Iraq’s Anti-Corruption Agencies

Iraq’s anti-corruption agencies continue to struggle with their job. The Minister of Planning Ali Baban told the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) that he thought corruption was worse now than under Saddam. He said that corruption was rampant throughout the government, and that Baghdad had failed to stop it. The investigative group Transparency International supports Baban’s claims. They look into corruption in governments across the world. In 2003 they ranked Iraq 113 out of 133 governments on its annual corruption index with one being the best and 133 the worst. By 2008 Iraq was tied as the second most corrupt government in the world out of 180 nations. According to SIGIR’s evaluation, of Iraq’s three anti-corruption agencies only one was doing its job.

Iraq has three offices that are tasked with stopping corruption. Those are the inspector generals, the Board of Supreme Audit, and the Commission on Public Integrity. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) created the inspector generals in 2004. They were fashioned after the investigative bodies that work in the United States government. There is one inspector general for each Iraqi ministry and agency. The Board of Supreme Audit is run by Dr. Abdul Basit, and looks into the government’s finances. It is similar to the American Government Accountability Office. The third agency is the Commission on Public Integrity led by Judge Raheem al-Ogaili. It was created by the CPA as well, and is an independent group that is tasked with investigating corruption throughout the government.

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki declared 2008 the year of fighting corruption, but SIGIR found little evidence of that. SIGIR said that the Board of Audit was the only reliable anti-corruption agency, and provided the best information. The inspector generals are caught in the middle of a controversy. Since 2008 six have been fired, but only a few of those have been replaced, leaving those agencies and ministries with no real oversight. The government claims they were not doing their job, but critics claim Prime Minister Maliki removed them for political reasons. Judge Ogaili of the Public Integrity Commission was definitely a political appointee. He took over from Judge Radhi Hamza al-Radhi who actively pursued corruption cases, but was constantly foiled by ministers, Maliki, and sometimes by the United States. In 2007 Judge Radhi fled Iraq due to threats. His successor was Judge Ogaili. He has been in office for over a year but has never been confirmed by parliament. The judge has said that corruption gives Iraq a bad image. His response has been to keep all the work of the Commission secret. He said his agency would only discuss cases after people have been found guilty. That rarely happens in Iraq. In 2008 only 300 officials were charged with corruption, and out of those 87 were found guilty. All were low-level officers. No high-level officials have ever had to go to court. That’s largely because of Article 136, a hold over from the Saddam period that allows ministers to stop any case from going to trial. This has consistently been used to stop corruption investigations. The Amnesty Law passed in 2008 that was supposed to foster reconciliation between Shiites and Sunnis has also been used to stop hundreds of corruption cases. The Commission on Public Integrity said it had to drop half of its investigations as a result of the law. By the end of 2008 the Prime Minister pardoned 1,023 government workers. Those included a group of Interior Ministry officers that were collecting salaries of 50,000 fake policemen, and Defense Ministry officials that skimmed money off of arms sales to Iraq. Maliki’s position is that corruption is all the result of Saddam Hussein, and would like to have the issue quietly disappear.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has also criticized Iraq’s fight with graft and fraud. The IMF has an agreement with Iraq to reduce its debt that includes better accounting of its oil profits. In 2008 the IMF said that Baghdad had not moved forward on this, and did not have a plan on how to create greater transparency. In December the organization said that Iraq had not done enough to fight corruption in the petroleum sector as a result.

The U.S. has often said it is committed to fighting corruption in Iraq, and has several programs to do so, but that appears to be more rhetoric than reality. The U.S. embassy in Baghdad has an anti-corruption coordinator, but there have been ten of those since the office was created. On average they have only served six months in Iraq, with the latest one just arriving in the country. That provides no continuity in effort. In May 2008, two State Department officials who worked in Iraq on this task said that the U.S. was never committed to the fight. The Americans have also stopped some investigations because of political concerns. A U.S. official told Reuters in December 2008 that if the U.S. or Baghdad really went after corruption, it could bring down the government because of the high officials that would be implicated.

Corruption has taken a great toll on Iraq. The former head of the Public Integrity Commission said that $13 billion had been lost in the reconstruction effort. The agency found oil workers in Basra stealing up to 500,000 barrels of oil a day in early 2008. No one of standing has been held accountable for these crimes. Instead, Prime Minister Maliki has attempted to silence the investigations fearing the bad image it creates for his country. That hinders development in a country that has mass unemployment and poverty despite its oil wealth, and undermines the public’s belief in the government. This was seen in the recent January 2009 provincial elections where corruption was a major issue. With no leadership from either the United States or Baghdad, this problem will continue to fester.

SOURCES

Adhoob, Salam, “An Inside View of the ‘Second Insurgency’: How Corruption and Waste Are Undermining the U.S. Mission in Iraq,” Senate Democratic Policy Committee Hearing, 9/22/08

Aswat al-Iraq, “Iraq among countries with highest levels of corruption – report,” 9/23/08

Brinkley, Joel, “Iraq quietly tackles rampant corruption,” San Francisco Chronicle, 1/24/09

Flahert, Anne, “Ex-officials: Bush admin. ignored Iraq corruption,” Associated Press, 5/13/08

Glanz, James and Mohammed, Riyadh, “Premier of Iraq Is Quietly Firing Fraud Monitors,” New York Times, 11/18/08

Human Rights Watch, “The Quality of Justice, Failings of Iraq’s Central Criminal Court,” December 2008

