The Future of the U.S. Military Presence in Iraq

This morning I attended The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) panel concerning The Future of the U.S. Military Presence in Iraq. It featured Kimberly Kagan of The Institute for the Study of War, Colin Kahl of The Center for a New American Security, Charles Knight of The Project on Defense Alternatives at the Commonwealth Institute, and Rend al-Rahim of the USIP. The panel was moderated by Daniel Serwer, also of USIP. Also in attendance was Marc Lynch, better known as the author of Abu Aardvark. Lynch reports:

To very briefly summarize, Kimberly Kagan laid out the familiar argument for the surge's success and the great progress being made, with more nuance and caveats than in some of her op-eds (but still drawing this from Colin Kahl: "I guess I see the glass half-empty, and Kim sees the glass as... overflowing"). Charles Knight gave a highly cogent presentation of the Commonwealth Institute's "Quickly, Carefully, Generously" report, arguing passionately that there will be no real political reconciliation until American military forces leave. Colin Kahl presented the Center for a New American Security's "Shaping the Iraqi Inheritance" report calling for "conditional engagement", arguing for the need to move away from 'Iraq centrism' (strategic interests actually exist beyond Iraq's borders, if you can believe it) and 'Iraq maximalism' (holding our policies hostage to outcomes manifestly beyond our capabilities to produce). Finally, Rend al-Rahim laid out a devastating depiction of Iraq's current situation, and - perhaps surprisingly - offered a wholehearted endorsement of Kahl's description of Iraq and policy recommendations.

Charles Knight spoke about the impact of the refugee crisis in Iraq: "The price we and others are paying for these blunders is not measured in blood and treasure alone – although these costs are already terribly high." He pointed to the Task Force report, which addresses one example of the extraordinary costs of the war:

There are now millions of refugees and millions of internally displaced persons, totally nearly 15% of the Iraq population. The displacement of a proportional number of Americans would mean: 45 million forced from their homes, the equivalent of emptying out the population of America’s ten largest cities. This happened under the American watch in Iraq. It is an immense failure for an occupying power; one we still respond to in the most "care less" of ways.

I noted that only two of the four panelists, Colin Kahl and Rend al-Rahim, used the phrase "sustainable security" in regard to the future of Iraq. In all my shaky earnestness, I got up to the microphone and pointed out this fact, and then proceeded to ask the first question in Q&A session:

"My question pertains to the ongoing process of securing peace in Iraq. In the opinion of the panelists, how is the future of peace in Iraq effected by the ticking time-bomb of 4.7 million displaced Iraqis, and what are the potential future effects of this deepening crisis, such as the unmet needs of those with no access to livelihoods?"

Rend al-Rahim replied that the dire conditions in which large numbers of refugees in Syria and Jordan live could breed radicalization, and therefore make refugees prone to taking extremist positions. Colin Kahl emphasized that clear and well-enforced property rights laws for returning internally displaced persons and refugees will be very important in securing a peaceful transition to regular life once refugees are resettled, but this will be a difficult task. Kahl also suggested that the IDPs be allowed to vote in the upcoming elections.

I applaud their recognition of the huge role that vulnerable refugees will play in the future and for understanding that the reactions of the displaced will have a huge impact on the future of Iraq and therefore should be considered when discussing America's role in the conflict.

Photo Caption: Panelists speak about the future of the U.S. military in Iraq at a forum hosted by the United States Institute of Peace

The Joy and Sorrow of Becoming a Baghdad Parent

There are so many emotions that run through a father's mind when preparing for the birth of his first child: excitement, pride, happiness, anticipation, and sometimes fear. Saleem Amer experienced this roller coaster of emotions in the days leading up to the birth of his first son, but in a way that most people could never imagine. Amer, a member of NPR's Iraqi staff, tells his story of getting ready to be a father in a time of war and the obsticles that he and his family faced.

