Iraqi Refugees: What Needs to Happen and What is Being Done

Julia is head of her family. A widow and mother, she fled Iraq shortly after her daughter was sexually assaulted in their home by an armed militia.

The family was once considered affluent, but without any employment and the exhaustion of their savings, this mother and daughter have no means of survival in Damascus, Syria, where they live today.

“Each person, like Julia, represents a compelling story,” said Bob Carey of International Rescue Committee and Refugee Council USA at Rutgers School of Law, where students, activists and academics gathered three weeks ago for Iraq at the Crossroads: Protecting Refugees, Rescuing our Allies, and Empowering Iraqi Law.

Julia and her daughter, like so many millions of Iraqis, find themselves with grave shortages and threats in Iraq’s neighbor countries of Syria, Lebanon, Jordan. “As urban refugees, many services can’t reach them,” continued Carey. “And there is a lack of images [of Iraqi refugees] as a catalyst to action.”

Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria are not signatories to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, which would require them to allow refugees to work, travel and go to school. As non-signers, they may also forcibly expel refugees back into Iraq, even if refugees’ homes remain unsafe.

Joining Bob Carey at the Rutgers conference was Hillary Ingraham of the U.S. State Department.

“While many Iraqis were initially able to sustain themselves, this is no longer possible,” said Ingraham.

She added that while registration for aid is available and encouraged, many Iraqi refugees do not approach the UNHCR and aid agencies. There is a prevailing stigma of registration for fear that they will be forcibly returned to Iraq. Registration, however, allows the UN and agencies to monitor the conditions of life and whereabouts of refugees, assist with housing, work and education, and provide heating fuel, food, and clothing.

The panel finished with Emily Gish of Mercy Corps, whose organization provides much-needed, immediate relief to Iraqi refugees outside of Iraq, as well as Iraq's internally displaced persons (IDPs) and vulnerable populations still within Iraq's borders. Mercy Corps' response to Iraqi displacement is strengthened through partnerships with the U.S. State Department, World Food Programme, Middle East Council of Churches, and a host of other organizations and agencies, enabling Iraqis both inside and outside of the country to receive much needed aid.

“Access to the health services, health education for pregnant women, mobile clinic, immunizations, water services, school supplies, warm clothes, and non-perishable foods,” she said, are some of the many services and goods provided. Mercy Corps also seeks to address the unique needs of Iraqi refugees who are victims of psychological, gender-based violence.

As the panel came to a close, Carey said any solution to the humanitarian crisis must be led by a UN ministerial conference. He added that the United States should fund 50% of what is requested by the UN, and called for a multi-year, multi-lateral, civilian-led resolution as the best way forward in Iraq.

Caption: (top) Panel speakers from right: Sana Hardina of Refugee Council USA, Hillary Ingraham of the U.S. Dept. of State, Emily Gish of Mercy Corps, and Bob Carey of International Rescue Committee/Refugee Council USA. By EPIC.

Caption: (left) Emily Gish of Mercy Corps. By EPIC.

Wasit Province Turned Over To Iraqi Control

The following commentary originally appeared in Musings On Iraq

Image source: BBC

On Wednesday October 29, Wasit province in southern Iraq was turned over to Iraqi control. It was the 13th of 18 provinces to be handed over to Baghdad. This follows closely after Babil went through a similar process on October 23.

Wasit has a population of 941,800 people, 100% of which are Shiite. The province’s economy is based upon farming, oil, and natural gas. Many of these natural resources are not being exploited however because the government has shown no leadership in developing them. The pace of reconstruction in the province is also slow, and there is little investment. On the positive side, in September 2008, Iraq and Iran signed a free trade agreement, which would includes a border crossing in Wasit. As reported earlier, Iran is Iraq’s largest trade partner, and supplies most of the country’s consumer goods.

The Gathering of Iraqi Elites runs the provincial council, which is part of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC). The U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Team in the province ranked their governance as “Developing,” the second lowest of five rankings. In terms of running Wasit, the council spent $33.7 million of its $83 million budget, 41% in 2007. That made it the eighth best among Iraq’s 18 provinces in budget execution. As with Baghdad, most of this money has been spent on salaries and expenses, rather than on infrastructure to rebuild the area. The major issue politically today, is the attempt by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to sway voters away from the SIIC to his Dawa party. In September the Prime Minister tried to set up a Tribal Support Council to this end, but the provincial council objected. The next month, Maliki went ahead and formed a council there anyway.

The province is also home to several thousand internally displaced Iraqis. The Special Inspector General for Iraq (SIGIR) reconstruction counted 75,325 in its July 2008 report. The Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) counted 118 families, 708 people, had recently returned to Wasit. In a separate report, the IOM reported that 100 displaced families had left for their home provinces.

Security in Wasit is considered good. SIGIR ranked it the 9th most violent province. The major source of conflict in the area recently was not between insurgents and the government and U.S., but with Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army and Iranian-backed Special Groups. Wasit and its capital Kut was part of one of the major routes Iranian operatives used to funnel weapons into Baghdad. In the fall of 2007, the U.S. began expanding its Sons of Iraq program to Wasit, aimed largely at stopping the flow of Iranian supplies and Shiite militias. During the security crackdown in Basra in March 2008, Iraqi forces were also involved in fighting Sadrists in Kut. These operations continued through the summer with senior Sadrists arrested, along with Special Group fighters. The conflict with the Mahdi Army also led to hundreds of local police being fired as suspected followers of Sadr. Iran continues to try to infiltrate the area as three members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard were just arrested in Kut on October 20, and another one was killed and one detained in separate incident south of Kut on October 24.

Overall, Wasit is relatively secure, but lacks an effective government and economy. There are few attacks, although Special Groups and Iranian agents are still operating there. At the same time, Iran is playing a positive role in the province, with a major trade route running through Kut, that provides essential goods to Iraqis. The ruling SIIC provincial council hasn’t done that good of a job running the area, and they are facing a strong challenge by the Prime Minister’s Dawa party, who is attempting to organize tribes behind him. The province is an example of post-Surge Iraq, where security is still an issue, but economic and political ones are becoming more important.

SOURCES
Ahmed, Farook and Cochrane, Marisa, “Recent Operations against Special Groups and JAM in Central and Southern Iraq,” Institute for the Study of War, 4/7/08
Aswat al-Iraq, “3 Iranian Revolutionary Guards arrested in Wassit,” 10/20/08
- “QRF kills Iranian gunman, detains another in Wassit,” 10/24/08
- “Wassit province refuses to establish support councils,” 9/24/08
Gamel, Kim, “U.S. Expands Anbar Model to Iraq Shiites,” Associated Press, 9/16/07
International Organization for Migration, “IOM Emergency Needs Assessments,” 10/1/08
IraqSlogger.com, “New Tribal Groups Buck Wishes of Wasit Council,” 10/23/08
Jab, Abdul-Razaq, “US military hands southern province over to Iraqis,” Associated Press, 10/29/08
Juhi, Bushra, “Iraq fires 1,300 soldiers and policemen for refusing to fight,” Associated Press, 4/13/08
Kagan, Kimberly, “Iran’s Proxy War against the United States and the Iraqi Government,” Institute for the Study of War, 8/20/07
Middle East Reference, “Governorate elections held in Iraq on 31 January 2005”
Ministry of Displacement and Migration & International Organization for Migration, “Returnee Monitoring and Needs Assessments Tabulation Report,” September 2008
Roggio, Bill, “Iran’s Ramazan Corps and the ratlines into Iraq,” Long War Journal.org, 12/5/07
- “Report: Iraqi security forces preparing operation against Mahdi Army in Maysan,” Long War Journal.org, 6/12/08
- “Report: Sadr to extend cease-fire,” Long War Journal.org, 2/21/08
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 7/30/08
Tehran Times, “Iran, Iraq to create 3 free zones,” 9/13/08

Numbers on Internally Displaced Iraqis

The following commentary originally appeared in Musings On Iraq

In August 2008, the Middle East Institute published a special issue of Viewpoints that focused upon Iraq’s refugee crisis. The report included some of the most up to date statistics on Iraq’s displaced available, based upon a number of sources such as the International Organization for Migration, the Brookings Institute, etc.