O’Hanlon, Michael and Campbell, Jason, “Iraq Index,” Brookings Institution, 11/20/08

Ryan, Missy, “U.S. Says Iraq Fails to Tackle Corrupt High Officials,” Reuters, 12/19/08

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/08
- “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09

U.S. Embassy, “Review of Anticorruption Efforts in Iraq Working Draft,” 2007

Iraqis Unwilling Or Incapable Of Maintaining U.S. Reconstruction Projects

On January 13, 2009 the Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) released an audit of a $1.2 billion contract to fix and rehabilitate oil and gas infrastructure in southern Iraq by the U.S. company KBR. Like previous reports, it found that costs went over budget, there was little oversight, and that while some improvements were made, overall, the projects’ potential was unfulfilled. What was most important for the future of the country however, was the finding that Iraq was either unwilling or incapable of maintaining many of these U.S. funded reconstruction projects.

Much of Iraq’s oil infrastructure is dated, and needs massive investment to continue production. The industry suffered years of sanctions, and then looting immediately after the invasion. SIGIR found major damage at several facilities costing millions of dollars from the theft and vandalism in 2003. KBR did improve the facilities it worked on, but the SIGIR thought that it might be futile because of the attitude of the Iraqi government. U.S. officials are worried about Baghdad’s commitment to reconstruction as it appears they don’t care about finishing some of the U.S. projects, maintaining them, or even using some.

For example, KBR worked on a $146.7 million project to improve gas plants in southern Iraq. It bought rotors for gas compressors at one, but didn’t have time to install them. They were left in a nearby warehouse when KBR was done, but the Iraqis have yet to install them. The plant is producing below benchmarks as a result, and SIGIR believes that the U.S. money was wasted because Baghdad doesn’t have plans to finish it.

Another case was in June 2004 when KBR was given a contract to fix the loading arms at Al Basra Oil Terminal. SIGIR found that the company ended its work early at the request of Baghdad in January 2005. In April 2006 a U.S. contractor told the state-run South Oil Company that they had to maintain the loading arms by oiling them, but the Iraqis never did. The contractor witnessed Iraqis using the rusted equipment in ways that might break the arms. KBR and other companies repeatedly told South Oil that they had to do preventive maintenance, but nothing was done. The government didn’t seem to want the project in the first place, and after the work was finished, showed little interest in keeping it up.

There have been similar reports before. In November 2008, Reuters reported on Al Qods, a new U.S.-funded power plant opening in Baghdad that cost $170 million and would service 180,000 households in central Iraq. Right next to Al-Qods was another energy facility that was abandoned by the Iraqis. The $20 million turbines in the plant broke because the Iraqis couldn’t operate them. The government may never repair them.

This is of major concern since the U.S. has spent billions on Iraq, but it is an open question about how much of it was effective. In total, the U.S. has spent almost $18 billion on reconstruction. On September 30, 2008 the last amount of money was appropriated. All the way back in 2005 however, the SIGIR warned that the Iraqi government was not ready to take over many of these projects, and had even rejected responsibility for some of them. The U.S. often turned over projects to the local government whether they wanted them or not. Sometimes the Americans had to continue to operate them because there was no one else willing to. Others remain idle and unfinished because of Iraqi neglect. Baghdad has also been unable to spend most of its capital budget that goes into infrastructure. The war has caused a brain drain of Iraqi professionals and skilled workers leaving the country, leading to a talent deficit to operate and fix facilities. Iraqis also seem to have created a culture of just getting by in industry after years of sanctions. That has led simple preventative measures such as oiling equipment to be ignored. That’s not to say that the U.S. has not contributed to Iraq’s rebuilding, but the amount that was wasted on large projects Iraqis either didn’t want or couldn’t maintain appears staggering.

For more on reconstruction and development see:

Maysan Province Remains Underdeveloped

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s Quarterly October Report

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction July Report’s Major Findings

Iraq Outspends U.S. on Reconstruction

SOURCES

Pincus, Walter, “Report Details Iraq Contract Failures,” Washington Post, 1/14/09

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraqi Official: Oil Infrastructure Needs Major Upgrade,” 1/15/09

Ryan, Missy and Qusay, Aws, “Iraqis Measure Progress with Flip of Switch,” Reuters, 11/14/08

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Cost, Outcome, and Oversight of Iraq Oil Reconstruction Contract with Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc.,” 1/13/09
- “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/08

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s Quarterly October Report

At the end of October the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) issued its quarterly report on reconstruction, and the Iraqi government and economy. As usual, it provides some of the most comprehensive and up to date statistics on Iraq available. For the U.S., its reconstruction program is coming to an end, as there are no more large appropriations coming in the future. On the Iraqi side, the country has moved from a failed state where nothing was working, to a fragile state. It still needs to move towards a stable one. That requires the ability to spend its budget, continued improvement in the security forces, its justice system, fighting corruption, and its infrastructure, and economy.

Security and Iraqi Forces

2008 has seen a continued improvement in security. The number of attacks from April 1 to July 1 compared to July 1 to September 30 declined approximately 35% from 5,318 to 3,435. Violence is down to levels not seen since 2004. That still makes it a dangerous country, but nowhere near the bloody months of the sectarian war that lasted from 2006-2007. General Ray Odierno, the new U.S. commander in Iraq, said that the nation has progressed to a fragile state.

