Ned, “Maliki remakes himself ahead of elections,” Los Angeles Times, 7/21/09
Parker, Ned and Salman, Raheem, “In Basra, political skirmishing heats up as elections near,” Los Angeles Times, 12/28/08
Shadid, Anthony, “In Iraq, Political Ambiguity,” Washington Post, 4/4/09
Visser, Reidar, “After Sadr-Badr Compromise in Tehran, the Iraqi National Alliance (INA) Is Declared,” Historiae.org, 8/24/09
- “Claiming Nothing Has Really Changed, Fadila Rejects the Offer to Rejoin a ‘Reformed’ UIA,” Historiae.org, 7/17/09
Thursday, August 20, 2009
Not So Fast On A New United Iraqi Alliance
As reported before, the major Shiite parties including Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s Dawa party, with ample support from Iran, have agreed in principle to reform the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA). The UIA was the major vote getter in the 2005 elections, but has since broken apart. The announcement of the new UIA line-up has been delayed several times, most recently August 13, 2009. Officially, members of the Dawa party say there are three holds ups. First, Dawa is asking for more parties to be added to the list. Second, Members of the UIA want it to be a Shiite coalition first and foremost, while Dawa disagrees. Last, there is a debate about how parliamentary seats will be awarded within the alliance. The real reason, as always is what role Prime Minister Maliki will play.
Maliki’s greatest desire is to maintain his position as prime minister, which is why he agreed to rejoin the UIA after forming his own State of Law List for the 2009 provincial elections. According to Nibras Kazimi of the Hudson Institute, Maliki wants to be assured that he will be the only UIA candidate for prime minister. The problem is the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) only want to ride Maliki’s coattails back into power and then drop him. There are rumors that Interior Minister Jawad Bolani of the Constitution Party may be an alternative candidate within the alliance to Maliki. His other possible rival, Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi of the SIIC, has been politically wounded by members of his security detail robbing the Rafidain Bank, one of the three largest in the country. Bolani and Mahdi are also political rivals, and the Interior Minister has been trying to take credit for the arrests, while implicating the Vice President. Maliki has joined the fray as well saying that Mahdi’s office has turned over the stolen money, but not the guards involved in the heist.
If Maliki does not get the nod for prime minister from the UIA, he is threatening to run alone. Sheikh Abu Risha of the Anbar Awakening has consistently said that he wants to run with Maliki in 2010. Maliki also recently gave a speech in Anbar to tribal sheikhs where he praised their work, called for Iraqi nationalism, and an end to sectarian politics. Other possible allies mentioned are Sheikh Ahmad Abdul Ghafoor Samarraei who runs a series of Sunni mosques, and parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq, who Maliki courted after the 2009 elections. Running with independent Sunnis like these would fit Maliki’s rhetoric of forming a truly nationalist and cross-sectarian alliance, something he promised after the provincial elections but failed to follow through on.
Either way Maliki decides to go he may have found himself caught in a Catch-22. If he runs with the United Iraqi Alliance he will be taking a step backwards in Iraqi politics, and will be accused of returning to sectarianism after promoting nationalism. On the other hand, if he chooses to run his own list, and brings in Sunnis he will be accused of collaborating with Baathists, something that still resonates with the Shiite public. The Prime Minister actually tried to reach out to former regime elements after the provincial elections, but was forced to back off because of constant attacks of trying to bring back the Baath party. Maliki’s negotiations also show that his ultimate goal is holding onto power, and he will use anything, nationalism, sectarianism, etc. to maintain his position.
