Iraq’s 2009 Drought

Iraq is facing a drought again. Officially, it has been going on for the last two years. Unofficially the United Nations says four. The lack of rain, no government water policy, and population growth are the main causes, but Baghdad has been blaming its neighbors as well. Iran, Syria, and Turkey have all built dams that affect Iraq’s two main rivers, the Euphrates and Tigris, along with smaller tributaries. Iraq needs 500 cubic meters per second from both major rivers according to the Water Ministry, but as of August 2009 was only receiving 440 cubic meters per second from the Euphrates and 100-160 cubic meters from the Tigris. All four countries have been holding meetings over water issues, with few results.

Together these problems are having larger and larger effects upon Iraq’s agriculture, rural areas, and power supply. Iraq’s rice production has dropped from 500,000 tons per year to 250,000 tons. Wheat has declined from 3.5 million tons to 1 million tons. As a result, Iraq has become one of the largest food importers in the world, when it was self-sufficient in the 1980s. It will need to import 4 million tons of wheat alone this year, at a cost of $1.4 billion. Overall, Iraq will have to buy 80% of its food needs this year. The drought is also leading to population shifts. 3,000 people in Basra have left their homes because of rising salt levels in the land. In Ninewa, 60 out of 150 villages in the Al-Tal district are deserted in what was once the most productive wheat and barley area of the province. 90% of the land is also desert or suffering from desertification. A report by the European Water Associated warned that Iraq could become barren like Saudi Arabia if something isn’t done. Hydroelectric power production is also down. In the city of Nasiriyah in Dhi Qar province, two of four turbines have been shut down because water levels are so low.

With no government planning, little money to support farmers, minimal international aid, and a lack of cooperation so far from its neighbors, Iraq’s water situation is likely to get worse before it gets better. More rain is likely to be the only respite, otherwise it will face another year of drought, whose effects are spreading from the countryside to Iraq’s cities with migration, decreased power production, and food imports.



Farmland Affected
Affected farmland 36,919 square kilometers
Total farmland 96,706 square kilometers
% of affected farmland 38.7%
Babil, Irbil, Ninewa, Salahaddin, Tamim, – 46-56%
Dhi Qar, Diyala, Maysan – 31-45%
Baghdad, Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiyah – 26-30%
Anbar, Basra, Muthanna, Wasit – 6-25%
Sulaymaniya – 4-5%
Dohuk – 0%

SOURCES

Blua, Antoine, “Iraq Tussles With Neighbors Over Water,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 9/13/09

Chulov, Martin, “Water shortage threatens two million people in southern Iraq,” Guardian, 8/26/09

DiPaola, Anthony and Alexander, Caroline, “Iraq Drought Cuts Harvest, Boosts Imports as Oil Cash Slips,” Bloomberg, 8/5/09

Hope, Bradley, “Iraq digs in to rebuild agricultural sector,” The National, 8/30/09

Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit, “The Humanitarian Situation In Iraq, Inter-Agency Fact Sheet,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, August 2009

IRIN, “IRAQ: Drought hits rice, wheat staples,” 8/31/09b

Kamal, Adel, “desertification destroys ninawa villages,” Niqash, 7/17/09

Raphaeli, Dr. Nimrod, “Water Crisis in Iraq: The Growing Danger of Desertification,” The Middle East Media Institute, 7/23/09

Sly, Liz, “Iraq in throes of environmental catastrophe, experts say,” Los Angeles Times, 7/30/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 7/30/09

Tharp, Mike, “Once world’s bread basket, Iraq now a farming basket case,” McClatchy Newspapers, 7/17/09

Williams, Timothy, “Idle Iraqi Date Farm Show Decline of Economy,” New York Times, 8/15/09

May 2009 International Organization for Migration Report On Iraq's Displaced

At the end of May 2009 the International Organization for Migration (IOM) released its latest report on Iraq's displaced. They specifically are worried about the fate of the two million plus Iraqis that have not returned home yet. They note that while thousands of displaced have gone back to their original provinces, the vast majority have not. Both groups continue to face problems such as finding work and housing, and gaining access to services and assistance. The IOM is concerned that many of these Iraqis will become permanent refugees.

Since 2007 the IOM has noted that Iraqis displaced after the February 2006 Samarra bombing, which triggered the sectarian war, have begun to return. The IOM has counted 49,464 of these families, or 296,598 people, that have come back. Only 7%, of those, 3,443 families, were refugees. That is a small fraction of the estimated 1.6 million that lost their homes after the 2006 attack. They have gone back to 765 different locations in Iraq. 90% of the post-Samarra displaced came from Baghdad, Diyala and Ninewa, so it should be no surprise that those three provinces, plus Anbar have seen the most returns. Qadisiyah, Muthanna, and Dhi Qar had the least with 44, 64, and 108 families respectively. 61% of displaced families surveyed said they wanted to go home.

Post-Feb. 2006 Displaced And Refugee Family Returns (Not Including Kurdistan)

Province	Returning Families	% That Are Refugee Families
Iraq	49,464	7%
Baghdad	31,497	4%
Diyala	8,779	1%
Anbar	4,536	27%
Ninewa	1,602	1%
Maysan	626	49%
Tamim	620	37%
Basra	500	0%
Karbala	298	21%
Babil	258	9%
Najaf	215	55%
Salahaddin	191	35%
Dhi Qar	108	31%
Muthanna	64	88%
Qadisiyah	44	23%

A major factor in returning is the proximity of the displaced to their original homes. 68% of the families that came back resided within their home province. That compared to 21% that were in another province, and 11% that came back from another country. That varied however across each province. In Muthanna and Najaf for example, 100% of the returnees were refugees, while none of those that came back to Basra and Ninewa were in foreign nation beforehand.

