Iraq Ranked No. 6 On Failed State List

Foreign Policy Magazine run by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Fund for Peace released their latest Failed States Index for 2009. Iraq was ranked number 6 out of 177 countries. That was a very minor improvement from 2008 when Iraq was number 5. In 2007 it got its lowest mark as the second worst country in the index. Each nation was ranked from 1.0 to 10.0 with one being the best and ten the worst in twelve different social, economic, and political categories. In 2009 Iraq received a total score of 108.6. Only the Congo, Chad, Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Somalia got lower marks. In 2008 Iraq was only behind Chad, Zimbabwe, Sudan and Somalia. While missing some of the major changes in Iraq since the end of the sectarian war, the report does highlight the instability and challenges that remain in the country.

Four social indicators were covered first. Iraq received an 8.7 on demographic pressures, down 0.3 from 2008. Much of Iraq is urbanized, but that is also where most of the violence takes place. Travel within many cities is limited due to checkpoints. The report believes that as security improves, Iraq will improve in this category. On refugees and displaced it got an 8.9, down 0.1 from 2008. Due to the violence 4-5 million Iraqis were forced from their homes, one of the largest refugees crises in the world. The process of return has begun, which accounts for the minor improvement in the score, but it is still happening at very low levels. Iraq received a 9.7 in group grievances, again a 0.1 improvement from 2008. The report sees the country still largely divided between Sunni and Shiites and between Arabs and Kurds. All of their examples however were from 2005 to 2008. While there are still plenty of differences between Sunnis and Shiites, much of this is now being played out in the political rather than military world as most of their events show. The dispute between Arabs and Kurds on the other hand has increased. This could be one area where Iraq could earn a better mark since there is not even half as much violence as there was before resulting from these differences. On human flight Iraq went from a 9.3 in 2008 to a 9.1 in 2009. The report cited the continued absence of much of Iraq’s professional class, and oddly attacks on journalists as a reason why the nation continues to score poorly in this category. Very few Iraqis have been displaced since 2007, which is what the category seems to be about. The latest report by the International Organization for Migration for example, found that only 2.0% of Iraq’s displaced lost their homes in 2008. The fact that Iraq’s middle class has left and not returned yet would seem to go under the refugees’ category, so the country should’ve scored better here. Overall, the study could’ve done better in ranking Iraq in group grievances and human flight.

Economic concerns were next. In uneven development Iraq did worse going from 8.5 to 8.6. The report found that Shiites areas still did better than Sunni ones. This could be partly due to the fact that Sunni areas have little to no oil, but the study also believes this has been done on purpose because of sectarian biases. United Nations reports on Iraq however, would partly dispute this finding. The Shiite south for example, has the highest rates of poverty. Since violence has been concentrated in Sunni areas, that could also be a reason why there has been less development there. In terms of the economy overall, Iraq improved 0.1 with 7.6 in 2009. The improved security meant there was more opportunity for Iraqis to return to their normal lives and conduct business. Iraq is also on the verge of its first round of bidding for long-term oil and natural gas contracts with foreign oil companies. While the study notes that Iraq is largely dependent on oil, it seemed to have missed the fact that the world recession and subsequent drop in crude prices have imposed severe limits on revenues this year. The rest of the economy is still largely underdeveloped due to wars, sanctions, and neglect.

Last the Failed State Index went through six political and military categories. First was legitimacy of the state where Iraq moved from 9.4 in 2008 to 9.0 in 2009. Iraq’s government still suffers from massive corruption, but has been able to bring back different groups that were boycotting the cabinet in 2007. The report does not take into account the new found standing of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki who has increasingly presented himself as an Iraqi nationalist that is intent upon rebuilding the Iraqi state and government authority. The strength of his argument was displayed in Maliki’s strong showing in the 2009 provincial elections. In public services Iraq received an 8.4. Baghdad is still not able to meet many of the public’s needs, but it is making small improvements. On human rights, Iraq moved up from 9.6 to 9.3 due to the weakening of the insurgency. Iraq’s security forces are still accused of human rights abuses. For security forces Iraq went from 9.9 to 9.7. In this category, the study seems stuck in the sectarian war mentioning the fighting between Sunnis and Shiites, which ended in 2007, and the role of militias. That is now largely over however. Iraq received a 9.6 for factionalized elite. Here the study was right on noting that Iraq’s Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish politicians are still deeply divided upon the direction of the country. Finally Iraq maintained a 10.0 score on external intervention since the United States is still occupying the country. On legitimacy and security apparatus Iraq should’ve done much better, but the Failed State Index seemed to do okay on the other marks.

The Index gets the general idea that Iraq is still a very troubled country. There are deep political divisions within the country, the economy is dependent upon oil, services are bad, and Iraq has one of the largest number of refugees and displaced in the world, very few of which have come home. At the same time there has been a huge improvement in the security situation, very few Iraqis are being forced from their homes anymore, and Maliki has begun the process of rebuilding the image of the state. On those issues, the Failed State report is stuck in the past. This was a more marked problem in the 2008 report. While the study had problems with some individual categories, it highlights the massive problems that are still ahead to make Iraq a stable and prosperous country. This raises the question of course, of who will be responsible for trying to improve Iraq, Baghdad or Washington.

Top 10 Failed States And Total Scores
1. Somalia 114.7
2. Zimbabwe 114.0
3. Sudan 112.4
4. Chad 112.2
5. Congo 108.7
6. Iraq 108.6
7. Afghanistan 108.2
8. Central African Republic 105.4
9. Guinea 104.6
10. Pakistan 104.1

2009/2008 Marks for Iraq on Failed State Index
Total Score: 108.6/110.6
Demographic Pressures: 8.7/9.0
Refugees & Displaced: 8.9/9.0
Group Grievances: 9.7/9.8
Human Flight: 9.1/9.3
Uneven Development: 8.6/8.5
Economy: 7.6/7.8
Legitimacy of State: 9.0/9.4
Public Services: 8.4/8.5
Human Rights: 9.3/9.6
Security Apparatus: 9.7/9.9
Factionalized Elites 9.6/9.8
External Intervention 10.0/10.0

SOURCES

Foreign Policy and The Fund for Peace, “The Failed States Index 2009,” June 2009

The Fund for Peace, “Country Profiles – Iraq,” June 2009

World Food Programme, “Comprehensive Food Security And Vulnerability Analysis In Iraq,” November 2008

November 2008 Iraq Index By The Brookings Institution

Each month the Brookings Institution puts out its Iraq Index. It’s a compendium of various statistics on violence, economic development, social indicators, and public opinion. The November 2008 edition was recently released. While it gives a good list of numbers, like previous reports, the major drawback is that many of them date back to 2006 and 2007 when newer ones are available. The latest Index shows that civilian deaths are down to the lowest level since 2003. Attacks on Coalition forces are down to 2004 levels, and attacks on Iraqi forces are the lowest since war began. There are still mass casualty bombings however at the same casualty rates as early 2005. Displacement is down to about 10,000 per month. Reconciliation is still shaky. U.S. casualties are minimal, but the psychological toll is increasing, especially with those that have deployed to Iraq for more than one tour. Finally, the aggregate economic numbers for Iraq are up, largely due to oil, while many of the country’s professionals have fled and not returned. While violence was Iraq’s most pressing issue, the Iraq Index shows that the country still has a long way to go before it becomes a healthy and stable one.

Security

Since the Surge all types of attacks and casualties are down in Iraq. Civilian deaths are at their lowest since the 2003 invasion. At the beginning of 2007 approximately 3,500 civilians were killed according to the Pentagon. Since January there has been a steady drop down to 600 in January 2008. After the security operations against the Mahdi Army that started in March, deaths have leveled off to around 500 deaths per month. This is the lowest number since the invasion. In comparison in May 2003 866 Iraqis were killed.

Coalition and Iraqi forces’ casualties are also down. The number of weekly attacks against the Coalition began dropping in June 2007. In September 2008 there were 390 per week, the lowest since 2004. Attacks on Iraqi forces are also down with only 25 killed in November 2008, a number not seen since the U.S. invasion.

Mass casualty bombings are the only thing that has not dropped as precipitously. In the first four months of 2005 there was an average of 20 bombings a month. From August to November 2008 there were an average of 19.75 such attacks. The casualties from these bombings are also down from 211 in January 2008 to 197 in June to 136 in November.

Iraqi Civilian Deaths 2003-2008:
May 2003: 866
August 2003: 1,292 highest for year
October 2004: 2,638 highest for year
August 2005: 3,303 highest for year
October 2006: 3,709 highest for year
January 2007: 3,500 highest for year
February 2007: 2,700
March 07: 2,400
April 07: 2,500
May 07: 2,600
June 2007: 1,950
July 07: 2,350
August 07: 2,000
September 07: 1,100
October 07: 950
November 07: 750
December 2007: 750
January 2008: 600
February 2008: 700
March 2008: 750
April 2008: 950
May 2008: 550
June 2008: 490
July 2008: 550
August 2008: 500
September 2008: 490

Note: The numbers from January 2007 to September 2008 are derived from charts provided by the Pentagon and are only approximations

Iraqi Forces Killed Per Month 2007-2008
Monthly Average April 2003 to May 2004: 65
January 2007: 91
February 2007: 150
March 2007: 215
April 2007: 300
May 2007: 197
June 2007: 197
July 2007: 232
August 2007: 76
September 2007: 96
October 2007: 114
November 2007: 89
December 2007: 72
January 2008: 69
February 2008: 110
March 2008: 161
April 2008: 113
May 2008: 110
June 2008: 77
July 2008: 98
August 2008: 85
September 2008: 98
October 2008: 48
November 2008: 25

Number Of Mass Casualty Bombings
May 2003: 0
December 2003: 14
January 2004: 9
June 2004: 19
December 2004: 17
January 2005: 28
February 2005: 18
March 2005: 13
April 2005: 21
June 2005: 34
December 2005: 21
January 2006: 30
June 2006: 56
December 2006: 65
January 2007: 69
June 2007: 42
November 2007: 22
December 2007: 23
January 2008: 24
February 2008: 21
March 2008: 28
April 2008: 21
May 2008: 14
June 2008: 19
July 2008: 19
August 2008: 22
September 2008: 22
October 2008: 14
November 2008: 21

Deaths From Mass Casualty Bombings 2008:
January 2008: 211
February 2008: 281
March 2008: 278
April 2008: 205
May 2008: 131
June 2008: 197
July 2008: 181
August 2008: 195
September 2008: 164
October 2008: 102
November 2008: 136

Reconciliation

While Iraq has passed a number of reconciliation laws, the implementation has been uneven. For these reasons the Brookings Institution gives the country a mixed rating. Out of a total of 11 possible points, Iraq rated a 6.0. The 2008 budget, the Pension Law, and purging the government of extremists were given the highest rating, while the Accountability and Justice Law, which is meant to replace the deBaathification process, the Amnesty Law, integrating the Sons of Iraq, funding the provinces, the Provincial Powers Act, and the provincial election law were all given mixed reviews because they have been unevenly implemented. Dealing with Kirkuk and passing a hydrocarbon law were given failing grades as little has happened with them.

