The new quarterly report by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) includes the latest figures on Iraq’s unemployment and underemployment rates. The national averages were 17.3% unemployment and 29.4% underemployment. That compares to a United Nations survey conducted in January 2009 that found 18% of those questioned out of work and 10% underemployed. The SIGIR report shows that joblessness and lack of steady employment are spread throughout the different provinces of Iraq with no real regional patterns, while the U.N. survey pointed out that the young are the worst effected.
The SIGIR broke down employment numbers by province. Wasit, Irbil, Baghdad, Tamim, and Qadisiyah had the lowest unemployment rates ranging from 13.6% to 15.9%. Dhi Qar, Muthanna, Salahaddin, Dohuk, and Ninewa on the other hand with jobless rates going from 20.9% to 36.5% did the worst. The top and bottom five showed that there was no real connection between region and employment. Northern Iraq for example, had both one of the best labor markets in Tamim, and one of the worst in Ninewa. Kurdistan, which has a much more stable environment than the rest of Iraq had 14.5% unemployment in Irbil, but 21.6% in Dohuk. The same was true for southern Iraq with Wasit and Qadisiyah at the top, and Muthanna and Dhi Qar at the absolute bottom.
Unemployment by Province July 2009
Wasit 13.6%
Irbil 14.5%
Baghdad 14.5%
Tamim 15.7%
Qadisiyah 15.9%
Babil 15.9%
Sulaymaniya 16.0%
Maysan 17.3%
Anbar 17.4%
Najaf 18.6%
Basra 18.8%
Diyala 19.0%
Karbala 19.1%
Ninewa 20.9%
Dohuk 21.6%
Salahaddin 21.9%
Muthanna 30.5%
Dhi Qar 36.5%
National Avg. 17.3%
That order didn’t quite hold up for underemployment. Wasit with the lowest jobless rate in Iraq had the highest underemployment at 51.4%. Irbil however with the second best labor market also had the lowest underemployment with 18.1%, while Muthanna was in the bottom five in both categories. The three Kurdish provinces tended to do better with underemployment than the rest of the country, but otherwise the problem was evenly distributed across the other regions of Iraq.
Underemployment By Province July 2009
Irbil 18.1%
Sulaymaniya 21.1%
Najaf 21.1%
Basra 21.6%
Dohuk 23.2%
Dhi Qar 25.8%
Tamim 26.0%
Salahaddin 27.1%
Baghdad 27.3%
Qadisiyah 27.3%
Karbala 31.1%
Diyala 31.9%
Maysan 32.9%
Anbar 33.3%
Muthanna 33.5%
Ninewa 37.5%
Babil 40.9%
Wasit 51.4%
National Avg. 29.4%
What is another pressing issue is the fact that the United Nations found that young people were the most likely to be jobless in a society facing increasing demographic pressure from that exact group. The U.N. survey reported that men between the ages of 15-29 had a 28% unemployment rate. They made up 57% of all the unemployed in Iraq. 26% of all women were without a job. They were also only 17% of the labor market. The U.N. said one of the major causes of this was the fact that the government, which provided 43% of all the jobs in the country, 60% of full time work, and was the largest employer in fourteen of Iraq’s eighteen provinces, preferred hiring older males. This in a society where 313,000 males turn 18 each year, and 38.8% of the population is 14 or under.
The overall employment situation would probably be even worse if the government hadn’t increased its hiring in recent years. Many state-run industries, for example have far more workers than needed. Reuters went to a power plant in Baghdad that was supposed to have 2,500 employees, but had hired 4,370. The Minister of Industry and Minerals in a July 27, 2009 interview said that because of this bloated work force, the average public employee only works two hours a day. This also distorts the labor market as everyone wants a government job because of its security, which means fewer people available for private business.
Iraq is still a state-run economy despite all the attempts by the Americans at reform. A whole range of structural and security issues hinders the private sector, and foreign investment, while increasing, is still very limited. All together that means that the government will play the determining factor in employment in the future. Unless the civil service diversifies its practices, that means an increasing jobless rate as more and more young people enter the labor market to no avail, which could lead to more unrest and greater dissatisfaction with Baghdad.
SOURCES
Abbas, Mohammed, “Iraq investors face bloated workforce dilemma,” Reuters, 8/10/09
Cordesman, Anthony, “Iraq’s Fracture Lines: Recidivism or Reassertion,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7/28/09
Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit, “Iraq Labour Force Analysis 2003-2008,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, January 2009
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09
- “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 7/30/09
Tuesday, August 18, 2009
Monday, August 17, 2009
International Crisis Group Report On Baghdad-Kurdish Divide
In early July 2009 the International Crisis Group issued its latest report on Iraq covering the simmering Baghdad-Kurdish dispute entitled “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line.” This has been one of the biggest problems in Iraq over the last two years, and has replaced the sectarian war as the major dividing line in the country. The U.S. is especially worried that it might blow up and lead to new violence as the administration is trying to draw down forces. Vice President Joe Biden, Defense Secretary Robert Gates, and U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Christopher Hill, have all talked recently about this issue needing to be resolved. There may not be enough of a commitment on the part of Washington, Baghdad, and Kurdistan however to fix this problem anytime soon.
The split between the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) began in the summer of 2008. Previous to that Baghdad was relatively weak, especially in the years immediately following the U.S. invasion. That allowed the Kurds to win a number of large concessions to protect their autonomy, while their peshmerga forces swept south into areas they claimed to be historically Kurdish. By 2008 however, Maliki and the central government were stronger, and the Prime Minister began trying to assert federal authority and limit the Kurds to Kurdistan. This led to a number of confrontations, some of which are still playing out today. In August 2008 Maliki confronted the Kurds in the disputed district of Khanaqin in Diyala province. That same month the Prime Minister began talking about the need for a strong central government, that the constitution should be changed, that ethnosectarian quotas should be done away with, that there was no need to find consensus on every law between the different groups in the country, and that majority rule should replace it. In September 2008 Maliki followed that up by moving the 12th Iraqi Army Division into Tamim, home of Kirkuk. These were all steps meant to improve Maliki’s image as a nationalist leader before the 2009 provincial elections. He could very use the same tactics in the run-up to the 2010 parliamentary vote.
As would be expected, Maliki’s actions set off alarm bells in Kurdistan. The Kurdish leadership began condemning the Prime Minister, and claiming he was acting like the new dictator of Iraq. The Kurds were also becoming increasingly frustrated that nothing was being done about Kirkuk, and began holding up major legislation in parliament as a result. The Kurds even flirted with having a no confidence vote against Maliki in December 2008, but a lack of a successor ended the idea. By 2009 then, the two sides had hardened their positions, and neither seemed willing to back down.
The Crisis Group points to five on-going issues that are contributing to the conflict between Baghdad and the KRG. First is Kirkuk, which remains in political limbo as none of the parties can agree upon how to resolves its future or hold elections there. Second is the Green Line, the former border between Iraq and Kurdistan established in 1991. That line disappeared after 2003 when the peshmerga moved south into the disputed areas. Even though the constitution says they should not be there, the Kurds claim that part of the constitution should be revised. Third is the United Nations’ attempt to mediate the disputed areas. In April 2009 the U.N. presented its findings on the territories, and in mid-June the first meeting was held to work out the details, but shortly afterwards the Kurds passed a draft of a regional constitution, which laid claim to Kirkuk and other the other areas the Kurds consider theirs. Fourth, is the increasing confrontation between the peshmerga and Iraqi security forces. This began in Khanaqin in August 2008, spread to Tamim, and then Ninewa. The U.S. has increased its presence in the north to try to mediate, and set up a joint committee of Kurdish and Iraqi forces in Kirkuk, but has been unsuccessful in creating similar groups in the rest of the conflicted areas. The Kurds and Baghdad are both apprehensive about what will happen after the U.S. withdrawal, and are thinking in terms of worst-case scenarios of a possible armed confrontation. Last is the control of Iraq’s oil and natural gas. This involves the constitution and who has the authority to issue contracts, Baghdad or Kurdistan. The two sides have held up work on fields in disputed areas, and even when there is an apparent break through like the recent okay for the Kurds to export some of their oil, there are major hindrances as well. The Kurds are looking for major oil companies to move into the region, and create stronger ties with Turkey and the European Union to pressure Baghdad into allowing the KRG to follow its own, autonomous resource development plan.
The International Crisis Group, the United Nations, and the U.S. all say that this is the major divide in Iraq today. The problem is that the dispute involves so many different issues, federalism, the constitution, the security forces, the disputed territories, and natural resources, that any negotiations will be long and difficult. The Crisis Group calls for a grand bargain between the two sides that would include all of these issues. In October 2008 they proposed just such a deal for Kirkuk, but there were so many steps that it seemed impossible to implement. There is also the added issue that this is an election year for Iraq with parliamentary elections due in January 2010, which leads politicians to harden their stances rather than seek compromise. U.S. influence is also weakening as Maliki is limiting their freedom of operation under the Status of Forces Agreement, and U.S. troops are set to withdraw in the coming months. All of these factors do not point to a breakthrough in this dispute. Unless the Americans make a major push to put all of these sides in a room together to talk out their differences, it seems like the Baghdad-KRG dispute could last for years. Despite recent trips and comments by leading administration officials, there does not appear to be this level of commitment by the White House. Instead they seem to be working at the local level to try to stop the peshmerga and Iraqi Army from shooting at each other, while standing behind the United Nations’ talk at the national level, rather than being in the forefront and being the initiator. Perhaps only Maliki being replaced as Prime Minister could change things in the short-term, and this will definitely be a goal of the Kurds after the 2010 elections.
SOURCES
International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09
- “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08
Khalil, Lydia, “Stability in Iraqi Kurdistan: Reality or Mirage?” Brookings Institution, June 2009
Kurdistan Regional Government, “Full Text of the KRG Response to Iraqi Prime Minister’s Accusations,” 12/1/08
Mahmoud, Amer, “controversy over Kurdish constitution,” Niqash, 7/6/09
Malazada, Hemin, “kurds dismiss talk of centralization,” Niqash, 11/24/08
Raghavan, Sudarsan, “Deaths of Iraqis in July Lower Than in May, June,” Washington Post, 8/2/08
Reuters, “Shi’ite Maliki calls for majority rule in Iraq,” 5/15/09
The split between the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) began in the summer of 2008. Previous to that Baghdad was relatively weak, especially in the years immediately following the U.S. invasion. That allowed the Kurds to win a number of large concessions to protect their autonomy, while their peshmerga forces swept south into areas they claimed to be historically Kurdish. By 2008 however, Maliki and the central government were stronger, and the Prime Minister began trying to assert federal authority and limit the Kurds to Kurdistan. This led to a number of confrontations, some of which are still playing out today. In August 2008 Maliki confronted the Kurds in the disputed district of Khanaqin in Diyala province. That same month the Prime Minister began talking about the need for a strong central government, that the constitution should be changed, that ethnosectarian quotas should be done away with, that there was no need to find consensus on every law between the different groups in the country, and that majority rule should replace it. In September 2008 Maliki followed that up by moving the 12th Iraqi Army Division into Tamim, home of Kirkuk. These were all steps meant to improve Maliki’s image as a nationalist leader before the 2009 provincial elections. He could very use the same tactics in the run-up to the 2010 parliamentary vote.
As would be expected, Maliki’s actions set off alarm bells in Kurdistan. The Kurdish leadership began condemning the Prime Minister, and claiming he was acting like the new dictator of Iraq. The Kurds were also becoming increasingly frustrated that nothing was being done about Kirkuk, and began holding up major legislation in parliament as a result. The Kurds even flirted with having a no confidence vote against Maliki in December 2008, but a lack of a successor ended the idea. By 2009 then, the two sides had hardened their positions, and neither seemed willing to back down.
