Low Oil Prices Threaten $79B Iraqi Surplus
CBS News/Associated Press
October 15, 2008
During the 2nd Presidential debate, Sen. Barack Obama said: "We're spending $10 billion a month in Iraq at a time when the Iraqis have a $79 billion surplus, $79 billion." That number is wrong. First, the Government of Iraq doesn't have $79 billion in the bank. That number is based on a Government Accountability Office (GAO) projection in August that Baghdad could reach a cumulative $79 surplus budget by the end of this year. Not only was that a projection, it was the GAO's highest possible projection. Second, $79 billion now looks excessive because it assumed that Iraq's oil revenues would remain sky high. Instead, oil prices have fallen sharply. Third, the Iraqi parliament passed a $21 billion supplemental spending bill in August, which was not factored into the GAO’s surplus tally. Since the supplemental is funded by this year's projected surplus (which as noted earlier is less than expected), there is no way for Iraq's cumulative surplus to reach $79 billion by the end of the year. Fourth, as noted by our contributing blogger, Musings on Iraq, Baghdad is outspending Washington in helping Iraqis rebuild. Finally, if you factor in falling oil prices and rising Iraqi government spending, then the government of Iraq may end up with less than $30 billion "in the bank" at the end of this year. As Iraq's Finance Minister rightly points out, it is not accurate to refer to such funds as a "surplus." The Central Bank of Iraq must maintain a federal reserve to support Iraq's currency. Without a healthy reserve, Iraq cannot have a fixed currency. And without a fixed currently, there would be even more instability and turmoil in Iraq.
US Agrees to Limit Iraqi Jurisdiction
Associated Press
October 15, 2008
Qassim Abdul-Zahra writes about American troops who could face trial before Iraqi courts for major crimes committed off base.
Followers of Ancient Faith Caught in Iraq’s Fault Lines
New York Times
October 13, 2008
Campbell Robertson writes of the Yazidis of Qahtaniya and the plight of this largely peaceful people in the all-too-familiar position for Iraqi minorities who exist between two antagonistic forces.
Iraq’s Christians Ask for Protection
National Public Radio
October 13, 2008
Lourdes Garcia-Navarro reports on the Christian minority in Iraq, which has been targeted with a rapid increase of attacks this year.
Pigeon Breeds Now Face Fewer Challenges in Iraq
Los Angeles Times
October 12, 2008
Raheem Salman writes that sanctions and war made it difficult and dangerous for hobbyists to pursue their passion, but lately things are looking up for the bird lovers.
Schools Open, and First Test is Iraqi Safety
New York Times
October 11, 2008
Sam Dagher writes of schools opening in Baghdad and students attending classes amid improved security, but families remain fearful of the situation.
Violence in Mosul Forces Iraqi Christians to Flee
New York Times
October 10, 2008
Erica Goode and Suada Al-Salhy write about the hundreds of Christians who have fled Mosul in the wake of a string of killings that appear to be singling out Christians in the northern Iraqi city.
In Iraq, Those Displaced by Violence Return Home
National Public Radio
October 9, 2008
Lourdes Garcia-Navarro reports after the holy month of Ramadan when hundreds of families displaced by sectarian fighting began returning to the divided neighborhood of Ghazaliyah.
Nearing the End
New York Times Editorial
October 8, 2008
Editorial writer argues that no matter who wins the presidential election, the United States is on its way out of Iraq.
The Race for Iraqi Oil
National Public Radio
October 5, 2008
Peter Kenyon reports on the rising competition for Iraqi oil. In late October, Iraq will host more than three dozen major oil companies, all of which hope to bid and win the account for handling Iraq's massive oil reserves.
P.S. EPIC has set up a scholarship fund to help offset travel costs for students, activists, and low income participants who wish to attend the Iraq at the Crossroads symposium. So far $121.25 has been donated. If you'd like to contribute, donate today "on behalf of the Rutgers Scholarship Fund."
Thursday, October 16, 2008
Wednesday, October 15, 2008
Bad Times For Iraq’s Christians
The following commentary originally appeared in Musings On Iraq
Al Jazeera video on the recent events surrounding the Christians in Mosul
Iraq’s Christians recently faced two major setbacks. First, when Iraq’s parliament passed the new provincial election law in September 2008, they dropped Article 50 that was to set a quota for minority representation in provincial councils. Second, a wave of attacks on Christians in the northern city of Mosul in Ninewa province has caused thousands to flee the city. Both point to the precarious situation the country’s Christians find themselves in.
After a long delay, Iraq’s Presidential Council ratified the provincial election law on October 8, 2008. The original legislation included Article 50 that would set aside 13 provincial seats for Christians, and two for Yazidis and Shabeks in six provinces. During the debate on the law, two Shiite parties argued over whether the two seats for the Yazidis and Shabeks should be included, saying there was no census data to base the quotas upon. As a result, Article 50 was dropped. A special committee however, was set up to deal with the issue.
Despite the negative feelings the Christians felt after the removal of Article 50, it has received overwhelming support from Iraqi politicians to be re-included. At first, Christians said the article was dropped on purpose to punish them. Thousands came out into the streets in Mosul, Dohuk, but only a few in Baghdad. However, since then, many have voiced support for the article to be re-instated, beginning with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, the Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government, the Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party, and the United Nations representative to Iraq Staffan Di Mistura.
To add to their problem, the exact same day the election law was ratified, the first reports of attacks on Christians in Mosul appeared. On October 8 and 9, seventy-five families fled the city after attacks had killed five Christians. By October 14, fourteen Christians were dead, while 1,795 families had left the city. According to the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration most of those have gone to Christian villages and towns north of Mosul. In response, Maliki sent two National Police Brigades to the city, along with two investigative teams in an attempt to restore security.
To add to the confusion, no one seems to know who is responsible for the attacks, and why they are happening, although rumors are rampant. Some have blamed insurgents, but five insurgents groups in the city have denied any responsibility. That could leave Al Qaeda in Iraq or other Islamists who have attacked Christians before. Others have pointed fingers at the Kurds. Some have said they were attacked because they have demanded an autonomous region, others have pointed to the fact that the incidents came just after Christians protested Article 50 in large numbers in the north. The various theories point to the chaotic situation the city finds itself in as everyone seems like a suspect.
This has not been the first time Christians have been attacked or forced to flee in Iraq either, although some believe this is the worst case. Before the invasion, for example, there were up to 1 million Christians in Iraq. Since the invasion, almost half of them have left the country. The Ministry of Human Rights has documented 172 Christian deaths from 2003 to 2007. Churches have been bombed over the last five years, and many have fled Baghdad for the north where there are large Christian communities.
Iraq’s Christians have been one of the most vulnerable groups in the country since the U.S. invasion. The recent attacks on them couldn’t have come at a worst time as they were already feeling rejected by parliament due to Article 50 being dropped from the provincial election law. Since so many Iraqis have voiced support for it however, it is likely that it will be re-instated. The attacks in Mosul, however, may taper off, but they have served their purpose. They have instilled fear in the Christian community and driven many out. It’s unknown when or if they will return, as Mosul remains one of the most violent cities in the country.
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Christian shot dead in Mosul,” 10/13/08
- “Iraq Christians demand reserved council seats,” 10/6/08
- “UN concerned as flight of Iraq Christians continues,” 10/15/08
CNN, “Christian families fleeing Iraqi city tops 1,000,” 10/15/08
Dagher, Sam, “British hand over Basra in disarray,” Christian Science Monitor, 12/17/07
- “Iraqi Christians Flee Mosul in the Wake of Attacks,” New York Times, 10/15/08
Fadel, Leila, “Iraqi provincial elections likely to be held early next year,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/8/08
- “Thousands of Christians flee killings in Mosul,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/12/08
al-Ghuzi, Mohammad, “Iraqi PM concerned over scrapped law article,” KUNA, 9/28/08
Goode, Erica, “Iraq Passes Provincial Elections Law,” New York Times, 9/25/08
Goode, Erica and Farrell, Stephen, “Iraqis Unite to Restore Minority Representation Law,” New York Times, 10/7/08
Goode, Erica and al-Salhy, Suadad, “Violence in Mosul Forces Iraqis Christians to Flee,” New York Times, 10/11/08
Hamilton, Eric, “The Fight for Mosul,” Institute for the Study of War, 4/29/08
IRIN, “Attacks drive thousands of Christians out of Mosul,” 10/12/08
- “More food aid needed for displaced Christians – official,” 10/13/08
Jeddah, “Muslim states slam Iraq Christians violence,” Middle East Online, 10/15/08
Kenyon, Peter, “Christian Security Forces Growing Stronger In Iraq,” Morning Edition, NPR, 10/6/08
Kurdistan Regional Government, “Prime Minister Barzani supports minority representation in Iraqi Provincial Elections Law,” 10/10/08
Mohammed, Mujahid, “Iraq pours in police to protect Christians,” Agence France Presse, 10/12/08
Salaheddin, Sinan, “Official: 500 Christian families flee Iraq’s Mosul,” Associated Press, 10/11/08
Voices of Iraq, “Canceling article 50 of elections law unconstitutional – Kurdish MP,” 10/7/08
- “Christian demonstration in Duhuk, calls for self-rule,” 10/3/08
- “IIP demands to reactivate item 50 of elections bill,” 10/1/08
- “Security sources say 50 Christian families flees Mosul,” 10/9/08
- “UN envoy calls for re-including minorities article in provincial polls law,” 10/3/08
Yacoub, Sameer, “Iraqi Christians protest end to legislative quotas,” Associated Press, 9/29/08
Al Jazeera video on the recent events surrounding the Christians in Mosul
Iraq’s Christians recently faced two major setbacks. First, when Iraq’s parliament passed the new provincial election law in September 2008, they dropped Article 50 that was to set a quota for minority representation in provincial councils. Second, a wave of attacks on Christians in the northern city of Mosul in Ninewa province has caused thousands to flee the city. Both point to the precarious situation the country’s Christians find themselves in.
After a long delay, Iraq’s Presidential Council ratified the provincial election law on October 8, 2008. The original legislation included Article 50 that would set aside 13 provincial seats for Christians, and two for Yazidis and Shabeks in six provinces. During the debate on the law, two Shiite parties argued over whether the two seats for the Yazidis and Shabeks should be included, saying there was no census data to base the quotas upon. As a result, Article 50 was dropped. A special committee however, was set up to deal with the issue.
Despite the negative feelings the Christians felt after the removal of Article 50, it has received overwhelming support from Iraqi politicians to be re-included. At first, Christians said the article was dropped on purpose to punish them. Thousands came out into the streets in Mosul, Dohuk, but only a few in Baghdad. However, since then, many have voiced support for the article to be re-instated, beginning with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, the Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government, the Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party, and the United Nations representative to Iraq Staffan Di Mistura.
To add to their problem, the exact same day the election law was ratified, the first reports of attacks on Christians in Mosul appeared. On October 8 and 9, seventy-five families fled the city after attacks had killed five Christians. By October 14, fourteen Christians were dead, while 1,795 families had left the city. According to the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration most of those have gone to Christian villages and towns north of Mosul. In response, Maliki sent two National Police Brigades to the city, along with two investigative teams in an attempt to restore security.
To add to the confusion, no one seems to know who is responsible for the attacks, and why they are happening, although rumors are rampant. Some have blamed insurgents, but five insurgents groups in the city have denied any responsibility. That could leave Al Qaeda in Iraq or other Islamists who have attacked Christians before. Others have pointed fingers at the Kurds. Some have said they were attacked because they have demanded an autonomous region, others have pointed to the fact that the incidents came just after Christians protested Article 50 in large numbers in the north. The various theories point to the chaotic situation the city finds itself in as everyone seems like a suspect.
This has not been the first time Christians have been attacked or forced to flee in Iraq either, although some believe this is the worst case. Before the invasion, for example, there were up to 1 million Christians in Iraq. Since the invasion, almost half of them have left the country. The Ministry of Human Rights has documented 172 Christian deaths from 2003 to 2007. Churches have been bombed over the last five years, and many have fled Baghdad for the north where there are large Christian communities.
Iraq’s Christians have been one of the most vulnerable groups in the country since the U.S. invasion. The recent attacks on them couldn’t have come at a worst time as they were already feeling rejected by parliament due to Article 50 being dropped from the provincial election law. Since so many Iraqis have voiced support for it however, it is likely that it will be re-instated. The attacks in Mosul, however, may taper off, but they have served their purpose. They have instilled fear in the Christian community and driven many out. It’s unknown when or if they will return, as Mosul remains one of the most violent cities in the country.
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Christian shot dead in Mosul,” 10/13/08
- “Iraq Christians demand reserved council seats,” 10/6/08
- “UN concerned as flight of Iraq Christians continues,” 10/15/08
CNN, “Christian families fleeing Iraqi city tops 1,000,” 10/15/08
Dagher, Sam, “British hand over Basra in disarray,” Christian Science Monitor, 12/17/07
- “Iraqi Christians Flee Mosul in the Wake of Attacks,” New York Times, 10/15/08
Fadel, Leila, “Iraqi provincial elections likely to be held early next year,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/8/08
- “Thousands of Christians flee killings in Mosul,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/12/08
al-Ghuzi, Mohammad, “Iraqi PM concerned over scrapped law article,” KUNA, 9/28/08
Goode, Erica, “Iraq Passes Provincial Elections Law,” New York Times, 9/25/08
Goode, Erica and Farrell, Stephen, “Iraqis Unite to Restore Minority Representation Law,” New York Times, 10/7/08
Goode, Erica and al-Salhy, Suadad, “Violence in Mosul Forces Iraqis Christians to Flee,” New York Times, 10/11/08
Hamilton, Eric, “The Fight for Mosul,” Institute for the Study of War, 4/29/08
IRIN, “Attacks drive thousands of Christians out of Mosul,” 10/12/08
- “More food aid needed for displaced Christians – official,” 10/13/08
Jeddah, “Muslim states slam Iraq Christians violence,” Middle East Online, 10/15/08
Kenyon, Peter, “Christian Security Forces Growing Stronger In Iraq,” Morning Edition, NPR, 10/6/08
Kurdistan Regional Government, “Prime Minister Barzani supports minority representation in Iraqi Provincial Elections Law,” 10/10/08
Mohammed, Mujahid, “Iraq pours in police to protect Christians,” Agence France Presse, 10/12/08
Salaheddin, Sinan, “Official: 500 Christian families flee Iraq’s Mosul,” Associated Press, 10/11/08
Voices of Iraq, “Canceling article 50 of elections law unconstitutional – Kurdish MP,” 10/7/08
- “Christian demonstration in Duhuk, calls for self-rule,” 10/3/08
- “IIP demands to reactivate item 50 of elections bill,” 10/1/08
- “Security sources say 50 Christian families flees Mosul,” 10/9/08
- “UN envoy calls for re-including minorities article in provincial polls law,” 10/3/08
Yacoub, Sameer, “Iraqi Christians protest end to legislative quotas,” Associated Press, 9/29/08
Tuesday, October 14, 2008
Analyst On Iraq’s Oil Plans: Don’t Expect Much Until A New Oil Law Is Passed
The following commentary originally appeared in Musings On Iraq
The public radio show Living On Earth recently interviewed Peter Zeihan, the director of analysis at Stratfor, an on-line intelligence and foreign policy research group, on Iraq’s oil plans. This comes on the eve of an initiative to open up long-term oil contracts by Iraq’s Oil Ministry. Zeihan said that until Iraq passes a new oil law, nothing major much would come of this policy.
