When is a Nonprofit Scholar a Spy?

Here at EPIC, we work hard to report the truth in Iraq. We interview Iraqis, scholars and government officials, we rake through stacks of newspapers and magazines and page through blog after blog to bring you as much information as we can about the realities on the ground. But sometimes we take for granted just how lucky we are to work in a country that considers it our right to do so.

Yesterday, Iran's military intelligence formally brought charges of espionage and endangering national security against three American scholars, including EPIC friends Haleh Esfandiari, director of the Middle East Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and Kian Tajbakhsh of the Open Society Institute.

These are not spies. These are not even representatives of the U.S. government. These are nonprofit workers trying to improve the lives of Iranians similar to the ways in which we at EPIC are focused on Iraq. The charges against Haleh and Kian - which amount to capital crimes in Iran - are nothing short of ridiculous.

Please take a moment to read the defenses of Haleh Esfandiari and Kian Tajbakhsh issued by their respective organizations. We hope you will join us in supporting these scholars, and take action through Haleh's website and also through Kian's website to help us save their lives.

So when is a nonprofit scholar a spy?

When she or he operates under a government that arbitrarily says so.

Memorial Day and the Emergency Spending Bill

With what's happening in Iraq, it's hard to not feel the power of Memorial Day everyday. This morning is no exception as we receive news of 10 U.S. military deaths in Iraq and scores of Iraqi civilian casualties. Among the civilians dead: Khalil al-Zahawi, one of the Muslim world's most celebrated calligraphers.

There was some closure over the weekend. On Friday, President Bush signed into law the emergency spending bill for Iraq and Afghanistan. EPIC began preparing for battles related to the emergency spending bill back in November.

By late January, Congress received the President's initial request for emergency spending. While including nearly $100 billion for U.S. military spending, it only included $30 million to help Iraq's war refugees and $50 million for Iraqi-led development. In comparison to previous spending bills, the President's request represented a substantial cut in U.S. aid to Iraq.

In February, we helped form the Iraq Peace and Development Working Group (IPDWG), a community of more than 40 national organizations working to reduce suffering and conflict in Iraq. EPIC cochairs the working group with NETWORK, a National Catholic Social Justice Lobby, and active members include Amnesty International, Mercy Corps and Refugees International. Together, we've been working to:

• Help 2 million Iraqi refugees who have fled their country and another 1.9 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) who remain inside Iraq;


• Fully restore USAID’s Community Action Program (CAP), a successful NGO-implemented effort delivering assistance directly to Iraqis rebuilding their own communities; and


• Support the Marla Ruzicka Iraqi War Victims Fund (Marla Fund), assisting innocent civilians harmed in the conflict and the families of those killed in Iraq.

I am pleased to report that we are seeing results. Thanks to the letters and phone calls of dedicated EPIC members and the efforts of the more than 40 nationally respected organizations that joined our efforts, we got Congress to add $85 million above the President’s request for Iraqi refugee assistance, restore $95 million of funding for one of the few effective development programs in Iraq, and maintain most of the economic assistance requested – including funding to reactivate Iraq’s state-owned factories to rapidly create some jobs and needed stability. Although it’s only 1/3 of what EPIC and the NGO community asked for, it’s a start.

Now, we're gearing up for FY 2008 appropriations, preparing to fight for a more sustainable U.S. policy than emergency supplemental bills and ad hoc policies. Be sure to check back here for regular updates on our progress. To find out how you can make a difference right now, visit EPIC's website and add your voice to our ongoing advocacy initiatives.

NGOs Meet to Coordinate Advocacy on Iraq Crisis

Yesterday, I attended a roundtable strategy session tackling the challenge of Iraq's war refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Refugee Council USA hosted the gathering, which included representatives from operational NGOs such as International Medical Corps and the International Rescue Committee, as well as research and advocacy organizations Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and EPIC.

Being involved in this meeting of minds was exciting. The room buzzed with creativity, and each organization had a unique perspective to offer. I was particularly interested to meet Kirk Johnson, an advocate of resettling Iraqi refugees who worked for the U.S. and international organizations.

The roundtable kicked off by examining the refugee crisis in its current and future stages. Victor Tanner of SAIS, along with Bill Frelick of Human Rights Watch, highlighted important differences between the refugee policies of Syria and Jordan. The Jordanian government’s treatment of refugees has been hardline. As Tanner pointed out, Jordan sees the Iraqi refugee population as a threat to national security and even national identity. In a land of 5.63 million people, Jordan has 1.7 million Palestinian refugees (many living as citizens), 500,000-800,000 Iraqi refugees from the 1990 Iraq war, plus 700,000 to a million Iraqi refugees who have fled sectarian violence resulting from the 2003 invasion.

Syria has been more welcoming to Iraqis for a number of reasons. Syrians have a keen sense of Arab nationalism and feel a sense of pride about letting Iraqis into their country. In addition, Syrians have a diplomatic card to play, especially in relation to the west. But Syria's infrastructure will struggle to cope with Iraqis as they continue to enter the country at such an alarming rate.

Later, the roundtable focused on the U.S. and UK, which bear considerable responsibility for the displacement of Iraqis. These countries need to dedicate significant funds to resettling tens of thousands of refugees each year, and supporting Iraq’s neighbors and the greater Middle East with this crisis.

We also recognized that creativity and new approaches are essential. For example, Norway, one of the most expensive countries in Europe, has proposed turning its openings for refugees into money for resettlement elsewhere, money that will go much further in a country such as Chile, which itself has proposed resettling 100 refugees over the following year.

EPIC’s own Erik Gustafson talked about some of successful programs helping refugees, a theme brought up by representatives of Relief International, International Medical Corps and the International Rescue Committee. These relief organizations have implemented initiatives including management of mobile health clinics and school construction and rehabilitation. Although the issue at times appears overwhelming, it is important to recall that there are successes in the region and that the Iraqi refugees can be helped.

Who will be their champion?

A brighter future for Iraq is possible. But we need your help to generate hope.

Last week Erik wrote, "If Iraq were only populated by car bombers, death squads and the victims of both, then there would be no hope for change. Fortunately, Iraq has many brave souls struggling to make a difference in every sector of society. The problem is not that they don’t exist, but that the media rarely reports on their efforts."

That's where EPIC comes in. Through our increasingly popular Ground Truth interviews and new media, we’re educating Americans about the realities inside Iraq and promoting workable solutions for building peace.

But without you, we cannot sustain our efforts. Please make a generous contribution right now and help us raise $15K in May.

Through the Ground Truth Project, EPIC is advancing the solution-focused perspectives of Lisa Schirch, Eric Davis and other policy experts. We are amplifying the firsthand accounts of Iraqi aid worker Khaldoon Ali, Iraq War veteran-turned-advocate Jonathan Powers and other peacebuilders working against incredible odds. We are making their voices heard in the national media. And through EPIC’s blog, we are engaging thousands of readers in thought-provoking discussion about the future of Iraq and U.S. policy.

Despite ongoing violence, Iraq has dedicated doctors, teachers, aid workers and peacebuilders who are working hard to stabilize and develop their country. Their hope for Iraq is contagious, but their efforts rarely make the front page news. Without EPIC, who will be their champion?

Please help us to be a strong advocate for Iraq’s peacebuilders. Make a generous donation right now to bring us closer to our goal of $15K by the end of May.

