Reports: 8/6/2008

Key reports on the Iraq relief and development:

Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Revenues, Expenditures, and Surplus
Government Accountability Office (GAO)
August 2008
From 2005 through 2007, the Iraqi government generated an estimated $96 billion in cumulative revenues (mostly from oil sales). For 2008, GAO estimates that Iraq could generate as much as $86 billion in total revenues. From 2005 through 2007, the Iraqi government spent an estimated $67 billion on operating and investment activities. The Iraqi government spent only 1% of total expenditures to maintain Iraq- and U.S.-funded investments such as buildings, water and electricity installations. From 2005 through 2007, Iraq was unable to spend all its budgeted funds. In 2007, Iraq spent 80% of its $29 billion operating budget and 28% of its $12 billion investment budget. For 2008, GAO estimates that Iraq could spend as much as $35.9 billion of its $49.9 billion budget. As a result, GAO estimates a cumulative budget surplus of about $29 billion from 2005 to 2007 and projects an additional $38 to $50 billion budget surplus for 2008 (although a proposed $22 billion Iraqi budget supplemental could reduce this projected surplus). U.S. and international officials identify the shortage of trained staff, weak procurement and budgeting systems, violence and sectarian strife, and other factors affecting the Iraqi government’s ability to spend more of its revenues on capital investments.

Failed Responsibility: Iraqi Refugees in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon
International Crisis Group (ICG)
July 2008
Although the security situation in Iraq shows progress, Iraqi refugees remain stranded, jobless and deprived of essential services, while the Iraqi government and the wider international community have failed in their responsibilities and are ill prepared to cope with a new refugee crisis, should it occur. While initially welcoming their Iraqi brethren, ICG reports that Syria and Jordan have put tough restrictions on entry. They provide few basic services and inadequate opportunities for jobs, health care and children's education. If the host countries can be faulted for unfriendly treatment of refugees, they deserve credit for receiving so many at great cost to their societies. By contrast, it is difficult to give the Iraqi government any credit. Flush with oil money, it has been conspicuously ungenerous toward its citizens stranded abroad. The attitude of Western nations also has been deeply troubling.

Iraq Displacement 2008 Mid-Year in Review
International Organization for Migration (IOM)
July 2008
During the first half of 2008, trends of decreased violence and a declining rate of displacement continued throughout the country. Yet the deteriorating conditions facing the 2.8 million Internally Displaced People (IDPs), as well as the limited returnee population, remain one of the most serious humanitarian crises in the world. The report finds that about half of the population continue to get their water from unsafe sources -- 53% from nearby rivers and streams and 52% from open or broken pipes. Meanwhile, shelter is consistently among the highest-priority needs cited by IDPs, and eviction threats coupled with rapidly rising rental prices have created an even more precarious housing situation in recent months. Food access was also poor, only three in ten had regular access to food rations. About half had intermittent access and 21% no access at all. In addition, approximately two million Iraqis are refugees, mostly in neighboring Syria and Jordan, resulting in a total of 5 million internally and externally displaced.

Assessment on Returns to Iraq Amongst Iraqi Refugee Population in Syria
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)
April 2008
A survey of nearly 1,000 Iraqis currently staying in Syria has shown that 95 percent fled their homeland because of direct threats or general insecurity and that only 4 percent currently had plans to return to Iraq.

Consolidated Appeal for Iraq 2008
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
February 2008
Conflict in Iraq has exacerbated chronic problems that stem from the past two decades. An estimated four million people in the country are in need of food assistance as the Public Distribution System is weakened, and only 40 percent of the population has reliable access to safe drinking water. As part of the global Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) for 2008, the $265 million Emergency Appeal for Iraq brings together 14 UN agencies and 10 NGOs to deliver urgent relief to vulnerable people in Iraq over the next 12 months. Priority areas include health and nutrition, education, water and sanitation, housing and shelter, food, and protection. These operations are designed to move into recovery programs and are part of a wider effort to support Iraq’s own goals for stability and recovery.

