On August 24, 2009 the new Iraqi National Alliance was announced. This was the long-awaited revised version of the United Iraqi Alliance, which was the largest vote getter in the 2005 elections. The new grouping includes the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), the Sadrists, former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s National Reform Party, the Dawa-Iraq Party, and two Sunni figures, Sheikh Hamid al-Hayes of the Anbar Salvation Council and Khalid Abd al-Wahhab al-Mulla from Basra. It appears that the new list was unable to convince the Fadhila Party to join. In July 2009 they said they would not, and in August claimed they were going to form their own list, the Alliance for Integrity and Development. More importantly, the National Alliance did not include Prime Minster Nouri al-Maliki’s Dawa Party.
Dawa was said to be involved in negotiations right up to the last minute of the press conference of the new list, but couldn’t get their demands met. Maliki was asking for a majority of seats in the alliance and a promise that he would be their sole candidate to be prime minister, which the other parties objected to. The National Alliance however did leave the door open to Maliki joining the list at a later date.
As reported before, Maliki’s main reason for flirting with rejoining the alliance after running separately with his own State of Law List in the 2009 provincial balloting, was to secure the top post in the country. While Maliki was considered the biggest winner in the 2009 election, a breakdown of the results show that he was in no position to hold onto the prime ministership if he ran alone again. Of the fourteen provinces that held elections, Maliki’s State of Law only won majorities in two, Baghdad and Basra, and even then, came away with 38% and 37% of the vote respectively. Overall, State of Law won 15.1% of the ballots and took 27.5% of the 440 seats up for grabs. That was hardly a hold on the electorate to ensure that he be re-elected. In comparison, the new National Alliance members walked away with 17.1% of the vote and 27.7% of the seats.
January 2009 Provincial Election Results Comparison
Maliki’s State of Law: 15.1% of vote, 121 seats, 27.5%
SIIC’s Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 6.6% of vote, 58 seats, 13.1%
Sadrists’ Independent Free Movement List: 6.3% of vote, 41 seats, 9.3%
Jaafari’s National Reform Party: 4.2% of vote, 23 seats, 5.2%
Iraqi National Alliance members together: 17.1% of vote, 122 seats, 27.7%
This leaves the Prime Minister in a quandary because there are few other major parties left for him to align with. The Fadhila Party and Dawa have not gotten along. The State of Law List did not include it in any of its ruling coalitions after the 2009 provincial elections, and Fadhila had a poor showing in the voting. Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha of the Awakening and National Independents List has repeatedly expressed a desire to run with Maliki in 2010. The al-Hadbaa Party of Ninewa, the Change List in Kurdistan, and Mithal al-Alusi’s Ummah Party may also be new partners. Those together would still probably not deliver a plurality of the vote. Maliki flirted with allying with parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq’s National Dialogue Front after the 2009 balloting, but was attacked for it by the other Shiite parties who claimed Mutlaq was a Baathist. Mutlaq is now in discussions with former speaker of parliament Mahmoud al-Mashhadani of the National Dialogue Council, Vice President Tariq Hashemi of the Iraqi Islamic Party, former Prime Miniser Ilyad Allawi of the Iraqi National List, and Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani of the Constitution Party to form a new alliance. Bolani is said to be a candidate for prime minister, so it’s unlikely that Maliki would want to work with this grouping. After that there are only a plethora of smaller parties that tend to have very localized support.
Iraqi politics are in a state of flux. The Shiites along with the other ethnosectarian groups are fragmenting into smaller parties as the 2009 elections showed. This makes it much harder to form winning coalitions. Maliki may have to cobble together an ad hoc group of parties and hope for the best if he wants to be prime minister again. Even if he ran with the National Iraqi Alliance there was no guarantee he would hold onto the spot as the SIIC was only hoping to ride Maliki’s coattails back into power and then drop him afterwards. After the 2010 vote is completed and negotiations begin for a ruling coalition, the Prime Minister will also have to contend with the fact that the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (KDP) alliance is set against him, along with many in the Islamic Party. No matter what then, Maliki is facing an uphill battle after his spate of military and political victories in 2008 and 2009.
SOURCES
Alsumaria, “New Iraq political coalition in the offing,” 8/24/09
Associated Press, “New Shiite alliance excludes Iraqi prime minister,” 8/24/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Fadhila party announces new alliance for next elections,” 8/10/09
- “Sunni leader envisions alliance with Maliki in next polls,” 7/26/09
Domergue, Jeremy and Cochrane, Marisa, “Balancing Maliki,” Institute for Understanding War, June 2009
Fox News, “Iraqi Clan Leader May Hold Key to Lasting Political Stability After U.S. Exit,” 4/4/09
Iraq The Model, “Accord Front Collapses, Sunni Tribes Seek Shiite Allies,” 8/15/09
- “Maliki promises a crackdown that could reach political figures,” 8/23/09
Kazimi, Nibras, “Announcing the ‘New’ UIA,” Talisman Gate, 8/24/09
- “Iraq: Alliances Galore,” Hudson Institute, 7/17/09
- “Iraq: Rumors Swirl,” Hudson Institute, 8/6/09
Londono, Ernesto, “Iraqi Shiite Parties Form Coalition Without Maliki,” Washington Post, 8/24/09
Myers, Steven Lee, “Iraqi Shiite Leaders Create Alliance, Minus Maliki,” New York times, 8/24/09
Parker, Ned, “Maliki remakes himself ahead of elections,” Los Angeles Times, 7/21/09
Parker, Ned and Salman, Raheem, “In Basra, political skirmishing heats up as elections near,” Los Angeles Times, 12/28/08
Shadid, Anthony, “In Iraq, Political Ambiguity,” Washington Post, 4/4/09
Visser, Reidar, “After Sadr-Badr Compromise in Tehran, the Iraqi National Alliance (INA) Is Declared,” Historiae.org, 8/24/09
- “Claiming Nothing Has Really Changed, Fadila Rejects the Offer to Rejoin a ‘Reformed’ UIA,” Historiae.org, 7/17/09
Showing posts with label National Reform Party. Show all posts
Showing posts with label National Reform Party. Show all posts
Friday, August 28, 2009
Thursday, June 11, 2009
USIP Report On Iraqi Politics and The 2010 Parliamentary Elections
In May 2009 two members of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Daniel Serwer and Sam Parker, traveled to Baghdad where they met with around 20 top Iraqi politicians and government officials. They wrote a report about their trip called “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections.” The major topic of discussion was the 2009 provincial elections, and its repercussions for the 2010 parliamentary vote. The Iraqi elites agreed that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki had stolen the stage of Iraqi politics. All of the major national parties now operate in relation to him. At the same time, the USIP group worked with the newly elected provincial council in Diyala, who were more concerned about getting their government working than what was going in the capital. The report believes that this could be the beginning of a major change in Iraq with the emergence of issue-based parties rather than sectarian ones. That’s likely to be a long-term process as the major parties with the money, organization, and power are likely to dominate the parliamentary vote, and are still caught up on what to do with Maliki.
The first issue dealt with was the impact of the January 2009 provincial elections. Most of the Iraqis felt that the vote had gone off well, and were now reflecting upon the lessons learned. One was that parties with a strong organization and that could get out the vote did well. Coalition building was also of importance since so many parties participated it was the only way to gain power. Many also talked about “wasted votes,” those that went to parties and candidates that didn’t garner enough ballots to gain seats on the councils. That amounted to about 30% of the overall vote. That compared to Maliki’s State of Law List, which only got 19% of the national returns. 50% of the electorate also did not participate. The major parties were interested in trying to win over some of these populations.
All of the politicians were also focused upon the Prime Minister. Everyone seemed to base their positions upon Maliki. Some want to oppose him, some want to ally with him, and others want to see what will happen after the 2010 vote. No one thought Maliki would face a no confidence vote in parliament before the parliamentary elections. That could make him a martyr, and also deny his critics the chance to blame him for the country’s problems. There are also no clear replacements for him.
This is quite a change from when Maliki first came into office. His Dawa party returned to Iraq in 2003 from exile, weak, divided, lacking support, money and a militia. He was picked for his position because of his weakness compared to the two major Shiite parties the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Party (SIIC) and the Sadrists that dominated the United Iraqi Alliance. His initial inaction in the face of the increasing violence and chaos reinforced his image as an ineffectual leader. This all changed with the Surge. The Americans went after all of Maliki’s opponents from Al Qaeda in Iraq to the Sunni insurgency to the Shiite militias. That made the Iraqi state and the Prime Minister stronger. In 2008 he launched his own security crackdowns on the Sadrists in Basra, Sadr City, and Maysan. This created a new view of the Prime Minister and government as strong and decisive. Maliki was quick to claim all of the success, and make himself synonymous with the state.
In the process Maliki has stepped away from his former friends, and attempted to forge new ones to gain all the glory of the improved situation in the country. Maliki’s main coalition is made up of the Iraqi Islamic Party, the Supreme Council, and the two Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Originally Moqtada al-Sadr was also part of that group, but was pushed out with the help of the Americans. In 2008 Maliki moved away from this alliance to establish his independence. That was signaled in the January 2009 provincial elections when he formed his own State of Law List. Afterwards, Maliki has reached out to all groups in preparation for the 2010 vote. The Prime Minister for example, has held discussions with Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Hiwar Party, Ninewa’s al-Hadbaa List, Sheikh Abu Risha’s Anbar Awakening, and attempted to reach out to Baathists in an attempt to find new Sunni partners. Maliki also talked to the Sadrists, and recently flew to Iran to meet with the head of the Supreme Council Abdul Aziz al-Hakim who is in Tehran for cancer treatment. In doing so, he hopes to be the main player in any new ruling coalition that might emerge. He also has everyone guessing as to whom he will run with in the elections, himself, rejoin the United Iraqi Alliance, or some new gathering.
The Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) has emerged as the strongest critic of the Prime Minister. Like the Dawa, they entered the new Iraqi political scene after the invasion with no real base, but were able to put together the main Sunni alliance the Iraqi Accordance Front, which has since disintegrated. During the Surge, they were able to take advantage of the new Sons of Iraq groups, and successfully co-opt many of them, thus gaining a grass roots organization. The IIP’s victory in Diyala in 2009 was an example of this. The party went on to win the most seats of any Sunni group in the provincial elections. To oppose Maliki they are trying to build up the power of the parliament. The election of Ayad al-Samarraie as speaker of the legislature on April 19, 2009 was the first step in their plan. He wants to make the parliament a check on Maliki’s authority. That was recently seen when the parliament forced the resignation of the Trade Minister, who was from the Dawa Party, over corruption. There are plans to question other members of Maliki’s cabinet about misdeeds as well. Parliament also blocked funding for the Tribal Support Councils, which was a patronage system put together by the Prime Minister in various provinces, and a reconciliation initiative that was aimed at co-opting Baathists. The Islamic Party is also pushing for constitutional reform to limit the Prime Minister’s office.
The Supreme Council has become another major opponent of Maliki, but seems to be turning inwards in the aftermath of their defeat in the provincial elections. In 2005 the SIIC walked away with eight governorships out of eighteen. In 2009 they won none. Since then they have been trying to deal with this loss. In the 2010 vote they want to portray themselves as being independent from Iran, and no longer advocating for a Shiite southern region. Despite their criticisms, they also want to try to convince Maliki to rejoin the United Iraqi Alliance, and run together in the election. Another major distraction is the fact that its leader, al-Hakim, is dying of cancer. When he passes, many think that the SIIC will split in two with old guard Badr Brigade militia leaders like Finance Minister Bayan Jabr running one faction, and newer officials like Vice President Adel Abd al-Mahdi the other.
The Kurds are also in conflict with Maliki. Beginning in 2008 the Prime Minister began moving the Iraqi Army into disputed territories of the north, which have largely been under Kurdish control since 2003. There have been several confrontations with the peshmerga as a result. The main Kurdish parties and the Americans are afraid that the dispute between Kurdistan and Baghdad will lead to violence. The United Nations is trying to mediate, but without strong U.S. support their work is likely to go nowhere. Surprisingly most of the Arab politicians in Baghdad were not that concerned about this issue. They believe that time is on the side of the central government, and as it gets stronger the Kurds will have to give way. Until then this division is likely to fester for the next couple years.