The number most commonly used for Iraq’s internal refugees comes from the United Nations, but there are others sources that say the total might be less. The U.N. says there are 2.7 million refugees. 1.2 million of those came before the February 2006 Samarra shrine bombing, which is credited for setting off the sectarian war. The other 1.5 million were a result of that fighting. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) used the U.N.’s numbers, but when it broke down those that have registered province by province, it only found 1,579,245. The Middle East Institute’s numbers were only an estimate, but came very close to the SIGIR’s at 1,607,994. The International Crisis Group released a report on Iraq’s refugees in July 2008 that noted there was a wide range of numbers on the displaced for a number of reasons. Those included the fact that some don’t register with authorities, foreign countries don’t have the ability to track many of them, illegal immigration, different groups use different methods, and the fact that governments change the numbers for political reasons.

Here’s a breakdown of the Viewpoints’ findings.

Note: The percentages for causes and aid do not add up to 100%

Internally Displaced Iraqis Since April 2003

2003 400,000
2004 800,000
2005 1,200,000
2006 2,000,000
2007 2,740,000
2008 2,770,000

Overview

• Most displaced before Feb. 2006: Sulaymaniyah 50.465 families (approx. 302,790 people)
• Most displaced after Feb. 2006: Baghdad 92,936 families (approx. 563,771 people)

Sect:

• Highest Percentage of Shiite Arabs: Basra, Dhi Qar, Muthana, Qadisiyah and
• Wasit 99.99%
• Highest Percentage of Sunni Arabs: Anbar 99.3%
• Highest Percentage of Kurds: Irbil 39.7%

Aid:

• Highest Percentage Ministry of Displacement and Migration Wasit 84.5%
• Lowest Percentage of Ministry of Displacement and Migration Dahuk 0.1%
• Highest Percentage Other Government Agency Dahuk 17.1%
• Lowest Percentage Other Government Agency Muthana 0.3%
• Highest Percentage Iraqi Red Crescent Najaf 69.7%
• Lowest Percentage Iraqi Red Crescent Irbil 0.1%
• Highest Percentage Humanitarian Group Anbar 66.8%
• Lowest Percentage Humanitarian Group Salahadin 0.4%
• Highest Percentage Non-Government Organization or U.N. Wasit 28.5%
• Lowest Percentage Non-Government Organization or U.N. Naaf 0.2%
• Highest Percentage of No Aid Kirkuk 58.6%
• Lowest Percentage of No Aid Najaf 1.6%

Anbar
Total displaced before Feb. 2006: 1,025 families (approx. 29,418 people)
Total displaced after Feb. 2006: 8,876 families (approx. 51,487 people)
Origin: Baghdad 77.27%, Anbar 16.41%, Basra 6.19%
Sect: 99.3% Sunni Arab, 0.5% Shiite Arab
Causes: General Violence 43.7%, Threats on Life 30.1%, Forced Out 28.5%, Fighting 19.1%, Fear 8.9%
Security Statistics: Checkpoints 57.8%, Other Limits on Movement 23.1%, Death or Injury 22.1%
Aid: Humanitarian Groups 66.8%, Community 57.8%, Religious Group 57.4%, Family 22.3%, Iraqi Red Crescent 19.5%, No Aid 6.6%, Ministry of Displacement and Migration 2.2%

Babil
Total displaced before Feb. 2006: 1,475 families (approx. 8,850 people)
Total displaced after Feb. 2006: 12,799 families (approx. 77,914 people)
Origin: Baghdad 82.6%, Diyala 5.84%, Babil 5.65%, Salahadin 2.06%, Anbar 1.93%, Wasit 1.06%, Kirkuk 0.66%, Other 0.2%
Sect: 94.4% Shiite Arab, 5.3% Sunni Arab
Causes: Threats on Life 59.5%, Fear 57.2%, Forced Out 54.7%, Violence 50.5%
Security Statistics: Checkpoints 16.7%, Other Limits on Movement 10.4%, Need Pass to Move From Residence 7.1%, Death Or Injury 6%, Missing Group Members 3.4%
Aid: Community 62%, Iraqi Red Crescent 56.9%, Ministry of Displacement and Migration 30.2%, No Aid 26.1%, Family 27.4%, Other Government Agency 13.2%, Non-Government Organization or U.N. 1.4%

Baghdad
Total displaced before Feb. 2006: 3,867 families (approx. 23,202 people)
Total displaced after Feb. 2006: 92,936 families (approx. 563,771 people)
Origin: Baghdad 80.29%, Diyala 16.4%, Anbar 1.71%, Salahadin, 0.9%, Kirkuk 0.35%, Ninewa, 0.32%, Babil 0.16%, Other 0.22%
Sect: 80% Shiite, 19.8% Sunni, 0.1% Shiite Kurd, 0.02% Yazidi Arab
Causes: Threats on Life 56.5%, Fear 39.5%, Forced Out 39.4%, Violence 36.4%, Fighting 24.8%
Security Statistics: Death Or Injury 25.6%, Need Pass to Move From Residence 4.5%, Missing Group Members 3.0%, Other Limits on Movement 1.4%, Checkpoints 0.2%
Aid: No Aid 54.8%, Family 30%, Religious Group 27.2%, Community 20.9%, Iraqi Red Crescent 16%, Humanitarian Groups 14%, Ministry of Displacement and Migration 10.7%, Other Government Agency 2.6%

Basra
Total displaced before Feb. 2006: 15,778 families (approx. 94,668 people)
Total displaced after Feb. 2006: 6,031 families (approx. 35,718 people)
Origin: Baghdad 51.64%, Salahadin 26.54%, Anbar 8.13%, Diyala 6.4%, Kirkuk 4.15%, Babil 2.01%, Basra 0.66%, Other 0.l22%
Sect: 99.99% Shiite, 0.01% Sunni Arab
Causes: Threats on Life 95.5%, Fear 5.2%, Forced Out 2.1%, Violence 0.6%, Fighting 0.5%
Security Statistics: Death Or Injury 13.5%, Missing Group Members 1.4%, Need Pass to Move From Residence 0.6%
Aid: No Aid 46.4%, Iraqi Red Crescent 33.1%, Family 23.4%, Ministry of Displacement and Migration 20.8%, Community 14.1%, Religious Group 12.5%, Humanitarian Group 4.4%, Other Government Agency 1.6%

Dahuk
Total displaced before Feb. 2006: 22,474 families (approx. 134,844 people)
Total displaced after Feb. 2006: 18,733 families (approx. 104,948 people)
Origin: Baghdad 56.51%, Ninewa 41.69%, Kirkuk 0.69%, Basra 0.50%, Anbar 0.38%, Salahadin, 0.06%, Muthanna 0.03%, Other 0.06%
Sect: 35.6% Sunni Kurd, 31.5% Chaldean Christian, 20.8% Assyrian Christian, 4.0% Armenian Christian, 2.4% Sunni Arab, 2.1% Shiite
Causes: Fear 91.3%, Violence 88.1%, Threats on Life 71.6%, Fighting 37%
Security Statistics: Death or Injury 13.3%, Missing Group Members 2.5%, Checkpoints 0.9%, Need Pass to Move From Residence 0.6%, Other Limits on Movement 0.2%
Aid: No Aid 45%, Religious Group 19.8%, Iraqi Red Crescent 19.1%, Other Government Agency 17.1%, Family 12.8%, Humanitarian Group 4.2%, Community 4%, Ministry of Displacement and Migration 0.1%