Part of the reason for the improved situation in the country has been the dramatic increase in the Iraqi security forces, although there are problems telling just how many there are. The number of trained police and soldiers has grown from 87,414 to 531,000 since 2003. There happens to be 591,695 on the payroll however. An October 21 audit by the SIGIR found that there are in fact, no accurate figures on how many members of the security forces are actually still on duty. The U.S. has changed what it counts over the years, and Iraqi payrolls aren’t reliable. Corruption also plays a role as Iraqi officers collect pay from ghost soldiers, there are also officials who do not follow procedures, and others who do not want accurate accounting. Finally, there are many Iraqis on leave, absent without leave, dead, and wounded, that are still counted. At the local level, there are also many police that have received no training because the provinces have large leeway in hiring, independent of the Interior Ministry. Eight of Iraq’s 18 provinces for example, have more police on the payroll than are authorized by Baghdad. The U.S. has tried to automate the many power system, but that plan has run into major problems. The SIGIR found that depending upon the time period and accounting methods, the U.S. could either be undercounting the number of Iraqis or over counting. This problem may never be solved.

However many are on duty, they are making improvements, with problems still looming. There are now 164 Iraqi Army battalions, 107 of which are in the lead or acting independently. This has allowed the U.S. to move to more of a support role. There are still not enough non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and officers however. The Ministry of Defense has attempted to solve this problem by offering jobs to former soldiers from Saddam’s army that lost their positions when the Coalition Provisional Authority disbanded the military in 2003. So far, 97,000 have signed up for this program as of early October 2008, but only 738 officers and 1,425 NOCs were accepted by September 13. The Accountability and Justice Law that replaced the old DeBaathificaition process says that the Defense and Interior Ministries cannot take in any former Baathists, but it is unclear if or how many of these ex-soldiers fit that description. Iraq’s government however, tends to implement laws how they want to, rather than how they were written. The Defense Ministry’s training centers have also produced 12,000 new NCOs as of July 2008. The Ministry also has problems with logistics and procurement, while Interior has corruption, sectarianism, and issues with command and control and maintenance. The rapid expansion of forces, has also strained Iraq’s training centers, many of which lack adequate equipment and facilities. The lack of housing for example has reduced training by 14%.

Iraq's Justice System And Corruption

Despite increases in the number of officials, and new facilities opening, Iraq’s justice system still does not work. Judges are routinely threatened and killed. In 2008, seven judges have been assassinated. Since 2003 over 40 judges and families members have also died. The Interior Ministry said they are working on security for the judiciary, but the SIGIR has found no evidence that anything is actually being done. The U.S. is still working hard to open new courts, nine new ones from July to October 2008, expand the staff, 428 new judges, 287 new investigative judges, 689 new investigators, and 313 prosecutors, as well as rebuild courthouses. The number of cases however, continues to overwhelm the system. By October 8, there were 31,578 detainees and 10,169 prisoners. Overcrowded jails and mistreatment were the norm. The United States is in the process of building six new prisons to relieve the stress.

Like the rest of the government, corruption is rife in the Justice Ministry, but the ability to fight it is still minimal. The main anti-corruption office is the Commission on Integrity, but the Amnesty Law closed down half of its cases. The Commission also doesn’t really operate outside of Baghdad, and many of its staff have been killed, so it is very limited in what it can do. The Board of Supreme Audit is supposed to check spending, but the dramatic increase in Iraq’s budget with the rise of oil prices has meant its work has grown tremendously, while its speed has slowed. The International Monetary Fund has reported some improvement in oil smuggling as metering has improved as well as transparency in the industry. The United Nations has also launched a major anti-corruption effort to help Baghdad.

U.S. Reconstruction

The U.S. has appropriated almost $18 billion for Iraq reconstruction since 2003. As of September 30, 2008 there is no more new funding for this effort. 94% of the money that has been appropriated by Congress has been spent. There are still considerable amounts of money that is yet to be expended, such as $6.9 billion for Iraq’s security forces, but Iraq is basically now in charge of financing its own reconstruction in the future. Baghdad has appropriated $45.98 billion for this purpose since the invasion.

U.S. Funds For Iraq’s Security Forces
$17.94 billion has been appropriated
$14.09 billion has been obligated
$11.04 billion has been spent
$6.9 billion still to be spent
$3.85 billion left to be appropriated

Totals For U.S. Funds Obligated For Iraq’s Services
$4.65 billion for electricity
$2.6 billion for water
$1.75 billion for oil and gas
$1.1 billion for transportation and communication
$900 million for health care

Iraq’s Budget

The problem as usual on the Iraqi side is their inability to spend much of their capital budget, which goes to infrastructure. In 2008, Baghdad appropriated $20 billion for its overall capital budget, but the SIGIR did not know how much of it had actually been spent. Out of Iraq’s major ministries, none has been able to spend more than 30% of its capital budgets by June 2008. Some Iraqi ministries, such as Electricity, do not allow U.S. advisors to operate within them, which also makes improving their spending difficult.

Capital Budget Spending Of Iraq’s Ministries As Of June 2008

Water Ministry:

• Appropriated $375 million
• Spent $113 million
• 30.1% spent

Oil Ministry:

• Appropriated $2 billion
• Spent $410 million
• 20.5% spent

Electricity Ministry:

• Appropriated $1.3 billion
• Spent $229 million
• 17.6% spent

Health Ministry:

• Appropriated $83 billion
• Spent $8 million
• 9.6% spent

As reported earlier, Iraq’s increasing budgets have not improved the standard of living for average Iraqis. Its per capita income of $1,214 is lower than Saudi Arabia ($15,440), Algeria ($3,620), and Syria ($1,760) for example.