Saleem began by looking for a doctor for his wife, but this was not an easy task since there are only two respectable maternity wards in Baghdad. The first doctor that he was recommended to had been killed a month earlier, the second had fled the country, and the third was Sunni and would not accept Saleem and his wife because they are Shia. When he finally found a doctor, he had to make a decision on the clinic where his wife would deliver the baby. He decided on the riskier option of taking her to the Sunni clinic because it was closer to their house and her doctor was practicing there.

A nurse at the clinic asked Saleem who would be accompanying his wife during the delivery, since the clinic didn't have enough staff to help during the birth. Saleem informed her that he and his brother, along with his mother and mother-in-law would all be there during the delivery. The nurse warned Saleem that it would be extremely dangerous for he and his brother to stay because Sunni militias came in at night and kidnapped Shia men. Saleem didn't know what he was going to do; should he stay for the birth of his son and risk being killed, or leave his wife and his new baby?

The day his wife went into labor, they brought clean water, antibiotics and painkillers, flashlights, blankets, and a small electric heater to the clinic. The clinic turned off its generator at midnight and did not have any clean water. Overcoming all of these complications, his wife delivered a healthy, ten pound baby boy with black hair and blue eyes named Yousef. Saleem explained that he wanted to leave before dusk, but changed his mind and decided to take the risk when he saw his wife and son being wheeled into the room. They bribed the nurse to erase their names off the registry and in case anyone came during the night, he and his brother would cover themselves with blankets and hide. The morning finally came and everyone was safe and asleep. Saleem explained that, "The most fearful night of my life was over; the night my son was born."

So many emotions ran through Saleem Amer when he was finally able to have a moment of peace and look at his son:

Why did I bring a baby into such a violent war? Could I ensure that my son would have a peaceful life; not a rich or unique life, just a peaceful life?

The waves of happiness of a father looking into his son's eyes were overcome by feelings of uncertainty, fear, and regret.

The humanitarian price of war is often missing in the political, economic, and military dialogue surrounding the conflict. The everyday reality of innocent Iraqis is very similar to that of Saleem and his family. The hope for peace and security is like a distant dream to many, and is often overshadowed by fear, violence, and uncertainty. Saleem explains that, "A day in Iraq at war is like a year in peacetime." Go here to hear all the details in Saleem's own words.

Partitioning Iraq- Davis Interview Part 2

This is the second part of an excerpt from an interview I recently conducted with Dr. Eric Davis of Rutgers. The first part can be found here and a full interview which focuses exclusively on economic development will be published by the Education for Peace in Iraq Center in a week or so. If you haven't read the first part, I suggest you give it a quick look before reading on.
---------------
Matteo: So I take it you would be totally against the soft-partitioning of Iraq?

Dr. Davis: That is a horrible idea. It is like saying let’s divide up the United States and put all the Italian-Americans in one part, all the Jewish-Americans another part, and all the Irish-Americans in third part. Then this huge percentage of the population comes out and says, “Wait a second. We’re Irish-Italian, we’re Jewish-Irish.” What do you do? Do you start cutting people down the middle? That is ridiculous. Why would we assume there would be less violence? I think this would lead to more violence. There is already violence between the Sadr organization and the Badr, and it was just seen in Amarah in the south a couple months ago. Once a central government is partitioned and weakened, the ability of a central, national army to come in and repress this violence is further compromised. Even if the partition was able to happen, it would add to the violence, not undermine it.

Matteo: As a result of the high level of violence many Iraqis are fleeing from their homes and settling in areas inside Iraq that are dominated by their respective sect. In other words, there seems to be a de facto partitioning occurring. How can we reverse this trend?

Dr. Davis: I think the capture of militia squad leaders and political criminals will have an effect like putting down crime in Chicago in the late 1920s and 1930s. Political stability will return and the economy will begin to function at some minimal level. At this point, many people will go back to their old neighborhoods because they had close ties with their neighbors and there will be no sectarian problems. It is really the militias that come into neighborhoods and start forcing people to leave. It is not the neighbors that go to a neighbor’s house and put a sign up. It is the militias that come and realize what sect lives in the neighborhood and what families that they want to get rid of. First they will deliver a letter to the door, and then they will knock on the door telling them in various stages to leave or be killed, and of course, the people will leave.