Dhi Qar
Total displaced before Feb. 2006: 4,226 families (approx. 25,356 people)
Total displaced after Feb. 2006: 7,138 families (approx. 47,925 people)
Origin: Baghdad 68.42%, Salahadin 13.21%, Diyala 8.57%, Anbar 3.06%, Kirkuk 2.82%, Babil 2.43%, Wasit 1.1%
Sect: 99.99% Shiite Arab, 0.01% Sunni Arab
Causes: Threats 75.1%, Violence 58.6%, Forced Out 34%, Fear 33.7%, Fighting 7.1%
Security Statistics: Missing Family Member 15.2%, Need Pass to Move From Residence 12.4%, Death or Injury 7.8%, Checkpoints 0.1%
Aid: Relatives 45.1%, Religious Group 41.6%, Iraqi Red Crescent 40.7%, Community 35.7%, Ministry of Displacement and Migration 33.1%, No Aid 27.6%, Humanitarian Group 18%, Other Government Agency 0.6%

Diyala
Total displaced before Feb. 2006: 9,100 families (approx. 54,600 people)
Total displaced after Feb. 2006: 17,198 families (approx. 103,426 people)
Origin: Diyala 83.47%, Baghdad 15.84%, Anbar 0.19%, Babil 0.l6%, Kirkuk 0.15%, Salahadin 0.12%, Basra 0.04%, Qadisiyah 0.02%
Sect: 50.7% Sunni Arab, 39.5% Shiite Arab, 7.8% Shiite Kurd, 1.37% Sunni Kurd, 0.5% Shiite Turkomen, 0.13% Sunni Turkomen
Causes: Violence 57.4%, Forced Out 55.1%, Threats on Life 53.2%, Fear 36.8%, Fighting 27.2%, Other 1.6%
Security Statistics: Checkpoints 50.7%, Death or Injury 39.4%, Missing Group Members 16.1%, Other Limits on Movement 11.5%, Need Pass to Move From Residence 8.8%
Aid: Community 59.3%, Family 44.2%, Iraqi Red Crescent 34%, No Aid 20.3%, Ministry of Displacement and Migration 19.9%, Humanitarian Group 16.9%, Religious Group 16.6%, Other Government Agency 2.2%

Irbil
Total displaced before Feb. 2006: 32,813 families (approx. 196,878 people)
Total displaced after Feb. 2006: 10,339 families (approx. 62,034 people)
Origin: Ninewa 46.76%, Baghdad 45.78%, Kirkuk 2.52%, Diyala 1.94%, Salahadin 0.76%, Anbar 0.74%, Basra 0.71%, Other 0.53%
Sect: 39.7% Sunni Kurd, 23.56% Chaldean Christian, Sunni Arab 21.8%, Assyrian Christian 5.9%, Christian Kurd/Other/Arab 2.9%, Shiite Arab 1.6%
Causes: Fear 97.2%, Violence 48.4%, Threats on Life 11.1%, Fighting 0.3%
Security Statistics: Need Pass to Move From Residence 95.8%, Checkpoints 89.9%, Missing Group Member 0.5%, Death or Injury 0.5%, Other Limits on Movement 0.1%
Aid: Religious Group 4.9%, Humanitarian Group 0.8%, Iraqi Red Crescent 0.1%, Family 0.1%

Karbala
Total displaced before Feb. 2006: 18,818 families (approx. 112,908 people)
Total displaced after Feb. 2006: 8,617 families (approx. 55,962 people)
Origins: Baghdad 53.78%, Diyala 23.38%, Anbar 8.5%, Babil 3.05%, Kirkuk 2.82 %, Salahadin 1.67%, Karbala 1.65%, Wasit 0.16%
Sect: 98.2% Shiite, 1.4% Shiite Turkomen
Causes: Threats on Life 78.6%, Fear 48.2%, Violence 41%, Forced Out 32.5%, Fighting 32%
Security Statistics: Checkpoints 28.3%, Missing Group Members 24.3%, Death or Injury 17.1%, Need Pass to Move From Residence 14.3%, Other Limits on Movement 0.1%
Aid: Iraqi Red Crescent 53.7%, Family 48.5%, No Aid 47.7%, Ministry of Displacement and Migration 41.9%, Community 28.3%, Other Government Agency 11%, Non-Government Organization or U.N. 1.5%

Kirkuk
Total displaced before Feb. 2006: 1,252 families (approx. 7,512 people)
Total displaced after Feb. 2006: 7,958 families (approx. 47,748 people)
Origins: Diyala 28.96%, Baghdad 18.92%, Salahadin 17.14%, Ninewa 16.3%, Kirkuk 15.17%, Anbar 2.17%, Irbil 0.32%, Other 0.49%
Sect: 51.8% Sunni Arab, 18.8% Shiite Turkomen, 18.2% Sunni Kurd, 3.2% Sunni Turkomen, 2.8% Shiite Arab
Causes: Violence 84.6%, Fear 68.4%, Threats on Life 45.3%, Fighting 4.2%, Forced Out 1.6%
Security Statistics: Missing Family Members 48.4%, Other Limits on Movement 27.1%, Need Pass to Move From Residence 27.0%, Death or Injury 23.1%, Checkpoints 17.2%
Aid: No Aid 58.6%, Family 15.%, Ministry of Displacement and Migration 14.4%, Community 5.9%, Religious Group 5.7%, Humanitarian Group 5.2%, Iraqi Red Crescent 3.9%, Other Government Agency 1%

Maysan
Total displaced before Feb. 2006: 18,871 families (approx. 113,226 people)
Total displaced after Feb. 2006: 6,858 families (approx. 46,948 people)
Origins: Baghdad 83.84%, Diyala 7.67%, Salahadin 4.65%, Kirkuk 1.55%, Anbar 1.02%, Wasit 0.47%, Babil 0.34%
Sect: 99.9% Shiite, 0.1% Sabean Mandean
Causes: Fear 63.4%, Threats on Life 43.4%, Forced Out 30.7%, Violence 18.4%, Fighting 10.7%
Security Statistics: Checkpoints 3.3%, Missing Family Members 2.5%, Other Limits on Movement 1.9%, Need Pass to Move From Residence 1%
Aid: Ministry of Displacement and Migration 52%, Religious Group 37.9%, Community 28.4%, No Aid 27.7%, Iraqi Red Crescent 23.1%, Family 3%, Non-Government Organization or U.N. 2.6%

Muthana
Total displaced before Feb. 2006: 861 families (approx. 5,166 people)
Total displaced after Feb. 2006: 2,641 families (approx. 18,351 people)
Origins: Baghdad 72.44%, Diyala 14.1%, Anbar 7.64%, Babil 1.82%, Salahadin 1.31%, Ninewa 1.11%, Wasit 0.71%
Sect: 99.99% Shiite, 0.01% Sunni ARab
Causes: Threats on Life 74.8%, Fear 48.3%, Fighting 41.1%, Forced Out 34.7%, Violence 20.4%
Security Statistics: Need Pass to Move From Residence 9.8%, Missing Family Members 6%, Death or Injury 0.8%, Checkpoints 0.6%
Aid: Iraqi Red Crescent 41.5%, Ministry of Displacement and Migration 29.5%, No Aid 27.9%, Family 18.7%, Community 5.9%, Religious Group 5.3%, Humanitarian Group 2.3%, Other Government Agency 0.3%