Brookings’ Rating Of Benchmark Reconciliation Acts:
Note: Each issue can be given a 0, 0.5 or 1 with 0 being bad and 1 good. The highest possible score is 11.
2008 Budget – 1
Pension law – 1
Purging extremists from the government – 1
Accountability an Justice Law – 0.5
Integrating Sons of Iraq – 0.5
Amnesty Law – 0.5
Funding of provinces – 0.5
Provincial election law – 0.5
Kirkuk – 0
Hydrocarbon law – 0
TOTAL: 6.0 out of 11

U.S. Forces In Iraq

Casualties for U.S. forces are down, but the costs of repeated deployments are increasing. U.S. killed and wounded have dropped to the lowest levels since the U.S. invasion. From March 2003 to November 1, 2008 4,182 Americans have been killed. The overwhelming majority have been active duty, 3,410, and come from the Army, 3,035. Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) use to be the most deadly weapon used against American forces, but now they are down to 2003 levels. Of the 513,000 U.S. troops that have gone to Iraq, over 197,000 of them have been deployed more than once, and 53,000 have gone three or more times. Those that have gone on multiple deployments face a greater likelihood of developing Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.

U.S. Troop Fatalities December 2007-November 2008:
December 2007: 23
January 2008: 40
February 2008: 29
March 2008: 39
April 2008: 52
May 2008: 19
June 2008: 29
July 2008: 13
August 2008: 23
September 2008: 25
October 2008: 17
November 2008: 15

U.S. Troops Wounded November 2007-November 2008:
November 2007: 203
December 2007: 213
January 2008: 234
February 2008: 216
March 2008: 327
April 2008: 331
May 2008: 197
June 2008: 143
July 2008: 150
August 2008: 107
September 2008: 91
October 2008: 82
November 2008: 84

U.S. Military Casualties From 3/19/03 to 11/1/08:
Total Deaths: 4,182

• Men: 4,081
• Women: 101

Age:

• Younger than 22: 1,226
• 22-24: 1,020
• 25-30: 1,061
• 31-35: 408
• Older than 35: 467

Component:

• Active Duty: 3,410
• Reserve: 305
• National Guard: 467

Service:

• Army: 3,035
• Marines: 1,003
• Navy: 95
• Air Force: 48
• Coast Guard: 1

Race/Ethnicity:

• American Indian: 42
• Multi-race/Unknown: 45
• Pacific Islander: 48
• Asian: 79
• Black: 339
• Latino: 446
• White: 3,124

U.S. Deaths by IED’s December 2007-November 2008:
December 2007: 9
January 2008: 23
February 2008: 17
March 2008: 26
April 2008: 26
April 2008: 29
May 2008: 12
June 2007: 14
July 2008: 3
August 2008: 7
September 2008: 4
October 2008: 2
November 2008: 2

U.S. Troop Deployment:
Total since 2003: 513,000
Deployed more than once: 197,000+
Deployed three or more times: 53,000

Percentage of Non-Commissioned Officers suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder:
First deployment: 12%
Second deployment: 18.5%
Third of fourth deployment: 27%

Percentage of U.S. Active Duty Military Who Have Served in Iraq or Afghanistan:
57%

Insurgent Activity

As the casualty numbers reveal, violence is down across Iraq since the Surge. There are still pockets of instability however. Baghdad remains the most violent province of Iraq. Insurgent attacks have gone largely unchanged in Salahaddin, while they have increased in Ninewa. Diyala, the other unstable governorates has seen a 66% decline in insurgent activity compared to the average number of attacks from 2005-2008. In comparison, Kurdistan and much of the south are relatively peaceful.

Number of Daily Insurgent Attacks By Province: December 2007-May 2008 Compared to 2005-2008 Average
Baghdad: Dec. 07-Feb. 08: 15.7, Feb.-May 08: 24.0, Avg. Attacks from Feb. 05-May 08: 32.8
Ninewa: Dec. 07-Feb.08: 16.3, Feb.-May 08: 13.7, Avg. Attacks from Feb. 05-May 08: 11.9
Salahaddin: Dec. 07-Feb. 08: 8.8, Feb.-May 08: 6.2, Avg. Attacks from Feb. 05-May 08: 6.2
Diyala: Dec. 07-Feb. 08: 5.2, Feb.-May 08: 3.8, Avg. Attacks from Feb. 05-May 08: 12.1
Anbar: Dec. 07-Feb. 08: 2.4, Feb.-May 08: 2.0, Avg. Attacks from Feb. 05-May 08: 19.2
Tamim: Dec. 07-Feb. 08: 2.7, Feb.-May 08: 1.9, Avg. Attacks from Feb. 05-May 08: 4.5
Basra: Dec. 07-Feb. 08: 1.6, Feb.-May 08: 1.5, Avg. Attacks from Feb. 05-May 08: 3.9
Babil: Dec. 07-Feb. 08: 0.7, Feb.-May 08: 0.8, Avg. Attacks from Feb. 05-May 08: 2.0
Wasit: Dec. 07-Feb. 08: 0.3, Feb.-May 08: 0.5, Avg. Attacks from Feb. 05-May 08: 0.7
Dhi Qar: Dec. 07-Feb. 08: 0.3, Feb.-May 08: 0.3, Avg. Attacks from Feb. 05-May 08: 0.5
Qadisiyah: Dec. 07-Feb. 08: 0.2, Feb.-May 08: 0.2, Avg. Attacks from Feb. 05-May 08: 0.9
Karbala: Dec. 07-Feb. 08: 0.1, Feb.-May 08: 0.1, Avg. Attacks from Feb. 05-May 08: 0.2
Maysan: Dec. 07-Feb. 08: 0.1, Feb.-May 08: 0.0, Avg. Attacks from Feb. 05-May 08: 0.4
Muthanna: Dec. 07-Feb. 08: 0.1, Feb.-May 08: 0.0, Avg. Attacks from Feb. 05-May 08: 0.2
Najaf: Dec. 07-Feb. 08: 0.0, Feb.-May 08: 0.0, Avg. Attacks from Feb. 05-May 08: 0.1
Irbil: Dec. 07-Feb. 08: 0.1, Feb.-May 08: 0.0, Avg. Attacks from Feb. 05-May 08: 0.1
Sulaymaniyah: Dec. 07-Feb. 08: 0.1, Feb.-May 08: 0.0, Avg. Attacks from Feb. 05-May 08: 0.1
Dohuk: Dec. 07-Feb. 08: 0.0, Feb.-May 08: 0.0, Avg. Attacks from Feb. 05-May 08: 0.1
TOTAL: Dec. 07-Feb. 08: 54.7, Feb.-May 08: 55.0, Avg. Attacks from Feb. 05-May 08: 106.4

Iraqi Forces

Iraqi forces continue to grow. In January 2004 there were just over 108,000 police, soldiers, and border guards. By November 2008 there were over 550,000. There are plans for even more expansion with new equipment purchases and recruiting.

Iraqi Force Growth Totals (Police, National Guard – Ended in January 2005, Iraqi Armed Forces, Border Patrol):
May 2003: 7,000-9,000
January 2004: 108,800
January 2005: 125,373
January 2006: 227,300
January 2007: 323,000
June 2007: 353,100
December 2007: 439,678
January 2008: 441,779
June 2008: 478,524
November 2008: 558,279

Political Freedoms

There were three rankings of Iraq’s political system in the Iraq Index. Brookings rated Iraq quite high on political freedom compared to other countries in the Middle East. Based upon elections, fairness, the right to organize, power of politicians, existence of an opposition, transparency, minority participation, corruption, freedom of assembly, press and religion, independence of judiciary, rule of law, and property rights, Iraq was ranked fourth out of 20 with a score of 5.05. Israel was ranked the most free at 8.2 with Libya the least at 2.05. Reporters Without Borders and Transparency International however ranked Iraq near the bottom in the world in terms of press freedom and corruption. In 2008 Iraq was 158 out of 173 countries in media freedom, while 178 out of 180 nations in corruption.