After those three major groups there are a series of smaller Shiite, Sunni, and secular parties that are also related to Maliki. What the paper called the Shiite center is made up of Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani’s Constitutional Party, government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh Competents Party, and ex-Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s National Reform Trend. The Sadrists are still a force in Shiite politics as well. The main secular leader is ex-Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi and his Iraqi National List. Finally there are Sunnis like parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Hiwar Party, the al-Hadbaa List of Ninewa, former Islamic Party member Dhafir al-Ani, and Deputy Prime Minister Rafi al-Issawi. All of these parties ran in the 2009 election as nationalists, arguing for a strong central government. That was similar to Maliki’s State of Law platform, so they had mixed results. The Shiite centrists, Sadrists, and Allawi got some provincial seats, but didn’t do as well as they had hoped. The smaller Sunni parties actually did surprisingly well. Maliki also courted all of these groups as potential new allies.
Finally the USIP traveled to Diyala to help the new provincial council there forge a position paper on what their goals would be while in office. There the USIP found that the politicians were much more interested in getting the local government working, especially because the previous one was considered a failure, rather than national politics. The Diyala council members didn’t pay much attention to their party bosses in Baghdad, and were more issue based. The Americans saw this as an important development in Iraqi politics, as the Diyala council was likely to meet the needs of average Iraqis compared to the power struggles going on in the capital.
“Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections” points out the dynamics of Iraq’s national and local politics. In Baghdad, the major parties are involved in a prolonged struggle for power as Maliki has successfully placed himself as the public face of the government. His former allies have been left out in the cold, and are either challenging him, like the Islamic Party and Kurds, or trying to re-organize like the SIIC. At the same time, this has opened up opportunities for newer and smaller parties by allying with one side or the other. It also appears that this struggle is more important than actually improving the country for many politicians. At the provincial level however, the USIP found different parties, sects, and ethnicities working together on the newly elected council, trying to address their constituents’ needs. The USIP paper believes that the 2010 election could be a turning point if Maliki decides to run on issues like he did in 2009. There is also the possibility that he will go back to sectarian politics and rejoin the United Iraqi Alliance. The USIP hopes for the former outcome, but if it doesn’t happen they believe there will probably be more opportunities in the future to change the political culture of Iraq. It seems likely that this will stay at the local level, and take quite some time to bubble up to the top. The major parties including Maliki are caught up in a serious struggle for the right to rule, which will have to play out before issues become the prime focus of the government, if ever. Until then finding new friends and shifting alliances will continue to dominate the capital.
SOURCES
Bakri, Nada, “In Iraq, Assertive Parliament Emerges Under New Speaker,” Washington Post, 5/27/09
Domergue, Jeremy, “Selection of Speaker Reveals Shifting Coalitions in Iraqi Parliamentary Politics,” Institute for the Study of War, 4/28/09
Press TV, “Iraq’s Maliki at Hakim’s bedside in Tehran,” 5/31/09
Serwer, Daniel and Parker, Sam, “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2009
Visser, Reidar, “Maliki Suffers Setbacks as Samarrai is Confirmed as New Speaker and More Governors Are Elected South of Baghdad,” Historiae.org, 4/19/09
Wong, Edward, “Iraqis weigh alliance to marginalize Sadr and bolster Maliki,” International Harold Tribune, 12/11/06
The first issue dealt with was the impact of the January 2009 provincial elections. Most of the Iraqis felt that the vote had gone off well, and were now reflecting upon the lessons learned. One was that parties with a strong organization and that could get out the vote did well. Coalition building was also of importance since so many parties participated it was the only way to gain power. Many also talked about “wasted votes,” those that went to parties and candidates that didn’t garner enough ballots to gain seats on the councils. That amounted to about 30% of the overall vote. That compared to Maliki’s State of Law List, which only got 19% of the national returns. 50% of the electorate also did not participate. The major parties were interested in trying to win over some of these populations.
All of the politicians were also focused upon the Prime Minister. Everyone seemed to base their positions upon Maliki. Some want to oppose him, some want to ally with him, and others want to see what will happen after the 2010 vote. No one thought Maliki would face a no confidence vote in parliament before the parliamentary elections. That could make him a martyr, and also deny his critics the chance to blame him for the country’s problems. There are also no clear replacements for him.
This is quite a change from when Maliki first came into office. His Dawa party returned to Iraq in 2003 from exile, weak, divided, lacking support, money and a militia. He was picked for his position because of his weakness compared to the two major Shiite parties the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Party (SIIC) and the Sadrists that dominated the United Iraqi Alliance. His initial inaction in the face of the increasing violence and chaos reinforced his image as an ineffectual leader. This all changed with the Surge. The Americans went after all of Maliki’s opponents from Al Qaeda in Iraq to the Sunni insurgency to the Shiite militias. That made the Iraqi state and the Prime Minister stronger. In 2008 he launched his own security crackdowns on the Sadrists in Basra, Sadr City, and Maysan. This created a new view of the Prime Minister and government as strong and decisive. Maliki was quick to claim all of the success, and make himself synonymous with the state.
In the process Maliki has stepped away from his former friends, and attempted to forge new ones to gain all the glory of the improved situation in the country. Maliki’s main coalition is made up of the Iraqi Islamic Party, the Supreme Council, and the two Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Originally Moqtada al-Sadr was also part of that group, but was pushed out with the help of the Americans. In 2008 Maliki moved away from this alliance to establish his independence. That was signaled in the January 2009 provincial elections when he formed his own State of Law List. Afterwards, Maliki has reached out to all groups in preparation for the 2010 vote. The Prime Minister for example, has held discussions with Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Hiwar Party, Ninewa’s al-Hadbaa List, Sheikh Abu Risha’s Anbar Awakening, and attempted to reach out to Baathists in an attempt to find new Sunni partners. Maliki also talked to the Sadrists, and recently flew to Iran to meet with the head of the Supreme Council Abdul Aziz al-Hakim who is in Tehran for cancer treatment. In doing so, he hopes to be the main player in any new ruling coalition that might emerge. He also has everyone guessing as to whom he will run with in the elections, himself, rejoin the United Iraqi Alliance, or some new gathering.
The Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) has emerged as the strongest critic of the Prime Minister. Like the Dawa, they entered the new Iraqi political scene after the invasion with no real base, but were able to put together the main Sunni alliance the Iraqi Accordance Front, which has since disintegrated. During the Surge, they were able to take advantage of the new Sons of Iraq groups, and successfully co-opt many of them, thus gaining a grass roots organization. The IIP’s victory in Diyala in 2009 was an example of this. The party went on to win the most seats of any Sunni group in the provincial elections. To oppose Maliki they are trying to build up the power of the parliament. The election of Ayad al-Samarraie as speaker of the legislature on April 19, 2009 was the first step in their plan. He wants to make the parliament a check on Maliki’s authority. That was recently seen when the parliament forced the resignation of the Trade Minister, who was from the Dawa Party, over corruption. There are plans to question other members of Maliki’s cabinet about misdeeds as well. Parliament also blocked funding for the Tribal Support Councils, which was a patronage system put together by the Prime Minister in various provinces, and a reconciliation initiative that was aimed at co-opting Baathists. The Islamic Party is also pushing for constitutional reform to limit the Prime Minister’s office.
The Supreme Council has become another major opponent of Maliki, but seems to be turning inwards in the aftermath of their defeat in the provincial elections. In 2005 the SIIC walked away with eight governorships out of eighteen. In 2009 they won none. Since then they have been trying to deal with this loss. In the 2010 vote they want to portray themselves as being independent from Iran, and no longer advocating for a Shiite southern region. Despite their criticisms, they also want to try to convince Maliki to rejoin the United Iraqi Alliance, and run together in the election. Another major distraction is the fact that its leader, al-Hakim, is dying of cancer. When he passes, many think that the SIIC will split in two with old guard Badr Brigade militia leaders like Finance Minister Bayan Jabr running one faction, and newer officials like Vice President Adel Abd al-Mahdi the other.
The Kurds are also in conflict with Maliki. Beginning in 2008 the Prime Minister began moving the Iraqi Army into disputed territories of the north, which have largely been under Kurdish control since 2003. There have been several confrontations with the peshmerga as a result. The main Kurdish parties and the Americans are afraid that the dispute between Kurdistan and Baghdad will lead to violence. The United Nations is trying to mediate, but without strong U.S. support their work is likely to go nowhere. Surprisingly most of the Arab politicians in Baghdad were not that concerned about this issue. They believe that time is on the side of the central government, and as it gets stronger the Kurds will have to give way. Until then this division is likely to fester for the next couple years.
After those three major groups there are a series of smaller Shiite, Sunni, and secular parties that are also related to Maliki. What the paper called the Shiite center is made up of Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani’s Constitutional Party, government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh Competents Party, and ex-Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s National Reform Trend. The Sadrists are still a force in Shiite politics as well. The main secular leader is ex-Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi and his Iraqi National List. Finally there are Sunnis like parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Hiwar Party, the al-Hadbaa List of Ninewa, former Islamic Party member Dhafir al-Ani, and Deputy Prime Minister Rafi al-Issawi. All of these parties ran in the 2009 election as nationalists, arguing for a strong central government. That was similar to Maliki’s State of Law platform, so they had mixed results. The Shiite centrists, Sadrists, and Allawi got some provincial seats, but didn’t do as well as they had hoped. The smaller Sunni parties actually did surprisingly well. Maliki also courted all of these groups as potential new allies.
Finally the USIP traveled to Diyala to help the new provincial council there forge a position paper on what their goals would be while in office. There the USIP found that the politicians were much more interested in getting the local government working, especially because the previous one was considered a failure, rather than national politics. The Diyala council members didn’t pay much attention to their party bosses in Baghdad, and were more issue based. The Americans saw this as an important development in Iraqi politics, as the Diyala council was likely to meet the needs of average Iraqis compared to the power struggles going on in the capital.
“Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections” points out the dynamics of Iraq’s national and local politics. In Baghdad, the major parties are involved in a prolonged struggle for power as Maliki has successfully placed himself as the public face of the government. His former allies have been left out in the cold, and are either challenging him, like the Islamic Party and Kurds, or trying to re-organize like the SIIC. At the same time, this has opened up opportunities for newer and smaller parties by allying with one side or the other. It also appears that this struggle is more important than actually improving the country for many politicians. At the provincial level however, the USIP found different parties, sects, and ethnicities working together on the newly elected council, trying to address their constituents’ needs. The USIP paper believes that the 2010 election could be a turning point if Maliki decides to run on issues like he did in 2009. There is also the possibility that he will go back to sectarian politics and rejoin the United Iraqi Alliance. The USIP hopes for the former outcome, but if it doesn’t happen they believe there will probably be more opportunities in the future to change the political culture of Iraq. It seems likely that this will stay at the local level, and take quite some time to bubble up to the top. The major parties including Maliki are caught up in a serious struggle for the right to rule, which will have to play out before issues become the prime focus of the government, if ever. Until then finding new friends and shifting alliances will continue to dominate the capital.
SOURCES
Bakri, Nada, “In Iraq, Assertive Parliament Emerges Under New Speaker,” Washington Post, 5/27/09
Domergue, Jeremy, “Selection of Speaker Reveals Shifting Coalitions in Iraqi Parliamentary Politics,” Institute for the Study of War, 4/28/09
Press TV, “Iraq’s Maliki at Hakim’s bedside in Tehran,” 5/31/09
Serwer, Daniel and Parker, Sam, “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2009
Visser, Reidar, “Maliki Suffers Setbacks as Samarrai is Confirmed as New Speaker and More Governors Are Elected South of Baghdad,” Historiae.org, 4/19/09
Wong, Edward, “Iraqis weigh alliance to marginalize Sadr and bolster Maliki,” International Harold Tribune, 12/11/06
Tuesday, March 31, 2009
Maliki Attempts To Forge New Ruling Coalition
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law list was the biggest winner after the January 2009 provincial elections. Since the results have been announced Maliki has been maneuvering to create a new ruling coalition that would participate in the 2009 parliamentary elections and be his new source of support.