The Crisis Group points to five on-going issues that are contributing to the conflict between Baghdad and the KRG. First is Kirkuk, which remains in political limbo as none of the parties can agree upon how to resolves its future or hold elections there. Second is the Green Line, the former border between Iraq and Kurdistan established in 1991. That line disappeared after 2003 when the peshmerga moved south into the disputed areas. Even though the constitution says they should not be there, the Kurds claim that part of the constitution should be revised. Third is the United Nations’ attempt to mediate the disputed areas. In April 2009 the U.N. presented its findings on the territories, and in mid-June the first meeting was held to work out the details, but shortly afterwards the Kurds passed a draft of a regional constitution, which laid claim to Kirkuk and other the other areas the Kurds consider theirs. Fourth, is the increasing confrontation between the peshmerga and Iraqi security forces. This began in Khanaqin in August 2008, spread to Tamim, and then Ninewa. The U.S. has increased its presence in the north to try to mediate, and set up a joint committee of Kurdish and Iraqi forces in Kirkuk, but has been unsuccessful in creating similar groups in the rest of the conflicted areas. The Kurds and Baghdad are both apprehensive about what will happen after the U.S. withdrawal, and are thinking in terms of worst-case scenarios of a possible armed confrontation. Last is the control of Iraq’s oil and natural gas. This involves the constitution and who has the authority to issue contracts, Baghdad or Kurdistan. The two sides have held up work on fields in disputed areas, and even when there is an apparent break through like the recent okay for the Kurds to export some of their oil, there are major hindrances as well. The Kurds are looking for major oil companies to move into the region, and create stronger ties with Turkey and the European Union to pressure Baghdad into allowing the KRG to follow its own, autonomous resource development plan.
The International Crisis Group, the United Nations, and the U.S. all say that this is the major divide in Iraq today. The problem is that the dispute involves so many different issues, federalism, the constitution, the security forces, the disputed territories, and natural resources, that any negotiations will be long and difficult. The Crisis Group calls for a grand bargain between the two sides that would include all of these issues. In October 2008 they proposed just such a deal for Kirkuk, but there were so many steps that it seemed impossible to implement. There is also the added issue that this is an election year for Iraq with parliamentary elections due in January 2010, which leads politicians to harden their stances rather than seek compromise. U.S. influence is also weakening as Maliki is limiting their freedom of operation under the Status of Forces Agreement, and U.S. troops are set to withdraw in the coming months. All of these factors do not point to a breakthrough in this dispute. Unless the Americans make a major push to put all of these sides in a room together to talk out their differences, it seems like the Baghdad-KRG dispute could last for years. Despite recent trips and comments by leading administration officials, there does not appear to be this level of commitment by the White House. Instead they seem to be working at the local level to try to stop the peshmerga and Iraqi Army from shooting at each other, while standing behind the United Nations’ talk at the national level, rather than being in the forefront and being the initiator. Perhaps only Maliki being replaced as Prime Minister could change things in the short-term, and this will definitely be a goal of the Kurds after the 2010 elections.
SOURCES
International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09
- “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08
Khalil, Lydia, “Stability in Iraqi Kurdistan: Reality or Mirage?” Brookings Institution, June 2009
Kurdistan Regional Government, “Full Text of the KRG Response to Iraqi Prime Minister’s Accusations,” 12/1/08
Mahmoud, Amer, “controversy over Kurdish constitution,” Niqash, 7/6/09
Malazada, Hemin, “kurds dismiss talk of centralization,” Niqash, 11/24/08
Raghavan, Sudarsan, “Deaths of Iraqis in July Lower Than in May, June,” Washington Post, 8/2/08
Reuters, “Shi’ite Maliki calls for majority rule in Iraq,” 5/15/09
Sunday, August 16, 2009
Centerpiece of Iraqi Army Maintenance System On Brink Of Failure
The new Defense Department quarterly report to Congress says that the Taji National Depot is the centerpiece of the maintenance and supply network for the Iraqi security forces. This is part of the American goal to make the Iraqi army and police self-sufficient so that they can carry out their own logistics and repair their own vehicles and equipment. The Pentagon claimed that the Iraqis have made progress at the tactical level in this field, but still need work at the strategic level. A recent memo by Col. Timothy Reese, the head of the U.S. advisory team in Baghdad stated that the Iraqi forces are institutionally incapable of becoming self-sufficient however. His opinion seems to be supported by two recent audits by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), the latest of which dealt with the Taji Depot.
In December 2007, the U.S. military signed a $350 million contract to build and develop the Taji National Maintenance Depot within two years. It was one of the largest contracts given out under the money appropriated for the Iraqi security forces. The contractor was to build the facilities, install the equipment, train Iraqis how to use them, and then eventually turn it over to Iraqi control by the end of 2009. When completed the Taji Depot was to be the main repair facility for the Iraqi forces.
This contract ran into two major problems. First, poor work and lack of supplies meant that many pieces of equipment were not installed, and some areas were unsafe to work in. The U.S. military was in charge of all supply orders, but couldn’t make timely deliveries. Today, the Taji facility is still waiting for parts and equipment to arrive. The U.S. has also failed miserably in providing manuals for the Iraqi students. Of the 115 manuals required for Taji, only two had been translated into Arabic. This obviously led to delays in the training of Iraqis, and the contractor was found to have set overly optimistic goals for how many could complete their lessons in the set amount of time. The company created a plan where Iraqi soldiers would first go to basic training, then spend two weeks in vocational classes, get one week off, return for four weeks of basic maintenance, then go on leave again, to return for the final 26 week, non-stop course. The Iraqi ministries however, never showed any commitment to supply the necessary soldiers to go through training. First, not all the soldiers assigned to Taji had completed basic training, and those who hadn’t were routinely pulled out to complete that task. Second, Iraqis couldn’t stick to the training schedule, and would often leave early before completing their lessons. 46% were said to be absent at any time, and most Iraqis only completed 12-13 weeks of the final 26-week course. More importantly the Iraqi security forces never sent enough soldiers to begin with. The depot dealing with tracked vehicles for example, only had 179 assigned students in July 2009 when 556 were required, and of those sent there, 45 were in basic training. Overall the U.S. military reported that as of July 2009 Taji only had 62% of its assigned Iraqi soldiers. Due to troops going to basic training however, only 33% of those were ever actually at the Taji Depot. The ministries would also sometimes pull soldiers out of the training program so that they could be sent on regular security duties. The contractor ended up trying to work around these problems to finish training, but was largely unsuccessful.
The result is that the Taji Depot is barely able to carry out its assigned tasks of maintaining the Iraqi security forces’ equipment. The U.S. military set a low rate goal, which is the minimum number of jobs the Iraqi Army is supposed to perform to show that they are proficient and productive. SIGIR found that only the low rate goal for transmissions on wheeled vehicles had been met, but even that had problems. The goal was 30 and that was accomplished, but of those, only 7 were tested good. Taji had a low rate goal of 500 jobs on the AK-47 rifle and none had been accomplished. The same thing was true for another rifle type. The low rate goal for the Humvee was 30, but only one of those had been completed.
SIGIR does not believe that the Iraqis will be able to maintain the Taji Depot once it’s turned over to their control on December 31, 2009. The Depot requires 1,037 skilled workers, but only 771 students had graduated by May 31, 2009. Of those, many were ranked as only marginally skilled because they had not completed all their courses. If the Iraqi government wanted enough troops to meet this goal, they would’ve had to send them to Taji by May 21 to start training. That obviously did not happen. Two Iraqi army officials said that the Iraqi military was not involved when the Americans decided to create the Taji Depot. They said it took a year before the U.S. really included the Iraqis in the process. This is a problem noted here before in the general American reconstruction effort in Iraq where the U.S. came in and built what they wanted, without ever really asking the Iraqis what they needed. At the same time, this audit, and another earlier one in April 2009 found that there was no commitment by Iraq to create a self-sufficient security force. Whether it was for maintenance, supply, transportation, or health services, the Iraqis never sent enough troops to go through training, those that did show up often left, and none were held responsible for not finishing. Again, this is similar to the overall experience the U.S. has had with rebuilding Iraq. There are millions of dollars worth of projects in Iraq that Baghdad didn’t want, and are either unwilling or incapable of running. In the end, the SIGIR and U.S. military are committed to turning over Taji at the end of 2009 no matter what. Unless Washington or Baghdad hires a contractor to run it afterwards, that will mean the centerpiece of the Iraqi forces maintenance program will operate at such a low level as to be almost completely useless.
SOURCES
Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” June 2009
Reese, Col. Timothy, “It’s Time for the US to Declare Victory and Go Home,” July 2009
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Developing A Depot Maintenance Capability At Taji Hampered By Numerous Problems,” 7/30/09
- “Security Forces Logistics Contract Experienced Certain Cost, Outcome, and Oversight Problems,” 4/26/09
In December 2007, the U.S. military signed a $350 million contract to build and develop the Taji National Maintenance Depot within two years. It was one of the largest contracts given out under the money appropriated for the Iraqi security forces. The contractor was to build the facilities, install the equipment, train Iraqis how to use them, and then eventually turn it over to Iraqi control by the end of 2009. When completed the Taji Depot was to be the main repair facility for the Iraqi forces.
This contract ran into two major problems. First, poor work and lack of supplies meant that many pieces of equipment were not installed, and some areas were unsafe to work in. The U.S. military was in charge of all supply orders, but couldn’t make timely deliveries. Today, the Taji facility is still waiting for parts and equipment to arrive. The U.S. has also failed miserably in providing manuals for the Iraqi students. Of the 115 manuals required for Taji, only two had been translated into Arabic. This obviously led to delays in the training of Iraqis, and the contractor was found to have set overly optimistic goals for how many could complete their lessons in the set amount of time. The company created a plan where Iraqi soldiers would first go to basic training, then spend two weeks in vocational classes, get one week off, return for four weeks of basic maintenance, then go on leave again, to return for the final 26 week, non-stop course. The Iraqi ministries however, never showed any commitment to supply the necessary soldiers to go through training. First, not all the soldiers assigned to Taji had completed basic training, and those who hadn’t were routinely pulled out to complete that task. Second, Iraqis couldn’t stick to the training schedule, and would often leave early before completing their lessons. 46% were said to be absent at any time, and most Iraqis only completed 12-13 weeks of the final 26-week course. More importantly the Iraqi security forces never sent enough soldiers to begin with. The depot dealing with tracked vehicles for example, only had 179 assigned students in July 2009 when 556 were required, and of those sent there, 45 were in basic training. Overall the U.S. military reported that as of July 2009 Taji only had 62% of its assigned Iraqi soldiers. Due to troops going to basic training however, only 33% of those were ever actually at the Taji Depot. The ministries would also sometimes pull soldiers out of the training program so that they could be sent on regular security duties. The contractor ended up trying to work around these problems to finish training, but was largely unsuccessful.
The result is that the Taji Depot is barely able to carry out its assigned tasks of maintaining the Iraqi security forces’ equipment. The U.S. military set a low rate goal, which is the minimum number of jobs the Iraqi Army is supposed to perform to show that they are proficient and productive. SIGIR found that only the low rate goal for transmissions on wheeled vehicles had been met, but even that had problems. The goal was 30 and that was accomplished, but of those, only 7 were tested good. Taji had a low rate goal of 500 jobs on the AK-47 rifle and none had been accomplished. The same thing was true for another rifle type. The low rate goal for the Humvee was 30, but only one of those had been completed.
