United Nations Humanitarian Report On Iraq

At the end of October 2008, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs released its latest report on Iraq. The study covered the cholera outbreak, security, refugees and their return, the drought, and Iraq’s budget.

In 2008 the United Nations and non-government organizations (NGOs) increased their activities within Iraq due to the improved security situation. Together they have formed a Consolidated Appeals Process to fund humanitarian assistance to Iraqis. In 2008 this fund had $164,675,584, but it asked for $271,371,554. This money went towards refugees, health, shelter, water, sanitation, schools, and food aid. Overall, the U.N. believes that the situation within Iraq is moving from a country in crisis to fragile stability where violence is down and refugees are slowly returning.

Health

The first major issue the report covered was the health situation, namely the on-going cholera outbreak. The first case appeared in Maysan province in August 2008. Since then it has spread to twelve of Iraq’s eighteen provinces, including Anbar, Babil, Baghdad, Basra, Qadisiyah, Diyala, Irbil, Karbala, Muthanna, Najaf, and Wasit. The number of cases peaked on September 22 with 79 then decreased, only to pick up again in mid-October. The disease is a regular occurrence in the country with an average of 600 annual cases. As of November 4, there were 738 confirmed cases. By November 18 the Iraqi Health Ministry reported that number had increased to 900, but said it will no longer provide statistics because of concerns with the media, other ministries, and victims. There have also been eight deaths as a result. As reported earlier, the majority of cases have occurred in Babil. The major causes have been inadequate and deteriorating infrastructure, and official incompetence.

The United Nations and the Iraqi government have tried to respond to the crisis. The World Health Organization has provided support to Baghdad as well, which has set up 950 centers to monitor the outbreak. The Ministry of Health also has a Cholera Preparedness Plan at work. By November 13, they claimed that 99% of the cases in Babil and Qadisiyah had been cured.

Cholera Cases In Iraq As Of 11/4/08
Diyala: 1 district affected, first-last case 9/9/08 – 9/9/08, 1 case
Wasit: 1 district affected, first-last case 9/30/08 – 9/30/08, 2 cases
Irbil: 2 districts affected, first-last case 10/14/08 - 10/14/08, 2 cases
Maysan: 1 district affected, first-last case 8/7/08 - 8/28/08, 3 cases, 1 death
Anbar: 2 districts affected, first-last case 9/7/08 - 10/1/08, 8 cases
Muthanna: 1 district affected, first-last case 10/14/08 - 11/1/08, 10 cases
Najaf: 3 districts affected, first-last case 9/17/08 - 10/28/08, 33 cases, 5 under investigation
Karbala: 3 districts affected, first-last case 9/5/08 - 10/27/08, 55 cases, 4 under investigation
Basra: 5 districts affected, first-last case 8/18/08 - 10/6/08, 58 cases, 1 death, 2 under investigation
Baghdad: 12 districts affected, first-last case 9/20/08 - 11/3/08, 92 cases, 1 death, 1 under investigation
Qadisiyah: 4 districts affected, first-last case 8/28/08 - 11/2/08, 207 cases, 2 deaths, 44 under investigation
Babil: 4 districts affected, first-last case 8/7/08 - 11/3/08, 267 cases, 3 deaths
Totals: 39 districts affected, first-last case 8/7/08 - 11/3/08, 738 cases, 8 deaths, 56 under investigation

Security

The U.N. reported that the number of deaths in Iraq has decreased from September to October. In October there were 294 civilian deaths and 726 wounded compared to 332 killed and 867 wounded in September. The number of deaths is higher if unidentified bodies found on the streets are included. Most of the violence is concentrated in northern and central Iraq.

Casualties – October 2008

Iraqi Civilians: 294 killed, 726 wounded
Iraqi Security Forces: 79 killed, 195 wounded
Iraqi Officials: 8 killed, 8 wounded
Unidentified Bodies: 70
Insurgents/militiamen: 75 killed, 9 wounded
Awakening/Sons of Iraq: 8 killed, 5 wounded
TOTAL: 534 killed, 943 wounded

Security Incidents – October 2008
Kurdistan: Small Arms Fire: 1, Indirect Fire: 3, IED: 2, found: 1, TOTAL: 7
North: Small Arms Fire: 117, Indirect Fire: 4, RPG: 5, Hand Grenades: 23, IED: 165, VBIED: 7, Found: 73, TOTA: 394
North Central: Small Arms Fire: 79, Indirect Fire: 22, RPG: 7, Hand Grenades: 12, IED: 124, VBIED: 4, Found: 112, TOTAL: 360
Baghdad: Small Arms Fire: 50, Indirect Fire: 21, RPG: 1, Hand Grenades: 14, IED: 150, VBIED: 7, Found: 120, TOTL: 363
West: Small Arms Fire: 28, Indirect Fire: 5, Hand Grenades: 1, IED: 32, VBIED: 3, Found: 12, TOTAL: 92
South Central: Small Arms Fire: 28, Indirect Fire: 1, IED: 22, Found: 17, TOTAL: 68
South: Small Arms Fire: 14, Indirect Fire: 7, Hand Grenades: 1, IED: 16, Found: 16, TOTAL: 54
TOTAL: Small Arms Fire: 316, Indirect Fire: 60, RPG: 13, Hand Grenades: 51, IED: 509, VBIED: 21, Found: 361, TOTAL: 1338

Refugees

The third issue that the U.N. report dealt with was that of Iraq’s refugees. The latest mass exodus occurred in Mosul when Christians were attacked. Twelve were killed and approximately 2,465 families fled as a result. The Christians received leaflets, letters, text messages, messages painted on walls, and even announcements on loud speakers all telling them to leave. Several houses were destroyed, and 19 were robbed. Because some of these incidents happened in the middle of the day there is strong suspicion that the Kurds were behind the attacks. The fact that they occurred right after Christians began protesting the exclusion of an article in the provincial election law that would have given minorities a quota on provincial councils also adds a political element to the incident. The Christians in Mosul are caught between the Muslim Arabs and the Kurds who are vying for control. The Christians are a swing vote in the city and province, with both sides trying to gain their loyalties or intimidate them. There are reports that up to 500 families have come back to Mosul because of jobs or school, although on November 12 two Christian sisters were assassinated at their home.

