As reported before, the Iranian backed Special Groups have resumed attacks in recent months after a short break. August 2009 also saw a number of reports about Tehran’s continued military interference in Iraq. On August 11, two Iranians were arrested in the Khanaqin district of Diyala after having infiltrated into Iraq. Iraqi officials said that other Iranians had recently been arrested in the area smuggling in weapons. On August 19 it was announced that 13-16 Iranian made rockets were seized along with three suspects after an attack on the U.S. base in Basra. This was part of the increase in Special Group activities in the south. Finally, on August 31 there was a story that Iraqi security forces were finding new caches of weapons in southern Iraq, some of which they believed originated in Iran.
The goal of these recent operations appears to be two pronged. First, the attacks in the south are a way for Iran and the Special Groups to let Washington and Baghdad know that they are still around and capable of disrupting things. Second, Iraqi officials loyal to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki think the weapons are going to his political rivals to stir up trouble in the run-up to the 2010 parliamentary elections. Maliki is running on law and order again, so any violence will help complicate that campaign. The increase in attacks in August 2009, for example, although mostly carried out by the insurgency and Al Qaeda in Iraq, made many Iraqis question the government and security forces. Some were also blaming political parties, so the Iranian tactic may backfire. Overall, the scope of this campaign seems far below what Iran has carried out in the past, and aimed at influencing Iraqi politics more than anything else, which has always been the top priority of Tehran.
SOURCES
Ashton, Adam and Issa, Sahar, “Iraqis remaining cool despite attacks on mosques, minorities,” McClatchy Newspapers, 8/14/09
Associated Press, “Iraqi Military Losing People’s Confidence,” 8/15/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “2 Iranians arrested after infiltrating into Iraq,” 8/11/09
Dagher, Sam, “Iranian Arms Seized in Iraq, Officials Say,” New York Times, 8/19/09
Reuters, “Arms Finds In Hitherto Quiet South Iraq Ring Alarms,” 8/31/09
Thursday, September 10, 2009
Wednesday, September 09, 2009
The U.S. Needs To Save Iraq From Itself Says Analyst
Kenneth Pollack of the Brookings Institution has been one of the long-time American commentators on Iraq. He recently wrote a piece for The National Interest journal entitled “The Battle for Baghdad". In it he argues that Iraqis, left to their own devices will destroy the gains made in Iraq since the Surge. He warns that the older political parties that took over after the 2003 invasion are still clinging to power, and are willing to bring down Iraqi democracy to maintain their positions. According to Pollack the only thing standing in the way of this happening is the United States. Even that is endangered because of the moves of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Like most of his think tank counterparts, Pollack is arguing for a long-term American diplomatic and military presence in Iraq to act as peacekeepers and mediators. Without them Pollack believes that Iraqis will only think about their own short-term interests to the detriment of the country.
Pollack begins with two conversations he had with Iraq politicians after the January 2009 provincial elections. The first was with a group that was opposed to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. They started off assuring Pollack that they had enough supporters for a no confidence vote against the Prime Minister in parliament, but in the end they admitted that Abdul Aziz al-Hakim of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council opposed this idea because it would go against the recent balloting that was in Maliki’s favor. The absence of Hakim’s support was considered a deal breaker. This represents one dynamic of the post sectarian war status quo in Iraq where many of the disputes are now political, and groups abide by the broad rules of the constitution and electoral system. On the other hand, Pollack met with a group of Dawa officials who were sure that Maliki would win in the 2010 parliamentary vote after his victory in 2009. They said the Prime Minister would run on services and security, and blame his opponents for any setbacks, something that’s actually happened recently. On the other hand when these politicians were asked about Maliki creating extra-judicial bodies and going outside standard procedures in the government they attempted to dodge the issues by saying that this was necessary because Iraq’s bureaucracy didn’t work and different political parties controlled the ministries and often didn’t listen to Maliki. This represented the other side of Iraq’s system where many believe that the Prime Minister is acting like leaders of the past and centralizing all authority around himself, which could intentionally or not lead to autocratic rule. To Pollack, this is the ying and the yang of Iraq. On the one hand democracy is taking root however precariously, on the other hand, there are plenty of forces in the country that threaten it.
There are two other issues that Pollack worries about. One is that Iraqi nationalism is making a comeback. This is helping to heal some of the wounds between Sunnis and Shiites created during the sectarian war. On the other hand, Iraqi nationalism is often interpreted as being solely Arab in character and anti-Kurdish. Maliki is playing on this by attempting to militarily confront the Kurds across the disputed territories in the north. There have been several times this has almost turned into shooting, only averted by the presence of U.S. forces. Pollack wonders if Maliki actually resents this outside interference, because he may want a confrontation with the Kurds so that he can rally the Arab public around him. Second, are the old Iraqi parties that have ruled Iraq since the 2005 elections. While he doesn’t name them, he is implying the Supreme Council, the Kurdistan Democratic Party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and the Iraqi Accordance Front, all of which either controlled their own militia or had contacts with the insurgency, and used these armed factions to gain political power. Pollack believes that these groups are trying to cling to power, and will do whatever it takes to do so. In the 2010 election for example, they are pushing for a closed list voting system where the electorate only gets to pick from coalitions instead of individuals because this gives party bosses, rather than the public, control over the politicians and government. Pollack thinks both of these are threats to stability and democracy, because Maliki and the old guard parties are only thinking about their own personal gain rather than the future of the country.
Pollack’s solution to all of these problems is a long-term American presence in Iraq. According to him, the U.S. needs to stay to provide support to the government and mediate conflicts. Only the U.S. he writes can help solve the problems between Baghdad and Kurdistan over disputed areas like Kirkuk and federalism. The U.S. needs to make sure that Iraqi prisoners and the Sons of Iraq are treated well. The U.S. needs to push the government to protect minorities. The U.S. needs to pressure Baghdad to increase its capacity and improve the bureaucracy. The Americans need to make sure that party bosses don’t take over the elections, and push for a closed list voting system. The U.S. needs to deal with Maliki’s attempt to centralize power, and corruption. In a nutshell, Pollack believes the U.S. is the only party in Iraq that will think about Iraq. The main lever of influence the U.S. has to achieve this laundry list of items is aid. U.S. advisors still partner with Iraqi units, the security forces are dependent upon the Americans for maintenance and supply, the Iraqi government has U.S. advisors throughout, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams are essential parts of the rebuilding provinces out in the governorates, and the U.S. still provides a large amount of economic aid and advice. All of this assistance needs to be made conditional based upon Baghdad’s compliance with the long list of reforms listed above. This is something many other American think tank writers have argued for over the last few years.
There is one major impediment to overcome to actually achieving this according to Pollack, Prime Minister Maliki. The Prime Minister seems to have an inflated sense of the capabilities of the Iraqi security forces and is playing politics with the U.S. presence. Maliki thinks that the Iraqi forces are going to be ready sooner rather than later so he wants to cut many of the public ties with the U.S. like joint patrols with U.S. forces and the blast walls in Baghdad. More importantly he is pushing for a referendum on the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) to coincide with the 2010 parliamentary vote. This will give Maliki a powerful tool to run on so he can portray himself as the leader that got the Americans to leave Iraq. He can also use it against his opposition since many support a longer stay for U.S. forces to protect against Maliki’s excesses. If the Iraqi public votes down the SOFA, a definite possibility, than Pollack is afraid U.S. influence will end that election day. A main priority then should be Washington lobbying Maliki to move the referendum to some other time.
Therein lies a major problem with Pollack and others who take this line of argument for a long-term U.S. role in Iraq. There is no real reason for Maliki to change the referendum date because holding it the same time as national balloting will benefit him the most. He has already given up many forms of American military assistance since the June 30, 2009 withdrawal from Iraq’s cities, and that is the greatest piece of leverage the U.S. holds. Iraqi domestic politics is a much greater force now than U.S. influence. The White House therefore, could make all kinds of assistance conditional, and the Iraqis might still not listen. Iraq may turn out to be the prodigal son for the United States, but Pollack and others can’t seem to let go. Ultimately, they seem afraid of Iraqis running their own affairs. Pollack in “The Battle for Baghdad” just happens to be the most explicit in voicing this opinion.
SOURCES
Biddle, Stephen, “Reversal in Iraq,” Center for Preventative Action Council on Foreign Relations, May 2009
Cordesman, Anthony, “Iraq: A Time To Stay?” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7/30/09
DPA, “Al-Maliki courts Iraqi Sunni tribal leaders,” 8/11/09
Nagl, John and Burton, Brian, “After the Fire: Shaping the Future U.S. Relationship with Iraq,” Center for a New American Security, June 2009
Nordland, Rod, “Bombs Hurt Maliki Case That Iraq Can Guard Itself,” New York Times, 8/21/09
Pollack, Kenneth, “The Battle for Baghdad,” The National Interest, September/October 2009
Pollack begins with two conversations he had with Iraq politicians after the January 2009 provincial elections. The first was with a group that was opposed to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. They started off assuring Pollack that they had enough supporters for a no confidence vote against the Prime Minister in parliament, but in the end they admitted that Abdul Aziz al-Hakim of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council opposed this idea because it would go against the recent balloting that was in Maliki’s favor. The absence of Hakim’s support was considered a deal breaker. This represents one dynamic of the post sectarian war status quo in Iraq where many of the disputes are now political, and groups abide by the broad rules of the constitution and electoral system. On the other hand, Pollack met with a group of Dawa officials who were sure that Maliki would win in the 2010 parliamentary vote after his victory in 2009. They said the Prime Minister would run on services and security, and blame his opponents for any setbacks, something that’s actually happened recently. On the other hand when these politicians were asked about Maliki creating extra-judicial bodies and going outside standard procedures in the government they attempted to dodge the issues by saying that this was necessary because Iraq’s bureaucracy didn’t work and different political parties controlled the ministries and often didn’t listen to Maliki. This represented the other side of Iraq’s system where many believe that the Prime Minister is acting like leaders of the past and centralizing all authority around himself, which could intentionally or not lead to autocratic rule. To Pollack, this is the ying and the yang of Iraq. On the one hand democracy is taking root however precariously, on the other hand, there are plenty of forces in the country that threaten it.
There are two other issues that Pollack worries about. One is that Iraqi nationalism is making a comeback. This is helping to heal some of the wounds between Sunnis and Shiites created during the sectarian war. On the other hand, Iraqi nationalism is often interpreted as being solely Arab in character and anti-Kurdish. Maliki is playing on this by attempting to militarily confront the Kurds across the disputed territories in the north. There have been several times this has almost turned into shooting, only averted by the presence of U.S. forces. Pollack wonders if Maliki actually resents this outside interference, because he may want a confrontation with the Kurds so that he can rally the Arab public around him. Second, are the old Iraqi parties that have ruled Iraq since the 2005 elections. While he doesn’t name them, he is implying the Supreme Council, the Kurdistan Democratic Party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and the Iraqi Accordance Front, all of which either controlled their own militia or had contacts with the insurgency, and used these armed factions to gain political power. Pollack believes that these groups are trying to cling to power, and will do whatever it takes to do so. In the 2010 election for example, they are pushing for a closed list voting system where the electorate only gets to pick from coalitions instead of individuals because this gives party bosses, rather than the public, control over the politicians and government. Pollack thinks both of these are threats to stability and democracy, because Maliki and the old guard parties are only thinking about their own personal gain rather than the future of the country.