SIGIR does not believe that the Iraqis will be able to maintain the Taji Depot once it’s turned over to their control on December 31, 2009. The Depot requires 1,037 skilled workers, but only 771 students had graduated by May 31, 2009. Of those, many were ranked as only marginally skilled because they had not completed all their courses. If the Iraqi government wanted enough troops to meet this goal, they would’ve had to send them to Taji by May 21 to start training. That obviously did not happen. Two Iraqi army officials said that the Iraqi military was not involved when the Americans decided to create the Taji Depot. They said it took a year before the U.S. really included the Iraqis in the process. This is a problem noted here before in the general American reconstruction effort in Iraq where the U.S. came in and built what they wanted, without ever really asking the Iraqis what they needed. At the same time, this audit, and another earlier one in April 2009 found that there was no commitment by Iraq to create a self-sufficient security force. Whether it was for maintenance, supply, transportation, or health services, the Iraqis never sent enough troops to go through training, those that did show up often left, and none were held responsible for not finishing. Again, this is similar to the overall experience the U.S. has had with rebuilding Iraq. There are millions of dollars worth of projects in Iraq that Baghdad didn’t want, and are either unwilling or incapable of running. In the end, the SIGIR and U.S. military are committed to turning over Taji at the end of 2009 no matter what. Unless Washington or Baghdad hires a contractor to run it afterwards, that will mean the centerpiece of the Iraqi forces maintenance program will operate at such a low level as to be almost completely useless.
SOURCES
Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” June 2009
Reese, Col. Timothy, “It’s Time for the US to Declare Victory and Go Home,” July 2009
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Developing A Depot Maintenance Capability At Taji Hampered By Numerous Problems,” 7/30/09
- “Security Forces Logistics Contract Experienced Certain Cost, Outcome, and Oversight Problems,” 4/26/09
Friday, August 14, 2009
Full Kurdish Election Results
The 2009 Kurdistan parliamentary and presidential elections resulted in the first real challenge to the ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). While their Kurdistan List still came in first with 69.57% of the vote, parties that claimed to be reformers received 39.43%. While most of the smaller parties in this group didn't qualify for seats in the 111-member Kurdish parliament, the largest one, the Change List, will control just under one-quarter of the legislature. The major reason for their success is that many Kurds wanted a real opposition to try to force the KDP-PUK alliance to end its corruption, provide greater transparency, allow more dissenting opinions, and develop the region.
The competition between the Kurdistan List and the Change List was intense. The Change List claimed that their followers were being fired from their government jobs by the PUK and KDP before the vote. A U.S. officer confirmed one such example when a Kurdish border patrol commander and his entire unit were fired by the PUK peshmerga because he supported the Change List. The ruling parties were also accused of hiring 2,500 government workers after a four year hiring freeze, all of whom were expected to vote for the Kurdistan List in return. The Change List and Kurdistan List accused each other of tearing down the others posters. In early June 2009 the Minister of Peshmerga was accused of attacking Change supporters at a rally. Finally, on election day, the opposition parties claimed that PUK and KDP followers were voting without IDs, blocking opposition observers from polling stations, campaigning after deadlines, and voting more than once. Afterwards the Change List said that their offices in Irbil were attacked by the KDP, and there were reports of violence between different supporters in Sulaymaniya.
As reported before, these election results are likely to have far ranging effects not only upon Kurdish politics, strengthening Barzani against Talabani, and creating the first real opposition, but also upon national ones, perhaps weakening the Kurds' unified position in Baghdad, and offering a new partner in the Change List for Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in the parliamentary balloting.
Kurdistan Regional Government Presidential Election Results
Massoud Barzani – Head of the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Re-Elected KRG President | 69.57% |
Kamal Mirawdeli – Independent scholar who won a majority in Sulaymaniya | 25.32% |
Halo Ibrahim Ahmed – Head of the Progress List and brother-in-law of the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and Iraqi President Jalal Talabani. His father was a famous PUK leader, and Halo was kicked out of the party for forming his own reform faction in 2008 | 3.49% |
Safin Sheikh Mohammed – Independent businessman and former PUK member who quit in 1995 over the KDP-PUK civil war to form his own party | 1.40% |
Hussein Karmiani – Another former PUK member who left the party in 2005 and runs agriculture business | 0.59% |
Seats Awarded In Kurdish Parliament – 111 seats total
Kurdish List 59 seats
Change List 25 seats
Service And Reform List 13 seats
Islamic Movement of Kurdistan List 2 seats
Social Justice and Freedom List 1 seat
Turkmen had a 5 seat quota
Turkmen Democratic Movement In Kurdistan 3 seats
Turkmen Reform List 1 seat
Irbil Turkmen List 1 seat
Christians had a 5 seat quota
National Council of Chaldean Syriac Assyrians 3 seats
Al-Rafidain List 2 seats
Armenians had a 1 seat quota
Aram Shahine Dawood Bakoyan
Kurdistan Parliamentary Election Results
Kurdistan List – KDP-PUK Coalition. Ran together in previous two Kurdish elections. PUK is now the weaker of the two parties as they lost in their own home province of Sulaymaniya | 69.57% |
Change List – Led by former PUK co-founder Nishurwan Mustafa, media magnet. Won Sulaymaniya and will be the first real opposition party if it can keep its disparate group of followers together | 23.75% |
Service And Reform List – Coalition of Islamists and Leftists, the Kurdistan Islamic Union, the Islamic Group of Kurdistan, the Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party, and Future Party. The Islamists were the previous opposition to the ruling parties, but had a history of cooperating with them | 12.8% |
Islamic Movement of Kurdistan List – Formed by Sunni mullahs in 1979 who call for Islamic government and greater transparency | 1.45% |
Turkmen Democratic Movement In Kurdistan – Calls for Turkmen unity, annexation of Kirkuk, and is opposed to Turkish influence. Won 3 of the 5 seats set aside for Turkmen | 0.99% |
Social Justice and Freedom List – Leftist coalition of the Kurdistan Communist Party, the Kurdistan Toilers Party, the Kurdistan Independent Work Party, the Kurdistan Pro-Democratic Party, and the Democratic Movement of Kurdistan People that calls for equal rights and secularism | 0.82% |
National Council of Chaldean Syriac Assyrians – Calls for the Ninewa Plains, a historically Christian area, to be annexed by Kurdistan. Is assured of at least one seat as 5 were reserved for Christians | 0.58% |
Turkmen Reform List – Wants more power for Turkmen and is against Turkish influence. Won 1 of 5 seats set aside for Turkmen | 0.38% |
Al-Rafidain List – Wants a greater role for Christians, especially in the security forces | 0.3% |
Aram Shahine Dawood Bakoyan – An Armenian politician assured of at least one seat as 2 were set aside for Armenians | 0.22% |
Irbil Turkmen List – Wants Kirkuk to be annexed and is against Turkish influence. Won the last of 5 seats set aside for Turkmen | 0.21% |
Kurdistan Toilers and Workers Party List – Calls for rule of law in Kurdistan | 0.18% |
Aertex Morses Sargisyan – Independent Armenian politician likely to receive other seat reserved for Armenians | 0.15% |
Kurdistan Conservative Party – A tribal party that has ties with the PUK | 0.13% |
Kurdistan Reform Movement – Led by Abdul Barzani, cousin of Massoud Barzani. Calls for an end to corruption, rule of law, and human rights | 0.11% |
Independent Youth List – Only includes ten people who call for more rights for the young | 0.1% |
Kurdistan Democratic National Party List – Calls for Kurdish unity throughout the region, plus more housing and women and youth rights in Kurdistan | 0.1% |
Unified Chaldean List – Made up of the Chaldean Union Party and the Chaldean National Council | 0.09% |
Chaldean Syriac Assyrian Autonomy List | 0.09% |
Kurdistan Bright Future List – Wants separation of political parties from administration and justice system | 0.05% |
Eshkhan Malkin Sargisyan – Independent Armenian candidate | 0.05% |
Progression List – Led by Jalal Talabani's brother-in-law and presidential candidate Halo Ibrahim Ahmed. Call for better standard of living | 0.05% |
Iraqi Constitutional Party – National party founded by Interior Minister Jawad Bolani | 0.04% |
Independent Turkmen List – Calls for Kirkuk to be an independent region | 0.02% |
SOURCES
Bakri, Nada, "Challengers Face an Uphill Battle in Elections in Iraq's Kurdish North," Washington Post, 7/19/09
Carpenter, J. Scott and Ali, Ahmed, "Iraqi Kurds Go to the Polls: Is Change Possible?" Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 7/23/09
Cocks, Tim, "Before polls, Iraq Kurds fret about graft not land," Reuters, 7/14/09
Druzin, Heath, "Iraqi border patrol officers fired by rival party supporters," Stars and Stripes, 7/25/09
Hamad, Qassim Khidhir, "kurdish election lists," Niqash, 6/30/09
- "kurds seek new political opposition," Niqash, 7/16/09
Institute for War & Peace Reporting, "KDP Flexes Muscles in Dohuk," 7/21/09
Kurdistan Regional Government, "Electoral Commission announces final results of Kurdistan Region elections," 8/8/09
Mahmoud, Shakhwan, "fired and hired for their political beliefs?" Niqash, 7/20/09
- "opposition claim kurdish election fraud," Niqash, 8/4/09
Monsters & Critics, "Official Iraqi Kurdish election results confirm incumbent victories," 8/8/09
Muhammad, Sardar, "kurdish presidential candidates," Niqash, 7/9/09
Rath, Tiare, "PUK and KDP Face Challenge," Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 7/17/09
Reuters, "Iraq's Kurdish Opposition Allege Poll Violations," 7/26/09
Sands, Phil, "Victory for Kurdistan opposition," The National, 7/30/09
United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, "UNAMI Focus," July 2009
Thursday, August 13, 2009
The Constitutional Conundrum Of The Kurds
Officials of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) consistently claim that the Constitution and its Article 140 need to be followed when it comes to resolving Kirkuk and other disputed territories. Most recently KRG President Massoud Barzani said at the end of July 2009 that he rejected the United Nation’s recommendations for the disputed areas and any other plan that does away with Article 140. At the same time the Kurds maintain de facto control of the city and other areas of northern Iraq they claim is part of a historical greater Kurdistan. This despite the fact that the constitution says they should not be there. This is their dilemma, the Kurds demand that part of the constitution be followed so that they can annex the areas they want, while at the same time they are ignoring other parts of the constitution that stand in the way of this goal.
Article 140 called for normalization, a census and a referendum on the future of Kirkuk and other disputed territories in Iraq by December 31, 2007. When it appeared unlikely that the article would be implemented in time the Kurds agreed to a six-month extension. That June 2008 deadline came and passed as well with no resolution to the problem. This has caused a huge amount of frustration on the part of the Kurds, who have held up major legislation in parliament in protest.
Despite this, the Kurds still maintain control over a large area of northern Iraq including Kirkuk. With the overthrow of Saddam, Kurdish peshmerga forces swept south into the areas they claimed to be theirs. The U.S. also asked for their help when the insurgency took off. This allowed the Kurds to establish themselves in northern sections of Ninewa, Salahaddin, Tamim, and Diyala. The Kurds also call a swath of northern Wasit theirs as well. If annexed this land would almost double the size of Kurdistan from 15,400 square miles to 30,100 square miles.
The problem is the 2005 Iraqi constitution says that this presence is illegal. The 2004 Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) that was drafted by the Coalition Provisional Authority to govern Iraq until it drew up its own constitution included Article 53(A). It said that the Kurds only had authority over areas that they controlled before the 2003 U.S. invasion. This area was established in the wake of the 1991 Gulf War when Iraqi forces withdrew and the U.S. and England established a northern no fly zone. The border between Kurdistan and the rest of Iraq became known as the Green Line. Article 53(A) was later incorporated into the 2005 constitution.
