Showing posts with label SOFA. Show all posts
Showing posts with label SOFA. Show all posts

Monday, August 24, 2009

Maliki Wants Referendum On SOFA In January 2010

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s cabinet submitted a draft law to parliament calling for a referendum on the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) to coincide with the January 2010 parliamentary election. The SOFA was originally passed in November 2008 by the Iraqi parliament. Alongside it was a second law, the Political Reform Document, which also called for power sharing in the government and security forces, and a referendum on the SOFA by July 2009. The Reform Document was pushed by the Iraqi Accordance Front, and was the only concession they were able to get from the negotiations over the SOFA. It was not binding however, which was why the referendum was not held on time, and there has been no change in the administration or army and police. There was also no one advocating for the referendum from within the parliament, Maliki’s cabinet, or the United States.

Now Maliki is on the campaign trail, and is portraying himself as the leader that got the Americans to leave Iraq. Maliki for example, called the June 30, 2009 withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq’s cities a national holiday and a great victory. If the Iraqi public votes the SOFA down in January, which American officials seem to believe will happen, the U.S. will have one year to withdraw its forces. As the policy now stands, the Obama administration plans to accomplish that by December 31, 2011. In pushing for the referendum, Maliki needs to balance the continued need for U.S. support with his desire for a nationalist image. He appears to be going for the route that will assure him the most votes.

SOURCES

Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Sunni Arab support key to US-Iraq security deal,” Associated Press, 11/25/08

Ashton, Adam, Landay, Jonathan and Youssef, Nancy, “U.S. staying silent on its view of Iraq pact until after vote,” McClatchy Newspapers, 11/26/08

Aswat al-Iraq, “Iraqi govt. allocates $100 million for referendum on security agreement,” 6/9/09

Domergue, Jeremy and Cochrane, Marisa, “Balancing Maliki,” Institute for Understanding War, June 2009

Londono, Ernesto, “Iraq May Hold Vote On U.S. Withdrawal,” Washington Post, 8/18/09

Mohsen, Amer, “Iraq Papers Mon: Tragedy Near Kirkuk,” IraqSlogger.com, 6/21/09

Rubin, Alissa, “Iraq Marks Withdrawal of U.S. Troops From Cities,” New York Times, 6/30/09

Rubin, Alissa, Robertson, Campbell and Farrell, Stephen, “Iraqi Parliament Approves U.S. Security Pact,” New York Times, 11/27/08

Tuesday, July 14, 2009

More On The SOFA Referendum

By the end of this month, July 2009, there was supposed to be a referendum on the Status of Forces Agreement, which set the relationship between the U.S. and Iraq. That’s not going to happen now. Instead, the latest word out of Baghdad is that if the vote is held at all, it will coincide with the January 2010 parliamentary election.

During the negotiations over the SOFA in Iraq’s parliament in 2008, the Sunni Iraqi Accordance Front was worried that the deal would give too much power to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. They successfully pushed for a Political Reform Document that was passed alongside the SOFA on November 27, 2008. The Reform Document called for power sharing in the government and security forces, and a July 2009 referendum on the security agreement. Maliki gave into the Accordance Front’s demands, because Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani had demanded widespread support for the deal, and the Front was one of the main Sunni coalitions in parliament and members of Maliki’s cabinet. The Reform Document wasn’t binding however. That’s why there has been no power sharing with Sunnis in the government since the bill was passed, and the referendum will not happen on its original date. It was simply a way to appease the Accordance Front and get them to support the SOFA.

If the referendum is delayed until January 2010 that would give Iraqi officials enough time to prepare for it. First the parliament needs to pass a law regulating the election and that sets aside a budget. The Iraqi Election Commission then needs two months to set up the actual election process.

The vote could have dramatic consequences for both U.S. and Iraqi politics. First, if the SOFA is voted down, the U.S. would have one year to withdraw from the country. As of now, the Obama administration has set December 31, 2011 as the date it will have all of its combat troops out of Iraq. If the SOFA doesn’t pass, American troops would have to leave by January 2011. Within Iraq, Prime Minister Maliki could also use the referendum against his political opponents. The Kurdish Alliance and the Accordance Front are two major opponents of Maliki in parliament, and both want the U.S. to stay to check his power. Since 2008 Maliki has been challenging the Kurds in the disputed territories in northern Iraq, as well as arresting selected Sons of Iraq (SOI) members, many of which are aligned with the Accordance Front. The U.S. has stepped in several times to mediate possible military confrontations between the Kurdish and Iraqi security forces, and to release some SOI members. Having the Americans leave is very popular in Iraq right now, so Maliki could use this against these two coalitions in the parliamentary vote.

Iraq is not a country ruled by law. Despite the Political Reform Document calling for a July 2009 referendum on the SOFA, it’s not likely to happen. Rather domestic Iraqi politics seem to be pushing it back to coincide with the January 2010 parliamentary election. It’s unknown how the Iraqi public will vote if the referendum is held, but the opposing Iraqi parties will definitely use it, and that will ultimately determine whether the U.S. timeline for withdrawal will be maintained or have to be dramatically revised.