Iraq has great potential when it comes to oil. Currently it has 115 billion barrels of known oil deposits. Analysts believe it might have up to 300 billion if sites in the west and north are explored. That would not only give Iraq a quarter of the known reserves, but it would posses the largest deposits in the world. The Stratfor analyst Zeihan noted that most of Iraq’s oil is also in the South, which gives it easy access to the Persian Gulf, and would mean low investment costs to increase its output.
Iraq wants to exploit these reserves and boost its production. Currently, Iraq produces around 2.4 million barrels a day, but the Oil Ministry wants to increase that to 4.5 million. As reported earlier, Oil Minister Hussein al-Shahristani had a two-part plan to sign deals with major international oil companies to achieve this. The first half, signing consulting agreements, was scrapped recently, so the minister is moving ahead with the second part. That will begin Monday, October 13, when the Oil Minister is scheduled to meet with executives from major petroleum companies in London to discuss long-term oil contracts. Zeihan said that while Iraq has the infrastructure and know how to exploit its existing oil fields, it needs new investment to reach its potential, and open up the suspected reserves in the north and west.
The problem is that the major groups in Iraq, the Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds, can’t agree on a new oil law. They have to come up with a plan to share the profits. Until then, it is illegal for foreign companies to operate in Iraq on major projects. Oil Minister Shahristani’s meeting with oil companies then, is a way to get around the lack of legislation, but all companies can do now is surface work. That’s not what they want. They want to invest large amounts to boost production so they can make major profits, and that requires a new oil law. The analyst noted that Iraq has had these types of meetings before, but nothing really happened afterwards. In fact, Zeihan warned that corruption could be the result. Iraq wants to create relationships with petroleum companies for when a new law is passed. Until then, he suspected that Iraqi officials would be asking for bribes from corporations who will be looking for an edge once parliament agrees on legislation.
The analyst’s comments continue to place a cloud over Iraq’s oil plans. The Oil Ministry already failed in the first part of its program. It is now moving ahead with oil deals even though there is no law to regulate them. The London meeting is in fact, extra-legal, and any deals made could be invalidated later. The fact that the Kurds, and the rest of Iraq’s political parties have fundamental differences over the exploitation of its resources makes passage of a petroleum law anytime soon highly questionable. That means the Oil Minister will have to continue to make haphazard moves until then, and that opens up more opportunities for corruption, which is endemic throughout the government.
SOURCES
Living On Earth, “Raising Iraq Oil,” 10/10/08
Smith, Grant, “Iraq to Favor National Oil Companies in Bid Round, Analyst Says,” Bloomberg, 10/10/08
Monday, October 13, 2008
International Organization for Migration and Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration Survey of Displaced Iraqis
The following commentary originally appeared in Musings On Iraq
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) recently released two reports on Iraq’s refugees. The first was a joint survey with Iraq’s Ministry of Displacement and Migration of 2,102 Iraqi families that returned to their homes. The 13,858 individuals were interviewed from December 15, 2007 to August 2008. 1,890 families were internally displaced, while 212 were foreign refugees who came back to Iraq. 7,196 were males, and 6662 were females. 56%, were children under 18 years old. The majority either came from or returned to Baghdad, which has seen the largest displacement, especially during the sectarian war of 2006-2007.
Overall, the IOM reported that 21,066 families, 126,396 people total, have returned so far. 18,757 of those were internally displaced, while 2,309 were internal refugees. Of those surveyed, 38.58% said they were coming back because of improved security in their area. Almost as many, 36.39% said that it was a combination of better security and difficulties with being displaced. Only 0.29%, the lowest percentage, said they were going back because the government was offering money to those who returned. The vast majority were still facing extreme difficulties however. 88% of heads of households for example, were able to work, but not employed. On the positive side 86% of those surveyed were able to return to their original homes. 43% of those found them in good condition, while 42% said there were damages.
Here are the results of the report.
Overall Returnees In Iraq
Total number returned as of September 5, 2008: 21,066 families, 126,396 people
Total number of internally displaced families that have returned: 18,757 (85%)
Total number of international refugee families that have returned: 2,309 (11%)
Results of Survey
Overall:
Surveyed: 2,102 returnee families, 13,858 people, from December 15, 2007 to August 2008
Who and where were people surveyed:
Anbar:
Reasons for Return:
Place of Return:
Where they live:
86% went back to original house, 14% went back to their neighborhood but not their home
Housing and Conditions:
Anbar: 42.6% own house good condition, 42.2% own house bad condition, 7.8% renting, 5.2% living with neighbor/friend/relative, 0.9% improvised shelter own land, 0.8% other, 0.5% squatting
Babil: 57% own house bad condition, 35% own house good condition, 4% renting, 4% living with neighbor/friend/relative
Baghdad: 52% own house good condition, 36% own house bad condition, 5% renting, 5% living with neighbor/friend/relative, 1% squatting, 1% improvised shelter on own land
Basra: 60% own house bad condition, 40% own house good condition
Diyala: 52% own house good condition, 34% own house bad condition, 9% living with neighbor/friend/relative, 4% renting
Karbala 100% own house good condition
Maysan 81% renting, 13% other, 5% living with neighbor/relative/friend, 1% own house bad condition
Muthanna: 40% renting, 35% living with neighbor/relative/friend, 20% own house good condition, 5% other
Najaf 48% own house good condition, 38% renting, 10% own house bad condition, 3% other
Ninewa: 88% own house bad condition, 8% own house good condition, 2% living with neighbor/relative/friend, 1% renting, 1% squatting
Salahaddin: 100% renting
Tamim 76% own house bad condition, 14% renting, 10% living with neighbor/relative/friend
Non-movable property:
In Baghdad: 56% good condition, 32% partially destroyed, 11% completely destroyed, 1% occupied by others
Movable property:
In Baghdad: 56% lost/stolen, 39% have it, 4% used by family during displacement
Access to food rations:
Have they received government payments for returnees?
Anbar: 54 not applied, 4 applied, 3 applied and received money, 1 applied and received money, 1 no answer
Babil: 17 not applied, 6 applied, 3 applied and received money, 3 applied not received money
Baghdad: 740 applied, 568 not applied, 453 applied but not received any money, 287 applied and received money, 14 no answer
Basra: 5 not applied
Diyala: 169 applied, 155 applied but not received any money, 38 not applied, 14 applied and received money, 2 no answer
Karbala: 12 not registered
Maysan: 67 applied, 67 applied but not received any money, 11 not applied
Muthanna: 15 not applied, 5 applied, 5 applied but not received any money
Najaf: 25 applied, 25 applied but not received any money, 4 not applied
Ninewa: 308 not applied, 12 applied, 12 applied but not received any money
Salahaddin 4 not applied
Tamim: 15 applied, 11 applied but not received any money, 6 not applied, 4 applied and received money
School attendance:
In Baghdad: 68% have school age children, 32% no school age children, 85% attend, 9%
none, 6% only sometime
Health care:
In Baghdad: 62% access, 38% none
Feel safe?
Anbar: 69% yes, 31% sometimes
Babil: 65% no, 17% yes, 17% sometimes
Baghdad: 63% yes, 36% sometimes, 1% no
Basra: 60% sometimes, 20% yes, 20% no
Diyala: 91% yes, 9% sometimes
Karbala 100% yes
Maysan 100% yes
Muthanna: 100% yes
Najaf 97% yes, 3% no
Ninewa: 98% sometimes, 1% yes, 1% no
Salahaddin: 50% yes, 25% sometimes, 25% no
Tamim: 81% sometimes, 19% yes
Needs:
Anbar: Fuel 85%, Food 83%, Food 56%, Legal Aid 33%, Other 32%, Work 31%,
Health 29%, Hygiene 28%, Sanitation 28%, Shelter 17%, Education 14%, Water 3%
Babil: Fuel 100%, Food 96%, Legal Aid 43%, Education 35%, Health 30%, Work 13%, Sanitation 9%, Water 9%, Hygiene 4%
Baghdad: Food 65%, Fuel 45%, Sanitation 37%, Health 35%, Other 34%, Shelter 22%, Legal Aid 21%, Work 21%, Hygiene 16%, Water 15%, Education 14%
Basra: Food 100%, Legal Aid 80%, Fuel 80%, Water 60%, Health 60%, Work 60%, Hygiene 20%
Diyala: Food 93%, Water 76%, Fuel 71%, Other 63%, Health 53%, Education 42%, Hygiene 32%, Sanitation 32%, Shelter 30%, Legal Aid 21%, Work 5%
Karbala: Health 100%, Hygiene 100%, Legal Aid 83%
Maysan: Shelter 100%, Other 99%, Food 92%, Legal Aid 9%, Education 1%
Muthanna: Shelter 80%, Work 75%, Other 70%, Fuel 25%, Health 20%, Food 15%
Najaf: Fuel 90%, Water 83%, Sanitation 79%, Shelter 72%, Work 69%, Legal Aid 66%, Hygiene 48%, Food 45%, Other 38%, Health 34%, Education 3%
Ninewa: Legal Aid 98%, Fuel 98%, Work 95%, Health 83%, Hygiene 86%, Water 80%, Other 66%, Food 40%, Shelter 3%, Education 2%
Salahaddin: Food 100%, Fuel 100%, Shelter 75%, Other 75%, Health 25%, Legal Aid 25%,
Tamim: Food 100%, Water 57%, Other 57%, Shelter 52%, Work 52%, Fuel 33%, Education 29%, Hygiene 24%, Legal Aid 10%,
Dates of return:
Jan 06: 2
Feb 06: 1
March 06: 3
April 06: 4
May 06: 3
June 06: 0
July 06: 2
August 06: 4
Sep 06: 3
Oct 06: 6
Nov 06: 2
Dec 06: 2
Jan 07: 21
Feb 07: 181
March 07: 273
April 07: 74
May 07: 22
June 07: 42
July 07: 82
Aug 07: 63
Sep 07: 91
Oct 07: 127
Nov 07: 152
Dec 07: 145
Jan 08: 183
Feb 08: 182
March 08: 140
April 08: 77
May 08: 60
June 08: 72
July 08: 12
Unknown: 71
SOURCES
Ministry of Displacement and Migration & International Organization for Migration, “Returnee Monitoring and Needs Assessments Tabulation Report,” September 2008
United National High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), “Internal displacement update for Iraq,” Reuters, 4/1/08
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) recently released two reports on Iraq’s refugees. The first was a joint survey with Iraq’s Ministry of Displacement and Migration of 2,102 Iraqi families that returned to their homes. The 13,858 individuals were interviewed from December 15, 2007 to August 2008. 1,890 families were internally displaced, while 212 were foreign refugees who came back to Iraq. 7,196 were males, and 6662 were females. 56%, were children under 18 years old. The majority either came from or returned to Baghdad, which has seen the largest displacement, especially during the sectarian war of 2006-2007.
Overall, the IOM reported that 21,066 families, 126,396 people total, have returned so far. 18,757 of those were internally displaced, while 2,309 were internal refugees. Of those surveyed, 38.58% said they were coming back because of improved security in their area. Almost as many, 36.39% said that it was a combination of better security and difficulties with being displaced. Only 0.29%, the lowest percentage, said they were going back because the government was offering money to those who returned. The vast majority were still facing extreme difficulties however. 88% of heads of households for example, were able to work, but not employed. On the positive side 86% of those surveyed were able to return to their original homes. 43% of those found them in good condition, while 42% said there were damages.
Here are the results of the report.
Overall Returnees In Iraq
Total number returned as of September 5, 2008: 21,066 families, 126,396 people
- Baghdad 9790 families (58,740 people)
- Diyala 5604 families (33,624 people)
- Anbar 3087 families (18,522 people)
- Maysan 626 families (3756 people)
- Ninewa 604 families (3624 people)
- Basra 458 families (2748 people)
- Karbala 182 families (1092 people)
- Tamim 158 families (948 people)
- Wasit 118 families (708 people)
- Babil 112 families (672 people)
- Najaf 95 families (570 people)
- Salahaddin 95 families (570 people)
- Dhi Qar 86 families (516 people)
- Muthanna 24 families (144 people)
- Qadisiyah 24 families (144 people)
- Dahuk 3 families (18 people)
Total number of internally displaced families that have returned: 18,757 (85%)
- Baghdad 8774 families
- Diyala 5576 families
- Anbar 2357 families
- Ninewa 604 families
- Basra 456 families
- Maysan 401 people
- Karbala 123 families
- Babil 102 families
- Wasit 87 families
- Tamim 76 families
- Najaf 70 families
- Dhi Qar 57 families
- Salahaddin 56 families
- Qadisiyah 14 families
- Dahuk 3 families
- Muthanna 1 family
Total number of international refugee families that have returned: 2,309 (11%)
- Baghdad 1016 families
- Anbar 730 families
- Maysan 225 families
- Tamim 82 families
- Karbala 59 families
- Salahaddin 39 families
- Wasit 31 families
- Dhi Qar 29 families
- Diyala 28 families
- Najaf 25 families
- Muthanna 23 families
- Babil 10 families
- Qadisiyah 10 families
- Basra 2 families
Results of Survey
Overall:
Surveyed: 2,102 returnee families, 13,858 people, from December 15, 2007 to August 2008
- 1,890 families were internally displaced, 212 were international refugees
- 7,196 men, 6,662 women
- 6,051 18 & over (44%), 7,807 kids (56%)
- 59.9% Shiite, 39.9% Sunni, 0.1% Christian
- 88% of heads of households able to work but not, 20% were working
- 56.6% unemployment rate, 50.8% of men, 97.3% of women
Who and where were people surveyed:
Anbar:
- 59 families interviewed (480 people)
- 41 were displaced, 18 refugees
- Interviewed people in al-Kaim, Fallujah, Ramadi
- 23 families (143 people) interviewed
- 20 displaced, 3 refugees
- Interviewed people in al-Mahawil, al-Musayab, Hilla
- 1322 families interviewed (7744 people)
- 1232 displaced, 90 refugees
- Interviewed people in Abu Ghraib, Adhamiya, Al Resafa, Karkh, Madain,
- Mahmoudiya, Taji
- 5 families (37 people) interviewed
- 5 displaced, 0 refugees
- Interviewed people in al-Zubair, Basra
- 209 families (1220 people) interviewed
- 193 displaced, 16 refugees
- Interviewed people in al-Khalis, al-Muqdadiya, Baladrooz, Baquba, Khanaqin
- 12 families (83 people) interviewed
- 0 displaced, 12 refugees
- Interviewed all in Karbala
- 78 families (435 people) interviewed
- 78 displaced
- All in Amarah
- 20 families (103 people) interviewed
- All 20 refugees
- Interviewed people in al-Rumaitha and Al-Samawa
- 29 families (107 people) interviewed
- All 29 refugees
- Interviewed in Kufa and Najaf
- 320 families (3249 people) interviewed
- All 320 displaced
- Interviewed in Mosul, Telafar
- 4 families (44 people)
- All 4 refugees
- Interviewed in al-Daur, Tikrit
- 21 families (213) people
- 1 displaced, 20 refugees
- Interviewed in Daquq, Kirkuk
Reasons for Return:
- 38.58% better security in area
- 36.39% improved security and difficulties with displacement
- 16.56% very difficult displacement
- 7.09% other
- 0.67% improved security and very difficult displacement
- 0.43% very difficult displacement and returnee payments
- 0.29% government payments for returnees
Place of Return:
- 1,322 families came back to Baghdad, 780 went to other provinces
- Reasons for Return in Baghdad:
- 48% improved security and very difficult displacement
- 40% improved security
- 11% other
- 1% very difficult displacement
Where they live:
86% went back to original house, 14% went back to their neighborhood but not their home
- Karbala 100% home (12 families)
- Anbar: 98% home (58 families), 2% neighborhood (1 family)
- Diyala 96% home (201 families), 4% neighborhood (8 families)
- Babil 91% home (21 families), 9% neighborhood (2 families)
- Baghdad 91% home (1198 families), 9% neighborhood (124 families)
- Ninewa 86% home (275 families), 14% neighborhood (45 families)
- Najaf 66% home (19 families), 34% neighborhood (10 families)
- Muthanna 65% home (13 families), 35% neighborhood (7 families)
- Tamim 43% home (9 families), 57% neighborhood (12 families)
- Basra 40% home (2 families), 60% neighborhood (3 families)
- Salahaddin 25% home (1 families), 75% neighborhood (3 families)
- Maysan 100% neighborhood (78 families)
Housing and Conditions:
- 43% own house good condition
- 42% own house bad condition
- 8% renting
- 5% living with neighbor/friend/relative
- 1% squatting on others’ land
- 1% improvised shelter on own land
- 1% other
Anbar: 42.6% own house good condition, 42.2% own house bad condition, 7.8% renting, 5.2% living with neighbor/friend/relative, 0.9% improvised shelter own land, 0.8% other, 0.5% squatting
Babil: 57% own house bad condition, 35% own house good condition, 4% renting, 4% living with neighbor/friend/relative
Baghdad: 52% own house good condition, 36% own house bad condition, 5% renting, 5% living with neighbor/friend/relative, 1% squatting, 1% improvised shelter on own land
Basra: 60% own house bad condition, 40% own house good condition
Diyala: 52% own house good condition, 34% own house bad condition, 9% living with neighbor/friend/relative, 4% renting
Karbala 100% own house good condition
Maysan 81% renting, 13% other, 5% living with neighbor/relative/friend, 1% own house bad condition
Muthanna: 40% renting, 35% living with neighbor/relative/friend, 20% own house good condition, 5% other
Najaf 48% own house good condition, 38% renting, 10% own house bad condition, 3% other
Ninewa: 88% own house bad condition, 8% own house good condition, 2% living with neighbor/relative/friend, 1% renting, 1% squatting
Salahaddin: 100% renting
Tamim 76% own house bad condition, 14% renting, 10% living with neighbor/relative/friend
Non-movable property:
- 60% good condition
- 26% partially destroyed
- 9% completely destroyed
- 5% occupied by others
In Baghdad: 56% good condition, 32% partially destroyed, 11% completely destroyed, 1% occupied by others
Movable property:
- 43% lost/stolen
- 35% have it
- 19% used by family during displacement
- 4% no answer
In Baghdad: 56% lost/stolen, 39% have it, 4% used by family during displacement
Access to food rations:
- 58% yes, but not regularly
- 34% yes, regularly
- 8% none
Have they received government payments for returnees?