SOURCES
Alsumaria, “Bank robbers not handed over yet Maliki says,” 8/11/09
- “Iraq’s new coalition on the agenda,” 8/13/09
- “New Unified Iraqi Coalition put off,” 8/8/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Baath should not be allowed in Iraq – Hakim,” 3/14/09
- “Sunni leader envisions alliance with Maliki in next polls,” 7/26/09
August, Oliver, “Iraq bank robbers were Vice-President’s security guards, police say,” Times of London, 8/3/09
Dagher, Sam, “Arrests in Bank Robbery Create a Rift Between Iraqi Officials,” New York Times, 8/3/09
Kazimi, Nibras, “Catching Up on Iraq Stuff,” Talisman Gate Blog, 8/13/09
- “Iraq: Rumors Swirl,” Hudson Institute, 8/6/09
- “Iraq: Trouble for Maliki,” Hudson New York, 4/24/09
Parker, Ned, “Maliki remakes himself ahead of elections,” Los Angeles Times, 7/21/09
Al-Salhy, Suadad, “Iraq Shi’ite alliance may split, other allies eyed,” Reuters, 8/7/09
Visser, Reidar, “Maliki Under Pressure as He Visits DC,” Historiae.org, 7/21/09
Maliki’s greatest desire is to maintain his position as prime minister, which is why he agreed to rejoin the UIA after forming his own State of Law List for the 2009 provincial elections. According to Nibras Kazimi of the Hudson Institute, Maliki wants to be assured that he will be the only UIA candidate for prime minister. The problem is the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) only want to ride Maliki’s coattails back into power and then drop him. There are rumors that Interior Minister Jawad Bolani of the Constitution Party may be an alternative candidate within the alliance to Maliki. His other possible rival, Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi of the SIIC, has been politically wounded by members of his security detail robbing the Rafidain Bank, one of the three largest in the country. Bolani and Mahdi are also political rivals, and the Interior Minister has been trying to take credit for the arrests, while implicating the Vice President. Maliki has joined the fray as well saying that Mahdi’s office has turned over the stolen money, but not the guards involved in the heist.
If Maliki does not get the nod for prime minister from the UIA, he is threatening to run alone. Sheikh Abu Risha of the Anbar Awakening has consistently said that he wants to run with Maliki in 2010. Maliki also recently gave a speech in Anbar to tribal sheikhs where he praised their work, called for Iraqi nationalism, and an end to sectarian politics. Other possible allies mentioned are Sheikh Ahmad Abdul Ghafoor Samarraei who runs a series of Sunni mosques, and parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq, who Maliki courted after the 2009 elections. Running with independent Sunnis like these would fit Maliki’s rhetoric of forming a truly nationalist and cross-sectarian alliance, something he promised after the provincial elections but failed to follow through on.
Either way Maliki decides to go he may have found himself caught in a Catch-22. If he runs with the United Iraqi Alliance he will be taking a step backwards in Iraqi politics, and will be accused of returning to sectarianism after promoting nationalism. On the other hand, if he chooses to run his own list, and brings in Sunnis he will be accused of collaborating with Baathists, something that still resonates with the Shiite public. The Prime Minister actually tried to reach out to former regime elements after the provincial elections, but was forced to back off because of constant attacks of trying to bring back the Baath party. Maliki’s negotiations also show that his ultimate goal is holding onto power, and he will use anything, nationalism, sectarianism, etc. to maintain his position.
SOURCES
Alsumaria, “Bank robbers not handed over yet Maliki says,” 8/11/09
- “Iraq’s new coalition on the agenda,” 8/13/09
- “New Unified Iraqi Coalition put off,” 8/8/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Baath should not be allowed in Iraq – Hakim,” 3/14/09
- “Sunni leader envisions alliance with Maliki in next polls,” 7/26/09
August, Oliver, “Iraq bank robbers were Vice-President’s security guards, police say,” Times of London, 8/3/09
Dagher, Sam, “Arrests in Bank Robbery Create a Rift Between Iraqi Officials,” New York Times, 8/3/09
Kazimi, Nibras, “Catching Up on Iraq Stuff,” Talisman Gate Blog, 8/13/09
- “Iraq: Rumors Swirl,” Hudson Institute, 8/6/09
- “Iraq: Trouble for Maliki,” Hudson New York, 4/24/09
Parker, Ned, “Maliki remakes himself ahead of elections,” Los Angeles Times, 7/21/09
Al-Salhy, Suadad, “Iraq Shi’ite alliance may split, other allies eyed,” Reuters, 8/7/09
Visser, Reidar, “Maliki Under Pressure as He Visits DC,” Historiae.org, 7/21/09
Thursday, July 23, 2009
Iran’s Role In The Revival Of The United Iraqi Alliance
On July 16, 2009 Al-Hayat newspaper reported that Moqtada al-Sadr visited Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, the leader of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) in his Tehran hospital. Sadr said he was interested in rejoining the United Iraqi Alliance, which the Sadrists left in September 2007. The new alliance is due to be announced later this month according to a Supreme Council member. In February 2009 Sadr issued a statement saying that he would come back to the Alliance as long as it was renamed, the SIIC was no longer leading it, and that it was non-sectarian. Those talks fell apart in May when the Sadrists said they would run independently in the January 2010 parliamentary vote. The change in the Sadrists' position could be due to the influence of Iran, which is applying strong pressure upon the leading Shiite parties to re-unite and run together in the next round of balloting in Iraq.
