At the end of December 2008 Human Rights First released an excellent report on Iraq’s refugees entitled “How to Confront the Iraqi Refugee Crisis.” It noted that the refugee crisis is still on going. The United Nations Refugee Agency UNHCR for example, recorded 12,500 Iraqis entering Syria in 2008. Surveys show that one-third of Iraqis fled the general violence in the country, while the other two-third left because they felt directly targeted. Most of the displacement occurred after the February 2006 Samarra bombing that set off the sectarian war. This can be seen in the fact that Sunnis were only about 20% of the population, but represent 55% of the U.N. registered refugees. Iraq’s minorities such as Christians, Mandeans, Yazidis, Turkomen, Shabaks, and others have also greatly suffered, comprising 18-20% of the U.N. refugees, but only 3-4% of Iraq. The result has been a less diverse country and more homogenous neighborhoods, especially in Baghdad, which has seen the most displacement. The UNHCR, the U.N. Assistance Mission for Iraq, and the State Department all believe that Iraq’s refugees still need help. The Human Rights First report was notable for its up to date numbers, and analysis of the current situation in Iraq. It not only went through the current refugee crisis, but also made suggestions for the in coming Obama administration as well.
The forces directly responsible for Iraq’s displacement are many. Insurgents, terrorist groups, and militias all took part in violence aimed at the country’s population. What is often overlooked is that the Iraqi government was also directly involved. The media usually talks about how militias had infiltrated the security forces during this period, but refugees told Human Rights Watch that they believed the ruling parties had a plan to force out certain groups. The police, National Police, Ministry of Interior, and Ministry of Health all took part in sectarian attacks. As reported before, Shiite parties like the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and its Badr Brigade and Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army were directly enrolled into the security forces, and took control of specific ministries. They carried out a systematic campaign to cleanse certain areas of Sunnis. Iraq’s minorities were caught in the middle of this bloodbath. This has repercussions today, as many displaced still do not trust their government.
Iraq’s refugees have been both greeted and rejected in the countries they have moved to. Most can’t work legally, which leads to exploitation. Children are not going to school because they need to support their families, while some Iraqi women have gone into prostitution to make money. Many have run through their savings, while their cost of living expenses have risen. That has led to increasing dependence upon U.N. aid. Syria and Jordan are increasingly growing weary of the large number of Iraqis in their country. This is problematic since many Iraqis don’t seem to want to return anytime soon. Many who register with the UNHCR hope to be repatriated to a third country. 64,500 have applied for asylum in 2007 and the first six months of 2008, the highest amount in the world. Most want to go to Sweden, Germany, Greece or the United States.
Iraq’s internally displaced are facing tougher conditions as well. Many provinces have stopped movement of the displaced into their areas. Some want them to leave. Lack of jobs, access to services, and assistance from either the government or non-government organizations is chronic. The International Organization for Migration in its monthly reports have recorded dozens of cases of displaced families living in mud huts with no access to jobs, clean water, and sewage systems.
All of these hardships and the improvement in security have begun the process of return. By September 2008 the International Organization for Migration and the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration counted 38,401 families who had come back, amounting to approximately 230,406 people. That was around 5% of the displaced. Most of these were internal refugees moving within Baghdad. Surveys say that 80% of the displaced in their own provinces want to go back to their homes while only around 50% of the displaced in other provinces want to. Many still feel their original areas are unsafe. Very few refugees have come back from other countries however.
Baghdad has also been pushing for Iraqis to return, but Human Rights First believes it actually might be detrimental. In late 2007 the government began to encourage Iraqis to come back. In 2008 they created a national policy on refugees and the displaced written with the help of the United Nations, and conforming to international norms. They called on Iraqis to return because the country was safe, and they could be protected. The plan allows the displaced to vote in elections, provides aid, and includes the eviction of squatters to resolve property issues. At the same time, Baghdad also tried to force refugees to come back from other countries. In 2007 Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki told Syria and Jordan to tighten their visa requirements to stem the flow of Iraqis to those two countries. In early 2008 the government talked Germany out of taking in minorities. Iraqi, Syrian and U.N. sources told Human Rights First that the Iraqi leadership was against helping the displaced because they believe the displacement crisis made the country look bad. They also thought that refugees who refused to go back were traitors.
Human Rights First also found that the refugee policy was not being applied evenly. In August 2008 the International Organization for Migration reported that militias were selling houses illegally that they had seized from people in Baghdad, Diyala, Tamim, and Ninewa with the help of local security forces. Some refugees said they believed the government was still sectarian. The government for example, was supposed to create two centers to assist returns in Baghdad, one in the Shiite east and one in the Sunni west. Only the center in the Shiite area was opened. Other refugees thought the return program was part of campaigning for the upcoming elections. In general, many did not trust the government.
This was why Human Rights First did not think that Baghdad’s refugee program was good. It thought that it was important that the government began an eviction process, but dealing with property issues was not the only thing that would help the displaced. It believes that Baghdad needs to provide the rule of law, punish those that carry out attacks and abuses, get rid of sectarianism, protect minorities, expel militias, and deal with Kirkuk and other disputed territories. Minorities especially, are still being targeted, while violence against women is increasing. Some refugees have also been attacked and intimidated after their returns. None of this is helping with the situation. Overall, Human Rights First believed that the Maliki government lacked earnestness when dealing with the plight of refugees.
The U.S. has also not had a real strategy to deal with this problem. President Bush and Secretary of State Rice hardly talk about the issue. The 2008 and 2009 budgets for example, had no funds for Iraq’s refugees. It was because of Congress that $500 million was set aside for fiscal year 2008 and $350 million in 2008 for Iraq’s displaced. This has meant a dramatic increase in aid and programs. The U.S. has also taken in more Iraqis. In 2006 202 Iraqis were admitted, followed by 1,608 in 2007 and 13,823 in 2008. There is still no real U.S. leadership however. The Bush White House has argued that returns are the solution, and this will happen when security improves.
Human Rights First believes that the Obama administration needs to make a real commitment to this crisis. They need to help those that want to go back, and those that don’t. It recommended setting benchmarks for the Iraqi government to meet. If they are not met, the U.S. should withdraw support form the Ministry of Displacement and Migration, and focus upon non-government organizations and direct aid to Iraqis. The U.S. should also encourage Prime Minister Maliki to provide accurate information on the situation within Iraq to refugees so that their returns are voluntary. The Americans also have to provide aid to host countries like Syria and Jordan, convince them to ease their visa restrictions on Iraqis, as well as facilitate the immigration of those Iraqis that have no plans to go home. Finally, a property claims/compensation program needs to be started even if the families never return. In order to ensure that this will be carried out, Human Rights First calls for a high level official to be appointed by the incoming president solely to focus upon Iraq’s refugees.