Najaf
Total displaced before Feb. 2006: 3,993 families (approx. 23,958 people)
Total displaced after Feb. 2006: 10,140 families (approx. 58,032 people)
Origins: Baghdad 87.9%, Diyala 5.76%, Anbar 2.01%, Ninewa 1.62%, Babil 0.96%, Salahadin 0.94%, Kirkuk 0.8%, Wasit 0.02%
Sect: 98.2% Shiite, 1.4% Shiite Turkomen
Causes: Threats on Life 98%, Violence 12.7%, Forced Out 12.3%, Fear 3.2%, Fighting 1%
Security Statistics: Death or Injury 28.2%, Need Pass to Move From Residence 15.9%, Missing Family Members 2.5%
Aid: Iraqi Red Crescent 69.7%, Community 28.3%, Ministry of Displacement and Migration 21.6%, Family 13.4%, Other Government Agency 1.7%, No Aid 1.6%, Non-Government Organization or U.N. 0.2%

Ninewa
Total displaced before Feb. 2006: 6,572 families (approx. 39,432 people)
Total displaced after Feb. 2006: 19,126 families (approx. 106,750 people)
Origins: Baghdad 52.68%, Ninewa 36.57%, Basra 6.56%, Diyala 1.21%, Kirkuk 0.87%, Salahadin 0.64%, Anbar 0.58%
Sect: 40.1% Christian Assyrian, 27.6% Sunni Arab, 12.2% Christian Chaldean, 12% Sunni Turkomen, 2.7% Sunni Kurd
Causes: Threats 62.9%, Violence 42.5%, Fear 28.8%, Forced Out 17.8%, Fighting 1.7%
Security Statistics: Missing Family Member 20.2%, Need Pass to Move From Residence 19.1%, Checkpoint 7.5%, Other Limits on Movement 5.5%
Aid: Ministry of Displacement and Migration 42.1%, Community 32.6%, Iraqi Red Crescent 32.2%, Religious Group 30.2%, Family 28.6%, No Aid 23.5%, Humanitarian Group 14.9%, Other Government Agency 2.1%

Qadisiyah
Total displaced before Feb. 2006: 1,154 families (approx. 6,924 people)
Total displaced after Feb. 2006: 4,111 families (approx. 26,320 people)
Origins: Baghdad 81.44%, Diyala 6.54%, Anbar 4.62%, Salahadin 2.99%, Kirkuk 2.38%, Babil 1.66%, Wasit 0.26%
Sect: 99.99% Shiite Arab
Causes: Threats 93.3%, Fear 25.8%, Violence 21.2%, Forced Out 0.9%, Fighting 0.5%
Security Statistics: Other Limits on Movement 7.9%, Missing Family Member 0.6%
Aid: Religious Group 46.3%, Iraqi Red Crescent 40.7%, Ministry of Displacement and Migration 36.3%, Community 30.7%, Non-Government Organization or U.N. 17.6%, No Aid 15.2%, Family 2.3%

Salahadin
Total displaced before Feb. 2006: 3,366 families (approx. 20,196 people)
Total displaced after Feb. 2006: 7,817 families (approx. 45,762 people)
Origins: Baghdad 62.3%, Basra 14.35%, Diyala 9.34%, Salahadin 5.37%, Kirkuk 2.6%, Anbar 2.45%, Wasit 0.99%
Sect: 95% Sunni Arab, 3.1% Shiite Arab, 1.2% Shiite Turkomen, 0.6% Sunni Kurd, 0.1% Sunni Turkomen
Causes: Threats 75.9%, Violence 21.5%, Forced Out 19.2%, Fighting, 14.6%, Fear 10.7%
Security Statistics: Need Pass to Move From Residence 9.9%, Other Limits on Movement 7.4%, Missing Family Members 7.2%, Checkpoints 4%, Death or Injury 0.2%
Aid: No Aid 55%, Community 25.7%, Iraqi Red Crescent 17%, Family 12.2%, Religious Group 10.5%, Ministry of Displacement and Migration 4.3%, Other Government Agency 0.7%, Humanitarian Group 0.4%

Sulaymaniyah
Total displaced before Feb. 2006: 50,465 families (approx. 302,790 people)
Total displaced after Feb. 2006: 14,254 families (approx. 79,672 people)
Origins: Diyala 48.95%, Baghdad 43.28%, Anbar 2.92%, Ninewa 1.78%, Salahadin 0.9%, Kirkk 0.61%, Basra 0.47%
Sect: 64.1% Sunni Arab, 22.2% Sunni Kurd, 9.8% Shiite Arab, 2.5% Shiite Kurd, 0.4% Yazidi Kurd
Causes: Fear 90.4%, Violence 88.4%, Fighting 53.8%, Threats 46.6%, Forced Out 3.8%
Security Statistics: Death or Injury 2.2%, Missing Family Member 1.2%, Other Limits on Movement 0.9%, Need Pass to Move From Residence 0.95
Aid: Iraqi Red Crescent 6.8%, Humanitarian Group 6.1%, Community 4.8%, Other Government Agency 1.9%, Religious Group 1.2%, Family 0.1%

Wassit
Total displaced before Feb. 2006: 2,030 families (approx. 12,180 people)
Total displaced after Feb. 2006: 12,259 families (approx. 75,326 people)
Origins: Baghdad 65.17%, Diyala 32.88%, Babil 1.04%, Kirkuk 0.48%, Anbar 0.3%, Salahadin 0.14%
Sect: 99.99 Shiite Arab, 0.01% Sunni Arab
Causes: Violence 97.9%, Forced Out 1.9%, Fear 1.7%, Threats 1.3%, Fighting 0.1%
Security Statistics: Death or Injury 1%, Need Pass To Move From Residence 1%, Missing Family Members 0.7%, Checkpoints 0.3%
Aid: Ministry of Displacement and Migration 84.5%, Community 53.6%, Religious Group 47.2%, Iraqi Red Crescent 43.8%, Non-Government Organization or U.N. 28.5%, No Aid 11%, Family 2.3%

SOURCES:
Ferris, Elizabeth, “The Looming Crisis: Displacement and Security in Iraq,” Brookings Institution, August 2008
International Crisis Group, “Failed Responsibility: Iraqi Refugees In Syria, Jordan and Lebanon,” 7/10/08
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 7/30/08
Viewpoints, “Iraq’s Refugee and IDP Crisis: Human Toll and Implications,” August 2008

The Future of the U.S. Military Presence in Iraq

This morning I attended The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) panel concerning The Future of the U.S. Military Presence in Iraq. It featured Kimberly Kagan of The Institute for the Study of War, Colin Kahl of The Center for a New American Security, Charles Knight of The Project on Defense Alternatives at the Commonwealth Institute, and Rend al-Rahim of the USIP. The panel was moderated by Daniel Serwer, also of USIP. Also in attendance was Marc Lynch, better known as the author of Abu Aardvark. Lynch reports:

To very briefly summarize, Kimberly Kagan laid out the familiar argument for the surge's success and the great progress being made, with more nuance and caveats than in some of her op-eds (but still drawing this from Colin Kahl: "I guess I see the glass half-empty, and Kim sees the glass as... overflowing"). Charles Knight gave a highly cogent presentation of the Commonwealth Institute's "Quickly, Carefully, Generously" report, arguing passionately that there will be no real political reconciliation until American military forces leave. Colin Kahl presented the Center for a New American Security's "Shaping the Iraqi Inheritance" report calling for "conditional engagement", arguing for the need to move away from 'Iraq centrism' (strategic interests actually exist beyond Iraq's borders, if you can believe it) and 'Iraq maximalism' (holding our policies hostage to outcomes manifestly beyond our capabilities to produce). Finally, Rend al-Rahim laid out a devastating depiction of Iraq's current situation, and - perhaps surprisingly - offered a wholehearted endorsement of Kahl's description of Iraq and policy recommendations.