Winning Hearts & Minds: Spotlight on Peacebuilders in Iraq

You've been reading a lot from Erik about how the media paints Iraqis as nothing but victims and victimizers, when in fact the situation is more nuanced. Meanwhile, an anonymous comment on my last blog astutely points out that we should focus on winning the hearts and minds of Iraqis rather than putting all our eggs in the basket of military solutions. Even newly-appointed “war czar” Army Lt. Gen. Douglas E. Lute said, in a May 16th Washington Post article, that "A short-term ‘surge’ would do little good [in Iraq] and any sustained increase in forces has to be matched by equal emphasis on political and economic steps."

Today, I'd like to tell you more about the people and programs that are winning those hearts and minds, taking those steps and, slowly, building peace in Iraq.

Yes, they're out there. You haven't heard their stories in the mainstream media but that doesn't mean their work is not having an impact. It's just that the most successful programs in Iraq are the ones operating on a small enough scale to avoid being targeted by insurgents.

But their small-scale successes are nevertheless impressive. Back in early May, I wrote about our conference on "Overlooked Successes in Iraq: Rebuilding communities, strengthening civil society, and advancing human rights despite the violence." Expanding upon that entry, here's more detail about three of the speakers.

Daniel Rothenberg is executive director of DePaul University's International Human Rights Law Institute (IHRLI), an organization dedicated to defending and promoting human rights through fieldwork, research and documentation, publications, and advocacy. Recently returning from his eighth trip to Iraq, Rothenberg has spearheaded the organization's efforts to advance human rights and rule of law there. IHRLI provides law training in Iraqi schools, encourages legal education reform, works on the Iraqi constitution and is running one of the largest human rights documentation projects in the world.

All this, as well as developing a plan for criminal justice reform, is done in collaboration with Iraqi partners integral to the success of all IHRLI's projects. "There are talented, educated Iraqis all over the country," Rothenberg observed at our conference. "The capacity exists. The people we work with are really excited. We have to keep a low profile for security, but it's not as hard to work in Iraq as one imagines."

Echoing Rothenberg's positive assessment of Iraqis was Bruce Parmelee, Middle East director of CHF International, who stressed the importance of community involvement in reconstruction efforts. CHF's efforts in Iraq are funded by USAID's Community Action Program (CAP) and are based on interacting with community associations to determine their needs and ways to best address them. CAP empowers Iraqi citizens to set their own priorities for rebuilding the infrastructure in their neighborhoods, towns and villages.

Parmelee recently returned from his twentieth trip to Iraq, and reported that "moving money is a challenge, as is getting around. But most of our projects are sustained and appreciated by Iraqis. We've gotten a lot of positive feedback."

Michael D. Miller, president of America's Development Foundation (ADF), helps run the Iraq Civil Society and Independent Media Support Program (ICSP) aimed at strengthening the role of Iraqi civil society to make democracy sustainable. The program coordinates between 18 different local governments and has reached 1900 Iraqi Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) all outside the green zone. And it is staffed by 275 Iraqis and only 12 foreigners.

"Our Iraqi staff members take big risks," Miller pointed out, "but they really want to be involved in change. They are passionate and dedicated despite the danger."

"Infrastructure development CAN take place in this environment," he continued. "Change can happen. The violence is committed by a small percentage of people, and we can't let the violence dissuade us. The Iraqis feel that way and they are willing counterparts. Not all of them are rooted to position; they are there for change. They want to identify corruption and throw it out. We owe all our success to the diligence of Iraqis."

EPIC applauds all three speakers for their dedication to the future and stability of Iraq. The experiences of IHRLI, CHF International and ADF all prove that when we listen to and engage with Iraqis, we can effectively work together to build sustainable peace.

The Silver Lining of the Supplemental

Yesterday, Congressional Democrats ended a nearly 5-month cold war with the Bush Administration by approving supplemental Iraq war funding absent a timetable for U.S. troop withdrawal.

The anti-war netroots at Daily Kos and practically everywhere else on the internet are now in a tizzy, declaring "if the supplemental bill passes, it most probably means that Mister Bush has all the money he needs to continue this bloody disaster for the next 16 months." Even the New York Times is riddled with language about how the Dems "relented" and made a "wrenching reversal."

But as Erik noted in his recent blog, the media has a curious affinity for black-and-white half-truths, and for declaring "game over" in the third inning. Congressional leaders will have other, better opportunities to duke it out on a number of funding bills in coming months, including Department of Defense Appropriations. Furthermore, there's more to this emergency spending bill than the timetable issue.

For starters, this is the first bill that begins to address the urgent needs of the fastest growing refugee and internally displaced populations in the world. It provides funding for lifesaving humanitarian assistance and protection to help those displaced by the conflicts in Iraq and Darfur. Secondly, it restores funding for development NGOs that have successfully partnered with local Iraqi leaders to help them rebuild their war-torn communities. Third, the bill provides some of the assistance that Iraq desperately needs for an economic and political solution -- something that neither troop surges nor withdrawals are likely to produce alone.

No, we didn't get as much as we would have liked, but EPIC and our Iraq Peace and Development Working Group (IPDWG) allies lobbied hard and won $85 million above the President's request for Iraqi refugee/IDP assistance and restored $50 million of funding for USAID's Community Action Program (CAP) and the Marla Ruzicka War Victims Fund.

Even if you're among the "support our troops, bring them home" crowd and you buy the Daily Kos' 16-month-bloodbath prophecy, you ought to know this funding is crucial for protecting our troops. As long as they're over there, the best way we can help them is by stabilizing Iraq through political, civil and economic projects. Employed Iraqis with ownership of and interest in community projects, such as those funded by CAP and highlighted in our "Overlooked Successes" conference, aren't strapping bombs to their chests and going after Americans. And what you may not have heard is that these moderates do have an influence on those who are causing trouble - popular support is key to movements such as Moqtada al-Sadr's.

The sooner we get moving on economic, political and civil solutions, the less justification this Administration will have for maintaining or augmenting troop levels.

Also present in the approved bill are benchmarks. We're planning a series of blog entries here giving you details on each one, but for now suffice it to say we've been calling for benchmarks for years. Of course, benchmarks on U.S. progress rather than focusing entirely on the Iraqi side of the equation would have been nice. But you know how it is in Washington - baby steps, baby steps.

The bottom line is that U.S. troop levels are just one part, one question in the debate over Iraq's future. The media needs to be careful not to over-focus on that question at the expense of the needs of the Iraqi people.

In the Media: When Agents of Death & Mayhem Get All the Press

Earlier this week I blogged about the tendency in the press to characterize Iraq as a "mission impossible" and "let homegrown terrorists and foreign fighters speak for Iraq using car bombs and death squads."

As I posted the blog, I heard the voice of Seven of Nine, Tertiary Adjunct of Unimatrix Zero-One (the abrupt, impolite borg crewman on Voyager who always spoke in short declarative sentences) demand: "Where's your data?"

