Two Actions You Can Take Right Now

Tell Congress to Support Obama's Promise to Iraqis
Last month, President Obama promised to help vulnerable Iraqis. Now, some in Congress want to break that promise by cutting President Obama's requested budget for foreign assistance.

To ensure that President Obama keeps his humanitarian promise to the people of Iraq, we must also ensure that he has the resources to do so.

Senators John Kerry (D-Mass.) and Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) have offered an amendment to fully fund the president's foreign affairs budget request. It is critically important that you contact your Senators today and urge them to co-sponsor the Kerry-Lugar Amendment (Senate Amendment 732) to help strengthen life-saving programs in Iraq. Millions of innocent civilians have been displaced or otherwise made vulnerable by violence in Iraq.

Call your Senators right now and urge them to fully fund President Obama's foreign assistance budget request.

Protect Civilians from Deadly Cluster Bombs
The Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict (CIVIC), which aids small, community-based projects assisting families directly affected by U.S. and coalition actions in Iraq and Afghanistan, is building support for the Cluster Munitions Civilian Protection Act of 2009 (S. 416/H.R. 981).

If passed, the legislation would limit the use, sale, and transfer of these deadly weapons. Though not an outright ban, if passed, this Act would be a major step in the right direction.

Visit CIVIC's action page to send a letter to your Senators!

Maliki Attempts To Forge New Ruling Coalition

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law list was the biggest winner after the January 2009 provincial elections. Since the results have been announced Maliki has been maneuvering to create a new ruling coalition that would participate in the 2009 parliamentary elections and be his new source of support.

When Maliki became Prime Minister in 2006 he was backed by a coalition of Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds that followed the “national unity” model propagated by the Americans. His main supporters were the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance made up of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), Dawa – Iraq, the Sadrist Trend, the Fadhila Party, Maliki’s own Dawa Party, the Sunni Iraqi Accordance Front, the Kurdish Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and Kurdistan Democratic Party, and smaller independent parties. Maliki was actually a compromise candidate as the Sadrists and SIIC could not initially agree on who was to replace Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari.

The ruling alliance quickly fractured because of these differences. By the end of 2006 the Kurds, Accordance Front, Dawa and the SIIC were all conspiring to push Sadr out of the government. The U.S. was also applying pressure to exclude him. Sadr had already sealed his own fate when he withdrew his six ministers from the cabinet at the end of November 2006, thereby denying him any real say in the government. The U.S. and Shiites parties were hoping that including Sadr in the government would turn him towards politics, and away from being a militia leader, but Sadr’s position always came from his ability to control the streets and violence, so one could not come without the other. Eventually both the Sadrists and Fadhila left the United Shiite Alliance and Maliki’s ruling coalition. A new alliance was then made consisting of the Dawa, the Supreme Council, and the two Kurdish parties. The Accordance Front was later brought on board as well.

While the ruling parties were generally united in getting rid of Sadr they had some fundamental differences on the future of the country as well. The Kurds and Supreme Council both supported federalism. The Kurds wanted more autonomy for Kurdistan, while the SIIC were pushing for a nine province Shiite region in the south. Maliki on the other hand wanted a stronger central government based in Baghdad. As the Prime Minister began exerting more of his power with the improved security situation in 2008, these differences began coming to the fore. By the fall both parties were criticizing and making moves against Maliki, and he was replying in turn.

Since the January 2009 provincial elections, the Prime Minister has been attempting to forge a new alliance to run in the parliamentary elections and back him afterwards. Although the coalition has not been finalized the broad outlines of it are apparent. The new grouping looks to be made up of Maliki’s State of Law List with the Dawa Party at its core, the Sadrists, the Sunni Iraqi National Dialogue Front who ran as the Iraqi National Project in the provincial balloting, and perhaps Ilyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List. This group has already made a deal to rule Wasit province. Saleh al-Mutlaq, the head of the Dialogue Front has also said he is open to joining with the State of Law list in Diyala, Salahaddin, Baghdad, and Babil. According to the Al-Qatan paper, Maliki is also courting the Fadhila party, Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s Reform List, and Ahmad Chalabi. Originally, Allawi looked to be joining with the SIIC, but he has apparently changed his mind as the State of Law offers the chance to rule. While Saleh and the Sadrists are both apprehensive of working with Maliki since they have had major differences with him in the past, what unites them is opposition to the Supreme Council and the Kurds, and of course the chance to hold power.

The SIIC and Kurds, along with the Iraqi Accordance Front have attempted to keep their old alliance together. In Diyala for example, the Accordance Front, the Supreme Council, and the Kurdish Alliance have agreed to work together to run the provincial council.

Whether Maliki’s attempt to re-arrange Iraq’s political map succeeds or not is yet to be seen. The ruling provincial councils have not even been announced yet, and there is still plenty of negotiating to be done. What is for sure is that the old coalitions are mostly dead. The United Iraqi Alliance, which was the largest victor in the 2005 parliamentary elections, has now broken apart. The Sunni Accordance Front has also split. The Kurdish alliance is the only one that remains, and they are now diametrically opposed to Maliki and his attempt to centralize power. This is all part of the new status quo that is still emerging after the end of the sectarian war of 2006-2007.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Sadr renews idea of local alliances with Iraq PM,” 2/20/09

Alsumaria, “Iraq parties form alliances after elections,” 2/13/09

Asharq al-Awsat, “Al Maliki Wants An Alternative To The Current Shiite Alliance That Will Support The Central Government And Reject The Sectarian Quota System,” 2/16/09

Associated Press, “Shiites, Kurds form alliance; 4 Iraqi kids found in rubble of bombed area,” 8/16/07

Aswat al-Iraq, “KA, IAF agree to share leading posts in Diala,” 2/24/09
- “PM Accuses Kurdish Leadership of ‘violating’ the Constitution,” 11/20/08

Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08

International Crisis Group, “Iraq After The Surge II: The Need for a New Political Strategy,” 4/30/08

Parker, Ned, “Sadr’s bloc quits Iraq’s ruling coalition,” Times of London, 9/16/07

Roads To Iraq Blog, “American delegation met with former Iraqi army officers,” 2/20/09
- “The upcoming confrontation, Maliki and the Kurdish Coalition,” 11/14/08
- “Reconciliation without reconciliation,” 3/10/09

Rossmiller, Alex, “The Bush administration’s four-year history of erratic meddling in search of an Iraqi ‘savior.’” American Prospect, 4/11/07

Al-Sa’dawi, Ahmad, “post-election analysis: real change or more of the same?” Niqash, 2/19/09

Shadid, Anthony, “New Alliance In Iraq Cross Sectarian Lines,” Washington Post, 3/20/09

Visser, Reidar, “Maliki, Hakim, and Iran’s Role in the Basra Fighting,” Historiae.org, 4/9/08
- “Two Very Different Takes on Centralism,” Historiae.org, 9/20/08

Al-Wazzan, Saleem, “al-maliki angles for broad alliance in basra,” Niqash, 3/20/09

Wong, Edward, “Iraqis weigh alliance to marginalize Sadr and bolster Maliki,” International Harold Tribune, 12/11/06

Budget Problems Affecting Integration of Sons of Iraq

Almost all of the Sons of Iraq (SOI) have been transferred to Iraqi control now. Only the 10,000 SOI in Salahaddin are left, and they are due to be taken over by Baghdad by April 1. In March the SOI in Ninewa and Tamim were turned over to the government. That meant a total of 81,773 fighters in the eight provinces of Baghdad, Wasit, Babil, Qadisiya, Anbar, Diyala, Ninewa, and Tamim have now been handed over by the Americans, but their future is still uncertain.

The Americans have created an extensive program in conjunction with the government to try to integrate the SOI into the armed forces and other government jobs. Iraqi officials have been registering all of the SOI, and taking down their qualifications and education levels. The U.S. is running almost the entire program. They have set up federal employment centers, which are supposed to be labor pools from which ministries will recruit new workers. The U.S. is also pushing private companies, including American contractors, and tribes to consider hiring SOI. Ones that do are to receive preferential treatment. Finally, the Americans are offering micro-grants to any SOI that want to go into business for themselves or begin farming. The U.S. has also been offering vocational, literacy, and general education courses for the fighters since most ministries require a primary education to be employed. The U.S. has set up a literacy program in Tamim for example, that if successful will be copied throughout the rest of the country.

This entire process is being threatened by the country’s budget problems now. As reported before, Iraq has cut its spending several times before because of the declining price of oil. There is money set aside to pay for the SOI, but the promise of jobs is not guaranteed. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki signed Executive Order 118-C that said 20% of the SOI are to be integrated into the security forces, and the remaining 80% are to be given jobs in the ministries. So far, 5,000 have been given positions in the police and 500 in the army. That means only around 7% of those that have registered have found actual employment. Of the other ministries, only Education, Health, and Oil have promised to hire 10,000, 3,000, and 500 SOI as guards respectively. Further hiring is going to be difficult because of the financial problems. Already the Interior Ministry has announced that it will stop expanding the police force for fiscal year 2009-2010. All the other ministries are also supposed to have hiring freezes as well.