I don’t think we don’t know enough about this process. I think that not enough emphasis is being placed on the fact that in many of these neighborhoods, the former neighbors are protecting each other, not trying to benefit from the misfortune of one another.

Humanitarian Risk of "Operation Imposing Law"

The devastating human toll that has taken place in Iraq can be seen in dramatic headlines and photographs throughout the media today. The bombing that killed 135 people in a crowded Baghdad market was only one of the horrifying events that took place this past weekend in Iraq. The human suffering that is created by war is inevitable, but the question of proportionality and the protection of innocent civilians must be a part of the discourse taking place in light of President Maliki's new military strategy, dubbed "Operation Imposing Law." A recent article in The Washington Times has more details on this plan to combat militants throughout the country, but the basic idea is that Maliki will take the fighting to the insurgent groups.

Maliki explains, "We have no choice but to use force and any place we receive fire will not be safe, even if it is a school, a mosque, a political party office or home." This comment, even though directed at terrorist cells and insurgent groups, will also indirectly apply to civilians if carried out. In the build-up to the Iraq War, the concept of "Just War" was bandied about by both pro and anti-war groups in defense of their respective positions, so the concept is certainly open to much interpretation, but in pursuing "Operation Imposing Law," Maliki is completely disregarding on of its core principles: it is never "just" to target civilians (noncombatants), or places that are traditionally seen as civilian areas, like schools for example.

Customarily, schools, religious sites, and residences are off limits to fighting. Granted Iraq's sectarian violence is anything but traditional, but should the Iraqi and Coalition forces endorse this unethical means of fighting? Shouldn't they be the example for upholding the principles of engagement outlined in the Just War tradition? This must be done to uphold the human rights of Iraqi noncombatants. In doing so, the Maliki government will also gain some accountability internationally, setting itself apart from insurgent groups who do not regard these traditionally accepted humanitarian norms.

Maliki did later make a statement ensuring the protection of innocent civilian's human rights, while at the same time going after those individuals responsible for the escalating violence. The Washington Times article goes on to state that Washington was happy with Maliki's address and his committment to a sustainable peace. Even so, conflict based on sectarian lines has ensued. It is playing out between political parties and in the streets of Baghdad. The voices that are drowned out by the continued fighting are Iraq's innocent civilians, who are suffering the consequences of war.

Cutting Funds to the Militias and Insurgent Groups

Key to President Bush's new strategy for success in Iraq is the dismantling of militias and insurgent groups across the country. In today's Christian Science Monitor, Keith Crane, senior economist at RAND, discusses where these groups obtain their funding and suggests a "five-point plan" to starve them of these funds. He explains that, "if successful, this effort could give Iraq's government a fighting chance to curb the violence."

Militias and insurgent groups are funded by four primary sources: the smuggling and resale of gasoline and fuel, kidnapping and extortion, other countries, and Iraq government payrolls. Regarding the fourth source of funding:

"...anti-American Shiite cleric and Mahdi Army leader Moqtada al-Sadr controls the ministries of agriculture, health, and transportation. Mr. Sadr puts his militia members on the payrolls of these ministries in a broad range of jobs, including as members of the Facilities Protection Service (FPS)."

Given the fact that Maliki relies on the support of Moqtada al-Sadr to stay in power, it seems quite unlikely that he will cut funding to his militia. And yet lately Maliki has demonstrated that the Mahdi Army is not immune. Two weeks ago Iraqi security forces arrested 400 members of Al-Sadr's militia and detained a top aide to al-Sadr. Many have suggested that the 400 arrested were likely renegades not dear to al-Sadr and that the top aide was merely in the wrong place at the wrong time (he was not the main target of the raid), but either way it is a sign of progress.