New SIGIR Report Outlines Reconstruction Challenges

As President Bush and Congress continue their stalemate over the 2007 supplemental spending bill, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) released its latest quarterly report today, stating in no uncertain terms that worsening security conditions, ongoing violence and far-reaching corruption will keep Iraqis from managing their country's reconstruction for the foreseeable future. The report echoes the recent sentiments of General David Petraeus, the U.S. military commander in Iraq, who admits that challenges still lay ahead in Iraq and anticipates "an enormous [U.S.] commitment" for some time to come.

The latest SIGIR report cites several trends in Iraq that are contributing to the setbacks in U.S. reconstruction efforts, chiefly:

* Corruption - The report notes that $5 billion is lost every year in Iraq due to fraud "which 'afflicts virtually every Iraqi ministry,' particularly the oil, interior and defense ministries." On a positive note, the report says that the Maliki government is making some strides toward ousting corruption within its ranks, so far weeding out eight ministers and 40 directors general, who are awaiting prosecution for the mismanagement of $8 billion in reconstruction funds.

* Violence & Unrest - Though the frequency of violent attacks seems to be down in Iraq, the scale of each attack has become more devastating, killing more people and crippling rebuilding efforts of desperately-needed public services. According to a BBC article, "The U.S. Defense Department says there are on average 1.4 attacks on critical electricity, water, oil and gas facilities each week." The SIGIR report adds, "Repair teams sent in after attacks continue to face threats, including kidnapping and murder." In a separate report, the State Department noted that in 2006 45 percent of the 14,338 terror attacks around the world took place in Iraq, an increase of 29 percent from the previous year.

* Poor Maintenance & Sustainability - The latest SIGIR report finds that, when projects are finally handed over to Iraqis, they "are not being adequately maintained." This is largely due to poor training and management. Take SIGIR’s evaluation of a hospital in Irbil, for example, where inspectors found that "a sophisticated oxygen distribution system was not used because staff did not trust it.” They also noted that needles and bandages were being tossed into the sewer system, causing it to clog, because the incinerator installed to deal with such waste was not in use. Why? Inspectors say it’s because no one on staff at the hospital was trained on how to operate the incinerator and, on top of that, no one had the key to unlock the incinerator door.

From a policy standpoint, what does the latest SIGIR report really mean? It further reinforces the importance of alternative solutions, pressing our leaders to reevaluate the United States’ current reconstruction strategy and urging them to seriously consider a new approach.

That's exactly what Congress and the White House have the opportunity to do with this year’s supplemental. By using this critical report and considering alternative approaches – such as those advocated by noted experts like Eric Davis and Lisa Schirch – Congress and the White House have the ability to fund a new strategy for peacebuilding in Iraq, leveraging a plan that could significantly and immediately improve the quality of life for millions of Iraqi families.

The challenge now is getting them to listen.

Just 0.4% More Could Save Millions of Iraqis

Yesterday Emily mentioned that EPIC and 40 other NGOs including Amnesty International, Mercy Corps, the Muslim Public Affairs Council, Iraq Foundation and Refugees International had sent a letter to Congress urging members to amend President Bush's $99.6 billion 2007 Supplemental to include more money for development projects and humanitarian crisis response.

The letter was initiated by the Iraq Peace and Development Working Group (IPDWG), a newly-formed NGO working group advocating policy improvements to reduce human suffering and conflict in Iraq.

One would think that a sum as large as $99.6 billion would adequately cover all facets of our involvement in Iraq, but an overwhelming majority of the request ($93.4 billion) is on behalf of the Department of Defense, once again demonstrating this administration's over-reliance on a military solution to the conflict in Iraq.

Bush has requested $5.99 billion of the remainder for the State Department. Of this sum, $2.3 billion is ear-marked for foreign assistance for Iraq. Secretary Rice broke this figure down further in her February 27th testimony to Congress. The aid-related numbers:

• $428 million for democracy programs to support greater engagement with political parties, civil society organizations and national political institutions such as parliament.
• $60 million for humanitarian programs to support the growing number of displaced people within Iraq who have fled areas due to sectarian violence.

Let's start with the last figure: $60 million to aid and resettle displaced Iraqis who have fled from the violence. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) approximately 3.7 million Iraqis, or 1 out of every 8, have been displaced by violence, with tens of thousands more fleeing every single month. While the figure is certainly a great improvement, it falls far short of what is needed to even begin to adequately address the displacement crisis. Several NGOs party to the letter who have operations on the ground in Iraq conducted a needs assessment and determined that at least $290 million would be needed to address the effects of the crisis.

