New Security Statistics For Iraq April 1 to July 21, 2009

The new Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) quarterly report to Congress has been released and includes new details on the security situation in Iraq. The report has a calendar recording the number of Iraqi casualties by day. It notes that while the number of monthly attacks has stayed at a low level from January to July 2009, mass-casualty attacks have led to an increase in Iraqi casualties. June 20-24 was the deadliest period recorded in the second quarter of 2009 with 136 Iraqis killed and more than 300 wounded in bombings. As noted several times before, attacks and deaths dropped in the second half of 2008 as the January 2009 provincial elections neared. The average number of security incidents for example, went from 1,715.5 from July to September 2008 to 323.0 from January to March 2009. From April to July 24 there was a slight increase to an average of 396.7 attacks per month. This is the new ebb and flow of violence in Iraq, which closely follows major political events.

Below is the statistics provided by the SIGIR.

Iraqi Casualties (Killed/Wounded) and Major Attacks 4/1/09-

7/21/09

April 09 – 435 killed/Avg: 14.5 killed per day

			6	9	5	3
12	44	11	15	5	8	8
5	4	0	11	2	2	3
13	13	3	10	81	75	8
9	3	2	61	9

4/15/09 11 killed in bombing Kirkuk

4/23/09 60 killed in suicide bombings in Baghdad and Diyala

4/24/09 60 Iraqis and Iranian pilgrims killed and 125 wounded by 2 suicide bombers in Baghdad

4/29/09 16 killed and 45 wounded in 3 car bombings in Baghdad

May 09 – 305 killed/Avg. 9.8 killed per day

					8	3
8	13	4	18	5	2	5
4	12	7	6	10	2	8
16	3	5	48	29	7	4
11	11	12	9	8	14	7
9

5/6/09 11 killed and 44 wounded in 2 car bombings in Baghdad

5/11/09 11 killed in car bombing in Kirkuk

5/20/09 35 killed and 72 wounded in car bomb in Baghdad

5/21/09 20 killed and 33 wounded by suicide bombers in Baghdad and Kirkuk

June 09 – 624 killed/Avg. 20.8 killed per day

	9	2	13	1	3	9
8	11	3	36	14	3	6
6	9	1	0	0	6	271
8	80	0	57	0	15	14
0	9	30

6/10/09 26 killed in car bomb in Nassirya

70 killed and more than 200 wounded in attack in Kirkuk

6/22/09 14 killed and 60 wounded in attacks in Baghdad and Abu Ghraib

6/27/09 13 killed in motorcycle bombing in Baghdad

July 1-21/09 – 447 killed/Avg. 21.2 killed per day

			4	35	11	3
25	15	3	40	52	0	6
35	11	1	55	21	0	5
0	10	115

7/8/09 31 killed and wounded in two bombings in Mosul

7/9/09 52 killed or wounded in attacks in Tel Afar, Mosul, Baghdad and Kirkuk

7/20/09 10 killed in attacks in Mosul

7/21/09 15 killed and 100 wounded in attacks in Baghdad

Total Number of Attacks In Iraq April 1, 2008-July 21, 2009 From U.S. Military - Least To Most Violent

Province	Total Attacks 4/1/08-7/1/08	Total Attacks 7/1/08- 9/30/08	Total Attacks 10/1/08- 12/31/08	Total Attacks 1/1/09- 3/20/09	Total Attacks 4/1/09- 7/21/09
Muthanna	2	1	1	1	2
Karbala	1	4	0	1	15
Najaf	4	1	2	1	22
Kurdistan (Dohuk, Irbil, Sulaymaniya)	3	6	3	1	26
Dhi-Qar	17	21	7	4	7
Qadisiyah	17	7	9	2	29
Wasit	34	8	9	8	7
Maysan	12	43	39	24	13
Basra	108	26	11	11	18
Babil	81	54	62	17	15
Anbar	275	209	162	53	92
Tamim	248	245	184	73	129
Diyala	537	533	251	123	122
Salahaddin	717	482	374	138	150
Ninewa	1,041	924	511	219	454
Baghdad	2,221	867	713	293	486
TOTALS:	5,318	3,431	2,338	969	1,587
Avg. Per Month	1,772.6	1,715.5	1,169.0	323.0	396.7

SOURCES

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, - "Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress," 1/30/09

-"Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress," 7/30/09

- "Quarterly Report to the United States Congress," 10/30/08

- "Quarterly Report to the United States Congress," 4/30/09

Governors, Heads of Councils, and Ruling Coalitions In Iraq's Provinces

More information is now available on the ruling coalitions that took power after the 2009 provincial elections. Here’s a rundown of governors and heads of councils, (and where possible their deputies), the parties that are now in control of the fourteen provinces that held balloting in January 2009, and the election results. After each is a short note about the motivations behind the coalitions. At the end is a comparison with the 2005 balloting. The three provinces of Kurdistan will not have provincial voting until the new Kurdish parliament drafts their own election law, while balloting in Tamim is indefinitely postponed because of political disputes.

The 2009 voting dramatically changed the face of provincial politics. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law List displaced the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council across most of southern Iraq and Baghdad. New parties also emerged such as the Awakening of Iraq and Independents led by Sheikh Abu Risha in Anbar and the Al-Hadbaa List in Ninewa. They represented the return of Sunnis to local politics after they largely boycotted the 2005 elections. Despite the fact that nationalist and local parties did better than those based upon ethnosectarian identity/politics, Shiites still largely voted for Shiites, Sunnis for Sunnis, and Kurds for Kurds. The 2009 results are also setting the stage for the 2010 parliamentary balloting as everyone is strategizing in relation to Maliki, the big winner. Some want to run with him to ride his coattails into power, while others are hoping to unseat him.



The numbers before each province refer to the numbers on the map above

13. Anbar
Governor Qaseem Muhammad – Independent - Awakening of Iraq and Independents – Sheikh Abu Risha
Head of Council Jassem Mohammed Hamad – Iraqi National Project – Parliamentarian al-Mutlaq
Ruling Coalition
Awakening of Iraq and Independents
Iraqi National Project
4 other parties
Election Results – 29 seats
1. Awakening of Iraq and Independents – Sheikh Abu Risha: 8 seats
2. Iraqi National Project – Parliamentarian al-Mutlaq: 6 seats
2. Alliance of Intellectuals and Tribes – Iraqi Islamic Party – Vice President Hashemi: 6 seats
4. National Movement for Development and Reform – Jamal al-Karbouli: 3 seats
5. Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 2 seats
5. Iraqi Tribes List – Sheikh al-Hayes: 2 seats
5. Iraqi National Unity: 2 seats
Notes: Formed to kick the Iraqi Islamic Party out of office

10. Babil
Governor Salman Hassan al-Zarkani – Independent Trend of the Noble Ones - Sadrists
1st Deputy Governor Iskander Wattout – Civil Society List
2nd Deputy Governor Sadeq al-Mhanna – National Reform Party – Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari
Head of Council Kadum Majid Tuman – Independent Trend of the Noble Ones - Sadrists
Ruling Coalition
State of Law
Civil Society List
Independent Trend of the Noble Ones
Iraqi National List
National Reform Party
Election Results – 30 seats
1. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 8 seats
2. Al-Mihrab Marty List – SIIC: 5 seats
3. Independent Trends of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 3 seats
3. National Reform Party – Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 3 seats
3. Civil Society List: 3 seats
3. Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 3 seats
3. Independent Justice Association: 3 seats
8. Independent Ansar List: 2 seats
Notes: Babil, Dhi Qar, Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiyah are all anti-Supreme Council coalitions put together by State of Law