One of the main goals of Tehran is to ensure friendly Shiite rule in Iraq so that it never becomes a rival again. Following this Iran wants the main Shiite parties to be united during elections, so they stay in power. In 2005 Iran helped put together the United Iraqi Alliance, and gave them printing presses, advisors, broadcast equipment, and stuffed ballot boxes. Since the January 2009 provincial elections, Iran has been pushing for the Alliance to be revived. In January, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki ran his own State of Law List, which trumped the Supreme Council in most of southern Iraq. Iran was afraid of further fracturing by the Shiites, and began pressuring them to run together in 2010.
Iranian officials began traveling to Iraq shortly after the provincial vote. On February 11, Iran’s Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki came to Baghdad to mediate between the estranged Dawa Party and SIIC. On March 2 Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, the head of Iran’s Expediency Council came to Iraq for five days. He was followed by the speaker of Iran’s parliament Ali Larijani who came at the end of that month.
Domestic Iraqi politics also played into this Iranian policy. In early 2009 the Supreme Council and their allies in parliament were threatening a no confidence vote against Maliki. The Prime Minister was forced to reach out to them to stop this from happening. Their price was for Maliki to rejoin the United Alliance. This appealed to Maliki, because if he was given the leadership position in the list it could help his chances of maintaining his office. The SIIC was also hoping to ride Maliki’s coattails back into power after their loses in the provincial councils. There is still a lot of mistrust between the two, but mutual ambition appears to be bringing them back together with ample pressure from Tehran.
May 2009 saw a renewed drive by Tehran and SIIC leader Hakim to get the Shiite parties back together. On May 13, Hakim publicly announced that he wanted the United Alliance reformed. The chairman of the SIIC Humam Hammudi was given responsibility for re-organizing the List, while Ahmad Chalabi was tasked with bringing back the old members of the Alliance.
Most of the negotiations for the revival of the Alliance occurred in Hakim’s Tehran hospital where he is undergoing cancer treatment. On May 14 Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited Hakim. Six days later Ibrahim al-Jaafari of the National Reform Trend and Iraq’s Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari came to Hakim’s hospital. Hakim also met with Hadi al-Amiri, the head of the Badr Organization. At the end of the month Maliki flew to Tehran to consul with Hakim. Iran’s Foreign Minister Mottaki was present. Maliki then met with Supreme Iranian leader Ayatollah Ali Khamanei who also pressured him on the United Alliance.
These moves have apparently paid off for Iran for now. On June 19, al-Hayat reported that Maliki and the SIIC had agreed to revive the United Iraqi Alliance. It would now be called the Coalition of the State of Law, and the Prime Minister would be its leader. Sadr’s meeting with Hakim this month, almost completes the original line-up of the Alliance. If these parties do run together it would be a big victory for Iran’s policy, and a step backwards for Iraq. In the 2009 vote, Iraqi nationalism made a revival. The re-birth of the United Alliance would be a return to the sectarian politics of the past. Early reports that the new election law will also maintain the 2005 closed list system where voters only get to vote for lists and not individual candidates is another sign that the major parties are more interested in maintaining their positions rather than advancing the country’s interests. The leading Shiite parties also do not seem to have any problems with playing along with Iran, as long as it helps them win.