- 1,043 applied
- 1.042 not applied
- 732 applied but not received any money
- 311 applied and received money
- 17 no answer
Anbar: 54 not applied, 4 applied, 3 applied and received money, 1 applied and received money, 1 no answer
Babil: 17 not applied, 6 applied, 3 applied and received money, 3 applied not received money
Baghdad: 740 applied, 568 not applied, 453 applied but not received any money, 287 applied and received money, 14 no answer
Basra: 5 not applied
Diyala: 169 applied, 155 applied but not received any money, 38 not applied, 14 applied and received money, 2 no answer
Karbala: 12 not registered
Maysan: 67 applied, 67 applied but not received any money, 11 not applied
Muthanna: 15 not applied, 5 applied, 5 applied but not received any money
Najaf: 25 applied, 25 applied but not received any money, 4 not applied
Ninewa: 308 not applied, 12 applied, 12 applied but not received any money
Salahaddin 4 not applied
Tamim: 15 applied, 11 applied but not received any money, 6 not applied, 4 applied and received money
School attendance:
- 74% have school age children
- 26% no school age children
- 83% attend school
- 9% none
- 8% only sometime
In Baghdad: 68% have school age children, 32% no school age children, 85% attend, 9%
none, 6% only sometime
Health care:
- 54.1% no access
- 45.6% access
In Baghdad: 62% access, 38% none
Feel safe?
- 58% yes
- 41% sometimes
- 1% no
Anbar: 69% yes, 31% sometimes
Babil: 65% no, 17% yes, 17% sometimes
Baghdad: 63% yes, 36% sometimes, 1% no
Basra: 60% sometimes, 20% yes, 20% no
Diyala: 91% yes, 9% sometimes
Karbala 100% yes
Maysan 100% yes
Muthanna: 100% yes
Najaf 97% yes, 3% no
Ninewa: 98% sometimes, 1% yes, 1% no
Salahaddin: 50% yes, 25% sometimes, 25% no
Tamim: 81% sometimes, 19% yes
Needs:
- 65% Food
- 56% Fuel
- 44% Other
- 42% Health
- 33% Legal Aid
- 32% Work
- 30% Water
- 28% Sanitation
- 28% Hygiene
- 24% Shelter
- 14% Education
Anbar: Fuel 85%, Food 83%, Food 56%, Legal Aid 33%, Other 32%, Work 31%,
Health 29%, Hygiene 28%, Sanitation 28%, Shelter 17%, Education 14%, Water 3%
Babil: Fuel 100%, Food 96%, Legal Aid 43%, Education 35%, Health 30%, Work 13%, Sanitation 9%, Water 9%, Hygiene 4%
Baghdad: Food 65%, Fuel 45%, Sanitation 37%, Health 35%, Other 34%, Shelter 22%, Legal Aid 21%, Work 21%, Hygiene 16%, Water 15%, Education 14%
Basra: Food 100%, Legal Aid 80%, Fuel 80%, Water 60%, Health 60%, Work 60%, Hygiene 20%
Diyala: Food 93%, Water 76%, Fuel 71%, Other 63%, Health 53%, Education 42%, Hygiene 32%, Sanitation 32%, Shelter 30%, Legal Aid 21%, Work 5%
Karbala: Health 100%, Hygiene 100%, Legal Aid 83%
Maysan: Shelter 100%, Other 99%, Food 92%, Legal Aid 9%, Education 1%
Muthanna: Shelter 80%, Work 75%, Other 70%, Fuel 25%, Health 20%, Food 15%
Najaf: Fuel 90%, Water 83%, Sanitation 79%, Shelter 72%, Work 69%, Legal Aid 66%, Hygiene 48%, Food 45%, Other 38%, Health 34%, Education 3%
Ninewa: Legal Aid 98%, Fuel 98%, Work 95%, Health 83%, Hygiene 86%, Water 80%, Other 66%, Food 40%, Shelter 3%, Education 2%
Salahaddin: Food 100%, Fuel 100%, Shelter 75%, Other 75%, Health 25%, Legal Aid 25%,
Tamim: Food 100%, Water 57%, Other 57%, Shelter 52%, Work 52%, Fuel 33%, Education 29%, Hygiene 24%, Legal Aid 10%,
Dates of return:
Jan 06: 2
Feb 06: 1
March 06: 3
April 06: 4
May 06: 3
June 06: 0
July 06: 2
August 06: 4
Sep 06: 3
Oct 06: 6
Nov 06: 2
Dec 06: 2
Jan 07: 21
Feb 07: 181
March 07: 273
April 07: 74
May 07: 22
June 07: 42
July 07: 82
Aug 07: 63
Sep 07: 91
Oct 07: 127
Nov 07: 152
Dec 07: 145
Jan 08: 183
Feb 08: 182
March 08: 140
April 08: 77
May 08: 60
June 08: 72
July 08: 12
Unknown: 71
SOURCES
Ministry of Displacement and Migration & International Organization for Migration, “Returnee Monitoring and Needs Assessments Tabulation Report,” September 2008
United National High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), “Internal displacement update for Iraq,” Reuters, 4/1/08
Sunday, October 12, 2008
Another Sadrist Assassinated
The following commentary originally appeared in Musings On Iraq
Funeral procession of Sadrist parliamentarian Saleh al-Auqaeili through Sadr City
On October 9 Saleh al-Auqaeili, a Sadrist member of parliament, was killed by a bomb as he drove through eastern Baghdad. Auqaeili was a university professor, and one of the senior legislators in the 30-seat bloc of Sadrists in parliament. He was also known as a moderate in the movement.
The Sadr Trend at first blamed Iraqi forces and the U.S. for the assassination. Collaboration with the security forces was implicated as the attack occurred 200 yards from an Iraqi army checkpoint in an area that was heavily guarded by the U.S. military. Later, a Sadrist spokesman blamed gangs. The initial announcements however, led to a brief nighttime clash between militiamen and the Iraqi army. Later, U.S. soldiers arrived and one was wounded in the fighting. The next day thousands of Sadrists hit the streets of Sadr City to protest the murder.
As reported earlier, several other Sadrist leaders have been killed this year. The most well known was Riadh al-Nouri, who was gunned down in Najaf in April 2008. Nouri ran the Sadr office in the city, was Sadr’s brother in-law, and was also a moderate.
None of the murders have been solved, but suspicions have focused upon rival Shiite groups and breakaway elements of the Sadr movement itself. Sadrists and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) have had a long running rivalry that has often turned violent. In August 2007 for example, the two had a large battle in Karbala that led to Moqtada al-Sadr calling his first cease-fire. Taking out Sadrist leaders could be a prelude to the provincial elections, because they are the main rival to the SIIC’s rule of most of the southern governorates. The Sadrists themselves have always been loosely organized. Many militiamen have been recruited by Iran to carry out attacks for them in Special Groups. Sadr has also lost standing with some of his followers after the government crackdowns in Basra and Sadr City where he agreed to Iranian negotiated peace deals. Others are also unhappy with his decision to turn the movement into more of a social, religious, and political group rather than a militia. Together, these have all led to more breakaway factions who might be interested in carrying out these acts.
SOURCES
Associated Press, “Iraq: Bomb Kills Senior Shiite Lawmaker,” 10/9/08
Felishman, Jeffrey, “Shiite fighters clash with Iraqi, U.S. troops in Baghdad,” Los Angeles Times, 10/10/08
International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Civil War, The Sadrists And The Surge,” 2/7/08
- “Shiite Politics In Iraq: The Role Of The Supreme Council,” 11/15/07
Klapper, Bradley, “Thousands of al-Sadr supporters mourn lawmaker,” Associated Press, 10/10/08
Reid, Robert, “Shiite politician assassinated in Baghdad,” Associated Press, 10/9/08
Zein, Qassim and Allam, Hannah, “Al-Sadr followers vow to avenge killing of top aide,” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/12/08
Funeral procession of Sadrist parliamentarian Saleh al-Auqaeili through Sadr CityOn October 9 Saleh al-Auqaeili, a Sadrist member of parliament, was killed by a bomb as he drove through eastern Baghdad. Auqaeili was a university professor, and one of the senior legislators in the 30-seat bloc of Sadrists in parliament. He was also known as a moderate in the movement.
The Sadr Trend at first blamed Iraqi forces and the U.S. for the assassination. Collaboration with the security forces was implicated as the attack occurred 200 yards from an Iraqi army checkpoint in an area that was heavily guarded by the U.S. military. Later, a Sadrist spokesman blamed gangs. The initial announcements however, led to a brief nighttime clash between militiamen and the Iraqi army. Later, U.S. soldiers arrived and one was wounded in the fighting. The next day thousands of Sadrists hit the streets of Sadr City to protest the murder.
As reported earlier, several other Sadrist leaders have been killed this year. The most well known was Riadh al-Nouri, who was gunned down in Najaf in April 2008. Nouri ran the Sadr office in the city, was Sadr’s brother in-law, and was also a moderate.
None of the murders have been solved, but suspicions have focused upon rival Shiite groups and breakaway elements of the Sadr movement itself. Sadrists and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) have had a long running rivalry that has often turned violent. In August 2007 for example, the two had a large battle in Karbala that led to Moqtada al-Sadr calling his first cease-fire. Taking out Sadrist leaders could be a prelude to the provincial elections, because they are the main rival to the SIIC’s rule of most of the southern governorates. The Sadrists themselves have always been loosely organized. Many militiamen have been recruited by Iran to carry out attacks for them in Special Groups. Sadr has also lost standing with some of his followers after the government crackdowns in Basra and Sadr City where he agreed to Iranian negotiated peace deals. Others are also unhappy with his decision to turn the movement into more of a social, religious, and political group rather than a militia. Together, these have all led to more breakaway factions who might be interested in carrying out these acts.
SOURCES
Associated Press, “Iraq: Bomb Kills Senior Shiite Lawmaker,” 10/9/08
Felishman, Jeffrey, “Shiite fighters clash with Iraqi, U.S. troops in Baghdad,” Los Angeles Times, 10/10/08
International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Civil War, The Sadrists And The Surge,” 2/7/08
- “Shiite Politics In Iraq: The Role Of The Supreme Council,” 11/15/07
Klapper, Bradley, “Thousands of al-Sadr supporters mourn lawmaker,” Associated Press, 10/10/08
Reid, Robert, “Shiite politician assassinated in Baghdad,” Associated Press, 10/9/08
Zein, Qassim and Allam, Hannah, “Al-Sadr followers vow to avenge killing of top aide,” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/12/08
Saturday, October 11, 2008
Maliki Responds To His Critics On Tribal Support Councils
Prime Minister Maliki has created tribal Support Councils in 4. Wasit, 5. Maysan, 6. Basra, 7. Dhi Qar, 10. Babil, 11. KarbalaThe following commentary originall appeared in Musings On Iraq
As reported earlier, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has been creating tribal Support Councils across most of Southern Iraq. Currently there are councils in Basra, Maysan, Babil, Dhi Qar, Wasit, and Karbala. They were originally formed to counter the Sadrists and the Mahdi Army militia, but as they spread to more secure areas in the summer of 2008, provincial councils, governors, and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) all began to complain about them. All the criticisms were similar. They asked why the central government was organizing tribes and their fighters outside of the boundaries of the local provincial councils. It was apparent that Maliki was both protecting against the return of the Sadrists, as well as building up a base for the upcoming provincial elections.
The criticism however has grown so loud that the Prime Minister has been forced to respond. October 9, Maliki announced that he would disband any tribal Support Council that was working with a political party. This was obviously meant to just mute the complaints, because he also said that the councils were non-partisan and worked for the good of the country. Since Maliki created the councils, and they work for him, he is not likely to end them any time soon. The SIIC, anticipating this, said that they welcomed the Prime Minister’s announcement, but wanted to see some action instead of just words about the councils.