In terms of the larger refugee crisis, the U.N. notes that the process of returning has begun. Although the number of families coming back is small, it is increasing. The government fully supports this and has launched a refugee program based upon encouraging Iraqis to go back to their residences. On September 1, 2008 Maliki issued Order 101 that said all squatters must vacate their premises. The order also set up refugee centers in Baghdad to assist with returns. Any family that registered with the authorities would receive one million dinars to help with their move. The centers are also supposed to help with any property disputes. The International Organization for Migration reported that 16,782 families (100,692 people) have gone back to Baghdad. Another 11,986 families have returned to other parts of the country, with 8,691 going back to Anbar and Diyala provinces. 92% of those are internal refugees. Some are not able to go back to their homes because they are occupied or destroyed, leading to further displacement. In Maysan province for example, 100% of returnees were not able to return to their homes, only to their original neighborhoods, while in Karbala it was the exact opposite. There 100% of families were able to get back into their houses. In Baghdad, which has seen the greatest displacement and returns, 91% were able to go back to their homes. In Diyala that number was 96% and in Anbar 97%. Many of these families still face large obstacles such as finding jobs, food, and shelter.

Iraqi Government Figures On Internally Displaced
Note: This is the number of families and people that have registered with the government. The actual numbers are probably higher.

Dohuk: Families: 18,706, Individuals: 104,824, 7% of total
Irbil: Families: 10,304, Individuals: 52,007, 4% of total
Sulaymaniya: Families: 14,585, Individuals: 80,935, 5% of total
Total North: Families: 43,595, Individuals: 237,766
Ninewa: Families: 19,100, Individuals: 106,623, 3.7% of total
Tamim: Families: 7,911, Individuals: 43, 623, 4.8% of total
Anbar: Families: 9,179, Individuals: 55, 716, 3.6% of total
Baghdad: Families: 90,731, Individuals: 550,099, 7.5% of total
Diyala: Families: 22,784, Individuals: 136,891, 8.5% of total
Salahaddin: Families: 7,790, Individuals: 45,614, 3.7% of total
Total Center: Families: 157,495, Individuals: 938,566
Babil: Families: 12,677, Individuals: 77,197, 4.5% of total
Basra: Families: 5,989, Individuals: 35,509, 1.8% of total
Qadisiyah: Families: 3,858, Individuals: 25,186, 2.5% of total
Karbala: Families: 10,921, Individuals: 70,709, 7.7% of total
Maysan: Families: 6,792, Individuals: 46,523, 5.5% of total
Muthanna: Families: 2,457, Individuals: 18,331, 2.9% of total
Najaf: Families: 10,087, Individuals: 57,716, 5.2% of total
Dhi Qar: Families: 7,066, Individuals: 47,423, 2.8% of total
Wasit: Families: 12,306, Individuals: 75,457, 6.9% of total
Total South: Families: 72,153, Individuals: 454,051
Grand Total: Families: 273,243, Individuals: 1,630,383

Drought

Iraq is facing the greatest water crisis in at least ten years. The northern provinces of Diyala, Ninewa, Dohuk, and Irbil have been affected the most. In the north, many farms rely upon rain for their crops. Wheat and barley production is estimated to be 51% lower than 2007 numbers as a result. Electricity and fuel shortages along with deteriorating infrastructure are also hampering the government’s response. Families in four districts have been displaced from mountainous regions because of the drought as well because they cannot support themselves. The Kurds have set up a special committee to deal with the problem, and five million dinars have been allocated to help with wells, pipes, etc. Water shortages in Sulaymaniyah have also led to many diarrhea cases, but no cholera so far. Iraq has seen a recent spate of rain, which might alleviate the situation.

Budget

The last issue covered is Iraq’s budget. The 2009 budget was just approved on November 12 and totals $67 billion. This is a decrease from the original proposal of $80 billion. The major reason for the cut is the rapidly declining price of oil. The budget will likely run a deficit as it was based upon a $62 a barrel price for oil, when world prices are currently around $50 a barrel. $52 billion of the budget will go to operational costs such as bills and salaries, with only $4.1 billion going towards the capital budget, which is used for investment in infrastructure. The budget cut will have an affect on humanitarian assistance provided by the government as well.

SOURCES
Alsumaria, “99% of cholera cases healed in Babel,” 11/13/08
- “Iraq Cabinet approves 2009 budget,” 11/12/08
Associated Press, “Iraq plans to cut 2009 budget by $13 billion,” 10/31/08
Azzaman, “Iraqi Oil Exports Receding by 100,000 Barrels a Day Every Month, Former Minister Says,” 11/19/08
Reuters, “Gunmen Kill Two Christian Sisters In Iraq’s Mosul,” 11/12/08
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Iraq Humanitarian Update,” October 2008

Wasit Province Turned Over To Iraqi Control

The following commentary originally appeared in Musings On Iraq

Image source: BBC

On Wednesday October 29, Wasit province in southern Iraq was turned over to Iraqi control. It was the 13th of 18 provinces to be handed over to Baghdad. This follows closely after Babil went through a similar process on October 23.

Wasit has a population of 941,800 people, 100% of which are Shiite. The province’s economy is based upon farming, oil, and natural gas. Many of these natural resources are not being exploited however because the government has shown no leadership in developing them. The pace of reconstruction in the province is also slow, and there is little investment. On the positive side, in September 2008, Iraq and Iran signed a free trade agreement, which would includes a border crossing in Wasit. As reported earlier, Iran is Iraq’s largest trade partner, and supplies most of the country’s consumer goods.

The Gathering of Iraqi Elites runs the provincial council, which is part of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC). The U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Team in the province ranked their governance as “Developing,” the second lowest of five rankings. In terms of running Wasit, the council spent $33.7 million of its $83 million budget, 41% in 2007. That made it the eighth best among Iraq’s 18 provinces in budget execution. As with Baghdad, most of this money has been spent on salaries and expenses, rather than on infrastructure to rebuild the area. The major issue politically today, is the attempt by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to sway voters away from the SIIC to his Dawa party. In September the Prime Minister tried to set up a Tribal Support Council to this end, but the provincial council objected. The next month, Maliki went ahead and formed a council there anyway.

The province is also home to several thousand internally displaced Iraqis. The Special Inspector General for Iraq (SIGIR) reconstruction counted 75,325 in its July 2008 report. The Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) counted 118 families, 708 people, had recently returned to Wasit. In a separate report, the IOM reported that 100 displaced families had left for their home provinces.