Here’s a list of the 16 top stories on the New York Times Website - Iraq News:

May 23, 2007 - As Comrades Search, Fatal Bomb Wreaks Havoc
May 23, 2007 - Suicide Bomber Kills 15 East of Baghdad (AP)
May 23, 2007 - Democrats Pull Troop Deadline From Iraq Bill
May 23, 2007 - Iraqi Police Say Body in U.S. Uniform Is Found (AP)
May 22, 2007 - Gunmen Kill 5 in Ambush of Minibus in Diyala Province on Day of Scattered Violence in Iraq
May 22, 2007 - Attacks in Sunni Areas in Baghdad Kill at Least 29
May 22, 2007 - Baghdad District Is a Model, but Only for Shiites
May 22, 2007 - War Proposal Still Stymied Despite Talks
May 22, 2007 - Car Bombing in Baghdad Kills 25 (AP)
May 21, 2007 - 7 U.S. Soldiers Die in Iraq, 6 in Sweep of Baghdad
May 20, 2007 - Bombs Imperil U.S. Troops Searching for Captured Comrades
May 20, 2007 - Gunmen in Iraqi Army Uniforms Kill 15 in Eastern Village
May 20, 2007 - U.S. Force Kills Shiite Linked to Deaths of 5 Soldiers
May 19, 2007 - Talks, but No Breakthrough, on Iraq War Spending Measure
May 19, 2007 - Contractor Deaths in Iraq Soar to Record
May 19, 2007 - U.S. Forces Seize 6 Linked to Armor-Piercing Bombs

Since most Americans rarely read past the headlines, I used key words to tally the number of news stories devoted to agents of death and mayhem in Iraq vs. stories about more responsible parties.

Here's the score: 12 points for Suicide Bombers, Gunmen, Bombs, Killing, Imperiled Troops, and Deaths; 3 points for U.S. domestic politics over the emergency spending bill, and (Maestro, can I have a drum roll please…) 1 point for “Model Districts” in Baghdad (although only for Shiites, mind you).

Granted, Iraq is on fire from Mosul to Basra, especially in parts of Baghdad and Diyala provinces, but that does not let the New York Times and news media off-the-hook. The U.S. media ought to be reporting on both the people who are part of the problem as well as the people and events who might be part of the solution.

ABC News Loses Two Journalists; Iraq Loses Two of Her Finest Sons

Iraq continues to be the most dangerous assignment in the world for journalists, especially for local Iraqi journalists and media support professionals.

Last Thursday, ABC News lost two of its broadcast journalists. Unidentified gunmen in two cars ambushed and killed cameraman Alaa Uldeen Aziz, 33, and soundman Saif Laith Yousuf, 26, on their way home from the network’s Baghdad bureau.

"They are really our eyes and ears in Iraq," ABC's Terry McCarthy said of the contribution each made to ABC News. "Many places in Baghdad are just too dangerous for foreigners to go now, so we have Iraqi camera crews who very bravely go out … without them we are blind, we cannot see what's going on."

"Today we've lost two family members. It really hurts," McCarthy said.

Aziz is survived by his wife, his two daughters and his mother. Yousuf leaves behind his fiancée, his mother and brothers and sisters.

The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) reports that "at least 104 journalists, including Aziz and Yousuf, and 39 media support staffers have been killed in Iraq since March 2003, making Iraq the deadliest conflict for the press in CPJ’s 26-year history. About four in five journalist deaths there have been Iraqis."

In the Media: Declaring "Game Over" in Iraq Over and Over Again

When it comes to Iraq, the media loves broad-stroke narratives. In recent years we've watched the pendulum of U.S. media coverage swing from "mission accomplished" to "mission impossible."

Yet the reality has always remained somewhere in between. Iraq’s emergence from devastating tyranny, sanctions, wars and occupation was never going to be “a cake walk,” nor hopeless. The former has already been proven wrong, and the latter does a terrible injustice to all Iraqis as well as U.S. soldiers and international aid workers. It tells them we would rather let homegrown terrorists and foreign fighters speak for Iraq using car bombs and death squads, rather than listen to the needs and aspirations of the vast majority of Iraqis who abhor the killing of noncombatants and want to see an end to violence.

If Iraq’s population included only car bombers, death squads and the victims of both, then yes, the country would be without hope. Fortunately, Iraq has many brave souls struggling to make a difference in every sector of society and every city and province. The problem is not that they don’t exist, but that the media has a difficult time reporting on their efforts without exposing them to threats and attacks from criminal gangs and violent extremists.

Reading the broad-stroke newspaper headlines, sub-headers and captions these days, one gets the distinct impression we’re all presiding over the funeral of Iraq. Every day another nail is driven into the coffin. For example, here’s the blurb that the New York Times Magazine used to describe Nir Rosen’s ace reporting on Iraq’s refugee crisis: “Millions of Iraqis have fled their country, creating the largest Mideast refugee problem since 1948 -- and depriving Iraq of the very people who might have rebuilt it.”

Might have rebuilt it?! Yep folks, the gig is up. Iraq will never be rebuilt: time to throw in the towel and watch the country burn from a safer distance. Good grief!?

While we can all agree (save perhaps one lonely President) that the war in Iraq has created the worst displacement crisis we’ve seen in the Middle East since the formation of Israel, it’s a little premature to declare: “Game Over.” It’s far from over, and as we’ve seen time and time again in places such as East Timor and the former Yugoslavia, even the most hopeless tragedies can be transformed into brighter futures. Perhaps not in time for the 5 o’clock news or the next Presidential election, but eventually a brighter day will dawn.

As Ed Chigliak of Northern Exposure might have put it, just look at Tom Hanks in Cast Away. Lost on an island with nothing to keep him company but his volleyball named Wilson, you’d think the man would succumb to despair. But instead, at that pivotal moment of the film, he says to Wilson: "Gotta keep breathing, because tomorrow the sun will rise. Who knows what the tide may bring?"

Indeed, tomorrow the sun will rise. And who knows what the tide may bring for Iraq?

Talk Instead of Kill: Shia and Sunni Peacebuilders Reach Out

Two weeks ago, I wrote about Morton Kondracke's disturbing Roll Call piece in which he calls for a U.S.-sponsored Shia elimination of Sunnis within Iraq. I argued that even aside from the fact that such action would be morally unpardonable, it isn't necessary. The potential for peace in Iraq exists in the form of an internationally-mediated reconciliation between Sunnis and Shias, modeled upon the Dayton Accords which ended warfare in Bosnia.

An article in Sunday's Washington Post entitled "Iraq's Sadr Overhauls His Tactics," by Sudarsan Raghavan, provides further evidence that such reconciliation is possible. Despite the deep trenches of their differences, peacebuilders on both sides are reaching out for dialogue and an end to violence in Iraq.

Moqtada al-Sadr is a prominent Shia cleric known for sewing dischord and encouraging violence towards Sunnis. His Mahdi Army - the second largest armed force in Iraq, after the U.S. military - has been blamed for horrific atrocities, including torturing and mutilating civilians. But recently, Sadr has begun purging his movement of violent radicals in favor of popular moderates, and recasting himself as a Nationalist in the middle of the Iraqi political spectrum. Although Shia-initiated aggression continues, "at least 600 fighters have been forced out of the militia over the past three months" for violent acts.

Can a leopard change its spots? Maybe not. But a good politician such as Sadr is more akin to a chameleon, savvy enough to adapt his colors to changes around him.

The changes are apparent. While many Iraqis accepted Shia-led violence after the bombing of Al-Askari Mosque in February 2006, the Raghavan article sites increasing popular frustration with violent insurgent tactics as part of the reason for Sadr's change. The populist message carrying the most weight these days is summed up by Sadr's moderate senior aide Salah al-Obaidi: "No, no, to sectarianism," and indeed Sunnis and Shias are largely united against creating autonomous regions.