When Maliki became Prime Minister in 2006 he was backed by a coalition of Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds that followed the “national unity” model propagated by the Americans. His main supporters were the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance made up of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), Dawa – Iraq, the Sadrist Trend, the Fadhila Party, Maliki’s own Dawa Party, the Sunni Iraqi Accordance Front, the Kurdish Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and Kurdistan Democratic Party, and smaller independent parties. Maliki was actually a compromise candidate as the Sadrists and SIIC could not initially agree on who was to replace Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari.
The ruling alliance quickly fractured because of these differences. By the end of 2006 the Kurds, Accordance Front, Dawa and the SIIC were all conspiring to push Sadr out of the government. The U.S. was also applying pressure to exclude him. Sadr had already sealed his own fate when he withdrew his six ministers from the cabinet at the end of November 2006, thereby denying him any real say in the government. The U.S. and Shiites parties were hoping that including Sadr in the government would turn him towards politics, and away from being a militia leader, but Sadr’s position always came from his ability to control the streets and violence, so one could not come without the other. Eventually both the Sadrists and Fadhila left the United Shiite Alliance and Maliki’s ruling coalition. A new alliance was then made consisting of the Dawa, the Supreme Council, and the two Kurdish parties. The Accordance Front was later brought on board as well.
While the ruling parties were generally united in getting rid of Sadr they had some fundamental differences on the future of the country as well. The Kurds and Supreme Council both supported federalism. The Kurds wanted more autonomy for Kurdistan, while the SIIC were pushing for a nine province Shiite region in the south. Maliki on the other hand wanted a stronger central government based in Baghdad. As the Prime Minister began exerting more of his power with the improved security situation in 2008, these differences began coming to the fore. By the fall both parties were criticizing and making moves against Maliki, and he was replying in turn.
Since the January 2009 provincial elections, the Prime Minister has been attempting to forge a new alliance to run in the parliamentary elections and back him afterwards. Although the coalition has not been finalized the broad outlines of it are apparent. The new grouping looks to be made up of Maliki’s State of Law List with the Dawa Party at its core, the Sadrists, the Sunni Iraqi National Dialogue Front who ran as the Iraqi National Project in the provincial balloting, and perhaps Ilyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List. This group has already made a deal to rule Wasit province. Saleh al-Mutlaq, the head of the Dialogue Front has also said he is open to joining with the State of Law list in Diyala, Salahaddin, Baghdad, and Babil. According to the Al-Qatan paper, Maliki is also courting the Fadhila party, Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s Reform List, and Ahmad Chalabi. Originally, Allawi looked to be joining with the SIIC, but he has apparently changed his mind as the State of Law offers the chance to rule. While Saleh and the Sadrists are both apprehensive of working with Maliki since they have had major differences with him in the past, what unites them is opposition to the Supreme Council and the Kurds, and of course the chance to hold power.
The SIIC and Kurds, along with the Iraqi Accordance Front have attempted to keep their old alliance together. In Diyala for example, the Accordance Front, the Supreme Council, and the Kurdish Alliance have agreed to work together to run the provincial council.
Whether Maliki’s attempt to re-arrange Iraq’s political map succeeds or not is yet to be seen. The ruling provincial councils have not even been announced yet, and there is still plenty of negotiating to be done. What is for sure is that the old coalitions are mostly dead. The United Iraqi Alliance, which was the largest victor in the 2005 parliamentary elections, has now broken apart. The Sunni Accordance Front has also split. The Kurdish alliance is the only one that remains, and they are now diametrically opposed to Maliki and his attempt to centralize power. This is all part of the new status quo that is still emerging after the end of the sectarian war of 2006-2007.
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Sadr renews idea of local alliances with Iraq PM,” 2/20/09
Alsumaria, “Iraq parties form alliances after elections,” 2/13/09
Asharq al-Awsat, “Al Maliki Wants An Alternative To The Current Shiite Alliance That Will Support The Central Government And Reject The Sectarian Quota System,” 2/16/09
Associated Press, “Shiites, Kurds form alliance; 4 Iraqi kids found in rubble of bombed area,” 8/16/07
Aswat al-Iraq, “KA, IAF agree to share leading posts in Diala,” 2/24/09
- “PM Accuses Kurdish Leadership of ‘violating’ the Constitution,” 11/20/08
Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08
International Crisis Group, “Iraq After The Surge II: The Need for a New Political Strategy,” 4/30/08
Parker, Ned, “Sadr’s bloc quits Iraq’s ruling coalition,” Times of London, 9/16/07
Roads To Iraq Blog, “American delegation met with former Iraqi army officers,” 2/20/09
- “The upcoming confrontation, Maliki and the Kurdish Coalition,” 11/14/08
- “Reconciliation without reconciliation,” 3/10/09
Rossmiller, Alex, “The Bush administration’s four-year history of erratic meddling in search of an Iraqi ‘savior.’” American Prospect, 4/11/07
Al-Sa’dawi, Ahmad, “post-election analysis: real change or more of the same?” Niqash, 2/19/09
Shadid, Anthony, “New Alliance In Iraq Cross Sectarian Lines,” Washington Post, 3/20/09
Visser, Reidar, “Maliki, Hakim, and Iran’s Role in the Basra Fighting,” Historiae.org, 4/9/08
- “Two Very Different Takes on Centralism,” Historiae.org, 9/20/08
Al-Wazzan, Saleem, “al-maliki angles for broad alliance in basra,” Niqash, 3/20/09
Wong, Edward, “Iraqis weigh alliance to marginalize Sadr and bolster Maliki,” International Harold Tribune, 12/11/06
When Maliki became Prime Minister in 2006 he was backed by a coalition of Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds that followed the “national unity” model propagated by the Americans. His main supporters were the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance made up of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), Dawa – Iraq, the Sadrist Trend, the Fadhila Party, Maliki’s own Dawa Party, the Sunni Iraqi Accordance Front, the Kurdish Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and Kurdistan Democratic Party, and smaller independent parties. Maliki was actually a compromise candidate as the Sadrists and SIIC could not initially agree on who was to replace Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari.
The ruling alliance quickly fractured because of these differences. By the end of 2006 the Kurds, Accordance Front, Dawa and the SIIC were all conspiring to push Sadr out of the government. The U.S. was also applying pressure to exclude him. Sadr had already sealed his own fate when he withdrew his six ministers from the cabinet at the end of November 2006, thereby denying him any real say in the government. The U.S. and Shiites parties were hoping that including Sadr in the government would turn him towards politics, and away from being a militia leader, but Sadr’s position always came from his ability to control the streets and violence, so one could not come without the other. Eventually both the Sadrists and Fadhila left the United Shiite Alliance and Maliki’s ruling coalition. A new alliance was then made consisting of the Dawa, the Supreme Council, and the two Kurdish parties. The Accordance Front was later brought on board as well.
While the ruling parties were generally united in getting rid of Sadr they had some fundamental differences on the future of the country as well. The Kurds and Supreme Council both supported federalism. The Kurds wanted more autonomy for Kurdistan, while the SIIC were pushing for a nine province Shiite region in the south. Maliki on the other hand wanted a stronger central government based in Baghdad. As the Prime Minister began exerting more of his power with the improved security situation in 2008, these differences began coming to the fore. By the fall both parties were criticizing and making moves against Maliki, and he was replying in turn.
Since the January 2009 provincial elections, the Prime Minister has been attempting to forge a new alliance to run in the parliamentary elections and back him afterwards. Although the coalition has not been finalized the broad outlines of it are apparent. The new grouping looks to be made up of Maliki’s State of Law List with the Dawa Party at its core, the Sadrists, the Sunni Iraqi National Dialogue Front who ran as the Iraqi National Project in the provincial balloting, and perhaps Ilyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List. This group has already made a deal to rule Wasit province. Saleh al-Mutlaq, the head of the Dialogue Front has also said he is open to joining with the State of Law list in Diyala, Salahaddin, Baghdad, and Babil. According to the Al-Qatan paper, Maliki is also courting the Fadhila party, Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s Reform List, and Ahmad Chalabi. Originally, Allawi looked to be joining with the SIIC, but he has apparently changed his mind as the State of Law offers the chance to rule. While Saleh and the Sadrists are both apprehensive of working with Maliki since they have had major differences with him in the past, what unites them is opposition to the Supreme Council and the Kurds, and of course the chance to hold power.
The SIIC and Kurds, along with the Iraqi Accordance Front have attempted to keep their old alliance together. In Diyala for example, the Accordance Front, the Supreme Council, and the Kurdish Alliance have agreed to work together to run the provincial council.
Whether Maliki’s attempt to re-arrange Iraq’s political map succeeds or not is yet to be seen. The ruling provincial councils have not even been announced yet, and there is still plenty of negotiating to be done. What is for sure is that the old coalitions are mostly dead. The United Iraqi Alliance, which was the largest victor in the 2005 parliamentary elections, has now broken apart. The Sunni Accordance Front has also split. The Kurdish alliance is the only one that remains, and they are now diametrically opposed to Maliki and his attempt to centralize power. This is all part of the new status quo that is still emerging after the end of the sectarian war of 2006-2007.
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Sadr renews idea of local alliances with Iraq PM,” 2/20/09
Alsumaria, “Iraq parties form alliances after elections,” 2/13/09
Asharq al-Awsat, “Al Maliki Wants An Alternative To The Current Shiite Alliance That Will Support The Central Government And Reject The Sectarian Quota System,” 2/16/09
Associated Press, “Shiites, Kurds form alliance; 4 Iraqi kids found in rubble of bombed area,” 8/16/07
Aswat al-Iraq, “KA, IAF agree to share leading posts in Diala,” 2/24/09
- “PM Accuses Kurdish Leadership of ‘violating’ the Constitution,” 11/20/08
Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08
International Crisis Group, “Iraq After The Surge II: The Need for a New Political Strategy,” 4/30/08
Parker, Ned, “Sadr’s bloc quits Iraq’s ruling coalition,” Times of London, 9/16/07
Roads To Iraq Blog, “American delegation met with former Iraqi army officers,” 2/20/09
- “The upcoming confrontation, Maliki and the Kurdish Coalition,” 11/14/08
- “Reconciliation without reconciliation,” 3/10/09
Rossmiller, Alex, “The Bush administration’s four-year history of erratic meddling in search of an Iraqi ‘savior.’” American Prospect, 4/11/07
Al-Sa’dawi, Ahmad, “post-election analysis: real change or more of the same?” Niqash, 2/19/09
Shadid, Anthony, “New Alliance In Iraq Cross Sectarian Lines,” Washington Post, 3/20/09
Visser, Reidar, “Maliki, Hakim, and Iran’s Role in the Basra Fighting,” Historiae.org, 4/9/08
- “Two Very Different Takes on Centralism,” Historiae.org, 9/20/08
Al-Wazzan, Saleem, “al-maliki angles for broad alliance in basra,” Niqash, 3/20/09
Wong, Edward, “Iraqis weigh alliance to marginalize Sadr and bolster Maliki,” International Harold Tribune, 12/11/06
Friday, February 20, 2009
Official Iraqi Election Results
Iraq’s Election Commission finally released its official results for the January 2009 Provincial Elections. The report broke down how many seats each list received. As noted before, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law List came away the victor in nine of the fourteen provinces that voted. Those were Babil, Baghdad, Basra, Dhi Qar, Najaf, Qadisiyah, and Wasit. In Maysan and Muthanna they were tied for first. The List also finished third in Karbala, and tied for fifth in Diyala and Salahaddin.