Security in Wasit is considered good. SIGIR ranked it the 9th most violent province. The major source of conflict in the area recently was not between insurgents and the government and U.S., but with Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army and Iranian-backed Special Groups. Wasit and its capital Kut was part of one of the major routes Iranian operatives used to funnel weapons into Baghdad. In the fall of 2007, the U.S. began expanding its Sons of Iraq program to Wasit, aimed largely at stopping the flow of Iranian supplies and Shiite militias. During the security crackdown in Basra in March 2008, Iraqi forces were also involved in fighting Sadrists in Kut. These operations continued through the summer with senior Sadrists arrested, along with Special Group fighters. The conflict with the Mahdi Army also led to hundreds of local police being fired as suspected followers of Sadr. Iran continues to try to infiltrate the area as three members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard were just arrested in Kut on October 20, and another one was killed and one detained in separate incident south of Kut on October 24.

Overall, Wasit is relatively secure, but lacks an effective government and economy. There are few attacks, although Special Groups and Iranian agents are still operating there. At the same time, Iran is playing a positive role in the province, with a major trade route running through Kut, that provides essential goods to Iraqis. The ruling SIIC provincial council hasn’t done that good of a job running the area, and they are facing a strong challenge by the Prime Minister’s Dawa party, who is attempting to organize tribes behind him. The province is an example of post-Surge Iraq, where security is still an issue, but economic and political ones are becoming more important.

SOURCES
Ahmed, Farook and Cochrane, Marisa, “Recent Operations against Special Groups and JAM in Central and Southern Iraq,” Institute for the Study of War, 4/7/08
Aswat al-Iraq, “3 Iranian Revolutionary Guards arrested in Wassit,” 10/20/08
- “QRF kills Iranian gunman, detains another in Wassit,” 10/24/08
- “Wassit province refuses to establish support councils,” 9/24/08
Gamel, Kim, “U.S. Expands Anbar Model to Iraq Shiites,” Associated Press, 9/16/07
International Organization for Migration, “IOM Emergency Needs Assessments,” 10/1/08
IraqSlogger.com, “New Tribal Groups Buck Wishes of Wasit Council,” 10/23/08
Jab, Abdul-Razaq, “US military hands southern province over to Iraqis,” Associated Press, 10/29/08
Juhi, Bushra, “Iraq fires 1,300 soldiers and policemen for refusing to fight,” Associated Press, 4/13/08
Kagan, Kimberly, “Iran’s Proxy War against the United States and the Iraqi Government,” Institute for the Study of War, 8/20/07
Middle East Reference, “Governorate elections held in Iraq on 31 January 2005”
Ministry of Displacement and Migration & International Organization for Migration, “Returnee Monitoring and Needs Assessments Tabulation Report,” September 2008
Roggio, Bill, “Iran’s Ramazan Corps and the ratlines into Iraq,” Long War Journal.org, 12/5/07
- “Report: Iraqi security forces preparing operation against Mahdi Army in Maysan,” Long War Journal.org, 6/12/08
- “Report: Sadr to extend cease-fire,” Long War Journal.org, 2/21/08
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 7/30/08
Tehran Times, “Iran, Iraq to create 3 free zones,” 9/13/08

Iraq Needs Real Governance Center for Strategic and International Studies Report Says

Anthony Cordesman from the Center for Strategic and International Studies is one of the leading military analysts on Iraq and the Middle East. In September 2008 he wrote a report on transferring Iraq’s provinces to Baghdad’s control, and its consequences. He notes that while Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has been able to wield the hammer recently in security operations, the Iraqi government still has not proven that it can carry out the more difficult build and hold aspects of a successful counterinsurgency program. That includes reconciliation, and real governance at all levels; something hindered by the deep divisions between Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds.

Iraq’s political system is still developing. The three main groups in Iraq, the Sunnis, the Shiites, and Kurds still have deep disagreements over the future of the country, which hinders the development of the government. Reconciliation is an important and necessary step to overcome these problems. Iraq has passed several reconciliation laws as part of this process, but it is always the implementation that matters.

The Accountability and Justice Law for example, was passed to replace the old Debaathification act from the American Coalition Provisional Authority. As reported earlier, no officials have been appointed to the Supreme National Commission on Accountability and Justice that is suppose to administer it. The government has been using this as an excuse not to follow it, except for the Interior Ministry, which has accepted former officers into the security forces. This is happening despite the fact that the new law says that no ex-Baathists can work for the ministry. It says a lot about Iraqis inability to follow through on legislation it passes when most of the government is ignoring the Accountability and Justice act, but the one ministry that is forbidden from doing so, is. It is no wonder then that this law and others like it have not ameliorated the distrust of the Sunnis.

In early 2009, Iraq is scheduled to have provincial elections, which could also change the country’s political make-up. Cordesman points out, that simply having a vote, doesn’t add authority or legitimacy. What is important is the type of governance that happens afterwards. In Iraq’s case, three elections since the invasion have done little to solve the nation’s divisions.

Voting has not fixed other problems such as the government’s inability to spend its budget and provide basic services. Cordesman doesn’t mention it, but Prime Minister Maliki’s announcements to rebuild Basra, Sadr City, Mosul, Maysan, and Diyala provinces provide perfect examples of the government’s inability to build after security operations have cleared. After each military offensive in those five areas, the Prime Minister said that Baghdad would spend $100 million to help with reconstruction. So far those have been empty promises. In Basra, the governor argued over spending the money. Similarly, in Sadr City, the local council couldn’t agree on contracts. In Mosul, Maysan, and Diyala, nothing has happened. In fact, the U.S. and England are doing whatever reconstruction is happening in Basra and Sadr City because Baghdad has not proven to be up to the task.

On October 3, 2008 Iraq received control of the 12th province, Babil in the south, from the United States. All of Iraq’s provinces are suppose to be turned over to Baghdad by early 2009. These are important steps towards Iraq receiving full sovereignty. However, the provinces are turned over when the number of attacks in each province decreases, not whether the provincial governments are working or whether there is any reconciliation. Cordesman argues that this happens many times whether the Iraqis are ready or not. In the March 2008 quarterly report to Congress, the Pentagon said that the turnover of Basra had been successful, there was less violence, and that the Army and police were in control. That month Maliki launched an offensive against Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army that led to bloody fighting in the city of Basra and across the south.