Origins Of Returnees By Province

Location	Refugees	Displaced Within Same Province	Displaced In Another Province
TOTAL	11%	68%	21%
Anbar	36%	52%	12%
Babil	15%	52%	33%
Baghdad	6%	71%	23%
Basra	0%	0%	100%
Diyala	6%	61%	33%
Karbala	92%	0%	8%
Maysan	0%	0%	100%
Muthanna	100%	0%	0%
Najaf	100%	0%	0%
Ninewa	0%	100%	0%
Salahaddin	88%	13%	0%
Tamim	58%	11%	31%
Wasit	50%	0%	50%

Conditions in Iraq appeared to be another major reason why families come back. 36.7% of returnees interviewed by the IOM said that better security was the top cause for returning. That was followed by 35.7% that believed a combination of improved security and difficult conditions where they lived was the major factor. Only 15.5% felt that they left because of the hardships they were going through.

Reasons For Return

Reasons for Return	%
Improved security in home area	36.7%
Improved security in home area and difficult conditions	35.7%
Very difficult conditions	15.5%
Other	5.8%
Government returnee payments	4.2%
Improved security in home area, difficult conditions, returnee payments	1.8%
Very difficult conditions and returnee payments	0.3%

The majority of families feel safe after their returns, but there are still some troubling incidents. 59.6% of those polled by the IOM said they felt safe all of the time after going back, while 39.4% said they only felt safe some of the time. There are various anecdotal stories of attacks and threats against displaced. In the Dora neighborhood of Baghdad an IED targeted displaced. Eighteen families in Abu Ghraib came back, but couldn't stay in their homes and became displaced again. Two families from Diyala went back, but were attacked by a militia, which led to the death of two family members. They left the province again as a result. According to IraqSlogger, in Adhamiya, Baghdad, the Sons of Iraq put "X"s on the houses of Shiites that had been displaced telling them not to come back in April 2009. The state of their property is another issue for returnees. 49.1% said that their houses were in good condition, but 38.7% found some damage to them.

The government has also been actively encouraging Iraqis to come back. Baghdad offered $851 for families that did. The authorities have recently announced that they were no longer registering people anymore, which was a prerequisite to receive the money. Not many returnees signed up for this program in the first place, and the government paid even fewer. The IOM found that only 44% of those surveyed had applied for the money, and of those, only 36% said they got it.

For those still displaced, finding work, services, and aid are major problems. 50.4% of male-headed households were out of work, and 97.3% of female-led ones were. Overall, 35% of those surveyed said they could work, but couldn't find a job. Salahaddin, 75%, Muthanna 70%, and Babil, 64%, had the highest responses in that category. In total, 56% of the displaced are unemployed. 64.2% of those surveyed claimed they had six hours or less of electricity. 83.8% did say they had access to the national water system, but that doesn't mean that it is potable. Almost all of the displaced, 98%, said they had their food ration card, but their access varied. 32% said they regularly got their rations, 60% said it was irregular, and 8% said they never got them. Ninewa was the worst with 99% saying they got their rations infrequently. Getting health care also varied greatly from province to province. 90% or more in Anbar, Maysan, Muthanna, Najaf, Ninewa and Salahaddin said they had adequate access, while 57% of returnees in Baghdad, 65% in Basra, and 78% in Tamim claimed they had none. When asked what their greatest needs were, displaced families said food, 63%, fuel, 51%, and health care, 40% were the top priorities. 88% also said they had received no aid outside of the government.

Unemployment

Total: 44% employed, 56% unemployed

Male-headed household: 49.6% employed, 50.4% unemployed

Female-headed household: 2.7% employed, 97.3% unemployed

Overall the IOM is worried about what will happen to the millions of Iraqis that have lost their homes because of the war. Only a small fraction has returned, and those that haven't face a plethora of problems, most importantly finding work and food. Those that have come back also face a similar set of problems. Neither the government, nor non-government organizations such as the IOM have the resources to deal with such a large population. The fear is that many of them will simply have to fend for themselves, perhaps creating a permanent class of displaced both within and without of Iraq for the foreseeable future.

SOURCES

International Organization for Migration, "IOM Emergency Needs Assessments; Post February 2006 Displacement In Iraq, Monthly Report," 4/1/09

- "IOM Monitoring And Needs Assessments of Iraqi Return, May 2009," May 2009

Smith, Daniel and al-Timimi, Yousif, "Residents: Some Sahwa Still Keeping Shi'a Out," IraqSlogger.com, 4/21/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003

The first chapter of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” review of the U.S. effort to rebuild Iraq focuses upon the pre-war planning. That began in the fall of 2001 and went up right through the U.S. invasion. This period was characterized by three main trends. First, the Defense and State Departments had diametrically opposed views of what Iraq would be like after the war. Second, there was little to no coordination between the different groups working on post-war planning, even within the same agency. Finally, a best-case scenario was adopted as the operative model by the White House, which shaped all the subsequent planning.

Planning for the Iraq war began towards the end of 2001. On November 21, 2001 President Bush ordered Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to review the Pentagon’s strategy for invading Iraq. Even before that in September, Rumsfeld had already begun working on the Iraq war plan. This led to the Defense and State Departments as well as the National Security Council to eventually begin thinking about post-war Iraq.

At that time Iraq was in a state of disrepair due to Saddam’s rule, the Gulf War, and international sanctions. After the Gulf War Saddam had tried to rebuild Iraq’s infrastructure but it wasn’t successful. The non-oil sector was hit especially hard. By the mid-1990s unemployment and underemployment were over 50%. Gross Domestic Product, which peaked at $74.9 billion in 1990, dropped to below $20 billion for the rest of the decade. Iraq, which was a middle class Arab country before the Gulf War, became a poor underdeveloped one afterwards. 60% of the population depended upon the government food rations system, which wasn’t able to stop malnutrition from occurring. This led to the United Nations’ Oil For Food Program in 1995. That was manipulated both by the government, the U.N., and criminal gangs, and led to massive corruption. One thing the program did provide was an intimate look into the Iraqi economy and its needs. Unfortunately, none of that was looked at by the United States before the invasion.

