It’s been reported here several times before that Iraq has been pursuing its oil plans in a haphazard way. Baghdad’s latest moves are more proof of that. The government is now pursuing a dual track strategy that looks to be contradictory. On the one hand, the Oil Ministry has put up oil and gas fields for bidding by international oil companies. On the other hand, the government is offering contracts to Iraqi and foreign companies to begin service work and exploration on those same fields. The goal is to boost immediate production to make up for the declining price of oil, while setting up long-term development deals with multi-nationals. The plan seems contradictory as it would have companies begin to work on fields now that are up for bid by others.
Iraq is almost completely dependent upon oil to garner revenues. As noted before, the drop in oil prices has forced Iraq to cut its budget several times, and is still expected to run a large deficit. To try to make up for this gap the Oil Minister Hussain Shahristani is signing a number of service contracts to try to boost short-term production. In March 2009 the Oil Ministry signed a $250 million deal with a state-run engineering company to repair gas units at the Rumaila fields in the south. That followed a series of contracts signed in February. One was a $90 million joint venture formed between the Oil Ministry and the Mesopotamia Petroleum Company to drill 60 new wells per year in the south. The first explorations are to begin in Bazargan, Fakka, and Halfaya in a few months. Ramco Energy also signed a $400 million joint venture for drilling. They will first work with the state-owned oil companies, and then help the international firms that sign long-term production deals. The Korea National Oil Corporation signed a non-binding $3.55 billion contract to work on Qush Tappa, Sangaw, and six other fields in the south. British owned Foster Wheeler Energy Limited won a contract from the South Oil Company to work on offshore oil facilities in Basra.
The hope is that these moves will boost production by 500,000 barrels a day within two years. Before, Shahristani said that the Ministry was aiming for a 300,000-350,000 increase in two years. The Oil Ministry is also calling for the creation of an Iraqi National Oil Company and a Supreme Petroleum Council to coordinate these efforts. The National Oil Company will oversee oil work, while the Supreme Petroleum Council will be tasked with working out development strategy.
The problem is that Iraq is also courting major international oil companies to work on these same fields at the same time. On December 31, 2008 the first round of bidding on oil and gas fields began, followed by a second round in January 2009. These are 20 year, service agreements. The Oil Ministry is telling the corporations that they are expected to start work within six months of completing their contracts, which they hope to complete by June.
Trying to negotiation these deals couldn’t have come at a worse time. In 2008 when oil prices were high Iraq had the upper hand when dealing with the international oil companies. Now that prices have dropped the corporations know that countries like Iraq are desperate for funds and can drive harder deals to their advantage.
The Oil Ministry has already begun making concessions. In early February Shahristani traveled to Istanbul, Turkey to meet with 32 companies to try to work out details on the contracts. Originally Iraq was offering joint ventures where a state-run oil company would own 51% and the foreign firms 49%. Now the Ministry has said the corporations can have 75% of the joint ventures. Iraq has also lowered the production targets the companies have to meet before they start getting paid. Since oil firms are still unsure of the risks involved in investing, Iraq is likely to make more compromises in the future.
There are a number of issues that stand in the way of Iraq signing these long-term contracts. The largest impediment is the fact that Iraq’s parliament has not passed a new hydrocarbon law that has been stalled for years. Companies are afraid that their terms might change after the legislation is passed. An energy analyst writing for UPI doubted that Iraq would be successful in this dual track policy because it lacks qualified personnel. Since the U.S. invasion Iraq has had a massive brain drain, costing it much of its human capital. An official from Ramco Energy said many companies still do not want to do business in Iraq because they have not paid some companies for their work. The government bureaucracy is another major problem. Every little step needs to be okayed by higher ups that greatly delays any work. The Oil Ministry has also made arbitrary changes to deals. In September 2008 for example, Shell signed a joint venture with the South Gas Company to exploit Basra’s natural gas. Then in February Mitsubishi was added. Both of these were no-bid contracts, and Iraq’s parliament complained about the original Shell one because there was no transparency in the negotiations. The Middle East Economic Survey has criticized the Oil Ministry over these deals saying that they have not done a good job on them. The exact terms are unclear, they are too complicated, and the Iraqis are slow. Finally, in December 2008 the International Monetary Fund also said the government wasn’t doing enough to fight corruption in the oil sector.