With $290 million the U.S. will be able to:

• assist refugee-hosting countries with strained social services
• fund local NGO's to take care of basic needs of refugees
• fulfill 50% of UNHCR's funding appeal and 20% of the International Committee for the Red Cross' appeal
• resettle 20,000 Iraqis over FY07 and FY08
• assist internally displaced people (IDP's) with housing, food, healthcare, etc

Likewise the $428 million for democracy building is an improvement, but as the letter notes the Community Action Program (CAP) is still not fully-funded, despite it being one of the few successfull programs in Iraq. In the supplemental the administration asked for $50 million for CAP, a 50% decrease from previous years. The NGO letter asks that Congress restore full funding to CAP by granting it an extra $50 million. In addition, the letter also asks for an extra $100 million to support Iraqi civil society, conflict resolution and peace-building strategies, and the advancement of human rights and rule of law. All together, the letter asks for $440 million to address this critical funding gap for relief and development projects.

According to the Congressional Budget Office, approximately $30 billion has been spent to date on foreign aid and diplomatic operations in Iraq. Unfortunatly, as the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction has found, much of this money has been wasted due to a lack of proper oversight. For more on this see these previous postings:

The CBO report notes that to date no funding has been provided to promote local economic development nor to assist local governance in 2007. I suppose just the fact that the supplemental includes funding for such projects is somewhat reassuring. However, it is clear to the 40 national organizations that signed the letter that more money, at least $440 million, is needed to ensure they can be effective.

That is an increase to the current supplemental of only 0.4%. Surely the futures and lives of millions of Iraqis are worth an extra 0.4%.

Oversight of Iraq Relief & Reconstruction Programs

Yesterday I sat in on a State/Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee hearing on Iraq reconstruction oversight. Witnesses included Stuart Bowen, the Special Inspector General of Iraq Reconstruction; Donald Gambatesa, Inspector General of the USAID; and Howard J. Krongard, Inspector General for the State Department. The purpose of the hearing was to determine what after four years and $38 billion for Iraq relief and reconstruction, have we achieved?

First to testify was Stuart Bowen, of SIGIR. His testimony gave a relatively positive report on the success of reconstruction projects, but he said that Iraqis--and one must presume Americans as well--did not hear about the successes, only the failures. Here are some highlights of his statement before the committee:

"SIGIR investigations have produced five arrests and four convictions, with another 23 cases under prosecution at the Department of Justice...SIGIR advice and recommendations on policy have promoted economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the conduct of the US reconstruction program in Iraq and have served as a deterrent to malfeasance...SIGIR audit have saved or recovered $50 million and have identified the potential to recover and additional $106 million. SIGIR investigators have recovered or seized $9.5 million in assets and are working on the recovery of an additional $15 million...SIGIR inspectors also found that engineering improvements to oil pipelines could increase oil exports and potentially increase the volume of Iraqi oil revenues by more than $1 billion annually if the pipeline can be effectively secured...To date, approximately 70 percent of the 80 projects inspected on sight by SIGIR complied with contract specifications."

For more on the SIGIR reports be sure to read these postings. Giving his statement next was Donald Gambatesa, Inspector General for USAID. His statement briefly mentioned the relative success of five USAID program areas: agriculture (96% success), basic education (40% success), civil society/local governance (date unavailable due to lack of monitoring), electrical power (68% success), and water/sanitation rehabilitation (88% success). Gambatesa echoed Bowen in saying that security conditions impeded the inspection of many project sites.

Gambatesa was followed by Howard J. Krongard, Inspector General for the State Department. His statement was more prescriptive than descriptive, as he suggested a way to "ameliorate the foregoing difficulties" of inspection and oversight (i.e. lack of security for inspector general personnel) by establishing a Middle East Regional Office "to provide oversight for crisis and post-conflict State Department programs in Iraq and elsewhere in the region."