SOURCES
Allam, Hannah, Landay, Jonathan, and Strobel, Warren, “Is an Iranian general the most powerful man in Iraq?” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/28/08
Alsumaria, “Al Sadr agrees to reengage in Coalition,” 7/16/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Elections draft law completed without agreeing on Kirkuk – MP,” 7/15/09
Barzegar, Kayhan, “Iran’s Foreign Policy in Post-invasion Iraq,” Middle East Policy Council Journal, Winter 2008
Domergue, Jeremy and Cochrane, Marisa, “Balancing Maliki,” Institute for Understanding War, June 2009
Elkhamri, Mounir, “Iran’s Contribution to the Civil War in Iraq,” Jamestown Foundation, January 2007
Gwertzman, Bernard, “Iraq at Crossroads Amid U.S. Disengagement,” Council on Foreign Relations, 6/30/09
Kaplow, Larry, “Iraq Steps Out of Iran’s Shadow,” Newsweek, 6/6/09
Mohsen, Amer, “Iraq Papers Sat: The I’tilaf is Back!” IraqSlogger.com, 6/19/09
- “Iraq Papers Wed: Oil Contracts in Jeopardy,” IraqSlogger.com, 6/16/09
Parker, Ned, “Sadr’s bloc quits Iraq’s ruling coalition,” Times of London, 9/16/07
Press TV, “Iraq’s Maliki at Hakim’s bedside in Tehran,” 5/31/09
Al-Sharqiyah Television, “Iraq roundup: Al-Sadr Trend mediates in Ninawa; security incidents,” BBC Monitoring Service, 6/14/09
- “’Special groups’ leaders arrested in Iraq; political, security roundup,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 6/15/09
- “US troops start withdrawal from Al-Sadr City; Iraq roundup,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 5/29/09
One of the main goals of Tehran is to ensure friendly Shiite rule in Iraq so that it never becomes a rival again. Following this Iran wants the main Shiite parties to be united during elections, so they stay in power. In 2005 Iran helped put together the United Iraqi Alliance, and gave them printing presses, advisors, broadcast equipment, and stuffed ballot boxes. Since the January 2009 provincial elections, Iran has been pushing for the Alliance to be revived. In January, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki ran his own State of Law List, which trumped the Supreme Council in most of southern Iraq. Iran was afraid of further fracturing by the Shiites, and began pressuring them to run together in 2010.
Iranian officials began traveling to Iraq shortly after the provincial vote. On February 11, Iran’s Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki came to Baghdad to mediate between the estranged Dawa Party and SIIC. On March 2 Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, the head of Iran’s Expediency Council came to Iraq for five days. He was followed by the speaker of Iran’s parliament Ali Larijani who came at the end of that month.
Domestic Iraqi politics also played into this Iranian policy. In early 2009 the Supreme Council and their allies in parliament were threatening a no confidence vote against Maliki. The Prime Minister was forced to reach out to them to stop this from happening. Their price was for Maliki to rejoin the United Alliance. This appealed to Maliki, because if he was given the leadership position in the list it could help his chances of maintaining his office. The SIIC was also hoping to ride Maliki’s coattails back into power after their loses in the provincial councils. There is still a lot of mistrust between the two, but mutual ambition appears to be bringing them back together with ample pressure from Tehran.
May 2009 saw a renewed drive by Tehran and SIIC leader Hakim to get the Shiite parties back together. On May 13, Hakim publicly announced that he wanted the United Alliance reformed. The chairman of the SIIC Humam Hammudi was given responsibility for re-organizing the List, while Ahmad Chalabi was tasked with bringing back the old members of the Alliance.