“How to Confront the Iraqi Refugee Crisis” provides not only a good synopsis of the causes and effects of Iraq’s displacement, but analysis as well, in a short and to the point report. It shows that Iraqi refugees outside the country and displaced within it are still suffering major problems providing for themselves and obtaining support. Although some Iraqis have begun to return, Baghdad is not doing a good job dealing with them, and in fact, may be making the situation worse because it is more interested in image than implementation. Those that are coming back are mostly the displaced, with Iraq’s two million refugees staying in their new homes. This is probably due to the fact that they are largely Sunni and minorities who have been the victims of the Shiite parties and militias that now run Iraq. Until there is more trust and effective government it is unlikely that large numbers of refugees will ever return to Iraq. That places a large onus on the U.S. and international community to provide for these people, and the countries where they reside. That is the main point of the report, Iraq’s refugee crisis is an on-going event that is getting worse for many Iraqis, and needs the full attention of the new American administration.
SOURCES
Ferris, Elizabeth, “The Real Challenge of Internal Displacement in Iraq: The Future,” Brookings Institution, 12/6/07
Human Rights First, “How to Confront the Iraqi Refugee Crisis,” December 2008
Overview
International Organization for Migration, “Anbar, Baghdad & Diyala, Governorate Profiles,” December 2008
Ministry of Displacement and Migration & International Organization for Migration, “Returnee Monitoring and Needs Assessments Tabulation Report,” September 2008
We've Moved!
Showing posts with label Bush. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Bush. Show all posts
Wednesday, January 14, 2009
Monday, January 12, 2009
Interview With McClatchy Newspapers’ Baghdad Bureau Chief Leila Fadel
In mid-December 2008 The Real News Network, an internet television station, interviewed Leila Fadel, the longtime Baghdad Bureau Chief of McClatchy Newspapers. As reported before, McClatchy is one of the few news outlets to maintain a fulltime staff in Iraq. The discussion covered the Surge, Moqtada al-Sadr, and the influence of Iran, but the most interesting part of the conversation was on Fadel’s opinions of the continuing struggles in Iraq.
Ms. Fadel believes that Iraq is still in turmoil. The major divisions within the country have not been dealt with despite the reduction in violence. Every time a major issue comes up in parliament, for example, it is always delayed and pushed back to be dealt with at a later time. This was seen when the legislature was discussing the Provincial Election Law. The most heated debate centered on the city of Kirkuk and the future of Tamim province. In the final version of the law however, elections there were postponed until a commission comes up with suggestions on how the major groups in the city can share power. Fadel believes that until these issues are dealt with there will still be violence in Iraq.
This will not be at the same levels as in the past, nor come from the same sources. The latest reports on violence show a dramatic drop in deaths from 2007 to 2008. Yet attacks and killings continue. Fadel believes that the motivation for such violence has changed. She thinks that the fighting in Baghdad is basically over along with the sectarian war. Now the major divisions are over politics between the Shiites in the south, and the Arabs and Kurds in the north where there is also an ethnic element. The conflict as ever in post-invasion Iraq, is about power and control of oil. The major groups, the Shiites, the Sunnis, and the Kurds are each vying for position, trying to find out who will have what in the future. Fadel said the political parties and their politicians are all opportunists, looking to see how much they can get away with and how much influence they can accrue.
At the heart of this struggle is Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki who in 2008 has been concentrating power around himself. He has direct control of all military and police units. They can’t move without his permission. He has launched military operations against the Sadrists, the insurgency, and has increasing fashioned himself as a nationalist in opposition to the expansionist plans of the Kurds. He is also being accused of being an autocrat more and more. Fadel said that there were even some who were afraid of Maliki, and his newfound position. This is the reason why Iraq is full of stories about him being-unseated.
There are now two more added pressures to this competition. First, 2009 will see a series of ballots for local, provincial, and national offices. This has already led to an uptake in attacks. The most recent were the murders of a member of the Patriot Union of Kurdistan who was gunned down in a drive by shooting on January 5, and a politician from the Communist Party the day before, both in Kirkuk. The United Nations Special Representative to Iraq, Staffan de Mistura condemned such election related violence. He mentioned a member of the Hadba, Iraq For Us Party, the major Sunni coalition in Ninewa being killed in a café on December 31 in Mosul. De Mistura said there had also been raids and attacks on the party. At the beginning of that month, two members of the Islamic Party were also killed in that city. Second is the change in the U.S. administration. Under the Bush White House Iraq had a blank check from the United States. Fadel believes Iraqi politicians are afraid that under Obama Iraq will not be such a priority, and the new president might make more demands of Baghdad. The U.S. has also agreed to a 2011 withdrawal date under the Status of Forces Agreement, which means not only do the political parties need to consider Obama, but what position they’ll be in after the Americans are largely gone.
Leila Fadel has been working in Iraq for a long time, and provided some important insight in her interview with The Real News Network. She tried to explain that politics is increasingly driving violence rather than violence shaping the politicians. In fact, the differences between the major parties and sectarian groups is increasing as elections approach, the Americans have agreed to pull out their combat troops, and Maliki makes his move to grab power. This has made it almost impossible for the parties to come to any real meaningful compromises. Even when parliament passes important legislation like the election law, the major issue of Kirkuk is put off. Other laws like the Amnesty and the Accountability and Justice acts have not been implemented evenly leading to little reconciliation. As long as Iraq continues to be divided, this new status quo is likely to continue.
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Iraq Hails Lowest Monthly Death Toll in Three Years,” 1/2/09
- “Kurdish communist politician shot dead in Iraq,” 1/4/09
Al-Ansary, Khalid, “Election friction flares in Iraq’s violent north,” Reuters, 1/2/09
Associated Press, “Member of Iraq president party killed in drive-by,” 1/6/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Two IIP members assassinated in Mosul,” 12/1/08
Goode, Erica, “Iraq Passes Provincial Elections Law,” New York Times, 9/25/08
Hanna, Michael Wahid, “Through the cracks,” The National, 12/19/08
Jay, Paul, “Iraq gov’t fear Obama?” Real News Network, 12/16/08
- “Iraqi elites fight for position,” Real News Network, 12/12/08
Kadhim, Hussein, “Iraqi government plays down arrests of 23 police officers,” McClatchy Newspapers, 12/18/08
Kamal, Adel, “violence threatens mosul elections,” Niqash, 12/11/08
Rubin, Alissa, “Iraq Unsettled by Political Power Plays,” New York Times, 12/26/08
United Nations Radio, “UN Envoy in Iraq condemns election related violence,” 1/2/09
UPI, “SIIC denies attempts to oust Maliki,” 1/2/09
Ms. Fadel believes that Iraq is still in turmoil. The major divisions within the country have not been dealt with despite the reduction in violence. Every time a major issue comes up in parliament, for example, it is always delayed and pushed back to be dealt with at a later time. This was seen when the legislature was discussing the Provincial Election Law. The most heated debate centered on the city of Kirkuk and the future of Tamim province. In the final version of the law however, elections there were postponed until a commission comes up with suggestions on how the major groups in the city can share power. Fadel believes that until these issues are dealt with there will still be violence in Iraq.