Charles Knight spoke about the impact of the refugee crisis in Iraq: "The price we and others are paying for these blunders is not measured in blood and treasure alone – although these costs are already terribly high." He pointed to the Task Force report, which addresses one example of the extraordinary costs of the war:

There are now millions of refugees and millions of internally displaced persons, totally nearly 15% of the Iraq population. The displacement of a proportional number of Americans would mean: 45 million forced from their homes, the equivalent of emptying out the population of America’s ten largest cities. This happened under the American watch in Iraq. It is an immense failure for an occupying power; one we still respond to in the most "care less" of ways.

I noted that only two of the four panelists, Colin Kahl and Rend al-Rahim, used the phrase "sustainable security" in regard to the future of Iraq. In all my shaky earnestness, I got up to the microphone and pointed out this fact, and then proceeded to ask the first question in Q&A session:

"My question pertains to the ongoing process of securing peace in Iraq. In the opinion of the panelists, how is the future of peace in Iraq effected by the ticking time-bomb of 4.7 million displaced Iraqis, and what are the potential future effects of this deepening crisis, such as the unmet needs of those with no access to livelihoods?"

Rend al-Rahim replied that the dire conditions in which large numbers of refugees in Syria and Jordan live could breed radicalization, and therefore make refugees prone to taking extremist positions. Colin Kahl emphasized that clear and well-enforced property rights laws for returning internally displaced persons and refugees will be very important in securing a peaceful transition to regular life once refugees are resettled, but this will be a difficult task. Kahl also suggested that the IDPs be allowed to vote in the upcoming elections.

I applaud their recognition of the huge role that vulnerable refugees will play in the future and for understanding that the reactions of the displaced will have a huge impact on the future of Iraq and therefore should be considered when discussing America's role in the conflict.

Photo Caption: Panelists speak about the future of the U.S. military in Iraq at a forum hosted by the United States Institute of Peace

Iraqi Refugees in Jordan: The View from the Ground

Last Thursday, as I lunched in the stately dinning room of one of Northwest D.C.'s Victorian brownstones, I listened to a fascinating discussion of the refugee situation in Jordan. Sitting at the head of the table was Noah Merrill of Electronic Iraq, who just returned from Jordan, where he spent hundred of hours interviewing Iraqi refugees.

Although there are approximately one million Iraqi refugees in Jordan, the interviewees were not easy to locate, Noah told us. Despite the UNHCR estimated 50,000 refugees fleeing to Jordan every month, there are no refugee camps; newly arrived refugees disappear into the densely-populated urban landscape of Jordan's biggest cities.

The untraceable existence of these refugees has several worrisome causes. First among these is Jordan's ability to shirk the responsibility, mandated by international law, to recognize and protect refugees within its borders. Jordan never signed on to the 1951 Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees for fear that in doing so, it would be committing itself to granting residency to the large numbers of Palestinian refugees within its borders. With 60 to 70 percent of the Jordanian population made up of these Palestinian refugees, Jordanians, who are the minority in their own country, view the influx of Iraqi refugees as a genuine existential threat to their country's national identity.

Refugees, therefore, are not seen by the Jordanian government as, well, refugees. To paraphrase as senior Jordanian official: "Jordan does not have a refugee problem; Jordan has an illegal immigration problem." Thus viewed as illegal immigrants, Iraqi refugees are prohibited from working. Forced by financial circumstances to defy this prohibition, Iraqis try their best to stay under the radar. If caught, they face deportation back across the border, into the lawless terrorist haven of Al-Anbar province.

Other factors also make the climate inhospitable to Iraqi refugees. For example, the UN Refugee Agency, under pressure from the Jordanian government, has stopped issuing refugee certificates to Iraqis, and instead grants them refugees cards with the largely hollow "temporary asylum seeker" status.

Also, Noah continued, the Jordanian government, echoing a similar threat it made last year, has stated that it will expel all Iraqi children from schools - public and private. Amelia Templeton, an Iraqi refugee advocate and former NPR correspondent, said that when she interviewed Jordan's Minister of Education, he cited the cost and pressure on classroom size caused by the refugee influx as the rationale behind such measures. Yet Jordanian officials have begun to shut down schools operating out of churches - independent, informal schools which have no presumable impact on public classrooms. Noah pointed out the devastating effects such measures are having on the Iraqis, a people whose culture deeply prizes education.

In order for Iraqi refugees to ensure that they will not be deported back to Iraq, they have two options: leave Jordan and flee to a more hospitable country like Egypt, or try to gain residency status. This second option is only available to Iraqis that have the ability to put a certain amount of money into Jordanian banks. Essentially, says Noah, the Jordanian government is following international conventions to protect one type of refugee: the wealthy refugee.

A final factor threatening many Iraqi refugees in Jordan is a virulent and "intentionally constructed" anti-Shia sentiment, says Noah. State-led propaganda campaigns spread the belief that the Iraqi Shia community is responsible for bringing Americans into Iraq and for the "assassination" of Saddam Hussein. As a result of these sentiments, Iraqi Shia refugees that try to form self-help communities are deported back to Iraq.

Noah Merill ended the discussion by saying that the refugee crisis represents a political problem. As such, humanitarian aid is necessary - but not sufficient - when it comes to dealing effectively with this problem. He says that a plan that helps get Iraqi refugees back into Iraq should be fundamental to any proposed solution. This is, he said, what the refugees he interviewed truly desired - to go home.

With American NGO participants just coming back into town from last week's UN-led conference to address the Iraqi displacement crisis, I am trying to track down any information about whether such a plan is in the works. But with the fragile security environment in Iraq constantly undermined by ongoing violence, I have to wonder what the prospects for such a plan really are at this point.

For more information on Iraq's refugee emergency, be sure to check out EPIC's interview with refugee advocate Sean Garcia of Refugees International.

Invite an Iraqi Refugee Family into Your Home

Our friend JennyJo, a filmaker and producer at Democracy Now!, has a family she would like to introduce you to.

She met the Al-Khamisi family earlier this year. They are Iraqi Sabeans who follow the teachings of John the Baptist. They once lived in the "city of peace", the proprietors of a Baghdad jewelry shop. Now they reside in the shadows of Amman, Jordan. Once you know their story, learn about their terrible loss, and allow their words to reach your heart, you will not be able to forget them.



According to some estimates, there are more than 700,000 Iraqi refugees in Jordan -- roughly 20% of the population. For the United States, that would be the equivalent of 60 million Iraqi war refugees!

But I'm not asking you to open your doors to so many: just one. One family. One story. Invite the Al-Khamisi family into your home. Invite them into your workplace. Share their story with loved ones and colleagues, and help awaken America and the world to the urgent needs of Iraq's war refugees.

Gates: Under US Redeployment, Ethnic Cleansing Likely

Yesterday, Defense Secretary Robert Gates underscored a dire consequence of the redeployment of U.S. troops in Iraq:

"One real possibility is, if we abandon some of these areas and withdraw into the countryside or whatever to do these targeted missions, you could have a fairly significant ethnic cleansing inside Baghdad or in Iraq more broadly."

U.S. actions in Iraq have served as the catalyst for the collision of many underlying, dangerous elements of Iraqi society. One of these elements is corruption; coming of age under Saddam's regime, many in the current generation of Iraqi politicians use their political clout to advance their own group's agendas rather than the well-being of all Iraqis. Another element is sectarianism, with the major political parties defining themselves along sectarian lines. As a wartime sense of criminal immunity propels sectarian violence, and political parties back militias that "cleanse" neighborhoods until they are entirely Shia or entirely Sunni, the chances for large-scale ethnic cleansing in parts of Iraq are high.