Government Services

The United Nations reports that 50% of Iraqis do not have access to one or more services. Besides the basics like health care and electricity, Baghdad also provides basic food rations to over 12 million people. The Ministry of Trade is responsible for this system, because most of the food is imported. The Ministry is facing increasing world food prices, but has not received as much money as it asked for from Iraq’s parliament. The ration system also distorts prices in Iraq’s farming industry, which is fifth largest sector of Iraq’s GDP.

Electricity

The United States and Baghdad have worked to improve Iraq’s electrical capacity, yet it is nowhere near meeting demand. Iraq averaged 117,849 megawatts of electricity from July to October 2008. That was an 8% increase from the same quarter in 2007. Average demand for electricity however, stood at 209,483 megawatts, a 7% increase from the same time last year. U.S. reconstruction funds have led to 550 new power projects worth $4.3 billion. This has added 2,500 megawatts to the system. The problem has been that since the invasion, Iraqis have greatly expanded their consumer goods, which has kept demand far above what can be produced.

Economy

Despite all of Iraq’s problems, its economy is growing. This was mostly due to the sky rocketing price of oil, which provides 65% of the country’s GDP, and 90% of its revenue. That’s now going to take a hit as crude prices have dropped with the looming world recession. Still, in the first half of 2008, all of the none oil sectors of the economy grew as well except for farming, which has been hit by one of the worst droughts in decades. Inflation has also taken a dramatic drop. Still, most Iraqis can’t meet their basic needs, and most provinces suffer from high unemployment, malnutrition, and illiteracy, which limited job opportunities. The government has not calculated unemployment and underemployment figures for a few years now, but their last numbers were 18% and 38% respectively. Most believe up to 60% of the country is unemployed or underemployed.

Debt

Iraq’s debt has been dramatically reduced thanks to the help of the United States. Before a 2004 meeting of the Paris Club, which brings together many of the largest creditor nations in the world, Iraq had a $142 billion debt. Now it only owes $43 billion. The IMF is working on reducing $16 billion more. Iraq’s outstanding debts belong to Saudi Arabia ($15-$39 billion), China ($8.5 billion), Kuwait ($8.2 billion), and Qatar ($5 billion).

Oil

Oil is Iraq’s major industry. According to the Finance Ministry it will account for 94% of the country’s 2009 budget. From July to October oil production reached 2.47 million barrels a day. That was a 2% increase from the previous quarter, and an 18% increase from the same quarter in 2007. Exports of crude averaged 1.73 million barrels a day, an 8% increase from the last quarter, and a 2% increase from the same quarter last year. Overall, for 2008 the country has averaged 1.86 million barrels a day in exports, which is below the 1.9 million benchmark set by the Oil Ministry.

The government is working to improve its infrastructure and production. It has appropriated $5 billion for new pipes in Basra. This project started in August 2007. This is desperately needed, because as earlier reported, Basra’s pipelines are in danger of having catastrophic failures at any time. The Oil Ministry is also working to place meters throughout the country to accurately monitor production, although this is still a work in progress. The oil law and revenue sharing law continue to be deadlocked in parliament, so the Oil Ministry has to work on an ad hoc basis to sign deals with international oil companies to try to invest in Iraq’s oil industry.

Like many other oil exporting countries, Iraq lacks adequate facilities to refine crude and provide for its public. On September 21, 2008 for example, the country couldn’t meet demand for any oil products such as gas, kerosene, liquefied gas, or diesel. Iraq has to rely upon imports to meet these needs.

Conclusion

Overall, the new SIGIR report continues with previous ones from this year. The United States and Iraq have spent billions on Iraqi reconstruction, the Iraqi economy has grown since 2007, and improved security should make this work easier, yet little of this has had any affect upon the general public. Basic services do not meet demand, half or more of the country does not have steady work, and corruption and lack of skilled bureaucrats continue to hinder the government’s ability to improve its spending to fix these problems. These issues will take a long time to solve, some like corruption, may never be.

SOURCES
International Center for Transitional Justice, “Briefing Paper: Iraq’s New ‘Accountability and Justice’ Law,” 1/22/08
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Challenges in Obtaining Reliable and Useful Data on Iraqi Security Forces Continue,” 10/21/08
- “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/08

Rajiv Chandrasekaran: How Early US Failures Created the Iraq of Today

It is Friday morning and Rajiv Chandrasekaran takes the stage. He pulls the microphone a little closer to his lips and welcomes the coffee-sipping audience of students, writers, activists.

“Iraqis believed they should have been free to determine their own destiny,” he said. “They were not a vanquished nation in need of overhaul at foreign hands.”

Chandrasekaran’s powerful address opened Iraq at the Crossroads: Protecting Refugees, Rescuing Our Allies, and Empowering Iraqi Law, hosted at Rutgers School of Law last Friday.

Chandrasekaran, author of Imperial Life in the Emerald City and National Editor for The Washington Post, served as the newspaper’s bureau chief in Baghdad from April 2003 to October 2004. From the Green Zone—or “neoconservative terrarium” as he has called it—Chandrasekaran reported on what he soon recognized as a dismal US failure to implement an effective strategy for post-Saddam Iraq:

I was appalled by how we Americans were squandering our window of opportunity to build stability in Iraq. Instead of focusing principally on creating jobs, the economic advisers inside the Green Zone set about rewriting Iraq's tax code. They spent countless hours drafting laws to protect genetically modified seeds, copyrighted movies and even the designs of microchips, instead of devoting the necessary resources to increase electricity production or repair hospitals.