Since 2007 Kurdish officials have said they no longer recognize the Green Line since they have de facto control of these disputed territories. In late 2007 for example, the KRG Natural Resources Minister said the Green Line was passé. The KRG also told oil and security companies working in Kurdistan to remove any maps that included the Green Line. In early 2009 Masrour Barzani, son of KRG President Massoud Barzani, and head of the KRG’s security forces, stated that the Green Line was a relic of Saddam’s time and that the KRG refused to abide by it. In May he told the International Crisis Group that everything in the constitution should be negotiated to resolve the fate of these areas.
This is the conundrum the Kurds now find themselves in. On the one hand, they demand that Article 140 and the constitution be followed when it comes to Kirkuk, and the disputed territories. At the same time the constitution says they have no right to be in those areas as they now are. The Kurds have increasingly rejected this part of the constitution, and said that everything in it needs to be discussed. They can’t have it both ways. They can’t insist on the constitution being followed when they are breaking it and demanding revisions of it. This dilemma is unlikely to be resolved any time soon, especially with U.S. forces withdrawing. Even though Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki recently traveled to Kurdistan to meet with top KRG officials, positions will probably harden as the 2010 parliamentary elections near.
SOURCES
Cordesman, Anthony, “Iraq’s Fracture Lines: Recidivism or Reassertion,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7/28/09
Dagher, Sam, “Arrests in Bank Robbery Create a Rift Between Iraqi Officials,” New York Times, 8/3/09
- “New Kurdish Leader Asserts Agenda,” New York Times, 7/29/09
International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09
- “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08
Iraqi Constitution
Janabi, Nazar, “Kirkuk’s Article 140: Expired or Not?,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1/30/08
Mohammed, Shwan, “Kurdish forces refuse to quit Iraq battlefield province,” Agence France Presse, 8/13/08
Paley, Amit, “Strip of Iraq ‘on the Verge of Exploding,’” Washington Post, 9/13/08
Article 140 called for normalization, a census and a referendum on the future of Kirkuk and other disputed territories in Iraq by December 31, 2007. When it appeared unlikely that the article would be implemented in time the Kurds agreed to a six-month extension. That June 2008 deadline came and passed as well with no resolution to the problem. This has caused a huge amount of frustration on the part of the Kurds, who have held up major legislation in parliament in protest.
Despite this, the Kurds still maintain control over a large area of northern Iraq including Kirkuk. With the overthrow of Saddam, Kurdish peshmerga forces swept south into the areas they claimed to be theirs. The U.S. also asked for their help when the insurgency took off. This allowed the Kurds to establish themselves in northern sections of Ninewa, Salahaddin, Tamim, and Diyala. The Kurds also call a swath of northern Wasit theirs as well. If annexed this land would almost double the size of Kurdistan from 15,400 square miles to 30,100 square miles.
The problem is the 2005 Iraqi constitution says that this presence is illegal. The 2004 Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) that was drafted by the Coalition Provisional Authority to govern Iraq until it drew up its own constitution included Article 53(A). It said that the Kurds only had authority over areas that they controlled before the 2003 U.S. invasion. This area was established in the wake of the 1991 Gulf War when Iraqi forces withdrew and the U.S. and England established a northern no fly zone. The border between Kurdistan and the rest of Iraq became known as the Green Line. Article 53(A) was later incorporated into the 2005 constitution.
Since 2007 Kurdish officials have said they no longer recognize the Green Line since they have de facto control of these disputed territories. In late 2007 for example, the KRG Natural Resources Minister said the Green Line was passé. The KRG also told oil and security companies working in Kurdistan to remove any maps that included the Green Line. In early 2009 Masrour Barzani, son of KRG President Massoud Barzani, and head of the KRG’s security forces, stated that the Green Line was a relic of Saddam’s time and that the KRG refused to abide by it. In May he told the International Crisis Group that everything in the constitution should be negotiated to resolve the fate of these areas.
This is the conundrum the Kurds now find themselves in. On the one hand, they demand that Article 140 and the constitution be followed when it comes to Kirkuk, and the disputed territories. At the same time the constitution says they have no right to be in those areas as they now are. The Kurds have increasingly rejected this part of the constitution, and said that everything in it needs to be discussed. They can’t have it both ways. They can’t insist on the constitution being followed when they are breaking it and demanding revisions of it. This dilemma is unlikely to be resolved any time soon, especially with U.S. forces withdrawing. Even though Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki recently traveled to Kurdistan to meet with top KRG officials, positions will probably harden as the 2010 parliamentary elections near.
SOURCES
Cordesman, Anthony, “Iraq’s Fracture Lines: Recidivism or Reassertion,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7/28/09
Dagher, Sam, “Arrests in Bank Robbery Create a Rift Between Iraqi Officials,” New York Times, 8/3/09
- “New Kurdish Leader Asserts Agenda,” New York Times, 7/29/09
International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09
- “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08
Iraqi Constitution
Janabi, Nazar, “Kirkuk’s Article 140: Expired or Not?,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1/30/08
Mohammed, Shwan, “Kurdish forces refuse to quit Iraq battlefield province,” Agence France Presse, 8/13/08
Paley, Amit, “Strip of Iraq ‘on the Verge of Exploding,’” Washington Post, 9/13/08
Wednesday, August 12, 2009
The New Dispute In Kirkuk – The National Census
On October 24, 2009 Iraq is set to conduct a national census. This will be the first one held since the overthrow of Saddam. Its results will have the largest effect upon the disputed area of Kirkuk in Tamim province. Article 140 of the constitution called for a census in Tamim before a referendum on the future of Kirkuk could be conducted no later than December 31, 2007. Neither happened. The Kurds want the census to occur because they are the majority in the province, and it would create facts on the ground to support their claim to the area. Arabs and Kurds in Tamim are therefore opposed to it. They claim that the Kurdish parties moved in thousands of their followers into the province after the U.S. invasion, sometimes by force, thus gerrymandering the demographics in their favor. The Kurds dispute this, claiming that the returns were simply people who were forcibly displaced by Saddam’s Arabization policy. Neither side appears willing to compromise.
The government survey will also be of importance because it will determine the voting rolls for the province. Tamim has still not had provincial elections, which were held in January 2009, and unless the census happens there, may not participate in the January 2010 parliamentary elections either.
As usual, Iraq’s political leaders are unable to deal with this dilemma. Some Turkmen political parties say they want Baghdad to delay the census until it can figure out how many Kurds moved to Tamim after 2003. They have threatened a boycott of the census if this doesn’t happen, and the Arabs may join them. In parliament, one proposal is to simply drop Tamim from the national census. Another is to push ahead with a referendum and parliamentary elections in Kirkuk without one. A major sticking point is that the presidential committee, which includes Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, will veto any law devised by parliament unfavorable to the Kurds. The most likely scenario then, is that parliament will do nothing, and Tamim will be excluded from the census, and participation in voting again.
SOURCES
Gibbs, Nancy, “Unfinished Business,” Time, 4/28/03
International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09
Iraqi Constitution
Nordland, Rod, “Now It’s A Census That Could Rip Iraq Apart,” New York Times, 7/26/09
Williams, Timothy, “Turkmens in Contested Oil-Rich Province Vow to Boycott Iraq’s National Census,” New York Times, 7/24/09
The government survey will also be of importance because it will determine the voting rolls for the province. Tamim has still not had provincial elections, which were held in January 2009, and unless the census happens there, may not participate in the January 2010 parliamentary elections either.
As usual, Iraq’s political leaders are unable to deal with this dilemma. Some Turkmen political parties say they want Baghdad to delay the census until it can figure out how many Kurds moved to Tamim after 2003. They have threatened a boycott of the census if this doesn’t happen, and the Arabs may join them. In parliament, one proposal is to simply drop Tamim from the national census. Another is to push ahead with a referendum and parliamentary elections in Kirkuk without one. A major sticking point is that the presidential committee, which includes Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, will veto any law devised by parliament unfavorable to the Kurds. The most likely scenario then, is that parliament will do nothing, and Tamim will be excluded from the census, and participation in voting again.
SOURCES
Gibbs, Nancy, “Unfinished Business,” Time, 4/28/03
International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09
Iraqi Constitution
Nordland, Rod, “Now It’s A Census That Could Rip Iraq Apart,” New York Times, 7/26/09
Williams, Timothy, “Turkmens in Contested Oil-Rich Province Vow to Boycott Iraq’s National Census,” New York Times, 7/24/09
Tuesday, August 11, 2009
Charles Duelfer’s Account Of The End Of The 1990s U.N. Inspections
In the July/August 2009 issue of The National Interest, former U.N. weapons inspector Charles Duelfer painted a picture of the first round of Iraq inspections in the 1990s. On the one hand, his piece is informative because it explains how international support for inspections in Iraq deteriorated. This was pushed along by Saddam’s astute use of bribes and lucrative petroleum deals through the United Nations’ Oil for Food program to sow dissent amongst the Security Council. On the other hand nowhere does he mention the work that the inspectors did in Iraq, which was largely successful in destroying Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and nuclear programs. Rather Duelfer solely concentrates upon the political squabbles that occurred behind the scenes in Iraq, and within the United Nations that led to the end of the inspections in 1998.
As part of the 1991 cease-fire that ended the Gulf War, the United Nations imposed sanctions on Iraq until it divulged and destroyed all of its WMD and nuclear programs. To achieve this goal the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) was created as the first inspectors in Iraq. This was the toughest and most intrusive inspection regime created since Germany after World War I. Duelfer skips all of UNSCOM’s early work, and goes to its last two years in 1997 and 1998 to highlight the political problems it ran into.
1997 was the beginning of the end of UNSCOM. In that year Iraq refused to admit American inspectors into the country claiming that Washington was trying to undermine the government. That was true as Pres. Clinton tried to launch a coup the previous year using the inspections. At the same time, Saddam was making another concerted effort to undermine and end the process, and the sanctions. UNSCOM didn’t comply with Baghdad’s request, and withdrew. They returned in three weeks, but under a deal brokered by France and Russia where foreign diplomats acted as chaperons for the inspectors. A few months later Baghdad refused to let the inspectors into presidential palaces. A deal was eventually worked out with U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, but many saw it as appeasement of Saddam. The delay also allowed Iraq to empty the palaces of any incriminating material.
By 1997 support for the inspections and sanctions were weakening anyway within the Security Council. Iraq was offering Russia, France, and other countries preferential oil contracts under the Oil for Food program to weaken and undermine UNSCOM. Iraq was also correctly arguing that the inspections were being used by the U.S. for political ends, beyond what the U.N. resolution called for. Duelfer argues that these divisions made the inspections useless. The inspectors themselves became divided, some collecting intelligence for their own countries, some giving it to Iraq, and the lack of a united Security Council meant that Baghdad could chip away at the inspections little by little with no repercussions.
In 1998 Iraq refused to cooperate with the inspectors anymore. They withdrew as the U.S. and England launched Operation Desert Fox, a bombing campaign for non-cooperation with UNSCOM. Duelfer calls the attack a “feckless bombing,” and said that afterwards U.S. containment of Iraq ended with the suspension of inspections. This is far from true. Gen. Anthony Zinni, who was the commander of the U.S. Central Command at the time, received intelligence that Saddam was teetering and was seriously afraid that he might be overthrown as a result Desert Fox. More importantly, as a result of the bombing, Iraq decided to give up on its weapons programs. The Iraq Study Group later found out that labs were shutdown and work was ended as Baghdad believed that it could never continue under U.N. sanctions and U.S. attacks. The U.S.-U.K. no fly zones continued, as well as U.N. sanctions, and Iraq never restarted its weapons programs. The problem of course was that the West completely missed these changes in Iraq. Saddam’s constant refusal to cooperate with inspections, convinced the United States that Iraq would never give up its desire to have WMD. These unresolved issues were left to fester, and became a driving issue for many American politicians and foreign policy officials, who later gained office in the Bush administration.