Can Iraq balance all of its plans? It’s not clear whether the long-term oil deals will be completed by June 2009. Some of the short-term contracts already signed seem complimentary to that larger effort, while others do not. Iraq has vast oil and gas resources that have been underdeveloped because of wars and international sanctions. The recent dramatic drop in petroleum prices are putting tremendous pressure upon the Oil Ministry to increase output to fund the government, which is almost completely dependent upon oil. Since 2003 the Ministry has largely failed to meet its goals, which has forced it to reverse course and make dramatic changes in its strategy before. This latest effort seems to fit that pattern. This time Oil Minister Shahristani may be jeopardizing major oil exploration and development for immediate production increases.
SOURCES
Ciszuk, Samuel, “Government hopes two-pronged oil strategy will not discourage IOC investment in Iraq,” UPI, 3/5/09
Cockerill, Rob, “New offshore oil export facilities in Iraq,” Gas World.com, 2/23/09
Hoyos, Carola, “Iraq eases terms for oil projects,” Financial Times, 2/26/09
IraqDirectory.com, “Iraq is urging the oil companies to start working in oil fields to cancel their agreements,” 2/16/09
Kamal, Fatima, “Ministry relies on state-run engineering firm to boost oil exports,” Azzaman, 3/12/09
Koo, Hejin and Kang, Shinhye, Kang, “South Korea Signs $3.55 Billion Iraq Oil Field Accord,” Bloomberg, 2/24/09
Lando, Ben, “Iraqi oil meetings to start crucial, difficult year as ministry faces variety of critics,” UPI, 2/10/09
Mackey, Peg, “Iraq to rely on own technicians to reverse output decline,” Reuters, 2/24/09
Pagnamenta, Robin, “Shell among contenders to develop big Iraqi oilfields,” Times of London, 1/3/09
Rasheed, Ahmed, “UPDATE 4-UK firm gets 1st of possibly many Iraq well deals,” Reuters, 2/26/09
Reuters, “Hungry For Money, Iraq Seeks To Boost Oil Sales,” 3/1/09
- “Iraq’s Legal and Security Risks Still Frighten Firms,” 2/13/09
Salaheddin, Sinan, “Iraq to offer 10 fields in 2nd oil licensing round,” Associated Pres, 12/30/08
- “Iraqi official: Mitsubishi to join Iraq gas deal,” Associated Press, 2/12/09
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09
Webb, Simon, “Iraq Proposes to Improve Terms for Big Oil Deals,” Rigzone, 2/13/09
Webb, Tim, “Scotland’s Ramco Energy agrees joint Iraqi oil venture,” Guardian, 2/26/09
Saturday, March 21, 2009
Friday, March 20, 2009
Iran’s Policy Towards Iraq
In the winter 2008 addition of the Middle East Policy Council Journal, Iranian academic Kayhan Barzegar published an article entitled, “Iran’s Foreign Policy in Post-invasion Iraq.” It was a refutation of many common ideas about Tehran’s stance towards Iraq held by Americans and westerners. Barzegar is a professor of international relations at Azad University in Tehran, who is currently at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. Barzegar argues that rather than being offensive and ideological in nature, Iran’s Iraq policy is historically based upon long-standing ideas about Iranian-Arab relations, defensive in response to the new American military presence, and pragmatic, taking advantage of new opportunities that have evolved since the overthrow of Saddam.