Sunni insurgent group, on the other hand, receive much of their funding from reselling smuggled gasoline and diesel to several countries including Turkey and Jordan. The U.S. could really make a dent in this source of funding if it began pressuring the Turkish and Jordanian governments to secure their borders.

The question of funding coming in from other countries is one that also must be addressed. Some Shiite groups are receiving money from Iran, and there continue to be contributions made from Sunnis around the world and Baathist exiles to Sunni insurgent groups. An article today in The Australian discusses the economic pressure Saudi Arabia is putting on Iran, and the effects it will have on Iran's influence in funding Shiite militias. Along with UN sanctions on Iran and economic pressure being placed through the price of oil, the hope is that Tehran will no longer be able to fund Shiite militias in Iraq.

The current debate between Congress and the Bush Administration on the new strategic plan for Iraq should include dialog on steps the US can take to cut funding to militias. By doing this the US military, along with Iraqi military forces, will have a better chance in dismantling insurgent groups and preventing new ones from forming. If there is to be a sustainable peace in Iraq, the US should put pressure on the Iraqi government to take a stand against funding members of militias and having increased oversight over monies and what individuals or groups are benefiting from them. The steps that can be taken in reducing the influence of insurgent groups across Iraq, will also have the effect of creating greater accountability for the Iraqi government.

New Pentagon Report Released: Violence Up, Jobs Needed

The violence just keeps getting worse. According to a just-released Pentagon report, injuries and deaths among US and coalition forces in Iraq rose 32% during the period from mid-August to mid-October over the previous three months. The average number of attacks each week and the average number of people killed or wounded in those attacks were at their highest levels since the United States handed over power to the Iraqi government in June 2004.

The Pentagon report places much of the blame for this increase in violence on the rise of ethnic and sectarian militias and other armed groups. The report specifically refers to the militia led by Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr noting that it has replaced al-Qaeda as the biggest security threat in Iraq.

In terms of the economy, the Pentagon once again acknowledges the importance of job creation:

"High unemployment continued to feed sectarian, insurgent, and criminal violence. Although definitive data are not available on the actual unemployment rate, it has been an issue that has had a significant effect on the security environment. The Iraqi government, along with Coalition and international help, must create an effective strategy to provide jobs. This program must be seen as fair and non-sectarian by common Iraqis. It must produce tangible results for a plurality of Iraqis or it may decrease the legitimacy of the Government of Iraq and have little effect on the level of violence."

As I mentioned in an earlier post, the Pentagon has been proactive in this regard. For the past 6 months, the Pentagon has been going around and preparing to open approximately 200 factories located all over Iraq, including in some of the most dangerous cities. Oil production and electricity services are still hampered. The report also makes mention that reconstruction efforts have boosted capacity to provide drinking water to 5.2 million people. However as Justin Rood of TPM Muckracker notes, a GAO report released this past Friday claims that 60% of that water is lost due to leaking, contamination and theft.

Another interesting tidbit from the report: While most organizations, pundits and politicians have already adopted the term "civil war,"the Pentagon says the situation in Iraq is "far more complex than the term 'civil war' implies." It goes on to say, "However, conditions that could lead to civil war do exist, especially in and around Baghdad," and the Iraqi people are fearful of civil war.

Al Sadr's Group has Quit the Government (updated)

According to The Washington Post, a bloc of Iraqi MP's led by Muqtada al-Sadr has quit the government in protest to PM Maliki's meeting with President Bush in Jordan. Al Sadr had threatened as much last week though he later modified his statement to say that his party would "suspend" participation in the government. Not clear if the WaPo is accurate here.

update: AP is reporting that al Sadr's bloc has in fact only suspended participation in Maliki's government.
and again...: The WaPo has completely changed the article to reflect the postponement of the summit and now correctly mentions that Sadr's block has only suspended its participation.