The other big winners were the Iraqi Islamic Party and its larger Iraqi Accordance Front coalition that came in first in Diyala, tied for first in Salahaddin, and came in second in Baghdad, tied for second in Anbar, third in Ninewa, and fifth in largely Shiite Basra. The Iraqi National List of former Interim Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi also had one victory tying for first in Salahaddin, and also coming in tied for third in Babil, Baghdad, Qadisiyah, Wasit, and fourth in Diyala, and tied for fifth in Anbar. That was much better than the preliminary results.
There were three new victors as well. The coalition Al-Hadbaa List won in Ninewa running on a largely anti-Kurdish ticket. Youssef Majid al-Habboubi, an independent Shiite and former Baathist won in Karbala. Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha, one of the leaders of the tribal Anbar Awakening won the most seats in Anbar.
The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) also did better than originally predicted. They tied for most seats in Maysan and Muthanna with the State of Law List, and also got second place in Babil, Basra, Najaf, Qadisiyah, and Wasit, third in Dhi Qar, tied for fourth in Karbala, tied for fifth in Diyala and Qadisiyah. They did finish a disappointing sixth in Baghdad after having controlled that province since the 2005 elections.
Independent Sunni parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Iraq National Project also did well for a small party. They came in tied for second in Anbar and Diyala, and tied for third in Salahaddin.
The Kurds were expecting to lose control of Ninewa and Salahaddin because of the larger Sunni turnout. They did, but their lists got the second most seats in Ninewa and Diyala. They got no representation in Salahaddin.
The Sadrists, former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s National Reform Party, and the Fadhila Party fared the worst of the major parties. Initially Sadr’s followers were said to have finished second in Maysan, Dhi Qar, Baghdad, and Babil, third in Najaf and Wasit, fourth in Basra and Karbala, fifth in Qadisiyah and Muthanna, and eighth in Diyala. When all was said and done they came out second in Dhi Qar, third in Maysan and Najaf, tied for third in Babil, Baghdad, and Wasit, tied for fourth in Karbala and Muthanna, tied for fifth in Basra, and no seats in Diyala. Al-Jaafari’s list tied for third place in Babil, Muthanna, and Qadisiyah, fourth in Dhi Qar and Maysan, tied for fifth in Baghdad and Najaf, and a distant seventh in Baghdad and Diyala. The biggest loser had to be the Fadhila Party however. Not only did they lose control of Basra finishing seventh, but they only did slightly better with two fifth place results in Dhi Qar and Qadisiyah.
Parties or alliances need to hold 51% of the seats to name the top positions such as governor, deputy governor, head of council, provincial police chief, etc. After the seat allotment was announced, Maliki’s State of Law list and the al-Hadbaa List came out with majorities in Basra and Ninewa. In the other twelve provinces ruling coalitions need to be formed. The talk is that Maliki’s State of Law list will form an alliance with Sadr’s followers, while the Supreme Council is reaching out to Allawi’s Iraqi National List. In Anbar, the tribes have formed a coalition with al-Mutlaq’s Iraq National Project to shut out the Iraqi Islamic Party from power. This after Sheikh Abu Risha joined with them in a coalition at the end of 2008. Salahaddin, which was formerly ruled by the Kurds had the greatest fragmentation. Ten parties finished with enough votes to receive seats at the council. In Karbala independent Shiite Youssef Majid al-Habboubi won the most votes, but because he did not run as part of a party or list he only received one of 27 seats. That left the independent Hope of Rafidain list and Maliki’s State of Law with the most representation with nine seats each. Habboubi could become governor, but the real powers would be with the parties behind him.
Below is a breakdown of the major parties that won seats, how they fared, and then how many seats were allotted by province.
Major Parties & Candidates
Awakening of Iraq and Independents – Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha. One of the leaders of the tribal Awakening movement in Anbar
Coalition of Diyala – Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s Diyala list
Fadhila Party – Ayatollah Mohammed al-Yaccoubi. Claims the mantle of Moqtada al-Sadr’s father’s movement
Al-Hadbaa Party – Coalition of four parties in Ninewa that ran an anti-Kurdish campaign
Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Moqtada al-Sadr. Sadr supported a group of independents that called ran on a nationalist, strong central government, and non-sectarian list
Iraqi Islamic Party/Iraqi Accordance Front – Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi. Main Islamic Sunni party that split apart just before the election. Called for a withdrawal of the U.S., and revising laws that are considered anti-Sunni like the DeBaathification policy
Iraqi National List – Former Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi. Appealed to nationalists and former Baathists
Iraq National Project – Parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq. Independent Sunni politician that ran on a secular and nationalist campaign
Kurdish Alliance – Made up of two major Kurdish parties, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Kurdish President Massoud Barzani, plus several other smaller parties
Al-Mihrab Martyr List - Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC). Islamic party formed in Iran. Ran on religion and federalism
National Movement for Development and Reform – Jamal al-Karbouli. Made up of former Baathists and insurgents
National Reform Party – Former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari. Broke away from the Dawa party
Ninewa Brotherhood List – Kurdish Alliance list for Ninewa
State of Law – Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s Islamic Dawa Party. Islamic party that ran on a nationalist and strong central government platform
Tribes Of Iraq – Sheikh Hamid al-Hayes. Led by one of the Anbar Awakening leaders
Youssef Majid al-Habboubi – Independent Shiite and former Baathist
Finishes By Party
State of Law – Maliki: 1st Babil, Baghdad, Basra, Dhi Qar, Najaf, Qadisiyah, Wasit, tied 1st Maysan, Muthanna, 3rd Karbala, tied 5th Diyala, Salahaddin
Iraqi Islamic Party/Iraqi Accordance Front/ Alliance of Intellectuals and Tribes – 1st Diyala, tied 1st Salahaddin, 2nd Baghdad, tied 2nd Anbar, 3rd Ninewa, tied 5th Basra
Iraqi National List – Allawi: Tied 1st Salahaddin, Tied 3rd Babil, Baghdad, Qadisiyah, Wasit, 4th Diyala, tied 5th Anbar
Al-Hadbaa Party: 1st Ninewa
Youssef Majid al-Habboubi: 1st Karbala
Awakening of Iraq and Independents – Sheikh Abu Risha: 1st Anbar
Al-Mihrab Martyr List/Diyala Coalition – SIIC: Tied 1st Maysan, Muthanna, 2nd Babil, Basra, Najaf, Qadisiyah, Wasit, 3rd Dhi Qar, tied 4th Karbala, tied 5th Diyala, Qadisiyah, 6th Baghdad
Ninewa Brotherhood List/Kurdish Alliance: 2nd Ninewa, tied 2nd Diyala
Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadr: 2nd Dhi Qar, 3rd Maysan, Najaf, tied 3rd Babil, Baghdad, Wasit, tied 4th Karbala, Muthanna, tied 5th Basra
Iraq National Project – al-Mutlaq: Tied 2nd Anbar, Diyala, tied 3rd Salahaddin
National Reform Party – Jaafari: Tied 3rd Babil, Muthanna, Qadisiyah, 4th Dhi Qar, Maysan, tied 5th Baghdad, Najaf, 7th Baghdad, Diyala
Fadhila Party: 5th Dhi Qar, tied 5th Qadisiyah, 7th Basra
Results By Province:
Anbar (29 seats)
1. Awakening of Iraq and Independents – Sheikh Abu Risha: 8
2. Iraq National Project – al-Mutlaq: 6
2. Alliance of Intellectuals and Tribes – Iraqi Islamic Party: 6
4. National Movement for Development and Reform - al-Karbouli: 3
5. Iraqi National List - Allawi: 2
5. Iraqi Tribes List – Sheikh al-Hayes: 2
5. Iraqi National Unity: 2
Babil (30 seats)
1. State of Law - Maliki: 8
2. Al-Mihrab Martyr List - SIIC: 5
3. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadr: 3
3. National Reform Party – Jaafari: 3
3. Civil Society List: 3
3. Iraqi National List - Allawi: 3
3. Independent Justice Association: 3
8. Independent Ansar List: 2
Baghdad (57 seats)
1. State of Law – Maliki: 28
2. Iraqi Accordance Front: 7
3. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadr: 5
3. Iraqi National List – Allawi: 5
5. Iraq National Project – al-Mutlaq: 4
6. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 3
7. National Reform Party – Jaafari: 3
8. Christian: 1 – through quota
8. Mandean: 1 – through quota
Basra (35 seats)
1. State of Law - Maliki: 20
2. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 5
3. Gathering of Justice and Unity: 2
3. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones - Sadr: 2
5. Iraqi National List - Allawi: 2
5. Iraqi Islamic Party: 2
7. Fadhila Party: 1
8. Christians: 1 – through quota
Dhi Qar (31 seats)
1. State of Law - Maliki: 13
2. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones - Sadr: 7
3. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 5
4. National Reform Trend – Jaafari: 4
5. Fadhila Party: 2
Diyala (29 Seats)
1. Iraqi Accordance Front: 9
2. Iraq National Project – al-Mutlaq: 6
2. Kurdish Alliance: 6
4. Iraqi National List - Allawi: 3
5. State of Law - Maliki: 2
5. Diyala Coalition – SIIC: 2
7. National Reform Party – Jaafari: 1
Karbala (27 seats)
1. Youssef Majid al-Habboubi: 1
2. Hope of Rafidain: 9
2. State of Law - Maliki: 9
4. Al-Mihrab Martyr List - SIIC: 4
4. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones - Sadr: 4
Maysan (27 seats)
1. State of Law - Maliki: 8
1. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 8
3. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadr: 7
4. National Reform Party – Jaafari: 4
Muthanna (26 seats)
1. State of Law – Maliki: 5
1. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 5
3. The People’s List: 3
3. National Reform Party – Jaafari: 3
4. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadr: 2
4. Gathering of Muthanna: 2
4. Independent National List: 2
4. Gathering of Iraqi Professionals: 2
4. Gathering of Middle Euphrates: 2
Najaf (28 seats)
1. State of Law – Maliki: 7
1. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 7
3. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadr: 6
4. Loyalty to Najaf: 4
5. National Reform Party – Jaafari: 2
5. Union of Independent Najaf: 2
Ninewa (37 seats)
1. Al-Hadbaa Party: 19
2. Ninewa Brotherhood List – Kurdish Alliance: 12
3. Iraqi Islamic Party: 3
4. Shabak: 1 – through quota
4. Christian: 1 – through quota
4. Yazidi: 1 – through quota
Qadisiyah (28 seats)
1. State of Law – Maliki: 11
2. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 5
3. Iraqi National List – Allawi: 3
3. National Reform Party – Jaafari: 3
5. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadr: 2
5. Islamic Loyalty Party: 2
5. Fadhila Party: 2
Salahaddin (28 seats)
1. Iraqi Accordance Front: 5
1. Iraqi National List – Allawi: 5
3. Iraq National Project – al-Mutlaq: 3
3. National Project of Iraq: 3
5. Group of Intellectuals and Scientists: 2
5. Iraqi Turkoman Front: 2
5. Front of Liberation and Building: 2
5. Salahaddin Patriotic List: 2
5. Brotherhood and Peaceful Coexistence: 2
5. State of Law – Maliki: 2
Wasit (28 seats)
1. State of Law – Maliki: 13
2. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 6
3. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadr: 3
3. Iraqi National List – Allawi: 3
3. Iraqi Constitutional Party: 3
SOURCES
Associated Press, “Iraqi provincial election results,” 2/19/09
Farrell, Stephen, “Election: Preliminary Results,” Baghdad Bureau Blog, New York Times, 2/5/09
Hamid, Nirmeen, “anbar’s Islamic party and tribes vie for power,” Niqash, 12/12/08
Madhani, Aamer, "In Anbar, new partnership are taking root," USA Today, 2/8/09
Rubin, Alissa, “Prime Minister’s Party Wins in Iraqi Vote but Will Need to Form Coalitions,” New York Times, 2/6/09
Al-Sa’dawi, Ahmad, “post-election analysis: real change or more of the same?” Niqash, 2/19/09
The other big winners were the Iraqi Islamic Party and its larger Iraqi Accordance Front coalition that came in first in Diyala, tied for first in Salahaddin, and came in second in Baghdad, tied for second in Anbar, third in Ninewa, and fifth in largely Shiite Basra. The Iraqi National List of former Interim Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi also had one victory tying for first in Salahaddin, and also coming in tied for third in Babil, Baghdad, Qadisiyah, Wasit, and fourth in Diyala, and tied for fifth in Anbar. That was much better than the preliminary results.