But what is stopping it? Ironically, it seems to be the presence of U.S. troops. In a January hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Cornyn and the Secretary Gates pointed to the role that U.S. forces are playing in maintaining a fragile level of peace--and, as a result, warding off large-scale ethnic cleansing:

SEN. CORNYN: "What would be the humanitarian consequences [if US forces in Iraq are redeployed]? What would be the likely outcomes in terms of loss of life to innocent men, women and children in that region if some of these dire consequences do occur?"

SEC. GATES: "I think one of the consequences -- we're already seeing some internal immigration and to a limited extent ethnic cleansing. And I would suspect that one consequence would be a fairly dramatic increase both in internal immigration, the number of displaced persons, but also ethnic cleansing. Sir, clearly in my mind there would be additional increased murders, sectarian violence. I don't know how much, but certainly a large increase in that..."

SEN. CORNYN: Well, if I could just say in closing that many people in this country are justly concerned about the genocide in Darfur, where hundreds of thousands of people have died. And I've -- with others who've traveled to Iraq -- I remember traveling with the chairman to Iraq in 2003 and standing on the edge of a mass-grave site where the United Nations said in that and similar sites 400,000, perhaps, Iraqis lay dead at the hand of Saddam Hussein, and perhaps a million more people had simply exited the country during his regime in order to avoid a similar fate. So I hope that we will focus a little bit more on the consequences of failure in Iraq. And that will fuel us and encourage us to at least try to heed the advice of the president's most expert military advisers, present company included, to try to avoid that failure, because I agree that the consequences of failure are simply unacceptable."

In all of the political posturing and agenda-advancing taking place in Washington over the president's request for a $100 billion funding bill, our leaders must not lose sight of the need to protect Iraqi civilians. With 3.9 million displaced Iraqis clinging to a hope that normalcy can be restored to their fractured lives, childhoods being destroyed as children are used as decoys in car bombings, and dozens and dozens of sectarian-motivated murders taking place every day, the U.S. must do everything it can to protect civilians and care for those who have been affected by this war.

And They Suffer in the South Too...

Last week I discussed the difficulties internally displaced people (IDP's) were having in the Kurdish north of Iraq; entry restrictions are strict, cost of living is prohibitively high and little to no aid is allocated for those who have fled their homes with little more than the clothes on their back.

Unfortunatly, the Refugees International report I referenced is one of the only places in which the IDP situation is discussed at length. Most U.S., U.N. and even Iraqi institutions fail to even acknowledge that there is an IDP crisis.

The RI report, however, seems to have created a little bit of momentum. Yesterday IraqSlogger published a piece detailing the plight of IDP's in the south of Iraq. According to local officials in the southern provinces, there are nearly a million displaced people in urgent need of food, medicines and municipal services. And unlike the Kurdish north, which is protected by its own security forces, much of the south is plagued by violence. Thus even though aid may be available, often times it cannot be delivered due to security concerns. The south is also considerably poorer than the north and so can offer few jobs to the massive influx of IDP's.

Fareed Abbas, a spokesman for Najaf-based NGO the Muslim Organisation for Peace (MOP), said the central government was unwilling to provide sufficient funds to develop sanitation, education and electricity projects in the southern provinces:

“We have appealed dozens of times to the central government to help in such critical circumstances but we haven’t got any response yet. Instead, over the past few months, their assistance has decreased considerably, leaving people without support and infrastructure."

Dr. Aziz Ali Baroud, a physician at Najaf Main Hospital, explains that the health care system cannot cope with the dramatic increase in people:

“At least one person dies in our hospital every day due to lack of assistance or medicines. If you add all the people dying for the same reason in all the hospitals in the southern provinces, the number becomes very serious."

-----------
Only recently did the U.S. and international community acknowledge the refugees crisis. It took intense lobbying, multiple public awareness campaigns, tens of op-eds and several Congressional hearings, but eventually the scope and implications of the crisis were appreciated by one and all: The State Department created a displacement task force, the U.S. upped its quota for accepting Iraqi refugees, the Senate included $65 million in their version of the supplemental to deal with the crisis and the international community collectively provided millions more.

With tens of thousands of Iraqis being displaced within Iraq every month, I can only hope that it will not take as long to begin effectively addressing the crisis now that people are becoming aware of its scope. It is a good sign, however, that the Senate version of the supplemental provides $65 million for just Iraqi IDP's alone. We can only hope that whatever ultimately happens to the Senate version -veto or no veto- this provision makes it through to the final spending bill.

"Iraqi Volunteers, Iraqi Refugees: What is America's Obligation?"

I went to a House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia hearing yesterday concerning the plight of the millions of displaced Iraqis, both within and outside Iraq. The panelists testimonies covered a number of topics: personal stories of Iraqi civilians who have aided the U.S. and therefore are facing extreme danger; the millions of Iraqis living outside of the country and the humanitarian crisis in which they find themselves; the challenges lawmakers must confront in backing legislation that funds acceleration of the resettlement process; as well as the need for the U.S. to finally come to terms with the humanitarian catastrophe in Iraq and accept the moral responsibility of addressing it.

The first panel consisted of Ellen Sauerbrey, Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration. The second panel was made up of Major General Paul D. Eaton; George Packer, staff writer at The New Yorker; Kristele Younes, refugee advocate at Refugees International; and a former employee of the U.S. embassy in Baghdad who, for security purposes, had to go by the alias "Sarah."

The common theme of the hearing was that it has taken the Administration and lawmakers far too long to acknowledge and address the suffering of displaced Iraqis, especially those who have risked their lives by working with American and Coalition forces. Assistant Secretary Sauerbrey attempted to explain why admitting Iraqi refugees into the U.S. is such a lengthy process and why the Administration has not taken legislative or monetary steps to provide relief and safety for the 3.9 million displaced Iraqis. She explained that the Presidential determination for resettlement this year is 70,000 inclusive, and that 10% of that--or 7,000 spots--is designated for Iraqis. Representative Mike Pence of Indiana, suggested that 7,000 is UNHCR's capacity for processing refugees, not ours. He went on to state that there is a nonpartisan consensus that the problem should be addressed and that questions should be asked.

Chairman Gary L. Ackerman of New York agreed, stating that if lawmakers and the Administration were serious about processing Iraqi refugees it could be done. Sauerbrey argued that since 9/11, and the Immigration of Nationality Act, the process has gotten much longer for Homeland Security to conduct security clearances. Four to six months is the average length of time for someone to go through the process of asylum.

Many obstacles are facing Iraqis as they seek refuge. For example, there is no way of processing IDPs for resettlement; they must first leave Iraq under extremely dangerous conditions and then apply through UNHCR in a neighboring country. If someone has paid a ransom for a kidnapped family member, or paid off the insurgency for their own lives, the U.S. considers this "providing material support to terrorists"and the individuals will not be granted visas under the provisions of the PATRIOT and Real ID Acts. Iraqis who worked or are still working with the U.S. are not allowed housing in the Green Zone, and no protection is given to them. Only 500 Special Immigrant Visas are given a year, and only to direct hires of the government; this is not including the countless Iraqis who worked for contractors and subcontractors.

Major General Eaton explained that 70,000 Chinese and 80,000 Indian immigrants were accepted into the United States in 2006. He urged lawmakers to immediately identify Iraqis who have helped the U.S. and grant them asylum, regardless of quotas. George Packer argued that, "We cannot allow more Iraqis to die while we fine-tune refugee settlement." His first recommendation was to make in-country processing available, or at the very least, to ensure safe transfer to neighboring countries. Kristele Younes warned lawmakers that the problem stretches farther than Iraqis who have aided U.S. efforts; the millions living in Syria and Jordan, and those displaced within the country should not be forgotten. She urged an increase in funding for local Iraqi and International NGOs, as well as fully endorsing UNHCR recommendations.