Pollack’s solution to all of these problems is a long-term American presence in Iraq. According to him, the U.S. needs to stay to provide support to the government and mediate conflicts. Only the U.S. he writes can help solve the problems between Baghdad and Kurdistan over disputed areas like Kirkuk and federalism. The U.S. needs to make sure that Iraqi prisoners and the Sons of Iraq are treated well. The U.S. needs to push the government to protect minorities. The U.S. needs to pressure Baghdad to increase its capacity and improve the bureaucracy. The Americans need to make sure that party bosses don’t take over the elections, and push for a closed list voting system. The U.S. needs to deal with Maliki’s attempt to centralize power, and corruption. In a nutshell, Pollack believes the U.S. is the only party in Iraq that will think about Iraq. The main lever of influence the U.S. has to achieve this laundry list of items is aid. U.S. advisors still partner with Iraqi units, the security forces are dependent upon the Americans for maintenance and supply, the Iraqi government has U.S. advisors throughout, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams are essential parts of the rebuilding provinces out in the governorates, and the U.S. still provides a large amount of economic aid and advice. All of this assistance needs to be made conditional based upon Baghdad’s compliance with the long list of reforms listed above. This is something many other American think tank writers have argued for over the last few years.
There is one major impediment to overcome to actually achieving this according to Pollack, Prime Minister Maliki. The Prime Minister seems to have an inflated sense of the capabilities of the Iraqi security forces and is playing politics with the U.S. presence. Maliki thinks that the Iraqi forces are going to be ready sooner rather than later so he wants to cut many of the public ties with the U.S. like joint patrols with U.S. forces and the blast walls in Baghdad. More importantly he is pushing for a referendum on the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) to coincide with the 2010 parliamentary vote. This will give Maliki a powerful tool to run on so he can portray himself as the leader that got the Americans to leave Iraq. He can also use it against his opposition since many support a longer stay for U.S. forces to protect against Maliki’s excesses. If the Iraqi public votes down the SOFA, a definite possibility, than Pollack is afraid U.S. influence will end that election day. A main priority then should be Washington lobbying Maliki to move the referendum to some other time.
Therein lies a major problem with Pollack and others who take this line of argument for a long-term U.S. role in Iraq. There is no real reason for Maliki to change the referendum date because holding it the same time as national balloting will benefit him the most. He has already given up many forms of American military assistance since the June 30, 2009 withdrawal from Iraq’s cities, and that is the greatest piece of leverage the U.S. holds. Iraqi domestic politics is a much greater force now than U.S. influence. The White House therefore, could make all kinds of assistance conditional, and the Iraqis might still not listen. Iraq may turn out to be the prodigal son for the United States, but Pollack and others can’t seem to let go. Ultimately, they seem afraid of Iraqis running their own affairs. Pollack in “The Battle for Baghdad” just happens to be the most explicit in voicing this opinion.
SOURCES
Biddle, Stephen, “Reversal in Iraq,” Center for Preventative Action Council on Foreign Relations, May 2009
Cordesman, Anthony, “Iraq: A Time To Stay?” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7/30/09
DPA, “Al-Maliki courts Iraqi Sunni tribal leaders,” 8/11/09
Nagl, John and Burton, Brian, “After the Fire: Shaping the Future U.S. Relationship with Iraq,” Center for a New American Security, June 2009
Nordland, Rod, “Bombs Hurt Maliki Case That Iraq Can Guard Itself,” New York Times, 8/21/09
Pollack, Kenneth, “The Battle for Baghdad,” The National Interest, September/October 2009
Tuesday, September 08, 2009
Maliki On The 2010 Campaign Trail
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has been in full campaign mode for several months now anticipating the January 2010 parliamentary elections. The themes he is promoting are largely the same ones he used in the 2009 provincial vote: security, services, nationalism, and one new one, getting the Americans to leave Iraq. After Maliki’s State of Law List rode to victory in the governorates’ balloting it seemed like Maliki was assured of returning to the prime ministership using these issues. Since then, Maliki has run into a series of problems in his run for re-election, but he may still have one ace up his sleeve.
After Maliki’s crackdown on the Sadrists beginning in March 2008, the Prime Minister seized the limelight of Iraqi politics. He claimed that he had secured Iraq by getting rid of the Mahdi Army militia. This of course, ignored the work of the U.S. forces and the Surge, but he was more than willing to take credit for their sacrifices. His move gained support from both Shiites and Sunnis, and the name of his new list, State of Law, showed his new position. Attacks and deaths across Iraq took a large drop in the run up and aftermath of the January 2009 elections as well. By the summer Maliki was calling for the removal of blast walls along major thoroughfares in the capital.
The Baghdad bombings however, smashed Maliki’s successful campaign. On August 19, 2009 two truck bombs struck Iraq’s Foreign and Finance Ministries in Baghdad. 101 were killed and 1203 were wounded. These were the most devastating attacks since 2008. The Prime Minister was forced to rescind his order on the blast walls, and called for a renewed effort to secure the country. The bombings exposed the false sense of security that Maliki had helped create. The insurgents are a shell of their former selves, and are not a threat to overthrow the government, but they are still quite capable of spreading terror in Iraq’s major cities. In response, Maliki has blamed Syria, while the State of Law governor of Baghdad has accused Saudi Arabia of complicity in the bombings. This was the first chink in Maliki’s armor.
Another issue Maliki ran on in the 2009 vote was for improved services. The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and Sadrists controlled most of the south and Baghdad after the 2005 elections, but did a poor job running them. Maliki promised to rectify this. The problem was that Iraq’s 2009 budget was drastically slashed with the drop in oil prices due to the world recession. The 2008 budget in comparison was a record high due to the skyrocketing price of petroleum that year. There was no way the provinces were going to get more money than the previous year then. Not only that, but the old provincial governments signed a large number of contracts for development projects in 2008 due to their growing budgets, which rolled over to 2009 and tied up all the money available for the new governorate councils. As reported before, most of the provinces are reporting deficits this year as a result. Maliki has tried to deflect the matter by blaming his opponents for the lack of services.
Finally, the Prime Minister has linked his nationalist stance with the withdrawal of the American forces. Maliki seems over confident in the capabilities of the Iraqi security forces. Before the passage of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) he was hoping that the Defense and Interior Ministers would say that the Iraqi forces were ready to assume complete control of internal security, but instead they said they needed at least three more years. He went ahead with the SOFA that set a December 31, 2011 pullout date for the Americans. In the implementation law it called for a referendum, originally set for July 30, 2009. That didn’t happen, but Maliki is now pushing for that to occur in conjunction with the 2010 election. That would give Maliki a powerful tool to run with, as he is not as strong as he once was with security and services, and most Iraqis want the Americans to leave. It’s also helpful that the some of his main opponents, the ruling Kurdish parties and the Iraqi Islamic Party want to have the U.S. stay to be a guarantor against Maliki using the security forces against them. Since Iraqi nationalism is on the rise, it will be hard for any of these parties to run for the SOFA, and if they do, Maliki is likely to ravage them for doing so.
As of now Maliki is not in as strong a position as he was after the 2009 vote. Iraqi perceptions of the security situation have seemingly changed after the Baghdad bombings. The central and provincial governments are incapable of improving services with the large budget cuts. In both instances, Maliki is blaming others, foreigners and the opposition respectively, to deflect attention away from his own shortcomings. What the Prime Minister still has going for him is Iraqi nationalism and growing anti-Americanism. For now, Maliki is still at the center of Iraqi politics. He’s also much better known, more popular with the electorate, and has a clear message compared to his opponents. Who for example, will run the new National Iraqi Alliance? Will anyone see them as anything but a sectarian Shiite coalition without the Prime Minister? The problem is he doesn’t hold a plurality, let alone a majority of votes. With five months to go before the parliamentary elections, plenty of things could change, and that’s symbolic of the state of Iraqi politics at this period in time.
SOURCES
Arraf, Jane, “Baghdad governor: Sunni MPs may be arrested for bombing,” Christian Science Monitor, 8/23/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Deficit in Baghdad provincial council’s budget,” 6/13/09
Buzbee, Sally and Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Iraq handing out cash to people on the streets,” Associated Press, 7/12/08
Dagher, Sam, “2 Blasts Expose Security Flaws in Heart of Iraq,” New York Times, 8/20/09
DPA, “Al-Maliki courts Iraqi Sunni tribal leaders,” 8/11/09
Gwertzman, Bernard, “Reappraising U.S. Withdrawal from Iraqi Cities,” Council on Foreign Relations, 8/25/09
Hauslohner, Abigail, “In Iraqi Politics, the Sunni-Shi’ite Divide Recedes,” Time, 1/14/09
Howard, Michael, “Baghdad tears down security barriers,” Guardian, 6/10/09
Iraq The Model, “Maliki promises a crackdown that could reach political figures,” 8/23/09
Knights, Michael and Ali, Ahmed, “Putting Iraq’s Security Agreement to the Vote: Risks and Opportunities,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy,” 8/24/09
Pollack, Kenneth, “The Battle for Baghdad,” The National Interest, September/October 2009
Santora, Marc, “Iraqis Demand Syria Turn Over Suspects,” New York Times, 8/25/09
Sly, Liz, “Iraqi army officers pulled $4.8-million bank heist, police say,” Los Angeles Times, 8/3/09
After Maliki’s crackdown on the Sadrists beginning in March 2008, the Prime Minister seized the limelight of Iraqi politics. He claimed that he had secured Iraq by getting rid of the Mahdi Army militia. This of course, ignored the work of the U.S. forces and the Surge, but he was more than willing to take credit for their sacrifices. His move gained support from both Shiites and Sunnis, and the name of his new list, State of Law, showed his new position. Attacks and deaths across Iraq took a large drop in the run up and aftermath of the January 2009 elections as well. By the summer Maliki was calling for the removal of blast walls along major thoroughfares in the capital.
The Baghdad bombings however, smashed Maliki’s successful campaign. On August 19, 2009 two truck bombs struck Iraq’s Foreign and Finance Ministries in Baghdad. 101 were killed and 1203 were wounded. These were the most devastating attacks since 2008. The Prime Minister was forced to rescind his order on the blast walls, and called for a renewed effort to secure the country. The bombings exposed the false sense of security that Maliki had helped create. The insurgents are a shell of their former selves, and are not a threat to overthrow the government, but they are still quite capable of spreading terror in Iraq’s major cities. In response, Maliki has blamed Syria, while the State of Law governor of Baghdad has accused Saudi Arabia of complicity in the bombings. This was the first chink in Maliki’s armor.