There were three new victors as well. The coalition Al-Hadbaa List won in Ninewa running on a largely anti-Kurdish ticket. Youssef Majid al-Habboubi, an independent Shiite and former Baathist won in Karbala. Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha, one of the leaders of the tribal Anbar Awakening won the most seats in Anbar.
The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) also did better than originally predicted. They tied for most seats in Maysan and Muthanna with the State of Law List, and also got second place in Babil, Basra, Najaf, Qadisiyah, and Wasit, third in Dhi Qar, tied for fourth in Karbala, tied for fifth in Diyala and Qadisiyah. They did finish a disappointing sixth in Baghdad after having controlled that province since the 2005 elections.
Independent Sunni parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Iraq National Project also did well for a small party. They came in tied for second in Anbar and Diyala, and tied for third in Salahaddin.
The Kurds were expecting to lose control of Ninewa and Salahaddin because of the larger Sunni turnout. They did, but their lists got the second most seats in Ninewa and Diyala. They got no representation in Salahaddin.
The Sadrists, former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s National Reform Party, and the Fadhila Party fared the worst of the major parties. Initially Sadr’s followers were said to have finished second in Maysan, Dhi Qar, Baghdad, and Babil, third in Najaf and Wasit, fourth in Basra and Karbala, fifth in Qadisiyah and Muthanna, and eighth in Diyala. When all was said and done they came out second in Dhi Qar, third in Maysan and Najaf, tied for third in Babil, Baghdad, and Wasit, tied for fourth in Karbala and Muthanna, tied for fifth in Basra, and no seats in Diyala. Al-Jaafari’s list tied for third place in Babil, Muthanna, and Qadisiyah, fourth in Dhi Qar and Maysan, tied for fifth in Baghdad and Najaf, and a distant seventh in Baghdad and Diyala. The biggest loser had to be the Fadhila Party however. Not only did they lose control of Basra finishing seventh, but they only did slightly better with two fifth place results in Dhi Qar and Qadisiyah.
Parties or alliances need to hold 51% of the seats to name the top positions such as governor, deputy governor, head of council, provincial police chief, etc. After the seat allotment was announced, Maliki’s State of Law list and the al-Hadbaa List came out with majorities in Basra and Ninewa. In the other twelve provinces ruling coalitions need to be formed. The talk is that Maliki’s State of Law list will form an alliance with Sadr’s followers, while the Supreme Council is reaching out to Allawi’s Iraqi National List. In Anbar, the tribes have formed a coalition with al-Mutlaq’s Iraq National Project to shut out the Iraqi Islamic Party from power. This after Sheikh Abu Risha joined with them in a coalition at the end of 2008. Salahaddin, which was formerly ruled by the Kurds had the greatest fragmentation. Ten parties finished with enough votes to receive seats at the council. In Karbala independent Shiite Youssef Majid al-Habboubi won the most votes, but because he did not run as part of a party or list he only received one of 27 seats. That left the independent Hope of Rafidain list and Maliki’s State of Law with the most representation with nine seats each. Habboubi could become governor, but the real powers would be with the parties behind him.
Below is a breakdown of the major parties that won seats, how they fared, and then how many seats were allotted by province.
Major Parties & Candidates
Awakening of Iraq and Independents – Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha. One of the leaders of the tribal Awakening movement in Anbar
Coalition of Diyala – Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s Diyala list
Fadhila Party – Ayatollah Mohammed al-Yaccoubi. Claims the mantle of Moqtada al-Sadr’s father’s movement
Al-Hadbaa Party – Coalition of four parties in Ninewa that ran an anti-Kurdish campaign
Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Moqtada al-Sadr. Sadr supported a group of independents that called ran on a nationalist, strong central government, and non-sectarian list
Iraqi Islamic Party/Iraqi Accordance Front – Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi. Main Islamic Sunni party that split apart just before the election. Called for a withdrawal of the U.S., and revising laws that are considered anti-Sunni like the DeBaathification policy
Iraqi National List – Former Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi. Appealed to nationalists and former Baathists
Iraq National Project – Parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq. Independent Sunni politician that ran on a secular and nationalist campaign
Kurdish Alliance – Made up of two major Kurdish parties, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Kurdish President Massoud Barzani, plus several other smaller parties
Al-Mihrab Martyr List - Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC). Islamic party formed in Iran. Ran on religion and federalism
National Movement for Development and Reform – Jamal al-Karbouli. Made up of former Baathists and insurgents
National Reform Party – Former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari. Broke away from the Dawa party
Ninewa Brotherhood List – Kurdish Alliance list for Ninewa
State of Law – Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s Islamic Dawa Party. Islamic party that ran on a nationalist and strong central government platform
Tribes Of Iraq – Sheikh Hamid al-Hayes. Led by one of the Anbar Awakening leaders
Youssef Majid al-Habboubi – Independent Shiite and former Baathist
Finishes By Party
State of Law – Maliki: 1st Babil, Baghdad, Basra, Dhi Qar, Najaf, Qadisiyah, Wasit, tied 1st Maysan, Muthanna, 3rd Karbala, tied 5th Diyala, Salahaddin
Iraqi Islamic Party/Iraqi Accordance Front/ Alliance of Intellectuals and Tribes – 1st Diyala, tied 1st Salahaddin, 2nd Baghdad, tied 2nd Anbar, 3rd Ninewa, tied 5th Basra
Iraqi National List – Allawi: Tied 1st Salahaddin, Tied 3rd Babil, Baghdad, Qadisiyah, Wasit, 4th Diyala, tied 5th Anbar
Al-Hadbaa Party: 1st Ninewa
Youssef Majid al-Habboubi: 1st Karbala
Awakening of Iraq and Independents – Sheikh Abu Risha: 1st Anbar
Al-Mihrab Martyr List/Diyala Coalition – SIIC: Tied 1st Maysan, Muthanna, 2nd Babil, Basra, Najaf, Qadisiyah, Wasit, 3rd Dhi Qar, tied 4th Karbala, tied 5th Diyala, Qadisiyah, 6th Baghdad
Ninewa Brotherhood List/Kurdish Alliance: 2nd Ninewa, tied 2nd Diyala
Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadr: 2nd Dhi Qar, 3rd Maysan, Najaf, tied 3rd Babil, Baghdad, Wasit, tied 4th Karbala, Muthanna, tied 5th Basra
Iraq National Project – al-Mutlaq: Tied 2nd Anbar, Diyala, tied 3rd Salahaddin
National Reform Party – Jaafari: Tied 3rd Babil, Muthanna, Qadisiyah, 4th Dhi Qar, Maysan, tied 5th Baghdad, Najaf, 7th Baghdad, Diyala
Fadhila Party: 5th Dhi Qar, tied 5th Qadisiyah, 7th Basra
Results By Province:
Anbar (29 seats)
1. Awakening of Iraq and Independents – Sheikh Abu Risha: 8
2. Iraq National Project – al-Mutlaq: 6
2. Alliance of Intellectuals and Tribes – Iraqi Islamic Party: 6
4. National Movement for Development and Reform - al-Karbouli: 3
5. Iraqi National List - Allawi: 2
5. Iraqi Tribes List – Sheikh al-Hayes: 2
5. Iraqi National Unity: 2
Babil (30 seats)
1. State of Law - Maliki: 8
2. Al-Mihrab Martyr List - SIIC: 5
3. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadr: 3
3. National Reform Party – Jaafari: 3
3. Civil Society List: 3
3. Iraqi National List - Allawi: 3
3. Independent Justice Association: 3
8. Independent Ansar List: 2
Baghdad (57 seats)
1. State of Law – Maliki: 28
2. Iraqi Accordance Front: 7
3. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadr: 5
3. Iraqi National List – Allawi: 5
5. Iraq National Project – al-Mutlaq: 4
6. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 3
7. National Reform Party – Jaafari: 3
8. Christian: 1 – through quota
8. Mandean: 1 – through quota
Basra (35 seats)
1. State of Law - Maliki: 20
2. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 5
3. Gathering of Justice and Unity: 2
3. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones - Sadr: 2
5. Iraqi National List - Allawi: 2
5. Iraqi Islamic Party: 2
7. Fadhila Party: 1
8. Christians: 1 – through quota
Dhi Qar (31 seats)
1. State of Law - Maliki: 13
2. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones - Sadr: 7
3. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 5
4. National Reform Trend – Jaafari: 4
5. Fadhila Party: 2
Diyala (29 Seats)
1. Iraqi Accordance Front: 9
2. Iraq National Project – al-Mutlaq: 6
2. Kurdish Alliance: 6
4. Iraqi National List - Allawi: 3
5. State of Law - Maliki: 2
5. Diyala Coalition – SIIC: 2
7. National Reform Party – Jaafari: 1
Karbala (27 seats)
1. Youssef Majid al-Habboubi: 1
2. Hope of Rafidain: 9
2. State of Law - Maliki: 9
4. Al-Mihrab Martyr List - SIIC: 4
4. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones - Sadr: 4
Maysan (27 seats)
1. State of Law - Maliki: 8
1. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 8
3. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadr: 7
4. National Reform Party – Jaafari: 4
Muthanna (26 seats)
1. State of Law – Maliki: 5
1. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 5
3. The People’s List: 3
3. National Reform Party – Jaafari: 3
4. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadr: 2
4. Gathering of Muthanna: 2
4. Independent National List: 2
4. Gathering of Iraqi Professionals: 2
4. Gathering of Middle Euphrates: 2
Najaf (28 seats)
1. State of Law – Maliki: 7
1. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 7
3. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadr: 6
4. Loyalty to Najaf: 4
5. National Reform Party – Jaafari: 2
5. Union of Independent Najaf: 2
Ninewa (37 seats)
1. Al-Hadbaa Party: 19
2. Ninewa Brotherhood List – Kurdish Alliance: 12
3. Iraqi Islamic Party: 3
4. Shabak: 1 – through quota
4. Christian: 1 – through quota
4. Yazidi: 1 – through quota
Qadisiyah (28 seats)
1. State of Law – Maliki: 11
2. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 5
3. Iraqi National List – Allawi: 3
3. National Reform Party – Jaafari: 3
5. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadr: 2
5. Islamic Loyalty Party: 2
5. Fadhila Party: 2
Salahaddin (28 seats)
1. Iraqi Accordance Front: 5
1. Iraqi National List – Allawi: 5
3. Iraq National Project – al-Mutlaq: 3
3. National Project of Iraq: 3
5. Group of Intellectuals and Scientists: 2
5. Iraqi Turkoman Front: 2
5. Front of Liberation and Building: 2
5. Salahaddin Patriotic List: 2
5. Brotherhood and Peaceful Coexistence: 2
5. State of Law – Maliki: 2
Wasit (28 seats)
1. State of Law – Maliki: 13
2. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 6
3. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadr: 3
3. Iraqi National List – Allawi: 3
3. Iraqi Constitutional Party: 3
SOURCES
Associated Press, “Iraqi provincial election results,” 2/19/09
Farrell, Stephen, “Election: Preliminary Results,” Baghdad Bureau Blog, New York Times, 2/5/09
Hamid, Nirmeen, “anbar’s Islamic party and tribes vie for power,” Niqash, 12/12/08
Madhani, Aamer, "In Anbar, new partnership are taking root," USA Today, 2/8/09
Rubin, Alissa, “Prime Minister’s Party Wins in Iraqi Vote but Will Need to Form Coalitions,” New York Times, 2/6/09
Al-Sa’dawi, Ahmad, “post-election analysis: real change or more of the same?” Niqash, 2/19/09
Friday, February 06, 2009
Early Returns For Provincial Elections
The early results for the January 2009 provincial elections are in. The Iraqi Election Commission claims they have counted 90% of the votes in the fourteen provinces that took part. There are two sets of differing numbers available, one from the New York Times, the other from Alsumaria TV. The numbers from the Times are used below because they seem more comprehensive.