On September 29, 2001 Secretary Rumsfeld ordered an internal review of the invasion plans for Iraq. Almost all of the planning focused solely upon the military side of the operation, because the Pentagon believed that the State Department would deal with the post-war situation. On December 28 Rumsfeld briefed President Bush. The Secretary stressed three themes that he would stay with until he left office. He said that the invasion would be over fast and quick. Afterwards the U.S. would turn power over to Iraqis, and the American troops would be out quickly. One of Rumsfeld’s deputies Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith continually stressed that the U.S. was going to act as liberators not occupiers. That meant Iraqi sovereignty as soon as possible after the war. Rumsfeld and Feith both thought this would make the Iraqis deal with their own problems, and not get the U.S. caught up in nation building. To support their argument the Pentagon pointed to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. Following this model also meant that the U.S. would not be responsible for rebuilding Iraq.

The State Department developed a completely different point of view. They considered the sectarian divisions within Iraq, and believed that it would take years for the country to be rebuilt and stabilized. They also didn’t think that Iraq would be like Afghanistan or that Iraqi leaders would emerge after the invasion that could take over the country. Secretary of State Colin Powell famously told President Bush that if the U.S. invaded they would be the ones that would be left to pick up the pieces. Powell warned that there would be no government and no law and order, meaning that the Iraqis would be looking to the U.S. for leadership. This conflict between Defense and State shaped the pre-war planning on Iraq with the dispute never being resolved.

In early 2002 the State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs created the Future of Iraq Project. It included 200 Iraqi exiles and experts, and was the largest study done within the government on Iraq. Its major drawbacks were that it was not an operational plan, but rather background information for the administration of Iraq, and was never presented to Secretary Powell as a counter to the Pentagon’s vision. The project was broken up into various working groups, some of which provided high quality material, while others never finished. The basic premise was that the U.S. was going to have to run Iraq after the war, and that this should be a civilian job with the goal of building up democratic institutions before Iraqis could take over. The Coalition Provisional Authority later took up this position.

In the spring of 2003 the White House became involved in Iraq planning when the National Security Council started holding meetings on the topic. In early 2003 the National Security Council’s Deputies bean holding twice-weekly conferences on Iraq. They came up with three alternatives for post-invasion Iraq. One was Iraqis quickly taking over, the second was military rule through the Central Command, and the third was a civilian government, perhaps under the United Nations. They also addressed three major concerns: security, reconstruction, and creating a pro-U.S. stable Iraq.

Which approach the United States would follow was not decided until August 2002. On August 29 the White House issued “Iraq: Goals, Objectives, Strategy.” It said that the U.S. was committed to overthrowing Saddam, and that it would work with Iraqi exiles to liberate Iraq, not occupy it. Those were wins for the Pentagon. However it did say that the U.S. would be involved in the reconstruction of Iraq, something the State Department stressed.

After the paper was released the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the National Security Council, and the Pentagon increased their efforts. The JCS ordered the Central Command (CENTCOM) to begin planning for post-war Iraq. Two Army majors that worked in Bosnia were given the task. That went against the preferences of Rumsfeld who wanted the U.S. out as quickly as possible. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice also had a steering group on Iraq created. Over at the Defense Department Undersecretary Feith created the Office of Special Plans. The major problem was that while work on Iraq was accelerating in the fall of 2002 none of it was coordinated, and there was little sharing of ideas and information. The compartmentalization of these different groups led to a highly disjointed set of ideas.

One example was the National Security Council’s (NSC) humanitarian group. Elliot Abrams and Robin Cleveland of the Office of Management and Budget led it. It was created in September 2002 with members from the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Joint Chiefs, the Defense, State, Treasure, Justice, and Commerce departments. They considered the effects of Iraq using chemical weapons, a possible refugee crisis, the U.N.’s Oil for Food program, and what targets not to hit during the war. It also wanted to get Iraq up and running as quickly as possible after the war ended. A major problem was that it had very little information about what Iraq was like. They knew that sanctions had hurt the country, but decided that its oil wealth would pay for any reconstruction. Just as important it had no interaction with the other NSC groups working on military, political, and democratization affairs.

Over at the Pentagon, planning was often vague and based upon best-case scenarios. Different officials were often told that there were plans for post-war security, but there were no actual meetings about it. The Defense Department also followed Rumsfeld’s belief that the war would be short, there would be little damage to Iraq in the process, the country’s oil would pay for everything, an Iraqi leader would emerge, and that would allow the U.S. a quick exit.

On October 15, 2001 Undersecretary Feith briefed the National Security Council on CENTCOM’s planning. They came up with three phases for postwar Iraq. First there would be military control. Second a U.S. civilian authority would take over, and then finally, Iraqi leaders would emerge and the U.S. would turn power over to them and then leave. The military had no timeline for how long this process would take. Feith also said that Rumsfeld should be in charge during this time, allowing for unity of command after the war. This idea led to interagency arguments that lasted for two months.

At the same time, the administration wanted to keep all their work secret. On October 18 for example, Rumsfeld asked Feith to create an official postwar planning office, but then rescinded that order shortly afterwards. That was because the White House had decided that the government could not openly plan for postwar Iraq when it had not declared war yet, and publicly said it was trying to avoid it.