Another interesting bit of the hearing came when Ranking Member Wolf suggested the creation of a "decider" position for all things reconstruction-related in Iraq, à la General MacArthur in post-WWII Japan.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were a recurrent topic since they are a critical part of Bush's New Strategy in Iraq. Chairwoman Lowey asked the Inspector Generals about the feasibility and efficacy of sending largely civilian PRTs into Iraq. Bowen responded that security was a problem for all 9 (mostly military) PRTs in Iraq at the time of his last quarterly audit. Although several efficacy audits of PRT efforts are currently underway and therefore there is no hard data to draw from, Bowen made it a point to mention the crucial role PRTs play in training local officials in democratic practices.

A Day of Reckoning for Bremer

The failure of the CPA to provide oversight of reconstruction programs in Iraq under their 2003-2004 watch has once again boiled to the surface of national media attention. Case in point: this story from today's Washington Post.

Allegedly, goes the article, some American civilians and service members directed Iraqi reconstruction funds toward an American businessman in exchange for $3,200 watches, swanky cars, and top-of-the-line laptops.

"'This indictment alleges that the defendants flagrantly enriched themselves at the expense of the Iraqi people -- the very people they were there to help,' said Paul J. McNulty, U.S. deputy attorney general."

If you're finding it easy to get mad at these particular crooks, don't spend all your ire in one place. You'll need plenty of it to cover all the instances of corruption and unadulterated incompetence in Iraq that took place under CPA rule. Brace yourselves, this isn't pretty:

Exhibit A: SIGIR Quarterly Report, January 2005, details the massive scope of money mismanagement by CPA.

Exhibit B: The Special Inspector General of Iraq Reconstruction himself gives testimony before the House Committee of Government Oversight & Reform. He says that:

"The CPA’s internal controls for approximately $8.8 billion in DFI funds disbursed to Iraqi ministries through the national budget process failed to provide sufficient accountability for the use of those funds. As noted in the report, the CPA did not establish or implement sufficient managerial, financial, and contractual controls to ensure DFI funds were used in a transparent manner."

Exhibit C: Former CPA director Bremer, before the same committee this past Tuesday, offered this explanation for the unaccounted $12 billion:

"The [SIGIR] report implies that we should have gone much further, seeking to impose modern financial control systems on the disbursement of these Iraqi funds by Iraqi ministries themselves--and this in less than a year, on a failed state in the middle of a war. I know of no one who spent meaningful time in Baghdad working with the Iraqi ministries who thought this was possible under the conditions we faced."

Bremer goes on to say that US and IMF pre-war planners felt that Iraqi ministries were the proper channels for distribution of the Development Fund for Iraq money, despite the ministries' notorious reputations for corruption. Bremer curtails his mea culpa for CPA's fund-dispersment related shortcomings with his statements that planning that denied the reality of the situation in Iraq is what really brought about the squandering of these funds.

But then there is the ugly suspicion that tracking the money was of dubious importance to Bremer and the CPA. It was, after all, Iraqi money generated from oil revenues and therefore did not consist of American taxpayer dollars. This Washington Post summary of Bremer's testimony has the details.

Wasted Billions/Equipping US Troops

The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) just released its quarterly report and truth be told I could probably just copy and paste my earlier blog entry on the last SIGIR report in this space. Little to no progress has been made in reviving crucial sectors of Iraq such as water and electricity, and reconstruction projects continue to suffer from poor construction practices and in a new twist, unwarranted extravagances. In one case, contractors building a camp for American trainers constructed an Olympic-size swimming pool that hadn't been ordered.

Once again at issue is a lack of effective oversight. The major contractors are passing on the contracts to Iraqi subcontractors without ever following up.

In its last report SIGIR revealed that 4% of the weapons that the United States had provided to Iraqi security forces could not be accounted for. This time around, SIGIR went a step further auditing the US' ability to equip the soldiers presently stationed in Iraq. SIGIR found that many soldiers have gone without guns, ammunition and other supplies necessary for the soldiers to complete missions. Soldiers have also been found lacking proper body armor, armored vehicles and communication devices. This Washington Post article has more details on the challenges the Pentagon is having equipping US troops.