Overall, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law list was the biggest winner. They came in first in eight provinces, Baghdad, Basra, Dhi Qar, Qadisiyah, Maysan, and Najaf, second in Wasit, third in Karbala, fifth in Diyala, and tenth in Salahaddin. The List did not win a majority in any of those governorates however. They did the best in Baghdad with 38% and Basra 37%. That will mean they will have to form coalitions with other parties to rule.
That could be the Sadrists, who lost control of Maysan, but came in second there and in Dhi Qar, Baghdad, and Babil, and third in Najaf and Wasit. Although Maliki launched military campaigns against them in early 2008, they both have a common animosity towards the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) that once ruled most of the south.
The rest of the Shiite lists had mixed results. The SIIC won no provinces, but finished second in Najaf, Qadisiyah, Basra, Wasit, Muthanna, and Babil, and third in Maysan and Dhi Qar. Former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari created the Reform Party after he left the Dawa. His best results were third in Qadisiyah, and then several fourth places in the south. Finally, the Fadhila Party lost Basra finishing sixth there. That symbolized their finish across the rest of the country.
There was also the Sunni Iraqi Accordance Front and its major party the Iraqi Islamic Party and the Kurdish Alliance. The Accordance Front came in 1st in Diyala and Salahaddin, third in Anbar, Baghdad and Ninewa, and a surprising fifth in Basra, a largely Shiite province. The Kurdish Alliance lost control of Ninewa but finished a respectable second there, and the same in Diyala. They did much worse in Salahaddin.
A few new parties and independents also emerged. The Iraq National Project, led by independent Sunni parliamentarian Mithal al-Alusi came in first in Anbar, third in Diyala and Salahaddin, fourth in Baghdad, and fifth in Ninewa. Alusi did better than former Interim Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi’s secular Iraqi National List. They did finish second in Salahaddin appealing to the largely Sunni population by criticizing American policies like the deBaathification law and disbanding the armed forces. Otherwise they had a lot of fourth place finishes in provinces like Diyala and Baghdad. Amongst the tribal Awakening groups in Anbar, Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha’s Awakening and National Independent List finished second, while his former ally now rival Sheikh Amid al-Hayes’ Tribes of Iraq finished a distant seventh. The mayor of Karbala City Yousef Majid al-Haddoubi carried Karbala itself, but with only 13.3% of the vote, while the Iraqi nationalist newcomers al-Hadbaa Party discussed before won in Ninewa, but with 38.4% instead of the 66% predicted by an American official earlier. That will mean they will have to join with their rivals the Kurdish Alliance to run the province. That might force al-Hadbaa to tone down their anti-Kurdish rhetoric or conversely freeze the entire process.
The next several weeks will really show what this election was about. The State of Law and every other List that took first place will have to find other parties to rule because none walked away with a majority of the votes. That could lead to joint governance where no single party will be able to impose their will, intense infighting that will incapacitate the process, or a mixture of both where parties will carve up the provincial offices much like the provinces and the central government are currently run.
The major parties and candidates:
Awakening and National Independents List – Led by Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha, one of the Anbar Awakening leaders. Aligned with Iraqi Accordance Front
Coalition Of Diyala – Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s Diyala List
Constitutional Party – Led by Interior Minister Jawa al-Bulani
Fadhila Party – Formed by Ayatollah Mohammed al-Yacoubi who claimed the legacy of Mohammed Sadeq al-Sadr’s movement, Moqtada al-Sadr’s father, after the U.S. invasion
Yousef Maid al-Habboubi – Independent Shiite mayor of Karbala
Al-Hadbaa Party – Coalition of four parties in Ninewa
Independent Free Movement List – One of two independent lists supported by the Sadrists
Iraq National Project – Led by independent Sunni Parliamentarian Mithal al-Alusi
Iraqi Accordance Front – Major Sunni list led by Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi’s Iraqi Islamic Party
Iraqi Communist Party – Led by Hamid Majid Mousa
Kurdish Allliance – Made up of two major Kurdish parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Kurdish President Massoud Barzani, and other smaller parties
Al-Mihrab Martyr List – Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council List
National Movement for Development and Reform – Led by Jamal al-Karbouli. Made up of former Baathists and insurgents
National Reform Party – Headed by former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari who broke away from the Dawa Party
State Of Law List – Headed by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s Islamic Dawa Party
Tribes Of Iraq – Led by Sheikh Hamid al-Hayes, one of the Anbar Awakening leaders
ANBAR
Iraqi National Project: 17.6%
Awakening and National Independents List: 17.1%
Accordance Front: 15.9%
National Movement for Reform and Development: 7.8%
Iraqi National List: 6.6%
Iraqi Unity: 4.6%
Tribes of Iraq: 4.5%
Group of Scholars And Intellectuals: 3.3%
Justice Movement: 3.2%
National Bloc: 2.3%
Constitutional Party: 2%
TURNOUT: 40%
BABIL
State of Law: 12.5%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 8.2%
Independent Free Movement List: 6.2%
National Reform Party: 4.4%
Iraqi Commission for NGOs: 4.1%
Independent Justice: 3.7%
Independent Ansar: 3.4%
Iraqi National List: 3.4%
National Unity: 3.3%
TURNOUT: 56%
BAGHDAD
State Of Law: 38%
Independent Free Movement List: 9%
Iraqi Accordance Front: 9%
Iraqi National Project: 8.6%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 5.4%
National Reform Party: 4.3%
Iraq Nation List: 1.6%
Fadhila: 1.3%
Iraqi Communist Party: 1.2%
TURNOUT: 40%
BASRA
State of Law: 37%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 11.6%
Gathering of Justice and Unity: 5.5%
Independent Free Movement List: 5%
Iraqi Accordance Front: 3.8%
Fadhila: 3.2%
Iraqi National List: 3.2%
National Reform Party: 2.5%
TURNOUT: 48%
DHI QAR
State of Law: 23.1%
Independent Free Movement List: 14.1%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 11.1%
National Reform Party: 7.6%
Fadhila: 6.1%
Constitutional Party: 3.2%
Iraqi National List: 2.8%
TURNOUT: 50%
DIYALA
Iraqi Accordance Front: 21.1%
Kurdish Alliance: 17.2%
Iraqi National Project: 15%
Iraqi National List: 9.5%
State of Law: 6%
Coalition of Diyala: 5.3%
National Reform Party: 4.3%
Independent Free Movement List: 3.1%
National Movement: 2.6%
Fadhila: 2.3%
TURNOUT: 57%
KARBALA
Yousef Majid al-Haddoubi: 13.3%
Hope of Rafidain: 8.8%
State of Law: 8.5%
Independent Free Movement List: 6.8%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 6.4%
Justice and Reform: 3.6%
National Reform Project: 2.5%
Fadhila: 2.5%
TURNOUT: 60%
MAYSAN
State of Law: 17.7%
Independent Free Movement List: 15.2%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 14.6%
National Reform Project: 8.7%
Fadhila: 3.2%
TURNOUT: 46%
MUTHANNA
State of Law: 10.9%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 9.3%
Jumhouriyoun: 7.1%
National Reform Project: 6.3%
Independent Free Movement List: 5.1%
National List: 5%
Gathering of Muthanna: 4.9%
Academics: 4.4%
Middle Euphrates: 3.9%
Fadhila: 3.7%
Iraqi National List: 3.5%
TURNOUT: 61%
NAJAF
State of Law: 16.2%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 14.8%
Independent Free Movement List: 12.2%
Loyalty to Najaf: 8.3%
National Reform Project: 7%
Union of Independent Najaf: 3.7%
Tribes and Sons of Najaf: 2.6%
TURNOUT: 55%
NINEWA
Al-Hadbaa: 38.4%
Kurdish Alliance: 25.5%
Iraqi Islamic Party: 6.7%
Turkomen Front: 2.8%
Iraqi National Project: 2.6%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 1.9%
TURNOUT: 60%
QADISIYAH
State of Law: 23.1%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 11.7%
National Reform Project: 8.2%
Iraqi National List: 8%
Independent Free Movement List: 6.7%
Islamic Loyalty: 4.3%
Fadhila: 4.1%
Development of Diwaniya: 3.4%
Iraqi National Congress: 3%
TURNOUT: 58%
SALAHADDIN
Iraqi Accordance Front: 14.5%
Iraqi National List: 13.9%
Iraqi National Project: 8.7%
Jumuaa: 8.5%
Scholars and Intellectuals: 6.6%
Turkomen Front: 4.8%
Salahaddin List: 4.6%
Taaqi List: 4.5%
Tahrir wa-Binaa: 4.5%
State of Law: 3.5%
Constitution Party: 3.2%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 2.9%
TURNOUT: 65%
WASIT
State of Law: 15.3%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 10%
Independent Free Movement List: 6%
Iraqi National List: 4.6%
Constituion Party: 3.9%
National Reform Party: 3.2%
Independence: 3%
TURNOUT: 54%
SOURCES
Abdullah, Muahmmed, “Diyala Sees Early Campaigning,” Niqash, 12/8/08
Agence France Presse, “Iraqi Shiite Factions Face Intimidation Claims,” 2/5/09
Alsumaria, “Iraq provincial elections preliminary results,” 2/5/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Dawlat al-Qanoon coalition dominates 9 of 14 provinces,” 2/5/09
- “MP accuses Kurds of ‘illegitimate’ campaigning,” 1/24/09
- “URGENT / IHEC announces 90% of election results,” 2/5/09
- “URGENT / PM’s list garners 38% of votes in Baghdad,” 2/5/09
Dagher, Sam, “Tribal Rivalries Persist as Iraqis Seek Local Posts,” New York Times, 1/20/09
Daniel, Trenton, “Pro-Iran party loses big in Iraq local elections, returns show,” McClatchy Newspapers, 2/5/09
Farrell, Stephen, “Election: Preliminary Results,” Baghdad Bureau Blog, New York Times, 2/5/09
Hamid, Nirmeen, “anbar’s Islamic party and tribes vie for power,” Niqash, 12/12/08
Al-Jazeera, “Strong poll showing by Iraqi PM,” 2/5/09
Lynch, Marc, “Iraqi Sunnis after the Awakening,” Abu Aardvark Blog, 6/20/08
O’Rourke, Brian, “Prime Minister’s Bloc Wins In Baghdad, Southern Iraq,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2/5/09
Rubin, Alissa, “Iraqi Prime Minister’s Party Dominates Vote,” New York Times, 2/6/09
Rubin, Alissa and Myers, Steven Lee, “As Iraqis Tally Votes, Former Leader Re-emerges,” New York Times, 2/4/09
UPI, “Maliki’s party tops provincial election,” 2/5/09
Visser, Reidar, “The Candidate Lists Are Out: Basra More Fragmented, Sadrists Pursuing Several Strategies?,” Historiae.org, 12/22/08
Overall, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law list was the biggest winner. They came in first in eight provinces, Baghdad, Basra, Dhi Qar, Qadisiyah, Maysan, and Najaf, second in Wasit, third in Karbala, fifth in Diyala, and tenth in Salahaddin. The List did not win a majority in any of those governorates however. They did the best in Baghdad with 38% and Basra 37%. That will mean they will have to form coalitions with other parties to rule.
That could be the Sadrists, who lost control of Maysan, but came in second there and in Dhi Qar, Baghdad, and Babil, and third in Najaf and Wasit. Although Maliki launched military campaigns against them in early 2008, they both have a common animosity towards the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) that once ruled most of the south.