To add to this problem is the fact that the SOI are being paid less and late. When Baghdad agreed to take over the first SOI in Baghdad in October 2008 they announced that they were cutting their pay. The Americans had been given them between $400-$600/month. Now they were going to receive $250/month. Some SOI have also begun to complain that the government is late with their payments. The New York Times contacted seven SOI units in Diyala and Baghdad in March 2009 and found that six said they had not been paid for two months.

Some U.S. officials have criticized the pace with which the SOI have been integrated, but now the whole process appears to be on hold. The deputy commander of U.S. forces in Baghdad General Frederick Rudesheim told the Associated Press in mid-March that the hiring of the SOI was going slower than expected. The causes are probably a mix of the notoriously slow Iraqi bureaucracy and political unwillingness on the part of some Shiites to accept the Sunnis fighters, many of which were former insurgents. Added to this is the much larger problem of the country’s budget crisis. There is little money to fund the expansion of any of the ministries and security forces right now, let alone hire almost 100,000 SOIs unless the price of oil increases. As a result, the ultimate plight of many of the SOI may be the unemployment line.

SOURCES

Associated Press, “U.S. troops to remain active in Iraq after pullback,” 3/15/09

Derhally, Massoud, “Iraq Freezes 66,000 New Police Hires, Minister Says,” Bloomberg, 3/22/09

Gamel, Kim, “Iraqi budget woes force security hiring freeze,” Associated Press, 3/20/09

Multi-National Corps-Iraq, “Iraq, Coalition forces developing numerous job opportunities for Sons of Iraq,” 2/25/09
- “Sons of Iraq transfer near completion; focus shifts to job creation,” 3/11/09

Multi-National Division – North, “U.S. military makes last payment to Sons of Iraq,” Multi-National Corps – Iraq, 3/11/09

Nordland, Rod and Rubin, Alissa, “Sunni Fighters Say Iraq Didn’t Keep Job Promises,” New York Times, 3/24/09

Parker, Barry, “Iraq govt to control US-backed Sunni militias by April,” Agence France Presse, 3/12/09

Reuters, “U.S. hands Almost All Sunni Guards To Iraqi Control,” 3/21/09

Sly, Liz, “Iraq plans to cut Sunni fighters’ salaries,” Chicago Tribune, 11/2/08

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09

Possible End To The PKK-Turkish Conflict

The President of Turkey Abdullah Gul arrived in Iraq today, March 23, 2009. His started goal was to work with the government of Iraq to end the Kurdistan Workers Party’s (PKK) insurgency against Ankara. Iraqi President Jalal Talabani recently announced that he expected the PKK to end their fighting with Turkey in the coming months, and called on them to lay down their arms while meeting with President Gul. In April or May a meeting is planned in Irbil, Iraq of Kurds from throughout the region including Iraq, Iran, Syria, Turkey, and Europe. Talabani believes that the conference, in conjunction with moves by the Turkish government will lead the PKK to give up their armed struggle.

Talabani made his prediction while attending a water conference in Turkey in mid-March. There he met with President Gul and Turkish Prime Minster Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Both times, the leaders discussed the plight of the PKK. Specifically, Turkey is constructing a new reconciliation program with its Kurdish population. Already the Turks have given Kurds more rights, and opened a Kurdish language TV station. With regards to the PKK, Ankara is considering a new amnesty program that would allow PKK fighters to return to Turkey, and its leaders travel to other parts of Europe if they wish. Turkey is also trying to ensure Iraq’s cooperation on this matter as it has increased ties with both Baghdad and Kurdistan. Gul’s visit to Iraq was part of this effort. The PKK’s leader, Abdullah Ocalan, who is imprisoned in Turkey, said that he looks forward to this new proposal.

The PKK has been fighting the Turks since 1984. They claim that they do not want independence, but rights for Kurds in Turkey. The group has an estimated 4,000-5,000 fighters who are based in Iraq’s Kurdistan. Although the PKK is considered a terrorist group by many countries, Iraq’s Kurdish officials have given them unofficial support.

If Talabani’s statement comes true, the Kurdish meeting in Irbil could be an important turning point. The PKK presence in Iraq has complicated its relations with Turkey, made other regional countries worry that the Kurdistan Regional Government is allowing its territory to be used by various Kurdish guerrilla and independence movements, and been another source of tension with Baghdad. Every few months the Turks have attacked PKK bases as a result, the most recent having occurred this month. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has also demanded that the PKK camps be shut down, but the Kurdish authorities have refused. An amnesty program and cessation of attacks could be the political solution to this complicated matter.

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “Talabani expects Kurds to lay down arms,” 3/19/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Gul’s Iraq visit aims to ‘liquidate’ PKK rebels-official,” 3/23/09

Calvan, Bobby Caina and Taha, Yaseen, “Maliki can’t stop PKK attacks, officials say,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/24/07

Al Jazeera, “Iraq calls on PKK to disarm,” 3/23/09

Partlow, Joshua, “A Kurdish Society of Soldiers,” Washington Post, 3/8/08

Seibert, Thomas, “New steps seen to end Turkish war on Kurds,” The National, 3/17/09

Tavernise, Sabrina, “In the Rugged North of Iraq, Kurdish Rebels Flout Turkey,” New York Times, 10/29/07

Xinhua, “Iraqi president: Independent Kurdish state in Iraq ‘impossible,’” 3/17/09

U.S. Government Report Recognizes Problems in Admitting Iraqi Refugees

As a recent addition to the EPIC staff, every day I am learning something new about the dire humanitarian and security situation facing millions of vulnerable Iraqis and Iraqi refugees. On Tuesday, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report on key Iraq-related issues for Congressional oversight. The report touches on Iraqi refugees and their resettlement (italics added for emphasis):

Government Resettles Iraqis, but Lasting Solutions Remain a Challenge
The U.S. government and [the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR)] face challenges offering lasting solutions for Iraqi refugees. According to UNHCR, voluntary repatriation is the preferred solution, but conditions in Iraq are not yet suitable for Iraqis to return. The Iraqi government has cited improvements in security and offered financial incentives to returning families, but there is no clear trend on the number of Iraqis returning to or leaving Iraq. Difficulties renewing visas, lack of funds, and limited access to employment and public services affect Iraqis’ decisions to stay in or return to Iraq. Another solution is resettlement in the host countries, though Jordan and Syria consider Iraqi refugees “guests” who should return to Iraq once the security situation improves. Resettlement to a third country is another option, according to State. The U.S. government has made progress resettling Iraqis under its U.S. Refugee Admissions Program. In 2007, the United States admitted 1,608 Iraqi refugees but did not achieve State’s expectation of admitting 2,000 to 3,000 refugees; however, the U.S. government surpassed its fiscal year 2008 goal of 12,000 with the admission of 13,823 Iraqi refugees. According to UNHCR, as of September 30, 2008, other countries resettled 5,852 Iraqi refugees in calendar years 2007 through 2008.

While the GAO report recognizes that the United States has lagged behind its own goals for admitting Iraqis, the report does not recognize that other countries have, in fact, admitted far more refugees than the United States. Sweden has admitted over 40,000 Iraqis since March 2003 and has lobbied other Europeans countries to admit more Iraqis. Last week, Germany offered to admit 2,500 Iraqi refugees from Jordan and Syria.

Admissions of Iraqis to the United States have increased each year, a laudable trend as humanitarian crises persist in Iraq. We joined over 40 NGOs in commending President Obama's promise to help Iraqis impacted by the war. Next, we must ensure that promise to vulnerable Iraqis and Iraqi refugees is fulfilled--immediately through vital foreign assistance and in the long-term through securing a peaceful and stable Iraq.

Iran-Iraq Trade To Increase

While recent headlines reported that U.S. forces shot down an Iranian drone in February 2009, economic ties between Iraq and Iran have continued to increase in the last few months. Iran is already one of Iraq’s largest trade partners, accounting for almost 50% of the country’s imports. Recently the two countries have signed a number of memorandums of understandings meant to boost trade to $5 billion by the end of the year.

On March 15, 2009 the Iraqi Ministry of Trade signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) for Iranian companies to provide products for Iraq’s Central Markets Company. This took place as part of an Iraqi trade delegation visit to Iran. The agreement would have Iranian businesses provide goods for state-run shopping centers that already sell almost exclusively Iranian products. The MoU was the latest part of a plan agreed to by both countries to boost trade to $5 billion by the end of 2009, with the goal of $10 billion by 2010.