Iran’s Worldview
Iran’s worldview has a major impact on its policy towards Iraq. Iran has a long history of conflict and rivalry with the Arab world. Iranian nationalism also says that Iranians are different from Arabs. Together this has led to a common belief that Arabs will always oppose Iran. The period of Saddam’s rule only re-enforced this belief. At the same time pan-Islamic ideas exist that say Iran needs to be involved in the Islamic world. For the decade after the Iranian Revolution this meant trying to spread the ideals of Ayatollah Khomeini, but since the 1990s, Tehran has been trying to reach out to Arab countries in a friendlier manner. Both of these factors have led the Iranian leadership to want to increase ties with the new Iraqi government so that they don’t develop into a rival again, and ensure Iran’s place in the region.
Iran’s Immediate Concerns In Iraq
Iran also has several immediate concerns in Iraq that shape policy. These include security, the history of the Iran-Iraq War, cultural ties, and economics. All of these together lead to a pragmatic approach to Iraq to make sure that there will not be conflict between the two again, that there can be a free flow of people across the border, and an increase in business opportunities.
The first is security. Iran wants to ensure the unity of Iraq, which is divided between Kurds, Sunnis, and Shiites. A break-up of Iraq could destabilize Iran. Iran and Iraq have also been historical rivals, and many Iranians believe that it could return to this role in the future. There is therefore an urge to improve ties between the two so that this won’t happen anytime soon. The Iranian opposition group Mujahadeen e-Khalq is also based in Iraq, which Tehran wants to keep in check.
Second are the lingering affects of the Iran-Iraq War. Many Iranians want to make sure that they did not fight the war for nothing. This has led to popular support for good relations so that another war might be prevented. According to the United Nations Iraq also owes Iran $149 billion in reparations. This has not been brought up by Iran lately, but it is a domestic issue. There are on-going disputes about the border between the two countries as well. Either or both issues could lead to conflicts in the future.
Third, is the desire amongst many Iranians to have good cultural relations with Iraq. This is tied up with access to the Shiite shrines in Karbala and Najaf in Iraq. Thousands of Iranians cross the border every month to go to these holy sites. Large numbers of Iraqis also go to Iran to visit Mashhad and Qom. Having open borders is important so that people can access to these areas.
Fourth Iran sees tremendous potential for economic gain in Iraq. Before the U.S. invasion most of Iran’s trade was through Jordan, Turkey and Russia. Now that Saddam is gone Iran has increased trade, tourism, and energy connections with Iraq. In February 2009 for example, the two countries signed a number of Memorandums of Understanding on industry, electricity, trade, and housing. They have also signed a deal to develop joint border oil fields. Every month similar announcements are made as the economic connections between the two are increasing.
Conflict With The U.S.
Just as important for Iran’s policy in Iraq is its conflict with the United States. For the last several decades, security in the Middle East has been largely defined by outside powers. From the 1970s on the U.S. tried to play Iran off of Iraq. The 2003 invasion disrupted this balance of power, and the U.S. has been attempting to rebuild it ever since. Iran has been adamantly opposed to re-creating this system, preferring a friendly Iraq rather than a new enemy. This conflict over ideas about security is at the heart of the dispute between Iran and the U.S.
This has led Iran to see the U.S. moves in Iraq as a threat. Initially, Tehran was afraid of the Bush administration’s talk of pre-emptive strikes and regime change. Having permanent American bases in Iraq was another major concern. The U.S. then began to blame Iran for instability in Iraq. The U.S. also portrayed itself as the arbitrator between the various factions in Iraq, which Iranians perceived as an invitation for a long-term presence. Finally, the U.S. has been emphasizing that if it leaves Iraq pre-maturely Iran will fill the vacuum and change the balance of the Middle East. This has led the U.S. to pressure neighboring Arab countries to improve ties with Iraq to counter Iran. Since Iraq is now Iran’s number one foreign concern, it can’t live with an American position that is attempting to turn Baghdad against Tehran. It has thus rejected cooperation with the U.S. because they have diametrically opposed visions. This has meant Iranian policy is as much defensive as pragmatic.
