Pentagon Pushing For Slow Withdrawal Process

When President Elect Barak Obama was campaign in 2008 he promised to have U.S. combat troops out of Iraq by May 2010. The military commanders in the Middle East however, are not comfortable with such a speedy withdrawal, and have proposed a much slower one loosely based upon the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). That would mean most U.S. troops would be out by the end of 2011, with an unknown amount of Americans staying behind as advisors and support staff for Iraqis. This is an approach that has been advocated by quite a few of America’s leading think tanks as well. Finding a compromise between Obama’s election promise and the desires of the military will be the first task of the new President’s Iraq policy.

In the middle of December 2008, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and the Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen presented President Elect Obama and his national security team with their initial plans for withdrawal. General David Petraeus, commander of the Central Command, and General Ray Odierno, U.S. commander in Iraq, drew up the timetable. They loosely based their schedule upon the dates set in the SOFA newly signed between Iraq and the United States. Their withdrawal would start with two brigades of between 7,000-8,000 personnel coming out in the first six months of 2009. After that, the remaining 12 brigades would stay during most of 2009 to ensure Iraq’s elections. There are three planned for that year, provincial, district, and parliamentary. In the middle of the year U.S. forces are supposed to be out of Iraq’s cities however. The Americans are already pulling out of some of their camps and joint military stations, but General Odierno plans on getting around that deadline be re-designating some U.S. soldiers as trainers rather than combat personnel so that they can remain embedded with Iraqi forces. The rest of the U.S. troops would be consolidated into large bases. Only after the elections have been finished and the new politicians seated does Odierno want to begin drawing down large numbers of U.S. troops. By the end of 2011 most U.S. forces would be out, but again General Odierno wants to keep some American troops in Iraq past 2011 as advisors.

This slow approach to withdrawal has been advocated by some of the leading think tanks in the United States. Stephen Biddle, from the Council on Foreign Relations, and Kenneth Pollack and Michael O’Hanlon, both of the Brookings Institution, have long been pushing for a gradual pullout of American forces. In a recent chapter they wrote for book for example, they echoed General Odierno’s concern about securing the Iraqi elections, and only starting sizeable withdrawals after they were completed. They too would have most U.S. forces out by the 2011 SOFA date, but like Odierno would keep some soldiers in the country afterwards.

Although these Iraq experts have criticized the Bush administration for giving Iraq an open-ended commitment, and call for conditional support of Iraq’s government, they and Odierno both want to keep U.S. forces in Iraq as long as possible in the hopes that it will develop politically. The problem is there is no guarantee that this will happen. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is consolidating power around himself to the great disdain of his coalition partners the Kurds and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council. The upcoming provincial elections, may only shift power from one ruling power to another, giving few seats to new independents. Afterwards Iraq may be just as divided as before, giving American planners more reasons to stay.

This will present President Obama with his first test on Iraq. Will he stick with his election promise of withdrawing combat troops by the middle of 2010 or will he give into his ground commanders? Perhaps he will disregard Petraeus’ and Odierno’s strategy so that he can transfer troops to the growing crisis in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It’s almost impossible to build up troops there without drawing down from Iraq first. There’s also the fact that Americans are not considering the Iraqis that much. In July of this year there will be a referendum on the SOFA. If the agreement is voted down, Baghdad and Washington will have to start all over again working out a deal to keep U.S. troops in Iraq. Either way, the Pentagon’s and the Obama teams’ planning are in their early stages, and changes can be expected on just when U.S. combat troops will ultimately be out, and how many will stay as advisors.

SOURCES

Ashton, Adam and Hammoudi, Laith, “What are ‘combat troops’? Iraq withdrawal depends on answer,” McClatchy Newspapers, 12/23/08

Baldor, Lolita, “Commander: Troops to stay in cities past deadline,” Associated Press, 12/13/08

Biddle, Stephen, O’Hanlon, Michael, Pollack, Kenneth, “The Evolution of Iraq Strategy,” Brookings Institution, December 2008

Bumiller, Elisabeth and Shaner, Thom, “Generals Propose a Timetable for Iraq,” New York Times, 12/18/08

Burns, Robert, “Troops begin to shift out of Iraqi cities,” Associated Press, 11/12/08