In the previous month several other MoUs and deals were inked. One was with the Iraqi Trade Ministry. Another was with the Ministry of Housing to increase aid on construction. This occurred while Iraqi President Jalal Talabani was visiting Iran on his way back from South Korea. Earlier in February Iran won a $1.5 billion contract to construct a new town south of Basra that would include 5,000 housing units, schools, parks, and shops. It was the largest deal signed with Iran so far. All of the building supplies are supposed to come from Iran. The contract occurred just after Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki visited Iraq. It was during that trip that Iran and Iraq agreed to try to boost trade to $5 billion.

Iran represents almost half of all of Iraq’s imports. The head of the Iran-Iraq Economic Development Headquarters said in January 2009 that the two countries had traded over $3 billion in goods in 2008. UPI said that trade is at $4 billion now. The Wall Street Journal recently reported that in 2007 Iraq imported $2.7 billion from Iran. That was 48% of Iraq’s total, and 30% of Iran’s trade.

As reported before, Iraq has been flooded by imports since the U.S. invasion. This began when the Coalition Provisional Authority did away with Iraq’s tariffs and duties in an attempt to boost demand and get the economy going after the war. Iran stepped in, along with Syria, China, and others. Iranian products have a distinct advantage as Tehran heavily subsidizes its businesses. The effect on Iraq has been largely detrimental, as it has undercut many domestic industries. Iraqi companies have complained about the cheap imports, and demanded some protection, but the trade agreements have only increased.

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “Iraq, Iran sign MoUs in different spheres,” 2/28/09
- “Iraq, Iran sign MoUs to enhance trade,” 3/15/09
- “Iraq, Iran to up economic cooperation to $10b,” 1/4/09

Azzaman, “Iran wins $1.5 billion Basra construction contract,” 2/16/09
- “Trade Ministry signs deals to expand imports from Iran,” 3/17/09

Chon, Gina, “Iran’s Cheap Goods Stifle Iraq Economy,” Wall Street Journal, 3/18/09

Iran Daily, “Trade Between Iraq, Iran Hits $3b in 9 Months,” 1/6/09

Nordland, Rod and Rubin, Alissa, “U.S. Says It Shot Down an Iranian Drone Over Iraq,” New York Times, 3/17/09

Rath, Tiare, “Iraq Looks to Iran,” Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 1/15/09

Roads To Iraq Blog, “Iran’s new policy towards Iraq,” 3/8/09

UPI, “Iraq-Iran trade meeting pledges $5 billion,” 2/12/09

Xinhua, “Iraqi Factories Fight to Survive Turbulence,” 11/23/08

Kurdish Elections Planned for May

When Iraq’s parliament passed the provincial election law in September 2008 it delayed voting in the three provinces of Kurdistan, Dohuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniyah. The date for balloting there was to be determined by the Kurdish Regional Government’s parliament. That has now been announced as May 19, 2009. For more than two decades, politics there have been dominated by the two major parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of Kurdish President Massoud Barzani and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by Iraqi President Jalal Talabani. Those two organizations will probably continue in that position, but there are increasing challenges to the PUK.

As reported before, President Talabani was recently forced into agreeing to a series of concessions about how he runs the PUK. Those included greater transparency over finances, fighting corruption, and more democratic practices. Talabani agreed to these changes after the Deputy Secretary General of the PUK Kosrat Rassoul, and four other politburo members threatened to resign. According to the on-line magazine Niqash, 16 of the 39 politburo and central committee members of the PUK supported their move. Seeking party unity before the elections, Talabani agreed to their demands. There are some who doubt that he will implement these promises though, because it would mean a loss of power for him and his followers.

The PUK’s problems may not be over either. According to the Iraqi paper Azzaman, the former Deputy Party leader Nishurawn Mustafa may form his own party to run in the May elections. Mustafa helped found the PUK with Talabani in 1975. In December 2006 he resigned, criticizing the Kurdistan Regional Government for being autocratic. Since then he has gone on to create a powerful media company that includes newspapers, a TV station, and a website. He has used these outlets to criticize the PUK for not improving the Kurdish economy, failing to raise the standard of living, and for attempting to control business. Under the agreement with the dissidents Talabani has agreed to open dialogue with Mustafa to try to bring him back into the PUK’s fold. If he agrees to create his own party, he could be a serious challenger.

Massoud Barzani of the KDP on the other hand has been demanding Kurdish authority over the vote. In late February 2009, Barzani announced that the Iraqi High Electoral Commission would not supervise the Kurdish elections. At the time the Kurdish parliament approved an election law that said the Iraqi Election Commission should organize the vote, but Barzani rejected it and demanded an independence Kurdish body have that duty.

The May 2009 elections will be the third held in Kurdistan. Previously voting was held in 1992 and 2005. Those two and the coming one will use a closed list system. That means the estimated 2.5 million eligible voters can only vote for parties and coalitions of parties called lists, not individuals. The victors will then select the politicians that will serve in the provincial governments. Iraq as a whole used this system in 2005. Some smaller Kurdish parties have complained about the closed list, but they have little power to change things.

Below are the results of the 1992 and 2005 votes for Kurdistan’s National Assembly (Parliament)

1992 Results

Votes:
Total Votes Cast: 971,953
Invalid Votes: 4,724

Votes By Party:
Kurdistan Democratic Party: 438,979 votes, 45.3%
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan: 423,833 votes, 43.8%
Islamic Movement: 49,108 votes, 5.1%
Kurdistan Socialist Party: 24,882 votes, 2.6%
Iraqi Communist Party: 21,123 votes, 2.2%
Kurdistan Popular Democratic Party: 9,903 votes, 1.0%
Independent Democrats: 501 votes

Seats:
Kurdistan Democratic Party: 51
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan: 49

2005 Results

Votes:
Total Votes Cast: 1,753,919
Invalid Votes: 23,067

Votes By Party:
Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan (Kurdistan Democratic Party, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and 11 smaller parties): 1,570,663 votes, 89.5%
Islamic Group of Kurdistan: 85,237 votes, 4.86%
Kurdistan Toilers Party: 20,585 votes
Democratic People’s Democratic Movement: 11,748 votes
Kurdistan People’s Democratic Movement: 10,953
Independent List: 10,262 votes
Others: 44,471 votes

Seats:
Members of the Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan:
Kurdistan Democratic Party: 40
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan: 38
Kurdistan Islamic Union: 9
Turkmen Party: 4
Kurdistan Communist Party: 3
Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party: 2
Assyrian Democratic Movement: 2
Chaldean Cultural Society: 1
Bet Nahrain Democratic Party: 1
Chaldean Democratic Union Party: 1
Farmers Movement Party: 1
Kurdistan Democratic National Union: 1
Independent Nouri Talabany: 1

Islamic Group of Kurdistan: 6
Kurdistan Toilers Party: 1

SOURCES

AK News, “Kurdistan parliament elections between closed and open lists,” 3/4/09

Azzaman, “Talabani Tries To Prevent His Party From Splitting And Rejects The Resignation Of Rasul,” 2/17/09

Goode, Erica, “Iraq Passes Provincial Elections Law,” New York Times, 9/25/08

Knights, Michael, “Significance of the Provincial Elections,” Arab Reform Bulletin, December, 2008

Knights, Michael and McCarthy, Eamon, “Provincial Politics in Iraq: Fragmentation or New Awakening?” Washington Institute for Near East Studies, April 2008

Kurdish Media.com, “Barzani rejects IHEC to supervise KRG Elections, Hawlati,” 2/26/09

Kurdistan National Assembly webpage

NINA, “Presidency reserved over IHEC supervising Kurdistan elections,” 2/25/09

Ose, Oshnag, “talabani battles new calls for reform,” Niqash, 3/4/09

Osman, Twana and Zagros, Roman, “Ex-Kurdish Leader Takes On Old Allies,” Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 11/12/08

PUKmedia, “President Barzani recommends establishing Election Committee in Kurdistan,” 2/27/09

Reuters, “Iraq’s Kurds to elect parliament on May 19,” 2/2/09

Wikipedia, “Iraqi Kurdistan legislative election, 2005”

Norwegian Institute’s Policy Paper On The Way Forward In Iraq

In February 2009 the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs released a report entitled “More than ‘Shiites and ‘Sunnis,’ How a Post-Sectarian Strategy Can Change the Logic and Facilitate Sustainable Political Reform In Iraq.” The paper was written by members of the Norwegian Institute, including Reidar Visser, who is a research fellow there and runs the blog Historiae. It also included input from a group of Iraqi academics and professionals. The paper is a policy proposal for the U.S. government on how to overcome Iraq’s problems before it withdraws. Overall, the report believes that the Surge brought about dramatic security improvements, but no real political change. The Norwegian Institute argues that unless the U.S. reforms its policy before it leaves, Iraq will be plagued by long-term problems. What the paper advocates is that the U.S. move away from supporting Iraq’s current political system, and support revising the constitution to strengthen the central government. The Institute believes that the 2009 parliamentary election should be the center of this new policy. It argues that this will unite Iraqis and push nationalism to the fore.