This will not be at the same levels as in the past, nor come from the same sources. The latest reports on violence show a dramatic drop in deaths from 2007 to 2008. Yet attacks and killings continue. Fadel believes that the motivation for such violence has changed. She thinks that the fighting in Baghdad is basically over along with the sectarian war. Now the major divisions are over politics between the Shiites in the south, and the Arabs and Kurds in the north where there is also an ethnic element. The conflict as ever in post-invasion Iraq, is about power and control of oil. The major groups, the Shiites, the Sunnis, and the Kurds are each vying for position, trying to find out who will have what in the future. Fadel said the political parties and their politicians are all opportunists, looking to see how much they can get away with and how much influence they can accrue.
At the heart of this struggle is Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki who in 2008 has been concentrating power around himself. He has direct control of all military and police units. They can’t move without his permission. He has launched military operations against the Sadrists, the insurgency, and has increasing fashioned himself as a nationalist in opposition to the expansionist plans of the Kurds. He is also being accused of being an autocrat more and more. Fadel said that there were even some who were afraid of Maliki, and his newfound position. This is the reason why Iraq is full of stories about him being-unseated.
There are now two more added pressures to this competition. First, 2009 will see a series of ballots for local, provincial, and national offices. This has already led to an uptake in attacks. The most recent were the murders of a member of the Patriot Union of Kurdistan who was gunned down in a drive by shooting on January 5, and a politician from the Communist Party the day before, both in Kirkuk. The United Nations Special Representative to Iraq, Staffan de Mistura condemned such election related violence. He mentioned a member of the Hadba, Iraq For Us Party, the major Sunni coalition in Ninewa being killed in a café on December 31 in Mosul. De Mistura said there had also been raids and attacks on the party. At the beginning of that month, two members of the Islamic Party were also killed in that city. Second is the change in the U.S. administration. Under the Bush White House Iraq had a blank check from the United States. Fadel believes Iraqi politicians are afraid that under Obama Iraq will not be such a priority, and the new president might make more demands of Baghdad. The U.S. has also agreed to a 2011 withdrawal date under the Status of Forces Agreement, which means not only do the political parties need to consider Obama, but what position they’ll be in after the Americans are largely gone.
Leila Fadel has been working in Iraq for a long time, and provided some important insight in her interview with The Real News Network. She tried to explain that politics is increasingly driving violence rather than violence shaping the politicians. In fact, the differences between the major parties and sectarian groups is increasing as elections approach, the Americans have agreed to pull out their combat troops, and Maliki makes his move to grab power. This has made it almost impossible for the parties to come to any real meaningful compromises. Even when parliament passes important legislation like the election law, the major issue of Kirkuk is put off. Other laws like the Amnesty and the Accountability and Justice acts have not been implemented evenly leading to little reconciliation. As long as Iraq continues to be divided, this new status quo is likely to continue.
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Iraq Hails Lowest Monthly Death Toll in Three Years,” 1/2/09
- “Kurdish communist politician shot dead in Iraq,” 1/4/09
Al-Ansary, Khalid, “Election friction flares in Iraq’s violent north,” Reuters, 1/2/09
Associated Press, “Member of Iraq president party killed in drive-by,” 1/6/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Two IIP members assassinated in Mosul,” 12/1/08
Goode, Erica, “Iraq Passes Provincial Elections Law,” New York Times, 9/25/08
Hanna, Michael Wahid, “Through the cracks,” The National, 12/19/08
Jay, Paul, “Iraq gov’t fear Obama?” Real News Network, 12/16/08
- “Iraqi elites fight for position,” Real News Network, 12/12/08
Kadhim, Hussein, “Iraqi government plays down arrests of 23 police officers,” McClatchy Newspapers, 12/18/08
Kamal, Adel, “violence threatens mosul elections,” Niqash, 12/11/08
Rubin, Alissa, “Iraq Unsettled by Political Power Plays,” New York Times, 12/26/08
United Nations Radio, “UN Envoy in Iraq condemns election related violence,” 1/2/09
UPI, “SIIC denies attempts to oust Maliki,” 1/2/09
Labels:
Bush,
human toll of violence,
Iraq election,
Kirkuk,
Maliki Government,
Obama
Thursday, November 27, 2008
The Status Of Forces Agreement
Today November 26, Iraq’s parliament showed up to work expecting to vote on the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) in the morning, which would set military relations between the U.S. and Iraq for the next several years. Instead they were told that they would vote on the agreement tomorrow November 27, along with a separate bill put forward by the Sunni Iraqi Accordance Front. The recent negotiations over the deal point to several important facts. First, the Sadrists recently received a lot of press for demonstrating against the SOFA, but they really had no say on whether it would pass or not. It was the Sunni parties that were the real swing votes. Second, the Sunni demands may derail the entire process. Third, the fact that the Americans gave in to so many concessions showed that the White House was always working from a position of weakness vis-a-vis the Iraqis. Fourth, the Iranians may have finally agreed to the deal, and last, many of the compromises Baghdad recently was able to gain may be largely symbolic and upset many later on.
Was Opposed By A Small Minority…
In November 2007, the U.S. and Iraq signed a Declaration of Principles that was to set up the long-term security relationship between the two countries. That agreement was to be the basis for the SOFA. Originally, the deal was to be signed by the end of July 2008. As that date approached, Moqtada al-Sadr began calling for weekly protests against the SOFA. Sadr has always preached Iraqi nationalism, and objected to any agreement that would legitimize the U.S. presence in the country. Instead, he demanded that the U.S. withdraw immediately. His call for protests was also motivated by a need to rebuild his movement and maintain his supporters after the government launched successive military operations against them in Basra, Sadr City, and Maysan province. The Sadrists were joined by the Fadhila party, which is based in Basra, and former Interim Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List in opposing the agreement. The Sadrists hold 30 seats in parliament, the Fadhila 15, and the Iraqi National List 25. Together they do not have enough votes to block the agreement from passing, and the National List might change sides and support it if the Sunnis’ demands are met.
But The Sunnis Were The Real Swing Voters …
While Sadr was trying to rally his followers against the SOFA, the real deciders on the matter were the Sunni parties. In the summer of 2008 Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani said that he would sign off on the agreement if it protected Iraq’s sovereignty, was passed by parliament, and all major parties agreed upon it. By November the Kurdish Alliance and the United Iraqi Alliance, the two largest coalitions in parliament, had come out for the SOFA. Together they had enough votes for a straight majority, 138 votes, to pass the agreement. However, because of Sistani’s insistence on national consensus on the SOFA, the Shiites and Kurds had to bring the Sunnis on board. That put the Iraqi Accordance Front in the driver's seat. They demanded that they receive more say in the government and the security forces, that prisoners held by the U.S. that are not charged with a crime be released, and a national referendum is held on the SOFA. As the vote on the agreement came down to the wire, they were able to get these concessions.
Whose Demand For A National Referendum May Undermine the SOFA …
Tomorrow when parliament reconvenes they will vote on the SOFA, and a separate bill that includes the Sunnis’ demands. If the bill is passed there will be a special election on the SOFA in July 2009. The problem is that U.S. forces are operating in Iraq under a United Nations mandate that expires on December 31, 2008. If the referendum bill is passed, that means the agreement won’t come to a conclusion until the summer of 2009, and even then the Iraqi public may veto it. That would mean the Americans would have to go back to the U.N. for another yearlong authorization, undermining whole point of the SOFA, which is to take the place of the U.N. deal.