Work continued with some of the most informative coming from the worst-case scenario papers. In October Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Feith, and the Joint Chiefs came up with a memo on 29 things that could go wrong in Iraq. Some of them were not finding weapons of mass destruction, sectarian fighting, not being able to find Saddam, Iraq breaking apart, the U.S. being there for 10 years, occupation costs skyrocketing, and world opinion turning against the war. Rumsfeld briefed the NSC and the president on this paper at a NSC meeting. In December Powell received a similar paper partially written by Ryan Crocker, the future U.S. ambassador to Iraq. It warned of a possible sectarian war for power that could lead to the dissolution of the country.

Outside and inside the government there were also warnings about what could happen in post-war Iraq. A review of the U.S.’s efforts at nation-building showed that of the sixteen countries the U.S. intervened in only four West Germany, Japan, Panama, and Grenada stayed democratic ten years after the U.S. left. Three, Cuba, Haiti, and Nicaragua got worse. Academics also noted that Iraq was not like Germany and Japan after World War II. Both were rich, developed, homogenous countries with bureaucracies. That was largely lacking in Iraq. The planning for the occupation of those two countries also started shortly after Pearl Harbor and took years to develop. The U.S. was trying to plan for Iraq on the fly. The National Intelligence Council released a paper in January 2003 that said setting up a democracy in Iraq would be a long and arduous process. In February the Army War College put out a report that said Iraq could fall into civil war because of the ethnic and sectarian divisions in the country, that the armed forces would have to be completely rebuilt, and that rebuilding the country would be a huge effort after the economy had been devastated by sanctions. It also warned that the longer the U.S. stayed, the more resistance would grow to their presence. These reports had little affect on planning however.

Overall the administration’s effort to deal with post-war Iraq was uncoordinated and fragmented. The National Security Council and Condoleezza Rice were supposed to manage policy, but State and Defense largely worked on their own. The various NSC planning groups acted separately as well. The NSC also did not consult with many key agencies until very late in the game. That meant there was no coherent strategy in the White House on what to do about Iraq after the war was over. Many including Secretary Powell, Undersecretary Feith, and a biography have blamed Rice for her weak leadership at the time, and said the administration was dysfunctional during this period. “Hard Lessons” believes part of that was due to the workings of the bureaucracy, but it also reflected the divisive views of the main decision makers. Rumsfeld for example, thought that the U.S. should be in and out of Iraq as quickly as possible, so the U.S. didn’t need to address any of the country’s big problems, while Powell predicted a long occupation. In the fall of 2002 the White House picked a mix of both views, but did not have a single, unified plan of how it was to work.

SOURCES

Collins, Joseph, “Choosing War: The Decision to Invade Iraq and Its Aftermath,” Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, April 2008

PBS Frontline, “INTERVIEWS Elisabeth Bumiller,” Bush’s War, 3/24/08
- “INTERVIEWS Karen DeYoung,” Bush’s War, 3/24/08

Ricks, Thomas, Fiasco, The American Military Adventure In Iraq, 2006

Ricks, Thomas and DeYoung, Karen, “Ex-Defense Official Assails Colleagues Over Run-Up to War,” Washington Post, 3/9/08

Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09

Woodward, Bob, State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III, 2006

Dec. 08-Jan. 09 U.N. Humanitarian Update – Iraq

In late February 2009 the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs released its latest humanitarian report on Iraq. The paper is a compilation of several others by UNICEF, Oxfam, and the International Organization for Migration, many of which have been reported here before, but also includes some new reporting as well. The humanitarian update focuses upon six main topics: refugees and the displaced, violence, women’s issues, children, Iraq’s food ration system, and health.

The Displaced

Returning refugees is a growing issue in Iraq. The number of Iraqis coming home has increased from 2007 to 2008. In 2007 an estimated 36,000 displaced people came back, compared to 195,240 in 2008. 25,000 refugees from other countries have also returned over those two years. In 2008 an average of 1,650 displaced families came back each month with the highest numbers during July, August and September, but then declining for the remaining three months of the year. Many have gone back to Baghdad, the sight of most of the displacement in the country. Other families wish to go back as well, but don’t have the financial means to.

The government has offered $432 to families that return from another province, and $216 to those that go back home within their own governorate. Baghdad began this program in October 2008, but it’s not clear whether it will continue in 2009. The Ministry of Displacement and Migration announced in February 2009 for example, that it had run out of funds for this program.

Many of those coming back face a number of problems finding basic necessities. Electricity is spotty, as well as access to public services and health care. Most importantly is finding housing. 41.8% of displaced families surveyed said they had no access to their property. 16.7% said they do have access, and 38.7% said they don’t know the status of their former homes. Of those that could go back 35% said their homes ere currently occupied. 22.1% said their homes were destroyed, 8.6% said they couldn’t go back to them because of security conditions, 2.5% said the military was using their property, while 0.5% said the government had taken it over.

In 2008 the Ministry of Displacement and Migration began plans to build housing projects for the displaced that could not go back home, but many of those plans have been put on hold because of budget cuts. Originally the Ministry was to be given $43.2 million for building housing projects in the 2009 budget, but that amount was slashed to $6.85 million because of the declining revenues from oil.

There are also restrictions and problems the displaced face when trying to receive aid from the government or retrieve their property. First, not all have registered with the Ministry of Displacement and Migration, which is a requirement to receive payments. Only Iraqis that left between January 1, 2006 and January 1, 2008 are covered. The amount of aid offered by the government is also not much, especially for those that had their homes destroyed. Iraqis that rented will probably not be able to get their places back, while those that sold, no matter what the situation, have no recourses. There are also some stories of returnees being threatened and attacked, and being forced to flee again. Finally, women have a much harder time coming up with the requirements to regain their property or get government assistance.

Both the United Nations and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) have programs for the internally displaced, but they are only reaching a fraction of the total. The U.N. has created Protection Assistance Centers for example that have only helped 26,677 people out of around 2 million internally displaced. The IOM has care packages for the displaced, but are only operating in Baghdad, Anbar, Irbil and Basra, and have only given them out to around 2,200 families, approximately 13,200 people.