Carter, Chelsea, “Top US general in Iraq prepares for troop decision,” Associated Press, 12/22/08

Hauslohner, Abigail, “Iraq’s Iffy New Year Resolution,” Time, 1/2/09

Reports: 8/6/2008

Key reports on the Iraq relief and development:

Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Revenues, Expenditures, and Surplus
Government Accountability Office (GAO)
August 2008
From 2005 through 2007, the Iraqi government generated an estimated $96 billion in cumulative revenues (mostly from oil sales). For 2008, GAO estimates that Iraq could generate as much as $86 billion in total revenues. From 2005 through 2007, the Iraqi government spent an estimated $67 billion on operating and investment activities. The Iraqi government spent only 1% of total expenditures to maintain Iraq- and U.S.-funded investments such as buildings, water and electricity installations. From 2005 through 2007, Iraq was unable to spend all its budgeted funds. In 2007, Iraq spent 80% of its $29 billion operating budget and 28% of its $12 billion investment budget. For 2008, GAO estimates that Iraq could spend as much as $35.9 billion of its $49.9 billion budget. As a result, GAO estimates a cumulative budget surplus of about $29 billion from 2005 to 2007 and projects an additional $38 to $50 billion budget surplus for 2008 (although a proposed $22 billion Iraqi budget supplemental could reduce this projected surplus). U.S. and international officials identify the shortage of trained staff, weak procurement and budgeting systems, violence and sectarian strife, and other factors affecting the Iraqi government’s ability to spend more of its revenues on capital investments.

Failed Responsibility: Iraqi Refugees in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon
International Crisis Group (ICG)
July 2008
Although the security situation in Iraq shows progress, Iraqi refugees remain stranded, jobless and deprived of essential services, while the Iraqi government and the wider international community have failed in their responsibilities and are ill prepared to cope with a new refugee crisis, should it occur. While initially welcoming their Iraqi brethren, ICG reports that Syria and Jordan have put tough restrictions on entry. They provide few basic services and inadequate opportunities for jobs, health care and children's education. If the host countries can be faulted for unfriendly treatment of refugees, they deserve credit for receiving so many at great cost to their societies. By contrast, it is difficult to give the Iraqi government any credit. Flush with oil money, it has been conspicuously ungenerous toward its citizens stranded abroad. The attitude of Western nations also has been deeply troubling.

Iraq Displacement 2008 Mid-Year in Review
International Organization for Migration (IOM)
July 2008
During the first half of 2008, trends of decreased violence and a declining rate of displacement continued throughout the country. Yet the deteriorating conditions facing the 2.8 million Internally Displaced People (IDPs), as well as the limited returnee population, remain one of the most serious humanitarian crises in the world. The report finds that about half of the population continue to get their water from unsafe sources -- 53% from nearby rivers and streams and 52% from open or broken pipes. Meanwhile, shelter is consistently among the highest-priority needs cited by IDPs, and eviction threats coupled with rapidly rising rental prices have created an even more precarious housing situation in recent months. Food access was also poor, only three in ten had regular access to food rations. About half had intermittent access and 21% no access at all. In addition, approximately two million Iraqis are refugees, mostly in neighboring Syria and Jordan, resulting in a total of 5 million internally and externally displaced.

Assessment on Returns to Iraq Amongst Iraqi Refugee Population in Syria
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)
April 2008
A survey of nearly 1,000 Iraqis currently staying in Syria has shown that 95 percent fled their homeland because of direct threats or general insecurity and that only 4 percent currently had plans to return to Iraq.

Consolidated Appeal for Iraq 2008
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
February 2008
Conflict in Iraq has exacerbated chronic problems that stem from the past two decades. An estimated four million people in the country are in need of food assistance as the Public Distribution System is weakened, and only 40 percent of the population has reliable access to safe drinking water. As part of the global Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) for 2008, the $265 million Emergency Appeal for Iraq brings together 14 UN agencies and 10 NGOs to deliver urgent relief to vulnerable people in Iraq over the next 12 months. Priority areas include health and nutrition, education, water and sanitation, housing and shelter, food, and protection. These operations are designed to move into recovery programs and are part of a wider effort to support Iraq’s own goals for stability and recovery.