Which Highlights The Weak American Position …
The U.S. finds itself in an unenviable position. This has been true since the beginning of the negotiations however. From the start, the Iraqis knew that President Bush wanted an agreement before he left office. It never appeared that the White House tried to convince the Iraqis of why they needed the U.S. Instead, Baghdad made more and more demands, and the Americans gave in, especially as time passed, deadlines were not met, and the end of the U.N. mandate lurked. The Iraqis were able to set a specific deadline, 2009, for when U.S. troops would be out of Iraq’s cities, and a 2011 date for when U.S. troops would be out of the entire country. They also got the administration to agree to Iraqis checking American cargo and mail coming to Iraq, ending immunity for foreign contractors and security guards, having a say over intelligence gathering and U.S. military operations, control over the Green Zone, requiring American soldiers to get an Iraqi warrant to conduct searches, not allowing the U.S. to use Iraq to attack any other country, turning over anyone arrested to the Iraqis within 24 hours, and control of Iraqi air space. This has upset some in the U.S. military and Pentagon, but after Barak Obama took the lead in the presidential race, and eventually won the election, President Bush was even more determined to sign the SOFA rather than leave it to his successor. Now they may have to reconfigure all of their plans if the Iraqi legislature agrees to hold a referendum in 2009.
And The Strength Of Iran’s Position…
Iran appears to have several different positions on the SOFA, but may be finally signing off on it. From the beginning, Iran has seen the U.S. presence in Iraq as a threat to its security. They were therefore against the SOFA that would maintain the American military in Iraq. Many Iranian newspapers along with the country’s leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, speaker of Iran’s parliament Ali Larijani, among others have publicly said that Iraq should not sign the agreement. At the same time others such as the head of Iran’s judiciary Ayatollah Hashemi Shahroudi and Iranian TV have made statements supporting the deal. Attacks by Special Groups and other Iranian backed militants are also down across the country, which Tehran has tempered before during important political decisions it has supported in the past. While there are recent statements in the Iranian press against the agreement, it appears that Tehran has acquiesced to the SOFA especially after Baghdad was able to get the U.S. to agree to not use the country as a base for attacks upon its neighbors, and that it sets a specific date for an American withdrawal. Both would be considered wins for Iran.
But Parts Of The Agreement May Be More Symbolic Anyway
The last major problem with the SOFA is how the Americans and Iraqis interpret the SOFA when and if it is passed. Many of the concessions that Baghdad was able to gain may be more symbolic than real. McClatchy Newspapers for example, pointed out three articles in the agreement that the U.S. sees differently than Baghdad. First, the Americans have agreed to allow U.S. soldiers that commit crimes when they are off duty and off base to be tried by joint U.S. and Iraqi courts. This is a largely meaningless article meant to appease Iraqis because U.S. forces rarely go off base when they are off duty, not to mention that Baghdad and Washington have to negotiate over how these joint courts would work, which could take years. By that time, the U.S. may be out of the country. Second, the agreement says that the U.S. cannot use Iraq as a base to attack other countries. The Americans believe this does not prohibit hot pursuit and the right of self-defense, which could make the point mean nothing. Finally, the U.S. military believes that the Iraqi security forces are full of insurgents, Sadrists, and people who simply want to make a buck, and therefore do not trust them with advance warning and detailed information on military operations. This is becoming less of an issue as the U.S. is moving from conducting their own operations to supporting Iraqi ones. Still, the Pentagon does not want to give Baghdad control over their planning. These last two could make many Iraqis and Iran mad if they are implemented in the way the U.S. sees them. The White House in fact, is withholding its version of the agreement until it is passed by Iraq’s parliament because they are afraid it will undermine support for the SOFA.
Conclusion
Tomorrow will be another important date in the process of passing the SOFA, but it will not be the last. The agreement still needs to go to the Presidential Council for approval, and if the parliament agrees on it, there will be a referendum in July 2009. That may force Iraq to go back to the United Nations for a new mandate to legalize America’s presence in the country, something that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has said he is loath to do. Either that or the U.S. and Iraq may have to come up with some kind of ad hoc interpretation of the SOFA. That means there is still much to watch for as the agreement proceeds along.
SOURCES
Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Iraq Shiites, Kurds meet Sunni demand on US pact,” Associated Press, 11/26/08
Alsumaria, “Iraq parties divided over US security pact,” 11/20/08
- “Iraqi List negotiates to approve agreement,” 11/26/08
Ashton, Adam and Fadel, Leila, “Iraqi cabinet approves accord setting U.S. troop withdrawal,” McClatchy Newspapers, 11/16/08
Ashton, Adam, Landay, Jonathan and Youssef, Nancy, “U.S. staying silent on its view of Iraq pact until after vote,” McClatchy Newspapers, 11/26/08
Aswat al-Iraq, “Security deal doesn’t guarantee Iraq’s full sovereignty,” 11/20/08
Dareini, Ali Akbar, “Iran hard-liners come out against Iraqi-US deal,” Associated Press, 5/12/08
DeYoung, Karen, “Iraq Wants U.S. to Compromise More on Security Deals,” Washington Post, 4/22/08
Fadhil, Omar, “Iraq’s political parties wrangle over the status of forces agreement,” Long War Journal.org, 6/17/08
Faraj, Salam, “Iraq to hold referendum on US troops pact,” Agence France Presse, 11/26/08
Farrell, Stephen, “Protests in Baghdad on U.S. Pact,” New York Times, 11/21/08
Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08
Gutman, Roy, “Iraq’s prime minister won’t sign U.S. troops deal,” McClatchy Newspaper, 10/24/08
Oppel, Richard and Farrell, Stephen, “Growing Opposition to Iraq Security Pact,” New York Times, 5/31/08
Roads To Iraq Blog, “Final amended SOFA version,” 11/16/08
- “Iran gave the “Green Light”, American negotiators briefed Obama on SOFA, there are still five stages to the agreement,” 11/17/08
Robertson, Campbell and Al-Salhy, Suadad, “Cleric Calls for Resistance to U.S. Presence in Iraq,” New York Times, 11/15/08
Robertson, Campbell and Farrell, Stephen, “In Baghdad, Debating Post-U.S. Outlook,” 11/21/08
Rose, Charlie Show, “A Conversation with Vali Nasr of The Council on Foreign Relations, Michael Gordon of the New York Times, and Stephen Biddle of the Council on Foreign Relations,” 6/18/08
Sands, Phil, “Style over substance in new deal with Iraq,” The National, 11/17/08
Shanker, Thom and Buckley, Cara, “U.S. and Iraq to Negotiate Pact on Long-Term Relations,” New York Times, 11/27/07
Was Opposed By A Small Minority…
In November 2007, the U.S. and Iraq signed a Declaration of Principles that was to set up the long-term security relationship between the two countries. That agreement was to be the basis for the SOFA. Originally, the deal was to be signed by the end of July 2008. As that date approached, Moqtada al-Sadr began calling for weekly protests against the SOFA. Sadr has always preached Iraqi nationalism, and objected to any agreement that would legitimize the U.S. presence in the country. Instead, he demanded that the U.S. withdraw immediately. His call for protests was also motivated by a need to rebuild his movement and maintain his supporters after the government launched successive military operations against them in Basra, Sadr City, and Maysan province. The Sadrists were joined by the Fadhila party, which is based in Basra, and former Interim Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List in opposing the agreement. The Sadrists hold 30 seats in parliament, the Fadhila 15, and the Iraqi National List 25. Together they do not have enough votes to block the agreement from passing, and the National List might change sides and support it if the Sunnis’ demands are met.