This on-going argument points to the inter-Shiite rivalries that have come to the fore recently. The Dawa and Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council are still part of the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance, and the SIIC is still one of the main supporters of Maliki’s ruling coalition. At the same time, the SIIC controls most of the southern provinces, has a large social and religious organization, plus its own militia, the Badr Brigade, that operates within the Interior Ministry, while Dawa is the smallest of the three major Shiite parties, and has no fighters of its own. Recently Maliki has been using the Iraqi security forces as a political tool, first against the Sadrists, then the insurgents, and most recently against the Kurds in the Khanaqin district of Diyala. It should be no surprise then that he is trying to build up his support while he can for the anticipated 2009 elections. The Support Councils provide him with both sheikhs and their tribesmen for the balloting, and armed men as well, if they are needed in another confrontation, as happened in Basra in March 2008. The SIIC’s response is also expected, as the councils are a direct challenge to the rule of the south. This dispute will probably continue until the day of the election.
SOURCES
Alsumaria, “Al Maliki defends tribal awakening councils,” 10/9/08
- “Rows growing between two major Iraqi parties,” 9/18/08
Cochrane, Marisa, “The Battle for Basra,” Institute for the Study of War, 5/31/08
Parker, Sam, “ISCI/Da’wa alliance showing strain,” Abu Muqawama Blog, 9/17/08
Voices of Iraq, “Government is the only authority and no negotiations with ‘the gangs’ – PM,” 3/28/08
- “Karbala governor says no-confidence vote proposal is political pressure tool,” 10/1/08
- “MP’s decision to cancel partisan support councils welcomed,” 10/9/08
- “PM announces formation of 17 tribal councils in Missan,” 6/23/08
- “Premier to cancel partisan support councils,” 10/9/08
- “Tribal chieftain announces opening 20 Supports Councils offices in Thi-Qar,” 10/1/08
- “Wassit province refuses to establish support councils,” 9/24/08
Friday, October 10, 2008
Disputes Over Tribal Support Councils
The following commentary originally appeared in Musings On Iraq
Baghdad has been setting up tribal Support Councils across southern and central Iraq recently. The first such councils were actually created by the United States to help formalize the Sons of Iraq program in Sunni areas. Beginning in March 2008 however, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki began creating his own councils during security operations in Basra and Maysan provinces. Later, he started spreading them throughout southern Iraq, and even just outside of Baghdad. Originally, these were a way to organize local tribes to support the government against Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia, but they were later used to counter the Sons of Iraq and expand Maliki’s political base.
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki took up the idea of the tribal Support Councils from the United States during his crackdowns on Sadr in southern Iraq. The first councils were originally set up by the United States in Anbar, Diyala, Ninewa, and Salahaddin to legitimize the Sons of Iraq units, give tribes a say in local governance, and create bottom up reconciliation. In March 2008, when Maliki launched Operation Knight’s Charge in Basra against the Mahdi Army he too reached out to local tribes for help with the crackdown. The Prime Minister offered them 10,000 positions in the security forces in return for their support, something tribes were all to willing to give him since there was high unemployment in the area. By early April, Maliki had gained the support of dozens of local sheikhs, who would form the basis of the first Support Council in the city with 2,500 fighters.
In June, Maliki sent forces to Maysan to again subdue the Sadrists that controlled the province. As in Basra, Baghdad turned to the tribes to counter the influence of the Sadr Trend. By the middle of the month the government announced the formation of 17 tribal councils in Maysan.
By the end of June, Maliki was even trying to create Support Councils in the Baghdad area. In Radwainiyah, just outside of the capitol, the government was courting a local Sunni sheikh to form a Support Council. This time, however, instead of responding to a perceived security threat like the Sadrists, the government was attempting to split the local Sunni tribes from the U.S.-funded Sons of Iraq that were operating in the area. That same month, Maliki met with representatives of the powerful Jabouri tribe about setting up a national council of tribes to support the government. Again, the Jabouri had been instrumental in working with the United States to create tribal Sons of Iraq, and now Baghdad was trying to win them over to their side.
From September to October the government attempted to create Support Councils across the rest of the south, but to the ire of the SIIC, governors, and the provincial councils. In September one was created in Babil. The governor, who was a member of the SIIC, was opposed to the idea because he said it did not include 1200 sheikhs. The SIIC controlled provincial government in Wasit was against a Support Council being created there as well, saying that it was not needed. The provincial council stated that there was already cooperation between the local government and the tribes, so a Support Council would be redundant. The Dawa governor of Karbala and the SIIC governor of Dhi Qar both voiced similar complaints. The Karbala governor claimed that the provincial council was trying to unseat him because he was against the Support Councils there, while the Dhi Qar governor questioned why Baghdad was creating 20 Support Councils in his province, without any coordination with the local government. The head of the security and defense committee in parliament and the SIIC itself have also questioned Maliki’s moves. The security and defense committee chairman said that the councils were unconstitutional. One SIIC member asked whether the tribal councils were a means to create a Dawa militia, while another said it was political maneuvering by Maliki before the provincial elections.
In 2008, the status quo changed in Iraq, and Maliki attempted to benefit from it through the creation of tribal Support Councils. First, Maliki’s main political and military rival, Moqtada al-Sadr had his militia scattered by security operations in Basra, Sadr City, and Maysan. Reaching out to tribes in Basra and Maysan was a way to protect against the Sadrists’ return, and to gain new supporters in areas where Maliki was weak before. The tribal council in Radwainiyah, was a shrewd move to undercut the local Sons of Iraq, which Maliki has never liked, and which he wishes to disband. Finally, the new councils in Babil, Wasit and Dhi Qar are direct challenges to the SIIC that rules those provinces. There is little coordination between the central and provincial governments, so even Dawa officials in those three areas felt that Malii was trying to usurp their power by creating independent tribal councils that answered to him rather than the local authorities. The 2009 provincial elections are the main backdrop for these movies. Dawa has always been the weakest of the three main Shiite parties. It was also the only one that lacked an armed militia. The Support Councils address both those issues by setting up a new Maliki dependent patronage system, and organizing armed tribesmen on his behalf. As 2008 ends, Maliki finds himself in a much stronger military and political situation, and the Support Councils have helped him with that.
SOURCES
Ahmed, Farook and Cochrane, Marisa, “Recent Operations against Special Groups and JAM in Central and Southern Iraq,” Institute for the Study of War, 4/7/08
Alsumaria, “Rows growing between two major Iraqi parties,” 9/18/08
Cochrane, Marisa, “The Battle for Basra,” Institute for the Study of War, 5/31/08
Cordesman, Anthony, “The Shi’ite Gamble: Rolling the Dice for Iraq’s Future,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 4/21/08
Dagher, Sam, “Basra strike against Shiite militias also about oil,” Christian Science Monitor, 4/9/08
- “U.S., Iraqi forces meet no Sadr resistance in Amara,” Christian Science Monitor, 6/23/08
Farrell, Stephen and Glanz, James, “More Than 1,000 in Iraq’s Forces Quit Basra Fight,” New York Times, 4/4/08
Hendawi, Hamza, “Program in Iraq against al-Qaida faces uncertainty,” Associated Press, 6/29/08
Iraqi News, “Three Support Councils established in Diala,” 1/24/08
McCallister, William, “Sons of Iraq: A Study in Irregular Warfare,” Small Wars Journal, 9/8/08
Missing Links Blog, “What’s up with Maliki’s latest tribal-council proposal,” 7/1/08
Multi-National Corps – Iraq, “Diyala leaders meet to establish tribal support councils (Diyala),” 3/21/08
Parker, Sam, “ISCI/Da’wa alliance showing strain,” Abu Muqawama Blog, 9/17/08
Raghavan, Sudarsan, “Basra’s Wary Rebirth,” Washington Post, 5/31/08
Scarborough, Rowan, “Tribe helps al-Maliki win control of south,” Washington Times, 5/23/08
Voices of Iraq, “Government is the only authority and no negotiations with ‘the gangs’ – PM,” 3/28/08
- “Karbala governor says no-confidence vote proposal is political pressure tool,” 10/1/08
- “PM announces formation of 17 tribal councils in Missan,” 6/23/08
- “Sunni, Shiite figures hold reconciliation conference in Diala,” 3/21/08
- “Thi-Qar governor slams govt’s plan of installing support councils,” 10/3/08
- “Tribal chieftain announces opening 20 Supports Councils offices in Thi-Qar,” 10/1/08
- “Wassit clans agree to back security agencies,” 4/6/08
- “Wassit province refuses to establish support councils,” 9/24/08
Baghdad has been setting up tribal Support Councils across southern and central Iraq recently. The first such councils were actually created by the United States to help formalize the Sons of Iraq program in Sunni areas. Beginning in March 2008 however, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki began creating his own councils during security operations in Basra and Maysan provinces. Later, he started spreading them throughout southern Iraq, and even just outside of Baghdad. Originally, these were a way to organize local tribes to support the government against Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia, but they were later used to counter the Sons of Iraq and expand Maliki’s political base.Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki took up the idea of the tribal Support Councils from the United States during his crackdowns on Sadr in southern Iraq. The first councils were originally set up by the United States in Anbar, Diyala, Ninewa, and Salahaddin to legitimize the Sons of Iraq units, give tribes a say in local governance, and create bottom up reconciliation. In March 2008, when Maliki launched Operation Knight’s Charge in Basra against the Mahdi Army he too reached out to local tribes for help with the crackdown. The Prime Minister offered them 10,000 positions in the security forces in return for their support, something tribes were all to willing to give him since there was high unemployment in the area. By early April, Maliki had gained the support of dozens of local sheikhs, who would form the basis of the first Support Council in the city with 2,500 fighters.
In June, Maliki sent forces to Maysan to again subdue the Sadrists that controlled the province. As in Basra, Baghdad turned to the tribes to counter the influence of the Sadr Trend. By the middle of the month the government announced the formation of 17 tribal councils in Maysan.
By the end of June, Maliki was even trying to create Support Councils in the Baghdad area. In Radwainiyah, just outside of the capitol, the government was courting a local Sunni sheikh to form a Support Council. This time, however, instead of responding to a perceived security threat like the Sadrists, the government was attempting to split the local Sunni tribes from the U.S.-funded Sons of Iraq that were operating in the area. That same month, Maliki met with representatives of the powerful Jabouri tribe about setting up a national council of tribes to support the government. Again, the Jabouri had been instrumental in working with the United States to create tribal Sons of Iraq, and now Baghdad was trying to win them over to their side.
From September to October the government attempted to create Support Councils across the rest of the south, but to the ire of the SIIC, governors, and the provincial councils. In September one was created in Babil. The governor, who was a member of the SIIC, was opposed to the idea because he said it did not include 1200 sheikhs. The SIIC controlled provincial government in Wasit was against a Support Council being created there as well, saying that it was not needed. The provincial council stated that there was already cooperation between the local government and the tribes, so a Support Council would be redundant. The Dawa governor of Karbala and the SIIC governor of Dhi Qar both voiced similar complaints. The Karbala governor claimed that the provincial council was trying to unseat him because he was against the Support Councils there, while the Dhi Qar governor questioned why Baghdad was creating 20 Support Councils in his province, without any coordination with the local government. The head of the security and defense committee in parliament and the SIIC itself have also questioned Maliki’s moves. The security and defense committee chairman said that the councils were unconstitutional. One SIIC member asked whether the tribal councils were a means to create a Dawa militia, while another said it was political maneuvering by Maliki before the provincial elections.
In 2008, the status quo changed in Iraq, and Maliki attempted to benefit from it through the creation of tribal Support Councils. First, Maliki’s main political and military rival, Moqtada al-Sadr had his militia scattered by security operations in Basra, Sadr City, and Maysan. Reaching out to tribes in Basra and Maysan was a way to protect against the Sadrists’ return, and to gain new supporters in areas where Maliki was weak before. The tribal council in Radwainiyah, was a shrewd move to undercut the local Sons of Iraq, which Maliki has never liked, and which he wishes to disband. Finally, the new councils in Babil, Wasit and Dhi Qar are direct challenges to the SIIC that rules those provinces. There is little coordination between the central and provincial governments, so even Dawa officials in those three areas felt that Malii was trying to usurp their power by creating independent tribal councils that answered to him rather than the local authorities. The 2009 provincial elections are the main backdrop for these movies. Dawa has always been the weakest of the three main Shiite parties. It was also the only one that lacked an armed militia. The Support Councils address both those issues by setting up a new Maliki dependent patronage system, and organizing armed tribesmen on his behalf. As 2008 ends, Maliki finds himself in a much stronger military and political situation, and the Support Councils have helped him with that.
SOURCES
Ahmed, Farook and Cochrane, Marisa, “Recent Operations against Special Groups and JAM in Central and Southern Iraq,” Institute for the Study of War, 4/7/08
Alsumaria, “Rows growing between two major Iraqi parties,” 9/18/08
Cochrane, Marisa, “The Battle for Basra,” Institute for the Study of War, 5/31/08
Cordesman, Anthony, “The Shi’ite Gamble: Rolling the Dice for Iraq’s Future,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 4/21/08
Dagher, Sam, “Basra strike against Shiite militias also about oil,” Christian Science Monitor, 4/9/08
- “U.S., Iraqi forces meet no Sadr resistance in Amara,” Christian Science Monitor, 6/23/08
Farrell, Stephen and Glanz, James, “More Than 1,000 in Iraq’s Forces Quit Basra Fight,” New York Times, 4/4/08
Hendawi, Hamza, “Program in Iraq against al-Qaida faces uncertainty,” Associated Press, 6/29/08
Iraqi News, “Three Support Councils established in Diala,” 1/24/08
McCallister, William, “Sons of Iraq: A Study in Irregular Warfare,” Small Wars Journal, 9/8/08
Missing Links Blog, “What’s up with Maliki’s latest tribal-council proposal,” 7/1/08
Multi-National Corps – Iraq, “Diyala leaders meet to establish tribal support councils (Diyala),” 3/21/08
Parker, Sam, “ISCI/Da’wa alliance showing strain,” Abu Muqawama Blog, 9/17/08
Raghavan, Sudarsan, “Basra’s Wary Rebirth,” Washington Post, 5/31/08
Scarborough, Rowan, “Tribe helps al-Maliki win control of south,” Washington Times, 5/23/08
Voices of Iraq, “Government is the only authority and no negotiations with ‘the gangs’ – PM,” 3/28/08
- “Karbala governor says no-confidence vote proposal is political pressure tool,” 10/1/08
- “PM announces formation of 17 tribal councils in Missan,” 6/23/08
- “Sunni, Shiite figures hold reconciliation conference in Diala,” 3/21/08
- “Thi-Qar governor slams govt’s plan of installing support councils,” 10/3/08
- “Tribal chieftain announces opening 20 Supports Councils offices in Thi-Qar,” 10/1/08
- “Wassit clans agree to back security agencies,” 4/6/08
- “Wassit province refuses to establish support councils,” 9/24/08
Thursday, October 09, 2008
EPIC to Join Groups Working to Alleviate Crisis at Oct. 24th National Symposium
At this year's Iraq Action Days, EPIC supporters like you came to Washington DC to urge the Bush administration and Congress to do more to help innocent Iraqis affected by the war. Among the hundreds who participated was Kevin Murphy, an Iraq War veteran and Rutgers law student who has been a passionate advocate for Iraqi refugees since his return home.Following Iraq Action Day, Kevin Murphy went back to his campus and got to work. Today, thanks to the extraordinary efforts of Kevin and his colleagues at Rutgers, we are proud to announce the next step in bringing the urgent humanitarian crisis to the center of our national discourse on Iraq:
IRAQ AT THE CROSSROADS: Protecting Refugees,
Rescuing Our Allies, and Empowering Iraqi Law
A National Symposium at Rutgers School of Law, Newark, NJ
October 24th, 2008 (Friday), 8:30 am - 5:30 pm
http://lawrecord.typepad.com/
Rescuing Our Allies, and Empowering Iraqi Law
A National Symposium at Rutgers School of Law, Newark, NJ
October 24th, 2008 (Friday), 8:30 am - 5:30 pm
http://lawrecord.typepad.com/
This important conference will explore the plight of Iraqi refugees and internally displaced persons, the unique dangers faced by Iraqis who helped the U.S., and how existing Iraqi law can be empowered to create peace in the country. Learn from and network with fellow activists, knowledgeable experts, and organizations taking humanitarian action for peace in Iraq.