Most of the negotiations for the revival of the Alliance occurred in Hakim’s Tehran hospital where he is undergoing cancer treatment. On May 14 Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited Hakim. Six days later Ibrahim al-Jaafari of the National Reform Trend and Iraq’s Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari came to Hakim’s hospital. Hakim also met with Hadi al-Amiri, the head of the Badr Organization. At the end of the month Maliki flew to Tehran to consul with Hakim. Iran’s Foreign Minister Mottaki was present. Maliki then met with Supreme Iranian leader Ayatollah Ali Khamanei who also pressured him on the United Alliance.
These moves have apparently paid off for Iran for now. On June 19, al-Hayat reported that Maliki and the SIIC had agreed to revive the United Iraqi Alliance. It would now be called the Coalition of the State of Law, and the Prime Minister would be its leader. Sadr’s meeting with Hakim this month, almost completes the original line-up of the Alliance. If these parties do run together it would be a big victory for Iran’s policy, and a step backwards for Iraq. In the 2009 vote, Iraqi nationalism made a revival. The re-birth of the United Alliance would be a return to the sectarian politics of the past. Early reports that the new election law will also maintain the 2005 closed list system where voters only get to vote for lists and not individual candidates is another sign that the major parties are more interested in maintaining their positions rather than advancing the country’s interests. The leading Shiite parties also do not seem to have any problems with playing along with Iran, as long as it helps them win.
SOURCES
Allam, Hannah, Landay, Jonathan, and Strobel, Warren, “Is an Iranian general the most powerful man in Iraq?” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/28/08
Alsumaria, “Al Sadr agrees to reengage in Coalition,” 7/16/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Elections draft law completed without agreeing on Kirkuk – MP,” 7/15/09
Barzegar, Kayhan, “Iran’s Foreign Policy in Post-invasion Iraq,” Middle East Policy Council Journal, Winter 2008
Domergue, Jeremy and Cochrane, Marisa, “Balancing Maliki,” Institute for Understanding War, June 2009
Elkhamri, Mounir, “Iran’s Contribution to the Civil War in Iraq,” Jamestown Foundation, January 2007
Gwertzman, Bernard, “Iraq at Crossroads Amid U.S. Disengagement,” Council on Foreign Relations, 6/30/09
Kaplow, Larry, “Iraq Steps Out of Iran’s Shadow,” Newsweek, 6/6/09
Mohsen, Amer, “Iraq Papers Sat: The I’tilaf is Back!” IraqSlogger.com, 6/19/09
- “Iraq Papers Wed: Oil Contracts in Jeopardy,” IraqSlogger.com, 6/16/09
Parker, Ned, “Sadr’s bloc quits Iraq’s ruling coalition,” Times of London, 9/16/07
Press TV, “Iraq’s Maliki at Hakim’s bedside in Tehran,” 5/31/09
Al-Sharqiyah Television, “Iraq roundup: Al-Sadr Trend mediates in Ninawa; security incidents,” BBC Monitoring Service, 6/14/09
- “’Special groups’ leaders arrested in Iraq; political, security roundup,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 6/15/09
- “US troops start withdrawal from Al-Sadr City; Iraq roundup,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 5/29/09
Sunday, June 28, 2009
United Iraqi Alliance Ready To Be Reconstituted
As recently reported, both the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) and Iran are desperately trying to put together the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) before the 2010 parliamentary elections. Al-Hayat newspaper recently reported that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has agreed to rejoin the List as long as he gets to set the agenda. According to the paper, the coalition will be called the Coalition of the State of Law, after Maliki’s successful list in the 2009 provincial vote. The alliance will also be open to any party, and not just be a Shiite one like it was when it was originally formed. The Prime Minister has talked to Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani about creating such a list.
An SIIC member was also quoted in the Azzaman paper that they were consulting with the Sadrists to bring them back into the fold as well. Sadr’s followers left the alliance in September 2007 after there were efforts to push him out of the ruling coalition behind Maliki’s government. The Sadrists and SIIC are long-time rivals who carried out a running battle against each other across the south after the U.S. invasion. Maliki launched a crackdown on the Mahdi Army in March 2008 that largely broke up the militia. That didn’t stop the State of Law List from reaching out to the Sadrists after the January 2009 elections. The Sadrists have recently been protesting against their followers still being in prison, and being abused after the government’s offensives. They have blamed Maliki and the Supreme Council for these arrests, and their release may be a precondition for them to rejoin the alliance. Until then the Sadrists have said they will run on their own like they did in the provincial vote.