“More than ‘Shiites’ and ‘Sunnis’” argues that the root of Iraq’s current problems is sectarianism. They believe that this is enshrined in the 2005 Constitution. Although 80% of voters ratified the document, the Institute thinks that it was rushed through with few Iraqis actually knowing what it was about. When it was passed it included a clause promising that it would be revised in the future, but this has never happened. The constitutional review committee is just as sectarian and deadlocked as the rest of the government. The effect of the Constitution was to empower a small group of mostly exile politicians who claimed they spoke for their sect or ethnic group. These leaders oppose any change to the system because it would endanger their positions. The result, the Institute writes is that a majority of Iraqis do not believe in this system and feel that it is illegitimate as a result.

The Institute believes that the main opponents of Iraq’s sectarian system come from parties in parliament that are loosely called the July 22 movement. They successfully pushed through the provincial election law despite the opposition of the Kurds and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council. Reidar Visser has been arguing that this bloc represents the true Iraqi nationalists as it includes a variety of parties such as the Sadrists, Ilyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List, Fadhila, and others that cuts across sect.

The problem is that the U.S. perpetuates Iraq’s sectarian system, and supports those that are currently in power. The Institute writes that this has led to a series of misplaced policies such as calling for a national compact between the major sects, the Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds, rather than pushing for Iraqi unity. This began with the Coalition Provisional Authority who created an Iraqi governing council based upon a sectarian quota system. The Americans have also pushed for an oil law that is supposed to ensure a share for Sunnis. The U.S. then allowed the ascendancy of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and the Kurds that pushed for decentralization. When the Surge started, the Bush White House gave unconditional support to the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. As Bush left office he signed the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which included no clauses to encourage Iraq to move towards political change. Maliki and other leaders have taken advantage of this to stay in office. The U.S. has therefore caused rather than solved the divisions within Iraq.

The differences between the U.S. and Iran have also perpetuated Iraq’s problems. Some Americans have argued that Iraqi leaders secretly want the U.S. to stay to protect their positions. This ignores the fact that Iraq could turn to Iran instead of relying upon the U.S. As long as Iran and the U.S. are opposing each other in Iraq, that will lead Teheran to support Iraq’s current political system. After all, sectarianism means that Shiites will always be in the lead, which gives Iran the most influence.

The Institute argues that sectarianism is a foreign idea throughout most of Iraq’s history. They count only three times before, in 1508, 1623, and 1801 when sectarian differences were in the forefront in the country. This leads the Institute to believe that the sectarian war of 2006-2007 was the exception not the rule. From their point of view, Iraqi nationalism and the belief in a strong central government are much stronger beliefs in Iraq’s past.

Because the U.S. helped create this system, they should be the ones to try to fix it before they leave. The paper includes a long list of proposals to accomplish this. By couching these moves in nationalist rhetoric, the Institute believes that it could be a unifying policy that will assist with the American withdrawal, and create long-lasting stability. The suggestions are to place a limit on federalism. Kurdistan should be the only area where an autonomous region should be allowed. Instead, power should be centered in Baghdad. This should be enshrined in revisions to the Constitution. As part of this the Oil Ministry should control the development of Iraq’s oil and gas resources. Revenues from these should be distributed solely on a per capita basis, not by sect. Instead of federalism, ministries could be decentralized with oil being based in Basra for example. All sectarian quotas in the government should be ended with officials appointed according to their competency and professionalism. While the Institute was open to negotiating over the future of Kirkuk, it emphasized that it should be Iraqi. Finally, political influence over the security forces should be ended.

“More than ‘Shiites’ and ‘Sunnis’” also argues that the U.S. should clearly state its mistakes and long-term plans in Iraq. This means announcing that it stands for the unity of Iraq, that it supports a strong central government, that it rejects the partition of the country, and will oppose undue influence by regional powers in the country. The Institute also believes that the Americans need to admit that they were wrong in creating a sectarian system, and that it has not worked. The U.S. also should publicly state that it does not want permanent bases in Iraq, and that it is committed to withdrawing even if Iraq’s government runs into problems.

The first step in this restructuring of Iraq can begin with the 2009 parliamentary elections, which are scheduled for the end of the year. The U.S. should stress constitutional reform as the main issue, and America’s commitment to democracy in Iraq. The U.S. also needs to work towards ensuring that they are free and fair, and organize a massive international effort to monitor the voting. Iraq refugees should also be allowed to vote, something that happened in the 2005 vote, but not in the recent provincial elections.

To prepare the environment for the vote, the paper has another list of suggestions. First the U.S. should encourage a freeze on all major work by parliament so that laws will be held off until a new, hopefully improved group of legislators takes office. The U.S. should also threaten sanctions on Baghdad if it takes any authoritarian measures before the election. America should also stop encouraging Iraq’s neighbors from opening up embassies, freeze working with the international compact on Iraq’s debt because it sets no conditions on Iraq, deter investment in Iraq’s oil sector, and open negotiations with Iran in an attempt to offer them deals on other areas so they will not focus on Iraq. Oddly the Institute also advocates giving aid to parties that stress the constitution. The thrust of the paper is that the U.S. needs to push Iraqi nationalism to the fore, but then giving direct aid to Iraq parties could undermine their chances because they could be seen as being American puppets.

Selecting a new parliament should then be followed by a revision of the Constitution. To encourage that the U.S. should offer debt relief, withdrawing its troops, and guarantee Kurdish autonomy as rewards for a successful constitutional process, but also continue to deter foreign investment, including in Kurdistan, hold off any regional conferences, and try to end the United Nations work on disputed territories to apply pressure on Iraqis to finish the task.

Holding successful elections and revising the Iraqi Constitution have been long sought after goals by a wide variety of groups ranging from the U.S., and other governments, to various think tanks. Iraqi nationalism is also an important ingredient, especially after the country fractured after the U.S. invasion. The Norwegian Institute’s paper however has some major flaws, which undermine its argument. First, it gives undue influence to the July 22 bloc. While the opposition parties were able to pass an election law before the Supreme Council and the Kurds wanted, it was something supported by the Prime Minister. That was actually one of its only major accomplishments. The provincial election law for example maintained the status quo in Kirkuk by setting up a committee to figure out how to conduct elections there, but all that did was maintain the status quo, something that suited the Kurds who control the province. The Institute claims this was a victory for the July 22 bloc, but it was actually a defeat of their earlier proposal that would have forced the Kurds to share power before the vote. Second, it believes that the parliamentary elections will lead to a new set of nationalist politicians that will want fundamental changes in Iraq’s government and constitution. That’s not guaranteed. Nationalist parties did do well in the 2009 provincial elections, but it was still mostly the ruling parties that came out on top, the very ones the Institute is advocating against. Also Shiites tended to vote for Shiite parties, Sunnis for Sunnis, and Kurds for Kurds. More importantly, Prime Minister Maliki could champion most of the paper’s main points such as a strong central government and constitutional reform, yet Maliki is also the type of exile politician that the paper condemns. More importantly his moves are meant to ensure his power over the country. Another point is that in all political systems, the ruling parties want their people to take up positions of power in the government after they win. That would make non-political appointments to the bureaucracy and military nearly impossible. Fourth, the paper believes that the Americans are the major perpetrators of Iraqi sectarianism. That overlooks the fact that rule under Saddam, which lasted for decades, was also sectarian as he went after the Shiites and Kurds. The report says that the U.S. supported the ascendancy of the Supreme Council and the Kurds who pushed for decentralization. The U.S. also supported Ilyad Allawi of the Iraqi National List and currently backs Nouri al-Maliki of the Islamic Dawa party, both of which were nationalists who wanted a strong central government. Finally, “More than ‘Shiites’ and ‘Sunnis’” also largely ignores the current major divide in Iraq, that between Arabs and Kurds. Iraqi nationalism is being created on the basis of opposition to the Kurds. This stretches from the Prime Minister to the July 22 bloc. While the report says that the U.S. should ensure Kurdistan’s autonomy that overlooks the fact that the Kurds would oppose almost every other proposal made by the Institute. That includes revising the constitution, shoring up a strong central government, empowering the Oil Ministry, ending work on the disputed territories, stressing that Kirkuk should be Iraqi, etc. The Institute argues that their proposals will unite Iraqis and are ideas shared across sectarian lines, but that’s probably mostly true of Iraqi Arabs. “More than ‘Shiites’ and ‘Sunnis’” is good at pointing out the levers the U.S. can still use to influence Iraqi politics before it withdraws, but ironically if the paper’s plans were followed it could actually increase the new divisions in the country as it attempts to solve an old one.