Index of Political Freedom:
Note: Each country was scored on a 10-point system with 1 the lowest and 10 the highest.
Israel: 8.20
Lebanon: 6.55
Morocco: 5.20
Iraq: 5.05
Palestine: 5.05
Kuwait: 4.90
Tunisia: 4.60
Jordan: 4.45
Qatar: 4.45
Egypt: 4.30
Sudan: 4.30
Yemen: 4.30
Algeria: 4.15
Oman: 4.00
Bahrain: 3.85
Iran: 3.85
United Arab Emirates: 3.70
Saudi Arabia: 2.80
Syria: 2.80
Libya: 20.05

Iraq’s Rank In Reporters Without Borders’ Annual Press Freedom Index:
2003: Rank Tied for 124 out of 166 countries
2004: 148 out of 167 countries
2005: 157 out of 167 countries
2006: 154 out of 168 countries
2007: 157 out of 169 countries
2008: 158 out of 173 countries

Iraq’s Rank In Transparency International’s Corruption Index:
2003: Tied for 113 out of 133 countries
2004: Tied for 129 out of 146 countries
2005: Tied for 137 out of 159 countries
2006: Tied for 160 out of 163 countries
2007: 178 out of 180

Iraq’s Political System

In 2005 Iraq held two elections for government. The first was for provincial councils, and the second for parliament. The elections were known for their sectarianism, as the major Shiite, Kurdish, and Sunni coalitions won the majority of seats. The secular Iraqi National List was the only other group to win a large number of seats. No group won an outright majority however so the cabinet positions were divided up between the major parties, along with a few independents and smaller parties.

Seats In Parliament By Party:
United Iraqi Alliance: 83
Kurdish Alliance: 53
Iraqi Accordance Front: 44
Sadrist Movement: 30
Iraqi National List: 25
Fadhila Party: 15
Iraqi National Dialogue Front: 11
Islamic Union of Kurdistan: 5
Liberation and Reconciliation Bloc: 3
Message Carries: 3
Mothal Alousi List for the Iraqi Nation: 1
Iraqi Turkoman Front: 1
Yazidi Movement for Progress and Reform: 1
Al Rafadeen List: 1

Iraqi Leadership:

• Prime Minister: Nouri al-Maliki, Shiite, Dawa
• Deputy Prime Minister: Barham Salih, Kurd, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
• Deputy Prime Minister: Rafie al-Issawi, Sunni, Iraqi People’s Conference, member of Iraqi Accordance Front
• President: Jalal Talabani, Kurd, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
• Vice President: Tarqi al-Heshemi, Sunni, Iraqi Islamic Party, part of Iraqi Accordance Front
• Vice President: Adel Abd al-Mahdi, Shiite, Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council

Iraqi Cabinet:

• Trade Minister: Abd al-Falah al-Sudani, Shiite, Dawa
• Education Minister: Khudayr al-Khuzai, Shiite, Dawa
• National Security Minister: Shirwan al-Waili, Shiite, Dawa
• Muncipalities & Public Works Minister: Riyadh Gharib, Shiite, Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council
• Finance & Banking Minister: Bayan Jabr, Shiite, Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council
• National Dialogue Minister: Akram al-Hakim, Shiite, Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council
• Tourism & Antiquities Minister: Qahtan Abbas Numan al-Jiburi, Shiite, United Iraqi Alliance, appointed 7/18/08
• Provincial Affairs Minister: Safa al-Safi, Shiite, United Iraqi Alliance, appointed7/18/08
• Transportation Minister: Amir Abd al-Jabar Ismail, Shiite, United Iraqi Alliance, appointed 7/18/08
• Civil Society Minister: Thamir Jaraf al-Zubaydi, Shiite, United Iraqi Alliance, appointed 7/18/08
• Minister of State Without Portfolio: Hasan Radhi Kazim al-Sari, Shiite, Hezbollah Movement in Iraq, close to Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council
• Science & Technology Minister: Raid Fahmi Jahid, Shiite, Iraqi Communist Party
• Oil Minister: Hussain al-Shahristani, Shiite, Independent
• Agriculture Minister: Ali al-Bahadii, Shiite, Independent
• Minister of Parliamentary Affairs, Safa al-Din Muhammad al-Safi, Shiite, Independent
• Labor & Social Affairs Minister: Mahmud Muhammad Jawad al-Radi, Shiite, Independent
• Interior Minister: Jawad al-Bolani, Shiite, Independent
• Electricity Minister: Karim Wahid al-hasan, Shiite, Independent
• Water Minister: Latif Rashid, Kurd, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
• Environment Minister: Nermin Othman, Kurd, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
• Housing & Construction Minister: Bayan Dizayee, Kurd, Kurdistan Democratic Party
• Industry & Minerals Minister: Fawzi al-Hariri, Christian Kurd, Kurdistan Democratic Party
• Foreign Affairs: Hoshyar Mahmud Zebari, Kurd, Kurdistan Democratic Party
• Displacement & Migraiton Minister: Abd al-Samad Sultan, Kurd, Faili Kurd
• Human Rights Minister: Wijdan Mikhail Salim, Christian Kurd, Iraqi National Accord
• Minister of State Without Portfolio: Ali Muhammad Ahmad, Kurd, Kurdistan Islamic Union
• Culture Minister: Mahir Dalli Ibrahim al-Hadithi, Sunni, General Council for the People of Iraq, member of Iraqi Accordance Front, appointed 7/18/08
• Higher Education Minister: Dr. Abd Dhiyab al-Ujayli, Sunni, Iraqi Islamic Party, member of Iraqi Accordance Front, appointed 7/18/08
• Women’s Affairs Minister: Dr. Nawal Majid Hamid al-Samarr, Sunni, Iraqi Islamic Party, member of Iraqi Accordance Front, appointed 7/18/08
• Foreign Affairs Minister: Dr. Muhammad Munajid Ifan al-Dulaymi, Sunni,Iraqi Accordance Front, appointed 7/18/08
• Communications Minister: Faruq Abdul Qadir Abdul Rahman, Sunni, Iraqi Accordance Front
• Planning Minister: Ali Baban, Sunni, Independent
• Defense Minister: Abd al-Qadir Muhammad Jasim, Sunni, Independent
• Minister of State Without Portfolio: Muhammad Abbas al-Uraybi, Shiite, Iraqi National List
• Youth & Sport Minister: Jasim Muhammad Jafar, Shiite, Turkoman Islamic Union
• Justice Minister, empty

Iraq’s Economy

Oil continues to dominate Iraq. The rise in oil prices is largely responsible for the growth of the Iraqi economy. Production however has been spotty since the U.S. invasion, regularly going up and down. In December 2003 Iraq produced 2.3 million barrels a day of crude, and in November 2008 there was little change at 2.39 million barrels. Exports have seen more of a gradual increase, but it is still a minimal one. In December 2003 there were 1.541 million barrels of oil exported, compared to 1.82 million in November 2008. Despite this lack of growth in production, Iraq’s economy has expanded from a -41.4% GDP decline in 2003 because of the invasion to a 7.0% GDP growth in 2008, largely funded by petroleum, and a massive influx of foreign assistance. Because of the improved security, Iraq is also finally attracting investment from other countries as well. Trade with neighboring states, especially Iran is also increasing. Not mentioned in the report however, is the fact that most of these products undermine Iraqi companies.

Iraqi Oil Production (Millions of Barrels/Day):
Estimated pre-war level 2.5
May 03: 0.3
December 03: 2.3
January 04: 2.44
June 04: 2.295
December 04: 2.16
January 05: 2.1
June 05: 2.17
December 05: 1.92
January 06: 1.73
June 06: 2.3
December 06: 2.15
January 07: 1.66
June 07: 2.0
December 07: 2.42
January 08: 2.24
February 08: 2.39
March 08: 2.38
April 08: 2.40
May 08: 2.50
June 08: 2.52
July 08: 2.54
August 08: 2.50
September 08: 2.37
October 08: 2.37
November 08: 2.39
Government Goal: 2.1

Oil Exports (Millions of Barrels/Day):
Estimated pre-war level: 1.7-2.5
May 03: 0
December 03: 1.541
January 04: 1.537
June 4: 1.148
December 04: 1.520
January 05: 1.367
June 05: 1.377
December 05: 1.071
January 06: 1.05
June 06: 1.67
December 06: 1.45
January 07: 1.30
June 07: 1.47
December 07: 1.93
January 08: 1.93
February 08: 1.93
March 08: 1.88
April 08: 1.96
May 08: 1.96
June 08: 1.96
July 08: 1.85
August 08: 1.70
September 08: 1.65
October 08: 1.69
November 08: 1.82

Oil Revenue From Exports ($ billions)
June 03: $0.2
December 03: $1.26
January 04: $1.26
June 04: $1.28
December 04: $1.44
January 05: $1.49
June 05: $2.03
December 05: $1.6
January 06: $1.84
June 06: $3.03
December 06: $2.46
January 07: $1.89
June 07: $2.87
December 07: $4.27
January 08: $5.21
February 08: $4.94
March 08: $5.94
April 08: $5.77
May 08: $6.65
June 08: $6.99
July 08: $7.01
August 08: $5.65
September 08: $4.64
October 08: $3.68
November 08: $1.82

Estimated Amount of Foreign Direct Investment Attracted Per Month in Iraq
2004: $10 million
2005: $10 million
2006: $10 million
2007: $10 million
2008: $100 million

Annual Tariff Collected At Iraq’s Zurbatiyah Border Crossing In Wasit With Iran
2006: $800,000
2007: $1,800,000
2008: $6,900,000

GDP Estimates and Projections 2002-2008
2002: GDP $20.5 bil, Per capita GDP $802, Real GDP Change: -7.8%
2003: GDP $13.6 bil, Per capita GDP $518, Real GDP Change: -41.4%
2004: GDP $25.7 bil, Per capita GDP $949, Real GDP Change: +46.5%
2005: GDP 34.5 bil, Per capita GDP $1,237, Real GDP Change: +3.7%
2006: GDP $48.5 bil, Per Capita GDP $1,687, Real GDP Change: +5.9%
2007: GDP $55.4 bil, Real GDP Change: +4.1%
2008: GDP $60.9 bil, Real GDP Change: +7.0%

U.S. Spending In Iraq

The United States has been the largest benefactor of Iraq since the U.S. invasion as one would expect. America has appropriated $20.8 billion for Iraqi reconstruction and security, with $20.2 billion of it obligated. That development project is coming to an end however as Iraq is expected to take on most of this responsibility next year. As the war has dragged on, the medical costs for the returning troops are also increasing with the VA medical bill reaching $1 billion in 2008 for Iraq war veterans. Including military expenditures, the U.S. will have spent $653.9 billion by the end of fiscal year 2009 on the war.