The rest of the Shiite lists had mixed results. The SIIC won no provinces, but finished second in Najaf, Qadisiyah, Basra, Wasit, Muthanna, and Babil, and third in Maysan and Dhi Qar. Former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari created the Reform Party after he left the Dawa. His best results were third in Qadisiyah, and then several fourth places in the south. Finally, the Fadhila Party lost Basra finishing sixth there. That symbolized their finish across the rest of the country.
There was also the Sunni Iraqi Accordance Front and its major party the Iraqi Islamic Party and the Kurdish Alliance. The Accordance Front came in 1st in Diyala and Salahaddin, third in Anbar, Baghdad and Ninewa, and a surprising fifth in Basra, a largely Shiite province. The Kurdish Alliance lost control of Ninewa but finished a respectable second there, and the same in Diyala. They did much worse in Salahaddin.
A few new parties and independents also emerged. The Iraq National Project, led by independent Sunni parliamentarian Mithal al-Alusi came in first in Anbar, third in Diyala and Salahaddin, fourth in Baghdad, and fifth in Ninewa. Alusi did better than former Interim Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi’s secular Iraqi National List. They did finish second in Salahaddin appealing to the largely Sunni population by criticizing American policies like the deBaathification law and disbanding the armed forces. Otherwise they had a lot of fourth place finishes in provinces like Diyala and Baghdad. Amongst the tribal Awakening groups in Anbar, Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha’s Awakening and National Independent List finished second, while his former ally now rival Sheikh Amid al-Hayes’ Tribes of Iraq finished a distant seventh. The mayor of Karbala City Yousef Majid al-Haddoubi carried Karbala itself, but with only 13.3% of the vote, while the Iraqi nationalist newcomers al-Hadbaa Party discussed before won in Ninewa, but with 38.4% instead of the 66% predicted by an American official earlier. That will mean they will have to join with their rivals the Kurdish Alliance to run the province. That might force al-Hadbaa to tone down their anti-Kurdish rhetoric or conversely freeze the entire process.
The next several weeks will really show what this election was about. The State of Law and every other List that took first place will have to find other parties to rule because none walked away with a majority of the votes. That could lead to joint governance where no single party will be able to impose their will, intense infighting that will incapacitate the process, or a mixture of both where parties will carve up the provincial offices much like the provinces and the central government are currently run.
The major parties and candidates:
Awakening and National Independents List – Led by Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha, one of the Anbar Awakening leaders. Aligned with Iraqi Accordance Front
Coalition Of Diyala – Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s Diyala List
Constitutional Party – Led by Interior Minister Jawa al-Bulani
Fadhila Party – Formed by Ayatollah Mohammed al-Yacoubi who claimed the legacy of Mohammed Sadeq al-Sadr’s movement, Moqtada al-Sadr’s father, after the U.S. invasion
Yousef Maid al-Habboubi – Independent Shiite mayor of Karbala
Al-Hadbaa Party – Coalition of four parties in Ninewa
Independent Free Movement List – One of two independent lists supported by the Sadrists
Iraq National Project – Led by independent Sunni Parliamentarian Mithal al-Alusi
Iraqi Accordance Front – Major Sunni list led by Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi’s Iraqi Islamic Party
Iraqi Communist Party – Led by Hamid Majid Mousa
Kurdish Allliance – Made up of two major Kurdish parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Kurdish President Massoud Barzani, and other smaller parties
Al-Mihrab Martyr List – Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council List
National Movement for Development and Reform – Led by Jamal al-Karbouli. Made up of former Baathists and insurgents
National Reform Party – Headed by former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari who broke away from the Dawa Party
State Of Law List – Headed by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s Islamic Dawa Party
Tribes Of Iraq – Led by Sheikh Hamid al-Hayes, one of the Anbar Awakening leaders
ANBAR
Iraqi National Project: 17.6%
Awakening and National Independents List: 17.1%
Accordance Front: 15.9%
National Movement for Reform and Development: 7.8%
Iraqi National List: 6.6%
Iraqi Unity: 4.6%
Tribes of Iraq: 4.5%
Group of Scholars And Intellectuals: 3.3%
Justice Movement: 3.2%
National Bloc: 2.3%
Constitutional Party: 2%
TURNOUT: 40%
BABIL
State of Law: 12.5%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 8.2%
Independent Free Movement List: 6.2%
National Reform Party: 4.4%
Iraqi Commission for NGOs: 4.1%
Independent Justice: 3.7%
Independent Ansar: 3.4%
Iraqi National List: 3.4%
National Unity: 3.3%
TURNOUT: 56%
BAGHDAD
State Of Law: 38%
Independent Free Movement List: 9%
Iraqi Accordance Front: 9%
Iraqi National Project: 8.6%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 5.4%
National Reform Party: 4.3%
Iraq Nation List: 1.6%
Fadhila: 1.3%
Iraqi Communist Party: 1.2%
TURNOUT: 40%
BASRA
State of Law: 37%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 11.6%
Gathering of Justice and Unity: 5.5%
Independent Free Movement List: 5%
Iraqi Accordance Front: 3.8%
Fadhila: 3.2%
Iraqi National List: 3.2%
National Reform Party: 2.5%
TURNOUT: 48%
DHI QAR
State of Law: 23.1%
Independent Free Movement List: 14.1%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 11.1%
National Reform Party: 7.6%
Fadhila: 6.1%
Constitutional Party: 3.2%
Iraqi National List: 2.8%
TURNOUT: 50%
DIYALA
Iraqi Accordance Front: 21.1%
Kurdish Alliance: 17.2%
Iraqi National Project: 15%
Iraqi National List: 9.5%
State of Law: 6%
Coalition of Diyala: 5.3%
National Reform Party: 4.3%
Independent Free Movement List: 3.1%
National Movement: 2.6%
Fadhila: 2.3%
TURNOUT: 57%
KARBALA
Yousef Majid al-Haddoubi: 13.3%
Hope of Rafidain: 8.8%
State of Law: 8.5%
Independent Free Movement List: 6.8%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 6.4%
Justice and Reform: 3.6%
National Reform Project: 2.5%
Fadhila: 2.5%
TURNOUT: 60%
MAYSAN
State of Law: 17.7%
Independent Free Movement List: 15.2%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 14.6%
National Reform Project: 8.7%
Fadhila: 3.2%
TURNOUT: 46%
MUTHANNA
State of Law: 10.9%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 9.3%
Jumhouriyoun: 7.1%
National Reform Project: 6.3%
Independent Free Movement List: 5.1%
National List: 5%
Gathering of Muthanna: 4.9%
Academics: 4.4%
Middle Euphrates: 3.9%
Fadhila: 3.7%
Iraqi National List: 3.5%
TURNOUT: 61%
NAJAF
State of Law: 16.2%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 14.8%
Independent Free Movement List: 12.2%
Loyalty to Najaf: 8.3%
National Reform Project: 7%
Union of Independent Najaf: 3.7%
Tribes and Sons of Najaf: 2.6%
TURNOUT: 55%
NINEWA
Al-Hadbaa: 38.4%
Kurdish Alliance: 25.5%
Iraqi Islamic Party: 6.7%
Turkomen Front: 2.8%
Iraqi National Project: 2.6%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 1.9%
TURNOUT: 60%
QADISIYAH
State of Law: 23.1%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 11.7%
National Reform Project: 8.2%
Iraqi National List: 8%
Independent Free Movement List: 6.7%
Islamic Loyalty: 4.3%
Fadhila: 4.1%
Development of Diwaniya: 3.4%
Iraqi National Congress: 3%
TURNOUT: 58%
SALAHADDIN
Iraqi Accordance Front: 14.5%
Iraqi National List: 13.9%
Iraqi National Project: 8.7%
Jumuaa: 8.5%
Scholars and Intellectuals: 6.6%
Turkomen Front: 4.8%
Salahaddin List: 4.6%
Taaqi List: 4.5%
Tahrir wa-Binaa: 4.5%
State of Law: 3.5%
Constitution Party: 3.2%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 2.9%
TURNOUT: 65%
WASIT
State of Law: 15.3%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 10%
Independent Free Movement List: 6%
Iraqi National List: 4.6%
Constituion Party: 3.9%
National Reform Party: 3.2%
Independence: 3%
TURNOUT: 54%
SOURCES
Abdullah, Muahmmed, “Diyala Sees Early Campaigning,” Niqash, 12/8/08
Agence France Presse, “Iraqi Shiite Factions Face Intimidation Claims,” 2/5/09
Alsumaria, “Iraq provincial elections preliminary results,” 2/5/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Dawlat al-Qanoon coalition dominates 9 of 14 provinces,” 2/5/09
- “MP accuses Kurds of ‘illegitimate’ campaigning,” 1/24/09
- “URGENT / IHEC announces 90% of election results,” 2/5/09
- “URGENT / PM’s list garners 38% of votes in Baghdad,” 2/5/09
Dagher, Sam, “Tribal Rivalries Persist as Iraqis Seek Local Posts,” New York Times, 1/20/09
Daniel, Trenton, “Pro-Iran party loses big in Iraq local elections, returns show,” McClatchy Newspapers, 2/5/09
Farrell, Stephen, “Election: Preliminary Results,” Baghdad Bureau Blog, New York Times, 2/5/09
Hamid, Nirmeen, “anbar’s Islamic party and tribes vie for power,” Niqash, 12/12/08
Al-Jazeera, “Strong poll showing by Iraqi PM,” 2/5/09
Lynch, Marc, “Iraqi Sunnis after the Awakening,” Abu Aardvark Blog, 6/20/08
O’Rourke, Brian, “Prime Minister’s Bloc Wins In Baghdad, Southern Iraq,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2/5/09
Rubin, Alissa, “Iraqi Prime Minister’s Party Dominates Vote,” New York Times, 2/6/09
Rubin, Alissa and Myers, Steven Lee, “As Iraqis Tally Votes, Former Leader Re-emerges,” New York Times, 2/4/09
UPI, “Maliki’s party tops provincial election,” 2/5/09
Visser, Reidar, “The Candidate Lists Are Out: Basra More Fragmented, Sadrists Pursuing Several Strategies?,” Historiae.org, 12/22/08
Sunday, January 25, 2009
New Iraqi Opinion Poll On Preferences And Federalism Before Provincial Elections
The government run National Media Center (NMC) released another public opinion poll recently, this time asking 4,500 Iraqis on their preference for parties and their views on federalism. The results closely follow an October 2008 survey conducted by the Iraq Center for Research & Strategic Studies reported on before. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his State of Law Coalition got the most responses, while there was little support for federal regions outside of Kurdistan.
Prime Minister Maliki has fashioned himself into the most popular Iraqi politician, however two former leaders of Iraq closely follow him. The NMC questionnaire found Prime Minister Maliki’s Coalition of the State of Law had the most support at 23%, followed by former Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List 12.6%, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) 11.4%, former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s National Reform Party 11.3%, the Iraqi Accordance Front 4.5%, and the Iraqi National Dialogue Front 3.6%. When asked whom they wanted as Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki came in first at 23%, Allawi was second 17.7%, and Jaafari third 10%. It’s been widely reported that Maliki is popular with the Iraqi public because of his offensives against the Sadrists in Basra, Sadr City and Maysan along with his increasing use of nationalism. Allawi’s and Jaafari parties however, have hardly been mentioned in the English language reporting on Iraq. Allawi was the interim prime minister after the Coalition Provisional Authority returned sovereignty to Iraq in 2004. His Iraqi National List is a secular and nationalist one. Other Iraqi polls have found growing support for just such parties. Jaafari was the Prime Minister after the 2005 elections. He was originally one of the leaders of the Dawa party, but was replaced by Maliki in 2007 after coming under increasing criticism for the country’s decent into sectarian war in 2006. In June 2008 he announced that he was leaving Dawa to form the National Reform Party made up of his wing of the Dawa, independent Shiites, and some Sadrists. Jaafari has been working with the loosely organized opposition since then consisting of the Sadr Bloc, the Fadhila Party, the National Dialogue Front, and Allawi’s Iraqi National List.