Cordesman’s conclusion is that while there has been military progress in Iraq, the more important political and economic development has lagged behind. Baghdad has not been able to carry out meaningful reconciliation. The central government and provinces are barely able to provide basic service and spend their budgets. Iraqi elections in 2009 have the opportunity to shuffle the seats of power in the governorates, but they will still be sitting at the same broken table. The U.S. has put too much emphasis on security as a benchmark. Now that that is improving, it is time for Washington and Baghdad to step up their efforts to build Iraq’s infrastructure and government so that it can hold the country together.

For more on Anthony Cordesman’s writings on Iraq see:

Anthony Cordesman, CSIS Report on Iraqi Forces

Cordesman Interview: U.S. Needs To Stay For The Long Haul In Iraq

SOURCES
Aswat al-Iraq, “Maliki allocates $100 million for Mosul projects,” 5/18/08
- “Over 7,500 police members sacked this year – official,” 5/29/08
- “Parl’t forms accountability & justice panel next term – MP,” 9/8/08
- “SIIC head, Babel governor take up security,” 10/22/08
Biddle, Stephen, Nasr, Vali, Nash, William, “Political and Security Developments in Iraq and the Region,” Council on Foreign Relations, 6/12/08
Cordesman, Anthony, “Transferring Provinces To Iraqi Control: The Reality And The Risks,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 9/2/08
Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” September 2008
International Center for Transitional Justice, “Briefing Paper: Iraq’s New ‘Accountability and Justice’ Law,” 1/22/08
Rubin, Alissa and Goode, Erica, “Iraq Struggle Unfolds in Peaceful Protest and Violent Attacks in Sadr City,” New York Times, 4/28/08
Al-Sabaah, “Cabinet allocates $ 100 mln to Diyala province,” 8/7/08
Senanayake, Sumedha, “Iraq: Will Passage Of New Law Appease Sunnis?” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1/15/08
Tavernise, Sabrina, “Shiite Militia in Baghdad Sees Its Power Ebb,” New York Times, 7/27/08

Maliki Responds To His Critics On Tribal Support Councils

Prime Minister Maliki has created tribal Support Councils in 4. Wasit, 5. Maysan, 6. Basra, 7. Dhi Qar, 10. Babil, 11. Karbala

The following commentary originall appeared in Musings On Iraq

As reported earlier, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has been creating tribal Support Councils across most of Southern Iraq. Currently there are councils in Basra, Maysan, Babil, Dhi Qar, Wasit, and Karbala. They were originally formed to counter the Sadrists and the Mahdi Army militia, but as they spread to more secure areas in the summer of 2008, provincial councils, governors, and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) all began to complain about them. All the criticisms were similar. They asked why the central government was organizing tribes and their fighters outside of the boundaries of the local provincial councils. It was apparent that Maliki was both protecting against the return of the Sadrists, as well as building up a base for the upcoming provincial elections.

The criticism however has grown so loud that the Prime Minister has been forced to respond. October 9, Maliki announced that he would disband any tribal Support Council that was working with a political party. This was obviously meant to just mute the complaints, because he also said that the councils were non-partisan and worked for the good of the country. Since Maliki created the councils, and they work for him, he is not likely to end them any time soon. The SIIC, anticipating this, said that they welcomed the Prime Minister’s announcement, but wanted to see some action instead of just words about the councils.

This on-going argument points to the inter-Shiite rivalries that have come to the fore recently. The Dawa and Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council are still part of the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance, and the SIIC is still one of the main supporters of Maliki’s ruling coalition. At the same time, the SIIC controls most of the southern provinces, has a large social and religious organization, plus its own militia, the Badr Brigade, that operates within the Interior Ministry, while Dawa is the smallest of the three major Shiite parties, and has no fighters of its own. Recently Maliki has been using the Iraqi security forces as a political tool, first against the Sadrists, then the insurgents, and most recently against the Kurds in the Khanaqin district of Diyala. It should be no surprise then that he is trying to build up his support while he can for the anticipated 2009 elections. The Support Councils provide him with both sheikhs and their tribesmen for the balloting, and armed men as well, if they are needed in another confrontation, as happened in Basra in March 2008. The SIIC’s response is also expected, as the councils are a direct challenge to the rule of the south. This dispute will probably continue until the day of the election.

SOURCES
Alsumaria, “Al Maliki defends tribal awakening councils,” 10/9/08
- “Rows growing between two major Iraqi parties,” 9/18/08
Cochrane, Marisa, “The Battle for Basra,” Institute for the Study of War, 5/31/08
Parker, Sam, “ISCI/Da’wa alliance showing strain,” Abu Muqawama Blog, 9/17/08
Voices of Iraq, “Government is the only authority and no negotiations with ‘the gangs’ – PM,” 3/28/08
- “Karbala governor says no-confidence vote proposal is political pressure tool,” 10/1/08
- “MP’s decision to cancel partisan support councils welcomed,” 10/9/08
- “PM announces formation of 17 tribal councils in Missan,” 6/23/08
- “Premier to cancel partisan support councils,” 10/9/08
- “Tribal chieftain announces opening 20 Supports Councils offices in Thi-Qar,” 10/1/08
- “Wassit province refuses to establish support councils,” 9/24/08

Disputes Over Tribal Support Councils

The following commentary originally appeared in Musings On Iraq

Baghdad has been setting up tribal Support Councils across southern and central Iraq recently. The first such councils were actually created by the United States to help formalize the Sons of Iraq program in Sunni areas. Beginning in March 2008 however, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki began creating his own councils during security operations in Basra and Maysan provinces. Later, he started spreading them throughout southern Iraq, and even just outside of Baghdad. Originally, these were a way to organize local tribes to support the government against Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia, but they were later used to counter the Sons of Iraq and expand Maliki’s political base.

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki took up the idea of the tribal Support Councils from the United States during his crackdowns on Sadr in southern Iraq. The first councils were originally set up by the United States in Anbar, Diyala, Ninewa, and Salahaddin to legitimize the Sons of Iraq units, give tribes a say in local governance, and create bottom up reconciliation. In March 2008, when Maliki launched Operation Knight’s Charge in Basra against the Mahdi Army he too reached out to local tribes for help with the crackdown. The Prime Minister offered them 10,000 positions in the security forces in return for their support, something tribes were all to willing to give him since there was high unemployment in the area. By early April, Maliki had gained the support of dozens of local sheikhs, who would form the basis of the first Support Council in the city with 2,500 fighters.