Ties With Iraq’s Shiite Factions
To ensure their interests, Iran has tried to establish friendly ties with all three major Shiite factions in Iraq, the Islamic Dawa party, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), and the Sadrists. Tehran’s main emphasis is upon relations with the government and the ruling parties. The Dawa and SIIC have long standing connections with Iran as many members lived in exile in Iran for years during the Saddam era. A lot of Shiites in the government also feel that they need Iranian support for now because the neighboring Sunni governments were none too friendly to Shiites taking power. It also allows for a counterweight to American influence.
Tehran also has ties with the Sadrists, but Barzegar believes this has been mostly tactical and short term to oppose the U.S. presence. The Sadrists are nationalists that have never expressed any desire for strategic relations with Iran. As the recent report by the Combating Terrorism Center revealed, many Sadrists saw aid from Iran as a marriage of convenience as well to gain weapons and money. The reason why the two cooperated was their mutual animosity at the American troop presence. The chances for long-term ties are therefore limited. In Basra for example, Iran supported various militia groups, but when the government launched its offensive against them in March 2008, Tehran stepped in to moderate the cease-fire rather than perpetuate the fighting because ties with Baghdad were more important than the Shiite gunmen. Iran will probably continue to work with factions that work with them such as the Special Groups, but it is not as important as Iran’s other concerns in Iraq.
Stance Towards Iraq’s Other Factions
Iran also has a policy towards Iraq’s nationalist, Sunni, and Kurdish parties. Tehran is not friendly with former Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi. He is a former Baathist that would probably attempt stronger ties with Sunni countries. Tehran also believes that many Sunnis are still deeply anti-Iranian and want to make sure they do not create another Iran-Iraq rivalry. The Kurds have had friendly relations with Iran, but it is worried about Kurdish independence. Any Kurdish state could be pro-Israel and pro-American, which would be a strategic threat to Iran. Tehran has thus tried to balance the Sunni and Kurdish parties in the government with the Shiites.
Refuting American Views of Iran’s Policy
One of Barzegar’s major arguments is that Americans and westerners have misinterpreted Tehran’s policy in Iraq. Many believe that Iran is driven by ideology and is following an offensive program in Iraq. Supporters of this view point to Iran’s ties with the Sadrists. There has also been much written about emerging Shiite power with Iran in its lead. While its true that Iran’s ideals do play a role in its foreign policy, and that for a decade after the overthrow of the Shah Iran tried to promote its revolution in the region, Barzegar believes that Iran has become much more strategic and opportunistic in the last few years. The ability to form an ideological alliance with Iraq’s Shiites for example is unlikely as the SIIC, Dawa, and the Sadrists all have different views of Iraq’s future and their relationship with Iran.
Conclusion
Overall, Iran wants to confront the American presence in Iraq, while taking advantage of the opportunities presented by the post-Saddam environment. Rather than being driven by ideology, Iraq’s worldview, and immediate cultural, political, and economic concerns according to Barzegar are driving Iran’s policy. They want friendly relations with Baghdad to prevent another rivalry, the free flow of people across the Iran-Iraq border, to increase business ties, see the U.S. leave, and stop their plans of creating an anti-Iranian Iraq. Tehran has largely been successful in all of these endeavors. For example, the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) signed between the U.S. and Iraq includes a withdrawal date for U.S. troops, and a promise not to use Iraq as a base to attack its neighbors, two clauses that were supported by Iran. In the January 2009 provincial elections many American analysts said that Tehran was a loser because their allies the SIIC lost, but Maliki still wants a unified Iraq and friendly relations with Iran. Those both fit Iran’s strategic goals. The point being that both Barzegar and the Combating Terrorism Center report argue that Iran is not attached to any individual, Sadr, or party, the SIIC, but rather wants influence within the government no matter who is at the helm. If Barzegar is right, then the question now is if the new Obama administration can accept an Iraqi government that is both friendly with the U.S. and Iran, and find some common ground with Tehran. If not, Iran will continue to oppose the Americans in Iraq, and reject cooperation.