Another issue Maliki ran on in the 2009 vote was for improved services. The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and Sadrists controlled most of the south and Baghdad after the 2005 elections, but did a poor job running them. Maliki promised to rectify this. The problem was that Iraq’s 2009 budget was drastically slashed with the drop in oil prices due to the world recession. The 2008 budget in comparison was a record high due to the skyrocketing price of petroleum that year. There was no way the provinces were going to get more money than the previous year then. Not only that, but the old provincial governments signed a large number of contracts for development projects in 2008 due to their growing budgets, which rolled over to 2009 and tied up all the money available for the new governorate councils. As reported before, most of the provinces are reporting deficits this year as a result. Maliki has tried to deflect the matter by blaming his opponents for the lack of services.
Finally, the Prime Minister has linked his nationalist stance with the withdrawal of the American forces. Maliki seems over confident in the capabilities of the Iraqi security forces. Before the passage of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) he was hoping that the Defense and Interior Ministers would say that the Iraqi forces were ready to assume complete control of internal security, but instead they said they needed at least three more years. He went ahead with the SOFA that set a December 31, 2011 pullout date for the Americans. In the implementation law it called for a referendum, originally set for July 30, 2009. That didn’t happen, but Maliki is now pushing for that to occur in conjunction with the 2010 election. That would give Maliki a powerful tool to run with, as he is not as strong as he once was with security and services, and most Iraqis want the Americans to leave. It’s also helpful that the some of his main opponents, the ruling Kurdish parties and the Iraqi Islamic Party want to have the U.S. stay to be a guarantor against Maliki using the security forces against them. Since Iraqi nationalism is on the rise, it will be hard for any of these parties to run for the SOFA, and if they do, Maliki is likely to ravage them for doing so.
As of now Maliki is not in as strong a position as he was after the 2009 vote. Iraqi perceptions of the security situation have seemingly changed after the Baghdad bombings. The central and provincial governments are incapable of improving services with the large budget cuts. In both instances, Maliki is blaming others, foreigners and the opposition respectively, to deflect attention away from his own shortcomings. What the Prime Minister still has going for him is Iraqi nationalism and growing anti-Americanism. For now, Maliki is still at the center of Iraqi politics. He’s also much better known, more popular with the electorate, and has a clear message compared to his opponents. Who for example, will run the new National Iraqi Alliance? Will anyone see them as anything but a sectarian Shiite coalition without the Prime Minister? The problem is he doesn’t hold a plurality, let alone a majority of votes. With five months to go before the parliamentary elections, plenty of things could change, and that’s symbolic of the state of Iraqi politics at this period in time.
SOURCES
Arraf, Jane, “Baghdad governor: Sunni MPs may be arrested for bombing,” Christian Science Monitor, 8/23/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Deficit in Baghdad provincial council’s budget,” 6/13/09
Buzbee, Sally and Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Iraq handing out cash to people on the streets,” Associated Press, 7/12/08
Dagher, Sam, “2 Blasts Expose Security Flaws in Heart of Iraq,” New York Times, 8/20/09
DPA, “Al-Maliki courts Iraqi Sunni tribal leaders,” 8/11/09
Gwertzman, Bernard, “Reappraising U.S. Withdrawal from Iraqi Cities,” Council on Foreign Relations, 8/25/09
Hauslohner, Abigail, “In Iraqi Politics, the Sunni-Shi’ite Divide Recedes,” Time, 1/14/09
Howard, Michael, “Baghdad tears down security barriers,” Guardian, 6/10/09
Iraq The Model, “Maliki promises a crackdown that could reach political figures,” 8/23/09
Knights, Michael and Ali, Ahmed, “Putting Iraq’s Security Agreement to the Vote: Risks and Opportunities,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy,” 8/24/09
Pollack, Kenneth, “The Battle for Baghdad,” The National Interest, September/October 2009
Santora, Marc, “Iraqis Demand Syria Turn Over Suspects,” New York Times, 8/25/09
Sly, Liz, “Iraqi army officers pulled $4.8-million bank heist, police say,” Los Angeles Times, 8/3/09
Monday, September 07, 2009
Mosul Remains Troubled City
Like the rest of the country, Mosul in Ninewa province saw an increase in violence in August 2009. The city, the third largest in Iraq, has been one of the most violent areas in the country for several years now. It is the last urban stronghold of Al Qaeda in Iraq and other insurgent groups. The divisions between Arabs and Kurds have given the militants a rationale for their violence. According to press repots, in August there were 77 security incidents resulting in 102 deaths and 171 wounded. That averages out to 2.48 security incidents, 3.29 deaths, and 5.51 wounded per day. That was an increase in deaths from July, but about the same number of wounded. In that month there were 73 security incidents, for an average of 2.35 per day, 79 deaths, 2.54 per day, and 169 wounded, 5.45 per day. August saw the most deaths since October 2008. After that month deaths never reached one hundred until last month.
The Iraqi government has launched three security operations in the city with some U.S. help to little effect. In May 2008 Baghdad announced Operation Lion’s Roar/Mother of Two Springs, followed by Mother of Two Springs II in October 2008, and then a third offensive, Operation New Hope in February 2009 that included several thousand U.S. troops. The Americans also deployed Special Forces to the city. The number of wounded actually increased after that last operation. The commander of U.S. forces General Ray Odierno was so worried about Mosul that he wanted to keep American troops there after the June 30, 2009 withdrawal from Iraq’s cities, but the idea was vetoed by Baghdad. Since then joint U.S.-Iraqi patrols have quietly returned to the city under the guise of checking on reconstruction projects, but with no real affect upon the number of casualties.
Attack Statistics In Mosul Based Upon Press Reports
August 2009
77 Attacks/Incidents – 2.48 attacks & incidents/day
102 Deaths – 3.29 deaths/day
171 Wounded – 5.51 wounded/day
July 2009
73 Attacks/Incidents – 2.35 attacks & incidents/day
79 Deaths – 2.54 deaths/day
169 Wounded – 5.45 wounded/day
June 2009
73 Attacks/Incidents – 2.43 attacks & incidents/day
58 Deaths – 1.93 deaths/day
123 Wounded – 4.1 wounded/day
May 2009
83 Attacks/Incidents – 3.06 attacks & incidents/day
64 Deaths – 2.06 deaths/day
164 Wounded – 4.70 wounded/day
April 2009
79 Attacks/Incidents – 2.63 attacks & incidents/day
53 Deaths – 1.76 deaths/day
191 Wounded – 6.36 wounded/day
March 2009
86 attacks/incidents – 2.77 attacks & incidents/day
69 deaths – 2.22 deaths/day
169 wounded – 5.45 wounded/day
February 2009
81 attacks/incidents – 2.89 attacks & incidents/day
58 deaths – 2.0 deaths/day
111 wounded – 3.96 wounded/day
January 2009
52 attacks/incidents – 1.67 attacks & incidents/day
56 deaths – 1.80 killed/day
85 wounded – 2.74 wounded/day
December 2008
65 attacks/incidents – 2.09 attacks & incidents/day
68 deaths – 2.19 deaths/day
181 wounded – 5.83 wounded/day
November 2008
65 attacks/incidents – 2.16 attacks & incidents/day
53 deaths – 1.76 deaths/day
249 wounded – 8.3 wounded/day
October 2008
92 attacks/incidents – 2.96 attacks & incidents/day
112 deaths – 3.61 deaths/day
188 wounded – 6.06 wounded/day
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Car bomb kills 20 outside Shiite mosque in Iraq,” 8/7/09
Ahmed, Hamid, “Iraqi leader calls for anti-corruption campaign,” Associated Press, 5/9/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “2 civilians killed in eastern Mosul,” 8/26/09
- “2 cops killed in attack in Mosul,” 8/17/09
- “2 policemen killed in attacks in Mosul,” 8/7/09
- “4 cops killed, injured in clashes with gunmen,” 8/19/09
- “4 security personnel killed, wounded in Ninewa blast,” 8/19/09
- “6 wounded in grenade blast in central Mosul,” 8/16/09
- “Bookstore owner gunned down in Mosul,” 8/31/09
- “Civilian killed, 2 soldier wounded in Mosul blast,” 8/27/09
- “Civilian killed, attacker nabbed in Mosul,” 8/25/09
- “Gunmen break into store, kill its owner,” 8/17/09
- “Gunmen kill 2 soldiers in Mosul,” 8/16/09
- “Gunmen kill shopkeeper in Mosul,” 8/22/09
- “Gunmen kill taxi driver in Mosul,” 8/16/09
- “Gunmen kill woman, injure civilian in Mosul,” 8/10/09
- “Gunmen shoot down merchant in Mosul,” 8/14/09
- “IED blast kills soldier, wounds 2 in Ninewa,” 8/3/09
- “IED explodes in northern Mosul,” 8/11/09
- “IED kills civilian, wounds cops in Mosul,” 8/18/09
- “IED kills soldier, wounds 2 in western Mosul,” 8/3/09
- “IED wounds 3 soldiers in Ninewa,” 8/31/09
- “Iraqi soldier wounded in Mosul attack,” 8/30/09
- “Medicine factory personnel killed, wounded by IED,” 8/5/09
- “Ninewa local official wounded in IED blast,” 8/16/09
- “Ninewa police arrest 2 gunmen in central Mosul,” 8/27/09
- “Oil official assassinated in Mosul,” 8/3/09
- “Police defuse car bomb in Mosul,” 8/17/09
- “Police defuse Katyusha rocket southeastern Mosul,” 8/31/09
- “Police kill gunman in Mosul,” 8/4/09
- “Policeman gunned down in northern Mosul,” 8/10/09
- “Policeman killed, another wounded in Mosul blast,” 8/27/09
- “Policeman killed in Mosul checkpoints attack,” 8/8/09
- “Policeman shot down by gunmen in Mosul,” 8/7/09
- “Policeman shot down in Mosul,” 8/23/09
- “Policeman wounded in clashes with gunmen in Mosul,” 8/30/09
- “Roadside bomb kills mayor, 2 children in Mosul,” 8/22/09
- “Soldier injured in eastern Mosul,” 8/4/09
- “Soldier wounded by sticky bomb in Ninewa,” 8/18/09
- “Sticky bomb destroys oil container south of Mosul,” 8/4/09
- “Sticky bomb kills civilian in western Mosul,” 8/17/09
- “Sticky IED explodes in front of house of oil employee,” 8/26/09
- “Telecoms company personnel killed, wounded in blast,” 8/12/09
- “Traffic policeman gunned down in Mosul,” 8/1/09
- “Unknown body found in Mosul,” 8/7/09
- “Unknown body found in Mosul,” 8/23/09
- “URGENT/3 soldiers killed by car bomb in Ninewa,” 8/21/09
Al-Badrani, Jamal, “Bombs targeting Shi’ite Muslims kill 44 in Iraq,” Reuters, 8/7/09
DPA, “Four killed, eight wounded in attacks in northern and western Iraq,” 8/12/09
Gatehouse, Gabriel, “US troops back on patrol in Iraq,” BBC, 7/28/09
Hammoudi, Laith, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Friday 14 August 2009,” 8/14/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Friday 21 August 2009,” 8/21/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 3 August 2009,” 8/3/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 18 August 2009,” 8/18/09
Issa, Sahar, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 17 August 2009,” 8/17/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 20 August 2009,” 8/20/09
KUNA, “Four Iraqi soldiers killed in car bomb blast,” 8/23/09
Loyd, Anthony, “US withdrawal from Mosul leads to fear of Iraqi insurgent attacks,” Times of London, 6/1/09
Myers, Steven Lee and Robertson, Campbell, “Insurgency Remains Tenacious In North Iraq,” New York Times, 7/10/09
Reuters, “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 3,” 8/3/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 5,” 8/5/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 6,” 8/6/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 9,” 8/9/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 10,” 8/10/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 12,” 8/12/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 21,” 8/21/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 25,” 8/25/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 26,” 8/26/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 28,” 8/28/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 29,” 8/29/09
The Iraqi government has launched three security operations in the city with some U.S. help to little effect. In May 2008 Baghdad announced Operation Lion’s Roar/Mother of Two Springs, followed by Mother of Two Springs II in October 2008, and then a third offensive, Operation New Hope in February 2009 that included several thousand U.S. troops. The Americans also deployed Special Forces to the city. The number of wounded actually increased after that last operation. The commander of U.S. forces General Ray Odierno was so worried about Mosul that he wanted to keep American troops there after the June 30, 2009 withdrawal from Iraq’s cities, but the idea was vetoed by Baghdad. Since then joint U.S.-Iraqi patrols have quietly returned to the city under the guise of checking on reconstruction projects, but with no real affect upon the number of casualties.