But The Sunnis Were The Real Swing Voters …
While Sadr was trying to rally his followers against the SOFA, the real deciders on the matter were the Sunni parties. In the summer of 2008 Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani said that he would sign off on the agreement if it protected Iraq’s sovereignty, was passed by parliament, and all major parties agreed upon it. By November the Kurdish Alliance and the United Iraqi Alliance, the two largest coalitions in parliament, had come out for the SOFA. Together they had enough votes for a straight majority, 138 votes, to pass the agreement. However, because of Sistani’s insistence on national consensus on the SOFA, the Shiites and Kurds had to bring the Sunnis on board. That put the Iraqi Accordance Front in the driver's seat. They demanded that they receive more say in the government and the security forces, that prisoners held by the U.S. that are not charged with a crime be released, and a national referendum is held on the SOFA. As the vote on the agreement came down to the wire, they were able to get these concessions.
Whose Demand For A National Referendum May Undermine the SOFA …
Tomorrow when parliament reconvenes they will vote on the SOFA, and a separate bill that includes the Sunnis’ demands. If the bill is passed there will be a special election on the SOFA in July 2009. The problem is that U.S. forces are operating in Iraq under a United Nations mandate that expires on December 31, 2008. If the referendum bill is passed, that means the agreement won’t come to a conclusion until the summer of 2009, and even then the Iraqi public may veto it. That would mean the Americans would have to go back to the U.N. for another yearlong authorization, undermining whole point of the SOFA, which is to take the place of the U.N. deal.
Which Highlights The Weak American Position …
The U.S. finds itself in an unenviable position. This has been true since the beginning of the negotiations however. From the start, the Iraqis knew that President Bush wanted an agreement before he left office. It never appeared that the White House tried to convince the Iraqis of why they needed the U.S. Instead, Baghdad made more and more demands, and the Americans gave in, especially as time passed, deadlines were not met, and the end of the U.N. mandate lurked. The Iraqis were able to set a specific deadline, 2009, for when U.S. troops would be out of Iraq’s cities, and a 2011 date for when U.S. troops would be out of the entire country. They also got the administration to agree to Iraqis checking American cargo and mail coming to Iraq, ending immunity for foreign contractors and security guards, having a say over intelligence gathering and U.S. military operations, control over the Green Zone, requiring American soldiers to get an Iraqi warrant to conduct searches, not allowing the U.S. to use Iraq to attack any other country, turning over anyone arrested to the Iraqis within 24 hours, and control of Iraqi air space. This has upset some in the U.S. military and Pentagon, but after Barak Obama took the lead in the presidential race, and eventually won the election, President Bush was even more determined to sign the SOFA rather than leave it to his successor. Now they may have to reconfigure all of their plans if the Iraqi legislature agrees to hold a referendum in 2009.
And The Strength Of Iran’s Position…
Iran appears to have several different positions on the SOFA, but may be finally signing off on it. From the beginning, Iran has seen the U.S. presence in Iraq as a threat to its security. They were therefore against the SOFA that would maintain the American military in Iraq. Many Iranian newspapers along with the country’s leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, speaker of Iran’s parliament Ali Larijani, among others have publicly said that Iraq should not sign the agreement. At the same time others such as the head of Iran’s judiciary Ayatollah Hashemi Shahroudi and Iranian TV have made statements supporting the deal. Attacks by Special Groups and other Iranian backed militants are also down across the country, which Tehran has tempered before during important political decisions it has supported in the past. While there are recent statements in the Iranian press against the agreement, it appears that Tehran has acquiesced to the SOFA especially after Baghdad was able to get the U.S. to agree to not use the country as a base for attacks upon its neighbors, and that it sets a specific date for an American withdrawal. Both would be considered wins for Iran.
But Parts Of The Agreement May Be More Symbolic Anyway
The last major problem with the SOFA is how the Americans and Iraqis interpret the SOFA when and if it is passed. Many of the concessions that Baghdad was able to gain may be more symbolic than real. McClatchy Newspapers for example, pointed out three articles in the agreement that the U.S. sees differently than Baghdad. First, the Americans have agreed to allow U.S. soldiers that commit crimes when they are off duty and off base to be tried by joint U.S. and Iraqi courts. This is a largely meaningless article meant to appease Iraqis because U.S. forces rarely go off base when they are off duty, not to mention that Baghdad and Washington have to negotiate over how these joint courts would work, which could take years. By that time, the U.S. may be out of the country. Second, the agreement says that the U.S. cannot use Iraq as a base to attack other countries. The Americans believe this does not prohibit hot pursuit and the right of self-defense, which could make the point mean nothing. Finally, the U.S. military believes that the Iraqi security forces are full of insurgents, Sadrists, and people who simply want to make a buck, and therefore do not trust them with advance warning and detailed information on military operations. This is becoming less of an issue as the U.S. is moving from conducting their own operations to supporting Iraqi ones. Still, the Pentagon does not want to give Baghdad control over their planning. These last two could make many Iraqis and Iran mad if they are implemented in the way the U.S. sees them. The White House in fact, is withholding its version of the agreement until it is passed by Iraq’s parliament because they are afraid it will undermine support for the SOFA.
Conclusion
Tomorrow will be another important date in the process of passing the SOFA, but it will not be the last. The agreement still needs to go to the Presidential Council for approval, and if the parliament agrees on it, there will be a referendum in July 2009. That may force Iraq to go back to the United Nations for a new mandate to legalize America’s presence in the country, something that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has said he is loath to do. Either that or the U.S. and Iraq may have to come up with some kind of ad hoc interpretation of the SOFA. That means there is still much to watch for as the agreement proceeds along.