SOURCES

Associated Press, “Iraqi parliament passes election law,” 7/22/08

Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, “More than “Shiites” and “Sunnis,” How a Post-Sectarian Strategy Can Change the Logic and Facilitate Sustainable Political Reform in Iraq,” February 2009

Visser, Reidar, “A Litmus Test for Iraq,” Middle East Report Online, 1/30/09
- “Debating Devolution in Iraq,” Middle East Report Online, 3/10/08
- “The Law on the Powers of Governorates Not Organised in a Region: Washington’s ‘Moderate’ Allies Show Some Not-So-Moderate Tendencies,” Historiae.org, 2/11/08

New Opinion Poll of Iraqis

In mid-March 2009 the BBC, ABC, and NHK news departments released their latest public opinion poll of Iraqis. This was the seventh one they have conducted. A Turkish and an American company interviewed 2,228 Iraqis in person in February 2009. The questions were about security, services, the government, society, sectarianism, and the recent January 2009 provincial elections. A majority of Iraqis thought that security and life in general were improving, but still had questions about the country such as the economy, services, and the competence of the government.

Life In General

The poll began by asking people what they thought about their life and community. 65% said they thought their life was good compared to 35% that said it was bad. That was a slight increase from the last survey conducted in March 2008 when 54% said things were good and 45% said they were bad. During 2007 60% of respondents thought life was going badly in Iraq, while in 2004 and 2005 70% or more thought things were well. When broken down by group Shiites and Kurds had the most positive outlook on their lives, while Sunnis were split 50-50. That was an improvement however, because in the March 2008 poll only 34% of Sunnis said things were good.

When asked how Iraq in general was doing 58% had a positive view saying things were going well, compared to 40% that thought not. That was the best response since the question was asked over five polls beginning in 2005. Similarly when questioned about how things had changed in the country in the last six months 52% said things had gotten better, 39% said things were the same, with only 8% saying it had gotten worse. That was a dramatic turnaround from March 2008 and August 2007 when the same question was asked. In March only 36% said things were better. In August 2007 only 11% felt that way, while 61% thought things were worse.

When asked about the future, the majority of respondents had a favorable view as well. When questioned about how their area would be a year from now 65% said it would continue to be good, compared to 35% that said it would be bad. That was a huge increase from March 2008 when only 44% thought things would improve, but not up to the 2004 and 2005 levels when 70% and 71% respectively said things would be positive. When asked how their children's live would be, respondents weren't as optimistic with 44% saying it would be better, 26% saying it would be worse, and 29% claiming it would be about the same. Thoughts about the country overall were positive with 60% saying Iraq would be doing better within a year compared to 26% who said it would be the same, and only 12% who believed things would turn for the worse. Responses like that hadn't been seen since 2005 when 69% thought things would be better in a year, 11% though it would be the same, and 11% said the country would be worse off.

How are things in your life?

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07	2005	2004
Very Good	21%	13%	8%	8%	22%	13%
Quite Good	44%	41%	31%	31%	49%	57%
Quite Bad	19%	29%	34%	32%	18%	14%
Quite Bad	16%	16%	26%	28%	11%	15%
Refused/Don't know	-	-	-	-	1%	1%

By community comparing Feb. 09/March 08

	Kurds	Shiite	Sunni
Very Good	32%/24%	25%/14%	8%/7%
Quite Good	41%/49%	46%/48%	42%/27%
Quite Bad	23%/20%	16%/27%	23%/38%
Very Bad	4%/7%	13%/11%	28%/28%

How do you think Iraq is doing today?

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07	2005
Very Good	20%	7%	3%	4%	14%
Quite Good	38%	36%	19%	31%	30%
Quite Bad	25%	36%	40%	35%	23%
Quite Bad	15%	20%	38%	31%	30%
Refused/Don't know	-	1%	-	-	3%

In the last six months how has the situation in Iraq changed?

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07
Became better	52%	36%	11%
Became worse	8%	26%	61%
Stayed the same	39%	37%	28%

What is your expectation for how things overall in your area will be a year from now?

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07	2005	2004
Very Good	21%	13%	8%	8%	22%	13%
Quite Good	44%	41%	31%	31%	49%	57%
Quite Bad	19%	29%	34%	32%	18%	14%
Quite Bad	16%	16%	26%	28%	11%	15%
Refused/Don't know	-	-	-	-	1%	1%

How will your children's life be?

	Feb. 09	March 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07
Better	44%	39%	33%	42%
Worse	26%	28%	42%	37%
About the same	29%	31%	25%	21%
Refused/don't now	2%	1%	-	-

How do you think Iraq will be doing a year from now?

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07	2005
Much Better	30%	14%	4%	14%	41%
Somewhat Better	30%	32%	19%	26%	28%
About the Same	26%	33%	35%	26%	11%
Somewhat Worse	10%	13%	25%	21%	6%
Much Worse	2%	7%	17%	13%	5%
Refused/Don't know	2%	2%	-	-	-

Security

The positive view of life in Iraq and its future is largely due to the improved security situation. 85% of Iraqis said they thought security in their area was good. That was a huge increase from 62% in March 2008 and 43% in August 2007. Most thought that security had also improved or stayed the same in their area over the last six months. When asked about their personal safety in their neighborhoods 59% said they felt very safe, 35% said not very safe, and 6% said not safe at all. That was a reversal of the March 2008 numbers when 37% said they felt very safe, and 53% said not very safe. Positive numbers had not really been seen since 2005 when 63% said they felt very safe, and 30% said not very safe.

The improved security situation was also shown when Iraqis were asked whether they had personally encountered violence in their life. Overall, around 40% of respondents from 2007 on had some kind of situation happen in their area. By February 2009 the number were down in every category. 18% for example had seen a car bomb or suicide attack compared to 35% in March 2008 and 32% in September 2007. 18% had witnessed sectarian fighting, compared to 35% in March 2008, and 27% in September 2007. What was still high was kidnappings, which were usually done for profit with 32% saying they had seen it, down from 45% in March 2008 and 40% in September 2007, but up from 25% in February 2007. Seeing abuses by Iraqi and American forces were also down.

The two slight exceptions were when Iraqis were asked about the future of the security situation, and their freedom to move and live where they wanted. On those questions people seemed a little apprehensive, but still positive. 74% of those that said the security situation was better thought that it would stay that way in the future, compared to 21% that were not confident. That was down however from March 2008 when 82% said they were confident. When asked could they go where they wanted 74% said they felt safe, and 25% said not. That trend began in March 2008 when 44% said the situation was good, and 56% said it was bad. In February and August 2007 the answers were only 24% and 25% good respectively. When Iraqis were questioned about whether they thought they could live where they wanted without persecution however, things were more mixed. 43% said they felt good, compared to 56% who felt bad. That was only a slight change from March 2008 when 40% felt good about being able to live where they wanted, compared to 60% who felt the situation was bad. That was a big improvement from 2007 however when only 23% felt good.

Security in your neighborhood

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07	2005	2004
Very good	46%	20%	15%	17%	31%	20%
Quite good	39%	42%	28%	30%	30%	29%
Quite bad	14%	27%	24%	21%	17%	21%
Very bad	1%	12%	32%	32%	21%	29%
Refused/Don't know		-		-	1%	1%

Last six months has the security situation in your area changed?

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07
Became better	50%	46%	24%
Became worse	3%	17%	31%
Stayed the same	47%	36%	45%
Refused/Don't know	-	1%	-

How safe do you feel in your neighborhood?

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07	2005	2004
Very safe	59%	37%	26%	26%	63%	40%
Not very safe	35%	53%	47%	41%	30%	40%
Not safe at all	6%	10%	28%	33%	6%	18%
Refused/Don't know	-	-	-	-	1%	3%

Which of the following have occurred near you?

Car bombs/suicide attacks	Have occurred near you	Have not occurred by you
Feb. 09	18%	82%
March 08	35%	64%
Sep. 07	32%	68%
Sniper, crossfire	Have occurred near you	Have not occurred by you
Feb. 09	21%	79%
March 08	34%	66%
Sep. 07	30%	70%
Feb. 07	30%	70%
Sectarian fighting	Have occurred near you	Have not occurred by you
Feb. 09	18%	82%
March 08	35%	64%
Sep. 07	27%	72%
Feb. 07	25%	75%
Kidnapping	Have occurred near you	Have not occurred by you
Feb. 09	32%	68%
March 08	45%	54%
Sep. 07	40%	59%
Feb. 07	25%	75%
Fighting between government and insurgents	Have occurred near you	Have not occurred by you
Feb. 09	20%	79%
March 08	37%	62%
Sep. 07	34%	66%
Feb. 07	34%	66%
Unnecessary violence against citizens by U.S. of Coalition	Have occurred near you	Have not occurred by you
Feb. 09	25%	74%
March 08	42%	57%
Sep. 07	41%	57%
Feb. 07	44%	55%
Unnecessary violence against citizens by Iraqi police	Have occurred near you	Have not occurred by you
Feb. 09	17%	83%
March 08	20%	79%
Sep. 07	21%	79%
Feb. 07	24%	76%
Unnecessary violence against citizens by Iraqi Army	Have occurred near you	Have not occurred by you
Feb. 09	18%	81%
March 08	20%	79%
Sep. 07	19%	81%
Feb. 07	24%	76%
Unnecessary violence against citizens by militias	Have occurred near you	Have not occurred by you
Feb. 09	18%	81%
March 08	36%	63%
Sep. 07	30%	70%
Feb. 07	31%	69%
Assassination or attempted assassination	Have occurred near you	Have not occurred by you
Feb. 09	22%	78%

If the security situation has improved do you think it will stay that way?