The sects remain divided on the U.S. timetable for troop withdrawal and other issues, and Sunnis remain understandably distrustful of Sadr's peacebuilding efforts and inability to reign in violent splinter groups. But the prognosis for peace improves every time a Sunni or Shia puts down a weapon in favor of dialogue. Explains Mithal al-Alusi, a Sunni legislator EPIC applauds for reaching across sectarian lines: "The Sadrists believe they have political problems, and they are trying new tactics to serve their own interests. But anyway, we welcome any political group who wants to talk instead of kill."

The fact that leaders on both sides are making an effort to talk instead of kill is a step, albeit a small one, in the right direction.

Iraq Study Group Gains Renewed Attention

A front page article in today's Washington Post opens: "After an initially tepid reception from policymakers, the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group are getting a second look from the White House and Congress, as officials continue to scour for bipartisan solutions to salvage the American engagement in Iraq."

Last December, EPIC championed the Iraq Study Group report as a bipartisan solution for responsibly moving forward on Iraq. Though the Group's recommendations were initially tabled by the congressional leaders and the Bush administration, we are pleased to see that Washington is finally giving the report the attention and consideration it needs and deserves.

As negotiations on the FY2007 supplemental continue this week, the White House seems poised to accept a measure to impose political benchmarks on the Iraqi government and reduce U.S. assistance to Iraq if those benchmarks are not met. This was one of the key recommendations included in last December's bipartisan report on Iraq, and now seems to be one of the most acceptable measures among both democratic and republican congressional offices.

Nearly all of the recommendations made by Iraq Study Group (ISG) are in accordance with the following goals that EPIC declared in 2003 as essential for peace in Iraq:

• Improve the protection of civilians and human rights
• Promote political participation, inclusion and reconciliation
• Grow Iraq's institutional capacity for security and the rule of law
• Improve government transparency and accountability
• Support job creation and Iraqi-led development, especially at the local level
• Increase international involvement and participation by civil society

However, while the report offers a solid top-down approach to achieving these goals, e.g. regional diplomacy, EPIC maintains that for this strategy to succeed the U.S. must simultaneously encourage development on the local level by increasing U.S. support for Iraqi non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and addressing the current jobs crisis. This bottom-up approach will strengthen the economy and secure the streets, which will in turn increase the likelihood for success of the ISG’s other recommendations.

The U.S., however, cannot be expected to bear the entire burden of these development projects. Through coordination with the International Compact for Iraq—the UN-sponsored framework for providing international assistance—governments, international organizations and NGOs around the world must aid Iraq’s recovery.

The Iraq Study Group has cleared the way for a more honest debate, and EPIC is pleased that the debate is finally getting underway. As the conversation develops, we hope that the President and Congress will soon realize the vital importance of community-based initiatives and economic revitalization to a comprehensive new approach to Iraq. Iraqi-driven peace and development must be the cornerstone of any new plan for the country.

Nir Rosen and the Exodus from Iraq

In the early 1990s, Nir Rosen used to be a bouncer at a club here in Washington DC. Interested in terrorism and what was happening in the Middle East, he met a DJ with similar interests. His name is Peter Bergen.

Years later, Peter would become one of the only journalists to interview Osama Bin Ladan. His 1997 TV interview with the man became the basis of a documentary and the bestselling book Holy War Inc. (Free Press, 2001). Nir Rosen would go on to become internationally recognized for his groundbreaking journalism on Iraq, including his time among the insurgents and tribal leaders of Fullujah and Anbar province. His book on Iraq is In the Belly of the Green Bird: The Triumph of the Martyrs in Iraq (Free Press, 2006), which made it onto EPIC's "2006 Best Books on Iraq."

Today, the Nir and Peter are senior fellows at the New American Foundation and
-- I suspect -- continue to keep up with Washington DC's great club scene. Nir's
latest work titled The Flight from Iraq was the cover story in last Sunday's New York Times Magazine.

Cosmically enough, the New York Times Magazine titled it "The Exodus." The name of one of the best clubs in DC in the early 1990s? You got it: Exodus.

But back to the here and now, millions of Iraqis have fled their country, creating the largest refugee crisis in the Middle East since 1948. As they flee, Iraq is being deprived of the very people needed to help rebuild and stabilize it. There are also fears that the sectarian conflict is already following them, transforming the war into a regional conflict.

Nir offers a cogent summary of the scale of the crisis, and he gets the interviews that only a reporter who's spent more than 2 years among combatants in Iraq can get. However I have one criticism, more for the editors of the New York Times than for Nir: some of the conversations that are a central part of the article are with Iraqi tribal leaders and insurgent/resistance leaders who are NOT refugees. Under international law, a refugee is a person who is outside his/her country of nationality or habitual residence; has a well-founded fear of persecution because of his/her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion; and is unable or unwilling to avail himself/herself of the protection of that country, or to return there, for fear of persecution. As you read the following excerpt, you can judge for yourself: do they fit the legal definition of a refugee?

Nevertheless, those same interviews are intriguing. They reveal clues to what a political solution to Iraq's civil war might look like in provinces like Anbar and Diyala, where there is a growing opposition to the terrorism of al-Qaeda and the "Islamic State of Iraq" (see The Story of Diyala and the Promise of a New Awakening). Here's a taste:

In Amman, I was reunited with Sheik Saad Naif al-Hardan, leader of the Aithawi tribe in Ramadi since 1995. I first met him in his village of Albu Aitha in 2004, when he was closely involved with antioccupation forces, refusing even to tell me how many men his tribe had, viewing it as a military secret. Sheik Hardan said he had been arrested by the Americans as early as July 2003, along with 85 men from his tribe. Since I last saw him, Sheik Hardan had briefly served in the Iraqi government (as minister for provincial affairs). But he spent most of his time in Jordan. "All the leaders of the Anbar are outside of Iraq," he told me. "In the Anbar, America is killing and Al Qaeda is killing."

Like many Sunni leaders, Sheik Hardan had grown pensive about the past few years. "The Sunnis left the political process," he said. "This is our fault. Sunni scholars forbade political participation." But not all had changed. "We all support the muqawama sharifa," he said -- the "honorable resistance," by which he meant to distinguish resistance warriors from the many armed people who attack civilians. "And I am part of it," he said. When I raised my eyebrows, he added, "With words." I asked if there was still an honorable resistance given the civil war that Sunni and Shiite militias were engaged in. "It still exists," he said. "You don't see how many Americans are killed in the Anbar?"

One of Sheik Hardan's companions that day, who served as deputy chief of police for Anbar Province under the American occupation, had survived numerous assassination attempts. He blamed them on Al Qaeda, which he also believed blew up his house. "Al Qaeda is not cooperating with the Iraqi resistance," he said. "The real Iraqi resistance considers Al Qaeda an enemy."

Sheik Hardan's refugee counterparts in Damascus told a similar story. There I met one of the leaders of the Anbar that Sheik Hardan referred to when he told me they had all fled. Sheik Yassin was a weathered and frail man with a thick white scarf over his head. He fingered black beads as we spoke. He led a mosque in the Anbar city of Hit but fled a month before we met and left it in the care of his sons. Hit was deserted, he told me. "The situation there has become disastrous," he said. "They hit my son's house in an air strike and destroyed his house and killed my grandson. The people of Hit are caught between Americans on one side and Al Qaeda on the other side. And the police and army do not treat people properly."