Gathering two weeks before the Presidential election, featured speakers include Iraqi Judge Ra'id Juhi of the Saddam Hussein trial, Emily Gish of Mercy Corps, Bob Carey of International Rescue Committee, Zahir Janmohamed of Amnesty International, Sam Parker of the U.S. Institute of Peace, Kirk Johnson of The List Project, Congressman Bill Pascrell, and Hilary Ingraham of the U.S. State Department.
We hope you will join us on October 24 for this powerful symposium on the Iraqi Crisis. For more information please visit: http://lawrecord.typepad.com/
Wednesday, October 08, 2008
In the Next Obama-McCain Debate, Who Will Speak Up for Millions of Vulnerable Iraqis?
Here at EPIC we're disappointed but not surprised that we didn't hear Tom Brokaw ask a question about the humanitarian crisis facing millions of Iraqis. Given the global economic crisis, Americans are understandably focused on pocketbook issues close to home.But in an increasingly interconnected world, it's important for the United States to be responsibly engaged in facing global challenges, especially challenges that we helped create.
Since the U.S. invasion of Iraq, millions of Iraqis have been forced to flee their homes. Years of violence, economic dislocation, and failures in the delivery of essential services have left 17 million Iraqis without reliable access to drinkable water. More than 4 million Iraqis live in fear of hunger. While security has improved significantly over the past year, the vast majority of Iraqi refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) are staying put. With their own safety or that of their families in mind, they worry about the sustainability of recent security gains. For those who fled direct threats of persecution, they fear any return as long as their persecutor remains free.
Dear friends, we think it's time we had a broader conversation about Iraq. A conversation that goes beyond shallow, partisan questions like "Did the surge work or not?" There are additional questions that the candidates ought to answer: How will you help millions of Iraqis affected by a conflict that we helped create? Will you increase U.S. admissions of vulnerable Iraqi refugees? Will you strengthen humanitarian assistance to the region? Are you committed to supporting Iraq's peace and development?
We need to take these questions directly to the candidates.
In one week, Barack Obama and John McCain will square up for one last debate. Here’s your chance to ask them questions about our issues and to offer the answers you'd like to hear. If you keep your submission to a paragraph or less, you increase your chances of reaching a senior communications adviser or even one of the candidate.
Send your questions and talking points to each candidate via their websites:
Barack Obama | John McCain
Here's a sample from yours truly: Americans and Iraqis are interconnected by events over the past five and a half years. It's not enough to say you support "victory" or "ending the war" in Iraq, we want to know what you plan to do -- specifically -- to help millions of Iraqis who desperately need humanitarian relief and protection. In addition, what do you see as America's moral and international obligation to the people of Iraq?
Photo caption: Kurdish refugee camp in northern Iraq. Jasper Young/Panos Pictures
U.S. Leaders Reinforced Sectarian Division, says Iraq scholar Nabil Al-Tikriti
Among the most provocative speakers at the 2008 Iraq Action Days Forum was Nabil al-Tikriti, a Senior Fellow at the U.S. Institute for Peace (USIP) and a passionate critic of U.S. Iraq policy. His presentation details how a chain of uninformed decisions made by senior U.S. officials like former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Ambassador Paul Bremer reinforced sectarian divisions.
Panel 1 Part 2 (19:59) from Sarah Shannon on Vimeo.
Al-Tikriti’s talk clarifies numerous assumptions about the sectarian rift in Iraq: “Iraqis historically got along well unless there was external interference.”
Al-Tikriti contrasts the dominant U.S. narrative of ancient sectarian blood fueds (e.g. “why they hate each other”) with the Iraqi narrative of intermarriage, pluralism, and shared histories and cultures. He raises serious questions about how U.S. policy makers’ without sufficient knowledge of Iraq's history and culture were allowed to make decisions that affected the entire population. He adamantly rejects the idea of partitioning Iraq as a solution to the conflict, a position supported by Vice-presidential Candidate Joe Biden.
Instead he boldly suggests that D.C. pundits advocating the partitioning of Iraq should be forced at gunpoint to load up their BMWs and relocate to Mississippi where they are given shelter in a crowded public building.
Among the important questions that Mr. al-Tikriti raises about U.S. involvement in Iraq: Is the surge successful and sustainable? What are the legacies of the U.S. led invasion of Iraq? How can any negative ramifications be reversed?
Panel 1 Part 2 (19:59) from Sarah Shannon on Vimeo.
Al-Tikriti’s talk clarifies numerous assumptions about the sectarian rift in Iraq: “Iraqis historically got along well unless there was external interference.”
Al-Tikriti contrasts the dominant U.S. narrative of ancient sectarian blood fueds (e.g. “why they hate each other”) with the Iraqi narrative of intermarriage, pluralism, and shared histories and cultures. He raises serious questions about how U.S. policy makers’ without sufficient knowledge of Iraq's history and culture were allowed to make decisions that affected the entire population. He adamantly rejects the idea of partitioning Iraq as a solution to the conflict, a position supported by Vice-presidential Candidate Joe Biden.
Instead he boldly suggests that D.C. pundits advocating the partitioning of Iraq should be forced at gunpoint to load up their BMWs and relocate to Mississippi where they are given shelter in a crowded public building.
Among the important questions that Mr. al-Tikriti raises about U.S. involvement in Iraq: Is the surge successful and sustainable? What are the legacies of the U.S. led invasion of Iraq? How can any negative ramifications be reversed?
Tuesday, October 07, 2008
Pentagon Public Opinion Poll of Iraqis
The Pentagon recently released its latest quarterly report to Congress, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq” for September 2008. (1) It contains results from a public opinion poll conducted within Iraq in August 2008. It is the latest such information available on what Iraqis are thinking.
Most of the questions had to do with security, but there were a few on public services as well. The survey found that over 70% of Iraqis feel secure in their own area. 91% said the situation was the same or better in their neighborhood as well over the last 6 months. They were apprehensive about the situation across the country however as only 37% said they felt secure outside of their neighborhood, and only 21% said Iraq was calm.
The public believed the Iraqi security forces and the government, rather than the U.S. or other armed groups were responsible for the improved security. Over 60% said they feel safe around the Iraqi Army or police, and over 80% said they believed in the abilities of both. Over 60% of Iraqis believed that the government could also protect them, although those numbers declined from the last Pentagon survey conducted in November 2007. Iraqis on the other hand, did not see the American military in that good of a light, despite the Surge. Only 22% of Iraqis for example, said they believed the U.S. could provide security, and that was a 15% decrease from the November poll, while just 3% said the U.S. was responsible for security in their neighborhood. Armed groups, militias, and the Sons of Iraq fared even worse in the poll with 7% of Iraqis believing in the Sons of Iraq to provide security in their neighborhood, 5% in their tribe, and 1% in militias.
When asked about whether they had adequate electricity or water, the poll numbers also declined between August 2008 and the last time Iraqis were asked this question by the U.S. military. Still, almost 60% said they had access to clean water, while only about a third said they had enough power. The lack of government services has been an on-going problem within Iraq.
Here are the polling results published in the Pentagon report.
Note: When it says “increase” or “decrease” that’s compared to the last Defense Department poll done in November 2007, except for Government Services, which is compared to other Pentagon surveys
Security in neighborhoods
73% said security in their neighborhood was good, 12% increase
91% said security same or better in their neighborhood over last 6 months, 3% increase
75% said feel safe in their neighborhood, 1% decrease
37% said feel safe outside of their neighborhood, 7% decrease
Security across Iraq
21% said it was calm across Iraq
79% said security in whole country was better or the same, down 1%
41% said Iraq was stable, 16% increase
Iraqi Security Forces
65% said feel safe with Iraqi Army, 14% increase
61% said feel safe with police, 8% increase
68% said Army was winning, 16% increase
58% said police were winning, 8% increase
83% said they believe in the Army to provide security
81% said they believe in the police to provide security
35% said the Iraqi Army was most responsible for security in their neighborhood, 12% increase
38% said police most responsible for security in their neighborhood, 5% decrease
84% said Iraqi Army could protect their families from threats
81% said police could protect their families from threats
Iraqi Government
41% said government was effective, 3% increase
62% said local government could provide security, 17% decrease
68% said provincial government could provide security, 9% decrease
63% said central government could provide security, 5% decrease
63% said local government could protect their family from threats
67% said provincial government could protect their family from threats
63% said central government could protect their family from threats
U.S.
22% said U.S. could provide security, 15% decrease
3% said U.S. was responsible for their neighborhood
24% said U.S. could protect their families from threats
Other Groups And Security
13% said armed groups could provide security, 16% decrease
12% said militias could provide security, 4% decrease
7% said Sons of Iraq responsible for security in their neighborhood, 5% increase
5% said their tribe was responsible for security in their neighborhood
3% said their neighbors were responsible for security in their neighborhoods
2% said religious leaders were responsible for security in their neighborhood
1% said militias were responsible for security in their neighborhood
11% said armed groups could protect their family from threats
11% said militias could protect their family from threats
Government Services
34% sad they have enough electricity, decrease from early 2008
58% said they have access to clean water, 11% decrease from August 2007
SOURCE
Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” September 2008
Most of the questions had to do with security, but there were a few on public services as well. The survey found that over 70% of Iraqis feel secure in their own area. 91% said the situation was the same or better in their neighborhood as well over the last 6 months. They were apprehensive about the situation across the country however as only 37% said they felt secure outside of their neighborhood, and only 21% said Iraq was calm.
The public believed the Iraqi security forces and the government, rather than the U.S. or other armed groups were responsible for the improved security. Over 60% said they feel safe around the Iraqi Army or police, and over 80% said they believed in the abilities of both. Over 60% of Iraqis believed that the government could also protect them, although those numbers declined from the last Pentagon survey conducted in November 2007. Iraqis on the other hand, did not see the American military in that good of a light, despite the Surge. Only 22% of Iraqis for example, said they believed the U.S. could provide security, and that was a 15% decrease from the November poll, while just 3% said the U.S. was responsible for security in their neighborhood. Armed groups, militias, and the Sons of Iraq fared even worse in the poll with 7% of Iraqis believing in the Sons of Iraq to provide security in their neighborhood, 5% in their tribe, and 1% in militias.
When asked about whether they had adequate electricity or water, the poll numbers also declined between August 2008 and the last time Iraqis were asked this question by the U.S. military. Still, almost 60% said they had access to clean water, while only about a third said they had enough power. The lack of government services has been an on-going problem within Iraq.
Here are the polling results published in the Pentagon report.
Note: When it says “increase” or “decrease” that’s compared to the last Defense Department poll done in November 2007, except for Government Services, which is compared to other Pentagon surveys
Security in neighborhoods
73% said security in their neighborhood was good, 12% increase
91% said security same or better in their neighborhood over last 6 months, 3% increase
75% said feel safe in their neighborhood, 1% decrease
37% said feel safe outside of their neighborhood, 7% decrease
Security across Iraq
21% said it was calm across Iraq
79% said security in whole country was better or the same, down 1%
41% said Iraq was stable, 16% increase
Iraqi Security Forces
65% said feel safe with Iraqi Army, 14% increase
61% said feel safe with police, 8% increase
68% said Army was winning, 16% increase
58% said police were winning, 8% increase
83% said they believe in the Army to provide security
81% said they believe in the police to provide security
35% said the Iraqi Army was most responsible for security in their neighborhood, 12% increase
38% said police most responsible for security in their neighborhood, 5% decrease
84% said Iraqi Army could protect their families from threats
81% said police could protect their families from threats
Iraqi Government
41% said government was effective, 3% increase
62% said local government could provide security, 17% decrease
68% said provincial government could provide security, 9% decrease
63% said central government could provide security, 5% decrease
63% said local government could protect their family from threats
67% said provincial government could protect their family from threats
63% said central government could protect their family from threats
U.S.
22% said U.S. could provide security, 15% decrease
3% said U.S. was responsible for their neighborhood
24% said U.S. could protect their families from threats
Other Groups And Security
13% said armed groups could provide security, 16% decrease
12% said militias could provide security, 4% decrease
7% said Sons of Iraq responsible for security in their neighborhood, 5% increase
5% said their tribe was responsible for security in their neighborhood
3% said their neighbors were responsible for security in their neighborhoods
2% said religious leaders were responsible for security in their neighborhood
1% said militias were responsible for security in their neighborhood
11% said armed groups could protect their family from threats
11% said militias could protect their family from threats
Government Services
34% sad they have enough electricity, decrease from early 2008
58% said they have access to clean water, 11% decrease from August 2007
SOURCE
Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” September 2008
Baghdadis Celebrate Eid-al-Fitr Openly in the Streets
Eid al-Fitr, the festival of the breaking of the fast, begins with the sighting of the first crescent of the new moon of Shawwal, the 10th month of the Islamic lunar calendar. For the world's 1.4 billion Muslims, Eid al-Fitr celebrates the end of dawn-to-dusk fasting during the holy month of Ramadan.Traditionally, the 3-day Eid celebration begins on the morning after the crescent moon is sighted. However, the sighting of the Shawwal moon varies for different sects of Islam and in different parts of the world. For most Sunnis, including those of Iraq, Eid began last Tuesday after religious authorities in Saudi Arabia reported seeing the rise of the Shawwal moon. But for Sunni Muslims who live far beyond the Arabian pennisula and who look to Islamic scholars in their respective countires, from Indonesia to the United States, the sighting of the Shawwal moon came a day or two later. The Grand Ayatollahs of most Shiites sighted the Shawwal moon on Tuesday, so most Shiites began their 3 days of celebration last Wednesday.
For the Muslims of Iraq, Shiite and Sunni, this year’s Eid festivities come at the end of the most peaceful Ramadan season since 2006. This confirms the hopeful optimism of many Iraqis which I shared with you at the beginning of Ramadan.
Attacks in Iraq are down 83% since 2007 which emboldened many Iraqis to observe Ramadan and celebrate Eid as they have during more peaceful times. According to AFP, the U.S. commander for Baghdad Major General Jeffery Hammond reports: the first 21 days of Ramadan saw just 60 attacks compared with 600 in 2007 and 800 in 2006 -- the year when sectarian violence erupted across Iraq. Baghdadis flocked to local parks and public squares to celebrate Eid in the open air.