	Feb. 09	March 08
Very confident	30%	32%
Somewhat confident	44%	50%
Not so confident	19%	15%
Not all confident	2%	-

Freedom of movement in your neighborhood

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07
Very good	28%	21%	8%	8%
Quite good	46%	23%	17%	16%
Quite bad	19%	29%	32%	40%
Very bad	6%	27%	42%	35%
Refused/Don't know	1%	-	-	-

How do you feel about your freedom to live where you want without persecution in your neighborhood?

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07
Very good	12%	16%	8%	8%
Quite good	31%	24%	15%	15%
Quite bad	36%	32%	32%	39%
Very bad	20%	28%	45%	38%
Refused/Don't know	1%	-	-	-

Economy and Services

When asked what was the biggest problem facing them in their own lives, economic issues outweighed security ones, something that was noted in the March 2008 poll. The top five personal concerns in the recent survey were high prices 9%, no jobs 9%, crime 5%, terrorist attacks 5%, economic problems 5%, lack of services 5%, and poor electricity 5%. That compared to the March 2008 survey where the top concerns were electricity 11%, no jobs 10%, high prices 6%, lack of security 6%, social disintegration 5%, fuel shortages 5%, and the U.S. occupation 5%. Some of the top concerns were thus the same, but just changed in importance, and security and the U.S. were more important.

What is the biggest problem you face?

February 2009 – Top 5
1.	High prices	9%
2.	No jobs/unemployment	9%
3.	Common crime	5%
3.	Terrorist attacks	5%
3.	Economic problems	5%
3.	Lack of goods and services/problems with food rations	5%
3.	Poor electricity supply	5%
March 2008
1.	Poor electricity supply	11%
2.	No jobs/unemployment	10%
3.	High prices	6%
3.	Lack of security	6%
5.	Can't trust people/social disintegration	5%
5.	Fuel shortages	5%
5.	U.S. occupation	5%

When asked about individual issues in their neighborhood, the situation was mixed. Jobs, electricity, water, and health care were felt to be inadequate, while education, basic needs, crime prevention, general economic situation, and fuel supply were good. 34% said access to jobs in their area was good, compared to 66% who thought it was bad. That was up from the March 2008 and 2007 polls, but not as high as 38% recorded in 2005. Similar numbers were found for electricity supply with 37% saying it was good, and 62% saying it was bad. That was the best response since 2005 however. In August 2007 positive responses were in single digits. 38% said the water situation was good, compared to 61% who said it was bad, which was similar to March 2008 responses. Medical care was also seen as inadequate with 40% saying it was good, 60% saying it was bad. Schools were seen as doing much better with 64% saying they were good, and 35% saying they were bad. Basic needs were also being met with 62% saying the situation was positive, 39% saying it was negative. 78% said they felt protected from crime, 60% said their family's general economic situation was good, and 67% said they had good access to fuel. Those were all improvements from March 2008 with the last having the largest increase.

Iraqis were also divided on how things had gone over the last six months. 33% said things had gotten better for their family economically over that period, 23% said things were worse, and 44% said things had stayed the same. Only 14% said the job situation had changed for the better, compared to 35% who said it was worse, and 50% who said it had stayed the same. Those were almost the exact same responses found in March 2008.

Jobs in your neighborhood

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07	2005	2004
Very good	7%	7%	4%	3%	11%	7%
Quite good	27%	22%	17%	17%	27%	19%
Quite bad	32%	35%	37%	44%	23%	23%
Very bad	34%	35%	43%	35%	34%	46%
Refused/Don't know	-	1%	-	-	5%	6%

Electricity in your neighborhood

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07	2005	2004
Very good	7%	1%	2%	2%	11%	8%
Quite good	30%	11%	6%	11%	35%	27%
Quite bad	32%	43%	35%	37%	30%	28%
Very bad	30%	45%	58%	51%	25%	37%
Refused/Don't know	-	-	-	-	1%	1%

Clean water in your neighborhood

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07	2005	2004
Very good	13%	8%	9%	9%	19%	20%
Quite good	25%	23%	16%	22	39%	31%
Quite bad	29%	37%	35%	35%	27%	22%
Very bad	32%	31%	40%	34%	15%	26%
Refused/Don't know	-	1%	-	-	-	1%

Medical care in your neighborhood

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07		Feb. 07	2005		2004
Very good	14%	10%	9%	8%			27%		17%
Quite good	26%	27%	23%	23%			35%		34%
Quite bad	28%	32%	37%	35%			23%		24%
Very bad	32%	30%	30%	34%			13%		22%
Refused/Don't know	-	-	-	-			2%		3%

Schools in your neighborhood

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07	2005	2004
Very good	18%	15%	15%	12%	43%	37%
Quite good	46%	48%	36%	31%	31%	35%
Quite bad	28%	29%	30%	35%	17%	15%
Very bad	7%	8%	19%	21%	7%	11%
Refused/Don't know	-	1%	-	-	1%	3%

Availability of basic needs in your neighborhood

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07	2005	2004
Very good	18%	19%	9%	8%	22%	18%
Quite good	44%	46%	30%	30%	38%	38%
Quite bad	25%	27%	34%	39%	23%	24%
Very bad	14%	8%	27%	23%	15%	17%
Refused/Don't know	-	-	-	-	2%	2%

Protection from crime in your neighborhood

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07	2005	2004
Very good	24%	19%	13%	14%	33%	21%
Quite good	54%	35%	22%	26%	33%	31%
Quite bad	17%	28%	28%	32%	19%	20%
Very bad	4%	18%	37%	28%	14%	23%
Refused/Don't know		-		-	1%	4%

Family's economic situation

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07	2005
Very good	19%	15%	7%	7%	22%
Quite good	41%	42%	30%	29%	48%
Quite bad	23%	27%	37%	41%	20%
Very bad	17%	16%	26%	23%	10%
Refused/Don't know	-	-	-	-	1%

Availability of fuel for cooking and driving

	Feb. 09	March 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07
Very good	26%	2%	1%	1%
Quite good	41%	17%	8%	11%
Quite bad	24%	40%	33%	40%
Very bad	8%	41%	59%	48%
Refused/Don't know	-	-	-	-

In the past six months how has your family's economic situation changed?

	Feb. 09	March 08
Became better	33%	31%
Became worse	23%	24%
Stayed the same	44%	45%
Refused/Don't know	-	1%

In the last six months how has the job situation changed?

	Feb. 09	March 08
Became better	14%	18%
Became worse	35%	35%
Stayed the same	50%	46%
Refused/Don't know	-	1%

The government was seen as the main provider of services compared to others, but they were not believed to be competent. Only 16% said the national government was doing a good job providing services, compared to 67% who said they were doing something to little. 17% said they were doing nothing at all. The provincial governments did a little better with 15% saying they did a great deal, 73% saying they did something to a little, and 11% saying nothing at all. After that the Sons of Iraq, Awakenings, foreign aid groups, and the U.S. and Iraqi security forces were grouped together. For all those 9% said they were doing a great deal. Last were mosques and religious charities at 6% who thought they were doing a lot, and militias at 5%.

How is each group doing providing services to your neighborhood?

	National Government	Provincial Government	Sons of Iraq/ Awakening	Militia	Mosque/ Religious charity	Foreign aid	U.S.-Iraqi security forces
A great deal	16%	15%	9%	5%	6%	9%	9%
Some	37%	39%	18%	11%	24%	11%	24%
A little	30%	34%	24%	17%	30%	25%	27%
Nothing at all	17%	11%	45%	64%	38%	53%	38%
Refused/Don't know	-	1%	4%	4%	2%	2%	2%

When questioned about the biggest problems facing the entire country, security and the U.S. presence were still at the top of the list, the same as in March 2008. The top issues were lack of security 8%, terrorist attacks 7%, the U.S. occupation 7%, civil war 6%, ethnic/religious tensions 6%, economic problems 6%, high prices 6%, and a weak government/political instability 6%. Those closely followed the March responses, which were lack of security 13%, terrorist attacks 12%, sectarian violence 7%, civil war 6%, ethnic/religious tensions 6%, and the U.S. occupation 6%.

What is the biggest problem Iraq is facing?