Violence

Violence, especially against civilians, continues in Iraq, but at much lower levels than before. The number of civilian casualties from December 2008 to January 2009 for example decreased. In December 275 civilians were killed and 854 wounded compared to 192 killed and 591 wounded in January. Two to three dozen bodies are also found on the streets each month. On average thirteen Iraqis civilians were killed per day in 2008. Members of the Iraqi security forces are also targets with 83 killed and 200 wounded in December, and 99 killed and 231 wounded in January. In total 392 Iraqis were killed and 1,054 wounded in December, and 335 died in January, and 1,085 wounded.

Women’s Issues

The U.N. has growing concerns about the state of Iraq’s women. A 2008 report found that women headed 10.2% of Iraq’s households. There are also around 1 million widows in the country. These Iraqis are largely ignored in society, and have a much harder time providing for their families. A 2008 survey of the Iraqi and Middle Eastern press found that only 1% of stories were about women. More than half were about violence, and 20% more were on female suicide bombers. The Iraqi Minister of Women’s Affairs also recently resigned in February 2009 claiming that the government was providing her with few funds, but there are reports that she will go back to her job. Calling attention to their plight, a group of widows held a demonstration in Baghdad calling for government aid on International Women’s Day in March.

Female Headed Households By Province
Basra 5.6%
Najaf 6.8%
Babil 6.9%
Anbar 8.6%
Maysan 8.6%
Salahaddin 8.6%
Wasit 8.8%
Dohuk 10%
Tamim 10.1%
Ninewa 10.2%
Dhi Qar 10.6%
Qadisiyah 10.6%
Diyala 11.2%
Karbala 11.4%
Muthanna 11.8%
Sulaymaniya 11.8%
Baghdad 12.2%
Irbil 12.5%

Children

Children in northern Iraq are facing bad conditions. Schools visited by UNICEF in Diyala and Dohuk were overcrowded, lacked clean water, and sanitation. More than 900 children were also found in Kirkuk begging. Half of them were displaced.

Food

The Iraqi government began its food rations system in 1995 under the U.N.’s Oil for Food program. 95% of Iraqis support the system. In 2007 the Ministry of Trade, which controls it, was going to cut the handouts in half because a lack of funds, but the 2008 supplemental budget stopped that. In 2009 the Ministry of Trade still has plans to reduce the program, this time limiting it only to the poor. The packages cost the government $0.50 per person.

Health

The Ministry of Health is concerned about a measles outbreak. In 2008 6,000 cases were reported in nine provinces. They were also worried that it would spread to Najaf, Sulaymaniya, Irbil, Maysan, and Dohuk. That would place up to 800,000 children at risk. The government is telling families that they need to get their kids vaccinated, and is trying to create a new health program to deal with it.

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “Widows urge govt. to support them economically, socially,” 3/9/09

Salaheddin, Sinan, “Iraq’s women’s minister to withdraw resignation,” Associated Press, 3/9/09

Al-Shawfi, Mundher, “Iraqi government careless about its own refugees – minister,” Azzaman, 2/27/09

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Humanitarian Update Iraq, December 2008-January 2009” United Nations, 1/31/09

Latest United Nations Numbers On Baghdad Province

Baghdad province is a paradox. It is one of the richest in the country, yet has pockets of deep poverty. Security is improving throughout the country and the capital, but it still has the most violence. Electricity production has increased yet half of Baghdad suffers from sever power outages. The United Nations’ Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit recently released a paper detailing the situation in the capital province.

Population

Baghdad has the largest, most urbanized population in Iraq. There are 7,145,470 people there, which is 24% of the total population. 87% live in urban areas, 13% in rural ones. The province is divided into nine major districts: Abu Ghraib, Adhamiyah, Kadhimiyah, Karkh, Madain, Mahmudiya, Resafa, Sadr City aka Thawra, and Tarmia.

Population
Baghdad: 7,145,470
Abu Ghraib: 326,626
Adhamiyah: 842,310
Kadhimiyah: 832,310
Karkh: 1,624,057
Madain: 332,883
Mahmudiya 496,053
Resafa: 1,312,052
Sadr City: 1,316,583
Tarmia: 62,147

Security

The security situation in Baghdad has improved with the rest of the country, but it is still the most dangerous area in the country. From June to December 2008 there was a steady decline in security incidents with one large increase from August to October that subsequently leveled off. At the beginning of June there were around 400 security incidents a month in the province. That declined to around 300 in August, but then increased to almost 550 by October. Since then they have decreased to around 250 by the end of 2008. The U.S. military has much more in depth reporting than the U.N. and found that attacks went from 2,221 a month in April 2008 to 713 in December.

Displaced

Baghdad faced the most displacement in the country during the sectarian war. After the Samarra Shiite shrine bombing in February 2006 1.6 million Iraqis became internal refugees. Over 60% of those came from the capital. Today there are 90,731 displaced families in the province, the largest amount in the country. Some Iraqis have begun to return, although it’s still a small percentage of the total. The International Organization for Migration recorded 31,521 families coming back to Baghdad so far as of February 2009. They face a variety of problems including finding jobs, permanent housing, and services.

Employment

Iraq’s unemployment rate matches that of the country’s. Iraq has 18% unemployment. 12% of males in the capital are unemployed, compared to 20% for women. 83% of the male population was involved in the labor force compared to 81% in the country. Unemployment for them was concentrated in Resafa and Sadr City that had double-digit joblessness. As a recent U.N. report found very few women are involved in Iraq’s economy. Only 11% of Baghdad province’s women were either employed or looking for work, compared to 18% in the country. There are wide differences between the districts however. In Mahmudiya and Tarmia 76% and 67% of women respectively were involved in the labor force. In Sadr City it was only 8%. Jobs for women are directly related to education. 43% of women over 10 years old in the province lack a primary education. The U.N. employment study found that women needed a college education to find steady work.