Where Duelfer’s article really falls short however is that he never really discusses what UNSCOM accomplished. He writes that the inspections did find out a lot about Iraq’s WMD programs in seven years, but never mentions that by 1996 Iraq’s known WMD munitions and equipment, and nuclear programs had been dismantled and destroyed. There was still an unaccounted for stockpile of weapons and WMD agents left over from the Iran-Iraq War, much of which was probably useless as it had expired, but as far as new production or active programs was concerned, there were none by the time UNSCOM left the country in December 1998.
Instead what you walk away from the Duelfer piece thinking is that the inspections were eventually undermined by political divisions within the U.N. and maneuvers by Saddam, and that overall they were failure. It seems that Duelfer came away from his work with UNSCOM mad and bitter because he was forced to leave before he felt his job was done. His comments after 1998 show that he was open to any and all allegations of Iraq breaking the U.N. resolutions on its WMD and nuclear programs. Even now in 2009 he apparently still holds a grudge from his experience, which makes him ignore the successes that he achieved while an inspector.
SOURCES
Blix, Hans, “An Update On Inspection,” UNMOVIC, 1/27/03
CNN, “Scott Ritter: Facts needed before Iraq attack,” 7/12/02
Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, “S/1997/779,” International Atomic Energy Agency, 10/8/97
Duelfer, Charles, “Canaries in the Cooling Tower,” The National Interest, July/August 2009
Gordon, Michael and Miller, Judith, “Threats And Responses: The Iraqis; U.S. Says Hussein Intensifies Quest For A-Bomb Parts,” New York Times, 9/8/02
Guardian, “The coup that wasn’t,” 9/26/05
Miller, Judith, “An Iraqi Defector Tells of Work on at Least 20 Hidden Weapons Sites,” New York Times, 12/20/01
PBS Frontline, “Interview: Kenneth Pollack,” 2/20/03
Rangwala, Glen, Hurd, Nathaniel, and Millar, Alistair, “A Case For Concern, Not A Case For War,” Middle East Report Online, 1/28/03
Ricks, Tom, Fiasco, 2006
Ritter, Scott, “The Case for Iraq’s Qualitative Disarmament,” Arms Control Today, June 2000
Rose, David, “Iraq’s Arsenal of Terror,” Vanity Fair, May 2002
Warrick, Joby, “In Assessing Iraq’s Arsenal, The ‘Reality Is Uncertainty,’” Washington Post, 7/31/02
As part of the 1991 cease-fire that ended the Gulf War, the United Nations imposed sanctions on Iraq until it divulged and destroyed all of its WMD and nuclear programs. To achieve this goal the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) was created as the first inspectors in Iraq. This was the toughest and most intrusive inspection regime created since Germany after World War I. Duelfer skips all of UNSCOM’s early work, and goes to its last two years in 1997 and 1998 to highlight the political problems it ran into.
1997 was the beginning of the end of UNSCOM. In that year Iraq refused to admit American inspectors into the country claiming that Washington was trying to undermine the government. That was true as Pres. Clinton tried to launch a coup the previous year using the inspections. At the same time, Saddam was making another concerted effort to undermine and end the process, and the sanctions. UNSCOM didn’t comply with Baghdad’s request, and withdrew. They returned in three weeks, but under a deal brokered by France and Russia where foreign diplomats acted as chaperons for the inspectors. A few months later Baghdad refused to let the inspectors into presidential palaces. A deal was eventually worked out with U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, but many saw it as appeasement of Saddam. The delay also allowed Iraq to empty the palaces of any incriminating material.
By 1997 support for the inspections and sanctions were weakening anyway within the Security Council. Iraq was offering Russia, France, and other countries preferential oil contracts under the Oil for Food program to weaken and undermine UNSCOM. Iraq was also correctly arguing that the inspections were being used by the U.S. for political ends, beyond what the U.N. resolution called for. Duelfer argues that these divisions made the inspections useless. The inspectors themselves became divided, some collecting intelligence for their own countries, some giving it to Iraq, and the lack of a united Security Council meant that Baghdad could chip away at the inspections little by little with no repercussions.
In 1998 Iraq refused to cooperate with the inspectors anymore. They withdrew as the U.S. and England launched Operation Desert Fox, a bombing campaign for non-cooperation with UNSCOM. Duelfer calls the attack a “feckless bombing,” and said that afterwards U.S. containment of Iraq ended with the suspension of inspections. This is far from true. Gen. Anthony Zinni, who was the commander of the U.S. Central Command at the time, received intelligence that Saddam was teetering and was seriously afraid that he might be overthrown as a result Desert Fox. More importantly, as a result of the bombing, Iraq decided to give up on its weapons programs. The Iraq Study Group later found out that labs were shutdown and work was ended as Baghdad believed that it could never continue under U.N. sanctions and U.S. attacks. The U.S.-U.K. no fly zones continued, as well as U.N. sanctions, and Iraq never restarted its weapons programs. The problem of course was that the West completely missed these changes in Iraq. Saddam’s constant refusal to cooperate with inspections, convinced the United States that Iraq would never give up its desire to have WMD. These unresolved issues were left to fester, and became a driving issue for many American politicians and foreign policy officials, who later gained office in the Bush administration.
Where Duelfer’s article really falls short however is that he never really discusses what UNSCOM accomplished. He writes that the inspections did find out a lot about Iraq’s WMD programs in seven years, but never mentions that by 1996 Iraq’s known WMD munitions and equipment, and nuclear programs had been dismantled and destroyed. There was still an unaccounted for stockpile of weapons and WMD agents left over from the Iran-Iraq War, much of which was probably useless as it had expired, but as far as new production or active programs was concerned, there were none by the time UNSCOM left the country in December 1998.
Instead what you walk away from the Duelfer piece thinking is that the inspections were eventually undermined by political divisions within the U.N. and maneuvers by Saddam, and that overall they were failure. It seems that Duelfer came away from his work with UNSCOM mad and bitter because he was forced to leave before he felt his job was done. His comments after 1998 show that he was open to any and all allegations of Iraq breaking the U.N. resolutions on its WMD and nuclear programs. Even now in 2009 he apparently still holds a grudge from his experience, which makes him ignore the successes that he achieved while an inspector.
SOURCES
Blix, Hans, “An Update On Inspection,” UNMOVIC, 1/27/03
CNN, “Scott Ritter: Facts needed before Iraq attack,” 7/12/02
Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, “S/1997/779,” International Atomic Energy Agency, 10/8/97
Duelfer, Charles, “Canaries in the Cooling Tower,” The National Interest, July/August 2009
Gordon, Michael and Miller, Judith, “Threats And Responses: The Iraqis; U.S. Says Hussein Intensifies Quest For A-Bomb Parts,” New York Times, 9/8/02
Guardian, “The coup that wasn’t,” 9/26/05
Miller, Judith, “An Iraqi Defector Tells of Work on at Least 20 Hidden Weapons Sites,” New York Times, 12/20/01
PBS Frontline, “Interview: Kenneth Pollack,” 2/20/03
Rangwala, Glen, Hurd, Nathaniel, and Millar, Alistair, “A Case For Concern, Not A Case For War,” Middle East Report Online, 1/28/03
Ricks, Tom, Fiasco, 2006
Ritter, Scott, “The Case for Iraq’s Qualitative Disarmament,” Arms Control Today, June 2000
Rose, David, “Iraq’s Arsenal of Terror,” Vanity Fair, May 2002
Warrick, Joby, “In Assessing Iraq’s Arsenal, The ‘Reality Is Uncertainty,’” Washington Post, 7/31/02
Monday, August 10, 2009
Violence Up In Anbar?
In mid-July 2009 Aswat al-Iraq reported that officials and tribal sheikhs in Anbar were worried about an up-tick in violence in their province. Sheikh Hashim Khalifa blamed the attacks on political factions vying for position before the January 2010 parliamentary elections. He said the provincial security forces were unable to deal with this violence because they were afraid of offending political parties. A former Iraqi Army officer had a slightly different take blaming the political blocs for selecting unqualified personnel to join the security forces. These accusations come in the midst of a drive by the new provincial council to oust the police chief. They voiced similar concerns saying that he has not been able to stop recent attacks, and that his force, while numbering around 28,000 are not qualified. Almost all of the local police and soldiers are made up of tribesman and Awakening members. A review of English language news reports shows that there has been an increase in attacks over the last two months, and a doubling of the number of casualties. In April 2009 there were 11 security incidents resulting in 95 casualties. May like the rest of the country had a large dip with 9 incidents and only 23 casualties. June saw a big jump with 24 attacks and over 82 dead and wounded. July had just about the same number of attacks, 22, and deaths, 33, but a huge increase in wounded, 126. This mirrored casualties in Iraq in general in July with a surge in wounded.
Security Incidents In Anbar April-July 2009
July 09
Attacks/Incidents: 22
Deaths: 33
Wounded: 126
June 09
Attacks/Incidents: 24
Deaths: 29
Wounded: 53+
May 09
Attacks/Incidents: 9
Deaths: 12
Wounded: 11
April 09
Attacks/Incidents: 11
Deaths: 31
Wounded: 64
As for the causes and culprits behind the attacks little is know. The favorite targets are Awakening members and local police. Al Qaeda in Iraq who usually gets blamed for almost all incidents only has a marginal presence left in a few of the province’s cities. Tribal rivalries could also be playing a role as well. The U.S. and Baghdad, because of their weaknesses and inadequacies, largely abrogated the security responsibilities in the province to the tribes, offering them money and jobs in return for their support. This led to the Awakening movement that was always a loose confederation of groups that broke apart into different factions in the 2009 elections. With Anbar turned over to Iraqi control in September 2008 the tribes now have pretty much free sway in Anbar, and their rivalries could be a cause of the violence.
Overall, the number of incidents and casualties in Anbar are still relatively low compared to the more violent areas of central and northern Iraq. At the same time it shows that the sources of attacks have changed in Iraq. Most are no longer based upon sectarian differences, the insurgency has largely been defeated, with most of its fighters having switched sides through the Sons of Iraq, and the Mahdi Army is largely dormant. Political differences and terrorism are some of the main causes of attacks today, as shown in Anbar.