SOURCES
Aswat al-Iraq, “Iraq, Iran sign MoUs in different spheres,” 2/28/09
Barzegar, Kayhan, “Iran’s Foreign Policy in Post-invasion Iraq,” Middle East Policy Council Journal, Winter 2008
Eggen, Dan and DeYoung, Karen, “Senior Iraqi Leader Says Pact With U.S. Is Unlikely to Pass,” Washington Post, 10/30/08
Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08
Hiltermann, Joost, “Iraq’s elections: winners, losers, and what’s next,” Global Democracy, 2/10/09
Peterson, Scott, “At Iraqi border outpost, signs of improving ties with Iran,” Christian Science Monitor, 12/22/08
Reuters, “Iraq says still at odds with Iran over border,” 3/9/09
Tehran Times, “Iran, Iraq ink energy cooperation deal,” 2/21/09
Zelikow, Philip, “The new strategic situation in Iraq,” Foreign Policy Online, 2/9/09
Iran’s Worldview
Iran’s worldview has a major impact on its policy towards Iraq. Iran has a long history of conflict and rivalry with the Arab world. Iranian nationalism also says that Iranians are different from Arabs. Together this has led to a common belief that Arabs will always oppose Iran. The period of Saddam’s rule only re-enforced this belief. At the same time pan-Islamic ideas exist that say Iran needs to be involved in the Islamic world. For the decade after the Iranian Revolution this meant trying to spread the ideals of Ayatollah Khomeini, but since the 1990s, Tehran has been trying to reach out to Arab countries in a friendlier manner. Both of these factors have led the Iranian leadership to want to increase ties with the new Iraqi government so that they don’t develop into a rival again, and ensure Iran’s place in the region.
Iran’s Immediate Concerns In Iraq
Iran also has several immediate concerns in Iraq that shape policy. These include security, the history of the Iran-Iraq War, cultural ties, and economics. All of these together lead to a pragmatic approach to Iraq to make sure that there will not be conflict between the two again, that there can be a free flow of people across the border, and an increase in business opportunities.
The first is security. Iran wants to ensure the unity of Iraq, which is divided between Kurds, Sunnis, and Shiites. A break-up of Iraq could destabilize Iran. Iran and Iraq have also been historical rivals, and many Iranians believe that it could return to this role in the future. There is therefore an urge to improve ties between the two so that this won’t happen anytime soon. The Iranian opposition group Mujahadeen e-Khalq is also based in Iraq, which Tehran wants to keep in check.
Second are the lingering affects of the Iran-Iraq War. Many Iranians want to make sure that they did not fight the war for nothing. This has led to popular support for good relations so that another war might be prevented. According to the United Nations Iraq also owes Iran $149 billion in reparations. This has not been brought up by Iran lately, but it is a domestic issue. There are on-going disputes about the border between the two countries as well. Either or both issues could lead to conflicts in the future.
Third, is the desire amongst many Iranians to have good cultural relations with Iraq. This is tied up with access to the Shiite shrines in Karbala and Najaf in Iraq. Thousands of Iranians cross the border every month to go to these holy sites. Large numbers of Iraqis also go to Iran to visit Mashhad and Qom. Having open borders is important so that people can access to these areas.
Fourth Iran sees tremendous potential for economic gain in Iraq. Before the U.S. invasion most of Iran’s trade was through Jordan, Turkey and Russia. Now that Saddam is gone Iran has increased trade, tourism, and energy connections with Iraq. In February 2009 for example, the two countries signed a number of Memorandums of Understanding on industry, electricity, trade, and housing. They have also signed a deal to develop joint border oil fields. Every month similar announcements are made as the economic connections between the two are increasing.
Conflict With The U.S.
Just as important for Iran’s policy in Iraq is its conflict with the United States. For the last several decades, security in the Middle East has been largely defined by outside powers. From the 1970s on the U.S. tried to play Iran off of Iraq. The 2003 invasion disrupted this balance of power, and the U.S. has been attempting to rebuild it ever since. Iran has been adamantly opposed to re-creating this system, preferring a friendly Iraq rather than a new enemy. This conflict over ideas about security is at the heart of the dispute between Iran and the U.S.