What’s interesting about the figures is that the U.S. has been unable to spend a vast majority of its money in Iraq’s provinces, something that Baghdad is regularly criticized for. In 2007 for example, America failed to spend 50% of its capital budget for projects in thirteen of Iraq’s eighteen provinces. From January to July 2008 things didn’t seem to have improved with the U.S. spending less than 10% of its money in nine governorates.

U.S. Aid For Iraq As Of November 2008:
Appropriated: $20.8 billion
Obligated: $20.2 billion
Disbursed: $19.4 billion

U.S. Money Appropriated for Operation Iraqi Freedom:

• FY 2003: DOD $50.0 bil, Foreign Aid and Diplomatic Corps $3.0 bil, Total: $35.0 bil
• FY 2004: DOD $56.4 bil, Foreign Aid and Diplomatic Corps $19.5 bil, Total: $75.9 bil
• FY 2005: DOD $83.4 bil, Foreign Aid and Diplomatic Corps $2.0 bil, VA Medical 200 mil, Total: $85.5 bil
• FY 2006: DOD $98.1 bil, Foreign Aid and Diplomatic Corps $3.2 bil, VA Medical 400 mil, Total: 102.0 bil
• FY 2007: DOD $129.6 bil, Foreign Aid and Diplomatic Corps $3.2 bil, VA Medical 900 mil, Total: $133.6 bil
• FY 2008: DOD $145.4 bil, Foreign Aid and Diplomatic Corps $2.8 bil, VA Medical 1 bil, Total: $149.2 bil
• FY 2009: DOD $53.4 bil, Foreign Aid and Diplomatic Corps $800 mil, VA Medical $0, Total: $54.2 bil

• Total FY 2003-2009: $653.3 bil

U.S. Capital Budget Expended By Province – 2007:
Diyala: $110 mil allocated, N/A expanded, N/A% expended
Anbar: $107 mil allocated, $4 mil expended, 4% expended
Muthanna: $52 mil allocated, $10 mil expended, 19% expended
Basra: $195 mil allocated, $41 mil expended, 21% expended
Ninewa: $226 mil allocated, $59 mil expended, 26% expended
Baghdad: $560 mil allocated, $174 mil expended, 31% expended
Salahaddin: $93 mil allocated, $32 mil expended, 34% expended
Tamim: $91 mil allocated, $31 mil expended, 34% expended
Qadisiyah: $64 mil allocated, $25 mil expended, 39% expended
Dhi Qar: $138 mil allocated, $55 mil expended, 40% expended
Karbala: $71 mil allocated, $29 mil expended, 41% expended
Wasit: $83 mil allocated, $34 mil expended, 41% expended
Babil: $127 mil allocated, $62 mil expended, 49% expended
Maysan: $76 mil allocated, $39 mil expended, 51% expended
Najaf: $88 mil allocated, $56 mil expended, 64% expended
Kurdistan (Dohuk, Irbil, Sulaymaniyah): $1,560 mil allocated, $1,487 mil expended, 95% expended

U.S. Capital Budget Expended By Province – January-July 2008:
Anbar: $192 mil allocated, N/A expended, N/A% expended
Diyala: $168 mil allocated, N/A expended, N/A% expended
Muthanna: $87 mil allocated, N/A expended, N/A% expended
Basra: $322 mil allocated, 0% expended, 0% expended
Ninewa: $359 mil allocated, 0% expended, 0% expended
Qadisiyah: $137 mil allocated, $0 expended, 0% expended
Dhi Qar: $219 mil allocated, 100,000 expended, 0.1% expended
Wasit: $137 mil allocated, 300,000 expended, 0.2% expended
Baghdad: $885 mil allocated, $15 mil expended, 2% expended
Babil: $206 mil allocated, $5 mil expended, 3% expended
Karbala: $170 mil allocated, $7 mil expended, 4% expended
Tamim: $146 mil allocated, $14 mil expended, 9% expended
Kurdistan (Douk, Irbil, Sulaymaniyah): $2,528 mil allocated, $266 mil expended, 11% expended
Salahaddin: $150 mil allocated, $16 mil expended, 11% expended
Najaf: $150 mil allocated, $19 mil expended, 13% expended
Maysan: $124 mil allocated, $17 mil expended, 14% expended

Judicial System

Like the rest of Iraq, the country’s judicial system had to start from scratch after the U.S. invasion. The Americans have been working on building up capacity, but it has been a slow and arduous process. The result is that Iraq still doesn’t have a functioning investigative or court system. The problem is with the huge amount of suspected insurgents arrested in the previous years that have completely overwhelmed the system. Violence is still directed at judges and lawyers as well. Corruption is also an issue with some. The number of judges is one indicator of progress. While the number has steadily increased, it is still not enough to deal with the caseload in the country.

Number of Trained Iraqi Judges:
May 2003: 0
June 2004: 175
May 2005: 351
October 2005: 351
August 2006: 740
November 2006: 800
January 2007: 870
August 2007: 1,100
November 2007: 1,200
March 2008: 1,200
June 2008: 1,180
40 judges have been assassinated since 2005
135 judges have been removed for corruption of because of the deBaathification process

Professional Brain Drain

There has been a massive brain drain since 2003. Many of the country’s professionals have fled the country. Even with violence subsiding since the Surge, few have come back. The Iraq Index provides numbers on Iraq’s doctors as an example of this debilitating loss of the country’s human capital.

Doctors In Iraq
Doctors before 2003 Invasion: 34,000
Doctors who have left since 2003: 20,000 estimate
Doctors murdered since 2003 invasion: 2,000
Doctors kidnapped: 250
Avg. salary of Iraqi doctor: 7.5 million dinars per year (around $5,100)
Annual graduates from Iraqi medical schools: 2,250
% of medical graduates that will work outside of Iraq: 20%

SOURCES:

O’Hanlon, Michael and Campbell, Jason, “Iraq Index,” Brookings Institution, 11/20/08

Iraq Cuts Budget

Iraq’s High Economic Committee met on December 16 and cut Iraq’s 2009 budget in the face of sinking oil prices. The committee consists of the ministers of Finance, Oil, Planning, Electricity, Industry, and Trade, along with advisors to Maliki, and experts from the ministries. The new budget is for $58 billion. That is $12 billion less than the 2008 budget. The government is planning on cutting spending for the provinces, reconstruction, ministries, and perhaps the food ration system as a result. More reductions could happen in the future.

Iraq’s new budget cuts billions of dollars from the original estimates. When Iraq’s 2009 budget was first announced it was $78.8 billion, and based upon an $80 a barrel oil price. Petroleum accounted for 94% of the government’s expected 2009 revenue according to the Finance Ministry. At the time this was a conservative estimate as oil prices peaked at $147 a barrel in July, but they quickly plummeted with the growing economic crisis. In mid-December crude prices stand at around $45. In November, Iraq’s cabinet made their first revision to the budget, reducing it to $67 billion, based upon a $62 a barrel price. The newest budget cuts another $9 billion, and is based upon $50 a barrel. The budget may be adjusted again before it is sent to parliament for final approve if oil continues to drop in value.

In order to achieve these cuts Iraq will face a series of austerity measures. First, the government promised pay increases for all government workers and the security forces. This is now off. Instead, the ministries will be asked to reduce their operational budgets, the only money they have proven to be able to spend, while the provinces’ spending will be trimmed by about 50%. The country’s $5 billion food ration system may also be reduced. There are also plans to slow the pace of reconstruction projects. Even after these moves, Iraq is still likely to run a deficit. It may even be forced to ask for international aid to make up for the difference.

These budget cuts are only the most recent problems to face Iraq’s economy. There is no real tax system and tariffs are low to non-existent. To add to the difficulties, an oil expert estimated that exports could drop 13% in 2009 because of deteriorating infrastructure. That’s why it’s likely that Iraq’s budget will face deficits and more cuts in the coming years until oil prices stabilize, and the recession ends. Iraq’s public will feel the effects as the government still dominates the economy. Reconstruction might come to a stand still as Iraq is now almost completely responsible for it. Iraq will probably take years to recover, when it still hasn’t even gotten over the decade of sanctions, the destruction from the U.S. invasion, and the mismanagement of the Americans.

SOURCES

Abedzair, Kareem, “Oil price drop forces government to tighten belt,” Azzaman, 12/14/08

Associated Press, “Iraq plans to cut 2009 budget by $13 billion,” 10/31/08

Aswat al-Iraq, “No decrease in salaries because of oil prices – planning minister” 12/19/08

Karouny, Mariam, “Iraq reviews 2009 budget due to falling oil price,” Reuters, 10/23/08

Mawloodi, Aiyob, “Iraq may ask for foreign economic assistance,” Kurdish Globe, 12/19/08

Michaels, Jim, “Declining oil prices threaten Iraqi stability,” USA Today, 12/16/08

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/08

Swartz, Spencer, “Iraqi Oil Exports Could Fall Amid Maintenance Problems,” Wall Street Journal, 12/2/08

United States Government Accountability Office, “Iraqi Revenues, Expenditures, and Surplus,” August 2008

Iraqi Al-Amal Association and Baghdad University’s Public Opinion Poll On Poverty In Iraq

The University of Baghdad and the Iraqi Al-Amal Association recently released a public opinion poll they conducted on poverty in Iraq. Khalid Kahntoush Sachet of the College of Arts oversaw the study. It surveyed 11,198 families from ten provinces. The survey found that there were a large number of female-headed households due to wives losing their husbands because of violence. Iraqi families also had large numbers of children. Together these increased the poverty level in the country, as women can’t provide as much as men, and the size of Iraqi families have increased while the economy has not. Almost two-thirds of the families interviewed were found to be below the international poverty line, and few receive any help. They still believed in the government however, and most wanted to participate in the upcoming elections.