In June, Maliki sent forces to Maysan to again subdue the Sadrists that controlled the province. As in Basra, Baghdad turned to the tribes to counter the influence of the Sadr Trend. By the middle of the month the government announced the formation of 17 tribal councils in Maysan.

By the end of June, Maliki was even trying to create Support Councils in the Baghdad area. In Radwainiyah, just outside of the capitol, the government was courting a local Sunni sheikh to form a Support Council. This time, however, instead of responding to a perceived security threat like the Sadrists, the government was attempting to split the local Sunni tribes from the U.S.-funded Sons of Iraq that were operating in the area. That same month, Maliki met with representatives of the powerful Jabouri tribe about setting up a national council of tribes to support the government. Again, the Jabouri had been instrumental in working with the United States to create tribal Sons of Iraq, and now Baghdad was trying to win them over to their side.

From September to October the government attempted to create Support Councils across the rest of the south, but to the ire of the SIIC, governors, and the provincial councils. In September one was created in Babil. The governor, who was a member of the SIIC, was opposed to the idea because he said it did not include 1200 sheikhs. The SIIC controlled provincial government in Wasit was against a Support Council being created there as well, saying that it was not needed. The provincial council stated that there was already cooperation between the local government and the tribes, so a Support Council would be redundant. The Dawa governor of Karbala and the SIIC governor of Dhi Qar both voiced similar complaints. The Karbala governor claimed that the provincial council was trying to unseat him because he was against the Support Councils there, while the Dhi Qar governor questioned why Baghdad was creating 20 Support Councils in his province, without any coordination with the local government. The head of the security and defense committee in parliament and the SIIC itself have also questioned Maliki’s moves. The security and defense committee chairman said that the councils were unconstitutional. One SIIC member asked whether the tribal councils were a means to create a Dawa militia, while another said it was political maneuvering by Maliki before the provincial elections.

In 2008, the status quo changed in Iraq, and Maliki attempted to benefit from it through the creation of tribal Support Councils. First, Maliki’s main political and military rival, Moqtada al-Sadr had his militia scattered by security operations in Basra, Sadr City, and Maysan. Reaching out to tribes in Basra and Maysan was a way to protect against the Sadrists’ return, and to gain new supporters in areas where Maliki was weak before. The tribal council in Radwainiyah, was a shrewd move to undercut the local Sons of Iraq, which Maliki has never liked, and which he wishes to disband. Finally, the new councils in Babil, Wasit and Dhi Qar are direct challenges to the SIIC that rules those provinces. There is little coordination between the central and provincial governments, so even Dawa officials in those three areas felt that Malii was trying to usurp their power by creating independent tribal councils that answered to him rather than the local authorities. The 2009 provincial elections are the main backdrop for these movies. Dawa has always been the weakest of the three main Shiite parties. It was also the only one that lacked an armed militia. The Support Councils address both those issues by setting up a new Maliki dependent patronage system, and organizing armed tribesmen on his behalf. As 2008 ends, Maliki finds himself in a much stronger military and political situation, and the Support Councils have helped him with that.

SOURCES
Ahmed, Farook and Cochrane, Marisa, “Recent Operations against Special Groups and JAM in Central and Southern Iraq,” Institute for the Study of War, 4/7/08
Alsumaria, “Rows growing between two major Iraqi parties,” 9/18/08
Cochrane, Marisa, “The Battle for Basra,” Institute for the Study of War, 5/31/08
Cordesman, Anthony, “The Shi’ite Gamble: Rolling the Dice for Iraq’s Future,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 4/21/08
Dagher, Sam, “Basra strike against Shiite militias also about oil,” Christian Science Monitor, 4/9/08
- “U.S., Iraqi forces meet no Sadr resistance in Amara,” Christian Science Monitor, 6/23/08
Farrell, Stephen and Glanz, James, “More Than 1,000 in Iraq’s Forces Quit Basra Fight,” New York Times, 4/4/08
Hendawi, Hamza, “Program in Iraq against al-Qaida faces uncertainty,” Associated Press, 6/29/08
Iraqi News, “Three Support Councils established in Diala,” 1/24/08
McCallister, William, “Sons of Iraq: A Study in Irregular Warfare,” Small Wars Journal, 9/8/08
Missing Links Blog, “What’s up with Maliki’s latest tribal-council proposal,” 7/1/08
Multi-National Corps – Iraq, “Diyala leaders meet to establish tribal support councils (Diyala),” 3/21/08
Parker, Sam, “ISCI/Da’wa alliance showing strain,” Abu Muqawama Blog, 9/17/08
Raghavan, Sudarsan, “Basra’s Wary Rebirth,” Washington Post, 5/31/08
Scarborough, Rowan, “Tribe helps al-Maliki win control of south,” Washington Times, 5/23/08
Voices of Iraq, “Government is the only authority and no negotiations with ‘the gangs’ – PM,” 3/28/08
- “Karbala governor says no-confidence vote proposal is political pressure tool,” 10/1/08
- “PM announces formation of 17 tribal councils in Missan,” 6/23/08
- “Sunni, Shiite figures hold reconciliation conference in Diala,” 3/21/08
- “Thi-Qar governor slams govt’s plan of installing support councils,” 10/3/08
- “Tribal chieftain announces opening 20 Supports Councils offices in Thi-Qar,” 10/1/08
- “Wassit clans agree to back security agencies,” 4/6/08
- “Wassit province refuses to establish support councils,” 9/24/08

Baghdadis Celebrate Eid-al-Fitr Openly in the Streets

Eid al-Fitr, the festival of the breaking of the fast, begins with the sighting of the first crescent of the new moon of Shawwal, the 10th month of the Islamic lunar calendar. For the world's 1.4 billion Muslims, Eid al-Fitr celebrates the end of dawn-to-dusk fasting during the holy month of Ramadan.

Traditionally, the 3-day Eid celebration begins on the morning after the crescent moon is sighted. However, the sighting of the Shawwal moon varies for different sects of Islam and in different parts of the world. For most Sunnis, including those of Iraq, Eid began last Tuesday after religious authorities in Saudi Arabia reported seeing the rise of the Shawwal moon. But for Sunni Muslims who live far beyond the Arabian pennisula and who look to Islamic scholars in their respective countires, from Indonesia to the United States, the sighting of the Shawwal moon came a day or two later. The Grand Ayatollahs of most Shiites sighted the Shawwal moon on Tuesday, so most Shiites began their 3 days of celebration last Wednesday.