Feb. 09
1.	Lack of security	8%
2.	Terrorist attacks	7%
2.	U.S. occupation	7%
4.	War/civil war	6%
4.	Ethnic/religious tensions	6%
4.	Economic problems	6%
4.	High prices	6%
4.	Political instability/weak government/bad leaders	6%
March 08
1.	Lack of security	13%
2.	Terrorist attacks	12%
3.	Sectarian violence	7%
4.	War/civil war	6%
4.	Ethnic/religious tensions	6%
4.	U.S. occupation	6%

Government, Groups, and Provincial Elections

As shown in the recent provincial elections, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is riding on a wave of popularity. 55% said they approved of his performance, his highest rating over four surveys. Views on him amassing power were mixed however with 41% saying he had too much, 25% saying he had too little, and 31% thinking he had the right amount. Opinions of the Iraqi parliament weren't as positive, and actually declined from the March 2008 poll. 47% said the parliament was willing to pass an oil law, down from 53% in March 2008, 46% said they were promoting reconciliation, down from 48%, and 38% said they were willing to fight corruption, down from 46%. Local governments were seen in a much better light with 59% saying they were doing a good job, compared to 40% saying they were bad. That was the highest rating since ABC, BBC, and the NHK started conducting the polls.

Thoughts on Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki?

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07
Approve	55%	40%	33%	43%
Disapprove	43%	58%	66%	57%
Refused/Don't know	2%	2%	1%	-

What do you think about Maliki's power?

Feb. 09
Too much power	41%
Too little power	25%
Right amount of power	31%
Refused/Don't know	3%

Opinions of Iraqi parliament

Sharing oil wealth with all parts of the country

	Feb. 09	March 08
Willing	47%	53%
Not willing	51%	46%
Refused/Don't know	2%	1%

Promoting reconciliation

	Feb. 09	March 08
Willing	46%	48%
Not willing	53%	51%
Refused/Don't know	1%	1%

Fighting corruption

	Feb. 09	March 08
Willing	38%	46%
Not willing	61%	53%
Refused/Don't know	1%	1%

Government in your neighborhood

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07	2005	2004
Very good	16%	11%	11%	12%	21%	18%
Quite good	43%	35%	28%	31%	30%	32%
Quite bad	25%	33%	32%	31%	24%	20%
Very bad	15%	21%	29%	26%	18%	18%
Refused/Don't know	-	1%	-	-	7%	12%

When asked their opinions on groups in Iraq, the security forces rated the best, with militias doing the worst. 73% said they had confidence in the Iraqi Army, and 74% said the same about the police. That was followed by the legal system 68%, the national government 61%, community leaders 44%, and Awakening councils 43%. The U.S. at 26%, and local militias with 18% were at the bottom. 67% also said that the security forces were loyal to the country. 30% said they followed individual factions. There was also suspicions about religious groups with 44% said they had too much power.

How do you feel about each group?

Iraqi Army

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07	2005	2004	2003
Great deal of confidence	37%	28%	23%	24%	36%	18%	13%
Quite a lot of confidence	36%	37%	43%	37%	31%	38%	25%
Not very much confidence	24%	24%	21%	25%	18%	25%	29%
None at all	3%	11%	12%	14%	12%	10%	16%
Refused/Don't know	-	-	-	-	3%	9%	17%

Iraqi police

	Feb. 09	March 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07	2005	2004	2003
Great deal of confidence	36%	33%	33%	32%	38%	26%	18%
Quite a lot of confidence	38%	34%	36%	32%	31%	41%	28%
Not very much confidence	20%	20%	17%	16%	18%	20%	30%
None at all	5%	13%	15%	20%	12%	8%	15%
Refused/Don't know	-	1%	-	-	2%	4%	10%

U.S. military

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07	2005	2004	2003
Great deal of confidence	12%	4%	4%	6%	7%	8%	7%
Quite a lot of confidence	14%	16%	11%	12%	11%	17%	12%
Not very much confidence	28%	33%	27%	30%	23%	23%	20%
None at all	45%	46%	58%	52%	55%	43%	52%
Refused/Don't know	1%	1%	-	-	5%	8%	9%

Community leaders

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07	2005	2004	2003
Great deal of confidence	10%	12%	11%	11%	17%	17%	19%
Quite a lot of confidence	34%	35%	36%	34%	23%	34%	26%
Not very much confidence	33%	32%	34%	34%	29%	22%	21%
None at all	23%	20%	20%	21%	21%	16%	17%
Refused/Don't know	1%	1%	-	-	10%	12%	18%

National government

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07	2005
Great deal of confidence	26%	17%	11%	18%	23%
Quite a lot of confidence	35%	31%	28%	31%	30%
Not very much confidence	26%	26%	31%	27%	25%
None at all	13%	25%	30%	24%	16%
Refused/Don't know	1%	1%	-	-	6%

Local militia

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07
Great deal of confidence	4%	7%	11%	16%
Quite a lot of confidence	14%	15%	13%	20%
Not very much confidence	25%	24%	26%	26%
None at all	56%	47%	43%	38%
Refused/Don't know	1%	8%	8%	-

Awakening Council

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08
Great deal of confidence	15%	16%
Quite a lot of confidence	28%	40%
Not very much confidence	28%	27%
None at all	25%	9%
Refused/Don't know	4%	7%

Legal system

	Feb. 09
Great deal of confidence	28%
Quite a lot of confidence	40%
Not very much confidence	24%
None at all	8%
Refused/Don't know	1%

Who are the Iraqi security forces loyal to?

	Feb. 09
Loyal to individual factions	30%
Loyal to Iraq	67%
Refused/Don't know	2%

Opinion on role of religious groups in society

	Feb. 09
Too much	44%
Too little	29%
The right amount	26%
Refused/Don't know	2%

When asked about Iraq's governmental system, a strong central authority and democracy seem to have taken hold. 70% said Iraq power should be centered in the capital. 20% believed in regional governments, while 7% thought Iraq should break apart into separate states. Since 2004 Iraqis have said they support power being based in Baghdad. A democratic system also received the highest mark with 64% supporting it. That was a large jump from February 2007 when only 43% believed in it. Next was an Islamic state at 19%, then a strongman at 14%. Regardless of what type of government they wanted, a majority also believed in voting.

How should Iraq be governed in the future?

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07	2005	2004
Unified Iraq under a central government	70%	66%	62%	58%	70%	79%
Regional governments	20%	23%	28%	28%	18%	14%
Separate independent states	7%	9%	9%	14%	9%	4%
Refused/Don't know	3%	1%	1%	-	3%	3%

Which political system would be best for Iraq?

	Feb. 09	Feb. 07	2005	2004
Strong leader for life	14%	34%	26%	28%
Islamic state	19%	22%	14%	21%
Democracy	64%	43%	57%	49%
Refused/Don't know	3%	-	3%	4%

Regardless of type of government you prefer, are you confident that voting can work in Iraq?

	Feb. 09
Very confident	28%
Somewhat confident	38%
Not so confident	25%
Not confident at all	7%
Refused/Don't know	2%

The January 2009 provincial elections also seem to have had a positive affect on the public. 43% said the election increased their confidence in voting. 47% also said they felt that they were free and fair, as opposed to 37% who said they were not. When asked how the elections would affect a variety of issues, all the results were positive. 56% said it would make the political situation better, 40% said it would improve cooperation amongst sectarian groups, 48% said it would help with security, 44% believed it would improve services, 45% thought it would improve the economy. The only issue that most did not think the elections would change were rights for women with 44% saying it would have no effect. One big change in the 2009 voting was that more Sunnis participated compared to the last ones in January 2005. Over two-thirds thought this was a positive development.

How did the Jan. 09 provincial elections affect your view of voting working in Iraq?

	Feb. 09
Increased confidence	43%
Decreased confidence	18%
Made no difference	37%
Refused/Don't know	2%

Opinion of Jan. 09 provincial elections

	Feb. 09
Were free and fair	47%
Were not free or fair	37%
Depends on province	14%
Refused/Don't know	3%

Effect of provincial elections on the following

Political situation

	Feb. 09
Better	56%
Worse	12%
No real effect	29%
Refused/Don't know	3%

Cooperation amongst sectarian groups

	Feb. 09
Better	40%
Worse	27%
No real effect	31%
Refused/Don't know	1%

Security

	Feb. 09
Better	48%
Worse	22%
No real effect	28%
Refused/Don't know	1%

Public services

	Feb. 09
Better	44%
Worse	26%
No real effect	28%
Refused/Don't know	2%

Economic opportunity

	Feb. 09
Better	45%
Worse	22%
No real effect	31%
Refused/Don't know	1%

Rights for women

	Feb. 09
Better	27%
Worse	26%
No real effect	44%
Refused/Don't know	3%

Opinion on more Sunnis participating in Jan. 09 provincial elections than Jan. 05 vote

	Feb. 09
Positive	67%
Negative	10%
No real effect	20%
Refused/Don't know	3%

Many Iraqis believed that the sectarian and ethnic tensions were improving in the country. 60% said relations between Shiites and Sunnis were excellent to good. 79% believed that Sunnis and Shiites would reconcile, with only 17% believing that they would separate.