1. Baghdad
Governor Salah Abd al-Razzaq – State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki
2nd Deputy Governor Kamil Saeed al-Saeedi – State of Law
Head of Council Kamil al-Zaydi – State of Law
Deputy Head of Council Thamir Riyad al-Addad – State of Law
Ruling Coalition
State of Law
Election Results – 57 seats
1. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 28 seats
2. Iraqi Accordance Front – Vice President Hashemi: 7 seats
3. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 5 seats
3. Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 5 seats
5. Iraqi National Project – Parliamentarian al-Mutlaq: 4 seats
6. Al-Mihrab Marty List – SIIC: 3 seats
7. National Reform Party – Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 3 seats
8. Christians: 1 seat – through quota
8. Mandeans: 1 seat – through quota
Notes: With a majority State of Law needed no coalition partners

6. Basra
Governor Shitagh Abbud – State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki
Deputy Governor Nizar al-Jabiri – State of Law
Head of Council Jabbar Amin – State of Law
Ruling Coalition
State of Law
Election Results – 35 seats
1. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 20 seats
2. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 5 seats
3. Gathering of Justice and Unity: 2 seats
3. Independent Trends of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 2 seats
5. Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 2 seats
5. Iraqi Islamic Party – Vice President Hashemi: 2 seats
7. Fadhila Party: 1 seat
8. Christians: 1 seat – through quota
Notes: With a majority State of Law needed no coalition partners

7. Dhi Qar
Governor Taleb Kazem Abdulkarim al-Hassan – State of Law- Prime Minister Maliki
Deputy Governor Abdulhadi Mohan – State of Law
2nd Deputy Governor Haydar Bunyan - ?
Head of Council Qusai al-Ibadi – National Reform Trend – Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari
Deputy Head of Council Abdulhadi Mohan – State of Law
Ruling Coalition
State of Law
Independent Trend of the Noble Ones
National Reform Trend
Election Results – 31 seats
1. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 13 seats
2. Independent Trends of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 7 seats
3. Al-Mihrab Marty List – SIIC: 5 seats
4. National Reform Trend: Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 4 seats
5. Fadhila Party: 2 seats
Notes: Babil, Dhi Qar, Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiyah are all anti-Supreme Council coalitions put together by State of Law

3. Diyala
Governor Abdulnasir al-Muntasirbillah – Iraqi Accordance Front – Vice President Hashemi
Deputy Governor Furat Mohammed – Diyala Coalition – SIIC
Head of Council Taleb Mohammed Hassan – Kurdish Alliance – KDP-PUK
Ruling Coalition
Iraqi Accordance Front
Kurdish Alliance
Diyala Coalition
Election Results – 29 seats
1. Iraqi Accordance Front – Vice President Hashemi: 9 seats
2. Iraqi National Project – Parliamentarian al-Mutlaq: 6 seats
2. Kurdish Alliance – KDP-PUK: 6 seats
4. Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 3 seats
5. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 2 seats
5. Diyala Coalition – SIIC: 2 seats
7. National Reform Party – Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 1 seat
Notes: Puts together coalition partners from parliament that shut out State of Law

11. Karbala
Governor Amaleddin Majeed Hameed Kadhem – State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki
Deputy Governor Abbas al-Musawai – Independent Trend of the Noble Ones - Sadrists
Deputy Governor Youssef Majid al-Habboubi –Independent
Head of Council Hamid al-Musawi – Independent Trend of the Noble Ones
Ruling Coalition
State of Law
Hope of Rafidain
Independent Trend of the Noble Ones
Youssef Majid al-Habboubi
Election Results – 27 seats
1. Youssef Majid al-Habboubi – Independent: 1 seat
2. Hope of Rafidain – Parliamentarian Yunadam Kanna - Christians: 9 seats
2. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 9 seats
4. Al-Mihrab Marty List – SIIC: 4 seats
4. Independent Trends of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 4 seats
Notes: Habboubi won the most votes in the election, but because he ran independently and not part of a list, he only got 1 seat on the council. Babil, Dhi Qar, Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiyah are all anti-Supreme Council coalitions put together by State of Law

5. Maysan
Governor Muhammed al-Sudani – State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki
Head of Council Hashim al-Shawki – Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC
Ruling Coalition
State of Law
Al-Mihrab Martyr List
Election Results – 27 seats
1. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 8 seats
1. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 8 seats
3. Independent Trends of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 7 seats
4. National Reform Party – Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 4 seats
Notes: State of Law could’ve formed another anti-SIIC coalition here but instead decided to join with them

8. Muthanna
Governor Ibrahim Salman al-Mayali – Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC
Head of Council Abd al-Latyif Abbas al-Hasani – Al-Mihrab Martyr List
Ruling Coalition
Al-Mihrab Martyr List
Local lists
Election Results – 26 seats
1. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 5 seats
1. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 5 seats
3. The People’s List: 3 seats
3. National Reform Party – Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 3 seats
4. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 2 seats
4. Gathering of Muthanna: 2 seats
4. Independent National List: 2 seats
4. Gathering of Iraqi Professionals: 2 seats
4. Gathering of Middle Euphrates: 2 seats
Notes: Muthanna’s council was split between the State of Law and the SIIC, but Dawa member Ibrahim Salman al-Mayali switched sides at the last minute to give the Al-Mihrab Marty List the majority. Al-Mayali became governor as a result, and State of Law walked out on the council

12. Najaf
Governor Adnan al-Zurfi – Independent - State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki
Head of Council Fayad al-Shamari – State of Law
Ruling Coalition
State of Law
Locals
Election Results – 28 seats
1. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 7 seats
1. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 7 seats
3. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 6 seats
4. Loyalty to Najaf: 4 seats
5. National Reform Party – Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 2 seats
5. Union of Independent Najaf: 2 seats
Notes: State of Law dropped possible coalitions with the Sadrists and SIIC and joined with local lists to take this council. The Supreme Council and Sadrists sued in response

14. Ninewa
Governor Atheel al-Najafi – Al-Hadbaa List
2nd Deputy Governor Hassan Mahmoud Ali – Independent – Al-Hadbaa List
Head of Council Faisal Abdullah al-Yawir – Al Hadbaa List
Deputy Head of Council Wild-dar Zebari – Al Hadbaa List
Ruling Coalition
Al-Hadbaa List
Iraqi Islamic Party
Election Results – 37 seats
1. Al-Hadbaa List: 19 seats
2. Ninewa Brotherhood List – PUK-KDP: 12 seats
3. Iraqi Islamic Party – Vice President Hashemi: 3 seats
4. Shabaks: 1 seat - through quota
4. Christians: 1 seat - through quota
4. Yazidis: 1 seat - through quota
Notes: Al-Hadbaa is a new Sunni party that emerged in the voting, running on Iraqi nationalism and anti-Kurdish sentiments. The Kurdish parties are boycotting the council as a result