Chandrasekaran explained how the absence of sound, structured policy and misplaced priorities can be understood in three pieces:

First, PEOPLE. The U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which came to Baghdad after Saddam’s government fell, “sent the loyal and the willing.” When interviewed for positions by Pentagon officials, CPA hopefuls were asked questions like: “Are you a member of the Republican Party?” “What is your position on capital punishment?” and “How do you feel about Roe v. Wade?”

While fervent support of the Administration and a set of conservative, partisan values appeared necessary for employment with the CPA, international experience and knowledge of the Middle East were not— “More than half the CPA staff got their first passports to go to Iraq.”

Second, PLACE. Centered in Iraq’s Green Zone, members of the CPA had little or no immediate understanding of the chaos and ruin that was quickly befalling Iraq. Outside the Baghdad walls there was no clean or running water, looting and lawlessness erupted in the absence of government police forces, waste filled the streets, and Iraqi families took refuge in their homes waiting for the speedy delivery of democracy promised by President Bush.

Third, POLICY. Tax code reform took the top agenda seat while “New Deal-like policies” that would employ Iraqis to sweep the streets, maintain clean water systems, and restore electricity were not considered. Following the March 2003 intervention, looting, lawlessness, and traffic jams paralyzed the city as drivers sat in jammed intersections below Baghdad’s lifeless traffic lights. While the CPA was walled up in Baghdad’s Green Zone rewriting copyright laws, Iraqi civilians worried about the safety of their children and wondered how to educate their children at home now that schools were closing. Copyright infringement was probably not in the forefront of Iraqis’ minds.

Mr. Chandrasekaran explained that an understanding of post-invasion Iraq is crucial for understanding Iraq today. Without a plan for the months after Saddam was removed from power, the US government created many of the problems that have plagued the country after five years at war. Instead of working with pre-existing infrastructures of Iraq’s government, such as the city police forces and the military, the CPA and Washington elite insisted upon a complete overhaul. With unqualified leadership in Iraq, complete isolation within the fortifications of Baghdad’s Green Zone, and policies that failed to address the most critical and immediate concerns of the Iraqi people, the United States was signed up for a disorganized, violent and lengthy involvement from the very beginning.

In January Iraq will host provincial elections, an opportunity to elect new, more representative leaders, making Baghdad more directly accountable to Iraqi constituents. Unlike the last provincial elections in 2005, all of Iraq’s communities are expected to turn out in force, and Iraqi voters will have the opportunity to vote for individual candidates rather than faceless “party lists.”

Chandrasekaran suggested that as Baghdad’s government becomes one of the people, there will be more room to address the needs of Iraqis. Thanking the Rutgers students and community for addressing the urgent Iraqi humanitarian crisis, he said that peace and security can only be built with great focus on the needs of the Iraqi people.

*Hey there! If you have not yet joined the 14,000 Americans who have signed The Humanitarian Pledge, please do so today! Help us put the humanitarian needs of vulnerable Iraqis at the center of the U.S. policy debate on Iraq. You can also help us raise public awareness by sharing this one-page backgrounder about the crisis with your community.

Where are the Benchmarks for U.S. Progress?

Let's step into our way-back machine and throw the dial to early November 2006. Speculating on potential common ground between President Bush and the coming Democratic majority, I wrote this:

To help stabilize Iraq and repair some of the damage done by the U.S., there will need to be a viable strategy for responsible withdrawal and continued development assistance. In a word: “benchmarks.”

Dial the way-back machine further to the summer of 2003, when EPIC hosted a weekend Iraq Forum and lobbied more than 100 Members of Congress, delivering our Citizens' Humanitarian Pledge to the Peace of Iraq signed by 30,000 Americans. Our message at that time was the same, Congress must establish benchmarks to hold the Bush administration accountable for progress in helping the people of Iraq rebuild after the U.S. invasion and decades of war, tyranny and crippling sanctions.

Four years later and Congressional leaders from both sides of the aisle are finally converging on benchmarks, but sadly they’re not the benchmarks that I had in mind. The benchmarks proposed by Senator Olympia Snowe and other Republicans are one-sided and misguided. One-sided because they focus on “Iraqi progress” and ignore the American side of the equation. Misguided because they seem to suggest that Iraq has a fully functional state and if Iraq’s leaders would simply get on with it, there would be a political solution to Iraq’s multiple conflicts and we'd soon see the country's economy, infrastructure, and government services back on track.

This week the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) released its latest quarterly report evaluating “U.S. progress.” The findings are summed up nicely by the Washington Post: “The U.S. project to rebuild Iraq remains far short of its targets, leaving the country plagued by power outages, inadequate oil production and shortages of clean water and health care, according to a report to be issued today by a U.S. government oversight agency.”

Benchmarks are not a bad idea, but they ought to be realistic and balanced to demand government performance from both Washington and Baghdad.

New SIGIR Report Outlines Reconstruction Challenges

As President Bush and Congress continue their stalemate over the 2007 supplemental spending bill, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) released its latest quarterly report today, stating in no uncertain terms that worsening security conditions, ongoing violence and far-reaching corruption will keep Iraqis from managing their country's reconstruction for the foreseeable future. The report echoes the recent sentiments of General David Petraeus, the U.S. military commander in Iraq, who admits that challenges still lay ahead in Iraq and anticipates "an enormous [U.S.] commitment" for some time to come.