SOURCES
Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Iraq Shiites, Kurds meet Sunni demand on US pact,” Associated Press, 11/26/08
Alsumaria, “Iraq parties divided over US security pact,” 11/20/08
- “Iraqi List negotiates to approve agreement,” 11/26/08
Ashton, Adam and Fadel, Leila, “Iraqi cabinet approves accord setting U.S. troop withdrawal,” McClatchy Newspapers, 11/16/08
Ashton, Adam, Landay, Jonathan and Youssef, Nancy, “U.S. staying silent on its view of Iraq pact until after vote,” McClatchy Newspapers, 11/26/08
Aswat al-Iraq, “Security deal doesn’t guarantee Iraq’s full sovereignty,” 11/20/08
Dareini, Ali Akbar, “Iran hard-liners come out against Iraqi-US deal,” Associated Press, 5/12/08
DeYoung, Karen, “Iraq Wants U.S. to Compromise More on Security Deals,” Washington Post, 4/22/08
Fadhil, Omar, “Iraq’s political parties wrangle over the status of forces agreement,” Long War Journal.org, 6/17/08
Faraj, Salam, “Iraq to hold referendum on US troops pact,” Agence France Presse, 11/26/08
Farrell, Stephen, “Protests in Baghdad on U.S. Pact,” New York Times, 11/21/08
Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08
Gutman, Roy, “Iraq’s prime minister won’t sign U.S. troops deal,” McClatchy Newspaper, 10/24/08
Oppel, Richard and Farrell, Stephen, “Growing Opposition to Iraq Security Pact,” New York Times, 5/31/08
Roads To Iraq Blog, “Final amended SOFA version,” 11/16/08
- “Iran gave the “Green Light”, American negotiators briefed Obama on SOFA, there are still five stages to the agreement,” 11/17/08
Robertson, Campbell and Al-Salhy, Suadad, “Cleric Calls for Resistance to U.S. Presence in Iraq,” New York Times, 11/15/08
Robertson, Campbell and Farrell, Stephen, “In Baghdad, Debating Post-U.S. Outlook,” 11/21/08
Rose, Charlie Show, “A Conversation with Vali Nasr of The Council on Foreign Relations, Michael Gordon of the New York Times, and Stephen Biddle of the Council on Foreign Relations,” 6/18/08
Sands, Phil, “Style over substance in new deal with Iraq,” The National, 11/17/08
Shanker, Thom and Buckley, Cara, “U.S. and Iraq to Negotiate Pact on Long-Term Relations,” New York Times, 11/27/07
Thursday, July 03, 2008
George Packer and Fareed Zakaria Offer Obama a Way Out on Iraq
Two years ago you could even hear Republicans grudgingly acknowledge that President Bush had an Iraq problem. His rhetoric was too inflexible to adapt to shifting realities in Iraq, and Americans were losing patience.
How quickly political fortunes change. Today it seems it's the Democrats who are not keeping up with shifting realities in Iraq.
In the latest New Yorker George Packer candidly explains Obama's Iraq Problem:
How quickly political fortunes change. Today it seems it's the Democrats who are not keeping up with shifting realities in Iraq.
In the latest New Yorker George Packer candidly explains Obama's Iraq Problem:
Obama’s plan, which was formally laid out last September, called for the remaining combat brigades to be pulled out at a brisk pace of about one per month, along with a strategic shift of resources and attention away from Iraq and toward Afghanistan. At that rate, all combat troops would be withdrawn in sixteen months. In hindsight, it was a mistake—an understandable one, given the nature of the media and of Presidential politics today—for Obama to offer such a specific timetable. In matters of foreign policy, flexibility is a President’s primary defense against surprise. At the start of 2007, no one in Baghdad would have predicted that blood-soaked neighborhoods would begin returning to life within a year. The improved conditions can be attributed, in increasing order of importance, to President Bush’s surge, the change in military strategy under General David Petraeus, the turning of Sunni tribes against Al Qaeda, the Sadr militia’s unilateral ceasefire, and the great historical luck that brought them all together at the same moment. With the level of violence down, the Iraqi government and Army have begun to show signs of functioning in less sectarian ways. These developments may be temporary or cyclical; predicting the future in Iraq has been a losing game. Indeed, it was President Bush’s folly to ignore for years the shifting realities on the ground.Syndicated columnist Fareed Zakaria concurs with Packer. In "What Obama Should Say On Iraq," he argues that Obama and the Democrats need more than just a new narrative on Iraq, they need to offer a serious policy "informed by the conditions on the ground today." Zakaria writes:
...[Obama] doubtless realizes that his original plan, if implemented now, could revive the badly wounded Al Qaeda in Iraq, reënergize the Sunni insurgency, embolden Moqtada al-Sadr to recoup his militia’s recent losses to the Iraqi Army, and return the central government to a state of collapse. The question is whether Obama will publicly change course before November. So far, he has offered nothing more concrete than this: “We must be as careful getting out of Iraq as we were careless getting in.”
Barack Obama needs to give a speech about Iraq. Otherwise he will find himself in the unusual position of having being prescient about the war in 2002 and yet being overtaken by events in 2008.Zakaria then proceeds to offer Obama a well-argued speech to help get him out of the corner that his campaign rhetoric has painted him into. It's a good speech, and one can only hope that Obama's speech writers and foreign policy advisers are taking note.
Wednesday, January 23, 2008
Bush, State Department Continue to Fail U.S. Allies in Need
In his eight days in the Middle East, President Bush visited six countries (seven, depending on how you count Palestine). Among the high points: he re-affirmed American support for a Palestinian state, called on Israel to return to its 1967 borders, and announced a $20 billion dollar arms sale to Saudi Arabia. However, the President remained silent on the Iraqi refugee crisis.Meanwhile, back in the U.S., State Department spokesman Gonzalo Gallegos has conceded that the U.S. is falling far short of its goal for taking in Iraqi translators and interpreters under threat for working with the United States in Iraq. But contained within his public acknowledgement was something even more disturbing. Gallegos suggested that the State Dept. is counting these specially-designated Iraqis against it's commitment to resettle 12,000 Iraqi refugees in FY 2008.
In fact, Senator Kennedy and Congress recently passed the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act that requires the admission of 5,000 Iraqis through expedited Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs) IN ADDITION TO whatever targets established by the Administration for Iraqi refugees. Furthermore, the Kennedy bill expands who is eligible to apply for SIVs beyond just translators and interpreters (a detail the major media outlets continue to overlook). The mechanism is also intended to help protect especially vulnerable Iraqis who belong to a group facing persecution.
Nevertheless, there is a reason why Iraqi translators and interpreters are getting most of the attention. According to the Washington Post:
Thousands of Iraqi translators have assisted U.S. forces since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, risking their lives and leaving their families vulnerable to retaliation from insurgents who see them as accomplices of American troops.Unfortunately, the State Department is not only lagging far behind its commitment to resettle 12,000 Iraqi refugees, it is now trying to confuse that commitment with a separate requirement by Congress to resettle 5,000 especially vulnerable Iraqis through SIVs. The total target that the State Dept. ought to reaffirm is 17,000 for FY 2008, which is still a tiny fraction of the 4.5 million Iraqis who have been displaced. All of that and Bush's ongoing silence about the entire refugee crisis has us very worried. We'll be listening to his State of the Union speech, scheduled for next Tuesday (Jan. 29th), with great interest.
More than 250 of the interpreters working with the United States -- or with U.S. contractors -- have been killed. But the U.S. asylum program for translators seeking to leave the country has fallen far short of demand and, at times, short of what other coalition countries have offered their Iraqi staff.