"Sarah" relayed her personal story of working with the U.S. and being hopeful that she would be a part of the liberation and democratization of Iraq. She now lives in Jordan, unable to return to her home in Iraq. She did not receive protection while working for the CPA, and was eventually fired when her job was given to a Jordanian citizen. Today, "Sarah" lives in fear, with nowhere to go; she is considered by many of her countrymen to be a traitor and a spy. She said that she does not regret having worked with the Americans in Iraq, only that she trusted the U.S. government, but they never trusted Iraqis.

Real initiatives must be taken to address the plight of the 3.9 million displaced Iraqis. General Eaton asked that our government act with the dignity and respect that the Iraqi people deserve. Chairman Ackerman explained that:

If the world's only superpower cannot protect Iraqis from the danger we put them in, then we are facing a bigger problem than I thought.

He stated that there must be funding and legislation put forth to back the rhetoric of concern coming from the Administration.

The Senate Supplemental- Fact Sheet and Why EPIC Did Not Oppose It All Together

Threw together this resource for work and thought it might interest a few of you out there.

After going through the entire Senate version of the supplemental S.965 and the committee report here are all funds I could find being appropriated for relief and development in Iraq:

• $100 million for CAP, of which $5 million is for the Marla Fund
• $65 million for Iraq refugees including $5 million specifically for Iraqi scholars
• $65 million for Iraqi IDP’s as part of International Disaster and Famine Assistance
• $55 million to replenish US Emergency Refugees and Migration Assistance Fund (could be used for Iraq)
• Sec. 1711 seems to relax the restrictions for Iraqis seeking refuge in the U.S.
• $5 million for Iraqi civilians who have suffered losses as a result of the military operations
• $384 million for the Community Stabilization Program [CSP]
• $100 million to restart state factories
• $385 million for democracy, governance, human rights, and rule of law programs in Iraq including: $40 million for Human Rights; $10 million for Women’s Programs; $20 million for Support for Medial and $200 million to continue Democracy Programs, Civil Society and Political Party Development
• $70 million for Private Sector Agribusiness development
• $20 million for Financial Markets Development and Strengthening
• $456.4 million for CERPs
• $1 billion for PRT’s according to Senate Appropriations Summary of the bill

Also, a few people have written in asking why EPIC supports the supplemental, as much of the funding is appropriated for the military surge. Some have suggested that only once troops have withdrawn from Iraq, should we appropriate funds for reconstruction and aid. The point is that the people of Iraq cannot wait through the months of political debate on the Hill that would be needed to reverse current Administration policy. We have a humanitarian emergency on our hands. Tens of thousands of Iraqis are fleeing their homes every month while those who can’t leave are suffering from an inadequate public health system, 60% unemployment rate and a security situation that fails to guarantee them even a tomorrow.

Congress will pass a supplemental spending bill in some form or another to support the troops that are already there. This much is clear. The number of votes needed to oppose the bill simply aren't there. Whether they add restrictions, timelines, etc is not our primary concern, though we are certainly against further fighting in Iraq. This Administration has been wrong to seek a military solution to the problems of Iraq. We have repeatedly stated this, and gone even further by suggesting effective solutions to the crisis, namely relief and development. Our main concern is the people of Iraq who are suffering greatly due to this Administration's short-sighted policies and failed initiatives. All we are asking is that Congress appropriates a small percentage of the supplemental funds to help the people of Iraq. I’m looking through the House version now and it includes $25 million for spinach producers (p. 291) and $60 million for salmon fisheries (p. 216) among other expenditures extraneous to Iraq. Surely we can include something for millions of Iraqis.

The Internal Refugees

Our friends at Refugees International have just released a report based on a two-week assessment mission in the Kurdish areas of N. Iraq undertaken by RI Advocate Kristele Younes and journalist Nir Rosen. Of late much of the focus on the displacement crisis has centered on the refugee crisis. So while we often hear of the difficulties Iraqis have finding refuge in neighboring countries, no one has really discussed difficulties internally displaced Iraqis have.

As one of the most secure areas in Iraq (due mostly to the fact that it is protected by its own security forces) Kurdistan is a very popular destination for internal refugees; but getting there is not easy. They must first pass through multiple security checkpoints and then provide the name of a guarantor, a "Kurdish resident of one of the the three Northern Governorates, who can attest to the morality and identity of the displaced." Even so, single Arab men are rarely allowed in, and Muslim Arabs in general have a much harder time getting in than Christians or Kurds.

The problems, however, do not stop once allowed through. Though the security situation is certainly more stable in the Kurdish north, internal refugees face dire economic prospects. Most are unable to find work and are thus unable to keep up with the high cost of living in this region. A Sunni Arab woman from Baghdad told Refugees International that she and her husband had decided to return to Baghdad with their two children despite the threats they had received for being Sunni. “My husband can’t find work here, and the rent is too expensive. Everything is cheaper in Baghdad. God will protect us, I hope.” This is just incredible.

While the situation of Iraq's IDP's continues to deteriorate, no Iraqi, U.S. or U.N. institution has to actually mount an effective response. Why? Because they don't even really acknowledge it as an issue. The report goes on to say, "In fact, the Iraqi Government’s refusal to declare a humanitarian crisis is leading donors to question whether their funds are really needed to assist the displaced." The U.N. Refugee Agency (UNHCR ), which has primary responsibility for the displaced people in the Kurdish and southern regions only has about $9 million to spend on the this year. RI quotes a UNHCR official as saying, “If we were looking at responding to real needs, then even $150 million would not be enough.”

We have made some small steps in dealing with the refugee problem, but have yet to even begin to address the IDP crisis. Hopefully this will report will motivate the U.S., U.N. and even Iraqi institutions to take the problem seriously.
----
UPDATE: You can hear Kristele Younes, one of the authors of the report, discussing the IDP crisis on NPR's Morning Edition.

Iraq: The Human Cost of War

Things have been very busy around the office here at EPIC lately. We've been working to set up an action site to let our members tell Congress about the extent of the humanitarian crisis in and around Iraq. So it was a nice change of pace to head over to Georgetown University's Iraq Remembrance Week to see a panel event titled "Iraq: The Human Cost of War" yesterday morning.

In the course of their presentations and the subsequent Q & A session, panelists Roberta Cohen of Brookings, Wendy Young of UNHCR, documentarian Adam Shapiro, and Larry Bartlett of the State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration did not disappoint. There was some talk of posting a transcript of the event to Georgetown's Center for Contemporary Arab Studies Program website, but until that gets posted, here is an overview of the information covered:

Latest estimates put the total number of IPDs and refugees at 3.9 million, with 700,000-800,000 people displaced in the last year. These individuals, which include not only Iraqi nationals but also 45,000 non-Iraqis, are fleeing to refugee camps in soccer stadiums and even cemeteries. The 3.9-million figure does not factor in the hundreds of thousand of additional Iraqis in "pre-displacement"--a state in which they are afraid to go to work and/or afraid to sleep in their own homes at night.

The Middle East has not seen such a large scale displacement crisis since 1948.

With half the displaced population living on less than 1$US a day, the State Department is seeking more funds to add to the efforts of UNHCR and other organizations helping to mitigate the humanitarian crisis. Notably, Larry Bartlett mentioned that the US obligations to the crisis are not solely financial. He also explained that, we must continue to honor America's diplomatic obligations to displaced Iraqis by working with neighboring states to create safe spaces for those forced from their homes. Roberta Cohen suggested that they US needs to increase aid to Jordan and Syria as their economies and infrastructure strain under the influx of refugees. Currently in Jordan, Iraqi refugees are not issued work permits, and this has brought about a rise in child labor and prostitution among the refugees.