9. Qadisiyah
Governor Salim Husayn – State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki
Head of Council Jubeir al-Juburi – State of Law
Ruling Coalition
State of Law
Iraqi National List
Election Results – 28 seats
1. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 11 seats
2. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 5 seats
3. Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 3 seats
3. National Reform Party – Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 3 seats
5. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 2 seats
5. Islamic Loyalty Party: 2 seats
5. Fadhila Party: 2 seats
Notes: Babil, Dhi Qar, Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiyah are all anti-Supreme Council coalitions put together by State of Law

2. Salahaddin
Governor Mutashar al-Aliwi – Iraqi Accordance Front – Vice President Hashemi
Head of Council ? - Iraqi National List - Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi
Ruling Coalition
Iraqi Accordance Front
Iraqi National List
Election Results – 28 seats
1. Iraqi Accordance Front – Vice President Hashemi: 5 seats
1. Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 5 seats
3. Iraq National Project – Parliamentarian al-Mutlaq: 3 seats
3. National Project of Iraq: 3 seats
5. Group of Intellectuals and Scientists: 2 seats
5. Iraqi Turkmen Front: 2 seats
5. Front of Liberation and Building: 2 seats
5. Salahaddin Patriotic List: 2 seats
5. Brotherhood and Peaceful Coexistence: 2 seats
5. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 2 seats
Notes: Province went to Sunnis after the Kurds ran it before because of the 2005 boycott, and shut out State of Law

4. Wasit
Governor Lateef Hamad al-Tarfa – Independent
Head of Council Mahmoud Abdulrida Talal – Al-Mihrab Marty List – SIIC
Ruling Coalition
State of Law
Al-Mihrab Martyr List
Election Results – 28 seats
1. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 13 seats
2. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 6 seats
3. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 3 seats
3. Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 3 seats
3. Iraqi Constitutional Party – Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani
Notes: Another province where State of Law gave up an anti-SIIC coalition to work with them

2009 1st Place Finishes – Provinces
State of Law (Maliki) – Babil, Baghdad, Basra, Dhi Qar, Maysan, Muthanna, Najaf, Qadisiyah, Wasit
Iraqi Accordance Front (Hashemi) – Diyala, Salahaddin (tied)
Iraqi National List (Allawi) – Salahaddin (tied)
Awakening of Iraq and Independents (Sheikh Abu Risha) – Anbar
Al-Hadbaa List - Ninewa
Youssef Majid al-Habboubi - Karbala

2009 Governors By Parties – Provinces
State of Law (Maliki) – Baghdad, Basra, Dhi Qar, Karbala, Maysan, Najaf, Qadisiyah
Iraqi Accordance Front (Hashemi) – Diyala, Salahaddin
Al-Mihrab Martyr List (SIIC) - Muthanna
Independent Trend of the Noble Ones (Sadrists) - Babil
Awakening of Iraq and Independents (Sheikh Abu Risha) – Anbar
Al-Hadbaa List: Ninewa

2009 Heads of Councils By Parties - Provinces
State of Law (Maliki) – Baghdad, Basra, Najaf, Qadisiyah
Al-Mihrab Martyr List (SIIC) – Maysan, Muthanna, Wasit
Independent Trend of the Noble Ones (Sadrists) – Babil, Karbala
Kurdish Alliance (KDP-PUK) - Diyala
National Reform Trend (Jaafari) - Dhi Qar
Iraqi National List (Allaqi) - Salahaddin
Iraqi National Project (Parliamentarian al-Mutlaq) – Anbar
Al-Hadbaa List: Ninewa

2005 1st Place Finishes – Provinces
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council – Babil, Baghdad, Basra, Dhi Qar (tied), Karbala, Muthanna, Najaf, Qadisiyah
Kurdistan Democratic Party – Dohuk, Irbil, Tamim
Kurdistan Democratic Party & Patriotic Union of Kurdistan – Ninewa, Salahaddin
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council & Dawa – Diyala
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan - Sulaymaniya
Sadrists – Maysan, Wasit
Fadhila Party – Dhi Qar (tied)
Iraqi Islamic Party (Hashemi) – Anbar

2005 Governors By Parties – Provinces
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council – Babil, Baghdad, Dhi Qar, Diyala, Karbala, Muthanna, Najaf, Qadisiyah
Kurdistan Democratic Party (Kurdish President Barzani) – Dohuk, Irbil, Tamim
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (President Talabani) - Sulaymaniya
Kurdish Alliance (Barzani and Talabani) - Salahaddin
Independent (Backed by Kurdish Alliance) – Ninewa
Sadrists - Maysan, Wasit
Iraqi Islamic Party (Vice President Hashemi) – Anbar
Fadhila Party – Basra

2005 Provincial Election Results

Anbar – 41 seats
Governor Mamoun Sami Rashi al-Awani – Iraqi Islamic Party – Vice President Hashemi
Iraqi Islamic Party: 29 seats
Independent Iraqi Group: 8 seats
Reconciliation and Liberation Bloc: 4 seats

Babil – 41 seats
Governor Salim al-Mesalmaoui – SIIC
Faithful Iraqis Association – SIIC: 25 seats
Al-Rasul Association: 6 seats
Imam Ali Society: 6 seats
Security & Reconstruction: 2 seats
Babil Independent Association: 2 seats

Baghdad – 51 seats
Governor Hussein al-Tahan – SIIC
Baghdad Nation – SIIC: 28 seats
Baghdad Peace – Dawa – Prime Minister Maliki/Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 11 seats
Fadhila Party: 6 seats
National Democratic Alliance: 2 seats
Iraqi Communist Party: 2 seats
National Independent Cadres and Elites – Sadrists: 1 seat
Iraqi Independent al-Bayan Gathering: 1 seat

Basra – 41 seats
Governor Muhammad al-Waili – Fadhila Party
Islamic Basra – SIIC: 20 seats
Fadhila Party: 12 seats
Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 4 seats
Dawa Party – Prime Minister Maliki/Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 3 seats
Iraqi Independent List: 2 seats

Dhi Qar – 41 seats
Governor Aziz Kadum Alwan al-Ogheli – SIIC
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council: 11 seats
Fadhila Party: 11 seats
Dawa – Iraq Organization: 10 seats
Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 2 seats
Islamic Movement of the 15th of Shaaban: 2 seats
Iraqi Communist Party: 2 seats
Iraqi Independent Gathering: 2 seats
Independent Coalition for the Care of Democracy: 1 seat

Diyala – 41 seats
Governor Raad Hameed al-Mula al-Tamimi – SIIC
Coalition of Islamic & National Forces in Diyala – SIIC & Dawa – Prime Minister Maliki/Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 20 seats
Iraqi Islamic Party – Vice President Hashemi: 14 seats
Kurdish Arabic Turkmen Democratic Coalition – Diyala Governorate – KDP-PUK: 7 seats

Dohuk – 41 seats
Governor Tamar Ramadan – Kurdistan Democratic Party
Kurdistan Democratic Party: 33 seats
Kurdistan Islamic Union: 4 seats
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan: 4 seats