Employment in Baghdad

Male Unemployment (15-64 years old)
Iraq 12%
Tarmia 1%
Abu Ghraib 3%
Adhamiyah 3%
Mahmudiya 3%
Karkh 6%
Kadhimiyah 8%
Madain 8%
Baghdad 12%
Sadr City 15%
Resafa 16%

Males In Labor Force (15-64 years old)
Iraq 81%
Baghdad 83%
Karkh 75%
Mahmudiya 81%
Resafa 82%
Sadr City 83%
Adhamiyah 85%
Madain 85%
Kadhimiyah 83%
Abu Ghraib 87%
Tarmia 96%

Female Unemployment (15-64 years old)
Iraq 13%
Mahmudiya 0%
Tarmia 1%
Abu Ghraib 2%
Madain 5%
Karkh 7%
Sadr City 12%
Adhamiyah 13%
Kadhimiyah 17%
Baghdad 20%
Resafa 23%

Females In Labor Force (15-64 years old)
Iraq 18%
Sadr City 8%
Baghdad 11%
Resafa 16%
Kadhimiyah 17%
Karkh 19%
Madain 27%
Adhamiyah 28%
Abu Ghraib 49%
Tarmia 67%
Mahmudiya 76%

Poverty

Baghdad is one of the richest provinces in the country, but still has pockets of poverty. In Adhamiyah the U.N. found no families in the lowest income quintile. In Abu Ghraib (1%), Karkh (1%), Kadhimiyah (2%), and Resafa (4%) there was also little poverty. That compared to Sadr City (16%), Madain (20%), and Mahmudiya (20%) where poverty was the highest.

% of households in the lowest income quintile
Iraq 22%
Adhamiyah 0%
Abu Ghraib 1%
Karkh 1%
Kadhimiyah 2%
Resafa 4%
Tarmia 12%
Sadr City 16%
Madain 20%
Mahmudiya 20%

Electricity

The Electricity Minister recently announced that Iraq had surpassed pre-war levels of power production. The problem remains that output does not meet demand. The capital is a perfect example. In Karkh, Sadr City, Resafa, and Adhamiyah more than half the population has power cuts for more than 11 hours a day. Abu Ghraib on the other hand has the best electricity supply in the province with only 2% suffering from long power outages.

% of households with more than 11 hours of power cuts or no connection to electricity network
Iraq 52%
Abu Ghraib 2%
Tarmia 29%
Mahmudiya 33%
Madain 40%
Karkh 60%
Sadr City 67%
Kadhimiyah 67%
Resafa 70%
Adhamiyah 76%

Water

Baghdad’s water supply is quite good. 10% of the province compared to 26% in the country is connected to the water network. Only Mahmudiya has a real problem with almost 50% having no access.

% of households not connected to water network
Iraq 26%
Abu Ghraib 0%
Adhamiyah 0%
Kadhimiyah 0%
Karkh 0%
Sadr City 0%
Tarmia 0%
Resafa 5%
Madain 7%
Baghdad 10%
Mahmudiya 47%

Food

Most Iraqis depend upon the country’s food rations, which are the largest in the world. That hasn’t prevented problems with malnutrition however. 22% of Iraqis, and 21% of Baghdad have children five years and younger that suffer from chronic malnutrition. The districts worst affected are Sadr City, Kadhimiyah, and Adhamiyah, while Abu Ghraib, Mahmudiya, and Tarmia have the fewest incidents.

% of children 0-5 years old with chronic malnutrition
Iraq 22%
Baghdad 21%
Abu Ghraib 4%
Mahmudiya 6%
Tarmia 6%
Resafa 14%
Madain 16%
Karkh 18%
Sadr City 20%
Kadhimiyah 32%
Adhamiyah 42%

Health

Baghdad overall does better than the rest of the country in terms of chronic diseases. 8% of the province reported being affected by them compared to 9% in Iraq. Tarmia did the best with only 4% reporting chronic cases, but that compared to Karkh, Kadhimiyah, Abu Ghraib, Sadr City, Adhamiyah, and Resafa that were all in double digits.

% of individuals with chronic disease
Iraq 9%
Baghdad 8%
Tarmia 4%
Mahmudiya 8%
Madain 9%
Kadhimiyah 10%
Karkh 10%
Abu Ghraib 11%
Sadr City 12%
Adhamiyah 14%
Resafa 15%

SOURCES

Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit, “Baghdad Governorate Profile,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, February 2009
- “Iraq Labour Force Analysis 2003-2008,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, January 2009

International Organization for Migration, “Three Years Of Post-Samarra Displacement In Iraq,” 2/22/09

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraq’s Electricity Production Surpasses Prewar Level,” 2/19/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, "Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress," 1/30/09

United Nations’ World Food Program Report On Iraq

Map of food needs in Iraq

In November 2008 the United Nations’ World Food Program (WFP) released a report on the state of Iraq’s food situation. It found that those with inadequate access to food had gone down from 4 million in 2005 to 930,000 in 2008. This happened despite the increase in violence in the country, especially during the sectarian war period from 2006-2007. The reason for this decrease has been the massive food ration system the Iraqi government maintains, the largest in the world. The WFP and other groups are also providing aid. Without these handouts, up to 6.4 million people, one-quarter of the population, would lack adequate food. The rations are controlled by the Trade Ministry, which imports most of the goods.

The report warns that despite these gains, Iraq still has many problems; the thousands of internally displaced being a major one. The WFP called on Baghdad to improve its monitoring and services to the most vulnerable in Iraqi society. That may be harder in the future as Maliki’s government has plans to end the rations and move towards more of a welfare type system.