He, too, recognized the strategic Sunni error made at the beginning of the American occupation. "That is the origin of the problem," he said. "They boycotted. If they had participated with all their weight, they would not have let the Shiite militias take over the government of Iraq." He blamed the Iraqi Sunni leadership for denouncing elections and threatening those who participated. "They made the wrong interpretation," he said. "Shiites wanted to prevent Sunnis from voting, and jihadists did as well. The jihadists fight the Americans on one side, and on the other side they destroy the community. The only solution is if the Americans stop the Iranian interference." Sheik Yassin did not flee Shiite militias. He fled from Al Qaeda. "Sunnis must choose between death or seeking refuge in the Anbar, Syria or Jordan," he said.

Check out The Exodus (the article that is) and bring it to the club to share with friends. On Monday, The New America Foundation hosted a great event with Nir where I learned of his past life as a DC bouncer. The moral of the blog? You never know who you'll meet at a dance club, nor where such friendships can lead.

The Story of Diyala and the Promise of a New Awakening

So why are so many foreign fighters and homegrown suicide bombers blowing themselves up in Diyala? What do we know about Diyala?

Diyala province covers an area of 6,828 square miles (about 4% of the total area of Iraq). It extends to the northeast of Baghdad as far as the Iranian border. The province is drained by a major tributary of the Tigris, the Diyala River. These two rivers support a largely agrarian economy. Throughout much of the province are large groves of Date Palm. Diyala is also considered the orange capital of the Middle East.

Out of Iraq’s 18 provinces, Diyala is the 8th most populous. In 2004, it had an estimated population of 1.4 million people, mostly Sunni Arabs, with a sizeable community of Shi'a Arabs and Kurds [1]. By comparison, Baghdad province has an estimated population of 6.5 million and Niniwa province has roughly 2.6 million. However, these estimates don’t factor in the movement of more than one million Iraqis who have been displaced by the war since 2004. By many accounts, some of Baghdad’s Sunni Arab residents have fled 35 miles northeast to more homogenous areas including Baqubah (est. pop. 280,000), the capital of Diyala province.

Baqubah has emerged as the scene of some of the heaviest insurgent activity. It was just north of Baqubah on June 8, 2006 that a U.S. airstrike and subsequent raid killed the Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq. By late 2006, Baqubah and much of Diyala province were reported to have come under the control of Sunni insurgents operating under the rubric of the “Islamic State of Iraq.” On January 3, 2007 the previous Iraqi government in Baquba was reported to have fallen, leaving the city in the hands of insurgents.

Similar to what's taken place over the past eight months in Anbar, there are emerging reports of an Awakening in Diyala province. IraqSlogger reports:

An official in Diyala Province announced that more than 280 prominent personalities and tribal and military leaders have formed a “Baquba Salvation Council” to confront acts of violence in the province, focusing especially on combating the so-called “Islamic State of Iraq.”

Citing “resentment and anger among the tribal leaders at the conduct of these gangs,” the head of the new Baquba Salvation Council, Sheik 'Awad Najm al-Rabi'i, said the leaders were insistent on “declaring war against them and expelling them from the province and bringing security back to the citizens,” the agency writes.

The tribal leader added, “We are prepared to cooperate with the armed factions that maintain loyalty to a nonsectarian, non-partisan Iraq with the goal of rooting out these terrorist groups,” adding that the current situation in the province was “tragic” and saying that it was urgent that the government get involved to deliver the city from the control of “takfiris and tens of Arab and Afghan terrorists that hide in the agricultural areas,” al-Melaf reports.

Bill Roggio of the Roggio Report blogs:

Several tribes have banded together to form the Diyala Awakening and have vowed to battle al Qaeda. "Tribesman Sheikh Wameed al-Jabouri told al-Hayat that a number of tribes had signed a cooperation agreement to undertake this mission and to bring the city [of Baqubah] back to how 'it used to be,'" reports Deutsche Presse-Agentur. "The agreement could be considered 'a national charter' that proves their rejection of the actions of the terrorist groups, al-Jabouri said."

This second Awakening along with growing cooperation against al-Qaeda in Anbar might help to create a more hostile environment for terrorist groups to operate. The Salvation Councils of Anbar and Diyala may also lead to better representation in the provincial governments, reversing the Sunni Arab boycott of the January 2005 elections which most Sunni Arab leaders now acknowledge as a mistake.

Three years into their war, some were becoming introspective. In Amman, I was reunited with Sheik Saad Naif al-Hardan, leader of the Aithawi tribe in Ramadi since 1995. I first met him in his village of Albu Aitha in 2004, when he was closely involved with antioccupation forces, refusing even to tell me how many men his tribe had, viewing it as a military secret. Sheik Hardan said he had been arrested by the Americans as early as July 2003, along with 85 men from his tribe. Since I last saw him, Sheik Hardan had briefly served in the Iraqi government (as minister for provincial affairs). But he spent most of his time in Jordan. "All the leaders of the Anbar are outside of Iraq," he told me. "In the Anbar, America is killing and Al Qaeda is killing."

Like many Sunni leaders, Sheik Hardan had grown pensive about the past few years. "The Sunnis left the political process," he said. "This is our fault. Sunni scholars forbade political participation." But not all had changed. "We all support the muqawama sharifa," he said -- the "honorable resistance," by which he meant to distinguish resistance warriors from the many armed people who attack civilians. "And I am part of it," he said. When I raised my eyebrows, he added, "With words." I asked if there was still an honorable resistance given the civil war that Sunni and Shiite militias were engaged in. "It still exists," he said. "You don't see how many Americans are killed in the Anbar?"

One of Sheik Hardan's companions that day, who served as deputy chief of police for Anbar Province under the American occupation, had survived numerous assassination attempts. He blamed them on Al Qaeda, which he also believed blew up his house. "Al Qaeda is not cooperating with the Iraqi resistance," he said. "The real Iraqi resistance considers Al Qaeda an enemy."

Sheik Hardan's refugee counterparts in Damascus told a similar story. There I met one of the leaders of the Anbar that Sheik Hardan referred to when he told me they had all fled. Sheik Yassin was a weathered and frail man with a thick white scarf over his head. He fingered black beads as we spoke. He led a mosque in the Anbar city of Hit but fled a month before we met and left it in the care of his sons. Hit was deserted, he told me. "The situation there has become disastrous," he said. "They hit my son's house in an air strike and destroyed his house and killed my grandson. The people of Hit are caught between Americans on one side and Al Qaeda on the other side. And the police and army do not treat people properly."

He, too, recognized the strategic Sunni error made at the beginning of the American occupation. "That is the origin of the problem," he said. "They boycotted. If they had participated with all their weight, they would not have let the Shiite militias take over the government of Iraq." He blamed the Iraqi Sunni leadership for denouncing elections and threatening those who participated. "They made the wrong interpretation," he said. "Shiites wanted to prevent Sunnis from voting, and jihadists did as well. The jihadists fight the Americans on one side, and on the other side they destroy the community. The only solution is if the Americans stop the Iranian interference." Sheik Yassin did not flee Shiite militias. He fled from Al Qaeda. "Sunnis must choose between death or seeking refuge in the Anbar, Syria or Jordan," he said.