Of course there are still cement barricades, security check points, and other daily reminders of ongoing dangers to public safety. At Baghdad's al-Zawra park, armed guards patrolled the perimeter and families received full body pat-downs before entering. The decision to venture beyond the walls of their homes remains a wary one for many Iraqis. Um Abdullah, a teacher in Baghdad, told the Washington Post: "There is a kind of inner conflict" about whether to risk going outside. But ultimately she decided that this year: "We should go outside and live."
Although safer than recent years, Ramadan did not pass without incident. Five bombing attacks shook the streets of Baghdad on September 28th, killing dozens of innocent civilians. Yet for this year's Eid, the bloodshed was not enough to deter Baghdad’s National Theatre from showing its first nighttime performance since the invasion. Even after a car bomb killed three people across the street two hours before the opening curtain, the Theatre defied the terrorist violence and managed to open as scheduled. Salam Mijbil, a Theatre official, proudly proclaimed:
"We cannot let the terrorists control us. This bombing is the wind of hate. We will resist this wind and not buckle."Other signs of Iraqi resilience and determination eased apprehension throughout Baghdad during Eid as well. There were children playing games in the parks, Iraqis enjoying rides on a local Ferris wheel and people lining up to buy ice cream. Some women even felt safe enough to dress in the knee length skirts they commonly wore before the war began.
However, not all Iraqis were able to celebrate without inhibition or sorrow. For many, the tragedy of war and the absence of loved ones forced to flee tainted the festivities. Since the U.S. led invasion in 2003, far too many Iraqis have lost their lives and millions have been forced to flee their homes, leaving many Eid al-Fitr dinner tables with empty seats. According to Abu Muhammad, an Iraqi journalist whose relatives have sought refuge abroad:
“We can't feel this is Eid. It's Eid when you're with your family."Photo Caption: Muslims start celebrating Eid al-Fitr
October 12, 2007: muslimstoday
Monday, October 06, 2008
Who Rules Iraq’s Provinces And How Are They Doing?
The following commentary originally appeared in Musings On Iraq
Now that Iraq’s parliament has finally passed a new provincial election law, there should be a discussion of what political parties currently run Iraq’s eighteen provinces, and what they are like. Here is a breakdown of some general information about each, mostly based upon U.S. agencies.
Overview of Iraq’s Major Parties and What Provinces They Control
Kurds (Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan): Dahuk, Irbil, Ninewa, Salahaddin, Sulaymaniyah, Tamim
SIIC: Babil, Baghdad, Dhi Qar, Diyala, Muthanna (but Dawa governor), Najaf, Qadisiyah, Wasit
Dawa (Jaafari faction) - Karbala
Fadhila – Basra - governor, but SIIC & Dawa control provincial council
Iraqi Islamic Party – Anbar
Sadrists – Maysan
Notes:
1) Many of the major political parties do not run under their names such as the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) in the provinces, and the monikers they do use are interpreted several different ways from Arabic into English.
2) Iraq did not pass its 2008 budget until February 2008, which accounts for the low percentage spent by the provinces by March 2008, the latest numbers available.
3) The U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams have five rankings for how Iraq’s provinces are doing governing in the following order: Beginning, Developing, Performing, Sustaining, Self-Reliant
Anbar
Population: 1,280,000
Religion: 99% Sunni, 1% Shiite
Control of provincial council: Iraqi Islamic Party (Part of Iraqi Accordance Front)
Economy: Farming, livestock, glass and ceramics
Capital budget:
2007: Appropriated: $107 million Spent: $4 million Percentage: 3.7%
Up To March 2008: Appropriated: $192 million Spent: N/A Percentage: N/A
U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams Rankings from 11/30/07-2/29/08
Governance: Developing to Sustaining
Political Development: Developing to Performing
Reconciliation: no change - Performing
Economic Development: Beginning to Developing
Rule of Law: no change - Performing
Governance: Lack of coordination with Baghdad. Has several different authorities operating independently of each other. Corruption
Average Daily Electricity Provided/Demand (megawatts): 161/304
Services: Lacks adequate electricity and water
U.S. projects: 7,139, $1.7 billion
Number of displaced living in province: 64,536
Average daily attacks from December 07 to February 08: 2.37
Average daily attacks from February 08 to May 08: 1.95
Babil
Population: 1,444,400
Religion: 5% Sunni, 95% Shiite
Control of provincial council: Society of Faithful Iraqis (SIIC)
Economy: Farming, 52% of GDP of province. Has some of the most advanced farming in country
Capital budget:
2007: Appropriated: $127 million Spent: $61.9 million Percentage: 49%
Up To March 2008: Appropriated: $206 million Spent: $5.1 million Percentage: 3%
U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams Rankings from 11/30/07-2/29/08
Governance: no change - Developing
Political Development: no change - Beginning
Reconciliation: no change – Beginning
Economic Development: no change - Performing
Rule of Law: no change - Performing
Average Daily Electricity Provided/Demand (megawatts): 133/260
Services: Water shortage
U.S. projects: 2,178, $433 million
Number of displaced living in province: 77,914
Average daily attacks from December 07 to February 08: 0.57
Average daily attacks from February 08 to May 08: 0.73
Baghdad
Population: 6,386,100
Religion: 20% Sunni, 80% Shiite
Control of provincial council: Baghdad Nation (SIIC)
Economy: Farming, which is improving, but still uses outdated techniques. Business in south improving with better security
Capital budget:
2007: Appropriated: $560 million Spent: $174.4 million Percentage: 31%
Up To March 2008: Appropriated: $885 million Spent: $14.5 million Percentage: 2%
U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams Rankings from 11/30/07-2/29/08
Governance: no change - Developing
Political Development: no change - Developing
Reconciliation: no change - Developing
Economic Development: no change - Developing
Rule of Law: Beginning to Performing
Average Daily Electricity Provided/Demand (megawatts): 989/2,047
U.S. projects: 17,153, $7 billion
Number of displaced living in province: 563,771
Average daily attacks from December 07 to February 08: 15.60
Average daily attacks from February 08 to May 08: 24.02, most violence province in Iraq
Basra
Population: 1,761,000
Religion: 100% Shiite
Control of provincial council: Islamic Basra (Coalition of SIIC, Dawa and 6 others)
Economy: Oil, trade, only port in Iraq. Business improving after March 2008 security crackdown
Capital budget:
2007: Appropriated: $195 million Spent: $40.8 million Percentage: 21%
Up To March 2008: Appropriated: $322 million Spent: $0 Percentage: 0%
U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams Rankings from 11/30/07-2/29/08
Governance: Beginning to Sustaining
Political Development: Beginning to Performing
Reconciliation: Beginning to Performing
Economic Development: Beginning to Developing
Rule of Law: Beginning to Developing
Average Daily Electricity Provided/Demand (megawatts): 615/762
U.S. projects: 3,306, $2.1 billion
Number of displaced living in province: 35,718
Average daily attacks from December 07 to February 08: 1.21
Average daily attacks from February 08 to May 08: 1.28
Dahuk
Population: 616,600
Religion: 39% Sunni, 3% Shiite, 58% Other
Control of provincial council: Kurdistan Democratic Party
Economy: Farming, tourism
Capital budget:
2007: Appropriated: Spent: Percentage: See Kurdistan
Up To March 2008: Appropriated: Spent: Percentage: See Kurdistan
U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams Rankings from 11/30/07-2/29/08
Governance: N/A
Political Development: N/A
Reconciliation: N/A
Economic Development: N/A
Rule of Law: N/A
Average Daily Electricity Provided/Demand (megawatts): 120/201
U.S. projects: 476, $164 million
Number of displaced living in province: 104,948
Average daily attacks from December 07 to February 08: 0
Average daily attacks from February 08 to May 08: 0, Turkey does attack Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) bases in province
Dhi Qar
Population: 1,427,200
Religion: 100% Shiite
Control of provincial council: Fadhila (Islamic Virtue Party)
Economy: Farming, livestock, oil
Capital budget:
2007: Appropriated: $138 million Spent: $54.8 million Percentage: 40%
Up To March 2008: Appropriated: $219 million Spent: $100,000 Percentage: 0.1%
U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams Rankings from 11/30/07-2/29/08
Governance: Beginning to Sustaining
Political Development: Beginning to Performing
Reconciliation: Beginning to Performing
Economic Development: Beginning to Performing
Rule of Law: Beginning to Performing
Average Daily Electricity Provided/Demand (megawatts): 213/298
Services: Water shortage
U.S. projects: 1,217, $919 million
Number of displaced living in province: 47,825
Average daily attacks from December 07 to February 08: 0.24
Average daily attacks from February 08 to May 08: 0.23
Diyala
Population: 1,373,900
Religion: 52% Sunni, 48% Shiite
Control of provincial council: Coalition of Islamic Forces and Patriots in Diyala (Coalition of SIIC and Dawa)
Economy: Farming, livestock, facing drought
Capital budget:
2007: Appropriated: $100 million Spent: N/A Percentage: N/A
Up To March 2008: Appropriated: $168 million Spent: N/A Percentage: N/A
U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams Rankings from 11/30/07-2/29/08
Governance: Performing to Sustaining
Political Development: no change - Developing
Reconciliation: Beginning to Developing
Economic Development: no change - Developing
Rule of Law: no change - Beginning
Average Daily Electricity Provided/Demand (megawatts): 157/225
U.S. projects: 3,074, $912 million
Number of displaced living in province: 103,426
Average daily attacks from December 07 to February 08: 5.26
Average daily attacks from February 08 to May 08: 3.58
Irbil
Population: 1,845,200
Religion: 62% Sunni, 2% Shiite, 365 Other
Control of provincial council: Democratic Voice of Kurdistan List (Kurdistan Democratic Party)
Economy: Oil, farming, hit by drought
Capital budget:
2007: Appropriated: Spent: Percentage: See Kurdistan
Up To March 2008: Appropriated: Spent: Percentage: See Kurdistan
U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams Rankings from 11/30/07-2/29/08
Governance: no change - Sustaining
Political Development: no change - Sustaining
Reconciliation: no change - Performing
Economic Development: no change - Performing
Rule of Law
Average Daily Electricity Provided/Demand (megawatts): 174/370
U.S. projects: 839, $481 million
Number of displaced living in province: 31,783
Average daily attacks from December 07 to February 08: 0.02
Average daily attacks from February 08 to May 08: 0.01
Karbala
Population: 756,000
Religion: 100% Shiite
Control of provincial council: SIIC
Economy: Tourism 37% of province’s GDP, trade 25%, farming 15%
Capital budget:
2007: Appropriated: $71 million Spent: $29.4 million Percentage: 41%
Up To March 2008: Appropriated: $170 million Spent: $7.4 million Percentage: 4%
U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams Rankings from 11/30/07-2/29/08
Governance: no change - Developing
Political Development: no change - Developing
Reconciliation: Beginning to Developing
Economic Development: no change - Developing
Rule of Law: no change - Performing
Average Daily Electricity Provided/Demand (megawatts): 100/215
Services: Power outages, lack of basic services, water, electricity.