Irbil – 41 seats
Governor Ali Nikzad – Kurdistan Democratic Party
Democratic Voice of Kurdistan List – KDP: 23 seats
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan: 16 seats
Kurdistan Islamic Union: 1 seat
Islamic Group of Kurdistan: 1 seat

Karbala – 41 seats
Governor Uqeil al-Khazaali – SIIC
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council: 21 seats
Fadhila Party: 5 seats
Shiite Political Council: 2 seats
Democratic Progressive Gathering: 2 seats
Independent Council of Tribal Sheikhs & Notables of Karbala Governorate: 2 seats
Iraqi Democratic Current: 2 seats
Independent Unified List for the Governorate of Holy Karbala: 2 seats
Democratic Meeting for Holy Karbala: 2 seats
Democratic Meeting for Holy Karbala: 2 seats
Independent Intellectuals Gathering: 2 seats
Dr. Abbas al-Hasnawi: 1 seat

Maysan – 41 seats
Governor Adil Mahwadar Radi – Al-Hussayni Thought Forum – Sadrists
Al-Hussayni Thought Forum – Sadrists: 15 seats
Islamic Unified Front – SIIC: 6 seats
Dawa – Iraq Organization: 5 seats
Fadhila Party: 4 seats
Al-Rida Center for Culture & Guidance: 3 seats
Gathering of the Independent Sons of Maysan: 2 seats
Iraqi Republican Group: 2 seats
Dawa Party – Prime Minister Maliki/Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 1 seat
Maysan Democratic Coalition: 1 seat
Shiite Political Council: 1 seat
Independent National Islamic Congregation: 1 seat

Muthanna – 41 seats
Governor Muhammad ali-Hassan Abbas al-Hassani – SIIC – Killed August 2007
Governor Ahmad Marzouq Salal – Dawa – Prime Minister Maliki/Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council: 8 seats
Fadhila Party: 6 seats
Al-Furat al-Awsat Assembly: 6 seats
Islamic Independent Society: 5 seats
Dawa Party – Prime Minister Maliki/Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 4 seats
Gathering for al-Muthanna: 4 seats
Allegiance Coalition: 3 seats
Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 3 seats
Iraqi Communist Party: 2 seats

Najaf – 41 seats
Governor Asad Abu Gilel al-Taie – SIIC
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council: 19 seats
Loyalty to Al-Najaf: 9 seats
Banner of the Independents: 4 seats
Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 3 seats
Fadhila Party: 2 seats
Allegiance Coalition: 2 seats
Iraq Future Gathering: 2 seats

Ninewa – 41 seats
Governor Usama Yousif Kashmula – Independent – Killed July 2004
Governor Duraid Kashmoula – Independent
Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan - KDP-PUK: 31 seats
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council: 5 seats
Iraqi Islamic Party – Vice President Hashemi: 2 seats
Council of the United Clans of Mosul: 2 seats

Qadisiyah – 41 seats
Governor Khalil Jalil Hamza – SIIC – Killed August 2007
Governor Hamid al-Khodari – SIIC
Martyr Of the Sanctuary Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim – SIIC: 20 seats
Shiite Political Council: 5 seats
Dawa Party – Prime Minister Maliki/Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 3 seats
Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 3 seats
Fadhila Party: 3 seats
Independent Brotherhood – Sadrists: 3 seats
Dawa – Islamic Organization: 2 seats
Loyalty to Iraq Coalition – Sadrists: 2 seats

Salahaddin – 41 seats
Governor Hamed Hamood Shekti al-Qaisi – List of the Unified Democratic Coalition in Salahaddin Governorate – KDP-PUK
List of the Unified Democratic Coalition in Salahaddin Governorate – KDP-PUK: 8 seats
Liberation & Reconciliation Gathering: 6 seats
Iraqi Turkmen Front: 5 seats
Coalition of the Iraqi National Unity: 5 seats
Unified List: 4 seats
Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 3 seats
Dawa Party – Prime Minister Maliki/Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 3 seats
National Iraqi Gathering: 3 seats
National al-Resalyoon List – pro-Sadrist: 2 seats
Gathering of Independents in Salahaddin: 2 seats

Sulaymaniya – 41 seats
Governor Dana Ahmed Majid – Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan: 28 seats
Kurdistan Islamic Union: 5 seats
Islamic Group of Kurdistan: 5 seats
Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq: 3 seats

Tamim – 41 seats
Governor Abdulrahman Mustapha Fatah – Kurdistan Democratic Party
List of Kurdistan Brotherhood – KDP: 26 seats
Iraqi Turkmen Front: 8 seats
Iraqi Republican Group: 5 seats
Islamic Turkmen Coalition: 1 seat
National Iraq Union: 1 seat

Wasit – 41 seats
Governor Latif Hamid Turfa – Sadrists
Iraqi Elites Gathering – Sadrists: 31 seats
Shiite Political Council – SIIC-Dawa: 4 seats
Gathering of the Independent in Wasit: 3 seats
Iraqi Communist Party: 2 seats
Democratic Iraq Gathering: 1 seat

SOURCES

Abdullah, Muhammed, “sectarian polarization in diyala,” Niqash, 4/20/09

Associated Press, “Iraqi provincial election results,” 2/19/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “4 blocs to contest the results of Diala council votes,” 4/12/09
- “Atheel Nejefi elected as Ninewa governor,” 4/12/09
- “Babel council elects independent engineer as governor,” 4/18/09
- “Baghdad’s second deputy governor elected,” 4/20/09
- “KA, IAF agree to share leading posts in Diala,” 2/24/09
- “Karbala governor assumes duty after republican decree issued,” 4/19/09
- “New Baghdad governor elected,” 4/12/09
- “New Diala governor elected,” 4/11/09
- “New governor picked for Anbar,” 4/11/09
- “New provincial council’s head, deputy selected in Thi-Qar,” 4/16/09
- “Presidential decrees to appoint governors of Thi-Qar, Babel,” 4/22/09
- “Wassit governor, provincial council chief elected,” 4/15/09
- “Zaydi unanimously elected to chair Baghdad provincial council,” 4/8/09

Barzanji, Yahya, “New candidate emerges among Iraq’s Kurds,” Associated Press, 5/2/09

Hamid, Nirmeen, “anbar’s Islamic party and tribes vie for power,” Niqash, 12/12/08

Knights, Michael and McCarthy, Eamon, “Provincial Politics in Iraq: Fragmentation or New Awakening?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2008

Meyerson, Thomas, “Provincial Governments in Southern Iraq,” Institute for the Study of War, 5/28/09

Reilly, Corinne and Abbas, Ali, “Kurdish-Arab tensions continue to grow in northern Iraq,” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/14/09

Al-Sa’dawi, Ahmad, “post-election analysis: real change or more of the same?” Niqash, 2/19/09

Shadid, Anthony, “New Alliance In Iraq Cross Sectarian Lines,” Washington Post, 3/20/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, "Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress," 7/30/09