The Future of the U.S. Military Presence in Iraq

This morning I attended The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) panel concerning The Future of the U.S. Military Presence in Iraq. It featured Kimberly Kagan of The Institute for the Study of War, Colin Kahl of The Center for a New American Security, Charles Knight of The Project on Defense Alternatives at the Commonwealth Institute, and Rend al-Rahim of the USIP. The panel was moderated by Daniel Serwer, also of USIP. Also in attendance was Marc Lynch, better known as the author of Abu Aardvark. Lynch reports:

To very briefly summarize, Kimberly Kagan laid out the familiar argument for the surge's success and the great progress being made, with more nuance and caveats than in some of her op-eds (but still drawing this from Colin Kahl: "I guess I see the glass half-empty, and Kim sees the glass as... overflowing"). Charles Knight gave a highly cogent presentation of the Commonwealth Institute's "Quickly, Carefully, Generously" report, arguing passionately that there will be no real political reconciliation until American military forces leave. Colin Kahl presented the Center for a New American Security's "Shaping the Iraqi Inheritance" report calling for "conditional engagement", arguing for the need to move away from 'Iraq centrism' (strategic interests actually exist beyond Iraq's borders, if you can believe it) and 'Iraq maximalism' (holding our policies hostage to outcomes manifestly beyond our capabilities to produce). Finally, Rend al-Rahim laid out a devastating depiction of Iraq's current situation, and - perhaps surprisingly - offered a wholehearted endorsement of Kahl's description of Iraq and policy recommendations.

Charles Knight spoke about the impact of the refugee crisis in Iraq: "The price we and others are paying for these blunders is not measured in blood and treasure alone – although these costs are already terribly high." He pointed to the Task Force report, which addresses one example of the extraordinary costs of the war:

There are now millions of refugees and millions of internally displaced persons, totally nearly 15% of the Iraq population. The displacement of a proportional number of Americans would mean: 45 million forced from their homes, the equivalent of emptying out the population of America’s ten largest cities. This happened under the American watch in Iraq. It is an immense failure for an occupying power; one we still respond to in the most "care less" of ways.

I noted that only two of the four panelists, Colin Kahl and Rend al-Rahim, used the phrase "sustainable security" in regard to the future of Iraq. In all my shaky earnestness, I got up to the microphone and pointed out this fact, and then proceeded to ask the first question in Q&A session:

"My question pertains to the ongoing process of securing peace in Iraq. In the opinion of the panelists, how is the future of peace in Iraq effected by the ticking time-bomb of 4.7 million displaced Iraqis, and what are the potential future effects of this deepening crisis, such as the unmet needs of those with no access to livelihoods?"

Rend al-Rahim replied that the dire conditions in which large numbers of refugees in Syria and Jordan live could breed radicalization, and therefore make refugees prone to taking extremist positions. Colin Kahl emphasized that clear and well-enforced property rights laws for returning internally displaced persons and refugees will be very important in securing a peaceful transition to regular life once refugees are resettled, but this will be a difficult task. Kahl also suggested that the IDPs be allowed to vote in the upcoming elections.

I applaud their recognition of the huge role that vulnerable refugees will play in the future and for understanding that the reactions of the displaced will have a huge impact on the future of Iraq and therefore should be considered when discussing America's role in the conflict.

Photo Caption: Panelists speak about the future of the U.S. military in Iraq at a forum hosted by the United States Institute of Peace

Improved Iraqi Army and the Latest ICG Report

I found an interesting article released by the Associated Press last week about the improving capacity of the Iraqi army, entitled "US pleased, worried by newfound Iraqi confidence." The reporter talked with high ranking military personnel in both the American and Iraqi armies. In an interview, American officers credited the new-found confidence of the Iraqi army to its transformative performance in the battle in Basra in March, followed by offensives in Mosul and Sadr City. The emerging strength of the Iraqi army is an encouraging sign that America may soon be able to responsibly draw down its troop presence. However, a stronger and more assertive Iraqi army also creates concerns on the part of Americans. Given the weakness of Iraq's civilian institutions, the reduction in U.S. control "feeds a worry that Iraqi security forces will either set themselves up for a catastrophic failure or might even decide - at some point when the Americans have largely departed - that the country would be better off under military rule."