U.S. projects: 710, $192 million
Number of displaced living in province: 55,962
Average daily attacks from December 07 to February 08: 0.02
Average daily attacks from February 08 to May 08: 0.06
Kurdistan (Dahuk, Irbil, Sulaymaniyah)
No figures are available for the individual provinces’ capital budget, only the total for all three
Capital budget:
2007: Appropriated: $1,560 million Spent: $1,487 million Percentage: 95%
Up To March 2008: Appropriated: $2,528 million Spent: $266 million spent Percentage: 11%
Maysan
Population: 743,400
Religion: 100% Shiite
Control of provincial council: Al-Hussayni Thought Forum (Sadrists)
Economy: 75% of province works in farming. Has ageing state owned industries. Poorest province in Iraq, 64% below poverty level
Capital budget:
2007: Appropriated: $76 million Spent: $39 million Percentage: 51%
Up To March 2008: Appropriated: $124 million Spent: $17.4 million Percentage: 14%
U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams Rankings from 11/30/07-2/29/08
Governance: decreased from Developing to Beginning, lowest in Iraq
Political Development: no change - Developing
Reconciliation: no change Performing
Economic Development: decreased from Developing to Beginning
Rule of Law: no change - Developing
Average Daily Electricity Provided/Demand (megawatts): 99/182
Services: Ranked as having one of the lowest levels of services such as electricity, schools, medical car, etc. in country. U.S. says so bad that it is “population-repelling”
U.S. projects: 727, $299 million
Number of displaced living in province: 46,948
Average daily attacks from December 07 to February 08: 0.02
Average daily attacks from February 08 to May 08: 0
Muthanna
Population: 536,300
Religion: 100% Shiite
Control of provincial council: SIIC
Economy: Subsistence farming, livestock. One of poorest in Iraq. 60% unemployed
Capital budget:
2007: Appropriated: $52 million Spent:$9.9 million Percentage: 19%
Up To March 2008: Appropriated: $87 million Spent: N/A Percentage: N/A
U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams Rankings from 11/30/07-2/29/08
Governance: no change - Developoing
Political Development: decreased from Developing to Beginning
Reconciliation: no change Self-Reliant
Economic Development: no change - Developing
Rule of Law: no change - Developing
Average Daily Electricity Provided/Demand (megawatts): 85/170
Services: Few services such as electricity, housing. During summer has water shortages
U.S. projects: 741, $316 million
Number of displaced living in province: 18,351
Average daily attacks from December 07 to February 08: 0.04
Average daily attacks from February 08 to May 08: 0.02
Najaf
Population: 946,300
Religion: 100% Shiite
Control of provincial council: SIIC
Economy: Tourism 30% of provinces GDP, trade 20%, farming 15%
Capital budget:
2007: Appropriated: $88 million Spent: $56.4 million Percentage: 64%
Up To March 2008: Appropriated: $150 million Spent: $18.7 million Percentage: 13%
U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams Rankings from 11/30/07-2/29/08
Governance: no change - Sustaining
Political Development: no change - Developing
Reconciliation: Beginning to Developing
Economic Development: no change - Performing
Rule of Law: Developing to Performing
Average Daily Electricity Provided/Demand (megawatts): 134/241
Services: Lacks infrastructure, no desire to improve especially electricity, roads, bridges
U.S. projects: 1,153, $272 million
Number of displaced living in province: 58,032
Average daily attacks from December 07 to February 08: 0
Average daily attacks from February 08 to May 08: 0.03
Ninewa
Population: 2,473,700
Religion: 42% Sunni, 5% Shiite, 53% Other
Control of provincial council: National Democratic Kurdistan List (Coalition of Kurdistan Democratic Party, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and six others)
Economy: Farming, has closed down industries
Capital budget:
2007: Appropriated: $226 million Spent: $58.5 million Percentage: 26%
Up To March 2008: Appropriated: $359 million Spent: $0 Percentage: 0%
U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams Rankings from 11/30/07-2/29/08
Governance: no change - Developing
Political Development: no change - Developing
Reconciliation: no change - Beginning
Economic Development: no change - Beginning
Rule of Law: Beginning to Developing
Average Daily Electricity Provided/Demand (megawatts): 408/736
Services: Electrical and water shortages
U.S. projects: 4,008, $983 million
Number of displaced living in province: 106,750
Average daily attacks from December 07 to February 08: 16.30
Average daily attacks from February 08 to May 08: 13.55, 2nd most violence province
Qadisiyah
Population: 866,700
Religion: 100% Shiite
Control of provincial council: Martyr of the Sanctuary Sayyid (SIIC)
Economy: Farming 47% of province’s GDP, using old techniques, old industries, high unemployment, inflation
Capital budget:
2007: Appropriated: $64 million Spent: $24.7 million Percentage: 39%
Up To March 2008: Appropriated: $137 million Spent: $0 Percentage: 0%
U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams Rankings from 11/30/07-2/29/08
Governance: no change - Developing
Political Development: no change - Developing
Reconciliation: no change - Beginning
Economic Development: no change - Developing
Rule of Law: no change – Performing
Governance: Corruption
Average Daily Electricity Provided/Demand (megawatts): 118/227
Services: Lacks basic services such as trash collection, medical care
U.S. projects: 1,450, $312 million
Number of displaced living in province: 26,320
Average daily attacks from December 07 to February 08: 0.08
Average daily attacks from February 08 to May 08: 0.18
Salahaddin
Population: 1,077,800
Religion: 96% Sunni, 4% Shiite
Control of provincial council: United Democratic Council List in Salah al-Din Governorate (Coalition of Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and Kurdistan Democratic Party)
Economy: Farming, oil, gas, salt, sulphur
Capital budget:
2007: Appropriated: $93 million Spent: $31.5 million Percentage: 34%
Up To March 2008: Appropriated: $150 million Spent: $16.1 million Percentage: 11%
U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams Rankings from 11/30/07-2/29/08
Governance: Developing to Sustaining
Political Development: Developing to Performing
Reconciliation: Beginning to Developing
Economic Development: no change - Developing
Rule of Law: no change - Developing
Average Daily Electricity Provided/Demand (megawatts): 227/323
U.S. projects: 3,249, $814 million
Number of displaced living in province: 45,762
Average daily attacks from December 07 to February 08: 8.73
Average daily attacks from February 08 to May 08: 6.28, 3rd most violence in Iraq
Sulaymaniyah
Population: 2,159,800
Religion: 88% Sunni, 12% Shiite
Control of provincial council: Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
Economy: Farming, inflation
Capital budget:
2007: Appropriated: Spent: Percentage: See Kurdistan
Up To March 2008: Appropriated: Spent: Percentage: See Kurdistan
U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams Rankings from 11/30/07-2/29/08
Governance: N/A
Political Development: N/A
Reconciliation: N/A
Economic Development: N/A
Rule of Law: N/A
Average Daily Electricity Provided/Demand (megawatts): 138/301
Services: Limited, government doesn’t use money well
U.S. projects: 646, $212 million
Number of displaced living in province: 79,672
Average daily attacks from December 07 to February 08: 0.02
Average daily attacks from February 08 to May 08: 0.02, Iran strikes Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) bases there
Tamim
Population: 839,100
Religion: 73% Sunni, 22% Shiite, 5% Other
Control of provincial council: List Brother Kirkuk (Coalition of Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan)
Economy: Farming, industry, oil, natural gas. Hit by drought
Capital budget:
2007: Appropriated: $91 million Spent: $31 million Percentage: 34%
Up To March 2008: Appropriated: $146 million Spent: $13.7 million Percentage: 9%
U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams Rankings from 11/30/07-2/29/08
Governance: no change - Developing
Political Development: no change - Performing
Reconciliation: no change - Developing
Economic Development: no change - Developing
Rule of Law: no change - Developing
Average Daily Electricity Provided/Demand (megawatts): 179/254
Services: Not enough electricity and water, shortage of medical care and schools
U.S. projects: 3,413, $983 million
Number of displaced living in province: 36,202
Average daily attacks from December 07 to February 08: 2.63
Average daily attacks from February 08 to May 08: 1.8
Wasit
Population: 941,800
Religion: 100% Shiite
Control of provincial council: Gather of Iraq Elites (SIIC)
Economy: Farming, oil, gravel, natural gas. Not much development of natural resources because of lack of government planning and direction
Capital budget:
2007: Appropriated: $83 million Spent: $33.7 million Percentage: 41%
Up To March 2008: Appropriated: $137 million Spent: $300,000 Percentage: 0.2%
U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams Rankings from 11/30/07-2/29/08
Governance: Beginning to Developing
Political Development: Beginning to Developing
Reconciliation: no change - Beginning
Economic Development: no change - Beginning
Rule of Law: Beginning to Developing
Average Daily Electricity Provided/Demand (megawatts): 90/189
U.S. projects: 1,404, $452 million
Number of displaced living in province: 75,325
Average daily attacks from December 07 to February 08: 0.23
Average daily attacks from February 08 to May 08: 0.57
SOURCES:
Institute for the Study of War, “Fact Sheet on Iraq’s Major Shi’a Political Parties and Militia Groups,” April 2008
- “Iraq’s Major Shi’a Political Parties and Militias,” 4/14/08
Middle East Reference.org, “Governorate elections held in Iraq on 31 January 2005”
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 7/30/08
Now that Iraq’s parliament has finally passed a new provincial election law, there should be a discussion of what political parties currently run Iraq’s eighteen provinces, and what they are like. Here is a breakdown of some general information about each, mostly based upon U.S. agencies.
Overview of Iraq’s Major Parties and What Provinces They Control
Kurds (Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan): Dahuk, Irbil, Ninewa, Salahaddin, Sulaymaniyah, Tamim
SIIC: Babil, Baghdad, Dhi Qar, Diyala, Muthanna (but Dawa governor), Najaf, Qadisiyah, Wasit
Dawa (Jaafari faction) - Karbala
Fadhila – Basra - governor, but SIIC & Dawa control provincial council
Iraqi Islamic Party – Anbar
Sadrists – Maysan
Notes:
1) Many of the major political parties do not run under their names such as the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) in the provinces, and the monikers they do use are interpreted several different ways from Arabic into English.
2) Iraq did not pass its 2008 budget until February 2008, which accounts for the low percentage spent by the provinces by March 2008, the latest numbers available.
3) The U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams have five rankings for how Iraq’s provinces are doing governing in the following order: Beginning, Developing, Performing, Sustaining, Self-Reliant
Anbar
Population: 1,280,000
Religion: 99% Sunni, 1% Shiite
Control of provincial council: Iraqi Islamic Party (Part of Iraqi Accordance Front)
Economy: Farming, livestock, glass and ceramics
Capital budget:
2007: Appropriated: $107 million Spent: $4 million Percentage: 3.7%
Up To March 2008: Appropriated: $192 million Spent: N/A Percentage: N/A
U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams Rankings from 11/30/07-2/29/08
Governance: Developing to Sustaining
Political Development: Developing to Performing
Reconciliation: no change - Performing
Economic Development: Beginning to Developing
Rule of Law: no change - Performing
Governance: Lack of coordination with Baghdad. Has several different authorities operating independently of each other. Corruption
Average Daily Electricity Provided/Demand (megawatts): 161/304
Services: Lacks adequate electricity and water
U.S. projects: 7,139, $1.7 billion
Number of displaced living in province: 64,536
Average daily attacks from December 07 to February 08: 2.37
Average daily attacks from February 08 to May 08: 1.95
Babil
Population: 1,444,400
Religion: 5% Sunni, 95% Shiite
Control of provincial council: Society of Faithful Iraqis (SIIC)
Economy: Farming, 52% of GDP of province. Has some of the most advanced farming in country
Capital budget:
2007: Appropriated: $127 million Spent: $61.9 million Percentage: 49%
Up To March 2008: Appropriated: $206 million Spent: $5.1 million Percentage: 3%
U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams Rankings from 11/30/07-2/29/08
Governance: no change - Developing
Political Development: no change - Beginning
Reconciliation: no change – Beginning
Economic Development: no change - Performing
Rule of Law: no change - Performing
Average Daily Electricity Provided/Demand (megawatts): 133/260
Services: Water shortage
U.S. projects: 2,178, $433 million
Number of displaced living in province: 77,914
Average daily attacks from December 07 to February 08: 0.57
Average daily attacks from February 08 to May 08: 0.73
Baghdad
Population: 6,386,100
Religion: 20% Sunni, 80% Shiite
Control of provincial council: Baghdad Nation (SIIC)
Economy: Farming, which is improving, but still uses outdated techniques. Business in south improving with better security
Capital budget:
2007: Appropriated: $560 million Spent: $174.4 million Percentage: 31%
Up To March 2008: Appropriated: $885 million Spent: $14.5 million Percentage: 2%
U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams Rankings from 11/30/07-2/29/08
Governance: no change - Developing
Political Development: no change - Developing
Reconciliation: no change - Developing
Economic Development: no change - Developing
Rule of Law: Beginning to Performing
Average Daily Electricity Provided/Demand (megawatts): 989/2,047
U.S. projects: 17,153, $7 billion
Number of displaced living in province: 563,771
Average daily attacks from December 07 to February 08: 15.60
Average daily attacks from February 08 to May 08: 24.02, most violence province in Iraq
Basra
Population: 1,761,000
Religion: 100% Shiite
Control of provincial council: Islamic Basra (Coalition of SIIC, Dawa and 6 others)
Economy: Oil, trade, only port in Iraq. Business improving after March 2008 security crackdown
Capital budget:
2007: Appropriated: $195 million Spent: $40.8 million Percentage: 21%
Up To March 2008: Appropriated: $322 million Spent: $0 Percentage: 0%
U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams Rankings from 11/30/07-2/29/08
Governance: Beginning to Sustaining
Political Development: Beginning to Performing
Reconciliation: Beginning to Performing
Economic Development: Beginning to Developing
Rule of Law: Beginning to Developing
Average Daily Electricity Provided/Demand (megawatts): 615/762
U.S. projects: 3,306, $2.1 billion
Number of displaced living in province: 35,718
Average daily attacks from December 07 to February 08: 1.21
Average daily attacks from February 08 to May 08: 1.28
Dahuk
Population: 616,600
Religion: 39% Sunni, 3% Shiite, 58% Other
Control of provincial council: Kurdistan Democratic Party
Economy: Farming, tourism
Capital budget:
2007: Appropriated: Spent: Percentage: See Kurdistan
Up To March 2008: Appropriated: Spent: Percentage: See Kurdistan
U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams Rankings from 11/30/07-2/29/08
Governance: N/A
Political Development: N/A
Reconciliation: N/A
Economic Development: N/A
Rule of Law: N/A
Average Daily Electricity Provided/Demand (megawatts): 120/201
U.S. projects: 476, $164 million
Number of displaced living in province: 104,948
Average daily attacks from December 07 to February 08: 0
Average daily attacks from February 08 to May 08: 0, Turkey does attack Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) bases in province
Dhi Qar
Population: 1,427,200
Religion: 100% Shiite
Control of provincial council: Fadhila (Islamic Virtue Party)
Economy: Farming, livestock, oil
Capital budget:
2007: Appropriated: $138 million Spent: $54.8 million Percentage: 40%
Up To March 2008: Appropriated: $219 million Spent: $100,000 Percentage: 0.1%
U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams Rankings from 11/30/07-2/29/08
Governance: Beginning to Sustaining
Political Development: Beginning to Performing
Reconciliation: Beginning to Performing
Economic Development: Beginning to Performing
Rule of Law: Beginning to Performing
Average Daily Electricity Provided/Demand (megawatts): 213/298
Services: Water shortage
U.S. projects: 1,217, $919 million
Number of displaced living in province: 47,825
Average daily attacks from December 07 to February 08: 0.24
Average daily attacks from February 08 to May 08: 0.23
Diyala
Population: 1,373,900
Religion: 52% Sunni, 48% Shiite
Control of provincial council: Coalition of Islamic Forces and Patriots in Diyala (Coalition of SIIC and Dawa)
Economy: Farming, livestock, facing drought
Capital budget:
2007: Appropriated: $100 million Spent: N/A Percentage: N/A
Up To March 2008: Appropriated: $168 million Spent: N/A Percentage: N/A
U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams Rankings from 11/30/07-2/29/08
Governance: Performing to Sustaining
Political Development: no change - Developing
Reconciliation: Beginning to Developing
Economic Development: no change - Developing
Rule of Law: no change - Beginning
Average Daily Electricity Provided/Demand (megawatts): 157/225
U.S. projects: 3,074, $912 million
Number of displaced living in province: 103,426
Average daily attacks from December 07 to February 08: 5.26
Average daily attacks from February 08 to May 08: 3.58
Irbil
Population: 1,845,200
Religion: 62% Sunni, 2% Shiite, 365 Other
Control of provincial council: Democratic Voice of Kurdistan List (Kurdistan Democratic Party)
Economy: Oil, farming, hit by drought
Capital budget:
2007: Appropriated: Spent: Percentage: See Kurdistan
Up To March 2008: Appropriated: Spent: Percentage: See Kurdistan
U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams Rankings from 11/30/07-2/29/08
Governance: no change - Sustaining
Political Development: no change - Sustaining
Reconciliation: no change - Performing
Economic Development: no change - Performing
Rule of Law
Average Daily Electricity Provided/Demand (megawatts): 174/370
U.S. projects: 839, $481 million
Number of displaced living in province: 31,783
Average daily attacks from December 07 to February 08: 0.02
Average daily attacks from February 08 to May 08: 0.01
Karbala
Population: 756,000
Religion: 100% Shiite
Control of provincial council: SIIC
Economy: Tourism 37% of province’s GDP, trade 25%, farming 15%
Capital budget:
2007: Appropriated: $71 million Spent: $29.4 million Percentage: 41%
Up To March 2008: Appropriated: $170 million Spent: $7.4 million Percentage: 4%
U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams Rankings from 11/30/07-2/29/08
Governance: no change - Developing
Political Development: no change - Developing
Reconciliation: Beginning to Developing
Economic Development: no change - Developing
Rule of Law: no change - Performing
Average Daily Electricity Provided/Demand (megawatts): 100/215
Services: Power outages, lack of basic services, water, electricity.