Attack Statistics In Mosul Based Upon Press Reports
August 2009
77 Attacks/Incidents – 2.48 attacks & incidents/day
102 Deaths – 3.29 deaths/day
171 Wounded – 5.51 wounded/day
July 2009
73 Attacks/Incidents – 2.35 attacks & incidents/day
79 Deaths – 2.54 deaths/day
169 Wounded – 5.45 wounded/day
June 2009
73 Attacks/Incidents – 2.43 attacks & incidents/day
58 Deaths – 1.93 deaths/day
123 Wounded – 4.1 wounded/day
May 2009
83 Attacks/Incidents – 3.06 attacks & incidents/day
64 Deaths – 2.06 deaths/day
164 Wounded – 4.70 wounded/day
April 2009
79 Attacks/Incidents – 2.63 attacks & incidents/day
53 Deaths – 1.76 deaths/day
191 Wounded – 6.36 wounded/day
March 2009
86 attacks/incidents – 2.77 attacks & incidents/day
69 deaths – 2.22 deaths/day
169 wounded – 5.45 wounded/day
February 2009
81 attacks/incidents – 2.89 attacks & incidents/day
58 deaths – 2.0 deaths/day
111 wounded – 3.96 wounded/day
January 2009
52 attacks/incidents – 1.67 attacks & incidents/day
56 deaths – 1.80 killed/day
85 wounded – 2.74 wounded/day
December 2008
65 attacks/incidents – 2.09 attacks & incidents/day
68 deaths – 2.19 deaths/day
181 wounded – 5.83 wounded/day
November 2008
65 attacks/incidents – 2.16 attacks & incidents/day
53 deaths – 1.76 deaths/day
249 wounded – 8.3 wounded/day
October 2008
92 attacks/incidents – 2.96 attacks & incidents/day
112 deaths – 3.61 deaths/day
188 wounded – 6.06 wounded/day
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Car bomb kills 20 outside Shiite mosque in Iraq,” 8/7/09
Ahmed, Hamid, “Iraqi leader calls for anti-corruption campaign,” Associated Press, 5/9/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “2 civilians killed in eastern Mosul,” 8/26/09
- “2 cops killed in attack in Mosul,” 8/17/09
- “2 policemen killed in attacks in Mosul,” 8/7/09
- “4 cops killed, injured in clashes with gunmen,” 8/19/09
- “4 security personnel killed, wounded in Ninewa blast,” 8/19/09
- “6 wounded in grenade blast in central Mosul,” 8/16/09
- “Bookstore owner gunned down in Mosul,” 8/31/09
- “Civilian killed, 2 soldier wounded in Mosul blast,” 8/27/09
- “Civilian killed, attacker nabbed in Mosul,” 8/25/09
- “Gunmen break into store, kill its owner,” 8/17/09
- “Gunmen kill 2 soldiers in Mosul,” 8/16/09
- “Gunmen kill shopkeeper in Mosul,” 8/22/09
- “Gunmen kill taxi driver in Mosul,” 8/16/09
- “Gunmen kill woman, injure civilian in Mosul,” 8/10/09
- “Gunmen shoot down merchant in Mosul,” 8/14/09
- “IED blast kills soldier, wounds 2 in Ninewa,” 8/3/09
- “IED explodes in northern Mosul,” 8/11/09
- “IED kills civilian, wounds cops in Mosul,” 8/18/09
- “IED kills soldier, wounds 2 in western Mosul,” 8/3/09
- “IED wounds 3 soldiers in Ninewa,” 8/31/09
- “Iraqi soldier wounded in Mosul attack,” 8/30/09
- “Medicine factory personnel killed, wounded by IED,” 8/5/09
- “Ninewa local official wounded in IED blast,” 8/16/09
- “Ninewa police arrest 2 gunmen in central Mosul,” 8/27/09
- “Oil official assassinated in Mosul,” 8/3/09
- “Police defuse car bomb in Mosul,” 8/17/09
- “Police defuse Katyusha rocket southeastern Mosul,” 8/31/09
- “Police kill gunman in Mosul,” 8/4/09
- “Policeman gunned down in northern Mosul,” 8/10/09
- “Policeman killed, another wounded in Mosul blast,” 8/27/09
- “Policeman killed in Mosul checkpoints attack,” 8/8/09
- “Policeman shot down by gunmen in Mosul,” 8/7/09
- “Policeman shot down in Mosul,” 8/23/09
- “Policeman wounded in clashes with gunmen in Mosul,” 8/30/09
- “Roadside bomb kills mayor, 2 children in Mosul,” 8/22/09
- “Soldier injured in eastern Mosul,” 8/4/09
- “Soldier wounded by sticky bomb in Ninewa,” 8/18/09
- “Sticky bomb destroys oil container south of Mosul,” 8/4/09
- “Sticky bomb kills civilian in western Mosul,” 8/17/09
- “Sticky IED explodes in front of house of oil employee,” 8/26/09
- “Telecoms company personnel killed, wounded in blast,” 8/12/09
- “Traffic policeman gunned down in Mosul,” 8/1/09
- “Unknown body found in Mosul,” 8/7/09
- “Unknown body found in Mosul,” 8/23/09
- “URGENT/3 soldiers killed by car bomb in Ninewa,” 8/21/09
Al-Badrani, Jamal, “Bombs targeting Shi’ite Muslims kill 44 in Iraq,” Reuters, 8/7/09
DPA, “Four killed, eight wounded in attacks in northern and western Iraq,” 8/12/09
Gatehouse, Gabriel, “US troops back on patrol in Iraq,” BBC, 7/28/09
Hammoudi, Laith, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Friday 14 August 2009,” 8/14/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Friday 21 August 2009,” 8/21/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 3 August 2009,” 8/3/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 18 August 2009,” 8/18/09
Issa, Sahar, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 17 August 2009,” 8/17/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 20 August 2009,” 8/20/09
KUNA, “Four Iraqi soldiers killed in car bomb blast,” 8/23/09
Loyd, Anthony, “US withdrawal from Mosul leads to fear of Iraqi insurgent attacks,” Times of London, 6/1/09
Myers, Steven Lee and Robertson, Campbell, “Insurgency Remains Tenacious In North Iraq,” New York Times, 7/10/09
Reuters, “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 3,” 8/3/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 5,” 8/5/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 6,” 8/6/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 9,” 8/9/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 10,” 8/10/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 12,” 8/12/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 21,” 8/21/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 25,” 8/25/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 26,” 8/26/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 28,” 8/28/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 29,” 8/29/09
Sunday, September 06, 2009
Deaths In Iraq Take Jump In August 2009
The ebb and flow of violence in Iraq in 2009 has been for deaths to go up and down every month. January 2009 saw the lowest deaths in the Iraq war up to that date because of the provincial elections. In February deaths went back up, to drop in March, and then go up again in April. That pattern has continued into August 2009. July saw fewer deaths than June, and August saw an increase from July. Iraq Body Count, as usual, had the highest figure of 537 killed in August. That was followed in descending order by Iraq’s ministries with 456, icasualties with 439, and the Associated Press with 425. Iraq’s ministries also reported 1,741 wounded last month, an increase from the 1,085 wounded in July. Around three-quarters of the casualties in August were caused by large bombings. According to press accounts there were 44 mass casualty bombings in August resulting in 359 killed and 2,252 wounded. The largest event was the August 19, 2009 bombing of the Finance and Foreign Ministries that killed 101 and wounded 1,203. There is not a direct correlation between attacks and casualties in Iraq however. July saw almost three times as many bombings as June, but that month had more deaths than July. Overall, violence and deaths have not reached 2008 levels, but months with high casualties are up to last year’s counts, while monthly attacks are down to one-third the level of the last quarter of 2008.