Thursday, January 10, 2008
Bush Must End Silence on Refugee Crisis
Bush has neglected visiting the Middle East, arguably the most strategically important part of the world, for seven years. But today, he is finally there, and finally encouraging efforts towards peace and prosperity in the region. Now, EPIC joins Refugees International and other organizations in calling on the President to end his silence on Iraq's refugee crisis, as well.Over 4.5 million Iraqis have been displaced since 2003, with nearly 2.5 million Iraqi civilians fleeing to neighboring countries and over 2 million displaced internally within Iraq. Refugees are overwhelming the basic infrastructure of Iraq’s neighbors, particularly Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, raising concerns about further destabilization of the region. Iraqis have no legal work options in most host countries, and are increasingly desperate. They face challenges in obtaining food, and have trouble accessing host countries’ health and education systems. Women and children are especially vulnerable, and a sense of frustration, despair and abandonment permeates communities of displaced Iraqis throughout the region.
At a time when Bush has expressed optimism about the prospect of regional dialogue, his administration must also engage proactively on Iraqi displacement and its impacts. The President's Middle East visit includes meetings with Arab leaders about developments in Iraq, as well as regional security and relations between the United States and these close allies. It is imperative that Bush use this visit to establish a robust international response to the humanitarian needs of displaced Iraqis.
President Bush must encourage the international community to contribute desperately needed financial and political support to the host countries to ensure that basic services are available for Iraqi refugees. The U.S. must also do more for refugees, directly. The current resettlement goal of 12,000 is too low. In order to begin living up to our responsibilities, we must commit to resettling at least 96,000 Iraqi refugees in the United States for FY 2008.
Unfortunately, the administration is failing to even meet its current goal. According to the Associated Press, “The steady decline — from 450 in October to 362 in November and 245 in December — means the administration will have to allow in 10,943 Iraqis over the next nine months, or roughly 1,215 per month, to meet the target it has set for itself.” Meanwhile, the administration is also failing to martial sufficient funding and resources to assist Iraq, Jordan, and other countries struggling to meet the needs of 4.5 million displaced Iraqis.As long as Bush remains silent about the crisis, his administration and the international community will continue to lack the resolve to respond to its urgency and magnitude. The value of a Presidential commitment to resolving this crisis cannot be overstated.
Monday, May 14, 2007
Iraqi Refugees and the Administration's (Lack of) Response
Military preemption and unilateral action are the centerpieces of the Bush Doctrine, a policy that has landed our country in the deadly quagmire that is Iraq. Having prompted a civil war, it follows that the United States bears the moral responsibility for handling the humanitarian situation and, by extension, the regional refugee crisis.
The Iraq Study Group says the U.S. should “take the lead in funding assistance requests from the UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies.” Rather than tackling the refugee problem directly, U.S. embassies do rely on the UNHCR’s referrals for immigration. But of the 3,000 UNHCR referrals, the U.S. has taken only 68 since the beginning of fiscal year 2007 (as I mentioned in my last entry).
Do a bit of research and you will find that, in nearly every way the U.S. could help Iraqi refugees, the government has fallen severely short. Even regarding Iraqis who have assisted the U.S. military and embassies - who seemingly everyone agrees should be a priority--we have set too low a standard. Murthy Law Firm notes that special immigration visas for translators were capped at fifty per fiscal year. This quota was reached just over a month after the beginning of fiscal year 2007.
The refugee crisis is all the more urgent given that Iraq’s neighbors are beginning to make flight from Iraq more difficult and, in some cases, are turning Iraqis back at the border. According to Refugees International and Human Rights Watch, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are placing increasing entry requirements for Iraqis. Syria and Jordan have taken in far more Iraqis than any other country in the Middle East, but new restrictions leave fewer options for those in greatest need.
Internally displaced persons (IDPs) number at 800,000 since February 2006 alone. A March 2007 Congressional Research Service report notes, “Iraq’s internal population displacement appears to be accelerating into a humanitarian crisis that is well beyond the current capacity on the ground.”
In particular, it appears the Department of Homeland Security has fallen short. The DHS, which gives the final green light for refugees to immigrate, “has yet to come up with a new screening process so that refugees can be vetted for security purposes,” says Al Kamen in today’s Washington Post. Kenneth Bacon, President of Refugees International, adds, “Until this is a top-level government concern, not much is going to happen.”
The U.S. has begun acknowledging its obligation toward Iraqi refugees. As I wrote in my last entry, Representative Earl Blumenauer (D-OR-3, right) proposed legislation to bring 20,000 Iraqis into the country this year. Bills such as this represent the first step in addressing the refugee crisis. There remains much work to be done in other parts of government. The Department of Homeland Security must, at very least, determine its new screening protocol and make the immigration process as efficient as possible while still maintaining security. The government also needs to earmark more than the meager $100 million promised for refugees by Paula Dobriansky, and much more than the $17 million appropriated for IDPs. Finally, the U.S. needs to work closely on the ground with the UNHCR, Iraq and its neighbors to alleviate this crisis.
Rep. Earl Blumenauer (D-OR-3) (EPIC Photo/Chris Breuer - 5/10/07)
The Iraq Study Group says the U.S. should “take the lead in funding assistance requests from the UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies.” Rather than tackling the refugee problem directly, U.S. embassies do rely on the UNHCR’s referrals for immigration. But of the 3,000 UNHCR referrals, the U.S. has taken only 68 since the beginning of fiscal year 2007 (as I mentioned in my last entry).
Do a bit of research and you will find that, in nearly every way the U.S. could help Iraqi refugees, the government has fallen severely short. Even regarding Iraqis who have assisted the U.S. military and embassies - who seemingly everyone agrees should be a priority--we have set too low a standard. Murthy Law Firm notes that special immigration visas for translators were capped at fifty per fiscal year. This quota was reached just over a month after the beginning of fiscal year 2007.
The refugee crisis is all the more urgent given that Iraq’s neighbors are beginning to make flight from Iraq more difficult and, in some cases, are turning Iraqis back at the border. According to Refugees International and Human Rights Watch, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are placing increasing entry requirements for Iraqis. Syria and Jordan have taken in far more Iraqis than any other country in the Middle East, but new restrictions leave fewer options for those in greatest need.
Internally displaced persons (IDPs) number at 800,000 since February 2006 alone. A March 2007 Congressional Research Service report notes, “Iraq’s internal population displacement appears to be accelerating into a humanitarian crisis that is well beyond the current capacity on the ground.”
In particular, it appears the Department of Homeland Security has fallen short. The DHS, which gives the final green light for refugees to immigrate, “has yet to come up with a new screening process so that refugees can be vetted for security purposes,” says Al Kamen in today’s Washington Post. Kenneth Bacon, President of Refugees International, adds, “Until this is a top-level government concern, not much is going to happen.”
The U.S. has begun acknowledging its obligation toward Iraqi refugees. As I wrote in my last entry, Representative Earl Blumenauer (D-OR-3, right) proposed legislation to bring 20,000 Iraqis into the country this year. Bills such as this represent the first step in addressing the refugee crisis. There remains much work to be done in other parts of government. The Department of Homeland Security must, at very least, determine its new screening protocol and make the immigration process as efficient as possible while still maintaining security. The government also needs to earmark more than the meager $100 million promised for refugees by Paula Dobriansky, and much more than the $17 million appropriated for IDPs. Finally, the U.S. needs to work closely on the ground with the UNHCR, Iraq and its neighbors to alleviate this crisis.