The latest SIGIR report cites several trends in Iraq that are contributing to the setbacks in U.S. reconstruction efforts, chiefly:

* Corruption - The report notes that $5 billion is lost every year in Iraq due to fraud "which 'afflicts virtually every Iraqi ministry,' particularly the oil, interior and defense ministries." On a positive note, the report says that the Maliki government is making some strides toward ousting corruption within its ranks, so far weeding out eight ministers and 40 directors general, who are awaiting prosecution for the mismanagement of $8 billion in reconstruction funds.

* Violence & Unrest - Though the frequency of violent attacks seems to be down in Iraq, the scale of each attack has become more devastating, killing more people and crippling rebuilding efforts of desperately-needed public services. According to a BBC article, "The U.S. Defense Department says there are on average 1.4 attacks on critical electricity, water, oil and gas facilities each week." The SIGIR report adds, "Repair teams sent in after attacks continue to face threats, including kidnapping and murder." In a separate report, the State Department noted that in 2006 45 percent of the 14,338 terror attacks around the world took place in Iraq, an increase of 29 percent from the previous year.

* Poor Maintenance & Sustainability - The latest SIGIR report finds that, when projects are finally handed over to Iraqis, they "are not being adequately maintained." This is largely due to poor training and management. Take SIGIR’s evaluation of a hospital in Irbil, for example, where inspectors found that "a sophisticated oxygen distribution system was not used because staff did not trust it.” They also noted that needles and bandages were being tossed into the sewer system, causing it to clog, because the incinerator installed to deal with such waste was not in use. Why? Inspectors say it’s because no one on staff at the hospital was trained on how to operate the incinerator and, on top of that, no one had the key to unlock the incinerator door.

From a policy standpoint, what does the latest SIGIR report really mean? It further reinforces the importance of alternative solutions, pressing our leaders to reevaluate the United States’ current reconstruction strategy and urging them to seriously consider a new approach.

That's exactly what Congress and the White House have the opportunity to do with this year’s supplemental. By using this critical report and considering alternative approaches – such as those advocated by noted experts like Eric Davis and Lisa Schirch – Congress and the White House have the ability to fund a new strategy for peacebuilding in Iraq, leveraging a plan that could significantly and immediately improve the quality of life for millions of Iraqi families.

The challenge now is getting them to listen.

Wasted Billions/Equipping US Troops

The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) just released its quarterly report and truth be told I could probably just copy and paste my earlier blog entry on the last SIGIR report in this space. Little to no progress has been made in reviving crucial sectors of Iraq such as water and electricity, and reconstruction projects continue to suffer from poor construction practices and in a new twist, unwarranted extravagances. In one case, contractors building a camp for American trainers constructed an Olympic-size swimming pool that hadn't been ordered.

Once again at issue is a lack of effective oversight. The major contractors are passing on the contracts to Iraqi subcontractors without ever following up.

In its last report SIGIR revealed that 4% of the weapons that the United States had provided to Iraqi security forces could not be accounted for. This time around, SIGIR went a step further auditing the US' ability to equip the soldiers presently stationed in Iraq. SIGIR found that many soldiers have gone without guns, ammunition and other supplies necessary for the soldiers to complete missions. Soldiers have also been found lacking proper body armor, armored vehicles and communication devices. This Washington Post article has more details on the challenges the Pentagon is having equipping US troops.

So because of a lack of proper oversight, billions have been wasted on shoddy reconstruction projects essentially depriving US soldiers of the equipment they count on to survive in Iraq. And this is not even taking into account the 21,000 extra troops that will soon be arriving in Iraq. How will we properly equip them, if we can't even manage to satisfy the demands of the soldiers currently in Iraq? Add to this the fact that the Iraqi security forces these soldiers will be fighting alongside are similarly ill-equipped. Putting aside any notion you may have that we have already lost, this new strategy for Iraq has been cited by many as our last shot at achieving a preferred outcome in Iraq. So how is it that we can't dedicate all our efforts to increasing its probability for success? Let us just hope that those on the ground in Iraq and on the Hill in DC are readying a Plan B.

Iran in Iraq

I've always believed that to mitigate the humanitarian crisis in Iraq, the US must engage its neighbors, especially Iran which has considerable influence over the predominantly Shia Iraq. The US excuse has been that Iran is unwilling to negotiate with the US, that the US has no "leverage" when it comes to Iran. And so we have been on the offensive: accusing the Iranian government of supplying weapons to the militias, seizing Iranian operatives within Iraq, authorizing our military to kill Iranian operatives inside Iraq and so on.

Meanwhile President Ahmadinejad has had this to say: " Trying to weaken the Iraqi government is tantamount to "treason for the Iraqi people and Islamic nation."

Whether he is being sincere or not is a up to debate. The point is that no matter what differences the US and Iran may have, both have an overwhelming desire to prevent Iraq from sliding into an all-out civil war. Today the New York Times reports that Iran is going to go ahead with its plans to help stabilize Iraq regardless of the US' warnings not to "meddle."

"The ambassador, Hassan Kazemi Qumi, said Iran was prepared to offer Iraq government forces training, equipment and advisers for what he called 'the security fight.' In the economic area, Mr. Qumi said, Iran was ready to assume major responsibility for Iraq reconstruction, an area of failure on the part of the United States since American-led forces overthrew Saddam Hussein nearly four years ago."