The question of resettlement also came up. Larry Bartlett and his colleagues at the State Department must be given credit for permitting the US resettlement of 7,000 Iraqis. UNHCR is hoping to increase this number significantly, as well as increasing resettlement rates in other countries. Some have pointed to the expeditious resettlement of 20,000 Iraqis in the US following a failed uprising against Saddam Hussein in the early 1990's as a possible model for the current situation. Yet this is complicated by the "material support bars" of the PATRIOT and Real ID Acts that exclude anyone who has given money to armed groups from entry to the United States. Adam Shapiro pointed out that in Iraq, many families are forced to pay armed groups just to recover the bodies of their dead loved ones. Thus, few in Iraq have been lucky enough to not be forced to take actions that the US brands as "terrorism." Larry Bartlett said that he and his colleagues at State will "work strenuously to make sure this hurdle is overcome."

Under a civil-war containment scenario (in which US troops redeploy to seal off Iraq's borders to prevent the spread of violence to neighboring states), dubbed "Plan B," camps would spring up inside Iraq's borders for those fleeing civil war, yet unable to escape Iraq due to the border closures. These camps would have to be protected by soldiers, and this poses several problems. First, according to Larry Bartlett, both the soldiers and the displaced persons at the camps would become easy targets for those seeking to propagate the violence in Iraq. The second problem, noted Roberta Cohen, is that the camps would become de facto "detention centers" for displaced persons. By closing off Iraq's borders, "Plan B" would both violate Iraqi rights to freedom of movement and deny Iraqis the chance to seek asylum in neighboring states. Lastly, Wendy Young pointed to the region's problematic and painful history of refugee camps, as well as the sense of dependency and disenfranchisement that these camps generate.

Finally, Wendy Young mentioned an upcoming UNHCR-hosted conference that will address the international community's response to the humanitarian crisis in Iraq. Invitations to this ministerial-level conference have been extended to 192 member states as well as over 60 NGOs. With Refugees International's new report that says Iraqis forced from their homes are not receiving adequate humanitarian assistance, and the NYT reporting this morning that the war has resulted in "the world's fastest-growing populations of refugees and internally displaced peoples," it is time for the Bush Administration to act. We here at EPIC are not alone in hoping that Secretary Rice will make all efforts to attend the UNHCR meeting in April and, as Roberta Cohen put it, "acknowledge the United States' specific responsibility for this humanitarian crisis."

Congress needs to act as well. And you can help to make that happen by going here.

Developments

• The IMF has extended its $700+ million for another 6 months Mr. Takatoshi Kato, Deputy Managing Director and Acting Chair, stated:

"Iraq is entering a crucial period in its economic recovery. Despite very difficult political and security circumstances, the Iraqi authorities have taken important measures to keep their economic program on track...Corruption and violence need to be brought under control to unlock Iraq's oil wealth. More forceful actions are needed, especially in the area of smuggling."

• Radar Online has an interview with a former linguist who worked in Iraq. "The [linguists] are looked down on in the army as prima donnas who need a slap-down. They don't see it as a tool. Patriot missiles are seen as a tool"

• and the NY Times has a story on how difficult it is for Iraqis to find refuge in the U.S.:

"For days, he trekked from Iraq to Turkey and from Turkey to Greece. He slipped through remote rural villages and crossed a river’s rushing waters to escape the violence that had left his cousin dead and his father in hiding.

Finally, after paying smugglers to get him on flights to Spain, Brazil, Guatemala and Mexico, he joined the crush of Spanish-speaking migrants on a bus ride to America’s doorstep."

Iraqi Displacement Crisis Update

Erik Gustafson, the executive director here at EPIC, sat down last Friday to talk to Columbia University Radio's Lisa Desai about the dramatic policy shift that will allow 7,000 Iraqi refugees to come to the U.S. (listen to the broadcast). Prior to last week's announcement of the change, many U.S. officials were refusing to acknowledge that displacement was actually happening in Iraq. Now, by extending an invitation to 7,000 displaced Iraqis and pledging $18 million to assist millions fleeing the violence, the U.S. is certainly taking a step in the right direction.

Unfortunately, as Iraq’s displacement crisis continues to grow at an alarming rate, much more will be needed. Given the role that the U.S. has played in helping to create the crisis, it is essential that the U.S. increase funding for the international relief operations of the UN Refugee Agency and other multilateral groups, covering at least 50% of their needed funds.

The good news is that the U.S. has the ability to fill the funding gaps facing these aid organizations. The US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI) is calling on our leaders to provide $250 million for refugee assistance and resettlement. To put that figure into perspective, take a look at these projected U.S. spending figures for the current fiscal year:

Bullets: $851 million
Agricultural Subsidies: $16.623 billion

That means that the $250 million that USCRI is calling for is only 2.9% of what the U.S. will spend on bullets this year. And it is only 1.5% what the U.S. will spend on agricultural subsidies. It is clear that the Bush administration and Congress have the ability to mitigate the suffering of the displaced—the question is, how long will it take until they do more about it?

US to Accept More Refugees

It seems that the Displacement Task Force I reported on last week will soon be quite busy. According to today's New York Times, the Bush administration and the United Nations will announce a plan later this week to bring thousands of Iraqi refugees to the U.S. over the next ten months. While this will hardly make a dent in resolving the crisis -there are approximately 2 million refugees- it is certainly a step in the right direction. Such measures are all the more urgent given that Syria, which previously had the only open border in the region, is no longer issuing three month visas to Iraqis.

UPDATE: The number of Iraqis let in has been set at 7,000 not including those Iraqis deemed to be at risk for having worked with the US government inside Iraqi and who may be given US residency under a separate program according to State Dept. spokesman Sean McCormack. Also seems amount of aid pledged to resettling refugees is $18 million. Will have full blog post in morning as more details become available.

Shia-Sunni Grouping Call for Return of Displaced

An interesting story in the Al-Mada:

"During a recent meeting held in the city, the Sadrist current, Sunni Endowment and the Islamic Party called for Sunni mosques to reopen and Sunni displaced families to return to Basra. The groups pledged that security would be provided to Sunni interests. A joint Sunni-Shia committee was formed to follow-up on these promises, said Sheikh Adnan al-Silani, who is in charge of tribal affairs and public gatherings for the Sadr office in Basra. The two sides recently held a conference on Sunni-Shia brotherhood during which they pledged to end sectarian violence in the city."

A rift has been growing between the two secs on account of the level of violence but there was not always such a divide. The Shia and Sunni have a history of cooperation with many families and tribes actually being mixed. For more on the issue of sectarian identity, read this excerpt from an interview we conducted with Professor Eric Davis.

New Displacement Task Force

According to a press release put out yesterday, the State Department has established the Iraq Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons Task Force. Its purpose is to coordinate refugee and IDP assistance to the region and refugees resettlement. It will also "devise strategies for Iraqis at risk because of their work with the U.S. Government." This comes on the heels of a recent Senate hearing on the refugee crisis during which two Iraqis employed by the coalition testified to how difficult it is to gain entry into the United States despite having risked their lives for the coalition effort.

According to the United Nations, about two million Iraqis, some eight per cent of the pre-war population, have fled the country to escape the war and mounting sectarian violence. Of those, only 466 have been allowed entry into the United States. The task force will be headed by Under Secretary of State for Democracy and Global Affairs Paula Dobriansky.

Though this is certainly a welcome sign, the creation of this task force still cannot make up for the fact that President Bush has not said a word about the displacement crisis. We can only hope that this task force is not merely a token gesture and actually does something about the growing displacement crisis in Iraq.