Visser, Reidar, “After Compromise on Kirkuk, Finally an Elections Law for Iraq’s Governorates,” Historiae.org, 9/24/08
- “Iraq’s New Provincial Councils: A Mixed Picture North of Baghdad, Unexpected Complications in the Centre and the South,” Historiae.org, 4/13/09
- “Maliki Suffers Setbacks as Samarrai is Confirmed as New Speaker and More Governors Are Elected South of Baghdad,” Historiae.org, 4/19/09
- “Mixed Outcome for Maliki as Muthanna and Najaf Elect New Governors,” Historiae.org, 5/1/09

Kurdish Election Results And Implications

The results of the Kurdistan parliamentary elections are in. As expected, the ruling Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Kurdistan Democratic Party’s (KDP) coalition, the Kurdistan List came in first place with 57.34% of the vote. However the new Change List, led by former PUK officials, came in second with 23.57%. The Service and Reform List came in third with 12%. They are a combination of two Islamic groups, which used to be the largest opposition parties, the Kurdistan Islamic Union and the Kurdistan Islamic Group, and two leftist groups, the Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party and the Future Party. Kurdistan ran a closed list election, counting all three provinces as a single district. This meant that voters could only pick from lists, and not individual candidates. In that system the parliamentarians are selected by and answer to their party bosses, not the electorate. There were 111 seats up for grabs, but five were set-aside for Christians, five for Turkmen, and one for Armenians. Voters also re-elected Massoud Barzani, the leader of the KDP, to be the region’s president. This election could have far-ranging effects on not only the politics within the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), but the rest of Iraq as well.

Kurdish Parliamentary Election Results
111 seats up for election by 24 parties
Kurdistan List 57.34%
Change List 23.57%
Services and Reform List 12%
5 seats for Christians
5 seats for Turkmen
1 seat for Armenians

Kurdish Presidential Election Results
Massoud Barzani – Kurdistan List 69.57%
Dr. Kamal Mirawdeli 25.32%
Halo Ibrahim Ahmed – Progress List 3.49%
Safin Sheikh Mohammed 1.4%
Hussein Karmiani 0.59%

First, the vote is likely to change the power dynamics between the KDP and PUK. Since 1992 when Kurdistan got its autonomy the two parties have had a rough, and sometimes tense, joint rule over the KRG. In the first two elections in 1992 and 2005 the two evenly split their seats 50-50 in the Kurdish parliament. The two also signed a Unification Agreement in January 2006, which divided up the major positions in the region between them. The PUK however, has been breaking apart due to internal struggles for years now. In 2005 a reform wing was formed within the party that wanted greater say in decision-making, more transparency, and a crackdown on corruption. The head of the Change List and former PUK co-founder Nishurwan Mustafa came to head this faction, and eventually left the party in 2006. Dozens of others would join him or be kicked out of the party in the following years. In 2008 for example, a group called the Movement for Democratic Change was expelled from the party, and in February 2009 the secretary general of the PUK, who was also the vice president of the KRG, and several other leading members threatened to quit. PUK leader and Iraqi President Jalal Talabani is also old and ailing. Further weakening the party is the fact that the Change List allegedly won Sulaymaniya in the election, the stronghold of the PUK. All together this has greatly reduced Talabani’s standing in Kurdistan. He and his party may not be able to maintain their equal status with Barzani and the KDP as a result.

Barzani has already hinted at this change in dynamics. Under the Unification Agreement, the PUK is to take over the office of prime minister in the KRG from the KDP. Massoud Barzani’s nephew Nechirvan Barzani currently holds the post, and Iraqi deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih of the PUK is supposed to succeed him. However Massoud Barzani recently asked why the PUK should hold that post.

Barzani may be in an even stronger position if a referendum is held on the new Kurdish constitution. A draft of the document was passed by the Kurdish parliament on June 24, 2009, and gives the president new wide-ranging powers. These include the ability to dissolve parliament, pass and veto laws, remove ministers, and command over the peshmerga. For these reasons the Change List say they are opposed to the constitution and want it revised and have filed a motion in the Iraqi courts, but Barzani says they don’t have the two-thirds necessary in the parliament to do that. Joost Hilterman of the International Crisis Group recently noted that this is a paradox as Barzani is one of the great proponents of federalism and decentralization in Iraq, but is trying to centralize power in the KRG.

Finally, Barzani is one of the main opponents of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, so relations between Baghdad and Kurdistan are not likely to improve anytime soon. Kirkuk is one of the main disputes between them, and yesterday, July 28, 2009, he told the press that he rejected the United Nation’s recommendations on the disputed territories, and that the only solution was for Article 140 to be implemented that calls for a referendum. Earlier in July Barzani warned that Baghdad and Kurdistan were close to war over the issue. The KRG draft constitution also lays claims to all of these areas as part of a historical greater Kurdistan. To add to the problem, Barzani and Maliki have not talked to each other in more than a year. When they were things were no better as Barzani said the Prime Minister smelled like a dictator and was acting like a new Saddam.

The 2009 Kurdish elections look to be bringing good and bad results. On the positive side, Kurdistan will have a real opposition for the first time. That will hopefully make the PUK and KDP more responsive to the voters, develop the region, and reduce their corruption. On the negative side, the ruling parties will still hold control of the top political offices and security forces with the KDP looking to surpass the PUK. If the Kurdish constitution is passed that will cement the KDP’s position as the dominant Kurdish party with Barzani’s expanded executive authority. With this new sense of power and national elections due in January 2010, there is little reason for Barzani to compromise or make amends with Baghdad, maintaining the gridlock in Iraq’s politics.

SOURCES

Alaaldin, Ranj, “Troubled times in Iraqi Kurdistan,” Guardian, 7/23/09

Alsumaria, “Results of Kurdistan Presidential and Parliamentary Elections 2009,” 7/29/09
- “Talabani to share power within his party,” 2/18/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “IHEC says initial results to come out in 2 days,” 7/26/09

Carpenter, J. Scott and Ali, Ahmed, “Iraqi Kurds Go to the Polls: Is Change Possible?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 7/23/09

Dagher, Sam, “New Kurdish Leader Asserts Agenda,” New York Times, 7/29/09
- “Opposition Rattles a Governing Coalition in Iraqi Kurds’ Vote,” New York Times, 7/26/09

Danly, James, “The 2009 Kurdish Elections,” Institute for the Study of War,” 7/23/09

Hama-Tahir, Wrya, “Prominent former PUK leader accused of using dissident faction as proxy to settle political scores,” Institute of War & Peace Reporting, 12/5/08

Hamad, Qassim Khidhir, “Kurdish election lists,” Niqash, 6/30/09

Khalil, Lydia, “Stability in Iraqi Kurdistan: Reality or Mirage?” Brookings Institution, June 2009

Mahmoud, Amer, “controversy over Kurdish constitution,” Niqash, 7/6/09

Shadid, Anthony, “After Kurdish Vote, Talabani Pledges to Rebuild Party,” Washington Post, 7/29/09
- “Kurdish Leaders Warn Of Strains With Maliki,” Washington Post, 7/17/09
- “Worries About A Kurdish-Arab Conflict Moves To Fore in Iraq,” Washington Post, 7/27/09

Stansfield, Gareth Anderson, Liam, “Kurds in Iraq: the struggle between Baghdad and Erbil,” Middle East Policy, Spring 2009

Synovitz, Ron, “Expert Focuses On Significance Of Iraq’s Kurdish Regional Elections,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 7/25/09

The Return Of The Special Groups

Special Groups was a term coined by the U.S. during the Surge to identify Shiite militants that were supported by Iran and/or were not following Muqtada al-Sadr’s cease-fire decree. After Baghdad’s crackdown on militias in southern Iraq beginning with Basra in 2008, many of these Special Groups were scattered, arrested, or fled to Iran. Now they seem to be making their return. In a July 18 article in the Washington Post U.S. officials warned of a new spate of attacks on American forces by these armed groups. An official named three main culprits, the League of the Righteous, Khataib Hezbollah, and the Promised Day Brigades.