So because of a lack of proper oversight, billions have been wasted on shoddy reconstruction projects essentially depriving US soldiers of the equipment they count on to survive in Iraq. And this is not even taking into account the 21,000 extra troops that will soon be arriving in Iraq. How will we properly equip them, if we can't even manage to satisfy the demands of the soldiers currently in Iraq? Add to this the fact that the Iraqi security forces these soldiers will be fighting alongside are similarly ill-equipped. Putting aside any notion you may have that we have already lost, this new strategy for Iraq has been cited by many as our last shot at achieving a preferred outcome in Iraq. So how is it that we can't dedicate all our efforts to increasing its probability for success? Let us just hope that those on the ground in Iraq and on the Hill in DC are readying a Plan B.

SIGIR Saved....For Now

Though not yet officially in the majority, the Democrats have already started their campaign to reform Iraq-related legislation. Late last week, the House and Senate passed a bill extending the life of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) through to 2008, giving it the authority to examine the $32 billion spent on reconstruction. The New York Times reports that Bush is likely to sign the bill. This is great news. EPIC has long been an active proponent of the work SIGIR has done.

Since its inception in 2004, SIGIR has saved US taxpayers approximately $405.1 million and its investigations have led to several convictions of American occupation officials on bribery charges. Its latest report, published in October, which I discussed extensively in an earlier blog posting, provided a detailed analysis of what progress has been made on the ground and where the most significant problems lie. SIGIR’s investigations of Halliburton alone uncovered tens of millions of dollars of wasted funds and found that the company has been exploiting a federal loophole to keep its activities in Iraq confidential.

Iraq's Unused Billions

In early November I discussed some of the key findings of a report put out by the
Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction. One of the more interesting finds
was that the Iraqi government had spent a negligible amount on reconstruction despite
having a budget of $6 billion. Certainly an odd revelation considering the urgent need Iraq has for more funding.

Today the New York Times examines the Iraqi government's inability to spend money and
offers a very interesting explanation.

"The country is facing this national failure to spend even as American financial
support dwindles. Among reasons for the problems...is a strange new one: bureaucrats are so fearful and confused by anticorruption measures put in place by the American and Iraqi governments that they are afraid to sign off on contracts.

...the stringent measures they had favored to slow the rampant corruption may be
especially daunting for bureaucrats who have little experience with Western-style
regulations and oversight. Those officials say that Iraqis who have seen their
colleagues arrested and jailed in anticorruption sweeps are reluctant to put their own name on a contract."

Other factors include a high government turnover, security problems, actual corruption and a lack of Iraqis skilled at writing contracts and managing complex projects. As the New York Times notes, these are the same issues that plague the US reconstruction effort.

This problem, if not addressed, will surely undermine future international fund-
raising efforts as countries and organizations will understandably be reluctant to provide Iraq with funds if they believe Iraq will be unable to use them.

Thus far, the government has been able to spend only 20% of its 2006 budget.

New Legislation to Save SIGIR

The New York Times is reporting that Congressional Democrats will introduce new legislation next week that will renew the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s (SIGIR) mandate to oversee reconstruction efforts in Iraq while greatly increasing its investigative reach. This is in response to a recent Republican-backed provision sneaked into a large military authorization bill that called for the closure of the SIGIR office in one year.

This is great news. It has become clear from the errors committed during this conflict by firms such as Halliburton and Parsons that oversight in Iraq is fundamental to our reconstruction efforts there. Besides the billions of taxpayer dollars being wasted, lackluster reconstruction efforts can endanger lives and will only prolong US involvement in Iraq.

Since its inception in 2004, SIGIR has saved US taxpayers approximately $405.1 million and its investigations have led to several convictions of American occupation officials on bribery charges. Its latest report, published in October, which I discussed extensively in an earlier blog posting, provided a detailed analysis of what progress has been made on the ground and where the most significant problems lie. SIGIR’s investigations of Halliburton alone uncovered tens of millions of dollars of wasted funds and found that the company has been exploiting a federal loophole to keep its activities in Iraq confidential.

One of the greatest problems in Iraq is a lack of oversight: Contractors and firms are not being held accountable for their actions. It should be inconceivable that the US do away with one of the only bodies that is successfully monitoring this phase in the Iraq conflict.