SOURCES
Abdul-Zahra, Qassim and Riechmann, Deb, “Iraq PM flies to US to meet Obama, seek investment,” Associated Press, 7/20/09
Abouzeid, Rania, “US Allies Angry at Anbar Handover,” Time, 9/1/08
Agence France Presse, “Four Iraqi cops killed,” 6/25/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “2 cops wounded in armed attack in Anbar,” 6/25/09
- “2 kids killed by IED in Anbar,” 4/20/09
- “2 policemen wounded in blast in Ramadi,” 7/26/09
- “4 civilians wounded in 2nd Falluja blast,” 7/25/09
- “4 cops wounded in Falluja,” 5/27/09
- “4 cops wounded in Falluja twin blasts,” 6/22/09
- “4 Islamic party’s guards inured in Falluja,” 4/30/09
- “4 wounded in car bomb blast in Anbar,” 7/9/09
- “5 cops killed, wounded in Anbar blast,” 6/6/09
- “Attacks on the rise in Anbar amidst violence scare,” 7/18/09
- “Car bomb dismantled in Ramadi,” 7/29/09
- “Car bomb explodes near IPP HQ, 12 wounded,” 7/25/09
- “Car bomb wounds Anbar police chief,” 6/6/09
- “Civilian shot down in Falluja,” 4/6/09
- “Cop found dead in northern Ramadi, 6/15/09
- “Cop found dead in western Anbar,” 6/22/09
- “Cop killed, 3 wounded in southern Falluja,” 4/24/09
- “Emergency police chief killed by IED,” 7/27/09
- “Falluja blast casualties reaches 7,” 7/2/09
- “Gunman killed in attack on police in Falluja,” 6/8/09
- “IED attack foiled in Falluja,” 4/20/09
- “IED wounds 2 cops in Anbar,” 6/9/09
- “IED wounds 3 in Anbar,” 7/18/09
- “IED wounds 3 Sahwa fighters in Anbar,” 4/8/09
- “Intelligence officer survives assassination attempt in Falluja,” 7/2/09
- “Katyushas kill 2, wound 7 in Anbar,” 7/8/09
- “Kidnapped officer found dead in Anbar,” 4/13/09
- “Mass grave found in Anbar,” 5/26/09
- “Police commander killed by IED in Falluja,” 6/25/09
- “Police gun down man while planting bomb in Anbar,” 7/1/09
- “Policeman killed, 2 others wounded in Anbar blast,” 7/29/09
- “Qaem blast kills 4, wounds 8,” 7/30/09
- “Senior officer escapes attempt in Falluja,” 5/23/09
- “Suicide blast sets U.S. vehicle ablaze in Falluja,” 5/7/09
- “Tribal official wounded in bomb blast in Anbar,” 4/21/09
- “U.S. soldier wounded in Falluja,” 6/4/09
- “Unknown body found in Anbar,” 6/24/09
- “Urgent/Sahwa leader survives assassination attempt,” 6/24/09
- “Urgent/Toll from Falluja car bomb reaches 7,” 6/20/09
BBC, “Suicide blast hits Iraq army base,” 4/16/09
DPA, “One child killed, eight wounded in Iraq rocket attacks,” 6/20/09
Fayad, Ma’ad, “Al-Anbar Salvation Council to Run in Parliamentary Elections,” Asharq Al-Awsat, 9/21/08
Hammoudi, Laith, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Sunday 26 July 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 7/26/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 25 June 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 6/25/09
Hammoudi, Laith and Kadhim, Hussein, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 25 May 2009,” 5/25/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Saturday 6 June 2009,” 6/6/09
IANS, “Twin blast in Iraq kills nine policemen,” 4/5/09
Issa, Sahar, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Friday 17 July 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 7/17/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Sunday 5 April 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/5/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Sunday 14 June 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 6/14/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 16 July 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 7/16/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 7 April 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/7/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 23 June 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 6/23/09
Issa Sahar and Kadhim, Hussein, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 9 June 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 6/9/09
Javno, “Angry Iraqis Demand Protection From Bombings,” 6/25/09
Kami, Aseel, “Bus terminal bombing kills seven in Baghdad,” Reuters, 6/8/09
Knights, Michael, “The Status and Future of the Awakening Movements,” Arab Reform Bulletin, June 2009
Long, Austin, “The Anbar Awakening,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 4/1/08
Niqash, “anbar police chief faces council hostility,” 7/14/09
Paley, Amit, “Uncertainty After Anbar Handover,” Washington Post, 9/2/08
Raghavan, Sudarsan, “A New Breed Grabs Reins in Anbar,” Washington Post, 10/21/08
Reuters, “Emergency declared in Iraq’s Ramadi,” 7/21/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 6,” 6/6/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 29,” 6/29/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 4,” 5/4/09
Riechmann, Deb, “US military in Iraq says 3 soldiers killed,” 7/17/09
Yacoub, Sameer, “Bombs kill 11 in Iraq, highlight security fears,” Associated Press, 7/15/09
Security Incidents In Anbar April-July 2009
July 09
Attacks/Incidents: 22
Deaths: 33
Wounded: 126
June 09
Attacks/Incidents: 24
Deaths: 29
Wounded: 53+
May 09
Attacks/Incidents: 9
Deaths: 12
Wounded: 11
April 09
Attacks/Incidents: 11
Deaths: 31
Wounded: 64
As for the causes and culprits behind the attacks little is know. The favorite targets are Awakening members and local police. Al Qaeda in Iraq who usually gets blamed for almost all incidents only has a marginal presence left in a few of the province’s cities. Tribal rivalries could also be playing a role as well. The U.S. and Baghdad, because of their weaknesses and inadequacies, largely abrogated the security responsibilities in the province to the tribes, offering them money and jobs in return for their support. This led to the Awakening movement that was always a loose confederation of groups that broke apart into different factions in the 2009 elections. With Anbar turned over to Iraqi control in September 2008 the tribes now have pretty much free sway in Anbar, and their rivalries could be a cause of the violence.
Overall, the number of incidents and casualties in Anbar are still relatively low compared to the more violent areas of central and northern Iraq. At the same time it shows that the sources of attacks have changed in Iraq. Most are no longer based upon sectarian differences, the insurgency has largely been defeated, with most of its fighters having switched sides through the Sons of Iraq, and the Mahdi Army is largely dormant. Political differences and terrorism are some of the main causes of attacks today, as shown in Anbar.
SOURCES
Abdul-Zahra, Qassim and Riechmann, Deb, “Iraq PM flies to US to meet Obama, seek investment,” Associated Press, 7/20/09
Abouzeid, Rania, “US Allies Angry at Anbar Handover,” Time, 9/1/08
Agence France Presse, “Four Iraqi cops killed,” 6/25/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “2 cops wounded in armed attack in Anbar,” 6/25/09
- “2 kids killed by IED in Anbar,” 4/20/09
- “2 policemen wounded in blast in Ramadi,” 7/26/09
- “4 civilians wounded in 2nd Falluja blast,” 7/25/09
- “4 cops wounded in Falluja,” 5/27/09
- “4 cops wounded in Falluja twin blasts,” 6/22/09
- “4 Islamic party’s guards inured in Falluja,” 4/30/09
- “4 wounded in car bomb blast in Anbar,” 7/9/09
- “5 cops killed, wounded in Anbar blast,” 6/6/09
- “Attacks on the rise in Anbar amidst violence scare,” 7/18/09
- “Car bomb dismantled in Ramadi,” 7/29/09
- “Car bomb explodes near IPP HQ, 12 wounded,” 7/25/09
- “Car bomb wounds Anbar police chief,” 6/6/09
- “Civilian shot down in Falluja,” 4/6/09
- “Cop found dead in northern Ramadi, 6/15/09
- “Cop found dead in western Anbar,” 6/22/09
- “Cop killed, 3 wounded in southern Falluja,” 4/24/09
- “Emergency police chief killed by IED,” 7/27/09
- “Falluja blast casualties reaches 7,” 7/2/09
- “Gunman killed in attack on police in Falluja,” 6/8/09
- “IED attack foiled in Falluja,” 4/20/09
- “IED wounds 2 cops in Anbar,” 6/9/09
- “IED wounds 3 in Anbar,” 7/18/09
- “IED wounds 3 Sahwa fighters in Anbar,” 4/8/09
- “Intelligence officer survives assassination attempt in Falluja,” 7/2/09
- “Katyushas kill 2, wound 7 in Anbar,” 7/8/09
- “Kidnapped officer found dead in Anbar,” 4/13/09
- “Mass grave found in Anbar,” 5/26/09
- “Police commander killed by IED in Falluja,” 6/25/09
- “Police gun down man while planting bomb in Anbar,” 7/1/09
- “Policeman killed, 2 others wounded in Anbar blast,” 7/29/09
- “Qaem blast kills 4, wounds 8,” 7/30/09
- “Senior officer escapes attempt in Falluja,” 5/23/09
- “Suicide blast sets U.S. vehicle ablaze in Falluja,” 5/7/09
- “Tribal official wounded in bomb blast in Anbar,” 4/21/09
- “U.S. soldier wounded in Falluja,” 6/4/09
- “Unknown body found in Anbar,” 6/24/09
- “Urgent/Sahwa leader survives assassination attempt,” 6/24/09
- “Urgent/Toll from Falluja car bomb reaches 7,” 6/20/09
BBC, “Suicide blast hits Iraq army base,” 4/16/09
DPA, “One child killed, eight wounded in Iraq rocket attacks,” 6/20/09
Fayad, Ma’ad, “Al-Anbar Salvation Council to Run in Parliamentary Elections,” Asharq Al-Awsat, 9/21/08
Hammoudi, Laith, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Sunday 26 July 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 7/26/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 25 June 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 6/25/09
Hammoudi, Laith and Kadhim, Hussein, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 25 May 2009,” 5/25/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Saturday 6 June 2009,” 6/6/09
IANS, “Twin blast in Iraq kills nine policemen,” 4/5/09
Issa, Sahar, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Friday 17 July 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 7/17/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Sunday 5 April 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/5/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Sunday 14 June 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 6/14/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 16 July 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 7/16/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 7 April 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/7/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 23 June 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 6/23/09
Issa Sahar and Kadhim, Hussein, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 9 June 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 6/9/09
Javno, “Angry Iraqis Demand Protection From Bombings,” 6/25/09
Kami, Aseel, “Bus terminal bombing kills seven in Baghdad,” Reuters, 6/8/09
Knights, Michael, “The Status and Future of the Awakening Movements,” Arab Reform Bulletin, June 2009
Long, Austin, “The Anbar Awakening,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 4/1/08
Niqash, “anbar police chief faces council hostility,” 7/14/09
Paley, Amit, “Uncertainty After Anbar Handover,” Washington Post, 9/2/08
Raghavan, Sudarsan, “A New Breed Grabs Reins in Anbar,” Washington Post, 10/21/08
Reuters, “Emergency declared in Iraq’s Ramadi,” 7/21/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 6,” 6/6/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 29,” 6/29/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 4,” 5/4/09
Riechmann, Deb, “US military in Iraq says 3 soldiers killed,” 7/17/09
Yacoub, Sameer, “Bombs kill 11 in Iraq, highlight security fears,” Associated Press, 7/15/09
Mosul Remains As Violent As Ever
July 2009 saw a drop in deaths across Iraq, but the situation in Mosul, the third largest city in the country, stayed the same. The number of security incidents last month was exactly the same as June, with an increase in deaths and wounded. In July there were 73 incidents for an average of 2.35 per month. Those led to 79 deaths, 2.54 per day, and 169 wounded, 5.45 per day. Those compared to 73 incidents in June, 58 deaths, 1.93 per day, and 123 wounded, 4.1 per day. While not as high as October 2008, attacks and casualties from November 2008 to July 2009 have roughly stayed the same.
Attack Statistics In Mosul Based Upon Press Reports
July 2009
73 Attacks/Incidents – 2.35 attacks & incidents/day
79 Deaths – 2.54 deaths/day
169 Wounded – 5.45 wounded/day
June 2009
73 Attacks/Incidents – 2.43 attacks & incidents/day
58 Deaths – 1.93 deaths/day
123 Wounded – 4.1 wounded/day
May 2009
83 Attacks/Incidents – 3.06 attacks & incidents/day
64 Deaths – 2.06 deaths/day
164 Wounded – 4.70 wounded/day
April 2009
79 Attacks/Incidents – 2.63 attacks & incidents/day
53 Deaths – 1.76 deaths/day
191 Wounded – 6.36 wounded/day
March 2009
86 attacks/incidents – 2.77 attacks & incidents/day
69 deaths – 2.22 deaths/day
169 wounded – 5.45 wounded/day
February 2009
81 attacks/incidents – 2.89 attacks & incidents/day
58 deaths – 2.0 deaths/day
111 wounded – 3.96 wounded/day
January 2009
52 attacks/incidents – 1.67 attacks & incidents/day
56 deaths – 1.80 killed/day
85 wounded – 2.74 wounded/day
December 2008
65 attacks/incidents – 2.09 attacks & incidents/day
68 deaths – 2.19 deaths/day
181 wounded – 5.83 wounded/day
November 2008
65 attacks/incidents – 2.16 attacks & incidents/day
53 deaths – 1.76 deaths/day
249 wounded – 8.3 wounded/day
October 2008
92 attacks/incidents – 2.96 attacks & incidents/day
112 deaths – 3.61 deaths/day
188 wounded – 6.06 wounded/day
The major cause is the Arab-Kurdish divide. Immediately after the invasion the peshmerga swept into the city and began kicking out Arab families, and looting their businesses and government offices. American forces quickly put an end to that, but when the security situation deteriorated in the following years the U.S. came to rely upon the Kurdish militias more and more. During the Surge insurgents were also pushed into the city where they have been able to portray themselves as the protectors of the Arabs against the Kurds. Violence in the city is down from previous years, but has basically leveled off since the end of 2008. Several military offensives there by the U.S. and Iraqi forces since then have failed to have any real affect upon casualties. The election of the Al-Hadbaa List in the January 2009 election, far from relieving tensions in Ninewa have only increased them, meaning that violence is likely to continue in Mosul at the current rate for the foreseeable future.