Families

The first questions were about the state of the families. 59.4% were headed by males, while 39.9% were headed by women. Most Middle Eastern families have male heads of households, so this was a very high percentage led by women. The cause is the violence that has wracked the country. Of those women leaders, 65.6% were widowed. The number of people in each family was also large, usually between 6-10, 49.3%, followed by 1-5, 43%. This increased poverty, as the economy has not as grown as fast as the size of families, leading to unemployment. 65.9% of families earned 250,000 dinars or less. That equaled roughly $420 a year for each family member, below the $500 international poverty level. 60.5% of those interviewed were displaced. Of those, 87.1% said they wanted to return to their homes if security improved.

Aid and Needs

The majority of families were in need of basic services, but received little aid official or otherwise. In terms of the government, only 31.5% of those surveyed received aid from any ministries or local governments. The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, which is responsible for the poor, only helped 12.9%. The Ministry of Displacement and Migration only helped 9.3%. Local councils assisted 6.5%. 68.5% received no government assistance at all. Non-government organizations (NGOs) did much better, aiding 50.8%. That still left a large percentage of the population sample without any help. Despite this, 74.3% believed that the government could assist them in some way.

The basic needs of the families broke down into three groups, which the study called security – electricity 22.3%, water 20.3%, and housing/shelter 10.1%, employment – food 9.3%, jobs 9.3%, money 9.2%, and services – fuel 8.9%, health care 7.8%, and schools 2.4%.

Provincial Elections

58.1% of respondents said they wanted to vote in the upcoming elections, with 23% were undecided, and 18.9% said they would not participate. When asked what kind of party they would vote for independents came in first, 26.3%, followed by democratic-secular groups 23.7%, and religious parties 22.7%. Tribal figures 7.3% and national blocs 6.3% came in last. When broken down by province, the democratic-secular parties fared the best, coming in first in Baghdad, Diyala, and Sulaymaniya, and second in Salahaddin, Anbar, Najaf, and Qadisiyah. Independents came in first in Basra, and second in Baghdad, Tamim, and Diyala, while the religious parties came in first in Qadisiyah, Salahaddin, and Najaf, and second in Babil. Basra had the most telling responses. The Shiite Fadhila party currently runs the province, but 70.2% said they would vote for independent figures instead. When unidentified was added to that the number came to 90.3% who did not support the current ruling parties. Tribal figures were also only popular in Anbar due to the Awakening. As discussed before, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is currently forming Tribal Support Councils across much of the country. According to this poll, that may not help him much as they registered less than 10% or less in every province outside of Anbar.

For more on Iraqi public opinion see:

Iraq Center for Research & Strategic Studies’ Survey Of Iraqis

Pentagon Public Opinion Poll of Iraqis

Here are the results of the poll.

The survey questioned 11,198 families from 10 provinces

Origins
Anbar: 801 families – 7.1%
Babil: 981 families – 8.8%
Baghdad: 2729 families – 24.4%
Basra: 2000 families – 17.9%
Diyala: 810 families – 7.2%
Najaf: 900 families – 8%
Qadisiyah: 800 families – 7.1%
Salahaddin: 1140 families – 10.2%
Sulaymaniya: 800 families – 7.1%
Tamim: 237 families – 2.1%

Head of Household
Male: 6654 – 59.4%
Female: 4463 – 39.9%
Unidentified: 81 – 0.7%

Marital Status of Female Headed Households
Single: 336 – 7.5%
Unidentified: 518 – 11.6%
Divorced: 683 – 15.3%
Widowed: 2926 – 65.6%

Number of Family Members
Unidentified: 51 – 0.5%
More than 21: 12 – 0.1%
16-20 Members: 48 – 0.4%
11-15 Members: 749 – 6.7%
6-10 Members: 5524 – 49.3%
1-5 Members: 4814 – 43%

Monthly Family Income
Unidentified: 1289 – 11.5%
More than 500,000 dinars: 316 – 2.8%
351,000-500,000 dinars: 680 – 6.1%
250,000-350,000 dinars: 1530 – 13.7%
Less than 250,000 dinars: 7383 – 65.9%

International Poverty line is $500 a year per family member
Iraq averages to $420 a year per family member

Official Aid
Ministry of Endowment: 311 – 2.8%
City Council: 725 – 6.5%
Ministry of Displacement and Migration: 1045 – 9.3%
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs: 1447 – 12.9%
No Aid: 7670 – 68.5%

Non-Official Aid
Religious Organization: 1374 – 12.3%
Red Cross/Red Crescent: 1972 – 17.6%
International Non-Government Organization: 2337 – 20.9%
No Aid: 5515 – 49.2%

Would Displaced Families Return To Their Homes If Security Improved
Yes: 5905 – 87.1%
No: 876 – 12.9%

Basic Needs of Family
Others: 34 – 0.1%
Schooling: 773 – 2.4%
Health Care: 2551 – 7.8%
Fuel: 2902 – 8.9%
Money: 3000 – 9.2%
Jobs: 3029 – 9.3%
Food: 3121 – 9.6%
Housing/Shelter: 3256 – 10.1%
Water: 6626 – 20.3%
Electricity: 7286 – 22.3%

Can The Government Meet Their Needs Or Not
Unidentified: 461 – 4.1%
Unable: 2419 – 21.6%
To An Extent: 4142 – 37%
Able: 4176 – 37.3%

Desire To Vote In Upcoming Elections
Won’t vote: 2115 – 18.9%
Undecided: 2577 – 23%
Will vote: 6506 – 58.1%

What Kind of Parties Will They Vote For
National blocs: 706 – 6.3%
Tribal Figures: 822 – 7.3%
Unidentified: 1138 – 12.4%
Religious Parties: 2545 – 22.7%
Democratic-Secular blocs: 2639 – 23.7%
Independent Figures: 2947 – 26.3%

What Kind Of Parties Will They Vote For By Province
Anbar:

• Unidentified: 2 – 0.2%
• Religious Parties: 52 – 6.5%
• National blocs: 4 – 0.5%
• Democratic-Secular blocs: 273 – 34.7%
• Independent Figures: 79 – 9.9%
• Tribal Figures: 391 – 48.8%

Babil:

• Unidentified: 551 – 56.2%
• Religious Parties: 182 – 18.6%
• National blocs: 8 – 0.8%
• Democratic-Secular blocs: 111 – 11.3%
• Independent Figures: 114 – 11.6%
• Tribal Figures: 15 – 1.5%

Baghdad:

• Unidentified: 427 – 15.6%
• Religious Parties: 579 – 21.2%
• National blocs: 106 – 3.9%
• Democratic-Secular blocs: 828 – 30.3%
• Independent Figures: 656 – 24.0%
• Tribal Figures: 133 – 4.9%

Basra:

• Unidentified: 401 – 20.1%
• Religious Parties: 72 – 3.6%
• National blocs: 2 – 0.1%
• Democratic-Secular blocs: 73 – 3.7%
• Independent Figures: 1404 – 70.2%
• Tribal Figures: 48 – 2.4%

Diyala:

• Unidentified: 42 – 5.2%
• Religious Parties: 149 – 18.4%
• National blocs: 47 – 5.7%
• Democratic-Secular blocs: 270 – 33.3%
• Independent Figures: 262 – 32.3%
• Tribal Figures: 41 – 5.1%

Najaf:

• Unidentified: 9 – 1.0%
• Religious Parties: 388 – 43.1%
• National blocs: 56 – 6.2%
• Democratic-Secular blocs: 234 – 26.0%
• Independent Figures: 120 – 13.3%
• Tribal Figures: 93 – 10.3%

Qadisiyah:

• Unidentified: 8 – 1.0%
• Religious Parties: 461 – 57.6%
• National blocs: 39 – 4.9%
• Democratic-Secular blocs: 144 – 18.0%
• Independent Figures: 128 – 16.0%
• Tribal Figures: 20 – 2.5%

Salahaddin:

• Unidentified: 16 – 1.4%
• Religious Parties: 487 – 42.7%
• National blocs: 135 – 11.8%
• Democratic-Secular blocs: 388 – 34.0%
• Independent Figures: 69 – 6.1%
• Tribal Figures: 45 – 3.9%

Sulaymaniya:

• Unidentified: 63 – 8.4%
• Religious Parties: 159 – 19.9%
• National blocs: 195 – 24.4%
• Democratic-Secular blocs: 307 – 38.4%
• Independent Figures: 55 – 6.9%
• Tribal Figures: 21 – 2.6%

Tamim:

• Unidentified: 20 – 8.4%
• Religious Parties: 16 – 6.8%
• National blocs: 115 – 48.5%
• Democratic-Secular blocs: 11 – 4.6%
• Independent Figures: 60 – 25.3%
• Tribal Figures: 15 – 6.3%

What Should the United Nations Do In Iraq
Unidentified: 926 – 8.2%
Humanitarian Aid: 2530 – 22.6%
Supervise Elections: 2316 – 20.7%
Maintain Security: 5426 – 48.5%

SOURCES

Sachet, Khalid Hantoush, “Results of the Field Survey For Needs and Opinions of The Poor in Iraq,” Iraqi Al Amal Association and University of Baghdad, September 2008

Will Baghdad Pay For The Sons Of Iraq?

November 1, is an important litmus test for Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. It is the day that the government is suppose to start paying the 54,000 Sons of Iraq (SOI) in the Baghdad area. On September 8, Maliki officially declared that the government would take responsibility for the Baghdad SOI and integrate them. The government promised that those that were literate, had an education, passed a medical test, and had no criminal record could join the security forces. The rest are suppose to get government jobs. At the same time, the government said that the U.S.’s numbers on the SOI were too high, and they demanded an audit to confirm their identities before they would pay them. An Iraqi Army general also said that the process was meant to ferret out any insurgents from infiltrating the security forces. Charges that the SOI are full of unrepentant militants has been a common one from the government. Comments such as these, plus the government’s crackdown on the SOI in Diyala and other areas, has caused widespread fear and apprehensions amongst the SOI. Many are afraid that Baghdad will arrest them, and disband the rest.