Either way any dissent at this scale can only mean trouble for the stability of Maliki's government as it relies quite strongly on the support of al Sadr. And as I mentioned in an earlier post, al Sadr is becoming only more powerful due to his increasing popularity among Iraqis across the country. What's more, his military might has grown considerably, becoming more effective than the government's own forces. I am surprised this has not gained more attention in the media- I found this fact buried in a WaPo article about Kofi Annan- but apparently in the last year, al Sadr's army has grown eight-fold to about 50,000 men! The Iraq army currently stands at 134,000, however half are on stationary guard duty, and according to Iraqi officials, of the half that conduct combat operations, only 10 battalions- about 9,500 men- are at all effective. The U.S. will have quite a tough time of dismantling Iraq's militias with military force alone, with or without the help of the Iraqi army.

But is it too late?

Yesterday’s edition of the New York Times brings attention to a draft of a new counter-insurgency doctrine that is to be published next month.

"The doctrine warns against some of the practices used early in the war, when the military operated without an effective counterinsurgency playbook. It cautions against overly aggressive raids and mistreatment of detainees. Instead it emphasizes the importance of safeguarding civilians and restoring essential services, and the rapid development of local security forces…The new doctrine is part of a broader effort to change the culture of a military that has long promoted the virtues of using firepower and battlefield maneuvers in swift, decisive operations against a conventional enemy."

The document also states what Bush has been loathe to concede:

"Any use of force generates a series of reactions. There may be times when an overwhelming effort is necessary to intimidate an opponent or reassure the populace. But the type and amount of force to be applied, and who wields it, should be carefully calculated by a counterinsurgent for any operation. An operation that kills five insurgents is counterproductive if the collateral damage or the creation of blood feuds leads to the recruitment of fifty more."

Well it is about time. I cannot understand why it took this long for our military leaders to realize that strategies employed during major combat operations cannot be adopted when dealing with insurgencies or militias. I suppose it’s not too surprising considering the obstinacy of our government in regards to nearly ever other facet of the war, but I can’t even begin to imagine how many lives would have been saved and catastrophes averted, had the U.S. military adopted this doctrine to begin with.

But is it too late? Maybe I am being too cynical, but I wonder whether this shift in doctrine will have any meaningful impact. After all this is an entirely new doctrine. Won’t it take time to adequately train soldiers in it? That could take years.

I am relieved that the new doctrine explicitly states the need to build up local institutions and encourage economic development, rather than focus entirely on a military solution. It is by discreetly empowering Iraqi NGO’s, encouraging civil society initiatives and addressing the unemployment crisis that the U.S. will create the conditions necessary for it to withdraw responsibly from Iraq. We must not forget that Iraqis are the only ones that can offer effective solutions to the problems that plague them. We'll see how it goes.

Two steps forward...

In defense of the current state of affairs in Iraq one can always claim that at least the Iraqi people are better off now than when they lived under Saddam. However, as the New York Times recently reported, not much has changed for Iraqi journalists.

As if the threat of violence from militias wasn’t enough -130 have been killed since the 2003 invasion- the Iraqi government recently enacted a new set of laws criminalizing speech that ridicules the government or its officials. These new laws, some drawn verbatim from Saddam’s penal code, have been used to charge at least a dozen Iraqi journalists in the past year. The punishment for publicly insulting a government or public official can be up to 7 years in prison. In addition to this government crackdown, dozens of journalists have been kidnapped by criminal gangs or detained by the US military.

There is some silver lining to this whole story. The article goes on to say that despite these threats, Iraqi journalists have “achieved a new level of professionalism by working closely with Western journalists …[and] have become increasingly aggressive… Despite the danger, Falah al-Mishaal, the editor of Al Sabah, the government-run newspaper in Baghdad, said he enjoyed his job now because he felt like a real journalist. ‘Now, we are free,” he said in an interview in late July. “We can write whatever we want.’” But it may just get them killed or incarcerated.