SOURCES
Ahmed, Haim, “6 killed in Iraq Attacks,” Associated Press, 7/6/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “2 bombings in Mosul leave 31 casualties,” 7/8/09
- “2 children wounded in Mosul blast,” 7/29/09
- “2 civilians killed in Mosul shootings,” 7/14/09
- “2 killed, 2 wounded in bomb attack in Mosul,” 7/31/09
- “3 cops wounded by car bomb in Ninewa,” 7/16/09
- “6 Iraq soldiers wounded in Mosul blast,” 7/27/09
- “Bomb wounds 2 soldiers in Mosul,” 7/18/09
- “Car bomb in front of Shiite mosque wounds 3 kids,” 7/13/09
- “Car bomb wounds 8 in Ninewa,” 7/6/09
- “Civilian gunned down in western Mosul,” 7/6/09
- “Civilian killed in two car bomb blasts in Ninewa,” 7/24/09
- “Civilian shot down by gunman in Mosul,” 7/28/09
- “Cop gunned down in Mosul,” 7/5/09
- “Cop killed in Mosul shooting,” 7/7/09
- “Cop wounded in Mosul shooting,” 7/6/09
- “Gunman wounded while attacking patrol in Mosul,” 7/19/09
- “Gunmen blow up house in Mosul,” 7/21/09
- “Gunmen break into Pepsi factory, kill worker,” 7/26/09
- “Gunmen kill contractor in Mosul,” 7/4/09
- “Gunmen killed while planting bomb in Mosul,” 7/1/09
- “Gunmen shoot down armless man in Mosul,” 7/18/09
- “Hand grenade injures 7 in Ninewa,” 7/8/09
- “Mosul blast casualties up to 5 deaths, 52 wounded,” 7/11/09
- “Mosul car bomb wounded up to 14,” 7/5/09
- “Officer, civilian wounded in Mosul,” 7/21/09
- “Policeman killed by grenade blast in Mosul,” 7/5/09
- “Policeman killed in IED blast in Mosul,” 7/10/09
- “Policeman wounded in Mosul blast,” 7/16/09
- “Sticky bomb kills chieftain in Ninewa,” 7/27/09
- “Sticky IED kills servicemen in Mosul,” 7/13/09
- “Turkmen council chief wounded in Mosul blast,” 7/30/09
- “Woman wounded by roadside bomb in Mosul,” 7/8/09
Badkhen, Anna, “Kurds evicting Arabs in north Iraq,” San Francisco Chronicle, 4/19/03
Dagher, Sam, “Fractures in Iraq City as Kurds and Baghdad Vie,” New York Times, 10/28/08
DPA, “At least 30 killed, 37 injured in Baghdad attacks – update,” 7/31/09
Al Dulaimy, Mohammed, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Monday 20 July 2009,” 7/20/09
Al Dulaimy, Mohammed, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Monday 27 July 2009,” 7/27/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Tuesday 14 July 2009,” 7/14/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Tuesday 21 July 2009,” 7/21/09
Hammoudi, Laith, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 6 July 2009,” 7/6/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 29 July 2009,” 7/29/09
Issa, Sahar, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 8 July, 2009,” 7/8/09
Myers, Steven Lee and Robertson, Campbell, “Insurgency Remains Tenacious In North Iraq,” New York Times, 7/10/09
Reuters, “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 2,” 7/2/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 3,” 7/3/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 8,” 7/8/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 17,” 7/17/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 20,” 7/20/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 30,” 7/30/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 31,” 7/31/09
Xinhua, “10 wounded in bomb attacks in N Iraq,” 7/5/09
- “Four policemen, gunman killed in N Iraq,” 7/7/09
Attack Statistics In Mosul Based Upon Press Reports
July 2009
73 Attacks/Incidents – 2.35 attacks & incidents/day
79 Deaths – 2.54 deaths/day
169 Wounded – 5.45 wounded/day
June 2009
73 Attacks/Incidents – 2.43 attacks & incidents/day
58 Deaths – 1.93 deaths/day
123 Wounded – 4.1 wounded/day
May 2009
83 Attacks/Incidents – 3.06 attacks & incidents/day
64 Deaths – 2.06 deaths/day
164 Wounded – 4.70 wounded/day
April 2009
79 Attacks/Incidents – 2.63 attacks & incidents/day
53 Deaths – 1.76 deaths/day
191 Wounded – 6.36 wounded/day
March 2009
86 attacks/incidents – 2.77 attacks & incidents/day
69 deaths – 2.22 deaths/day
169 wounded – 5.45 wounded/day
February 2009
81 attacks/incidents – 2.89 attacks & incidents/day
58 deaths – 2.0 deaths/day
111 wounded – 3.96 wounded/day
January 2009
52 attacks/incidents – 1.67 attacks & incidents/day
56 deaths – 1.80 killed/day
85 wounded – 2.74 wounded/day
December 2008
65 attacks/incidents – 2.09 attacks & incidents/day
68 deaths – 2.19 deaths/day
181 wounded – 5.83 wounded/day
November 2008
65 attacks/incidents – 2.16 attacks & incidents/day
53 deaths – 1.76 deaths/day
249 wounded – 8.3 wounded/day
October 2008
92 attacks/incidents – 2.96 attacks & incidents/day
112 deaths – 3.61 deaths/day
188 wounded – 6.06 wounded/day
The major cause is the Arab-Kurdish divide. Immediately after the invasion the peshmerga swept into the city and began kicking out Arab families, and looting their businesses and government offices. American forces quickly put an end to that, but when the security situation deteriorated in the following years the U.S. came to rely upon the Kurdish militias more and more. During the Surge insurgents were also pushed into the city where they have been able to portray themselves as the protectors of the Arabs against the Kurds. Violence in the city is down from previous years, but has basically leveled off since the end of 2008. Several military offensives there by the U.S. and Iraqi forces since then have failed to have any real affect upon casualties. The election of the Al-Hadbaa List in the January 2009 election, far from relieving tensions in Ninewa have only increased them, meaning that violence is likely to continue in Mosul at the current rate for the foreseeable future.
SOURCES
Ahmed, Haim, “6 killed in Iraq Attacks,” Associated Press, 7/6/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “2 bombings in Mosul leave 31 casualties,” 7/8/09
- “2 children wounded in Mosul blast,” 7/29/09
- “2 civilians killed in Mosul shootings,” 7/14/09
- “2 killed, 2 wounded in bomb attack in Mosul,” 7/31/09
- “3 cops wounded by car bomb in Ninewa,” 7/16/09
- “6 Iraq soldiers wounded in Mosul blast,” 7/27/09
- “Bomb wounds 2 soldiers in Mosul,” 7/18/09
- “Car bomb in front of Shiite mosque wounds 3 kids,” 7/13/09
- “Car bomb wounds 8 in Ninewa,” 7/6/09
- “Civilian gunned down in western Mosul,” 7/6/09
- “Civilian killed in two car bomb blasts in Ninewa,” 7/24/09
- “Civilian shot down by gunman in Mosul,” 7/28/09
- “Cop gunned down in Mosul,” 7/5/09
- “Cop killed in Mosul shooting,” 7/7/09
- “Cop wounded in Mosul shooting,” 7/6/09
- “Gunman wounded while attacking patrol in Mosul,” 7/19/09
- “Gunmen blow up house in Mosul,” 7/21/09
- “Gunmen break into Pepsi factory, kill worker,” 7/26/09
- “Gunmen kill contractor in Mosul,” 7/4/09
- “Gunmen killed while planting bomb in Mosul,” 7/1/09
- “Gunmen shoot down armless man in Mosul,” 7/18/09
- “Hand grenade injures 7 in Ninewa,” 7/8/09
- “Mosul blast casualties up to 5 deaths, 52 wounded,” 7/11/09
- “Mosul car bomb wounded up to 14,” 7/5/09
- “Officer, civilian wounded in Mosul,” 7/21/09
- “Policeman killed by grenade blast in Mosul,” 7/5/09
- “Policeman killed in IED blast in Mosul,” 7/10/09
- “Policeman wounded in Mosul blast,” 7/16/09
- “Sticky bomb kills chieftain in Ninewa,” 7/27/09
- “Sticky IED kills servicemen in Mosul,” 7/13/09
- “Turkmen council chief wounded in Mosul blast,” 7/30/09
- “Woman wounded by roadside bomb in Mosul,” 7/8/09
Badkhen, Anna, “Kurds evicting Arabs in north Iraq,” San Francisco Chronicle, 4/19/03
Dagher, Sam, “Fractures in Iraq City as Kurds and Baghdad Vie,” New York Times, 10/28/08
DPA, “At least 30 killed, 37 injured in Baghdad attacks – update,” 7/31/09
Al Dulaimy, Mohammed, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Monday 20 July 2009,” 7/20/09
Al Dulaimy, Mohammed, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Monday 27 July 2009,” 7/27/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Tuesday 14 July 2009,” 7/14/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Tuesday 21 July 2009,” 7/21/09
Hammoudi, Laith, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 6 July 2009,” 7/6/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 29 July 2009,” 7/29/09
Issa, Sahar, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 8 July, 2009,” 7/8/09
Myers, Steven Lee and Robertson, Campbell, “Insurgency Remains Tenacious In North Iraq,” New York Times, 7/10/09
Reuters, “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 2,” 7/2/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 3,” 7/3/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 8,” 7/8/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 17,” 7/17/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 20,” 7/20/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 30,” 7/30/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 31,” 7/31/09
Xinhua, “10 wounded in bomb attacks in N Iraq,” 7/5/09
- “Four policemen, gunman killed in N Iraq,” 7/7/09
Sunday, August 09, 2009
A Look At Violence In Iraq In July 2009
All the major sources on Iraq noted a drop in deaths for the month of July 2009. This is despite a high number of mass casualty bombings. The pattern being set in 2009 is one month of high casualties, followed by a drop, and then an increase.
All four organizations that have up-to-date statistics on deaths in Iraq recorded a drop in July compared to June 2009. That ranged from 420 by Iraq Body Count, the group with historically the highest numbers, to 308 of the Associated Press, which keeps its own independent count, to 275 by Iraq's ministries, to the 240 of icasualties.org, who states that the actual numbers are higher than their figures. Despite the differences, all these groups follow the same trends, and all witnessed drops from June. All but Iraq Body Count recorded a July amount below or at the average number of deaths over the first six months of 2009 set by each organization. The Associated Press for example counted 447 deaths in June and an average of 317.5 deaths from January to June of 2009.