Iraqi Deaths
Iraq Body Count | icasualties.Org | Iraqi Ministries | Associated Press | |
July 08 | 584 | 419 | 851 | N/A |
Aug. 08 | 592 | 311 | N/A | 475 |
Sep. 08 | 535 | 366 | 440 | 503 |
Oct. 08 | 528 | 288 | 317 | N/A |
Nov. 08 | 473 | 317 | 340 | N/A |
Dec. 08 | 522 | 320 | 316 | N/A |
Jan. 09 | 276 | 187 | 191 | 242 |
Feb. 09 | 343 | 202 | 258 | 288 |
March 09 | 416 | 278 | 252 | 335 |
April 09 | 484 | 347 | 355 | 371 |
May 09 | 332 | 188 | 165 | 225 |
June 09 | 488 | 367 | 437 | 447 |
July 09 | 418 | 240 | 275 | 309 |
Aug. 09 | 537 | 439 | 456 | 425 |
Last 6 months of 2008 Average | 539.0 | 336.8 | 452.8 5 of 6 months | N/A |
First 6 months of 2009 Average | 389.8 | 261.0 | 276.5 | 317.5 |
Number of Bombings and Casualty Statistics – April to July 2009
Bombings | Deaths | Wounded | |
April 2009 | 21 | 198 + 32 Iranians | 497 + 105 Iranians + 10 Americans |
May 2009 | 9 | 111 | 262 |
June 2009 | 14 | 174 | 517 |
July 2009 | 35 | 180 | 655 |
August 2009 | 44 | 359 | 2,252 |
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, "Car bomb kills 20 outside Shiite mosque in Iraq," 8/7/09
- "Iraq death toll in August highest in 13 months: officials," 9/1/09
Ahmed, Hamid, "String of bombings kill at least 43 in Iraq," Associated Press, 8/10/09
- "Truck bomb kills 16 people in Iraq," 8/29/09
Associated Press, "Bombs kill at least 8 at Iraqi market," 8/17/09
- "Iraq: Key figures since the war began," 9/1/09
- "Iraq lawmakers seek emergency session on security," 8/20/09
Aswat al-Iraq, "32 killed or wounded in Sinjar blast," 8/30/09
- "Final toll from Baghdad explosions 82 dead, 1203 injured – BOC," 8/20/09
- "Kirkuk bomb casualties rise to 32," 8/6/09
- "Toll from Falluja car bombing increases to 23," 8/3/09
- "URGENT/2 killed, 26 wounded in 2 blasts in Babel," 8/3/09
- "Wave of Baghdad blasts killed 91, wounded 552," 8/19/09
- "Wave of blasts in Babel leaves 4 dead, 65 wounded," 8/20/09
Al-Badrani, Jamal, "Bombs targeting Shi'ite Muslims kill 44 in Iraq," Reuters, 8/7/09
Carter, Chelsea, "Iraq: 2 killed in Baghdad truck bombing," Associated Press, 8/20/09
Fordam, Alice and Latif, Nizar, "Bombed back to a state of fear," The National, 8/22/09
Gamel, Kim, "Double bombing kills more than 20," Associated Press, 8/14/09
Hammoudi, Laith, "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 31 August 2009," 8/31/09
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 19 August 2009," 8/19/09
Hammoudi, Laith and Ashton, Adam, "Bombings kill dozens in Baghdad and northern Iraq," McClatchy Newspapers, 8/10/09
Icasualties.org
Iraq Body Count
Issa, Sahar, "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq –Friday 7 August, 2009," 8/7/09
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq –Monday 10 August, 2009," 8/10/09
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq –Monday 17 August, 2009," 8/17/09
Issa, Sahar and Ashton, Adam, "New bombings in Iraq kill 30 as Maliki moves to take control," McClatchy Newspapers, 8/20/09
Londono, Ernesto, "Explosions in Iraq Leave at Least 36 Dead," Washington Post, 8/7/09
Middle East Online, "Five police killed in Iraq bombing," 8/5/09
Monsters & Critics, "Cab bomb kills at least seven, wounds 20, in Iraqi market," 8/2/09
Reuters, "Bus Bombings South of Baghdad Kill 20," 8/24/09
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 7," 8/7/09
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 10," 8/10/09
Salaheddin, Sinan, "Bicycle Bomb Kills 2 Near Restaurant In Baghdad," 8/20/09
- "Wave of Baghdad Blasts Kills At Least 86," Associated Press, 8/19/09
Santora, Marc, "Blasts Kill 21 at a Café n North Iraq," New York Times, 8/13/09
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, "Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress," 7/30/09
- "Quarterly Report to the United States Congress," 4/30/09
Xinhua, "Civilian killed in Baghdad bombings," 8/27/09
- "Civilian killed in Baghdad suicide car bombing," 8/30/09
- "Eight killed in Iraq car bomb attacks," 8/12/09
- "Seven killed in Iraq's Diyala violence," 9/1/09
- "Suicide bomber kills 2 security members in W Iraq," 8/15/09
- "Suicide car bomb kills three in western Iraq," 8/3/09
Friday, September 04, 2009
Baghdad Can’t Get Its Story Straight On Aug. 18 Bombings
On August 18, 2009 two truck bombs struck the Finance and Foreign Ministries in central Baghdad. The blasts killed at least 101 and wounded 1203. In the aftermath, Iraqi officials and newspapers blamed any and everyone. Azzaman newspaper reported that Iranian backed Special Groups were responsible. A source in the Iraqi National Intelligence Service told columnist David Ignatius of the Washington Post that the explosives used were similar to those made in Iran. The mayor of Baghdad said that the government had photos and evidence implicating Sunni members of parliament, and that Baathists and Al Qaeda in Iraq, funded by Saudi Arabia, had carried it out. Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari said the Iraqi security forces must have collaborated for such an attack to be so successful, and 11 officers were arrested immediately afterward.
Beginning on August 22, the Iraqi government began announcing the arrests of suspects connected to the Baath Party. On that day, the Baghdad Operations Command reported that it had arrested a man involved in the bombings who admitted that he was a Baathist. Later that day Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki said that more suspects had been picked up as well. On August 23 the Baghdad Operations Command aired a taped confession of one of the arrestees who said that he was a former policeman from the Muqdadiya district of Diyala and a Baathist. He claimed that the truck bomb on the Finance Ministry was put together in Muqdadiya, and that he paid $10,000 in bribes to get it through security checkpoints. Two Baathist officials in Syria were said to have ordered the attack. Other confessions were supposed to be coming, and a military spokesman said guards at three checkpoints in Diyala had been arrested. On August 25 the Iraqi cabinet demanded that Damascus turn over the two Baathists to Baghdad, followed by Maliki’s spokesman calling on Syria to expel or turnover all terrorists in the country. This began a war of words between the two countries with Iraq withdrawing its ambassador to Syria and then Syria doing the same. The timing of these accusations were odd as well as Maliki had just gone to Damascus and promoted closer ties between the two the day before the bombing. Not only that but the Baathists in Syria denied involvement.
Then the government began promoting a completely different story. On August 25 Al Qaeda’s Islamic State of Iraq claimed responsibility for the attacks on a website. On August 29 the Interior Ministry reported that it had arrested 14 suspects from a terrorist cell that were behind the bombings. The men led authorities to a bomb factory in the Ghazaliyah district of Baghdad and were allegedly members of Al Qaeda in Iraq. Both of the suicide bombers involved in the attack were supposedly released from the American prison Camp Bucca a few months ago. This of course, contradicts the video taped confession aired on the 23rd that said Baathists from Diyala, taking orders from others in Syria, were responsible.
The Iraqi government has announced questionable arrests and deaths, and aired suspicious confessions before. In April 2009 for example, they claimed to have captured the prince of the Islamic State of Iraq Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. In May the government aired a taped confession by their prisoner, but that was quickly contradicted by new speeches by Baghdadi that experts said matched the voice used in previous releases. Iraqi officials also could not get their story straight on Baghdadi’s background. Even earlier in May 2007 the Interior Ministry claimed they had killed Baghdadi in a shootout in Salahaddin. Coincidentally, the supposed arrest of Baghdadi in April coincided with a new wave of bombings in Baghdad by insurgents.
The August 19 bombings were obviously a shock to the Iraqi government and public. They were the largest blasts since 2008, and came after Prime Minister Maliki had been bragging that he had secured the country. In its rush to show that it had the situation under control and could provide security once again, Baghdad blamed everyone from Al Qaeda in Iraq to Baathists to Sunni politicians to Saudi Arabia to Iran to Syria. The fact that they came up with two completely different stories didn’t seem to bother the authorities because either one was easily believable by the Iraqi public as Baathists and Al Qaeda in Iraq get blamed for almost every terrorist act in the country. Baghdad has also not been beyond airing questionable confessions by insurgents after attacks in the past. The point was to protect the government’s image as much as finding the suspects. Whether the real parties responsible will or have been found is unknown since Baghdad has played with the story so much. Finding the truth then, has been another casualty in these bombings.
SOURCES
Arraf, Janes, “Baghdad governor: Sunni MPs may be arrested for bombing,” Christian Science Monitor, 8/23/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “11 officers arrested after Baghdad bombings – Qassem Atta,” 8/20/09
- “Al-Maliki asserts Iraq’s keenness to boost ties with Syria,” 8/18/09
- “Al-Maliki urges neighboring countries not to shelter criminals,” 8/25/09
- “Cabinet urges Syria to hand over suspected bombers,” 8/25/09
- “Final toll from Baghdad explosions 82 dead, 1203 injured,” 8/20/09
- “Footage of “confessions” by Wednesday bombings’ prime suspect broadcast,” 8/23/09
- “PM: Persons involved in Wednesday bombings captured,” 8/22/09
- “URGENT/Syria rejects Iraq’s remarks, recalls ambassador,” 8/25/09
- “Wednesday attackers Baathists – BOC,” 8/22/09
BBC, “Baghdad blasts ‘were inside job,’” 8/22/09
Chulov, Martin, “Wave of bombings kills up to 70 as al-Qaida chief is caught,” Guardian, 4/23/09
Dawn Media Group, “Iraq ministry bombers had been ‘recently freed’ by US,” 8/30/09
Fordam, Alice and Latif, Nizar, “Bombed back to a state of fear,” The National, 8/22/09
Ignatius, David, “Behind the Carnage in Baghdad,” Washington Post, 8/25/09
Iraq The Model, “Azzaman: Special Groups Responsible for Wednesday’s Rocket and Mortar Attacks,” 8/20/09
- “Baghdad: Cell involved in Wednesday’s attacks captured” 8/29/09
- “Maliki blames Syria for last week’s attacks,” 8/25/09
Kazimi, Nibras, “’Al-Baghdad’ on TV,” Talisman Gate Blog, 5/18/09
- “Al-Baghdadi’s Sixteenth Speech,” Talisman Gate Blog, 5/12/09
- “Al-Waili on al-Baghdadi (Updated),” Talisman Gate Blog, 5/10/09
- “More Twists in the ‘al-Baghdadi’ Sage,” Talisman Gate Blog, 5/22/09
Myers, Steven Lee, “Iraq Military Broadcasts Confession on Bombing,” New York Times, 8/23/09
Roggio, Bill, “Islamic State of Iraq leader reported captured,” Long War Journal, 4/23/09
Sabah, Zaid, “Iraqi Official Says Security Forces May Have Colluded in Bombings,” Washington Post, 8/23/09
Sands, Phil, “A safe haven in Damascus,” The National, 8/29/09
Santora, Marc, “Iraqis Demand Syria Turn Over Suspects,” New York Times, 8/25/09
Santora, Marc and Mohammed, Abeer, “After Blasts, Iraqi Officials Point Fingers,” New York Times, 8/21/09
Sly, Liz, “Al Qaeda-linked group claims two recent Baghdad bombings that killed 95,” Los Angeles Times, 8/26/09
Beginning on August 22, the Iraqi government began announcing the arrests of suspects connected to the Baath Party. On that day, the Baghdad Operations Command reported that it had arrested a man involved in the bombings who admitted that he was a Baathist. Later that day Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki said that more suspects had been picked up as well. On August 23 the Baghdad Operations Command aired a taped confession of one of the arrestees who said that he was a former policeman from the Muqdadiya district of Diyala and a Baathist. He claimed that the truck bomb on the Finance Ministry was put together in Muqdadiya, and that he paid $10,000 in bribes to get it through security checkpoints. Two Baathist officials in Syria were said to have ordered the attack. Other confessions were supposed to be coming, and a military spokesman said guards at three checkpoints in Diyala had been arrested. On August 25 the Iraqi cabinet demanded that Damascus turn over the two Baathists to Baghdad, followed by Maliki’s spokesman calling on Syria to expel or turnover all terrorists in the country. This began a war of words between the two countries with Iraq withdrawing its ambassador to Syria and then Syria doing the same. The timing of these accusations were odd as well as Maliki had just gone to Damascus and promoted closer ties between the two the day before the bombing. Not only that but the Baathists in Syria denied involvement.