These projects will certainly strengthen Iran's influence in Iraq, and so it is in America's best interest that it works together with Iran to temper this influence as best it can. In a related story, it was reported today that Iran recently received a letter from US officials that sought to ease the tension between the two countries. Hopefully this letter signifies a realization on the part of the US that whether we like it or not, Iran is going to be a factor in Iraq.

Can Iraq Deliver? (funding)

To show that it is committed to delivering a better life, the Iraqi government will spend $10 billion of its own money on reconstruction and infrastructure projects that will create new jobs." - From President Bush's Jan. 10 address to the nation

How on earth can Bush pledge that the Iraqi government will spend $10 billion of its own money on anything? In 2006, the Iraqi government had a budget of $6 billion, but in the end was only able to spend 20% of that. In early December I referenced this article by the NYT which explained:

"The country is facing this national failure to spend even as American financial
support dwindles. Among reasons for the problems...is a strange new one: bureaucrats are so fearful and confused by anticorruption measures put in place by the American and Iraqi governments that they are afraid to sign off on contracts.

...the stringent measures they had favored to slow the rampant corruption may be
especially daunting for bureaucrats who have little experience with Western-style
regulations and oversight. Those officials say that Iraqis who have seen their
colleagues arrested and jailed in anticorruption sweeps are reluctant to put their own name on a contract."

Other factors include a high government turnover, security problems, actual corruption and a lack of Iraqis skilled at writing contracts and managing complex projects. I am sure that the Iraqi government is committed to delivering a better life for Iraqis, I'm just not sure that given the aforementioned issues, Bush can rely on these Iraqi billions.

Bush also declared:

"We endorse the Iraqi government's call to finalize an International Compact that will bring new economic assistance in exchange for greater economic reform."

But will the countries that make up this compact be willing to provide Iraq with significant funds without being sure if Iraq can even utilize them?

Training Iraq's Troops

Perhaps the most catastrophic error committed by the United States in the post-conflict period was to dismantle the Iraqi army and police forces. It seemed the U.S. was unable to distinguish between Saddam's Sunni regime and the security forces, which were in fact 90% Shia. This created an enormous security vacuum and is largely to blame for the present situation.

In response to this crisis, the Iraq Study Group and many others have recommended that the U.S. Army shift from conducting combat operations to advising and training Iraqi security forces. This is of course a great idea as besides reducing American casualties, it will allow the U.S. to responsibly withdraw from Iraq without fear that that security situation will decline precipitously. As I mentioned in an earlier entry, Vice President of Iraq, Tariq al Hashimi fully supports this recommendation, declaring that once Iraq has a fully operational and effective security force, "the U.S. must leave Iraq".

The keyword here is "effective." While the numbers of trained security forces are rising, they remain politically unreliable, often contributing to the sectarian strife rather than containing it. Today's New York Times reports:

"The soldiers who came upon the car in a Sunni neighborhood in Baghdad were part of a joint American and Iraqi patrol, and the Americans were ready to take action. The Iraqi commander, however, taking orders by cellphone from the office of a top Sunni politician, said to back off: the car’s owner was known and protected at a high level...This time, it was a Sunni politician — Vice Prime Minister Salam al-Zubaie — but the more powerful Shiites interfered even more often."

Prime Minister al Maliki has on several occasions allowed his loyalties to al Sadr to compromise Iraq's security, most recently lifting a roadblock around Sadr City that was immobilizing some of Iraq's most notorious death squads.

According to Brookings' Iraq Index, only 10,000 of the 115,000 trained and equipped Iraqi forces are politically reliable.

New Pentagon Report Released: Violence Up, Jobs Needed

The violence just keeps getting worse. According to a just-released Pentagon report, injuries and deaths among US and coalition forces in Iraq rose 32% during the period from mid-August to mid-October over the previous three months. The average number of attacks each week and the average number of people killed or wounded in those attacks were at their highest levels since the United States handed over power to the Iraqi government in June 2004.

The Pentagon report places much of the blame for this increase in violence on the rise of ethnic and sectarian militias and other armed groups. The report specifically refers to the militia led by Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr noting that it has replaced al-Qaeda as the biggest security threat in Iraq.

In terms of the economy, the Pentagon once again acknowledges the importance of job creation:

"High unemployment continued to feed sectarian, insurgent, and criminal violence. Although definitive data are not available on the actual unemployment rate, it has been an issue that has had a significant effect on the security environment. The Iraqi government, along with Coalition and international help, must create an effective strategy to provide jobs. This program must be seen as fair and non-sectarian by common Iraqis. It must produce tangible results for a plurality of Iraqis or it may decrease the legitimacy of the Government of Iraq and have little effect on the level of violence."

As I mentioned in an earlier post, the Pentagon has been proactive in this regard. For the past 6 months, the Pentagon has been going around and preparing to open approximately 200 factories located all over Iraq, including in some of the most dangerous cities. Oil production and electricity services are still hampered. The report also makes mention that reconstruction efforts have boosted capacity to provide drinking water to 5.2 million people. However as Justin Rood of TPM Muckracker notes, a GAO report released this past Friday claims that 60% of that water is lost due to leaking, contamination and theft.

Another interesting tidbit from the report: While most organizations, pundits and politicians have already adopted the term "civil war,"the Pentagon says the situation in Iraq is "far more complex than the term 'civil war' implies." It goes on to say, "However, conditions that could lead to civil war do exist, especially in and around Baghdad," and the Iraqi people are fearful of civil war.