Iraqi Deaths
Iraq Body Count | icasualties. Org | Brookings Iraq Index | Iraqi Ministries | Associated Press | |
July 08 | 584 | 419 | 500 | 851 | N/A |
Aug. 08 | 592 | 311 | 450 | N/A | 475 |
Sep. 08 | 535 | 366 | 400 | 440 | 503 |
Oct. 08 | 528 | 288 | 350 | 317 | N/A |
Nov. 08 | 473 | 317 | 270 | 340 | N/A |
Dec. 08 | 522 | 320 | 350 | 316 | N/A |
Jan. 09 | 276 | 187 | 270 | 191 | 242 |
Feb. 09 | 343 | 202 | 230 | 258 | 288 |
March 09 | 416 | 278 | 260 | 252 | 335 |
April 09 | 484 | 347 | 340 | 355 | 371 |
May 09 | 332 | 188 | N/A | 165 | 225 |
June 09 | 516 | 367 | N/A | 437 | 447 |
July 09 | 410 | 240 | N/A | 275 | 308 |
Last 6 months of 2008 Average | 539.0 | 336.8 | 386.6 | 452.8 5 of 6 months | N/A |
First 6 months of 2009 Average | 393.3 | 261.0 | 275.0 1st 4 months | 276.5 | 317.5 |
The drop in deaths in July happened despite a large increase in mass casualty bombings, those that cause ten or more dead and/or wounded. June, which had the highest body count in 2009 so far, had fourteen mass casualty bombings, resulting in 174 dead and 517 wounded. July more than doubled that amount with 35 bombings that had almost the same amount of deaths, 180, but a large increase in wounded, 655. McClatchy Newspapers recorded a similar surge in wounded as well, despite the drop in deaths. They found nearly 700 people wounded in July by bombs compared to approximately 400 in June.
Number of Bombings and Casualty Statistics – April to July 2009
April 2009
Bombings: 21
Deaths: 198 + 32 Iranians
Wounded: 497 + 105 Iranians + 10 Americans
May 2009
Bombings: 9
Deaths: 111
Wounded: 262
June 2009
Bombings: 14
Deaths: 174
Wounded: 517
July 2009
Bombings: 35
Deaths: 180
Wounded: 655
Overall, the latest quarterly report by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) notes that there has only been a slight increase in the number of security incidents in Iraq from the first quarter of 2009 to the second. From January 1 to March 20 there were 969 attacks for an average of 323.0 per month. That compared to 1,587 attacks from April 1 to July 21 for an average of 396.7. As Anthony Cordesman from the Center for Strategic and International Studies has pointed out however, there is no direct correlation between the number of attacks and casualties. In October 2008 for example there were 160 security incidents in Baghdad, compared to 159 in November. That month saw 208 deaths and 621 wounded compared to 183 deaths and 419 wounded in October despite having one more attack. One or two mass casualty bombings only slightly changes the number of incidents, yet can have a dramatic affect upon the amount of dead and wounded.
There are four important observations to be made from the latest statistics. First, the number of mass casualty bombings a month may not be as good an indicator of the overall deaths in Iraq as previously argued here. Second, the ebb and flow of casualties since the beginning of 2009 shows that the insurgents and militias are only able to kill large numbers of casualties for one month, and then they need to regroup for the next, until they can do it again the following month. That trend is only seen in the death numbers, not the amount of attacks, which is little changed so far. Third, that doesn't mean they still aren't capable of inflicting large casualty numbers as the figures on the wounded show. Finally, July was the first month after the U.S. withdrawal from the cities. With the insurgents and militias reduce to terrorist bombings, assassinations, drive-by shootings, and the odd mortar or rocket attack, it appears that the Iraqi security forces are finally able to take the lead as the U.S. has been calling for years now. That doesn't mean that they are not still dependent upon the United States for supply, maintenance, parts, intelligence, and training or that if some large conflagration were to occur they would not ask for American aid, but it does highlight the fact that they can maintain the day to day security needs of the country at this point in time. It also shows that even with this new capability Iraq continues to be a very violent place, which is likely to continue into the foreseeable future.
SOURCES
Abdul-Kadir, Saad, "18 hurt by Baghdad bomb targeting Shiite pilgrims," Associated Press, 7/16/09
Abdul-Zahara, Qassim, "Bomb kills 7 in Baqouba, Iraq police say," 7/30/09
Abdul-Zahara, Qassim and Reichmann, Deb, "Iraqis restrict US operations in Baghdad," Associated Press, 7/20/09
Agence France Presse, "Eight killed in Iraq bomb attacks," 7/21/09
Associated Press, "Four killed in Iraq bombing," 7/12/09
- "Iraq: Key figures since the war began," 8/1/09
Aswat al-Iraq, "2 bombings in Mosul leave 31 casualties," 7/8/09
- "2nd UPDATE/Casualties of Baghdad's 5 mosques bombings up to 90," 7/31/09
- "Car bomb explodes near IPP HQ, 12 wounded," 7/25/09
- "IED kills, wounds 13 in Baghdad," 7/4/09
- "Kirkuk car bomb explosion casualties reach 11," 7/3/09
- "Kirkuk car bomb leaves 2 killed, 15 wounded," 7/31/09
- "Mosul blast casualties up to 5 deaths, 52 wounded," 7/11/09
- "Mosul car bomb wounded up to 14," 7/5/09
- "Motorbike bomb kills, wounds 13 in Baghdad," 7/28/09
- "Qaem blast kills 4, wounds 8," 7/30/09
- "URGENT/9 killed, 32 wounded in 2 Baghdad blasts," 7/9/09
Cordesman, Anthony, "Iraq: USCENTCOM and Iraqi Government Estimates of the Trends in the Patterns in Violence and Casualties," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 5/1/09
Dagher, Sam, "Suicide Bomber Kills 6 in Iraqi City," New York Times, 7/15/09
Al Dulaimy, Mohammed, "Iraqis fear latest bombings signal return of al Qaeda in Iraq," McClatchy Newspapers, 7/31/09
Faraj, Salam, "Iraq death toll drops after US handover," Agence France Presse, 8/1/09
Hammoudi, Laith, "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Sunday 26 July 2009," McClatchy Newspapers, 7/26/09
Icasualties.org
Iraq Body Count
Issa, Sahar, "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 8 July, 2009," 7/8/09
Karim, Ammar, "Fourteen killed in Iraq bomb attacks," 7/21/09
Myers, Steven Lee and Robertson, Campbell, "Insurgency Remains Tenacious In North Iraq," New York Times, 7/9/09
O'Hanlon, Michael Campbell, Jason, "Iraq Index," 7/9/09
Quinn, Patrick, "Bombings kill at least 3 in Baghdad area," Associated Press, 7/2/09
Reuters, "Emergency declared in Iraq's Ramadi," 7/21/09
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 2," 7/2/09
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 8," 7/8/09
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, "Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress," 7/30/09
Yacoub, Sameer, "Bombs kill 11 in Iraq," Associated Press, 7/15/09
Xinhua, "Civilian killed by car bomb in Baghdad," 7/21/09
- "Roadside bomb kills 5 in Baghdad," 7/16/09
Saturday, August 08, 2009
Iraqis Unwilling To Accept Projects Big And Small From the U.S.
Iraq has been the largest reconstruction project ever attempted by the United Sates. When the Coalition Provisional Authority took over administration of Iraq in April 2003 it was focused upon completely transforming the country through large, multi-million dollar reconstruction projects. Many of these were started without regard to security, cost, oversight, or the needs of Iraqis. By the time of the Surge in 2007 the emphasis was changing to providing money directly to Iraqis at the community level to produce smaller, more local projects. This was facilitated through the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), which was ready cash and loans that U.S. officers could distribute upon their own discretion. Recent reports show that this strategy may have run into some of the same problems as the CPA’s policy.
The Commander’s Fund has received $3.63 billion since its inception in 2004, of which $2.58 billion has actually been spent. The most notable project funded under the CERP was the Sons of Iraq. It has also paid for schools, mini-grants to Iraqi businessmen, and compensation to Iraqis that suffered losses at the hands of U.S. forces.
Recent reports by the Washington Post and the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) have noted that some of these projects have been misused or not been taken over by the Iraqis. The U.S. military paid for a performance hall in Sadr City for example, which cost hundreds of thousands of dollars, but has not been used once since its completion. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) just conducted an audit of a $4.2 million CERP project to build a hotel in Baghdad that when finished was looted by Iraqis. The U.S. eventually had to hire a contractor to run it because they were afraid that Sadrists in the Ministry of Transportation, which had control of the business, would shut down the hotel and strip it bare.
Similar problems have occurred with larger, more expensive, non-CERP U.S.-funded schemes. A January 2009 audit by SIGIR on reconstruction efforts on Iraq’s southern oil and gas industry found that Iraqis were unwilling or incapable of taking over and maintaining many of the projects completed by the U.S. there, which cost $1.2 billion. There are other stories of entire power plants sitting idle because the Iraqis could not operate them properly.
All of these reports highlight a major dilemma facing the United States. American officials and soldiers have initiated thousands of projects since 2003 with the best of intentions, but have always had problems coordinating with Iraqis and figuring out their needs. The result has been huge amounts of waste. That’s not to say that there aren’t successful reconstruction works finished in Iraq, but that the fact that millions of dollars worth of equipment and facilities are sitting idle and unused undermines the entire effort. This is one reason why the Inspector General believes that the U.S. has failed to rebuild Iraq despite committing $52.27 billion.
SOURCES
Londono, Ernesto, “U.S. ‘Money Weapon’ Yields Mixed Results,” Washington Post, 7/27/09
Ryan, Missy and Qusay, Aws, “Iraqis Measure Progress with Flip of Switch,” Reuters, 11/14/08
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Cost, Outcome, and Oversight of Iraq Oil Reconstruction Contract with Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc.,” 1/13/09
- “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09
- “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 7/30/09
- “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 4/30/09
The Commander’s Fund has received $3.63 billion since its inception in 2004, of which $2.58 billion has actually been spent. The most notable project funded under the CERP was the Sons of Iraq. It has also paid for schools, mini-grants to Iraqi businessmen, and compensation to Iraqis that suffered losses at the hands of U.S. forces.
Recent reports by the Washington Post and the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) have noted that some of these projects have been misused or not been taken over by the Iraqis. The U.S. military paid for a performance hall in Sadr City for example, which cost hundreds of thousands of dollars, but has not been used once since its completion. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) just conducted an audit of a $4.2 million CERP project to build a hotel in Baghdad that when finished was looted by Iraqis. The U.S. eventually had to hire a contractor to run it because they were afraid that Sadrists in the Ministry of Transportation, which had control of the business, would shut down the hotel and strip it bare.
Similar problems have occurred with larger, more expensive, non-CERP U.S.-funded schemes. A January 2009 audit by SIGIR on reconstruction efforts on Iraq’s southern oil and gas industry found that Iraqis were unwilling or incapable of taking over and maintaining many of the projects completed by the U.S. there, which cost $1.2 billion. There are other stories of entire power plants sitting idle because the Iraqis could not operate them properly.
All of these reports highlight a major dilemma facing the United States. American officials and soldiers have initiated thousands of projects since 2003 with the best of intentions, but have always had problems coordinating with Iraqis and figuring out their needs. The result has been huge amounts of waste. That’s not to say that there aren’t successful reconstruction works finished in Iraq, but that the fact that millions of dollars worth of equipment and facilities are sitting idle and unused undermines the entire effort. This is one reason why the Inspector General believes that the U.S. has failed to rebuild Iraq despite committing $52.27 billion.
SOURCES
Londono, Ernesto, “U.S. ‘Money Weapon’ Yields Mixed Results,” Washington Post, 7/27/09
Ryan, Missy and Qusay, Aws, “Iraqis Measure Progress with Flip of Switch,” Reuters, 11/14/08
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Cost, Outcome, and Oversight of Iraq Oil Reconstruction Contract with Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc.,” 1/13/09
- “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09
- “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 7/30/09
- “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 4/30/09
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