If Maliki goes ahead and rejoins the Supreme Council they could be a powerful force in the 2010 balloting. Maliki’s State of Law won the most seats in the provincial elections, but only came away with a majority in two provinces. Including the Supreme Council, and other parties would make the alliance a dominant force, and give Maliki say over any new coalition that was put together in parliament, thus cementing his role as kingmaker and center of Iraqi politics.
SOURCES
Mohsen, Amer, “Iraq Papers Sat: The I’tilaf is Back!” IraqSlogger.com, 6/19/09
Parker, Ned, “Sadr’s bloc quits Iraq’s ruling coalition,” Times of London, 9/16/07
Al-Sharqiyah Television, “Iraq Al-Sadr bloc leader speaks of unjustified detentions, views spat with Kuwait,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 6/11/09
- “Iraq detains Interior Ministry employee over prison rights violations; update,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 6/15/09
- “’Special groups’ leaders arrested in Iraq; political, security roundup,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 6/15/09
- “US troops start withdrawal from Al-Sadr City; Iraq roundup,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 5/29/09
Tavernise, Sabrina and Mizher, Qais, “In Iraq’s Mayhem, Town Finds Calm Through Its Tribal Links,” New York Times, 7/10/06
An SIIC member was also quoted in the Azzaman paper that they were consulting with the Sadrists to bring them back into the fold as well. Sadr’s followers left the alliance in September 2007 after there were efforts to push him out of the ruling coalition behind Maliki’s government. The Sadrists and SIIC are long-time rivals who carried out a running battle against each other across the south after the U.S. invasion. Maliki launched a crackdown on the Mahdi Army in March 2008 that largely broke up the militia. That didn’t stop the State of Law List from reaching out to the Sadrists after the January 2009 elections. The Sadrists have recently been protesting against their followers still being in prison, and being abused after the government’s offensives. They have blamed Maliki and the Supreme Council for these arrests, and their release may be a precondition for them to rejoin the alliance. Until then the Sadrists have said they will run on their own like they did in the provincial vote.
If Maliki goes ahead and rejoins the Supreme Council they could be a powerful force in the 2010 balloting. Maliki’s State of Law won the most seats in the provincial elections, but only came away with a majority in two provinces. Including the Supreme Council, and other parties would make the alliance a dominant force, and give Maliki say over any new coalition that was put together in parliament, thus cementing his role as kingmaker and center of Iraqi politics.
SOURCES
Mohsen, Amer, “Iraq Papers Sat: The I’tilaf is Back!” IraqSlogger.com, 6/19/09
Parker, Ned, “Sadr’s bloc quits Iraq’s ruling coalition,” Times of London, 9/16/07
Al-Sharqiyah Television, “Iraq Al-Sadr bloc leader speaks of unjustified detentions, views spat with Kuwait,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 6/11/09
- “Iraq detains Interior Ministry employee over prison rights violations; update,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 6/15/09
- “’Special groups’ leaders arrested in Iraq; political, security roundup,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 6/15/09
- “US troops start withdrawal from Al-Sadr City; Iraq roundup,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 5/29/09
Tavernise, Sabrina and Mizher, Qais, “In Iraq’s Mayhem, Town Finds Calm Through Its Tribal Links,” New York Times, 7/10/06
Friday, October 24, 2008
Shiite Rivalries Increasing As Provincial Elections Near
The following commentary originally appeared in Musings On Iraq
The followers of Moqtada al-Sadr are coming under increasing fire. As reported earlier, on October 9, 2008, Sadrist member of parliament Saleh al-Auqaeili was assassinated in a bombing near Sadr City. Sadr’s followers initially blamed the U.S. for the death, which led to a brief clash between the Mahdi Army and Iraqi and U.S. forces, in Baghdad. Later, they blamed criminals gangs, which has usually meant breakaway Sadrist elements or Iranian backed Special Groups. On October 20, Alsumaria TV reported that two suspected culprits were arrested for the assault. They were members of the local electricity directorate, which gave them access to the area that was near an Iraqi army checkpoint, and patrolled by the United States. Iraqi authorities said they came from Sadr City and belonged to an outlaw group.