For the Muslims of Iraq, Shiite and Sunni, this year’s Eid festivities come at the end of the most peaceful Ramadan season since 2006. This confirms the hopeful optimism of many Iraqis which I shared with you at the beginning of Ramadan.

Attacks in Iraq are down 83% since 2007 which emboldened many Iraqis to observe Ramadan and celebrate Eid as they have during more peaceful times. According to AFP, the U.S. commander for Baghdad Major General Jeffery Hammond reports: the first 21 days of Ramadan saw just 60 attacks compared with 600 in 2007 and 800 in 2006 -- the year when sectarian violence erupted across Iraq. Baghdadis flocked to local parks and public squares to celebrate Eid in the open air.

Of course there are still cement barricades, security check points, and other daily reminders of ongoing dangers to public safety. At Baghdad's al-Zawra park, armed guards patrolled the perimeter and families received full body pat-downs before entering. The decision to venture beyond the walls of their homes remains a wary one for many Iraqis. Um Abdullah, a teacher in Baghdad, told the Washington Post: "There is a kind of inner conflict" about whether to risk going outside. But ultimately she decided that this year: "We should go outside and live."

Although safer than recent years, Ramadan did not pass without incident. Five bombing attacks shook the streets of Baghdad on September 28th, killing dozens of innocent civilians. Yet for this year's Eid, the bloodshed was not enough to deter Baghdad’s National Theatre from showing its first nighttime performance since the invasion. Even after a car bomb killed three people across the street two hours before the opening curtain, the Theatre defied the terrorist violence and managed to open as scheduled. Salam Mijbil, a Theatre official, proudly proclaimed:

"We cannot let the terrorists control us. This bombing is the wind of hate. We will resist this wind and not buckle."

Other signs of Iraqi resilience and determination eased apprehension throughout Baghdad during Eid as well. There were children playing games in the parks, Iraqis enjoying rides on a local Ferris wheel and people lining up to buy ice cream. Some women even felt safe enough to dress in the knee length skirts they commonly wore before the war began.

However, not all Iraqis were able to celebrate without inhibition or sorrow. For many, the tragedy of war and the absence of loved ones forced to flee tainted the festivities. Since the U.S. led invasion in 2003, far too many Iraqis have lost their lives and millions have been forced to flee their homes, leaving many Eid al-Fitr dinner tables with empty seats. According to Abu Muhammad, an Iraqi journalist whose relatives have sought refuge abroad:

“We can't feel this is Eid. It's Eid when you're with your family."

Photo Caption: Muslims start celebrating Eid al-Fitr
October 12, 2007: muslimstoday

Cold War Between Baghdad and Kurds Turns Hot

The following commentary was originally posted on Musings On Iraq

On September 27, Iraqi police and Kurdish forces got into a shoot out in the town of Jalawlaa in the Khanaqin district of Diyala province. There are two versions of what happened. According to Iraqi forces, a unit of the Emergency Police raided the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) headquarters in Jalawlaa and arrested two members. According to UPI, the target was the Kurdish intelligence agency the Asayesh. Kurdish officials then went to the Emergency Police Unit’s offices to demand the release of the two Kurds, but that resulted in a shootout that left a policeman and a member of the KDP dead, and two officers wounded. The other version comes from the Peshmerga who claim that two Arab policemen stopped three members of the Asayesh in a market. When they refused to show their identity cards they were arrested and taken to a police station. A member of the KDP went there to demand their release. He was successful, but as they were exiting, police began shooting at them, killing one of the Asayesh officers. A police official said the police who opened fire were being investigated.

The Khanaqin district has been the scene of growing conflict between Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s central government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). On August 11, 2008 Iraqi forces reached the outskirts of Khanaqin as part of Operation Omens of Prosperity. They entered the towns of Qara Taba, Saidyah, and Khanaqin and demanded that the Kurdish Peshmerga militia withdraw within 24 hours and that all government buildings be evacuated. The Kurds refused at first, but after high level negotiations, agreed to pull their forces out of Qara Taba and Jalawlaa, but not Khanaqin. The security forces immediately broke that deal by moving into Khanaqin on August 24. The Kurdish parties organized demonstrations against the Iraqi forces and refused to leave. By the end of the month, another round of negotiations led to both the army and Peshmerga to withdraw leaving the Kurds still in political control of the area. By September 9 however, a Baghdad spokesman denied that any deal had been signed. On September 18, the Iraqi army again announced that the Peshmerga had to pull out of Jalawaaa. Three days later it appeared the Kurds had agreed when they announced that they would evacuate government owned buildings. All that has gone up in smoke with yesterday’s shootout.

Although the Kurds represent one of the foundations of Prime Minister Maliki’s ruling coalition, the two sides have been disagreeing more and more. The most prominent was when the Kurds vetoed the provincial election law in July 2008. The Kurds also occupy 300 square miles of territory outside of Kurdistan, which they wish to annex. The Khanaqin district is one of those. There was no security situation to speak of there when the Iraqi forces moved into the area in August. Maliki’s action was an attempt to pressure the Kurds and assert the central government’s control over all sections of the country. The Prime Minister must have been pleased to have so many high level Kurds come to his office, including Kurdish President Massoud Barzani, to work out a deal over Khanaqin. The arguments between the two sides were heated, but stayed verbal. Yesterday’s incident was the first time they turned violent, and obviously threatens all the talks over the future of the area and Maliki’s power play. Already Kurdish President Barzani and the speaker of the Kurdish Assembly have begun talking about conspiracies against the Kurds and the return of Baathism to Baghdad. This shootout will only lead to the growing paranoia of Kurdish leaders, and will probably make working with them even harder.