Then the government began promoting a completely different story. On August 25 Al Qaeda’s Islamic State of Iraq claimed responsibility for the attacks on a website. On August 29 the Interior Ministry reported that it had arrested 14 suspects from a terrorist cell that were behind the bombings. The men led authorities to a bomb factory in the Ghazaliyah district of Baghdad and were allegedly members of Al Qaeda in Iraq. Both of the suicide bombers involved in the attack were supposedly released from the American prison Camp Bucca a few months ago. This of course, contradicts the video taped confession aired on the 23rd that said Baathists from Diyala, taking orders from others in Syria, were responsible.
The Iraqi government has announced questionable arrests and deaths, and aired suspicious confessions before. In April 2009 for example, they claimed to have captured the prince of the Islamic State of Iraq Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. In May the government aired a taped confession by their prisoner, but that was quickly contradicted by new speeches by Baghdadi that experts said matched the voice used in previous releases. Iraqi officials also could not get their story straight on Baghdadi’s background. Even earlier in May 2007 the Interior Ministry claimed they had killed Baghdadi in a shootout in Salahaddin. Coincidentally, the supposed arrest of Baghdadi in April coincided with a new wave of bombings in Baghdad by insurgents.
The August 19 bombings were obviously a shock to the Iraqi government and public. They were the largest blasts since 2008, and came after Prime Minister Maliki had been bragging that he had secured the country. In its rush to show that it had the situation under control and could provide security once again, Baghdad blamed everyone from Al Qaeda in Iraq to Baathists to Sunni politicians to Saudi Arabia to Iran to Syria. The fact that they came up with two completely different stories didn’t seem to bother the authorities because either one was easily believable by the Iraqi public as Baathists and Al Qaeda in Iraq get blamed for almost every terrorist act in the country. Baghdad has also not been beyond airing questionable confessions by insurgents after attacks in the past. The point was to protect the government’s image as much as finding the suspects. Whether the real parties responsible will or have been found is unknown since Baghdad has played with the story so much. Finding the truth then, has been another casualty in these bombings.
SOURCES
Arraf, Janes, “Baghdad governor: Sunni MPs may be arrested for bombing,” Christian Science Monitor, 8/23/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “11 officers arrested after Baghdad bombings – Qassem Atta,” 8/20/09
- “Al-Maliki asserts Iraq’s keenness to boost ties with Syria,” 8/18/09
- “Al-Maliki urges neighboring countries not to shelter criminals,” 8/25/09
- “Cabinet urges Syria to hand over suspected bombers,” 8/25/09
- “Final toll from Baghdad explosions 82 dead, 1203 injured,” 8/20/09
- “Footage of “confessions” by Wednesday bombings’ prime suspect broadcast,” 8/23/09
- “PM: Persons involved in Wednesday bombings captured,” 8/22/09
- “URGENT/Syria rejects Iraq’s remarks, recalls ambassador,” 8/25/09
- “Wednesday attackers Baathists – BOC,” 8/22/09
BBC, “Baghdad blasts ‘were inside job,’” 8/22/09
Chulov, Martin, “Wave of bombings kills up to 70 as al-Qaida chief is caught,” Guardian, 4/23/09
Dawn Media Group, “Iraq ministry bombers had been ‘recently freed’ by US,” 8/30/09
Fordam, Alice and Latif, Nizar, “Bombed back to a state of fear,” The National, 8/22/09
Ignatius, David, “Behind the Carnage in Baghdad,” Washington Post, 8/25/09
Iraq The Model, “Azzaman: Special Groups Responsible for Wednesday’s Rocket and Mortar Attacks,” 8/20/09
- “Baghdad: Cell involved in Wednesday’s attacks captured” 8/29/09
- “Maliki blames Syria for last week’s attacks,” 8/25/09
Kazimi, Nibras, “’Al-Baghdad’ on TV,” Talisman Gate Blog, 5/18/09
- “Al-Baghdadi’s Sixteenth Speech,” Talisman Gate Blog, 5/12/09
- “Al-Waili on al-Baghdadi (Updated),” Talisman Gate Blog, 5/10/09
- “More Twists in the ‘al-Baghdadi’ Sage,” Talisman Gate Blog, 5/22/09
Myers, Steven Lee, “Iraq Military Broadcasts Confession on Bombing,” New York Times, 8/23/09
Roggio, Bill, “Islamic State of Iraq leader reported captured,” Long War Journal, 4/23/09
Sabah, Zaid, “Iraqi Official Says Security Forces May Have Colluded in Bombings,” Washington Post, 8/23/09
Sands, Phil, “A safe haven in Damascus,” The National, 8/29/09
Santora, Marc, “Iraqis Demand Syria Turn Over Suspects,” New York Times, 8/25/09
Santora, Marc and Mohammed, Abeer, “After Blasts, Iraqi Officials Point Fingers,” New York Times, 8/21/09
Sly, Liz, “Al Qaeda-linked group claims two recent Baghdad bombings that killed 95,” Los Angeles Times, 8/26/09
Thursday, September 03, 2009
Why Didn’t Bush Strike Zarqawi And Ansar al-Islam In 2002?
The August 2009 issue of the Journal of Strategic Studies contains an article by Micah Zenko entitled, “Foregoing Limited Force: The George W. Bush Administration’s Decision Not to Attack Ansar Al-Islam.” Before 2003, the Bush White House singled out Ansar al-Islam, a Kurdish Islamist group, and its camp in Kurdistan as a reason to invade Iraq. The U.S. claimed hundreds of Al Qaeda fighters had fled there after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. One of these was Abu Musab al-Zarqawi who the administration said was an Al Qaeda terrorist leader. Finally, they said that Ansar was producing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and was supported by Saddam’s government. The base appeared to fit all of the criteria of President Bush’s new war on terror because it was an intersection of a dictator that supported terrorists working with Al Qaeda on WMD. In 2002 the U.S. drew up several plans to destroy Ansar’s base, but Bush vetoed the idea with no explanation. Zenko argues that the President made this decision because he thought that military action could derail the invasion of Iraq.
9/11 forever changed the Bush administration’s foreign policy. In the president’s first speech after the attack he said that the U.S. would not only go after terrorists, but the states that supported them. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz went even farther on September 13, 2001 when he said that the U.S. would end states that sponsored terrorism. This new stance was solidified in the President’s January 2002 Axis of Evil State of the Union where he said that preventing countries from possessing weapons of mass destruction and providing them to terrorists would be America’s new top priority. How this was going to be achieved was outlined in an address the President gave at West Point in June 2002 where he said the U.S. had the right to conduct pre-emptive wars to deal with threats in the newpost-9/11 world. This idea was incorporated into the White House’s September 2002 National Security Strategy that was very similar to a Defense Policy Guidance paper written by Wolfowitz in 1992, who was then Undersecretary of Defense for Policy under the 1st President Bush that called for unilateralism in foreign policy and pre-emptive war.
In a March 2002 issue of the New Yorker Jeffrey Goldberg wrote a piece about a Kurdish terrorist group called Ansar Al-Islam entitled “A Reporter at Large: The Great Terror.” While on a trip to Kurdistan he was taken to a jail controlled by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) where he interviewed three prisoners who claimed, amongst other things, that Ansar was secretly controlled by Iraqi intelligence. This article caught the eye of the Bush administration.
Ansar was a breakaway group from the Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan, formed at the beginning of September 2001. They operated in a small camp near the town of Khurmal along the Iranian border. They declared war on the PUK and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and invited Islamist militants to join their fight. They received support from Al Qaeda, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. They had about 600-1,000 fighters, who were quickly joined by thousands of militants, including Al Qaeda members, fleeing the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his Jund al-Sham group, Soldiers of the Levant, were one such group who arrived in the Ansar camp in December 2001.
Beginning in March 2002 the Bush administration began discussing what to do about Ansar, its growing camp of militants, and Zarqawi. In May the Joint Chiefs of Staff received its first intelligence briefing that said Ansar was a separate group from Al Qaeda, and that it was working on poisons. The Pentagon also began working on military plans against the camp. In the meantime officials were split over what to do, some were for taking action, and others were not. By June the White House was presented with a recommendation for a joint air-ground strike against the Khurmal base. The President vetoed the plan, but with no explanation even though it seemed like a perfect case to apply the new Bush doctrine to fight terrorism, the spread of WMD, and their state sponsors.
Zenko goes over four theories for why Bush might have made this decision. The first was that the threat was not great enough. The problem with this was that the reports about Zarqawi’s presence in the Ansar camp and the group’s production of WMD was believed to be real and a growing danger. Administration officials, beginning in May 2002 also began mentioning the importance of Ansar as an example of Iraq’s alleged support for Al Qaeda. Second was that there was no actionable intelligence to base the attack upon, but that was countered by the National Security Council’s Director for Combating Terrorism, Kurdish intelligence, and others who all said that Zarqawi was at the camp at that time. Third was that the White House was afraid of any possible negative repercussions of an attack such as dead American soldiers or civilian casualties. Zenko refutes this by going through a series of limited strikes by other presidents that failed, but had no real repercussions. Bush himself was also not against limited strikes as he okayed several missile attacks against Al Qaeda operatives in western and central Asia. The last possible reason was that Bush did not want to derail the drive to overthrow Saddam by a sideshow like attacking the Ansar camp. Sometime in the first half of 2002 the President decided to remove Saddam by force. In April 2002 Bush told the BBC that, “I made up my mind that Saddam needs to go.” In a July 23, 2002 memo from the British cabinet, Sir Richard Dearlove, the head of British intelligence, said that after a recent trip to Washington he came away with the impression that the U.S. was now committed to using force to remove Saddam. Geoffrey Hoon, the Defense Minister said that the Americans had come to no specific decision yet, but he expected the invasion to begin by January 2003. Douglas Feith, former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy told Zenko in 2006 that a strike on the Ansar camp that turned up nothing would’ve been problematic for the push to remove Saddam. General Jack Keane, who was the Army Chief of Staff at the time, said that he kept asking about striking Ansar in the fall of 2002 and the spring of 2003 and was told that it was too close to the invasion date. To Zenko this was the most convincing reason for Bush’s decision.