There are also more reports pointing towards a growing gap between Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s Dawa party and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC). Together they make up two-thirds of the coalition behind Maliki’s government and are both members of the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance (UIA). However, the UIA largely exists in name only as the Dawa and the SIIC are planning on running against each other in the upcoming provincial elections. This increasing divide is being played out in places like Babil, Qadisiyah, Nasiriyah, Maysan provinces, and Baghdad. In June when Maliki sent forces against the Sadrists in Maysan, the security forces tore down posters of SIIC leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim. A few months later, the SIIC protested a new police chief sent to Nasiriyah by the Interior Ministry. In late September, an Iraqi Army unit and U.S. forces raided the headquarters of the SIIC’s Badr Brigade in Hilla, the capital of Babil. The SIIC governor claimed they only had AKs for personal defense, but Iraqi forces said they came away with missiles and IEDs. In October, a dinner celebrating the end of Ramadan by the al-Fatla tribe in Qadisiyah was interrupted by SIIC controlled police. The sheikh from the tribe had recently agreed to head the government funded Tribal Support Council. As noted earlier, the councils are an attempt by Maliki to build up his support in the south. The SIIC has condemned their formation. Finally, a draft of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the U.S. and Iraq to maintain a U.S. presence in the country after United Nations authorization expires on December 31, 2008 was passed to government officials. SIIC leader Hakim said his party had kept silent on the issue because if it failed, they wanted the blame to fall on Maliki.
All of these developments are linked to the inter-Shiite struggle for power in the face of upcoming elections. The Sadrists, Maliki’s Dawa, and the Supreme Council, once all allies in the United Alliance, are now rivals. They will all be competing for provincial council seats across the Shiite south and Baghdad. This has led to an up tick in assassinations as in the case of Saleh al-Auqaeili, and increasing political disputes between Maliki and the SIIC. When the elections actually happen, they could lead to the rise of new independent parties and individual politicians, a redistribution of power amongst the Sadrists, SIIC, and Dawa, or violence between them to hold onto or increase their position.
For more on the SIIC-Maliki/Dawa split see:
Maliki Responds To His Critics On Tribal Support Councils
Disputes Over Tribal Support Councils
For more on assassinations of Sadrists see:
Another Sadrist Assassinated
Sadrist Cleric Assassinated In Basra
SOURCES
Alsumaria, “2 perpetrators involved in Sadrist MP assassination arrested,” 10/20/08
Fleishman, Jeffrey, “Shiite fighters clash with Iraqi, U.S. troops in Baghdad,” Los Angeles Times, 10/10/08
Hendawi, Hamza and Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Shiite split could complicate Iraqi efforts to approve security pact with US,” Associated Press, 10/16/08
Klapper, Bradley, “Thousands of al-Sadr supporters mourn lawmaker,” Associated Press, 10/10/08
Levinson, Charles and Nabhan, Ali, “Iraqi tribes caught between rival Shiite parties,” USA Today, 10/20/08
Parker, Sam, “ISCI/Da’wa alliance showing strain,” Abu Muqawama Blog, 9/17/08
Reuters, “U.S. Pact Hits Snag As Iraqi Shi’a Seek Changes,” 10/19/08
Visser, Reidar, “More Tension between the Iraqi Security Forces and the Badr Brigades, This
Time in Hilla,” Historiae.org, 9/29/08
Voices of Iraq, “SIIC denies it had banned arms in Babel office,” 9/29/08
The followers of Moqtada al-Sadr are coming under increasing fire. As reported earlier, on October 9, 2008, Sadrist member of parliament Saleh al-Auqaeili was assassinated in a bombing near Sadr City. Sadr’s followers initially blamed the U.S. for the death, which led to a brief clash between the Mahdi Army and Iraqi and U.S. forces, in Baghdad. Later, they blamed criminals gangs, which has usually meant breakaway Sadrist elements or Iranian backed Special Groups. On October 20, Alsumaria TV reported that two suspected culprits were arrested for the assault. They were members of the local electricity directorate, which gave them access to the area that was near an Iraqi army checkpoint, and patrolled by the United States. Iraqi authorities said they came from Sadr City and belonged to an outlaw group.