SOURCES

Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Iraq Shiites, Kurds meet Sunni demand on US pact,” Associated Press, 11/26/08
- “Sunni Arab support key to US-Iraq security deal,” Associated Press, 11/25/08

Alsumaria, “Iraq-US pact referendum likely to be delayed,” 7/3/09

Ashton, Adam and Fadel, Leila, “Iraqi cabinet Okays U.S. troop withdraw, Parliament could scuttle,” McClatchy Newspapers, 11/16/08

Aswat al-Iraq, “IAF will not support pact – al-Dulaimi,” 11/17/08
- “Security deal to pass 5 stages before approval,” 11/17/08

Domergue, Jeremy and Cochrane, Marisa, “Balancing Maliki,” Institute for Understanding War, June 2009

Gwertzman, Bernard, “Iraq at Crossroads Amid U.S. Disengagement,” Council on Foreign Relations, 6/30/09

Hamad, Qassim Khidhir, “looming u.s. troop withdrawal creates alarm in mosul,” Niqash, 6/11/09

Mohsen, Amer, “Iraq Papers Mon: Tragedy Near Kirkuk,” IraqSlogger.com, 6/21/09

Parker, Ned, “Corruption plays key role in Iraqi justice,” Los Angeles Times, 6/29/09

Rubin, Alissa, Robertson, Campbell and Farrell, Stephen, “Iraqi Parliament Approves U.S. Security Pact,” New York Times, 11/27/08

Friday, October 24, 2008

Shiite Rivalries Increasing As Provincial Elections Near

The following commentary originally appeared in Musings On Iraq

The followers of Moqtada al-Sadr are coming under increasing fire. As reported earlier, on October 9, 2008, Sadrist member of parliament Saleh al-Auqaeili was assassinated in a bombing near Sadr City. Sadr’s followers initially blamed the U.S. for the death, which led to a brief clash between the Mahdi Army and Iraqi and U.S. forces, in Baghdad. Later, they blamed criminals gangs, which has usually meant breakaway Sadrist elements or Iranian backed Special Groups. On October 20, Alsumaria TV reported that two suspected culprits were arrested for the assault. They were members of the local electricity directorate, which gave them access to the area that was near an Iraqi army checkpoint, and patrolled by the United States. Iraqi authorities said they came from Sadr City and belonged to an outlaw group.

There are also more reports pointing towards a growing gap between Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s Dawa party and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC). Together they make up two-thirds of the coalition behind Maliki’s government and are both members of the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance (UIA). However, the UIA largely exists in name only as the Dawa and the SIIC are planning on running against each other in the upcoming provincial elections. This increasing divide is being played out in places like Babil, Qadisiyah, Nasiriyah, Maysan provinces, and Baghdad. In June when Maliki sent forces against the Sadrists in Maysan, the security forces tore down posters of SIIC leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim. A few months later, the SIIC protested a new police chief sent to Nasiriyah by the Interior Ministry. In late September, an Iraqi Army unit and U.S. forces raided the headquarters of the SIIC’s Badr Brigade in Hilla, the capital of Babil. The SIIC governor claimed they only had AKs for personal defense, but Iraqi forces said they came away with missiles and IEDs. In October, a dinner celebrating the end of Ramadan by the al-Fatla tribe in Qadisiyah was interrupted by SIIC controlled police. The sheikh from the tribe had recently agreed to head the government funded Tribal Support Council. As noted earlier, the councils are an attempt by Maliki to build up his support in the south. The SIIC has condemned their formation. Finally, a draft of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the U.S. and Iraq to maintain a U.S. presence in the country after United Nations authorization expires on December 31, 2008 was passed to government officials. SIIC leader Hakim said his party had kept silent on the issue because if it failed, they wanted the blame to fall on Maliki.

All of these developments are linked to the inter-Shiite struggle for power in the face of upcoming elections. The Sadrists, Maliki’s Dawa, and the Supreme Council, once all allies in the United Alliance, are now rivals. They will all be competing for provincial council seats across the Shiite south and Baghdad. This has led to an up tick in assassinations as in the case of Saleh al-Auqaeili, and increasing political disputes between Maliki and the SIIC. When the elections actually happen, they could lead to the rise of new independent parties and individual politicians, a redistribution of power amongst the Sadrists, SIIC, and Dawa, or violence between them to hold onto or increase their position.

For more on the SIIC-Maliki/Dawa split see:

Maliki Responds To His Critics On Tribal Support Councils

Disputes Over Tribal Support Councils

For more on assassinations of Sadrists see:

Another Sadrist Assassinated

Sadrist Cleric Assassinated In Basra

SOURCES
Alsumaria, “2 perpetrators involved in Sadrist MP assassination arrested,” 10/20/08
Fleishman, Jeffrey, “Shiite fighters clash with Iraqi, U.S. troops in Baghdad,” Los Angeles Times, 10/10/08
Hendawi, Hamza and Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Shiite split could complicate Iraqi efforts to approve security pact with US,” Associated Press, 10/16/08
Klapper, Bradley, “Thousands of al-Sadr supporters mourn lawmaker,” Associated Press, 10/10/08
Levinson, Charles and Nabhan, Ali, “Iraqi tribes caught between rival Shiite parties,” USA Today, 10/20/08
Parker, Sam, “ISCI/Da’wa alliance showing strain,” Abu Muqawama Blog, 9/17/08
Reuters, “U.S. Pact Hits Snag As Iraqi Shi’a Seek Changes,” 10/19/08
Visser, Reidar, “More Tension between the Iraqi Security Forces and the Badr Brigades, This
Time in Hilla,” Historiae.org, 9/29/08
Voices of Iraq, “SIIC denies it had banned arms in Babel office,” 9/29/08
 
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