During the 2003 invasion, U.S. and Kurdish forces took the Ansar camp after four days of fighting. There they found that Ansar was working on poisons and WMD. They did not find evidence that the group was supported by Baghdad however. The group did receive foreign aid, and was considering launching attacks in other countries. Zarqawi was no longer at the camp though, having left when plans for a military strike against Ansar began leaking out to the press in 2002. Khurmal turned out to be the only place in Iraq that the U.S. actually found WMD being produced, which was the major justification for the war in the first place.
Bush’s decision not to attack the Ansar camp and Zarqawi was not only a tactical error, but showed that removing Saddam was the centerpiece of the Bush administration by 2002. Zenko writes that this was a mistake because Zarqawi became a leader of the insurgency in Iraq, was also responsible for terrorist attacks in Jordan, and organized a network that reached into France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Spain, and Turkey. In late 2004 he also joined Al Qaeda, and gave them a new base of operations outside of their strongholds in Afghanistan and Pakistan. His reign of terror could’ve been ended before the war. Bush’s decision not to attack the Ansar base also showed that by the summer of 2002 the President was focused upon planning and preparing for the invasion of Iraq, and apparently did not want other operations in the country that could detract from the ultimate goal of removing Saddam from power. This was seen in the fact that the Ansar camp and Zarqawi increasingly became talking points in speeches by the president and other administration officials advocating for war, while people like General Jack Keane were told that the U.S. would do nothing about them.
SOURCES
Eisenberg, Daniel, “’We’re Taking Him Out,’” Time, 5/5/02
Goldberg, Jeffrey, “A Reporter at Large: The Great Terror,” New Yorker, 3/25/02
Karon, Tony, “Why Saddam Remains a Tough Target,” Time, 1/30/02
PBS Frontline, “Chronology: The Evolution of the Bush Doctrine,” War Behind Closed Doors, 2/20/03
- “Interview Richard Perle,” Truth, War and Consequences, 10/9/03
- “The War Behind Closed Doors – Transcript,” War Behind Closed Doors, 2/20/03
Zenko, Micah, “Foregoing Limited Force: The George W. Bush Administration’s Decision Not to Attack Ansar Al-Islam,” Journal of Strategic Studies, August 2009
9/11 forever changed the Bush administration’s foreign policy. In the president’s first speech after the attack he said that the U.S. would not only go after terrorists, but the states that supported them. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz went even farther on September 13, 2001 when he said that the U.S. would end states that sponsored terrorism. This new stance was solidified in the President’s January 2002 Axis of Evil State of the Union where he said that preventing countries from possessing weapons of mass destruction and providing them to terrorists would be America’s new top priority. How this was going to be achieved was outlined in an address the President gave at West Point in June 2002 where he said the U.S. had the right to conduct pre-emptive wars to deal with threats in the newpost-9/11 world. This idea was incorporated into the White House’s September 2002 National Security Strategy that was very similar to a Defense Policy Guidance paper written by Wolfowitz in 1992, who was then Undersecretary of Defense for Policy under the 1st President Bush that called for unilateralism in foreign policy and pre-emptive war.
In a March 2002 issue of the New Yorker Jeffrey Goldberg wrote a piece about a Kurdish terrorist group called Ansar Al-Islam entitled “A Reporter at Large: The Great Terror.” While on a trip to Kurdistan he was taken to a jail controlled by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) where he interviewed three prisoners who claimed, amongst other things, that Ansar was secretly controlled by Iraqi intelligence. This article caught the eye of the Bush administration.
Ansar was a breakaway group from the Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan, formed at the beginning of September 2001. They operated in a small camp near the town of Khurmal along the Iranian border. They declared war on the PUK and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and invited Islamist militants to join their fight. They received support from Al Qaeda, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. They had about 600-1,000 fighters, who were quickly joined by thousands of militants, including Al Qaeda members, fleeing the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his Jund al-Sham group, Soldiers of the Levant, were one such group who arrived in the Ansar camp in December 2001.
Beginning in March 2002 the Bush administration began discussing what to do about Ansar, its growing camp of militants, and Zarqawi. In May the Joint Chiefs of Staff received its first intelligence briefing that said Ansar was a separate group from Al Qaeda, and that it was working on poisons. The Pentagon also began working on military plans against the camp. In the meantime officials were split over what to do, some were for taking action, and others were not. By June the White House was presented with a recommendation for a joint air-ground strike against the Khurmal base. The President vetoed the plan, but with no explanation even though it seemed like a perfect case to apply the new Bush doctrine to fight terrorism, the spread of WMD, and their state sponsors.
Zenko goes over four theories for why Bush might have made this decision. The first was that the threat was not great enough. The problem with this was that the reports about Zarqawi’s presence in the Ansar camp and the group’s production of WMD was believed to be real and a growing danger. Administration officials, beginning in May 2002 also began mentioning the importance of Ansar as an example of Iraq’s alleged support for Al Qaeda. Second was that there was no actionable intelligence to base the attack upon, but that was countered by the National Security Council’s Director for Combating Terrorism, Kurdish intelligence, and others who all said that Zarqawi was at the camp at that time. Third was that the White House was afraid of any possible negative repercussions of an attack such as dead American soldiers or civilian casualties. Zenko refutes this by going through a series of limited strikes by other presidents that failed, but had no real repercussions. Bush himself was also not against limited strikes as he okayed several missile attacks against Al Qaeda operatives in western and central Asia. The last possible reason was that Bush did not want to derail the drive to overthrow Saddam by a sideshow like attacking the Ansar camp. Sometime in the first half of 2002 the President decided to remove Saddam by force. In April 2002 Bush told the BBC that, “I made up my mind that Saddam needs to go.” In a July 23, 2002 memo from the British cabinet, Sir Richard Dearlove, the head of British intelligence, said that after a recent trip to Washington he came away with the impression that the U.S. was now committed to using force to remove Saddam. Geoffrey Hoon, the Defense Minister said that the Americans had come to no specific decision yet, but he expected the invasion to begin by January 2003. Douglas Feith, former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy told Zenko in 2006 that a strike on the Ansar camp that turned up nothing would’ve been problematic for the push to remove Saddam. General Jack Keane, who was the Army Chief of Staff at the time, said that he kept asking about striking Ansar in the fall of 2002 and the spring of 2003 and was told that it was too close to the invasion date. To Zenko this was the most convincing reason for Bush’s decision.
During the 2003 invasion, U.S. and Kurdish forces took the Ansar camp after four days of fighting. There they found that Ansar was working on poisons and WMD. They did not find evidence that the group was supported by Baghdad however. The group did receive foreign aid, and was considering launching attacks in other countries. Zarqawi was no longer at the camp though, having left when plans for a military strike against Ansar began leaking out to the press in 2002. Khurmal turned out to be the only place in Iraq that the U.S. actually found WMD being produced, which was the major justification for the war in the first place.
Bush’s decision not to attack the Ansar camp and Zarqawi was not only a tactical error, but showed that removing Saddam was the centerpiece of the Bush administration by 2002. Zenko writes that this was a mistake because Zarqawi became a leader of the insurgency in Iraq, was also responsible for terrorist attacks in Jordan, and organized a network that reached into France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Spain, and Turkey. In late 2004 he also joined Al Qaeda, and gave them a new base of operations outside of their strongholds in Afghanistan and Pakistan. His reign of terror could’ve been ended before the war. Bush’s decision not to attack the Ansar base also showed that by the summer of 2002 the President was focused upon planning and preparing for the invasion of Iraq, and apparently did not want other operations in the country that could detract from the ultimate goal of removing Saddam from power. This was seen in the fact that the Ansar camp and Zarqawi increasingly became talking points in speeches by the president and other administration officials advocating for war, while people like General Jack Keane were told that the U.S. would do nothing about them.
SOURCES
Eisenberg, Daniel, “’We’re Taking Him Out,’” Time, 5/5/02
Goldberg, Jeffrey, “A Reporter at Large: The Great Terror,” New Yorker, 3/25/02
Karon, Tony, “Why Saddam Remains a Tough Target,” Time, 1/30/02
PBS Frontline, “Chronology: The Evolution of the Bush Doctrine,” War Behind Closed Doors, 2/20/03
- “Interview Richard Perle,” Truth, War and Consequences, 10/9/03
- “The War Behind Closed Doors – Transcript,” War Behind Closed Doors, 2/20/03
Zenko, Micah, “Foregoing Limited Force: The George W. Bush Administration’s Decision Not to Attack Ansar Al-Islam,” Journal of Strategic Studies, August 2009
Wednesday, September 02, 2009
Kirkuk Looks To Be Voting In The 2010 Elections
There was some controversy as to whether Tamim province, home to the disputed city of Kirkuk, would be allowed to participate in the 2010 parliamentary elections. Tamim has still not voted for a new provincial government even though the balloting was held in January 2009 in fourteen of Iraq’s eighteen governorates. One of the big hold ups was over the voter rolls. The four major groups in Kirkuk, the Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, and Christians can not agree on who should be able to register. The Kurds asked that displaced families that had been kicked out by Saddam and since returned should be allowed to vote, while Arabs and Turkmen call them squatters who have been moved in by the Kurdish authorities to gerrymander the demographics of the city in their favor. The dispute has been not resolved. A proposed national census was also supposed to help with the voting lists, but that was indefinitely postponed in mid-August 2009 out of fear that it would create more divisions. Tamim has not held provincial elections as a result.
The Iraqi Election Commission is moving forward with preparations for the parliamentary vote in the province anyway. The Commission said that anyone that had a food ration card by July 15, 2009 would be eligible to register to vote. The centers to do this will be open until September 20, and the election is scheduled for January 16, 2010. The national vote is less controversial in Tamim than the local one, because it will not disturb the delicate and disputed balance of power within the province.
SOURCES
Aswat al-Iraq, “IHEC in Kirkuk stipulates ration card before mid July,” 8/27/09
International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09
Reuters, “Citing Tensions, Iraq Abandons Census Plans,” 8/16/09
The Iraqi Election Commission is moving forward with preparations for the parliamentary vote in the province anyway. The Commission said that anyone that had a food ration card by July 15, 2009 would be eligible to register to vote. The centers to do this will be open until September 20, and the election is scheduled for January 16, 2010. The national vote is less controversial in Tamim than the local one, because it will not disturb the delicate and disputed balance of power within the province.