Thoughts on Arab-Kurdish relations were not as positive, but still good with 53% believing in reconciliation, compared to 43% who believed separation was in the future. 44% thought relations between the two groups were excellent to good. Iraqis tended to oppose the Kurds' aspirations however. 78% for example said Kirkuk should not become part of Kurdistan. 58% thought that the Kurds would eventually declare independence, an idea that only 23% would support.

How are relations between Shiites and Sunnis today in Iraq?

	Feb. 09	March 08
Excellent	27%	9%
Good	33%	38%
Not so good	21%	33%
Poor	18%	19%

How are relations between Arabs and Kurds in Iraq today?

	Feb. 09	March 08
Excellent	20%	11%
Good	24%	31%
Not so good	29%	33%
Poor	26%	24%

What is in Iraq's future between Sunnis and Shiites?

	Feb. 09
Reconciliation	79%
Separation	17%
Refused/Don't know	3%

What is in the future for Arabs and Kurds?

	Feb. 09
Reconciliation	53%
Separation	43%
Refused/Don't know	4%

Should Kirkuk become part of Kurdistan?

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08
Should	20%	27%
Should not	78%	72%
Refused/Don't know	1%	1%

How likely is it that Kurdistan will declare independence?

	Feb. 09
Very likely	31%
Somewhat likely	27%
Somewhat unlikely	23%
Very unlikely	17%

Would you support or oppose Kurdish independence?

	Feb. 09
Support strongly	11%
Support somewhat	12%
Oppose somewhat	27%
Oppose strongly	48%

Finally, opinions on whether Iraq's refugees should return reversed from the earlier March 2008 poll. Then 45% said it as not time to return, as opposed to 54% who thought it was. In the newest poll 57% believed it was time, compared to 40% who said it was not.

Should Iraqi refugees return

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08
Yes	57%	45%
No	40%	54%
Refused/Don't know	3%	1%

Opinions Of The U.S. And Coalition

Iraqis did not have a positive view of the U.S. or the Coalition. The low opinion of the American presence has been recorded in other polls. The Pentagon's quarterly report to Congress on Iraq for example, has consistently reported that few Iraqis are willing to give the U.S. military credit for security in their area.

In the ABC, BBC, NHK poll 53% said that the Americans controlled Iraq compared to 32% who said it was the government. When asked about the job the U.S. and other Coalition forces had done in Iraq only 30% said it had been good, with 69% saying they had done a bad job. That was the highest positive mark since 2005 however. Opinions of the U.S. invasion are also mostly negative with 56% saying it was wrong, compared to 42% who thought it was right. That was a decrease from the March 2008 poll. In February 2007 and 2004 however, there were higher positive marks. This might be the reason why 62% believed that journalist Muntadar al-Zaidi was a hero for throwing his shoes at President Bush. Iraqis didn't seem impressed by new President Obama either with only 35% saying he would have a positive effect on Iraq. 19% thought he would make things worse, while 38% said he would make no difference.

Who controls things in Iraq?

	Feb. 09	Feb. 07	2005
Iraqi government	32%	34%	44%
U.S.	53%	59%	24%
Somebody else	9%	4%	17%
No one	3%	3%	6%
Refused/Don't know	3%	-	9%

Opinion on how the U.S. and other Coalition forces have done in Iraq

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07	2005
A very good job	11%	6%	3%	6%	10%
Quite a good job	19%	23%	15%	18%	27%
Quite a bad job	30%	35%	32%	30%	19%
A very bad job	39%	35%	48%	46%	40%
Refused/Don't know	1%	1%	1%	-	5%

Opinion of U.S. invasion

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07	2005	2004
Absolutely Right	19%	21%	12%	22%	19%	20%
Somewhat Right	23%	28%	25%	25%	28%	29%
Somewhat Wrong	28%	23%	28%	19%	17%	13%
Absolutely Wrong	28%	27%	35%	34%	33%	26%
Refused/Don't know	2%	-	-	-	4%	13%

What is your opinion of journalist Muntadar al-Zaidi who threw his shoe at President Bush

	Feb. 09
A hero	62%
A criminal	24%
Both equally	10%
Refused/Don't know	4%

How will President Obama affect Iraq

	Feb. 09
Better	35%
Worse	19%
No difference	38%
Depends	5%
Refused/Don't know	3%

Iraqis are also waiting for the U.S. to leave. 46% said the U.S. should leave before the 2011 deadline set by the Status of Forces Agreement. 59% thought that Iraqi forces were ready now to take over from the U.S. as well. Even so, there were some Iraqis who were worried about security after the U.S. left. 42% said they were concerned, compared to 57% who said they were not.

Should the U.S. leave before the 2011 deadline?

	Feb. 09
Leaver sooner than 2011	46%
Stay longer than 2011	16%
The timetable for withdrawal is right	35%
Refused/Don't know	2%

Are the Iraqi forces ready now to take over from the U.S.?

	Feb. 09
Ready	59%
Not Ready	40%
Refused/Don't know	1%

How concerned are you that security will worsen after the U.S. leaves?

	Feb. 09
Very concerned	7%
Somewhat concerned	35%
Not so concerned	36%
Not concerned at all	21%
Refused/Don't know	1%

The British who controlled southern Iraq fared no better with a few exceptions. 42% said they had a negative affect, compared to 36% who thought they were a positive influence. 19% said they did both good and bad. 57% said the Iraqi forces were ready to take over from the English. 57% also thought that the security situation would not change much after the British left. When asked about the British impact upon the south overall, there were mixed reviews. 47% thought they helped with long-term security compared to 49% who thought they were a hindrance. 51% did say that the British helped rebuilding the government and police of the region, but only 42% said they helped with reconstruction.

Opinion of British forces in the south

	Feb. 09
Generally positive	36%
Generally negative	42%
Some of both	19%
Refused/Don't know	3%

Are Iraqi forces ready to take over security in Basra from the British?

	Feb. 09
Ready	57%
Not ready	38%
Refused/Don't know	5%

How concerned are you that security in Basra will worsen after British leave

	Feb. 09
Very concerned	12%
Somewhat concerned	28%
Not so concerned	37%
Not concerned at all	20%
Refused/Don't know	2%

Opinion of British impact on each of the following:

Long-term security

	Feb. 09
Help	47%
Hindrance	49%
Refused/Don't know	4%

Rebuilding government and police in the south

	Feb. 09
Help	51%
Hindrance	47%
Refused/Don't know	3%

Rebuilding infrastructure

	Feb. 09
Help	42%
Hindrance	55%
Refused/Don't know	4%

Foreign Relations

Iraqis didn't seem to have a positive few of very many countries overall. Only Turkey garnered a positive view with 35%. Even then 30% had a negative view of it. All of the other countries asked about were seen as negative. Those included Russia, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and England. The U.S. at 64% and Iran at 68% had the most negative responses.

Opinion of role of each country

Russia

	Feb. 09	Feb. 07
Positive	18%	15%
Neutral	57%	72%
Negative	22%	13%

Saudi Arabia

	Feb. 09	Feb. 07
Positive	21%	20%
Neutral	45%	28%
Negative	32%	52%

Iran

	Feb. 09	Feb. 07
Positive	12%	17%
Neutral	19%	16%
Negative	68%	67%

Syria

	Feb. 09	Feb. 07
Positive	23%	7%
Neutral	38%	30%
Negative	38%	63%

Turkey

	Feb. 09	Feb. 07
Positive	35%	10%
Neutral	34%	44%
Negative	30%	46%

U.S.

	Feb. 09	Feb. 07
Positive	18%	12%
Neutral	17%	11%
Negative	64%	77%

Britain

	Feb. 09	Feb. 07
Positive	22%	11%
Neutral	18%	14%
Negative	59%	75%

Conclusion

This poll represents the new status quo in Iraq. The sectarian war of 2006-2007 is over. Violence is down. Iraqis feel much safer in their own neighborhood, although they are more apprehensive about the situation across the entire country. Still, the survey shows that many Iraqis feel that the situation is sustainable, and that the future holds promise. Economic issues have now eclipsed security as the most important issues for individuals when asked about their own neighborhoods. The U.S. and England have also set a date for withdrawal, something that is widely popular. Belief in a strong central government, and voting also appeared to have taken hold in the country. The two major complaints now appear to be about the government's inability to provide services, the economic outlook, and the claims of the Kurds for Kirkuk and possible independence.

SOURCES

BBC, ABC, NHK, “Iraq Poll February 2009,” 3/16/09

Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” December 2008