There are also more reports pointing towards a growing gap between Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s Dawa party and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC). Together they make up two-thirds of the coalition behind Maliki’s government and are both members of the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance (UIA). However, the UIA largely exists in name only as the Dawa and the SIIC are planning on running against each other in the upcoming provincial elections. This increasing divide is being played out in places like Babil, Qadisiyah, Nasiriyah, Maysan provinces, and Baghdad. In June when Maliki sent forces against the Sadrists in Maysan, the security forces tore down posters of SIIC leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim. A few months later, the SIIC protested a new police chief sent to Nasiriyah by the Interior Ministry. In late September, an Iraqi Army unit and U.S. forces raided the headquarters of the SIIC’s Badr Brigade in Hilla, the capital of Babil. The SIIC governor claimed they only had AKs for personal defense, but Iraqi forces said they came away with missiles and IEDs. In October, a dinner celebrating the end of Ramadan by the al-Fatla tribe in Qadisiyah was interrupted by SIIC controlled police. The sheikh from the tribe had recently agreed to head the government funded Tribal Support Council. As noted earlier, the councils are an attempt by Maliki to build up his support in the south. The SIIC has condemned their formation. Finally, a draft of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the U.S. and Iraq to maintain a U.S. presence in the country after United Nations authorization expires on December 31, 2008 was passed to government officials. SIIC leader Hakim said his party had kept silent on the issue because if it failed, they wanted the blame to fall on Maliki.
All of these developments are linked to the inter-Shiite struggle for power in the face of upcoming elections. The Sadrists, Maliki’s Dawa, and the Supreme Council, once all allies in the United Alliance, are now rivals. They will all be competing for provincial council seats across the Shiite south and Baghdad. This has led to an up tick in assassinations as in the case of Saleh al-Auqaeili, and increasing political disputes between Maliki and the SIIC. When the elections actually happen, they could lead to the rise of new independent parties and individual politicians, a redistribution of power amongst the Sadrists, SIIC, and Dawa, or violence between them to hold onto or increase their position.
For more on the SIIC-Maliki/Dawa split see:
Maliki Responds To His Critics On Tribal Support Councils
Disputes Over Tribal Support Councils
For more on assassinations of Sadrists see:
Another Sadrist Assassinated
Sadrist Cleric Assassinated In Basra
SOURCES
Alsumaria, “2 perpetrators involved in Sadrist MP assassination arrested,” 10/20/08
Fleishman, Jeffrey, “Shiite fighters clash with Iraqi, U.S. troops in Baghdad,” Los Angeles Times, 10/10/08
Hendawi, Hamza and Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Shiite split could complicate Iraqi efforts to approve security pact with US,” Associated Press, 10/16/08
Klapper, Bradley, “Thousands of al-Sadr supporters mourn lawmaker,” Associated Press, 10/10/08
Levinson, Charles and Nabhan, Ali, “Iraqi tribes caught between rival Shiite parties,” USA Today, 10/20/08
Parker, Sam, “ISCI/Da’wa alliance showing strain,” Abu Muqawama Blog, 9/17/08
Reuters, “U.S. Pact Hits Snag As Iraqi Shi’a Seek Changes,” 10/19/08
Visser, Reidar, “More Tension between the Iraqi Security Forces and the Badr Brigades, This
Time in Hilla,” Historiae.org, 9/29/08
Voices of Iraq, “SIIC denies it had banned arms in Babel office,” 9/29/08
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