Another opponent of Al Qaeda was Sheik Mudhir al-Khirbit of Ramadi, a former leader of the Confederation of Iraqi Tribes. The Khirbits were favored by the former regime, and in March 2003, they told me, an American air strike on the sheik's home killed 18 family members, reason enough to seek vengeance. Sheik Khirbit sought shelter in Damascus but made frequent trips to Lebanon for medical treatment. The Iraqi government reportedly placed him on its new list of 41 most wanted, and in January, on a medical trip to Lebanon, he was arrested by that country's Internal Security Forces. His affairs are now being handled by his oldest son, Sattam, who is only 18 but, according to one Western diplomat, had his father's trust and went on missions for him. I found him in a Damascus apartment. He was in a gray suit and wearing pointy leather shoes and taking business calls from sheiks well into the night. Sattam had a few days of stubble on his tired face.

In 2004, when he was 15, Sattam and an uncle were arrested in an American military raid on their home. He called the initial Sunni boycott of Iraqi politics "a big mistake" that opened the door to Shiite domination. "Now it's too late," he said. "People here, and in Amman, feel like they lost." In Sattam's view, the only way to protect Sunnis was a Sunni state that would include Anbar Province, Mosul and Tikrit. But radicals like Al Qaeda were now in control of Anbar Province, and the resistance was finding it hard to resist Al Qaeda. "Al Qaeda kills Sunnis the most, and you don't know what they want," he said. His priority was to deal with Al Qaeda in the Anbar first, then reconcile with the Shiites and then work to end the occupation. "When Sunnis in Baghdad get arrested by the Americans they feel good because it's better than being arrested by Shiite militias." Despite this, he did not show hostility to the Shiites. "My father doesn't differentiate between Sunnis, Shiites and Christians," he said. "We don't have anything against Shiites. Shiites didn't kill 18 people from our family, the Americans did."

Suicide Bombings shift from Anbar to Diyala

On May Day, I came across a smugly penned speech by New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman. He had written an apology and a warning for Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to deliver to Arab and Muslim nations on behalf of President Bush and the American people.

The apology: “I’m sorry that I rushed into the invasion of Iraq... I was wrong, and I now realize that in unilaterally launching the war the way I did,... Not only did that alienate you from us, it made us less effective in Iraq. We had too few allies and too little legitimacy. I’m most sorry, though, because my bungling of the war has prompted all of us to take our eye off the ball. I messed up the treatment so badly that people have forgotten the patient really does have a disease.”

The warning: “We are being defeated by nihilistic Islamist suicide bombers, who are proliferating across the Muslim world. We are losing to people who blow up mosques, markets, hospital emergency wards and girls’ schools.”

Friedman then detailed the rise of suicide bombings in Iraq and the region, including what he believes to be the handy work of “12 suicide bombers in a little over a week.” The man is definitely a columnist, not an academic -- in other words, imminently readable yet imprecise.

With the help of EPIC Spring intern Dominique Arvanitis, I tracked down the details of the “suicide bombings” that Friedman listed, to see where al-Qaeda and its allies have been focusing their attacks lately. All of the bombings Friedman writes about occurred from April 18th to April 30th, although the wave of car bombings in Baghdad on April 18th that killed 191 people and wounded 250 may not qualify as "suicide attacks." While al-Qaeda may have been involved, it may have not required foreign fighters or homegrown militants committing suicide.

So here are details of the only 6 confirmed suicide attacks that occurred during the last 13 days of April:

On April 23rd in Diyala Province, a pair of suicide bombers detonated explosive-packed dump trucks outside a U.S. patrol base, killing nine U.S. soldiers.

On April 25th, not far away in Balad Ruz, a suicide bomber killed four Iraqi policemen.

On April 26th in the Diyala town of Khalis, a suicide car bomber rammed an Iraqi checkpoint killing nine soldiers. On the same day in Zamar, a town just west of Mosul, two suicide car bombers attacked the local headquarters of the Kurdistan Democratic Party killing five people.

On April 30th, Khalis suffered a second attack. A suicide bomber walked into a crowded funeral tent and blew himself up, killing 32 mourners. The funeral was for the son of a Shi'ite family who had been killed by gunmen.

That's 6 suicide attacks carried out by 7 suicide bombers, killing 59 people in one week and a day. All but one of those suicide attacks took place in Diyala province.

So why are there noticeably less suicide bombings taking place in Baghdad or in the predominantly Sunni Arab cities of Fallujah, Ramadi, and Samarra? Last year, there were plenty of suicide bombings throughout the country. Why are most occurring in Diyala now?

It can be partly explained by the increasing difficultly al-Qaeda is finding in trying to operate in much of Baghdad and Anbar provinces. Following President Bush’s announcement in January of a “military surge,” the recruitment of foreign fighters picked up in response. The New York Times reports: “…Iraqi intelligence had concluded that Al Qaeda was in effect surging at the same time in Iraq to counteract the American program, damping any immediate gains.”

So what’s a terrorist organization got to do with so many would-be suicide bombers including the variety from Zarqa, Jordan (see Emily’s May 10th post Radicalization Spillover). The result has been increasingly ruthless and abhorrent bombings of innocent civilians, some even involving the use of trucks filled with chlorine gas.

That has led to a backlash particularly in Anbar province. Washington Post columnist David Ignatius writes:

In al-Qaeda's stronghold of Anbar province, tribal leaders have begun allying with American forces against the Sunni terrorists. According to Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno, who commands day-to-day military operations in Iraq, there were just 60 attacks in Anbar last week, compared with 480 per week a year ago.

The tribal leaders formed the Anbar Salvation Council in fall 2006 to fight al-Qa'ida. Also called the Anbar Awakening, the coalition began with dozens of tribes and now boasts more than 40 tribes or sub-tribes from Anbar. The Sunni Arab leader of the movement, Sheik Abdul Sattar al-Rishawi, lost his father and three brothers to al-Qaida assassins. AP quotes al-Rishawi as saying insurgents were "killing innocent people, anyone suspected of opposing them. They brought us nothing but destruction and we finally said, enough is enough."

Early this year, as the council gained new tribal members and strength, cooperation with U.S. forces began to improve especially in and around Ramadi, Anbar's provincial council. Last month I talked with a Marine fellow in Senator Reed's office who served in Ramadi two years ago. He stays in touch with fellow Marines, including men serving there right now who confirm a remarkable turnaround in Ramadi.

Bayan Jabr and the Chilling Gangs of Iraq

So you know those daily news reports you see about mutilated bodies being found and catastrophic bombings? Well it’s not random.

The choice of “soft targets” like markets -- often selected to maximize civilian casualties -- and attacks against a specific community like the Iraqi Shi’ite Muslims of Sadr City in eastern Baghdad are by design, intended to provoke the genocidal passions of civil war. And unfortunately it often works. The more provocative the attacks, the more difficult it can be to contain the retaliatory violence.

Look what happened on November 23, 2006 and the day after. A series of six car bombs and at least two mortars ripped through Sadr City, killing at least 215 Iraqis and injured another 257. The next morning, Shi’ite militiamen retaliated by carrying out extrajudicial killings of dozens of Sunni Muslims. CBS/AP reported militia men dousing 6 Sunni Muslims in kerosene and burning them alive, and the Abu Hanifa mosque, Baghdad’s holiest Sunni Muslim shrine, came under mortar attack.

An escalating cycle of tit-for-tat violence in Iraq and a loss of public confidence here at home clearly led President Bush to reach for a “change in strategy.” Previously for years, the “we will stand down as the Iraqis stand up” mantra defined the Bush/Rumsfeld approach to achieving “victory.” But they failed to recognize the growing pressures of sectarian politics and civil war, or reverse the decisions (particularly by the unrepentant L. Paul Bremer) that ratcheted up those pressures.