Also, the International Crisis Group recently released a report entitled, "Failed Responsibility: Iraqi Refugees in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon". Despite the current security improvements that Iraq is seeing, in terms of the number displaced, the refugee crisis continues to be one of the most massive in the world. The international community and the Iraqi government in particular have failed to meet their responsibilities in providing for vulnerable Iraqis. The ICG report details the serious challenges yet to be adequately addressed and recommends genuine actions that the United States, Iraq, and other members of the international community should take to meet their responsibility to the Iraqi people.

Photo Caption: Members of the Iraqi military stand in line

“We’ll keep drilling ‘til we run out of steel."

As part of EPIC's continued interest in sustainable development in Iraq, I attended a panel discussion on Dr. Reuben Brigety’s report, Humanity as a Weapon of War at the Center for American Progress. I was delighted to hear the panelist’s views, and to hear open discourse on the topic of humanitarian efforts and roles.

Shidley, Kenya, June 2007: The U.S. Armed Forces come across a settlement of 100 families near the border of Somalia. Anticipating an influx of Somali refugees fleeing their war-torn homeland, the Pentagon sends in the Navy's Seabees to help the settlement secure a source of clean water.

Five months of drilling, one quarter of a million dollars, and two failed wells later: U.S. Navy Seabees finally cease attempts to drill for water. The first attempt brought up brackish, undrinkable water, the second attempt never actually reached water. By then, only twenty of the settlement's residents remained. Given that the residents were members of a nomadic tribe, it turns out that the settlement was only temporary.

“By contrast, an underground well dug by civilian humanitarian agencies typically costs around $10,000,” reports Dr. Reuben Brigety, Director of the Sustainable Security Program at the Center for American Progress, in his new report, Humanity as a Weapon of War. The report investigates the role of the US military in humanitarian actions overseas.

Attempts by the military to reach into the humanitarian sector, such as the wells in Kenya, is a prime example of the blurred role of the Armed Forces and State Department which surrounds the debate over American foreign policy. Increasingly, the military's role in providing security goes hand in hand with development assistance.

The United States is working towards “sustainable security” as part of its long term plan for security success in countries that could potentially, or have previously, posed a threat to the United States. Security though sustainability is becoming a real part of the discourse on long-term peace building operations abroad.

"With chaos inside Somalia threatening the stability of the region and enabling the rise of extremism, using U.S. military assets to perform a humanitarian mission serves a dual purpose. It shows the face of American compassion to a skeptical population while also giving the military an eye on activity in the area. Winning ears and minds with an ear to the ground is the new American way of war.”

The Navy’s plan to drill for water in Kenya had a ring of benevolence, but in reality, resulted in utter failure. Have we witnessed a failure such as this before, and exactly what should the role of Armed Forces be in the larger context of United State’s humanitarian role overseas? Deputy Assistant Administrator for the U.S. Agency for International Development says that, while the USAID welcomes the logistical support of the Armed Forces and Department of Defense, the role of the Armed Forces in humanitarian actions overseas is, at most, a support role, and should remain as such.

The world has seen what happens when the United States Armed Forces suddenly acquires the broad mandate of "nation builder" without adequate preparation, experience or expertise. In 2003, EPIC Director Erik Gustafson questioned President Bush’s decision to put the Pentagon in charge of rebuilding Iraq instead of the State Department, or the United Nations who boasts “widely recognized international legitimacy in relief and reconstruction, extensive resources and expertise and a long history of working with Iraqi civil servants and NGOs.”

In the article, Gustafson argues that nation-building efforts led by the Pentagon will not help the United States or Iraq. Rather, "It will more likely become a lightning rod for Iraqi and international cynicism, fuel doubts about U.S. motives, deepen rifts with our allies, infuriate the Arab World, feed terrorism and further destabilize the Middle East."

Be it wells in Kenya, or the infrastructure of a country of 26 million [Iraq], the United States Armed Forces are not specialized in rebuilding, planning, or methods to work with local civilians to move that population towards security. Sometimes the military is the only presence in a devastated area, and the only resource available to attend to humanitarian crises, but this is a far cry from its normal function. Difficult situations can become rapidly more problematic when handled by those who are far from their designated positions.

Photo Caption: A Navy poster encouraging skilled laborers to join the Seabees as part of the war effort. Library of Congress