The World Food Program’s paper also provided statistics on the standard of living for Iraqis. They found poverty to be rampant across much of the country, which had a direct affect upon access to food. The WFP divided up Iraqis into five groups from richest to poorest. One district in Dhi Qar, Diyala, Irbil, Karbala, Muthanna, and Najaf, two in Sulaymaniya, half of Ninewa, and most of Maysan and Qadisiyah had populations 75-94% in the poorest group. One district in Basra, Karbala, and Najaf, one and a half districts in Salahaddin, two in Irbil, Muthanna, Ninewa, and Tamim, three in Maysan, half of Diyala, two-thirds of Karbala, most of Babil, Dhi Qar and Sulaymaniya, and all of Wasit had people 50-75% in the poorest group. In comparison there were only eight districts, and parts of four others that had 25% or less in poverty. The rural areas were also disproportionately impoverished compared to urban ones.

Wealth obviously has a direct affect upon the ability to obtain food, the major emphasis of the WFP report. They found that the poorest group had problems with food within a month 56% of the time. Even the richest group had problems 22%, while the entire country averaged 39%. In terms of the provinces, Karbala had the worst food situation with 82% of the residents facing food shortages, followed by Babil 77%, Najaf 70%, Qadisiyah 52%, and Dhi Qar 47%. It is no coincidence that these also happen to be some of the poorest provinces in the country and are concentrated in the south. At the other end of the spectrum, Sulaymaniya 14%, Diyala 15%, Basra 16%, and Irbil 17% had the least problems with food. Overall, 35% of the country had problems with their rations. The most vulnerable group were the internally displaced, 67% of which said they had not registered to receive their food rations when they moved. The World Food Program is providing help to 750,000 of these types of refugees.

In terms of jobs, the government was the largest employer, accounting for 37%. That was followed by self-employed, but not in farming at 25%, self-employed farmers at 14%, non-skilled labor at 11%, skilled labor 8%, and farm workers 4%. After wages, the largest source of income was remittances from relatives abroad pointing to the huge refugee population of Iraqis.

Below are some of those numbers from the World Food Program report.

Note: Most of the following are estimates based upon charts in the World Food Program’s Report on Iraq.

Wealth Index – Iraq Overall
Note: The World Food Program divided up Iraqi society into five wealth categories: poorest, second, third, fourth, richest.
- 20% in poorest group
- 20% in second group
- 23% in richest

Wealth Index – Urban vs Rural
Poorest: Urban 9% Rural 47%
Second: Urban 18% Rural 19%
Third: Urban 20% Rural 16%
Fourth: Urban 22% Rural 11%
Richest: Urban 35% Rural 5%

Wealth Index By Province – Richest To Poorest
Baghdad 5% poorest – 34% richest
Dohuk 17% poorest – 30% richest
Tamim 8% poorest – 23% richest
Irbil 13% poorest – 23% richest
Anbar 10% poorest – 22% richest
Basra 11% poorest – 21% richest
Sulaymaniya 15% poorest – 20% richest
Salahaddin 18% poorest – 18% richest
Karbala 27% poorest – 18% richest
Diyala 26% poorest – 15% richest
Ninewa 30% poorest – 17% richest
Muthanna 37% poorest – 17% richest
Dhi Qar 35% poorest – 15% richest
Maysan 30% poorest – 10% richest
Babil 35% poorest – 10% richest
Wasit 35% poorest – 8% richest
Qadisiyah 45% poorest – 8% richest

Wealth Index By Districts

Numbers before each district match numbers on the map

75-94% Of The Population In Poorest Wealth Group By Province - District
Dhi Qar – 10 Al-Chibayish
Diyala – 78 Kifri
Irbil – 66 Choman
Karbala – 4 Ain Al-Tamur
Maysan – 26 Al-Kahla, 34 Al-Maimouna, 86 Qalat Saleh
Muthanna – 49 Al-Salman
Najaf – 35 Al-Manathera
Ninewa – 8 Al-Baaj, 20 Hatra, 93 Sinjar, 98 Telefar
Qadisiyah – 3 Afaq, 18 Hamza, 51 Al-Shamiya
Sulaymaniya – 84 Penjwin, 90 Sharbazher

50-75% Of The Population In Poorest Wealth Group By Province - District
Anbar – 48 Al Rutba
Babil – 19 Hashimiya, 22 Hilla, 31 Al-Madain, 32 Al-Mahawil, 40 Al-Musayab
Basra – 37 Al-Midaina
Dhi Qar – 43 Nassriya, 46 Al-Rifai, 52 Al-Shatra, 97 Suq Al-Shoyokh
Diyala – 39 Al-Muqdadiya, 64 Baladrooz, 77 Khanaqin
Irbil – 94 Soran
Karbala – 23 Al-Hindiya
Maysan – 7 Amara, 36 Al-Mejar Al-Kabi, 57 Ali Al-Gharbi
Muthanna – 28 Al-Khidhir, 47 Al-Rumaitha
Najaf – 29 Kufa
Ninewa – 5 Akre, 17 Al-Hamdaniya
Salahaddin – 63 Balad, 88 50% of Samarra
Sulaymaniya – 65 Chamchamal, 70 Dokan, 73 50% of Halabja, 85 Pshdar, 87 Rania, 95 50% of Sulaymaniya
Tamim – 67 Daquq, 82 Makhmur
Wasit – 16 Al-Hai, 30 Kut, 41 Al-Namaniya, 55 Al-Suwaira, 61 Badra