There is no better documentary to see all of these disastrous consequences in full display than Gangs of Iraq, a joint production of FRONTLINE and the America at a Crossroads series. I’ve been talking with our NGO colleagues in Washington about showing the one-hour film, which I also recommend for college campuses and communities. You can watch it online here.

Here’s the opening lines of the transcript:

ANNOUNCER: In a divided country, America set out to train Iraqi forces.
NIR ROSEN, Author and Journalist: They were loyal
to Moqtada al Sadr, to Abdul Aziz Hakim, but not to the Iraqi state and not to
anybody in the Green Zone.
ANNOUNCER: Now Iraq is even more divided.
DEXTER FILKINS, New York Times Baghdad Bureau, 2003-06: We started hearing reports of death squads, kidnapping rings, extrajudicial killings.
ANNOUNCER: And less secure.
MATT SHERMAN, Ministry of Interior Adviser, 2003-05: My
fear is that what we're doing is equipping Iraqis for civil war.

Particularly chilling is the interview with Bayan Jabr, a top deputy in the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), a major Shi'ite political party originally sponsored by Tehran. After his appointment as Minister of Interior following the January 2005 elections, he began staffing commando units with Badr Corps commanders. Soon after, there were reports of death squads operating out of the Interior Ministry. By November 2006, U.S. forces began discovering torture chambers in buildings run by the Interior Ministry. It’s impossible to watch Jabr flagrantly deny all of these reports including the eyewitness accounts of our troops and the bona fide testimonials of torture survivors without shouting at him.

If you only have time to watch one 10-minute chapter, watch chapter four which includes the Jabr interview.

Injury and Insult: How the U.S. is Failing Iraqi Civilians

Back in April, we told you about EPIC's partnership with the Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict (CIVIC) and the legacy of CIVIC's founder, Marla Ruzicka. Marla was a great champion for innocent civilian victims of U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, advocating proper compensation for their families. Tragically, she was killed by a suicide bomber in 2005, at the age of 29.

Following her death, Congress established the Marla Ruzicka Iraqi War Victims Fund, giving money to small, community-based projects assisting families directly affected by U.S. and coalition actions. Meanwhile, CIVIC continues Marla's work, and we have teamed with them in promoting the Cluster Munitions Civilian Protection Act (S.594). This act would prohibit the use of U.S.-made cluster bombs in civilian areas, where they cause untold devastation.

However, even with these steps forward, an article in today's New York Times entitled "Sometimes in War, You Can Put a Price on Life," by Jon Tracy, proves we still have a long way to go in protecting and compensating civilian victims of U.S. aggression.

Tracy, a military lawyer who spent 14 months working with Iraqis claiming various combat- and non-combat-related injuries, points to the shocking Pentagon failure to adequately compensate Iraqis for deaths and injuries clearly resulting from the wrongdoing of U.S. forces.

In 2005, 24 civilians were massacred in Haditha at the hands of U.S. troops, and their families received only about $1,500 each. Just last year, a teenage girl in Mahmudiya was raped and then murdered along with her family. Their relatives received nothing, despite two U.S. soldiers confessing to the crimes. (read EPIC's statement on this tragedy here.)

In contrast, consider that the 9/11 Victims Compensation Fund awarded an average of $1.8 million per family of each victim. Do we really believe Iraqi lives are worth that much less than those of Americans?

What disturbs Tracy more than the meager amounts being offered is the fact that it is in the form of condolence payments rather than official compensation under the Foreign Claims Act. The latter acknowledges wrongdoing, while the former considers the incident an accident of war. "Imagine the feelings of the families...devastated because a foreign soldier has brutalized a loved one, and then the military grossly insults them by offering a token sum with no acknowledgment of the egregious wrongs committed."

Adding insult to injury in this way breeds even more resentment in the Middle East and further damages U.S. credibility abroad. We can and must do more to fulfill the legacy of Marla Ruzicka, and properly compensate and protect innocent Iraqi civilians.

The Economic Solution

In my last blog, I concluded that any real Iraqi reconstruction effort must focus on three elements: civil society, government reform, and economic development. Today I'd like to expand upon the economic dimension: What must a successful economic reconstruction strategy entail?

To answer this question, I refer you to EPIC's Ground Truth interview with Eric Davis (pdf), professor of political science and Center for Middle East Studies director at Rutgers University. Prof. Davis proposes a three-staged plan for economic development in Iraq:

1. Create jobs in Iraq immediately, using the New Deal as a model. Recreating the National Recovery Administration and Works Progress Administration would create the temporary jobs Iraq needs to put money in peoples' pockets, get them off the street and provide the basic services - such as sewage cleanup - that are essential to health and infrastructure in the short term.
   
   
2. Engage local leaders/businesses in communities to develop sustainable industries and services. Every report of successful programs emphasizes the necessity of involving local level Iraqis so they will have a vested interest in the outcome. You'll have to read Prof. Davis' example of the "temporary housing industry" in Iraq, which creates makeshift shelters out of palm fronds and is in such high demand it actually can't find enough workers. With the investments of local leaders, such programs could provide hundreds more jobs.
   
   
3. Establish middle-range business and service projects, including oil refineries ad construction projects. The model here would be the Iraqi-American Chamber of Commerce and Industry, which focuses on sewage and electricity and has met with success to scale in several regions.

The overall message Prof. Davis communicated in our interview was that of a "bottom-up" approach to Iraqi reconstruction. Top-down strategies just won't work; large-scale programs empirically aren't completed or are attacked by insurgents. But NGOs and even U.S. government-sponsored programs working with Iraqis in hands-on projects focused on putting people to work are the ones EPIC and Prof. Davis can point to with hope for a better, stronger Iraqi economy.

Seriously - go back and check out the interview for all the details about successful economic programs in Iraq and why they work. It's an incredibly insightful read.

Successes in Iraq: How NGOs and Iraqis are Building Peace Together

Is anything actually going right in Iraq?

If you listen to the mainstream media, you might think the country has nothing going aside from violence, hatred, corruption, squabbling and failure. But the reality on the ground is that several institutions - including Depaul University's International Human Rights Law Institute (IHRLI), CHF International, and the American Development Foundation's Iraq Civil Society and Independent Media Support Program (ICSP) - are seeing success in helping Iraqis strengthen civil society, improve their economy, and advance human rights and the rule of law.

On Friday, May 11th, EPIC joined representatives from over 20 distinct NGOs for an Open Society Institute-hosted event titled, "Overlooked Successes in Iraq: Rebuilding communities, strengthening civil society, and advancing human rights despite the violence." We'll be releasing a summary later this week detailing the specific programs and qualitative success stories described by conference participants, but for now, I'd like to highlight a few particularly interesting points from the discussion.

First, talented, educated Iraqis are never in short supply in the work of the NGOs reporting. Iraqis all over the country are excited about justice reform, improving infrastructure, and playing an active role in their communities. Only a very small percentage of people participate in violence, and many more take huge risks to be involved in change. They are passionate and dedicated despite the dangers of being associated with a U.S.-funded venture. They are ready to identify and throw out the corrupt, and they aren't rooted to a single position. They want and are willing to work for change.