SOURCES
Aswat al-Iraq, “IHEC in Kirkuk stipulates ration card before mid July,” 8/27/09
International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09
Reuters, “Citing Tensions, Iraq Abandons Census Plans,” 8/16/09
Kurds Might Have Scored Small Victory In Oil Dispute With Baghdad
The Chinese are claiming that Iraq’s Oil Ministry has okayed a deal for the state-run Sinopec company to buy Switzerland’s Addax, which is now exporting oil from the Taq Taq field near the city of Irbil in Kurdistan. For the past several years the Kurdish authorities and Baghdad have argued over who has the right to sign oil deals, and conduct exploration and exports. The Oil Ministry claims all contracts must go through them, while the Kurds claim they have the constitutional right to follow their own independent petroleum policy. In May 2009 there seemed to be a small break through when Kurdistan announced that it was to begin exporting oil from the Taq Taq and Tawke fields for the first time with the okay of the central government. While the Kurds held this up as a victory, Baghdad may have come out with the upper hand because the profits from the oil exports are going into their coffers, but the Oil Ministry has refused to pay the companies. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has not paid them either. This may derail the entire process, as many experts do not think the Kurds can afford to pay the exporting companies for a long time out of their own budget.
If Sinopec is allowed to buy Addax it may be another small boost for the KRG’s plans however. Its new strategy is to try to get big oil companies to buy up the small independent ones now doing exploration and exporting in Kurdistan. Baghdad could not say no to this because many of those same major petroleum corporations are bidding on Iraq’s large fields. If they said their deals were illegal in Kurdistan, they may not invest in the rest of Iraq. At the same time, if Sinopec takes over work at Taq Taq, they would still not be paid for their work, furthering the deadlock between Kurdistan and Baghdad. This conflict could drag on for years because no one is really mediating between the two sides.
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Iraq approves controversial Sinopec oil rights deal,” 8/26/09
Ciszuk, Samuel, “No clarity on Iraq-KRG oil export flap,” Iraq Oil Report, 5/13/09
International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09
Reuters, “Iraq Kurds to start Tawke crude exports June 1,” 5/8/09
Webb, Tim, “Oil giants find scramble for Iraq is a game with complex rules,” Observer, 10/19/08
If Sinopec is allowed to buy Addax it may be another small boost for the KRG’s plans however. Its new strategy is to try to get big oil companies to buy up the small independent ones now doing exploration and exporting in Kurdistan. Baghdad could not say no to this because many of those same major petroleum corporations are bidding on Iraq’s large fields. If they said their deals were illegal in Kurdistan, they may not invest in the rest of Iraq. At the same time, if Sinopec takes over work at Taq Taq, they would still not be paid for their work, furthering the deadlock between Kurdistan and Baghdad. This conflict could drag on for years because no one is really mediating between the two sides.
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Iraq approves controversial Sinopec oil rights deal,” 8/26/09
Ciszuk, Samuel, “No clarity on Iraq-KRG oil export flap,” Iraq Oil Report, 5/13/09
International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09
Reuters, “Iraq Kurds to start Tawke crude exports June 1,” 5/8/09
Webb, Tim, “Oil giants find scramble for Iraq is a game with complex rules,” Observer, 10/19/08
Tuesday, September 01, 2009
Latest Return Statistics For Iraqi Refugees/Displaced
The latest report by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on the number of Iraqi refugees and internally displaced that have returned is now available. Like the last report, 2009 has continued to see a number of Iraqis come back, but varying by month. In June, 2009 14,750 displaced and 3,490 refugees for a total of 18,410 Iraqis made the trip back. That compared to a total of 15,330 in May. March saw the largest number of returns this year with 26,540. Since 2005 displaced returns, 61% of the total, have far outweighed the refugees coming back, 39%. In the first six months of 2009 roughly 101,490 Iraqis have returned. That would put this year roughly on track to match last year's total of 221,260. 2004 has seen the most returns since the U.S. invasion with 291,997 making the trip. That year 193,997 were refugees coming back to see the new Iraq. In total, the UNHCR estimates that approximately 3,195,899 lost their homes, and about 1,075,986, 33.6%, have returned so far. The number of displaced and the percent that have returned is definitely incomplete because the UNHCR counts no refugees before 2006 when there were tens of thousands of them under Saddam.
Total displaced
Time | Displaced | Refugees | Total |
Pre-2006 | 1,212,108 | 1,212,108 | |
After 2006 | 1,695,899 | 1,500,000 | 3,195,899 |
Number of Returns 2003-June 2009
Time | Displaced | Refugees | Total |
2003 | 0 | 55,429 | 55,429 |
2004 | 98,000 | 193,997 | 291,997 |
2005 | 98,000 | 56,155 | 154,155 |
2006 | 150,000 | 20.235 | 170,235 |
2008 | 195,890 | 25,370 | 221,260 |
Jan. 09 | 6,390 | 1,130 | 7,520 |
Feb. 09 | 15,810 | 2,970 | 18,780 |
Mar. 09 | 20,690 | 4,860 | 26,540 |
Apr. 09 | 11,020 | 3,890 | 14,910 |
May 09 | 10,540 | 2,990 | 15,330 |
Jun. 09 | 14,750 | 3,490 | 18,410 |
2009 | 79,200 | 18,970 | 101,490 |
Total | 657,090 | 183,727 | 1,075,986 |
61% | 39% | 100% |
The vast majority of Iraqis are going back to six of Iraq's eighteen provinces, Baghdad, Diyala, Najaf, Karbala, and Babil. Baghdad has been at the center of the fighting since the U.S. invasion, so it should be no surprise then that the capital has seen the most displaced, and the most returns. 54% of the displaced and 52% of refugees have gone back to that province. The International Organization for Migration (IOM), the premier aid group working with Iraq's displaced, has extensively surveyed this community and found that 26.6% were forced from their property in Baghdad, 20.6% did so because of the fighting, 20.1% because of direct threats to their life, 15.8% fled the general violence, and 15.7% left out of fear. Those figures are signs of the death and destruction that were wrought in the capital, especially after the 2006 Amarra bombing when the Shiites began ethnically cleansing Sunnis. Overall, the major reason why the displaced have come back is the improved security according to the IOM, followed by a mix of better security and difficulties in their current locals. Those are probably the same reasons for refugees, although far fewer of them, 12.2% of the total, have come back so far.
Returns by Province Jan.-June 2009
Sulaymaniya | 140 | 0% |
Muthanna | 180 | 0% |
Irbil | 190 | 0% |
Salahaddin | 440 | 0% |
Dhi Qar | 440 | 0% |
Dohuk | 510 | 1% |
Qadisiyah | 510 | 1% |
Maysan | 510 | 1% |
Anbar | 520 | 1% |
Tamim | 740 | 1% |
Basra | 1,250 | 1% |
Wasit | 1,130 | 1% |
Karbala | 1,350 | 1% |
Babil | 1,680 | 2% |
Najaf | 2,170 | 2% |
Ninewa | 2,920 | 3% |
Diyala | 31,770 | 31% |
Baghdad | 55,040 | 54% |
TOTAL | 101,490 | 100% |
Refugee Returns by Province Jan.-June 2009
Ninewa | 20 | 0% |
Anbar | 60 | 0% |
Sulaymaniya | 140 | 1% |
Irbil | 160 | 1% |
Salahaddin | 160 | 1% |
Muthanna | 180 | 1% |
Dhi Qar | 430 | 2% |
Maysan | 440 | 2% |
Wasit | 450 | 2% |
Dohuk | 510 | 2% |
Qadisiyah | 510 | 2% |
Basra | 680 | 3% |
Tamim | 690 | 3% |
Babil | 1,030 | 5% |
Karbala | 1,320 | 6% |
Diyala | 1,660 | 7% |
Najaf | 2,170 | 10% |
Baghdad | 11,680 | 52% |
TOTAL | 22,290 | 100% |
Displaced Returns by Province Jan.-June 2009
Dohuk | 0 | 0% |
Qadisiyah | 0 | 0% |
Muthanna | 0 | 0% |
Najaf | 0 | 0% |
Sulaymaniya | 0 | 0% |
Dhi Qar | 10 | 0% |
Irbil | 30 | 0% |
Karbala | 30 | 0% |
Tamim | 50 | 0% |
Maysan | 70 | 0% |
Salahaddin | 280 | 0% |
Anbar | 460 | 1% |
Basra | 570 | 1% |
Babil | 650 | 1% |
Wasit | 680 | 1% |
Ninewa | 2,900 | 4% |
Diyala | 30,110 | 38% |
Baghdad | 43,360 | 55% |
TOTAL | 79,200 | 100% |
The government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is still encouraging the return of Iraq's displaced. The UNHCR does not think it's time, and the latest Pentagon report to Congress on Iraq said Baghdad has no serious plan to assist the process. The new plan is to try to get them to come back to violent areas in Abu Ghraib outside of Baghdad and Diyala. The authorities have plans to move in 3,000 mostly Shiite families into Abu Ghraib, and to begin evictions of squatters in Diyala. The governor of that province also hopes that families will come back, and has set up six committees in various regions of Diyala to look into damages and pay compensation to returning families. The displaced are worried about insurgent attacks.
Baghdad is trying to close the refugee file this year in an attempt to improve the image of the country, and to help Maliki in the 2010 parliamentary elections. Already, in February 2009 the Ministry of Displacement and Migration ordered a stop to registering new displaced claiming that most families have gone back to their homes. This is an important development because not only is the claim not true, but no Iraqis can receive government aid without registering. The authorities have also promised rewards for those that go back to Baghdad, but very few have received any payments.
The process of return has begun, but the majority of Iraq's refugees are still without their homes. The displaced are coming back in much larger numbers than refugees, mostly because of the improved security situation in the country. The major concern is what they will find when they come home. The government has promised help, but it has not come through in many cases. Prime Minister Maliki seems more concerned about the reports on returns to improve his standing, than actually bettering conditions for when families come back. International organizations have only been able to assist a small fraction of this community, which means many are likely to have to fend for themselves whether they decide to go back or stay where they are.
SOURCES
Abdullah, Muhammed, “displaced fear new al-qaeda violence,” Niqash, 6/24/09
Alsumaria, “UNHCR: Iraq not prepared for refugees return,” 6/3/09
Dagher, Sam, “Iraq’s Government Orders Barriers Removed,” New York Times, 8/6/09
Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” June 2009
International Organization for Migration, “Baghdad Governorate Profile July 2009 IOM IDP and Returnee Assessment,” July 2009
- “IOM Monitoring And Needs Assessments Assessment of Iraqi Return, May 2009,” May 2009
Reilly, Corinne, “Prospects are dismal for returning Iraqi refugees,” McClatchy Nespapers, 5/22/09
UNHCR, “Monthly Statistical Update on Return – June 2009,” 8/3/09
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