A review of English-language press reports shows that there has been a steady increase in incidents from March to July 2009. 1^st these are only articles from southern Iraq. It’s difficult to determine who is behind many of the attacks in Baghdad. The southern section of the country however has been relatively peaceful, and has been a base of Special Groups and Mahdi Army activities in the past, so any attacks that occur there on the Americans are most likely done by one of these organizations.

In March 2009 there were only a few incidents involving the British in Basra and none with the United States, but since April there have been several attacks aimed at Americans across a variety of southern provinces. In March there were no attacks against American forces in the region. There were two rocket attacks on the English in the Basra airport however. In April things changed when five incidents were reported, and all involving U.S. troops in Maysan, Qadisiyah, Wasit, and Basra. Attacks went up in May to seven and were all concentrated in Basra, Babil, and Wasit. In June incidents went down to four, but again were spread out over the region in Dhi Qar, Muthanna, Basra, and Wasit. From July 1 to 28 there have been eight attacks on Americans occurring in Dhi Qar, Qadisiyah, Karbala, and Basra. The most dramatic was a roadside bomb that went off against U.S. Ambassador Christopher Hill’s convoy in Dhi Qar on July 13. In four and a half months there were a total of 26 attacks on U.S. forces, and only a few casualties. While that is not a large amount compared to the more violent areas of the country, it does constitute an increase from earlier in the year.

Iran has conducted a multi-layered political, military, economic, and cultural strategy in Iraq since 2003. Supporting Shiite militiamen is only one part of this, and is aimed at tying down U.S. forces so they don’t attack Iran, and making the Americans pay a price for invading. In the past, when important events came up in Iraq such as the 2009 provincial elections, Iran has limited the amount of weapons and money that it provides to dampen violence so that it might focus upon its more important political goals. Afterwards Special Group attacks and activities have traditionally gone up. That appears to be what is occurring now. This could be a message from Iran that they are still capable of fomenting instability in Iraq and challenging Coalition Forces. Iraqi domestic issues may also play a part in some of these attacks. The League of the Righteous for example, has said that it wishes to participate in the 2010 parliamentary vote, so a few of these incidents may be a way to show that it is still relevant. Others may be conducted by violent gangs, which are active in places like Basra. Whatever the ultimate motivation, the last few months have shown that there are still militants in southern Iraq capable of attacking U.S. forces.

Attacks Against U.S. Forces In Southern Iraq

March 2009 – 0 Total

April 2009 – 5 Total

4/6/09 Rocket attack on U.S. base in Amarah, Maysan

4/20/09 IED attack on U.S. patrol in Basra

4/20/09 Rocket attack on U.S. base in Kut, Wasit

4/22/09 Rocket attack on U.S. base in Diwaniya, Qadisiyah

4/30/09 Sniper killed 2 U.S. soldiers in Amarah, Maysan

May 2009 – 7 Total

5/3/09 Rocket attack near U.S. consulate in Hilla, Babil

5/4/09 IED attack on U.S. patrol in Basra

5/11/09 IED attack on U.S. vehicle in Basra

5/14/09 IED attack on U.S. patrol in Wasit

5/14/09 IED attack on U.S. vehicle in Babil

5/16/09 One U.S. soldier killed in Basra

5/28/09 Rocket attack on U.S. base at Basra airport

June 2009 – 4 Total

6/1/09 Rocket attack on U.S. business in Wasit

6/7/09 Attack on U.S. patrol in Basra

6/16/09 IED attack on U.S. convoy in Muthanna

6/29/09 IED attack on joint Iraqi-U.S. patrol in Dhi Qar

July 1-28, 2009 - 8

7/5/09 Rocket attack on U.S. base in Diwaniya, Qadisiyah

7/10/09 Rocket attack near U.S. base in Basra

7/13/09 Rocket attack on U.S. base in Basra

7/13/09 Roadside bomb attack on U.S. Ambassador Christopher Hill’s convoy in Dhi Qar

7/17/09 Rocket attack on U.S. base in Basra

7/20/09 IED attack on U.S. convoy in Karbala

7/20/09 Bomb attack on U.S. convoy in Nassiriya, Dhi Qar

7/20/09 Rocket attack on U.S. base in Diwaniya, Qadisiyah

SOURCES

Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Anti-US Iraqi cleric facing leadership challenge,” Associated Press, 2/20/09

Adas, Basil, “Mahdi Army militia ‘going underground,’” Gulf News, 6/26/08

Aswat al-Iraq, “2 Katyushas land in U.S. camp in Diwaniya,” 7/20/09

- “2 Katyushas land in U.S. forces camp in Diwaniya,” 7/5/09

- “3 MNF soldiers injured in Basra,” 7/17/09

- “3 rockets land near U.S. consulate in Hilla,” 5/3/09

- “4 missiles fall near Echo camp in Diwaniya – spokesman,” 4/22/09

- “Blast in Nasseriya, no casualties, loses reported – U.S. spokesman,” 7/20/09

- “Bomb explodes on U.S. vehicle patrol in Wassit,” 5/14/09

- “British base in Basra rocketed,” 3/13/09

- “Hand grenade targets U.S. patrol, no casualties,” 6/7/09

- “IED explodes near joint convoy in Thi-Qar,” 6/29/09

- “IED targets U.S. convoy in Muthanna,” 6/16/09

- “IED targets U.S. convoy north of Karbala,” 7/20/09

- “IED targets U.S. patrol in Basra,” 5/4/09

- “MNF base in Kut rocketed,” 4/20/09

- “Roadside bomb hits MNF patrol in Basra,” 4/20/09

- “Rockets hit U.S. base in Amara,” 4/6/09

- “Sniper downs 2 U.S. soldiers in Amara,” 4/30/09

- “U.S. base at Basra airport rocketed,” 7/13/09

- “U.S. firm rocketed in Wassit,” 6/1/09

- “U.S. Hummer ablaze in Babel,” 5/14/09

- “U.S. vehicle damaged in IED blast in Basra,” 5/11/09

Gamel, Kim, “US military works to keep out Iraq militia leaders,” Associated Press, 8/6/08

Graff, Peter, "Influence wanes for followers of Iraq's Sadr," Reuters, 11/24/08

Haynes, Deborah, “Hope for British hostages in Iraq after release of Shia militant,” Times of London, 6/9/09

Issa, Sahar and Kadhim, Hussein, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 28 May 2009,” 5/28/09