The new SIGIR report: the bad, the bad and the good

I apologize in advance for the length of this entry. If it's any consolation the report itself was 537 pages. In a nutshell, the SIGIR report demonstrates just how essential proper oversight is to reconstruction efforts in Iraq. Anyway on to the blog:

On Tuesday, the Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction (SIGIR) released its quarterly report. Some of its findings:

Iraqi government is still spending very little of its own money on reconstruction projects and not for want of funds: it had $6 BILLION budgeted to major rebuilding projects this year

Of 142 primary health clinics funded by the United States, just seven are operational.

Perhaps one of its more sensational findings is that overhead costs have consumed more than half the budget on many reconstruction projects in Iraq, which of course leaves substantially less money than expected to improve the lives of Iraqis. The largest culprit is KBR a subsidiary of Halliburton whose overhead at the oil-facilities it was contracted to run accounted for 55% of its budget (approx. $160 million). Why so much? Halliburton sure isn’t too worried about the safety of its workers so I doubt it can all be going towards security.

Well apparently the US ordered KBR to Iraq and let them sit there for months at a time doing absolutely nothing. John Mitchell, a spokesman for the inspector general’s office explains,

“The government blew the whistle for these guys to go to Iraq and the meter ran. The government was billed for sometimes nine months before work began.”

Furthermore, the New York Times reports that,

“The findings are similar to those of a growing list of inspections, audits and investigations that have concluded that the program to rebuild Iraq has often fallen short for the most mundane of reasons: poorly written contracts, ineffective or nonexistent oversight, needless project delays and egregiously poor construction practices.”

Not surprisingly SIGIR also found that KBR sought to limit SIGIR’s oversight this quarter by improperly using the proprietary information exception to the Federal Acquisition Regulation. You can read more about that whole scandal here.

Sadly examples of poor construction practices abound and are especially prevalent in contracts for which there was little if no oversight. The construction of the Baghdad Police College has become the prime example for the failures of US reconstruction efforts. The College, which cost $75 million to construct, will likely have to be torn down due to leaking effluent (a nice way of saying human waste) caused by faulty plumbing that has compromised the structural integrity of the building. The Army Corps of Engineers handed out the police college contract out to the California firm Parsons which in turn subcontracted it to an Iraqi company. Needless to say Parsons didn’t really follow-up much with the subcontractors.

When it came time to build the police headquarters in Mosul, the Army Corps of Engineers realized how silly it was to go through firms like Parsons and started handing out the contracts directly to Iraqi firms. Good idea, except you still need some sort of oversight. The Mosul police HQ would suffer from similar problems as the police college. As a bonus, the station was also rife with shoddy construction that exposed security forces to unnecessary risk. This has implications beyond leaky faucets and the like: The US has been trying desperately to train the Iraqi police by stationing US troops with them. However, as should be expected, the US will not send their troops to stay in buildings like the headquarters in Mosul where they are easy targets.

SIGIR also revealed that 4% of the weapons that the United States had provided to Iraqi security forces could not be accounted for. That is 14,030 weapons unaccounted for. These weapons include semiautomatic pistols, assault rifles, machine guns and rocket-propelled grenade launchers. Nice.

So far SIGIR has done a commendable job in overseeing the reconstruction effort in Iraq. Due to its audits, SIGIR has saved US taxpayers approximately $405.1 million since its creation in 2004. It has proven itself to be a much-needed watchdog instrumental in spotting numerous cases of waste, fraud and abuse. With the possibility of transferring reconstruction efforts to the Iraqi government in the near future becoming ever more distant, SIGIR is needed more than ever. Tragically, Congress decided right before it recessed to terminate the office in exactly one year. It is not yet clear what will come in its place.

Before I forget there was some good news in the SIGIR report:

the average national electricity generation peak capacity finally surpassed prewar levels (only took us 2 ½ years)

Oil exports averaged 1.66 million BPD, slightly surpassing the Iraqi goal of 1.65 million BPD

U.S. projects have provided an estimated 4.6 million people with access to water—
more than half the anticipated end-state of 8.2 million people. Also, 5.1 million
people have access to sanitation services from U.S. projects; the end-state goal is
5.3 million people.

This is all great news and it appears that we can count on achieving relative success in several other sectors, but at issue is sustaining these US funded projects as programs shift to Iraqi control. The US has planned and allocated funds for this, but who knows how successful the transition will be. I am certain, however, that there would be a higher degree of success should SIGIR still be around at that point.