To try to protect against these possibilities, the U.S. has made a number of contingency plans. First, the U.S. has set aside 90 days worth of pay in case the government can’t or won’t provide salaries on November 1. Second, they have gotten promises form the government that they cannot arrest any Baghdad SOI for warrants that were issued in the last six months. Third, the U.S. has also set up a mini-grant program to try to get some of the SOI to retire or take up a new profession. Last, Americans will act as mediators in case of any confrontations. Still, there are many American officers that share the same suspicions as the SOI that they have worked with that the government is not committed to this program.

Even if Maliki follows through with his promises, there is not much of a future for the SOI. The government said that they would integrate 20% of the SOI. Some SOI leaders have asked for a larger percentage, but Baghdad has refused. Those that do get jobs in the security forces will get the lowest ranks. The remaining 80% are suppose to get government jobs that may not exist. This could lead some to turn back to violence. That would be a hard fight as all of them have had their biometric information recorded by the U.S., and are well known by U.S. troops. To be effective they would have to move to rural areas away from the security forces, or leave their provinces to places they are not known. Otherwise most of them will end up dead. If the government doesn’t follow through with the policy, a much more likely outcome is that many of these men will end up unemployed.

SOURCES
Alsumaria, “New procedures to enroll Awakening members,” 9/12/08
Farrell, Stephen, Rubin, Alissa, Dagher, Sam and Goode, Erica, “As Fears Ease, Baghdad Sees Walls Tumble,” New York Times, 10/10/08
Londono, Ernesto, “For U.S. and Sunni Allies, a Turning Point,” Washington Post, 9/30/08
Rasheed, Saif and Susman, Tina, “Iraq, U.S.-funded militia at loggerheads,” Los Angeles Times, 9/12/08
Sands, Phil, “Payday vital for stability in ‘triangle of death,’” The National, 10/30/08

Maliki Responds To His Critics On Tribal Support Councils

Prime Minister Maliki has created tribal Support Councils in 4. Wasit, 5. Maysan, 6. Basra, 7. Dhi Qar, 10. Babil, 11. Karbala

The following commentary originall appeared in Musings On Iraq

As reported earlier, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has been creating tribal Support Councils across most of Southern Iraq. Currently there are councils in Basra, Maysan, Babil, Dhi Qar, Wasit, and Karbala. They were originally formed to counter the Sadrists and the Mahdi Army militia, but as they spread to more secure areas in the summer of 2008, provincial councils, governors, and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) all began to complain about them. All the criticisms were similar. They asked why the central government was organizing tribes and their fighters outside of the boundaries of the local provincial councils. It was apparent that Maliki was both protecting against the return of the Sadrists, as well as building up a base for the upcoming provincial elections.

The criticism however has grown so loud that the Prime Minister has been forced to respond. October 9, Maliki announced that he would disband any tribal Support Council that was working with a political party. This was obviously meant to just mute the complaints, because he also said that the councils were non-partisan and worked for the good of the country. Since Maliki created the councils, and they work for him, he is not likely to end them any time soon. The SIIC, anticipating this, said that they welcomed the Prime Minister’s announcement, but wanted to see some action instead of just words about the councils.

This on-going argument points to the inter-Shiite rivalries that have come to the fore recently. The Dawa and Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council are still part of the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance, and the SIIC is still one of the main supporters of Maliki’s ruling coalition. At the same time, the SIIC controls most of the southern provinces, has a large social and religious organization, plus its own militia, the Badr Brigade, that operates within the Interior Ministry, while Dawa is the smallest of the three major Shiite parties, and has no fighters of its own. Recently Maliki has been using the Iraqi security forces as a political tool, first against the Sadrists, then the insurgents, and most recently against the Kurds in the Khanaqin district of Diyala. It should be no surprise then that he is trying to build up his support while he can for the anticipated 2009 elections. The Support Councils provide him with both sheikhs and their tribesmen for the balloting, and armed men as well, if they are needed in another confrontation, as happened in Basra in March 2008. The SIIC’s response is also expected, as the councils are a direct challenge to the rule of the south. This dispute will probably continue until the day of the election.

SOURCES
Alsumaria, “Al Maliki defends tribal awakening councils,” 10/9/08
- “Rows growing between two major Iraqi parties,” 9/18/08
Cochrane, Marisa, “The Battle for Basra,” Institute for the Study of War, 5/31/08
Parker, Sam, “ISCI/Da’wa alliance showing strain,” Abu Muqawama Blog, 9/17/08
Voices of Iraq, “Government is the only authority and no negotiations with ‘the gangs’ – PM,” 3/28/08
- “Karbala governor says no-confidence vote proposal is political pressure tool,” 10/1/08
- “MP’s decision to cancel partisan support councils welcomed,” 10/9/08
- “PM announces formation of 17 tribal councils in Missan,” 6/23/08
- “Premier to cancel partisan support councils,” 10/9/08
- “Tribal chieftain announces opening 20 Supports Councils offices in Thi-Qar,” 10/1/08
- “Wassit province refuses to establish support councils,” 9/24/08

Carrot and the Stick With Diyala’s Sons of Iraq, Or Just The Sticks?

The following commentary originally appeared in Musings On Iraq

Baghdad is claiming that it is integrating the Sons of Iraq (SOI) in Diyala province. On September 24, 2008 the general in charge of the National Command Center said that the Interior Ministry had hired 2,000 SOI from Diyala into the provincial police force since the beginning of Operation Promise of Good in late July, and was looking for a total of 4,000. The Defense Ministry also said that it wanted to recruit 3,000 as soldiers. Any SOI that had special skills or education were also promised government jobs. In the beginning of August, the Interior said that all the SOI in Diyala were going to be given employment. A few days later, the Prime Minister offered 3,000 police jobs to any SOI that assisted in the security crackdown.

The government’s claims are hard to believe, because as reported earlier, Iraqi forces have had nothing but conflicts with the local SOI. In May 2008 Baghdad issued arrest warrants for several SOI leaders. This was just two days after they had set up a political party to run in the provincial elections, and one day before they could begin forming coalitions. The warrants disqualified them from participating however. When the security operation began there in late July, the security forces also shut down SOI offices in the provincial capitol Baquba and other cities, told them to leave the streets, and arrested at least five leaders and 100 fighters. They have banned all weapons in the province, something that is illegal according to the Constitution, which allows each Iraqi family an AK-47 in their home. The order was obviously meant to give the security forces an excuse to arrest any SOI that was manning their post. The head of the SOI in Baquba, Abu Talib, had an arrest warrant for him. With the help of the U.S. he was not detained after a meeting with the provincial police chief, but he later met with an advisor to Maliki who told him he should hide. That led him to flee to Syria.

The security forces have also gone after the SOI’s allies in the provincial government. The Iraqi Islamic Party’s headquarters in Diyala have been raided three times for example. Some of their leading politicians have also been arrested. Most damning was an August 18 raid on the provincial offices where a special counterterrorism police unit arrested and beat Islamic Party official Hussein al-Zubaidi, the head of the provincial council’s security office. Zubaidi was known as a supporter of the local SOI. The U.S. says that there was no reason for Zubaidi to be arrested or held.

Many SOI in Diyala believe the government is out to disband them, and it is hard not to see where their suspicions come from. During the Surge, U.S. officials and military officers said that the Sons of Iraq were an example of an “Iraqi solution for Iraqi problems.” Ambassador Ryan Crocker said in January 2008 that things had progressed to the point where Iraqis could find solutions to their own problems. When it comes to the government and the SOI, it seems like an Iraqi solution will be the arrest of many of their leaders, the disbandment of many, and then the integration of the truncated leftovers.

SOURCES:
Alsumaria, “Popular committees to join security forces,” 8/4/08
Garcia-Navarro, Lourdes, “Iraq Paramilitary Group Targeted, Despite Success,” Morning Edition, NPR, 9/4/08
- “Sunni Group Says It’s Being Harrassed,” Morning Edition, 9/29/08
Levinson, Charles, “Awakening Councils in hiding as arrests on rise,” USA Today, 9/22/08
Parker, Sam, “Guest Post: Behind the Curtain in Diyala,” Abu Muqawama Blog, 8/20/08
Ricks, Thomas and DeYoung, Karen, “For U.S., The Goal Is Now ‘Iraqi Solution,’” Washington Post, 1/10/08
Russo, Claire, “The Maliki Government Confronts Diyala,” Institute for the Study of War,” 9/23/08
Shachtman, Noah, “Ominous Future for Iraq’s Militias,” Danger Room Blog, Wired, 3/14/08
UPI, “Sons of Iraq join Diyala offensive,” 8/6/08
Voices of Iraq, “MOI hires 2,000 Sahwa fighters in Diala,” 9/24/08

Is Honesty on Iraq as Elusive as The Great Pumpkin?

Today's Washington Post editorial once again challenges Democratic Presidential nominee Barack Obama to update his Iraq position. While EPIC takes no position on candidates running for political office, we have a lot to say about the policy prescriptions (or lack thereof) of both the Republican and Democratic nominees. Where one party seems to be blind to U.S. shortcomings in Iraq and the region, the other seems to be blind to any progress.

What progress you ask?!

Yesterday EPIC Guest Blogger Reidar Visser wrote about the successful passage of a special election law in Iraq, which opens the door for next year’s provincial elections. Today the editors of the Washington Post write:

Iraq's parliament on Wednesday took another major step toward political stabilization. By a unanimous vote, the national legislature approved a plan for local elections in 14 of 18 provinces by early next year -- clearing the way for a new, more representative and more secular wave of politicians to take office. The legislation eliminates the party slate system that allowed religious authorities to dominate Iraq's previous elections, and it provides for women to hold 25 percent of seats. Most important, it will allow Sunni leaders who boycotted the 2005 provincial elections -- and who have since allied themselves with U.S. forces against al-Qaeda in Iraq -- to compete for political power in the provinces that were once the heartland of the insurgency.