Londono, Ernesto and DeYoung, Karen, “Iraq Restricts U.S. Forces,” Washington Post, 7/18/09

Multi-National Corps – Iraq, “MND-S Soldier dies from combat-related injures (Basra),” 5/16/09

- “U.S. Forces respond to rocket attack in Basra province,” 7/10/09

Peter, Tom, “After setbacks, Sadr redirects Mahdi Army,” Christian Science Monitor, 8/11/08

Reuters, “U.S. ambassador to Iraq unhurt by convoy bomb,” 7/13/09

Rubin, Alissa and Gordon, Michael, “U.S. Frees Suspect in Killing of 5 G.I.’s,” New York Times, 6/9/09

Small Wars Journal, “SWJ Interview with Bing West (Part 1),” 8/14/08

Weaver, Teri, “U.S. troops keeping a low profile in Basra,” Stars and Stripes, 6/1/09

Early Reports On Iran’s Activities In Iraq

One of the first reports that Iran was taking an anti-American stance in Iraq came from a UPI. It quoted a U.S. intelligence source that said in March 2003 Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamanei, President Mohammad Khatami, and others met to decide Tehran’s policy in the wake of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. They decided to make the U.S. pay a price for invading Iraq. Tehran set about implementing this decision through several means.

On the military side Iran sent in agents, friendly Iraqis, and Hezbollah into several Iraqi cities including Baghdad, Najaf, Karbala, Basra, and Kirkuk to organize against the Americans. 1000s of fighters from the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s (SIIC) militia the Badr Brigade flowed into Iraq after the invasion. At the time, Badr was a formal arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, and was also supervised by Iranian intelligence. Later in 2003 there were reports that Hezbollah operatives were also dispatched to Iraq to help as well.

On the political front, Iran made agreements with the Kurds and facilitated negotiations between them and the SIIC. First, Iran and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) agreed upon a non-aggression pact. There were also a series of meetings in the fall of 2001 between the Badr Brigade and KDP and PUK leaders to discuss how to deal with the United States and a post-Saddam Iraq. Iranian intelligence was involved in many of these meetings.

After the invasion, Iran also tried to rally Iraq’s Shiite clerics against the Americans. In late April 2003 Iraqi born, but Iranian based Ayatollah Kadhem al-Haeri issued a fatwa calling on Shiite imams to fill the power vacuum left by the fall of the old regime by taking over administration of Iraq’s cities. Al-Haeri also said clerics needed to oppose the United States. There were several examples of this. In the city of Kut in Wasit province for example, the SIIC took over the city hall and a local cleric Sayed Abbas Fadhil claimed to control the city. His followers staged two protests against the American presence there, and there were several drive-by shooting on U.S. troops as well. Jay Garner, the head of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs, who was the civilian administrator of Iraq at the time, said the events in Kut were all examples of Iran trying to interfere in Iraq.

These early reports show the different sides of Iran’s policy towards Iraq. Not only was it going to use military means to undermine the American presence, but it was also using its extensive contacts with the Iraqi opposition, many of whom had been based in Iran during the Saddam years, and religious ties to Iraq’s clerics to get a foothold in Iraq’s new political order.

For more on Iran’s policy towards Iraq see:

Overview of Iran’s Influence In Iraq

Combating Terrorism Center’s Report On Iran’s Role In Iraq

SOURCES

Ayman, Dr. Hashemi, “A detailed and dangerous report about the Iranian role in the destruction of Iraq,” Homeland Security US.net, 3/19/06

Elkhamri, Mounir, “Iran’s Contribution to the Civil War in Iraq,” Jamestown Foundation, January 2007

Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08

Phillips, James, “Deter Iranian and Syrian Meddling In Postwar Iraq,” Heritage Foundation, 4/4/03

Pound, Edward, “The Iran Connection,” U.S. News & World Report, 11/22/04

Risen, James, “A Region Inflamed: The Hand Of Tehran: Hezbollah, in Iraq, Refrains From Attacks on Americans,” New York Times, 11/24/03

Smith, Craig, “Iraqi in Iran urges Shiites to take power,” San Francisco Chronicle, 4/26/03

Strauss, Valerie, “Pentagon: Ex-Iraqi Leader Aziz Is in Custody,” Washington Post, 4/24/03

Tanter, Raymond, “Iran’s Threat to Coalition Forces in Iraq,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1/15/04

Kurdistan Lacks Services And Employment

Kurdistan recently held parliamentary elections on July 25, 2009. The main topics in the vote were the rule of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and corruption. Just as important could be the economy. While there are many who tout the relative stability in Kurdistan and its foreign investment, the region actually lags behind in almost all humanitarian and economic indicators compared to the rest of the country.

The Kurdistan Region is made up of three provinces, Dohuk, Erbil, and Sulaymaniya. Irbil and Sulaymaniya have over one million inhabitants each, while Dohuk only has around 500,000. Dohuk is also home to over 100,000 internally displaced Iraqis.

Population

Dohuk 505,491

Irbil 1,542,421

Sulaymaniya 1,893,617

Internally Displaced In Kurdistan

Sulaymaniya 36,000

Ibril 62,034

Dohuk 112,392

The relative stability and security in Kurdistan has not provided the population there the opportunities or services one would expect. The employment situation in the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is mixed. In Iraq overall 12% of men and 13% of women are without jobs. Men in Irbil and Sulaymaniya do better at 9% and 10% respectively, but in Dohuk 13% of men are lacking employment. Women do far worse however. In Irbil the unemployment rate for them is 16%, followed by 26% in Sulaymaniya and 30% in Dohuk. The percentage of men and women involved in the labor force are also lower in Kurdistan compared to Iraq. In the rest of the country 18% of women and 81% of men are either employed or looking for work. The labor force participation in Dohuk is only 7% for women and 76% for women. Irbil at 12% of women, 77% of men, and Sulaymaniya at 15% of women and 78% of men, only do slightly better.

Unemployment

Iraq: 13% women, 12% men

Irbil: 16% women, 9% men

Sulaymaniya: 26% women, 10% men

Dohuk: 30% women, 13% men

Labor Force Participation

Iraq: 18% women, 81% men

Dohuk: 7% women, 76% men

Irbil: 12% women, 77% men

Sulaymaniya: 15% women, 78% men

In terms of poverty Kurdistan actually does better than Iraq in general. 22% of Iraqis live in the lowest per capita income quintile. Irbil at 15% and Sulaymaniya at 18% do better, although in Dohuk 33% of the population is in the bottom group.

Poverty - % Living In The Lowest Per Capita Income Quintile

Iraq: 22%

Irbil: 15%

Sulaymaniya: 18%

Dohuk: 33%

Where the KRG lags behind is in education. Kurdistan has higher illiteracy rates, with 43% of women and 21% of men in Dohuk, 40% of women and 20% of men in Sulaymaniya, and 44% of women and 18% of men in Irbil in this situation, compared to 24% of women and 11% of men nationally. This is due to lower education levels. In Iraq 47% of women and 31% of men have less than a primary education. In Dohuk the rate is 65% of women and 49% of men, followed by 64% of women and 49% of men in Sulaymaniya, and 64% of women and 42% of men in Irbil.