Second, several conference participants questioned accountability measures determining which programs receive U.S. funding. Right now, our government seems to throw money at organizations with the sole mechanism for accountability being a return of numbers. But does it matter how many people you can claim to have helped if what you're doing doesn't result in sustainable development, or build the capacity for lasting change once you're gone? The most successful programs are those paying attention to the needs of Iraqis and giving them a vested interest in the process. But to truly determine what works and what doesn't, we need the kind of evidence we can only get after a program has been around for years and had a chance to take root, not meaningless numbers and statistics just because they're easily organized into talking points.

In the final Q & A period, the participants engaged in a heated debate over U.S. funding priorities. What are Iraqis most in need of: civil society, economy or government reform? You have to have a middle class in order for civil society and government to function; you have to have civil society in order for government to be representative and an economy to function; and you have to have some level of government security in order for economic development and civil society to approximate stability. So what comes first - the chicken, or the egg?

At the conclusion of the event, I realized from the important points made by all the participants that it won't do to focus on any one component more than the others. Iraqi government, economy and civil society are like three points of a triangle, each one essential to the integrity of the whole.

We must equally fund programs in all three fields, and use the experiences and advice of successful programs to determine future funding.

Iraqi Refugees and the Administration's (Lack of) Response

Military preemption and unilateral action are the centerpieces of the Bush Doctrine, a policy that has landed our country in the deadly quagmire that is Iraq. Having prompted a civil war, it follows that the United States bears the moral responsibility for handling the humanitarian situation and, by extension, the regional refugee crisis.

The Iraq Study Group says the U.S. should “take the lead in funding assistance requests from the UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies.” Rather than tackling the refugee problem directly, U.S. embassies do rely on the UNHCR’s referrals for immigration. But of the 3,000 UNHCR referrals, the U.S. has taken only 68 since the beginning of fiscal year 2007 (as I mentioned in my last entry).

Do a bit of research and you will find that, in nearly every way the U.S. could help Iraqi refugees, the government has fallen severely short. Even regarding Iraqis who have assisted the U.S. military and embassies - who seemingly everyone agrees should be a priority--we have set too low a standard. Murthy Law Firm notes that special immigration visas for translators were capped at fifty per fiscal year. This quota was reached just over a month after the beginning of fiscal year 2007.

The refugee crisis is all the more urgent given that Iraq’s neighbors are beginning to make flight from Iraq more difficult and, in some cases, are turning Iraqis back at the border. According to Refugees International and Human Rights Watch, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are placing increasing entry requirements for Iraqis. Syria and Jordan have taken in far more Iraqis than any other country in the Middle East, but new restrictions leave fewer options for those in greatest need.

Internally displaced persons (IDPs) number at 800,000 since February 2006 alone. A March 2007 Congressional Research Service report notes, “Iraq’s internal population displacement appears to be accelerating into a humanitarian crisis that is well beyond the current capacity on the ground.”

In particular, it appears the Department of Homeland Security has fallen short. The DHS, which gives the final green light for refugees to immigrate, “has yet to come up with a new screening process so that refugees can be vetted for security purposes,” says Al Kamen in today’s Washington Post. Kenneth Bacon, President of Refugees International, adds, “Until this is a top-level government concern, not much is going to happen.”

The U.S. has begun acknowledging its obligation toward Iraqi refugees. As I wrote in my last entry, Representative Earl Blumenauer (D-OR-3, right) proposed legislation to bring 20,000 Iraqis into the country this year. Bills such as this represent the first step in addressing the refugee crisis. There remains much work to be done in other parts of government. The Department of Homeland Security must, at very least, determine its new screening protocol and make the immigration process as efficient as possible while still maintaining security. The government also needs to earmark more than the meager $100 million promised for refugees by Paula Dobriansky, and much more than the $17 million appropriated for IDPs. Finally, the U.S. needs to work closely on the ground with the UNHCR, Iraq and its neighbors to alleviate this crisis.

Rep. Earl Blumenauer (D-OR-3) (EPIC Photo/Chris Breuer - 5/10/07)

Reconciliation IS Possible - A Political Solution for Iraq

I read a disturbing article in last Thursday's Roll Call (a DC publication read mostly by Hill staffers; sorry, you have to sign up to read it online) arguing the Iraqi civil war can only end by Shias brutally suppressing Sunnis, and the U.S. has no choice but to back the Shias and hope the genocide isn't too bad. The author, Morton Kondracke, believes that otherwise the violence will be worse and might result in a regime unfriendly to U.S. interests. At least if we support the Shias now, he argues, we can take some credit when they inevitably win, and continue playing a role in the country.

Setting aside the obvious fact that supporting genocide or brutal repression on ANY scale is morally unpardonable, I still think Kondracke is wrong. First, his solution would only further antagonize and radicalize Sunni Jihadis, resulting in more violence against the U.S. and its allies. Second, there is an alternative. Reconciliation between Sunnis and Shias IS possible, and it's up to the international community to facilitate it.

I pointed out in my entry Radicalization Spillover last week that Sunnis and Shias do live in peace in some countries, and the Michigan example - however far removed from the realities of the Middle East - at least sets a precedent for a formal peace agreement between the sects in the wake of violence. But commenters questioned just how realistic such a solution was, and who could possibly implement it.

To answer those questions, I highly recommend an article in last Thursday's Washington Post called "A Dayton Process for Iraq," by EPIC friend and peacebuilder Rend Al-Rahim. We haven't always seen eye-to-eye with Rend on every issue, but on this one, we feel she got it spot on. Rend's extensive knowledge of her native country as the founding director of the Iraq Foundation and Iraq's representative to the U.S. from 2003 to 2004 should not be taken lightly. This woman knows what she's talking about.
Rend proposes a peace process modeled upon the Dayton Accords, which effectively ended major violence in Bosnia even after a brutal ethnic war leaving hundreds of thousands dead. Although important differences exist in the two cases, Rend argues they should not deter us from using this model, which - if properly implemented - could result in an Iraqi reconciliation.

Rend's solution includes seven elements:

1. A strong and credible driving force behind the process. The U.S. is in the best position to play this role, but need not do so alone.
2. A credible sponsor. The United Nations or another organization with high-profile, skilled facilitators must be involved.
3. The single objective of producing a Sunni-Shiite agreement. No questions of international troops, oil, regional conflicts or other concerns should be involved.
4. Representation of Iraqi groups at the highest level of decision-making. Nobody can make peace for Iraq. We can help, but if the Iraqis don't see it as their own, it will be doomed from the start.
5. Sustained discussions until compromise is reached. There need not be a time-table; if the final solution is to be truly final, it must be thorough and agreed upon by all.
6. Implementation mechanisms and a timetable. While we can't put a timer on the process, we can upon its implementation. The how and when of enforcement must be spelled out.
7. Ratification by concerned countries, including Iraq's neighbors. The final agreement will only be credible if it is linked to other agreements and accords, and agreed upon and respected by all with concerns in the nation.

"The attention the United States pays to legal aspects of national reconciliation puts the cart before the horse: Laws and constitutional revision must be outcomes of a national agreement, not conditions for one," Rend states. This ties in well to Erik's argument that "reconciliation is not something that ends wars, but rather helps societies heal after wars."

Although we have a moral obligation to help the vulnerable Iraqi people in the meantime and do what we can to build economic and political infrastructure, an agreement must be forged between Iraqi Sunnis and Shias before we can hope for real, sustainable peace.

With Rend's plan, we have that hope.