25-50% Of The Population In Poorest Wealth Group By Province - District
Anbar – 2 Abu Ghraib, 24 Al Kaim, 25 Kadhimiya, 45 Ramadi, 59 Ana, 74 Heet
Baghdad – 6 50% of Adhamiya
Basra – 1 Abu Al-Khaseeb, 14 Fao, 44 Al-Qurna, 91 Shatt Al-Arab
Dohuk – 58 Amedi, 96 Sumel, 102 Zakho
Irbil – 71 50% of Irbil, 80 Koisnjaq, 83 Mergasur, 89 Shaqlawa
Karbala – 76 Karbala
Muthanna – 50 Al-Samawa
Najaf – 42 Najaf
Ninewa – 38 Mosul, 53 Al-Shikhan, 92 Shekhan, 100 Tilkaif
Qadisiyah – 12 Diwaniya
Salahaddin – 11 Al-Daur, 15 Al-Faris, 54 Al-Shirqat, 62 50% of Baiji, 88 50% of Samarra, 99 Tikrit, 101 Tooz
Sulaymaniya – 68 Darbandihkan, 73 50% of Halabja, 75 Kalar
Tamim – 21 Al-Hawiga, 79 Kirkuk

0-25% Of The Population In Poorest Wealth Group By Province - District
Anbar – 13 Fallujah, 72 Haditha
Babil – 33 Mahmudiya
Baghdad – 6 50% of Adhamiya
Basra – 9 Basra, 56 Al-Zubair
Diyala – 27 Al-Khalis, 60 Baquba
Dohuk – 69 Dohuk
Irbil – 71 50% of Irbil
Salahaddin – 62 50% of Baiji
Sulaymaniya – 95 50% of Sulaymaniya

Food Problems In Last 30 Days by Five Wealth Groups
Poorest 56%
Second 44%
Third 40%
Fourth 34%
Richest 22%
Iraq Overall 39%

Households Experiencing Food Shortages By Province – Least To Most
Sulaymaniya: 14%
Diyala: 15%
Basra: 16%
Irbil: 17%
Maysan: 25%
Dohuk: 28%
Ninewa: 30%
Baghdad: 31%
Muthanna: 31%
Salahaddin: 32%
Anbar: 33%
Wasit: 40%
Tamim: 45%
Dhi-Qar: 47%
Qadisiyah: 52%
Najaf: 70%
Babil: 77%
Karbala: 82%
Iraq: 35%

Employment By Household
37% government
25% self-employed, not in farming
14% self-employed on farms
11% non-skilled labor
8% skilled labor
4% farm workers

Employment By Province, Area, And In Iraq
Dohuk: 4% farming self-employed, 4% farm workers, 11% skilled workers, 12% non-skilled workers, 47% government, 21% self-employed not farming, 2% other
Ninewa: 9% farming self-employed, 5% farm workers, 11% skilled workers, 12% non-skilled workers, 24% government, 28% self-employed not farming, 1% other
Sulaymaniya: 9% farming self-employed, 2% farm workers, 8% skilled workers, 14% non-skilled work, 43% government 23% self-employed not farming, 1% other
Tamim: 8% farming self-employed, 3% farm workers, 4% skilled workers, 17% non-skilled workers, 36% government, 30% self-employed not farming, 1% other
Diyala: 16% farming self-employed, 14% farm workers, 13% skilled labor, 3% non-skilled labor, 33% government, 20% self-employed not farming, 1% other
Anbar: 5% farming self-employed, 16% farm workers, 9% skilled workers, 8% non-skilled workers, 40% government, 22% self-employed, not farming, 1% other
Baghdad: 17% farming self-employed, 1% farm workers, 8% skilled workers, 8% non-skilled labor, 38% government, 28% self-employed not farming
Babil: 33% farming self-employed, 1% farm workers, 3% skilled worker, 11% non-skilled worker, 26% government, 26% self-employed not farming,
Karbala: 9% farming self-employed, 3% farm workers, 7% skilled worker, 11% non-skilled worker, 36% government, 34% self-employed not farming, 1% other
Wasit: 26% farming self-employed, 14% farm workers, 4% skilled workers, 9% non-skilled workers, 23% government, 23% self-employed not farming, 1% other
Salahaddin: 32% farming self-employed, 3% farm workers, 4% skilled labor, 8% non-skilled worker, 38% government, 14% self-employed not farming, 2% other
Najaf: 18% farming self-employed, 9% farm workers, 6% skilled workers, 9% non-skilled workers, 29% government, 29% self- employed not farming, 1% other
Qadisiyah: 14% farming self-employed, 8% farm worker, 12% skilled worker, 12% non-skilled worker, 37% government, 15% self-employed not farming, 2% other
Muthanna: 10% farming self-employed, 1% farm workers, 13% skilled workers, 23% non-skilled workers, 40% government, 13% self-employed not farming, 1% other
Dhi-Qar: 7% farming self-employed, 8% skilled workers, 11% non-skilled workers, 43% government, 29% self-employed not farming, 2% other
Maysan: 12% farming self-employed, 13% farm workers, 5% skilled workers, 11% non-skilled workers, 43% government, 29% self-employed not farming, 2% other
Basra: 1% farming self-employed, 12% skilled labor, 17% non-skilled labor, 46% government, 24% self- employed not farming
Urban: 1% farming self- employed, 1% farm workers, 10% skilled labor, 12% non-skilled workers, 45% government, 31% self-employed not farming, 1% other
Rural: 37% farming self-employed, 11% farm workers, 5% skilled workers, 9% non-skilled workers, 23% government, 14% self-employed not farming, 1% other
Iraq: 14% farming self-employed, 4% farm workers, 8% skilled labor, 11% non-skilled workers, 37% government, 25% self-employed not farming, 1% other

SOURCES
Khanfir, Imed, “Iraq: Access to Food Improves But Hunger Remains,” World Food Programme, 11/12/08
Reuters, “UN Says 1 Million Iraqis Lack Food,” 11/12/08
World Food Programme, “Comprehensive Food Security And Vulnerability Analysis In Iraq,” November 2008