Rep. Earl Blumenauer (D-OR-3) (EPIC Photo/Chris Breuer - 5/10/07)
Labels:
Bush,
humanitarian crisis,
IDP,
refugee crisis,
Refugees International,
unhcr
Wednesday, May 02, 2007
Bush Vetoes Supplemental Spending Bill
As promised, President Bush vetoed Congress' $124 billion emergency supplemental yesterday, sending congressional Democrats back to the drawing board on the crucial spending legislation.
Since the president largely rejected bill because of its Oct. 1 deadline for beginning troop withdrawal, congressional leaders are now discussing new legislation that would remove the timetables but include specific benchmarks created to urge Iraqi leaders to reduce the violence. Increasingly perturbed by the president but unwilling to back a withdrawal plan, Republicans in the House and Senate seem primed to support a plan that includes benchmarks for Iraq's government, the LA Times speculates.
CNN reports: "'I do think there are some kinds of benchmarks that might well achieve bipartisan support and might actually even conceivably be helpful to the effort in Iraq,' the Kentucky Republican [Senator Mitch O'Connell] said. 'And that's what we're going to be looking for.'"
The benchmarks being discussed include passing laws on revenue sharing for oil output, national reconciliation, and sectarian violence. Interestingly, these are measures that President Bush himself has repeatedly urged Iraq's government to undertake.
The question remains as to how long the new legislation will take to be drafted, passed and implemented. As our leaders here in Washington continue to debate the bill -- and, as many argue, they continue to play out their partisan theatrics -- 100,000s of Iraqis continue to suffer. In addition to supporting our troops, the bill provides desperately-needed funds for relief and aid for millions of Iraqi families. While EPIC is urging Congress and President Bush to increase funding for this important work, we are also articulating the need to implement this legislation in a timely and efficient manner -- keeping partisan politics off the table.
After all, every day that passes means countless more innocent lives lost.
Since the president largely rejected bill because of its Oct. 1 deadline for beginning troop withdrawal, congressional leaders are now discussing new legislation that would remove the timetables but include specific benchmarks created to urge Iraqi leaders to reduce the violence. Increasingly perturbed by the president but unwilling to back a withdrawal plan, Republicans in the House and Senate seem primed to support a plan that includes benchmarks for Iraq's government, the LA Times speculates.
CNN reports: "'I do think there are some kinds of benchmarks that might well achieve bipartisan support and might actually even conceivably be helpful to the effort in Iraq,' the Kentucky Republican [Senator Mitch O'Connell] said. 'And that's what we're going to be looking for.'"
The benchmarks being discussed include passing laws on revenue sharing for oil output, national reconciliation, and sectarian violence. Interestingly, these are measures that President Bush himself has repeatedly urged Iraq's government to undertake.
The question remains as to how long the new legislation will take to be drafted, passed and implemented. As our leaders here in Washington continue to debate the bill -- and, as many argue, they continue to play out their partisan theatrics -- 100,000s of Iraqis continue to suffer. In addition to supporting our troops, the bill provides desperately-needed funds for relief and aid for millions of Iraqi families. While EPIC is urging Congress and President Bush to increase funding for this important work, we are also articulating the need to implement this legislation in a timely and efficient manner -- keeping partisan politics off the table.
After all, every day that passes means countless more innocent lives lost.
Friday, January 12, 2007
Can Iraq Deliver? (funding)
To show that it is committed to delivering a better life, the Iraqi government will spend $10 billion of its own money on reconstruction and infrastructure projects that will create new jobs." - From President Bush's Jan. 10 address to the nationHow on earth can Bush pledge that the Iraqi government will spend $10 billion of its own money on anything? In 2006, the Iraqi government had a budget of $6 billion, but in the end was only able to spend 20% of that. In early December I referenced this article by the NYT which explained:
"The country is facing this national failure to spend even as American financialOther factors include a high government turnover, security problems, actual corruption and a lack of Iraqis skilled at writing contracts and managing complex projects. I am sure that the Iraqi government is committed to delivering a better life for Iraqis, I'm just not sure that given the aforementioned issues, Bush can rely on these Iraqi billions.
support dwindles. Among reasons for the problems...is a strange new one: bureaucrats are so fearful and confused by anticorruption measures put in place by the American and Iraqi governments that they are afraid to sign off on contracts.
...the stringent measures they had favored to slow the rampant corruption may be
especially daunting for bureaucrats who have little experience with Western-style
regulations and oversight. Those officials say that Iraqis who have seen their
colleagues arrested and jailed in anticorruption sweeps are reluctant to put their own name on a contract."
Bush also declared:
"We endorse the Iraqi government's call to finalize an International Compact that will bring new economic assistance in exchange for greater economic reform."But will the countries that make up this compact be willing to provide Iraq with significant funds without being sure if Iraq can even utilize them?
Labels:
Bush,
corruption,
funding,
Iraq reconstruction,
strategy
Thursday, December 07, 2006
Bush Discusses the ISG Proposals
In a joint press conference with PM Blair, President Bush discussed the findings of the Iraq Study Group."The thing I liked about the Baker-Hamilton report is it discussed the way forward in Iraq. And I believe we need a new approach. And that's why I've tasked the Pentagon to analyze a way forward. That's why Prime Minister Blair is here to talk about the way forward, so we can achieve the objective, which is an Iraq which can govern itself, sustain itself and defend itself and be an ally in the war on terror."In other words: thanks, but no thanks. He goes on to say:
"The Congress is not going to accept every recommendation in the report, and neither will the administration. But there's a lot of, you know, very important things in the report that we ought to seriously consider."Regardless of whether the proposals suggested by the ISG have merit, one thing is clear: the study is meant to be taken as a whole. It addresses issues that are inextricably tied together and as such a strategy that favored only select recommendations is liable to fail.
It's not really news at this point, but Bush went on the record again to reject the idea of negotiating with Iran and Syria. On Iran specifically, Bush declared that he would not even begin to consider entering discussions with Iran as long as it pursues its nuclear enrichment program. While it is certainly true that negotiations with Iran are likely to go nowhere at this time, success in Iraq must involve its neighbors, and the U.S. cannot afford to slam the door on Iraq's most influential neighbor. I intend on posting more about the difficulties of negotiating with Iran and Syria later.
addendum: Many newspapers have been reporting that Bush has also rejected the report's other main recommendation, namely the pullout of troops in early 2008. The thing is, the report doesn't actually recomend that the U.S. redeploy its troops in Iraq at this time. It only states that it would be nice if the U.S. "could" do so.
"By the first quarter of 2008 … all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq. At that time, U.S. combat forces in Iraq could be deployed only in units embedded with Iraqi forces."Certainly all of their proposals seem geared towards achieving a responsible withdrawal in the near future; however, they never give a timetable for when the U.S. "should" withdraw its combat troops from Iraq.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)