SOURCES:
Agence France Presse, “Man dies as Iraqi forces raid Kurdish peshmerga post,” 9/27/08
Gera, Vanessa, “Iraq: Kurdish politician killed in disputed region,” Associated Press, 9/27/08
Al-Ily, Naseer and Aziz, Hewa, “The Baghdad-Arbil Crisis Escalates,” Asharq Alawsat, 9/12/08
Middle East Online, “Iraqi forces raid Kurdish peshmerga post,” 9/27/08
Muhammed, Ako, “Kurds and their Iraqi allies see differences,” Kurdish Globe, 9/11/08
Paley, Amit, “Strip of Iraq ‘on the Verge of Exploding,’” Washington Post, 9/13/08
Press TV, “Iraq army sets deadline for Kurds,” 9/18/08
Russo, Claire, “The Maliki Government Confronts Diyala,” Institute for the Study of War,” 9/23/08
Voices of Iraq, “2 killed in clashes between policemen, Kurdish party supporters in Jalawlaa,” 9/27/08
- “Consensus solution about Khanaqin achieved – lawmaker,” 9/16/08
- “Kurdish parties to flee offices in Diala,” 9/21/08
- “No deal struck between central gov’t, Kurds over Khanaqin-spokesman,” 9/5/08

Back To Mosul

The following commentary was originally posted on Musings On Iraq:

On Wednesday August 17, 2008, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki admitted that the security operation in Mosul had failed to reach its goal of improving the situation in Ninewa. Maliki blamed the citizens for failing to secure their province. He said in other security crackdowns, the population had cooperated and helped the government forces round up militants, but this didn’t happen in Mosul. A member of the Interior Minister said that security forces would launch a new operation there soon.

On May 10, 2008, Maliki announced the beginning of Operation Lion’s Roar/Mother of Two Rivers that was aimed at dislodging insurgents from their last major urban stronghold in Mosul. Maliki had been talking about clearing the city since December 2007, and early operations began in February 2008. Because of the crackdowns on the Sadrists that started in March, large numbers of Iraqi forces were not able to deploy to Mosul until May. The offensive was considered a success, but as reported earlier, it actually had little affect on the number of attacks and deaths in the city.

Here is a breakdown of attacks and incidents in Mosul before and after Operation’s Lion’s Roar/Mother of Two Rivers:

January 2008:

• 32 attacks/19 incidents – 1.03 attacks/day – 1.65 attacks & incidents/day
• 109 killed – 3.52 deaths/day
• 362 wounded – 11.68 wounded/day

February 2008:

• 47 attacks/8 incidents 1.62 attacks/day – 1.9 attacks & incidents/day
• 86 killed – 2.97 killed/day
• 80 wounded 2.76 wounded/day
• 6 kidnapped

March 2008:

• 54 attacks/13 incidents – 1.74 attacks/day – 2.16 attacks & incidents/day
• 97 killed – 3.13 killed/day
• 147 wounded – 4.74 wounded/day
• 3 kidnapped

April 2008:

• 53 attacks/10 incidents – 1.77 attacks/day – 2.1 attacks & incidents/day
• 71 killed 2.37 killed/day
• 209 wounded 7.0 wounded/day
• 42 kidnapped

June 2008:

• 49 attacks/incidents – 1.63 attacks/day – 1.97 attacks & incidents/day
• 100 killed 3.33 killed/day
• 279 wounded 9.3 wounded/day
• 4 kidnapped

July 2008:

• 67 attacks/7 incidents – 2.16 attacks/day – 2.39 attacks & incidents/day
• 96 killed 3.1 killed/day
• 111 wounded 3.58 wounded/day
• 2 kidnapped

August 2008:

• 50 attacks/16 incidents – 1.61 attacks/day – 2.12 attacks & incidents/day
• 55 killed 1.77 killed/day
• 111 wounded 3.58 wounded/day
• 5 kidnapped

The numbers show little change in the number of attacks or the amount of people killed or wounded before and after the offensive until August. That month, the number of attacks did drop by an average of one per day, and deaths were down by almost two a day, but the amount injured stayed the same. If you include incidents that involved violence, there was little drop off from July to August.

The major reason why the situation in Mosul has remained unstable is because the offensive did not address the underlying causes of the violence there. Unlike in Basra, Sadr City, and Maysan where the Sadrists were directly challenged on the military, political, economic, and social fronts, Operation Lion’s Roar/Mother of Two Rivers turned out to be solely a military affair that only nabbed, killed, or ran off insurgents. Maliki promised $100 million in reconstruction after the offensive, but little of that has shown up. The political situation remained untouched, with the city divided between Kurds and Arabs, with Kurds controlling the eastern half and the Arabs the west. The presence of the Kurds has allowed insurgent groups like Al Qaeda in Iraq to portray themselves as the protectors of the Arabs. The Kurds have not helped since they do have aspirations to annex the city to Kurdistan and control the Ninewa provincial council. Until those issues are addressed there will probably still be latent violence in the area, with the new offensive reducing attacks while it is in affect, with a likely rise afterwards as happened after May.

SOURCES:
Ali, Fadhil, “Iraqi Government Launches Operation to Expel al-Qaeda from Mosul,” Terrorism Focus, Jamestown Foundation, 5/20/08
DPA, “Iraq’s Islamic Party leader assassinated in Mosul,” 8/7/08
Gamel, Kim, “UN unveils plans to step up efforts in Iraq,” Associated Press, 8/31/08
Hammoudi, Laith, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 13 August 2008,” McClatchy Newspapers, 8/13/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 27 August 2008,” McClatchy Newspapers, 8/27/08
Issa, Sahar, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq, Monday 11 August 2008,” McClatchy Newspapers, 8/11/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq, Friday 22 August 2008,” McClatchy Newspapers, 8/22/08
Kuwait News Agency, “Iraqi PM admits failure of Umm Al-Rubai in military operation,” 9/18/08
Levinson, Charles, “Mosul offensive illustrates U.S. challenges,” USA Today, 2/10/08
Monsters & Critics, “Policeman, soldier killed in two incidents in Iraq (Extra),” 8/14/08
Reuters, “Bombs hit northern Iraq, forces expect more,” 8/13/08
- “FACTBOX – Security developments in Iraq, Aug 4,” 8/4/08
- “FACTBOX – Security developments in Iraq, Aug 5,” 8/5/08
- “FACTBOX – Security developments in Iraq, Aug 6,” 8/6/08
- “FACTBOX – Security developments in Iraq, Aug 8,” 8/8/08
- “FACTBOX – Security developments in Iraq, Aug 15,” 8/15/08
- “FACTBOX – Security developments in Iraq, Aug 18,” 8/18/08
- “FACTBOX – Security developments in Iraq, Aug 21,” 8/21/08
- “FACTBOX – Security developments in Iraq, Aug 23,” 8/23/08
- “FACTBOX – Security developments in Iraq, Aug 25,” 8/25/08
- “FACTBOX – Security developments in Iraq, Aug 27,” 8/27/08
- “FACTBOX – Security developments in Iraq, Aug 28,” 8/28/08
- “FACTBOX – Security developments in Iraq, Aug 30,” 8/30/08
- “FACTBOX – Security developments in Iraq, Aug 31,” 8/31/08
Voices of Iraq, “2 civilians injured, gunmen kidnap 2 truck drivers in Mosul,” 8/12/08
- “2 gunmen killed in eastern Mosul clashes,” 8/3/08
- “2 unknown bodies found, arms seized in Mosul,” 8/2/08
- “2 wounded, body found in Mosul,” 8/12/08
- “3 Iraqi soldiers wounded in Mosul,” 8/8/08
- “3 Turks wounded in Mosul blast,” 8/30/08
- “4 wounded as car bomb explodes in Mosul,” 8/25/08
- “92 targets achieved during operations’ first day – Ninewa operations commander,” 5/10/08
- “Cart bomb kills 3 cops in Mosul,” 8/7/08
- “Civilian, child injured by gunmen in western Mosul,” 8/5/08
- “Gunmen wound policeman in central Mosul – NOC,” 8/26/08
- “IED targets U.S. patrol, U.S. army denies incident,” 8/18/08
- “Maliki allocates $100 million for Mosul projects,” 5/18/08
- “Mortar shell hits al-Iraqia, al-Mosuliya channels in Mosul,” 8/19/08
- “Mosul university president’s bodyguard killed,” 8/25/08
- “Policeman killed by gunmen fire in Mosul,” 8/25/08
- “Security member wounded in 2nd Mosul blast,” 8/18/08
- “Violence in Diala reduced, Mosul the coming target – MOI,” 8/17/08