The second half of the National Media Center poll asked Iraqis about their views on federalism. 72% rejected the idea. As would be expected, 78% of Kurds supported it as they have the Kurdistan Regional Government. 80% were opposed to the partition of the country, 80% were against autonomy for Basra, while 94% of those surveyed within Basra were against turning it into a federal region.
These results were very similar to an October 2008 survey conducted by the Iraq Center for Research & Strategic Studies. In that poll Maliki again was the most popular politician at 17.2%, followed by Allawi 16.7%, and Jaafari 7.9%. When asked what political party they would vote for Maliki’s Dawa Party came out on top 14.7%, and the Iraqi National List was second 13.3%. Don’t know 8.5% and no answer 7.4% were the next results, followed by the two Kurdish parties, and then Jaafari’s at 4.3%. Likewise, there were few in favor of federalism with 69.9% saying they wanted a strong central government, with only 17.7% saying they would prefer more power in the provinces. 70.0% said they were against forming another regional government outside of Kurdistan.
It should be noted that while these two polls show a realignment in preferences, and the collapse of the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance, they are both national polls. They may not transfer directly to the provincial elections where parties need organization and money to launch campaigns across the governorates to gain enough votes to win seats on the provincial councils. While its often been repeated that over 14,000 candidates are running in the upcoming election, few of these newcomers can compete with the Supreme Council’s two satellite TV channels, dozens of local channels and newspapers, five women’s organization, three student groups, and over 1,000 offices in the south. Maliki has shored up his popularity by forming Tribal Support Councils across Iraq. Allawi and Jaafari may not have the resources to match these two. What they do have going for them is the rising popularity of secularism and nationalism, and resentment against the poor governing by the ruling parties. How things turn out will soon be known when voting begins at the end of January.
Below are the results of the National Media Center and Iraq Center for Research & Strategic Studies polls.
National Media Center January 2009 Poll
What party would you vote for?
State of Law Coalition 23%
Iraqi National List 12.6%
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council 11.4%
National Reform Party 11.3%
Iraqi Accordance Front 4.5%
Iraqi National Dialogue Front 3.6%
Who would be the best prime minister?
Nouri al-Maliki 23%
Ilyad Allawi 17.7%
Ibrahim al-Jaafari 10%
Ideas on federalism
Opposed 72%
Kurds in favor of 78%
Opposed to partition of country 80%
Opposed to autonomy for Basra 80%
Basrans opposed to autonomy for the province 94%
Iraq Center for Research & Strategic Studies October 2008 Poll
Which one of the following person could make the most positive change in country?
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki 17.2%
Former Interim Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi 16.7%
None 13.2%
Former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari7.9%
President of Kurdish Regional Government Masooud Barzani 6.3%
President Jalal Talabani 4.3%
Don’t know 4.2%
Moqtada al-Sadr 3.8%
Vice President Adil Abdul Mahdi 3.6%
Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi 3.6%
Iraqi National Dialogue Front head Saleh al-Mutlaq 2.9%
Head of Anbar Awakening Council Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha 2.2%
Deputy Prime Minister Barhem Salih 1.9%
Prime Minister of Kurdish Regional Government Neachirevan Barzani 0.9%
Kusart Ali 0.7%
Ummah Iraqi Party Mithal al-Alusi 0.7%
Assyrian Democratic Movement Younadim Kanah 0.5%
Iraqi National Congress Ahmed al-Chalabi 0.5%
Iraqi National List Ayad Jamal al-Deen 0.5%
General Council for the People of Iraq Adnan al-Dulaimi 0.4%
Iraqi National Dialogue Council Khalaf al-Ulayyan 0.4%
Association of Muslim Scholars Harith al-Dhari 0.4%
Former speaker of parliament Mahmoud al-Mashhadani 0.3%
Who will you vote for in next election?
None 17.9%
Dawa 14.7%
Iraqi National List 13.3%
Don’t know 8.5%
No answer 7.4%
Kurdistan Democratic Party 7.2%
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 6.4%
National Reform Party 4.3%
Sadr Movement 4.1%
Islamic Party of Iraq 3.4%
Ummah Iraqi Party 2.5%
Anbar Awakening Council 2.4%
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council 2.4%
Iraqi National Dialogue Front 2.4%
Iraqi National Dialogue Council 0.9%
Islamic Dawa Party-Iraq 0.6%
Iraqi National Congress 0.4%
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Iraqi PM Calls for Strong Central Government,” 1/22/09
- “Iraqi PM’s Allies On Course To Win Provincial Elections – Poll,” 1/21/09
Associated Press, “Six parliamentary factions to coordinate efforts in Iraqi parliament, lawmakers say,” 6/8/08
Daniel, Trenton, “Iraqi candidates stumping for Jan. 31 provincial elections,” McClatchy Newspapers, 1/23/09
Iraq Centre For Research & Strategic Studies, “Public Opinion Survey in Iraq; The Security & Political Situation in Iraq,” October 2008
Hardy, Roger, “Iraq conflict thwarts PM Jaafari,” BBC, 4/21/06
Mohsen, Amer, “Iraq Papers Mon: Australian Troops to Depart,” IraqSlogger.com, 6/1/08
Shadid, Anthony, “Despite Discontent and Fragmentation, Islamic Parties Dominate,” Washington Post, 1/19/09
Prime Minister Maliki has fashioned himself into the most popular Iraqi politician, however two former leaders of Iraq closely follow him. The NMC questionnaire found Prime Minister Maliki’s Coalition of the State of Law had the most support at 23%, followed by former Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List 12.6%, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) 11.4%, former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s National Reform Party 11.3%, the Iraqi Accordance Front 4.5%, and the Iraqi National Dialogue Front 3.6%. When asked whom they wanted as Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki came in first at 23%, Allawi was second 17.7%, and Jaafari third 10%. It’s been widely reported that Maliki is popular with the Iraqi public because of his offensives against the Sadrists in Basra, Sadr City and Maysan along with his increasing use of nationalism. Allawi’s and Jaafari parties however, have hardly been mentioned in the English language reporting on Iraq. Allawi was the interim prime minister after the Coalition Provisional Authority returned sovereignty to Iraq in 2004. His Iraqi National List is a secular and nationalist one. Other Iraqi polls have found growing support for just such parties. Jaafari was the Prime Minister after the 2005 elections. He was originally one of the leaders of the Dawa party, but was replaced by Maliki in 2007 after coming under increasing criticism for the country’s decent into sectarian war in 2006. In June 2008 he announced that he was leaving Dawa to form the National Reform Party made up of his wing of the Dawa, independent Shiites, and some Sadrists. Jaafari has been working with the loosely organized opposition since then consisting of the Sadr Bloc, the Fadhila Party, the National Dialogue Front, and Allawi’s Iraqi National List.
The second half of the National Media Center poll asked Iraqis about their views on federalism. 72% rejected the idea. As would be expected, 78% of Kurds supported it as they have the Kurdistan Regional Government. 80% were opposed to the partition of the country, 80% were against autonomy for Basra, while 94% of those surveyed within Basra were against turning it into a federal region.
These results were very similar to an October 2008 survey conducted by the Iraq Center for Research & Strategic Studies. In that poll Maliki again was the most popular politician at 17.2%, followed by Allawi 16.7%, and Jaafari 7.9%. When asked what political party they would vote for Maliki’s Dawa Party came out on top 14.7%, and the Iraqi National List was second 13.3%. Don’t know 8.5% and no answer 7.4% were the next results, followed by the two Kurdish parties, and then Jaafari’s at 4.3%. Likewise, there were few in favor of federalism with 69.9% saying they wanted a strong central government, with only 17.7% saying they would prefer more power in the provinces. 70.0% said they were against forming another regional government outside of Kurdistan.
It should be noted that while these two polls show a realignment in preferences, and the collapse of the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance, they are both national polls. They may not transfer directly to the provincial elections where parties need organization and money to launch campaigns across the governorates to gain enough votes to win seats on the provincial councils. While its often been repeated that over 14,000 candidates are running in the upcoming election, few of these newcomers can compete with the Supreme Council’s two satellite TV channels, dozens of local channels and newspapers, five women’s organization, three student groups, and over 1,000 offices in the south. Maliki has shored up his popularity by forming Tribal Support Councils across Iraq. Allawi and Jaafari may not have the resources to match these two. What they do have going for them is the rising popularity of secularism and nationalism, and resentment against the poor governing by the ruling parties. How things turn out will soon be known when voting begins at the end of January.
Below are the results of the National Media Center and Iraq Center for Research & Strategic Studies polls.
National Media Center January 2009 Poll
What party would you vote for?
State of Law Coalition 23%
Iraqi National List 12.6%
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council 11.4%
National Reform Party 11.3%
Iraqi Accordance Front 4.5%
Iraqi National Dialogue Front 3.6%
Who would be the best prime minister?
Nouri al-Maliki 23%
Ilyad Allawi 17.7%
Ibrahim al-Jaafari 10%
Ideas on federalism
Opposed 72%
Kurds in favor of 78%
Opposed to partition of country 80%
Opposed to autonomy for Basra 80%
Basrans opposed to autonomy for the province 94%
Iraq Center for Research & Strategic Studies October 2008 Poll
Which one of the following person could make the most positive change in country?
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki 17.2%
Former Interim Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi 16.7%
None 13.2%
Former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari7.9%
President of Kurdish Regional Government Masooud Barzani 6.3%
President Jalal Talabani 4.3%
Don’t know 4.2%
Moqtada al-Sadr 3.8%
Vice President Adil Abdul Mahdi 3.6%
Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi 3.6%
Iraqi National Dialogue Front head Saleh al-Mutlaq 2.9%
Head of Anbar Awakening Council Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha 2.2%
Deputy Prime Minister Barhem Salih 1.9%
Prime Minister of Kurdish Regional Government Neachirevan Barzani 0.9%
Kusart Ali 0.7%
Ummah Iraqi Party Mithal al-Alusi 0.7%
Assyrian Democratic Movement Younadim Kanah 0.5%
Iraqi National Congress Ahmed al-Chalabi 0.5%
Iraqi National List Ayad Jamal al-Deen 0.5%
General Council for the People of Iraq Adnan al-Dulaimi 0.4%
Iraqi National Dialogue Council Khalaf al-Ulayyan 0.4%
Association of Muslim Scholars Harith al-Dhari 0.4%
Former speaker of parliament Mahmoud al-Mashhadani 0.3%
Who will you vote for in next election?
None 17.9%
Dawa 14.7%
Iraqi National List 13.3%
Don’t know 8.5%
No answer 7.4%
Kurdistan Democratic Party 7.2%
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 6.4%
National Reform Party 4.3%
Sadr Movement 4.1%
Islamic Party of Iraq 3.4%
Ummah Iraqi Party 2.5%
Anbar Awakening Council 2.4%
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council 2.4%
Iraqi National Dialogue Front 2.4%
Iraqi National Dialogue Council 0.9%
Islamic Dawa Party-Iraq 0.6%
Iraqi National Congress 0.4%
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Iraqi PM Calls for Strong Central Government,” 1/22/09
- “Iraqi PM’s Allies On Course To Win Provincial Elections – Poll,” 1/21/09
Associated Press, “Six parliamentary factions to coordinate efforts in Iraqi parliament, lawmakers say,” 6/8/08
Daniel, Trenton, “Iraqi candidates stumping for Jan. 31 provincial elections,” McClatchy Newspapers, 1/23/09
Iraq Centre For Research & Strategic Studies, “Public Opinion Survey in Iraq; The Security & Political Situation in Iraq,” October 2008
Hardy, Roger, “Iraq conflict thwarts PM Jaafari,” BBC, 4/21/06
Mohsen, Amer, “Iraq Papers Mon: Australian Troops to Depart,” IraqSlogger.com, 6/1/08
Shadid, Anthony, “Despite Discontent and Fragmentation, Islamic Parties Dominate,” Washington Post, 1/19/09
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