SIGIR Saved....For Now

Though not yet officially in the majority, the Democrats have already started their campaign to reform Iraq-related legislation. Late last week, the House and Senate passed a bill extending the life of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) through to 2008, giving it the authority to examine the $32 billion spent on reconstruction. The New York Times reports that Bush is likely to sign the bill. This is great news. EPIC has long been an active proponent of the work SIGIR has done.

Since its inception in 2004, SIGIR has saved US taxpayers approximately $405.1 million and its investigations have led to several convictions of American occupation officials on bribery charges. Its latest report, published in October, which I discussed extensively in an earlier blog posting, provided a detailed analysis of what progress has been made on the ground and where the most significant problems lie. SIGIR’s investigations of Halliburton alone uncovered tens of millions of dollars of wasted funds and found that the company has been exploiting a federal loophole to keep its activities in Iraq confidential.

The Community Action Program

The reconstruction effort in Iraq have thus far been predominantly unsuccessful in revitalizing the county or stemming the conflict in Iraq. We have all heard the stories of corruption, waste mismanagement, etc. There are however several groups involved in reconstructing Iraq that achieve success on a daily basis, but due to security concerns cannot publicize these successes.

Most of these organizations are part of the Community Action Program (CAP) funded by USAID. These organizations are on the ground in Iraq supporting community organized and implemented programs that make a notable difference in the respective communities. CAP organizations contract all work directly to Iraqi firms, thus offering the thousands of employed Iraqi youth an alternative to militias and criminal syndicates. They provide Iraqis with the opportunity to have a say in their own future by identifying their own needs and developing programs that will address them.

Because the specific work these organizations do cannot be publicized, it is not unusual for them to simply be lumped in with all the other reconstruction organizations such as Halliburton and Parsons. Nothing could be further from the truth. CAP programs are run quite efficiently and have a high rate of success. For example while the Halliburtons of Iraq spend up to 50% of their budget on security, CAP organizations spend only a negligible amount for the simple reason that there do not have to fear attacks from the community. The communities are the ones who devise and implement the development plans and so they are very much in support of the CAP programs. Bruce Parmelee, the Middle East Director of CHF International who has spent the last 4 years working with CAP, explains:

"Before we could do anything, the community would have to agree. I would tell them, 'It's for your community. You're the Iraqis. You can pave the way for this to happen.' And they did that. It was never a case of some American saying, 'This is what you need in your country.' People won't attack projects that they feel ownership of."

Also, according to the US government's own auditors the CAP programs have a success rate of 98%. Thus far the CAP program has helped:

* build/repair 830 schools;
* repair 337 roads;
* complete 325 water resource projects;
* launch 298 health-related initiatives; and
* improve 292 electric utility centers.

Yet despite being among one of the only things going right in Iraq today, CAP organizations must constantly fight with the administration for funding. In January, Bush will again ask for supplemental funds, but it is still unclear what funding CAP will receive if any. I do know that EPIC and many other Iraq-minded NGO's will be fighting to include substantial funding for CAP.

Iraq's Unused Billions

In early November I discussed some of the key findings of a report put out by the
Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction. One of the more interesting finds
was that the Iraqi government had spent a negligible amount on reconstruction despite
having a budget of $6 billion. Certainly an odd revelation considering the urgent need Iraq has for more funding.

Today the New York Times examines the Iraqi government's inability to spend money and
offers a very interesting explanation.

"The country is facing this national failure to spend even as American financial
support dwindles. Among reasons for the problems...is a strange new one: bureaucrats are so fearful and confused by anticorruption measures put in place by the American and Iraqi governments that they are afraid to sign off on contracts.

...the stringent measures they had favored to slow the rampant corruption may be
especially daunting for bureaucrats who have little experience with Western-style
regulations and oversight. Those officials say that Iraqis who have seen their
colleagues arrested and jailed in anticorruption sweeps are reluctant to put their own name on a contract."

Other factors include a high government turnover, security problems, actual corruption and a lack of Iraqis skilled at writing contracts and managing complex projects. As the New York Times notes, these are the same issues that plague the US reconstruction effort.

This problem, if not addressed, will surely undermine future international fund-
raising efforts as countries and organizations will understandably be reluctant to provide Iraq with funds if they believe Iraq will be unable to use them.

Thus far, the government has been able to spend only 20% of its 2006 budget.

New Legislation to Save SIGIR

The New York Times is reporting that Congressional Democrats will introduce new legislation next week that will renew the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s (SIGIR) mandate to oversee reconstruction efforts in Iraq while greatly increasing its investigative reach. This is in response to a recent Republican-backed provision sneaked into a large military authorization bill that called for the closure of the SIGIR office in one year.

This is great news. It has become clear from the errors committed during this conflict by firms such as Halliburton and Parsons that oversight in Iraq is fundamental to our reconstruction efforts there. Besides the billions of taxpayer dollars being wasted, lackluster reconstruction efforts can endanger lives and will only prolong US involvement in Iraq.

Since its inception in 2004, SIGIR has saved US taxpayers approximately $405.1 million and its investigations have led to several convictions of American occupation officials on bribery charges. Its latest report, published in October, which I discussed extensively in an earlier blog posting, provided a detailed analysis of what progress has been made on the ground and where the most significant problems lie. SIGIR’s investigations of Halliburton alone uncovered tens of millions of dollars of wasted funds and found that the company has been exploiting a federal loophole to keep its activities in Iraq confidential.

One of the greatest problems in Iraq is a lack of oversight: Contractors and firms are not being held accountable for their actions. It should be inconceivable that the US do away with one of the only bodies that is successfully monitoring this phase in the Iraq conflict.