While the U.S. media exaggerates Baghdad gridlock and sectarian politics in Iraq, in truth, the real contest for power in Iraq (as put forward by Sam Parker of USIP and other respected Iraq specialists) is between the powers that be (PTB) and the powers that aren’t (PTA). The passage of a special election law not only shows progress in negotiations between the rival factions of the PTB, but the growing political power and influence of the PTA. Unrepresented communities like Iraq’s tribal leaders (both Sunni and Shia), secular Iraqi professionals in Iraq’s urban centers, many Iraqis in rural areas, and minority communities such as Iraq's Chaldean and Assyrian Christians are demanding free and fair elections that give them a competitive chance of winning seats on Provincial Councils and eventually in the National Parliament.

Real representation from the grassroots up trumping sectarian (read: partisan) party lists and political insiders (dominated by former political exiles in the case of Iraq)? That’s change that both Americans and Iraqis can believe in.

At the same time, we’re all looking for more intellectual honesty and less knee-jerk partisan rhetoric. The McCain-Palin camp ought to offer more “straight talk” about U.S. shortcomings in Iraq and the region (especially surrounding the displacement and vulnerability of millions of Iraqis). The Obama-Biden ticket ought to explain how their administration will withdraw U.S. forces in a way that leaves sustainable security and continuing political progress behind, and it's hard to do that without being honest and forthcoming about where U.S. efforts have done some good. The first candidate who breaks out of the partisan framing of the “Iraq issue” will be the first to look truly Presidential in the eyes of thoughtful American voters.

So here’s the hard-to-swallow pill that the Washington Post prescribes to Obama:

...it's now clear that the political progress that the Bush administration hoped would follow the surge of U.S. forces in Iraq has finally begun. How can the next president preserve that momentum? Democrat Barack Obama continues to argue that only the systematic withdrawal of U.S. combat units will force Iraqi leaders to compromise. Yet the empirical evidence of the past year suggests the opposite: that only the greater security produced and guaranteed by American troops allows a political environment in which legislative deals and free elections are feasible.

Indeed, it’s time for both sides to reckon with the realities of Iraq no matter how inconvenient to old partisan narratives. Do that and you’ll be offering change we all can believe in.

EPIC Guest Blogger: Reidar Visser on the Passage of Iraq's Special Elections Law

Reidar Visser is research fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs with a background in history and comparative politics (University of Bergen) and a doctorate in Middle Eastern studies (University of Oxford). He's the author of Basra, the Failed Gulf State: Separatism and Nationalism in Southern Iraq (Lit Verlag, 2006) and co-editor of An Iraq of Its Regions: Cornerstones of a Federal Democracy? (Columbia University Press, 2007). The following commentary was originally posted at www.historiae.org

Iraq’s parliament today approved the remaining article 24 of the provincial elections law that was partially approved on 22 July except for the provisions relating to elections in Kirkuk.

The new article, which has been crafted in cooperation with the United Nations special representative in Iraq, Staffan de Mistura, delays the elections in the disputed Kirkuk province, but also establishes a committee which will deal with power-sharing issues in local government there. The committee will consist of 7 parliamentary representatives from Kirkuk – 2 Kurds, 2 Turkmens, 2 Arabs and 1 Christian – and will have until 31 March 2009 to prepare its report.

The Iraqi parliament will then proceed to create a special elections law for Kirkuk. (Or, if it fails to do so, the prime minister, the president and the speaker of the parliament will decree a suitable system for elections in cooperation with the United Nations!)

The new law is a compromise between federalists (in particular the Kurds) and nationalist centralists (now increasingly referred to as the “forces of 22 July”). Back in May this year, Kurdish politicians spoke in favour of postponing local elections in all disputed areas such as Kirkuk, arguing that their strong position in these areas – based on the heavily-boycotted January 2005 elections – would play to their advantage and could perhaps be a negotiating card towards a rapid settlement of territorial issues. The forces of 22 July, on the other hand, demanded more equitable power-sharing in the interim, thereby seeking to shake up Kurdish dominance in the local council and to challenge what they consider to be a number of pro-Kurdish placemen and figureheads that have been anointed by the Kurds to serve as “Arab” and “Turkmen” representatives in Kirkuk despite having little support in the communities they purport to represent.

The compromise is more than a mere postponement: it keeps Kirkuk and the issue of power sharing on the agenda, even if these issues are now lifted to the abstract realm of a parliamentary committee and with a timeline that stretches well into 2009. Also, it is noteworthy that the forces of 22 July scored at least a symbolic victory by gaining an explicit assurance that the central government would play an equally important role alongside the local authorities in facilitating the work of the parliamentary committee. The language on this disputed “fourth point” of article 24 is what held up the passage of the law for the last week or so, and in a testament to the lingering conflict between centralisers and decentralisers in the Iraqi parliament, both Kurds and ISCI (Jalal al-Din al-Saghir) had criticised the nationalists for insisting on a reference to the central government.

In the end, the role of the central government was confirmed, thus in some ways also confirming the diminishing parliamentary clout of the federalists in Iraq. This has apparently enabled many of the component elements of the 22 July forces – including MPs from Iraqiyya, Fadila and the Sadrists – to feel satisfaction about the passage of the law, as seen in a number of positive statements in the wake of the adoption of the law. Perhaps the more important result of the process – in addition to the fact that provincial elections may now actually be held in late 2008 or early 2009 – is the increased awareness, both inside and outside the Iraqi parliament, of this cross-sectarian bloc and the potential it represents. The big question now is whether the Maliki government is prepared to go ahead with free and fair elections given the increasing signs of a cohesive challenge from the opposition.

Postscript: After having blown hot and cold – mostly cold – with regard to Kurdish participation in the elections, Kurdish leaders according to press reports now say that local elections will not be held anywhere in the Kurdistan region, as the right to legislate on those elections is seen as falling within the domain of the regional government. While the Kurds are the most pro-federal force in Iraq, Kurdistan itself is quite centralised (with two competing centres in Arbil and Sulaymaniyya), with the local governorates having considerably less power vis-à-vis the Kurdistan Regional Government than their counterparts elsewhere in Iraq have towards Baghdad. This stance does throw into question the heavy Kurdish involvement in drafting the law, where they dominated parliamentary debates in long periods with their insistent demands that closed lists be used due to the supposed illiteracy of the Iraqi electorate – no such qualms when it came to the constitution back in 2005, apparently!

Photo caption: An Iraqi policeman stood watch under an election poster in Baghdad on Wednesday. Photo by Mohammed Jalil/European Pressphoto Agency
http://www.nytimes.com/pages/world/middleeast/index.html

Putting Iraq's Budget Surplus into Context

More than 2 million Iraqis have fled the country, while another 2.8 million people are internally displaced. To make matter worse, Iraqis are facing the worst drought in ten years. Millions live in hunger or fear of starvation.

Meanwhile here in the U.S., the lead Iraq story is the Iraqi government's budget surplus. A new GAO report projects that Iraq's cumulative budget surplus could reach as high as $79 billion by year's end. Pundits and politicians are asking: "They have the money so what's the problem?" The problem begins with decades of war, tyranny and sanctions that hampered Iraq's development. Then the U.S. toppled Iraq's government, allowed government ministries to be looted and destroyed, dismissed civil servants with any ties to Saddam's Baath Party, disbanded Iraq's military, created a security vacuum, which led many Iraqi professionals to flee the country.

Last Friday, a New York Times editorial declared: "Iraq now lacks the trained professionals to prepare and execute budgets and to solicit, award and oversee capital projects. The United States must redouble its efforts to help Iraq build this capacity, including bringing back skilled Iraqis who have fled the country."

Yes, Iraq's government can and must do better. But at the same time, as both the GAO report and New York Times point out, the U.S. is NOT off the hook. Until Iraq's government is fully functional, the U.S. has a moral and international obligation to address the unmet humanitarian needs of vulnerable Iraqis, and to work with the international community to provide technical capacity-building assistance to Iraq's government.

On a national, provincial, and municipal level, assistance is needed to build up:

• Institutional Capacities - Policies, strategies and implementing tools are in place to ensure efficient coordination and management of aid.
• Human Capacities - Skilled, trained personnel are in place to implement policies and strategies, and to maintain the government-donor interface.
• Structural / Economic Capacities - Capacity of the recipient country’s economy to absorb additional aid with minimal distortion (“dutch disease”) etc.

Progress in building up Iraq's capacities would not only allow implementing agencies to spend down their budgets, it would have a profound impact on the security, health and welfare of Iraq's 27 million people. For more about Iraq's budget surplus and other ongoing challenges facing Iraqi officials, see Reports: 8/6/2008 below.

Photo caption: A man sows a crop on a dry field on the outskirts of Najaf, 100 miles south of Baghdad, Iraq, Wednesday, July 2, 2008. It's been a year of drought and sand storms across Iraq, a dry spell that has devastated the country's crucial wheat crop and created new worries about the safety of drinking water (AP Photo by Alaa Al-Marjani).

Reports: 8/6/2008

Key reports on the Iraq relief and development:

Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Revenues, Expenditures, and Surplus
Government Accountability Office (GAO)
August 2008
From 2005 through 2007, the Iraqi government generated an estimated $96 billion in cumulative revenues (mostly from oil sales). For 2008, GAO estimates that Iraq could generate as much as $86 billion in total revenues. From 2005 through 2007, the Iraqi government spent an estimated $67 billion on operating and investment activities. The Iraqi government spent only 1% of total expenditures to maintain Iraq- and U.S.-funded investments such as buildings, water and electricity installations. From 2005 through 2007, Iraq was unable to spend all its budgeted funds. In 2007, Iraq spent 80% of its $29 billion operating budget and 28% of its $12 billion investment budget. For 2008, GAO estimates that Iraq could spend as much as $35.9 billion of its $49.9 billion budget. As a result, GAO estimates a cumulative budget surplus of about $29 billion from 2005 to 2007 and projects an additional $38 to $50 billion budget surplus for 2008 (although a proposed $22 billion Iraqi budget supplemental could reduce this projected surplus). U.S. and international officials identify the shortage of trained staff, weak procurement and budgeting systems, violence and sectarian strife, and other factors affecting the Iraqi government’s ability to spend more of its revenues on capital investments.