Illiteracy

Iraq: 24% women, 11% men

Irbil: 44% women, 18% men

Sulaymaniya: 43% women, 20% men

Dohuk: 43% women, 21% men

% With Less Than A Primary Education

Iraq: 47% women, 31% men

Irbil: 64% women, 42% men

Sulaymaniya: 64% women, 49% men

Dohuk: 65% women, 49% men

Services are also worse in the KRG. Kurds receive much less electricity than the rest of the country. 55% of Iraqis have more than 11 hours of power cuts per day or are not connected to the power network at all. In Kurdistan more than 80% of the population in all three provinces experience these difficulties. Kurdistan is also lacking in sanitation. 26% of Iraqis are not connected to the sanitation system. Dohuk is close to the national average at 28% not being connected, but Sulaymaniya at 38% and Irbil at 48% don’t do as well.

Electricity – More Than 11 Hours of Power Cuts Or No Connection To Network

Iraq: 55%

Irbil: 84%

Sulaymaniya: 88%

Dohuk: 85%

Not Connected To the Sanitation Network

Iraq: 26%

Dohuk: 28%

Sulaymaniya: 38%

Irbil: 48%

Since 2003, Kurdistan has been one of the most stable parts of Iraq due to its tight security, limits on migration, and domination by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). These two ruling parties however, have not been able to take advantage of that to provide jobs, education, or services to the population. Instead the PUK and KDP have been more interested in maintaining their control, and building up their two major strongholds, the cities of Irbil and Sulaymaniya. Outside of those urban areas the rest of the KRG has been left underdeveloped. This was the first year that this became an issue when Kurds went to the polls. Even then, the PUK and KDP seem to have maintained their control of the KRG. If the elections lead to an actual opposition however, those two parties may finally begin serving the population rather than themselves because now they actually have to compete for the loyalties of the people.

SOURCES

Dagher, Sam, “Strong Showing Seen for Kurdish Challengers,” New York Times, 7/26/09

Danly, James, “The 2009 Kurdish Elections,” Institute for the Study of War, 7/23/09

Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit, “Dahuk Governorate Profile,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, April 2009

- “Erbil Governorate Profile,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, July 2009

- “Sulyamaniyah Governorate Profile,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, July 2009

Oil Revenues Up, But Too Late For Iraq’s Provinces

In June 2009 Iraq had the highest oil revenues of the year, yet that has not helped Iraq’s provinces, which are facing massive budget deficits. That’s because it took five months for the country to reach the petroleum price set in the 2009 budget, and oil exports have still not achieved their target. 2008 was also a boom year for Iraq’s oil industry, and the provinces made large commitments to development projects as a result. Now that’s all coming back to haunt them.

The Oil Ministry announced that it earned almost $3.175 million in oil exports in June 2009. A barrel of Iraqi crude sold for an average price of $64.37 that month. Those were both highs for the year. The 2009 Iraqi budget called for 2 million barrels a day in exports at $50 each to earn an average of $3 billion a month. May 2009 was the first month that Iraq earned over $3 billion, and Iraqi oil sold for over $50. Exports have still not officially met their mark however.

This has led to a large budget deficit, which is playing out in Iraq’s provinces. Several have announced huge money shortages that are hindering their development projects. The head of the construction and development committee in Basra told Niqash that it had a 97 million dinar deficit. This was holding up development projects, and the province was waiting for the central government to bail them out. Basra is in the process of firing local officials to try to save money. The Maysan council said that they couldn’t start any new projects because of their money problems. Council members said they received 94 billion dinars from Baghdad, but have 250 billion dinars in outstanding contracts from the old council. They too were hoping for additional money at the end of this year from the central authorities. The chairman of Karbala’s reconstruction and planning committee announced that it had a 164 billion dinar deficit. In the previous month, the new governor of Anbar stated that his province owed $181 million from 2008. Baghdad, the most populated governorate in the country said that it was 155 billion dinar short. These deficits were a result of smaller budgets allocated in 2009, and large contracts signed when Iraqi oil prices were high in 2008 that are still being paid for.

Iraq needs billions to rebuild after years of wars and international sanctions. The country is almost completely dependent upon oil to garner revenues, so development goes up and down with the price of crude and its exports. Financial rules, which allow the Central Bank and Finance Ministry to refuse to use the large surpluses leftover from previous years, also hamper budgeting and spending. Until the oil industry is straightened out and reaches its potential, something that is not assured, the country will probably never earn enough to meet its large needs, and reconstruction will go boom and bust with the price of crude.

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “2009 budget deficit to hinder new projects in Missan,” 7/11/09
- “Deficit in Baghdad provincial council’s budget,” 6/13/09
- “ID164 billion budget deficit in Karbala,” 7/21/09
- “Iraq’s oil exports reach $3.17m in June 2009,” 7/22/09

Lando, Ben, “Iraq oil exports, revenue up,” Iraq Oil Report, 6/29/09

Niqash, “niqash meets anbar’s new governor,” 6/18/09

Al-Wazzan, Saleem, “still no public services in basra,” Niqash, 7/22/09

Provincial Reconstruction Teams To End By 2011?

One of the positive changes made during the Surge was to dramatically increase the number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq. Early attempts at reconstruction in Iraq under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) were characterized by huge, multi-million dollar projects without regard to security, cost, or the needs of Iraqis. The PRTs tried to reverse these trends by focusing upon small-scale projects that were coordinated with local Iraqis and government officials. The PRTs always struggled with staffing, coordination, and early on security was an overriding concern, which limited their ability to operate out in Iraq’s governorates, but there were eventually 14 teams and 10 Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams that worked alongside U.S. combat brigades.

Now that may be coming to an end. U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Christopher Hill said he wants to reduce the number of PRTs down to six in the coming years, and have them replaced by Non-Government Organizations. A July 2009 report by the State Department’s Inspector General also suggested that the PRTs be terminated by 2011 to cut the department’s costs. These announcements are worrying PRT officials, some of whom are going back to old U.S. habits of funding large projects in an effort to spend all their money before they are closed down. Other team members are worried this will be a waste, and undermine the more successful grassroots work that the PRTs were known for.

Iraq relies in large part on U.S. reconstruction outlays because its own bureaucracy lacks the means and capacity to spend most of their own investment money. Putting an end to the PRTs, and pushing huge infrastructure projects as their last gasp could be the worst of both worlds. As U.S. commitment to Iraq’s development comes to a halt, the last vestiges of this effort may end up adding little to a country with such great needs.

SOURCES

Ackerman, Spencer, “As Troops Withdraw, Iraq Provincial Reconstruction Teams to Change Director Expects Phase-Out by 2011,” Washington Independent, 3/11/09

Flaherty, Anne, “Study: Reconstruction teams face funding, staffing troubles,” Associated Press, 4/17/08

Madhani, Aamer, “Envoy to Iraq has message of tough love,” USA Today, 7/21/09

Robson, Seth, “Iraq reconstruction funds may be squandered,” Stars and Stripes, 7/11/09

Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09
- “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Government,” 7/30/07

Strobel, Warren, “Report: Big cuts needed at huge Baghdad embassy that Bush built,” McClatchy Newspapers, 7/22/09