Ramadan in Iraq: Improving Security Sparks Revival of Traditions

On September 1st, the setting sun marked the beginning of the holy month of Ramadan, a celebration which occurs during the ninth month of the Islamic calendar. The origins of Ramadan trace back to the 7th Century, known to Muslims as the year Ramadan 610. At this time, Muslims believe Muhammad received the initial verses of the Koran from the angel Gabriel, a messenger sent by Allah. Throughout the month of Ramadan, Muslims observe the tradition of fasting, one of the five pillars of the Islamic faith. From sunrise to sunset all those who are healthy abstain from eating, drinking (water included), sex and smoking. Daily fasting allows for self reflection and mastery over desires. Abstention from food also reminds Muslims of the suffering of others less fortunate.

The traditions of Ramadan are meant to unite families and neighborhoods in a spirit of charity, peace and hospitality. However, in Iraq, insecurity makes observing the holy month more difficult. In February 2006, the bombing of a Shiite shrine in Samarra catapulted the region into severe sectarian conflict. 9 P.M. curfews and fear of more bloodshed kept most Iraqis from the games, feasts and gatherings that, in past Ramadans, stretched into the early hours of dawn. In an article published by the Washington Post in 2006, an Iraqi grocery clerk pessimistically asserts that “All of our traditions will soon vanish, and we will only hear about them in history books.” In the same article a young Iraqi girl speaks of the fears that taint the Ramadan celebrations:

“Last year we were not afraid. But this year we are afraid. There are a lot of car bombs. I want security to come back and no terrorists.”

Considering the unremitting conflict that plagued Iraq following the bombing in Samarra, hope for the revival of a peaceful Ramadan became an illusion for even the most optimistic Iraqi.

Over the past year, however, a quelling of violence revives the hope that was fading amidst constant bloodshed. On August 31st, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki praised the resilience of the Iraqi people stating:

“Ramadan comes at a time when the Iraqis have earned the result of their patience and victory on terrorists, criminals and outlaws (…) There is progress in security and peace.”

Security has indeed improved. Last month a total of 430 Iraqi civilians, police officers and soldiers were killed nationwide as compared to the 1,860 deaths during the same period a year earlier. The recent handover of security responsibilities to Iraqi forces in the province of Anbar, formally a stronghold for Sunni insurgency and the birthplace of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, is more good news for Iraqis longing for a calm Ramadan. Feeling secure, people are returning to the streets in the evening after breaking the fast. In interviews with residents in Baghdad and throughout the country, the Los Angeles Times reports "Iraqi Muslims Pray for Peaceful Ramadan":

Muqdad Hammed, 23, who never thought of going out during Ramadan last year. Now he looks forward to the nights after breaking the fast. "We hang around in alleyways as late as 1 a.m. playing the traditional games," he said. Among those games is mahaibis, in which one person on a team conceals a ring in his hand and the other team must guess who has it.

In Baghdad's eastern neighborhood of Shaab, Ali Mohammed, 24, said that despite high food prices, he wants to take his family out to celebrate in parks and restaurants. “There will be no bloody explosions and killing. I’m optimistic that Ramadan will be full of prosperity and peace for all,” Mohammed said.

Despite improvements in security, violent attacks continue to be a danger in less secure areas. On September 6th a car bomb exploded near shops and cafes in the northwestern city of Tal Afar. The blast killed six people and wounded an estimated 50 others as reported by the New York Times. Late August also saw a string of fatal attacks by suicide bombers targeting mosques and police stations. The recent increase of attacks mimic similar surges that occurred during Ramadan in the past. In 2003 and 2006, Ramadan prompted anti-Iraqi insurgents to launch offensives that killed more than 350 Iraqi Security Forces personnel and nearly 200 coalition service members.

Security, however, is not the most pressing issue distressing many Iraqis this month. Lack of electricity and other essential services undermine the attempts of Iraqis to rebuild their lives and observe Ramadan. The extreme heat during blackouts makes fasting more difficult. The loss of loved ones becomes amplified as well during the month of Ramadan. A time of celebration is also a time of mourning when many Iraqis are forced to recall bitter memories of family and friends lost or displaced due to the violence in Iraq. One Iraqi man, whose son died two months ago from a gunshot wound, laments:

“Ramadan for us has always been a period of love and strength. The family was always together. But today, it means suffering and pain.”

Despite the challenges that still face Iraq; during this holy month of Ramadan, citizens can celebrate not only the Islamic traditions that unify them as Muslims but also the successes that unite them as Iraqis.

Photo Caption: "A baker prepares kunafa, a traditional Middle Eastern dessert pastry, in Baghdad’s Karada district. During Ramadan, Muslims fast during the day and feast at night (Ahmad al-Rubaye, AFP/Getty Images, 9/3/08)."