U.S. projects: 710, $192 million
Number of displaced living in province: 55,962
Average daily attacks from December 07 to February 08: 0.02
Average daily attacks from February 08 to May 08: 0.06
Kurdistan (Dahuk, Irbil, Sulaymaniyah)
No figures are available for the individual provinces’ capital budget, only the total for all three
Capital budget:
2007: Appropriated: $1,560 million Spent: $1,487 million Percentage: 95%
Up To March 2008: Appropriated: $2,528 million Spent: $266 million spent Percentage: 11%
Maysan
Population: 743,400
Religion: 100% Shiite
Control of provincial council: Al-Hussayni Thought Forum (Sadrists)
Economy: 75% of province works in farming. Has ageing state owned industries. Poorest province in Iraq, 64% below poverty level
Capital budget:
2007: Appropriated: $76 million Spent: $39 million Percentage: 51%
Up To March 2008: Appropriated: $124 million Spent: $17.4 million Percentage: 14%
U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams Rankings from 11/30/07-2/29/08
Governance: decreased from Developing to Beginning, lowest in Iraq
Political Development: no change - Developing
Reconciliation: no change Performing
Economic Development: decreased from Developing to Beginning
Rule of Law: no change - Developing
Average Daily Electricity Provided/Demand (megawatts): 99/182
Services: Ranked as having one of the lowest levels of services such as electricity, schools, medical car, etc. in country. U.S. says so bad that it is “population-repelling”
U.S. projects: 727, $299 million
Number of displaced living in province: 46,948
Average daily attacks from December 07 to February 08: 0.02
Average daily attacks from February 08 to May 08: 0
Muthanna
Population: 536,300
Religion: 100% Shiite
Control of provincial council: SIIC
Economy: Subsistence farming, livestock. One of poorest in Iraq. 60% unemployed
Capital budget:
2007: Appropriated: $52 million Spent:$9.9 million Percentage: 19%
Up To March 2008: Appropriated: $87 million Spent: N/A Percentage: N/A
U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams Rankings from 11/30/07-2/29/08
Governance: no change - Developoing
Political Development: decreased from Developing to Beginning
Reconciliation: no change Self-Reliant
Economic Development: no change - Developing
Rule of Law: no change - Developing
Average Daily Electricity Provided/Demand (megawatts): 85/170
Services: Few services such as electricity, housing. During summer has water shortages
U.S. projects: 741, $316 million
Number of displaced living in province: 18,351
Average daily attacks from December 07 to February 08: 0.04
Average daily attacks from February 08 to May 08: 0.02
Najaf
Population: 946,300
Religion: 100% Shiite
Control of provincial council: SIIC
Economy: Tourism 30% of provinces GDP, trade 20%, farming 15%
Capital budget:
2007: Appropriated: $88 million Spent: $56.4 million Percentage: 64%
Up To March 2008: Appropriated: $150 million Spent: $18.7 million Percentage: 13%
U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams Rankings from 11/30/07-2/29/08
Governance: no change - Sustaining
Political Development: no change - Developing
Reconciliation: Beginning to Developing
Economic Development: no change - Performing
Rule of Law: Developing to Performing
Average Daily Electricity Provided/Demand (megawatts): 134/241
Services: Lacks infrastructure, no desire to improve especially electricity, roads, bridges
U.S. projects: 1,153, $272 million
Number of displaced living in province: 58,032
Average daily attacks from December 07 to February 08: 0
Average daily attacks from February 08 to May 08: 0.03
Ninewa
Population: 2,473,700
Religion: 42% Sunni, 5% Shiite, 53% Other
Control of provincial council: National Democratic Kurdistan List (Coalition of Kurdistan Democratic Party, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and six others)
Economy: Farming, has closed down industries
Capital budget:
2007: Appropriated: $226 million Spent: $58.5 million Percentage: 26%
Up To March 2008: Appropriated: $359 million Spent: $0 Percentage: 0%
U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams Rankings from 11/30/07-2/29/08
Governance: no change - Developing
Political Development: no change - Developing
Reconciliation: no change - Beginning
Economic Development: no change - Beginning
Rule of Law: Beginning to Developing
Average Daily Electricity Provided/Demand (megawatts): 408/736
Services: Electrical and water shortages
U.S. projects: 4,008, $983 million
Number of displaced living in province: 106,750
Average daily attacks from December 07 to February 08: 16.30
Average daily attacks from February 08 to May 08: 13.55, 2nd most violence province
Qadisiyah
Population: 866,700
Religion: 100% Shiite
Control of provincial council: Martyr of the Sanctuary Sayyid (SIIC)
Economy: Farming 47% of province’s GDP, using old techniques, old industries, high unemployment, inflation
Capital budget:
2007: Appropriated: $64 million Spent: $24.7 million Percentage: 39%
Up To March 2008: Appropriated: $137 million Spent: $0 Percentage: 0%
U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams Rankings from 11/30/07-2/29/08
Governance: no change - Developing
Political Development: no change - Developing
Reconciliation: no change - Beginning
Economic Development: no change - Developing
Rule of Law: no change – Performing
Governance: Corruption
Average Daily Electricity Provided/Demand (megawatts): 118/227
Services: Lacks basic services such as trash collection, medical care
U.S. projects: 1,450, $312 million
Number of displaced living in province: 26,320
Average daily attacks from December 07 to February 08: 0.08
Average daily attacks from February 08 to May 08: 0.18
Salahaddin
Population: 1,077,800
Religion: 96% Sunni, 4% Shiite
Control of provincial council: United Democratic Council List in Salah al-Din Governorate (Coalition of Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and Kurdistan Democratic Party)
Economy: Farming, oil, gas, salt, sulphur
Capital budget:
2007: Appropriated: $93 million Spent: $31.5 million Percentage: 34%
Up To March 2008: Appropriated: $150 million Spent: $16.1 million Percentage: 11%
U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams Rankings from 11/30/07-2/29/08
Governance: Developing to Sustaining
Political Development: Developing to Performing
Reconciliation: Beginning to Developing
Economic Development: no change - Developing
Rule of Law: no change - Developing
Average Daily Electricity Provided/Demand (megawatts): 227/323
U.S. projects: 3,249, $814 million
Number of displaced living in province: 45,762
Average daily attacks from December 07 to February 08: 8.73
Average daily attacks from February 08 to May 08: 6.28, 3rd most violence in Iraq
Sulaymaniyah
Population: 2,159,800
Religion: 88% Sunni, 12% Shiite
Control of provincial council: Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
Economy: Farming, inflation
Capital budget:
2007: Appropriated: Spent: Percentage: See Kurdistan
Up To March 2008: Appropriated: Spent: Percentage: See Kurdistan
U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams Rankings from 11/30/07-2/29/08
Governance: N/A
Political Development: N/A
Reconciliation: N/A
Economic Development: N/A
Rule of Law: N/A
Average Daily Electricity Provided/Demand (megawatts): 138/301
Services: Limited, government doesn’t use money well
U.S. projects: 646, $212 million
Number of displaced living in province: 79,672
Average daily attacks from December 07 to February 08: 0.02
Average daily attacks from February 08 to May 08: 0.02, Iran strikes Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) bases there
Tamim
Population: 839,100
Religion: 73% Sunni, 22% Shiite, 5% Other
Control of provincial council: List Brother Kirkuk (Coalition of Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan)
Economy: Farming, industry, oil, natural gas. Hit by drought
Capital budget:
2007: Appropriated: $91 million Spent: $31 million Percentage: 34%
Up To March 2008: Appropriated: $146 million Spent: $13.7 million Percentage: 9%
U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams Rankings from 11/30/07-2/29/08
Governance: no change - Developing
Political Development: no change - Performing
Reconciliation: no change - Developing
Economic Development: no change - Developing
Rule of Law: no change - Developing
Average Daily Electricity Provided/Demand (megawatts): 179/254
Services: Not enough electricity and water, shortage of medical care and schools
U.S. projects: 3,413, $983 million
Number of displaced living in province: 36,202
Average daily attacks from December 07 to February 08: 2.63
Average daily attacks from February 08 to May 08: 1.8
Wasit
Population: 941,800
Religion: 100% Shiite
Control of provincial council: Gather of Iraq Elites (SIIC)
Economy: Farming, oil, gravel, natural gas. Not much development of natural resources because of lack of government planning and direction
Capital budget:
2007: Appropriated: $83 million Spent: $33.7 million Percentage: 41%
Up To March 2008: Appropriated: $137 million Spent: $300,000 Percentage: 0.2%
U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams Rankings from 11/30/07-2/29/08
Governance: Beginning to Developing
Political Development: Beginning to Developing
Reconciliation: no change - Beginning
Economic Development: no change - Beginning
Rule of Law: Beginning to Developing
Average Daily Electricity Provided/Demand (megawatts): 90/189
U.S. projects: 1,404, $452 million
Number of displaced living in province: 75,325
Average daily attacks from December 07 to February 08: 0.23
Average daily attacks from February 08 to May 08: 0.57
SOURCES:
Institute for the Study of War, “Fact Sheet on Iraq’s Major Shi’a Political Parties and Militia Groups,” April 2008
- “Iraq’s Major Shi’a Political Parties and Militias,” 4/14/08
Middle East Reference.org, “Governorate elections held in Iraq on 31 January 2005”
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 7/30/08
Saturday, October 04, 2008
Carrot and the Stick With Diyala’s Sons of Iraq, Or Just The Sticks?
The following commentary originally appeared in Musings On Iraq
Baghdad is claiming that it is integrating the Sons of Iraq (SOI) in Diyala province. On September 24, 2008 the general in charge of the National Command Center said that the Interior Ministry had hired 2,000 SOI from Diyala into the provincial police force since the beginning of Operation Promise of Good in late July, and was looking for a total of 4,000. The Defense Ministry also said that it wanted to recruit 3,000 as soldiers. Any SOI that had special skills or education were also promised government jobs. In the beginning of August, the Interior said that all the SOI in Diyala were going to be given employment. A few days later, the Prime Minister offered 3,000 police jobs to any SOI that assisted in the security crackdown.
The government’s claims are hard to believe, because as reported earlier, Iraqi forces have had nothing but conflicts with the local SOI. In May 2008 Baghdad issued arrest warrants for several SOI leaders. This was just two days after they had set up a political party to run in the provincial elections, and one day before they could begin forming coalitions. The warrants disqualified them from participating however. When the security operation began there in late July, the security forces also shut down SOI offices in the provincial capitol Baquba and other cities, told them to leave the streets, and arrested at least five leaders and 100 fighters. They have banned all weapons in the province, something that is illegal according to the Constitution, which allows each Iraqi family an AK-47 in their home. The order was obviously meant to give the security forces an excuse to arrest any SOI that was manning their post. The head of the SOI in Baquba, Abu Talib, had an arrest warrant for him. With the help of the U.S. he was not detained after a meeting with the provincial police chief, but he later met with an advisor to Maliki who told him he should hide. That led him to flee to Syria.
The security forces have also gone after the SOI’s allies in the provincial government. The Iraqi Islamic Party’s headquarters in Diyala have been raided three times for example. Some of their leading politicians have also been arrested. Most damning was an August 18 raid on the provincial offices where a special counterterrorism police unit arrested and beat Islamic Party official Hussein al-Zubaidi, the head of the provincial council’s security office. Zubaidi was known as a supporter of the local SOI. The U.S. says that there was no reason for Zubaidi to be arrested or held.
Many SOI in Diyala believe the government is out to disband them, and it is hard not to see where their suspicions come from. During the Surge, U.S. officials and military officers said that the Sons of Iraq were an example of an “Iraqi solution for Iraqi problems.” Ambassador Ryan Crocker said in January 2008 that things had progressed to the point where Iraqis could find solutions to their own problems. When it comes to the government and the SOI, it seems like an Iraqi solution will be the arrest of many of their leaders, the disbandment of many, and then the integration of the truncated leftovers.
SOURCES:
Alsumaria, “Popular committees to join security forces,” 8/4/08
Garcia-Navarro, Lourdes, “Iraq Paramilitary Group Targeted, Despite Success,” Morning Edition, NPR, 9/4/08
- “Sunni Group Says It’s Being Harrassed,” Morning Edition, 9/29/08
Levinson, Charles, “Awakening Councils in hiding as arrests on rise,” USA Today, 9/22/08
Parker, Sam, “Guest Post: Behind the Curtain in Diyala,” Abu Muqawama Blog, 8/20/08
Ricks, Thomas and DeYoung, Karen, “For U.S., The Goal Is Now ‘Iraqi Solution,’” Washington Post, 1/10/08
Russo, Claire, “The Maliki Government Confronts Diyala,” Institute for the Study of War,” 9/23/08
Shachtman, Noah, “Ominous Future for Iraq’s Militias,” Danger Room Blog, Wired, 3/14/08
UPI, “Sons of Iraq join Diyala offensive,” 8/6/08
Voices of Iraq, “MOI hires 2,000 Sahwa fighters in Diala,” 9/24/08
Baghdad is claiming that it is integrating the Sons of Iraq (SOI) in Diyala province. On September 24, 2008 the general in charge of the National Command Center said that the Interior Ministry had hired 2,000 SOI from Diyala into the provincial police force since the beginning of Operation Promise of Good in late July, and was looking for a total of 4,000. The Defense Ministry also said that it wanted to recruit 3,000 as soldiers. Any SOI that had special skills or education were also promised government jobs. In the beginning of August, the Interior said that all the SOI in Diyala were going to be given employment. A few days later, the Prime Minister offered 3,000 police jobs to any SOI that assisted in the security crackdown.
The government’s claims are hard to believe, because as reported earlier, Iraqi forces have had nothing but conflicts with the local SOI. In May 2008 Baghdad issued arrest warrants for several SOI leaders. This was just two days after they had set up a political party to run in the provincial elections, and one day before they could begin forming coalitions. The warrants disqualified them from participating however. When the security operation began there in late July, the security forces also shut down SOI offices in the provincial capitol Baquba and other cities, told them to leave the streets, and arrested at least five leaders and 100 fighters. They have banned all weapons in the province, something that is illegal according to the Constitution, which allows each Iraqi family an AK-47 in their home. The order was obviously meant to give the security forces an excuse to arrest any SOI that was manning their post. The head of the SOI in Baquba, Abu Talib, had an arrest warrant for him. With the help of the U.S. he was not detained after a meeting with the provincial police chief, but he later met with an advisor to Maliki who told him he should hide. That led him to flee to Syria.
The security forces have also gone after the SOI’s allies in the provincial government. The Iraqi Islamic Party’s headquarters in Diyala have been raided three times for example. Some of their leading politicians have also been arrested. Most damning was an August 18 raid on the provincial offices where a special counterterrorism police unit arrested and beat Islamic Party official Hussein al-Zubaidi, the head of the provincial council’s security office. Zubaidi was known as a supporter of the local SOI. The U.S. says that there was no reason for Zubaidi to be arrested or held.
Many SOI in Diyala believe the government is out to disband them, and it is hard not to see where their suspicions come from. During the Surge, U.S. officials and military officers said that the Sons of Iraq were an example of an “Iraqi solution for Iraqi problems.” Ambassador Ryan Crocker said in January 2008 that things had progressed to the point where Iraqis could find solutions to their own problems. When it comes to the government and the SOI, it seems like an Iraqi solution will be the arrest of many of their leaders, the disbandment of many, and then the integration of the truncated leftovers.
SOURCES:
Alsumaria, “Popular committees to join security forces,” 8/4/08
Garcia-Navarro, Lourdes, “Iraq Paramilitary Group Targeted, Despite Success,” Morning Edition, NPR, 9/4/08
- “Sunni Group Says It’s Being Harrassed,” Morning Edition, 9/29/08
Levinson, Charles, “Awakening Councils in hiding as arrests on rise,” USA Today, 9/22/08
Parker, Sam, “Guest Post: Behind the Curtain in Diyala,” Abu Muqawama Blog, 8/20/08
Ricks, Thomas and DeYoung, Karen, “For U.S., The Goal Is Now ‘Iraqi Solution,’” Washington Post, 1/10/08
Russo, Claire, “The Maliki Government Confronts Diyala,” Institute for the Study of War,” 9/23/08
Shachtman, Noah, “Ominous Future for Iraq’s Militias,” Danger Room Blog, Wired, 3/14/08
UPI, “Sons of Iraq join Diyala offensive,” 8/6/08
Voices of Iraq, “MOI hires 2,000 Sahwa fighters in Diala,” 9/24/08
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