Failed Responsibility: Iraqi Refugees in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon
International Crisis Group (ICG)
July 2008
Although the security situation in Iraq shows progress, Iraqi refugees remain stranded, jobless and deprived of essential services, while the Iraqi government and the wider international community have failed in their responsibilities and are ill prepared to cope with a new refugee crisis, should it occur. While initially welcoming their Iraqi brethren, ICG reports that Syria and Jordan have put tough restrictions on entry. They provide few basic services and inadequate opportunities for jobs, health care and children's education. If the host countries can be faulted for unfriendly treatment of refugees, they deserve credit for receiving so many at great cost to their societies. By contrast, it is difficult to give the Iraqi government any credit. Flush with oil money, it has been conspicuously ungenerous toward its citizens stranded abroad. The attitude of Western nations also has been deeply troubling.

Iraq Displacement 2008 Mid-Year in Review
International Organization for Migration (IOM)
July 2008
During the first half of 2008, trends of decreased violence and a declining rate of displacement continued throughout the country. Yet the deteriorating conditions facing the 2.8 million Internally Displaced People (IDPs), as well as the limited returnee population, remain one of the most serious humanitarian crises in the world. The report finds that about half of the population continue to get their water from unsafe sources -- 53% from nearby rivers and streams and 52% from open or broken pipes. Meanwhile, shelter is consistently among the highest-priority needs cited by IDPs, and eviction threats coupled with rapidly rising rental prices have created an even more precarious housing situation in recent months. Food access was also poor, only three in ten had regular access to food rations. About half had intermittent access and 21% no access at all. In addition, approximately two million Iraqis are refugees, mostly in neighboring Syria and Jordan, resulting in a total of 5 million internally and externally displaced.

Assessment on Returns to Iraq Amongst Iraqi Refugee Population in Syria
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)
April 2008
A survey of nearly 1,000 Iraqis currently staying in Syria has shown that 95 percent fled their homeland because of direct threats or general insecurity and that only 4 percent currently had plans to return to Iraq.

Consolidated Appeal for Iraq 2008
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
February 2008
Conflict in Iraq has exacerbated chronic problems that stem from the past two decades. An estimated four million people in the country are in need of food assistance as the Public Distribution System is weakened, and only 40 percent of the population has reliable access to safe drinking water. As part of the global Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) for 2008, the $265 million Emergency Appeal for Iraq brings together 14 UN agencies and 10 NGOs to deliver urgent relief to vulnerable people in Iraq over the next 12 months. Priority areas include health and nutrition, education, water and sanitation, housing and shelter, food, and protection. These operations are designed to move into recovery programs and are part of a wider effort to support Iraq’s own goals for stability and recovery.

Is Maliki a Friend to Iraqi Refugees?

On a recent visit to Germany, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki said he wanted to "encourage the thousands of Iraqis who fled the spiraling violence in their country in recent years to return home." At an international conference on Iraq in Stockholm, Prime Minister Maliki stated, “We have statistics that say that tens of thousands of refugees wish to return. We welcome them, we will give them privileges.” He is even going so far as to try and entice refugees to return to Iraq with promises of money when they return.

These statements by the Prime Minister are interesting for two reasons. First, Maliki's assessment that there are "thousands" of Iraqis who fled the country is a drastic understatement. According to recent estimates, there are as many as 2 million Iraqi refugees, roughly 750,000 in Jordan alone. But more importantly, the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) recommends that Iraqi refugees not return home yet because security conditions are not stable enough to support returns. In addition, a report recently published by the International Rescue Committee (IRC) states that “safe repatriation cannot be undertaken now or in the foreseeable future.”

Why is Maliki urging Iraqis to do specifically what the UNHCR and ground-based aid organizations say not to do?

One reason is politics. A large-scale return of Iraqi refugees back into Iraq would serve as a clear indication that Maliki’s security plan is succeeding and surely bolsters perceptions about his performance. There is a national election in Iraq in 2009 and, just like in the United States, public opinion matters even more around election time. Maliki wants to reinforce the notion that he is the right man to lead Iraq.

Another factor contributing to Maliki’s recent drive to encourage refugees to return to Iraq is the need for human capital. Many of the individuals who fled Iraq to escape violence were the professionals and educated middle-class Iraqis who had the resources and means to do so. As a result, Iraq lost a vast amount of human capital; its doctors, professors, and various experts. The process of rebuilding Iraq and creating a stable atmosphere will take two things: money and educated professionals. Iraq has no shortage of money; its estimated oil revenue for the 2008 fiscal year is 32 billion dollars; however it lacks the community-building experts who know how to effectively and efficiently allocate the money to produce the best results needed for structure. Maliki is attempting to regain some of the human capital that Iraq needs to rebuild and ensure that the recent improvements endure the test of time.

Despite Maliki’s assurances that Iraq is now safe for refugees to return home, some Iraqis are hesitant to trust him. In a report on Iraqi refugees in Jordan, Anna Badkhen, writing for the San Francisco Chronicle, quotes Raad Desher, a former goldsmith from Baghdad: “We don't believe Maliki…Militias are still killing people. Every day we hear news about new bombs in Iraq. We have no choice but to stay here.”

Clearly refugees must be encouraged to return only when security conditions allow for it. The the IRC report states: “We believe it is both dangerous and irresponsible to lure desperate refugees home with misleading statements about improved safety and security. Refugees should be discouraged from returning home to communities where they will not be safe.” So is Maliki just looking out for his own political interest, or does he truly believe that the security conditions permit a large-scale return of Iraqi refugees and the UNHCR is wrong?

Photo Caption: Iraq Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki delivers a speech

Brookings Institute: One Year Later

My name is Michael Gaubinger and I am working at the Education for Peace in Iraq Center for the summer of 2008. I will be entering my junior year at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst in the fall and am studying political science.

On Friday, June 13, the Brookings Institute hosted Senior Fellows Michael O'Hanlon and Kenneth Pollack for a discussion of their recent visit to Iraq. The discussion was called "Iraq: One Year Later." The fact-finding trip was sponsored by the Department of Defense and, while on the trip, they met with American and British soldiers, Iraqi government officials, and other Iraqis. They were unable to meet with very many Iraqi civilians, so their report is not an accurate gauge of the pulse on the street. The discussion began with a brief lecture by each individual about his impressions of the current situation in Iraq. Both men highlighted the improvement in security. O’Hanlon commented that, “This has been the spring of the beginning of the blossoming of the Iraq security forces.” Did the surge work? O’Hanlon says: “Since 2007, Iraq has seen an eighty percent reduction in violence against citizens as measured by the United States military, the Iraqi government, and even some independent sources.” He also stressed the increasing sense of control by the Iraqi government. Great challenges still exist, but the trend-line is positive. Pollack also noted that Iraqi security forces have emerged as a factor for the first time and are now contributing to the coalition effort. There are now 560,000 Iraqi Security Forces and that number is growing by 100,000 troops per year. The training system is working and as many as ten Iraqi brigades are combat ready now. The first wave of problems have been identified and confronted. Now, the United States faces the task of solving the old problems while shifting its focus to the second wave of problems. While the military and police are growing strong, Iraq’s civilian institutions remain weak. The progress of Iraqi regiments and security forces is a large contributor to the reduction in civilian violence in Iraq. For the nearly five-million Iraqi refugees and internally displaced persons, a sense of security and safety is a crucial step towards helping these individuals return home.

O’Hanlon and Pollack were asked about the potential for a decrease in American involvement in Iraq through the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region. Both agreed that an immediate withdrawal would be dangerous and set back the progress that they described. Furthermore, any reduction in current troop levels must be based on progress and not set to a calendar. O’Hanlon stressed that improvements in the mind-set of the Iraqi government were, in part due to the pressure applied by the Democratic leadership which reinforced the notion that American presence in Iraq must not be taken for granted by the Iraqi government. To ensure continued support from the United States, the Iraqi government must match the effort of the United States. According to Pollack, the general election in Iraq in 2009 represents a key moment politically within Iraq which could either cement and solidify the improvements or reverse them. Therefore, America withdrawal of troops before the elections could have dire consequences.

Planting the seeds of sustainable economic development is one of the first steps in redressing the humanitarian needs of Iraq. O’Hanlon and Pollack were asked about the current state of the Iraqi economy, specifically at the individual level. Oil exports are the backbone of Iraq’s economy, accounting for 98% of its revenue. Although oil exports are high and profitable for Iraq, they painted a bleak picture of life for the average citizen. Healthcare is poor and infant mortality rates are rising. There is not enough potable water. Unemployment is high and, among Iraqi civilians, there are no optimistic expectations of improvement. Due to the poor state of the economy, the return of refugees and internally displaced persons is a greater concern. Pollack suggested that an Iraqi government initiated housing project would help the economy by providing jobs and creating houses for some of the millions of displaced citizens.

A core component of the security improvement is sectarian separation. So far, approximately one-half of the sectarian separation has occurred, but there are some important concerns about the long-term sustainability of the recent improvements, which are due to forced ethnic division. What will happen when the walls are taken down? They were also asked about the current debate over the status of forces agreement. I will discuss this further in an upcoming blog. The final question directly addressed the willingness of the United States to take in refugees from Iraq. In 2008, the United States government promised to take in 7,000 refugees from Iraq, while Sweden is expected to take in 20,000 displaced persons. Pollack credited the low number of Iraqi refugees in America to fears by the Department of Homeland Security that the United States would be letting potential terrorists into the country; fears he categorized as foolish and repugnant.

O’Hanlon and Pollack both agree that Iraq faces many great challenges and unforeseen obstacles, but that the nation shows signs of improvement. Iraqi security forces are standing up as we transition to a plan where Iraqi forces are in the lead with American support, rather than the United States playing the lead role.