This has led Iran to see the U.S. moves in Iraq as a threat. Initially, Tehran was afraid of the Bush administration’s talk of pre-emptive strikes and regime change. Having permanent American bases in Iraq was another major concern. The U.S. then began to blame Iran for instability in Iraq. The U.S. also portrayed itself as the arbitrator between the various factions in Iraq, which Iranians perceived as an invitation for a long-term presence. Finally, the U.S. has been emphasizing that if it leaves Iraq pre-maturely Iran will fill the vacuum and change the balance of the Middle East. This has led the U.S. to pressure neighboring Arab countries to improve ties with Iraq to counter Iran. Since Iraq is now Iran’s number one foreign concern, it can’t live with an American position that is attempting to turn Baghdad against Tehran. It has thus rejected cooperation with the U.S. because they have diametrically opposed visions. This has meant Iranian policy is as much defensive as pragmatic.
Ties With Iraq’s Shiite Factions
To ensure their interests, Iran has tried to establish friendly ties with all three major Shiite factions in Iraq, the Islamic Dawa party, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), and the Sadrists. Tehran’s main emphasis is upon relations with the government and the ruling parties. The Dawa and SIIC have long standing connections with Iran as many members lived in exile in Iran for years during the Saddam era. A lot of Shiites in the government also feel that they need Iranian support for now because the neighboring Sunni governments were none too friendly to Shiites taking power. It also allows for a counterweight to American influence.
Tehran also has ties with the Sadrists, but Barzegar believes this has been mostly tactical and short term to oppose the U.S. presence. The Sadrists are nationalists that have never expressed any desire for strategic relations with Iran. As the recent report by the Combating Terrorism Center revealed, many Sadrists saw aid from Iran as a marriage of convenience as well to gain weapons and money. The reason why the two cooperated was their mutual animosity at the American troop presence. The chances for long-term ties are therefore limited. In Basra for example, Iran supported various militia groups, but when the government launched its offensive against them in March 2008, Tehran stepped in to moderate the cease-fire rather than perpetuate the fighting because ties with Baghdad were more important than the Shiite gunmen. Iran will probably continue to work with factions that work with them such as the Special Groups, but it is not as important as Iran’s other concerns in Iraq.
Stance Towards Iraq’s Other Factions
Iran also has a policy towards Iraq’s nationalist, Sunni, and Kurdish parties. Tehran is not friendly with former Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi. He is a former Baathist that would probably attempt stronger ties with Sunni countries. Tehran also believes that many Sunnis are still deeply anti-Iranian and want to make sure they do not create another Iran-Iraq rivalry. The Kurds have had friendly relations with Iran, but it is worried about Kurdish independence. Any Kurdish state could be pro-Israel and pro-American, which would be a strategic threat to Iran. Tehran has thus tried to balance the Sunni and Kurdish parties in the government with the Shiites.
Refuting American Views of Iran’s Policy
One of Barzegar’s major arguments is that Americans and westerners have misinterpreted Tehran’s policy in Iraq. Many believe that Iran is driven by ideology and is following an offensive program in Iraq. Supporters of this view point to Iran’s ties with the Sadrists. There has also been much written about emerging Shiite power with Iran in its lead. While its true that Iran’s ideals do play a role in its foreign policy, and that for a decade after the overthrow of the Shah Iran tried to promote its revolution in the region, Barzegar believes that Iran has become much more strategic and opportunistic in the last few years. The ability to form an ideological alliance with Iraq’s Shiites for example is unlikely as the SIIC, Dawa, and the Sadrists all have different views of Iraq’s future and their relationship with Iran.
Conclusion
Overall, Iran wants to confront the American presence in Iraq, while taking advantage of the opportunities presented by the post-Saddam environment. Rather than being driven by ideology, Iraq’s worldview, and immediate cultural, political, and economic concerns according to Barzegar are driving Iran’s policy. They want friendly relations with Baghdad to prevent another rivalry, the free flow of people across the Iran-Iraq border, to increase business ties, see the U.S. leave, and stop their plans of creating an anti-Iranian Iraq. Tehran has largely been successful in all of these endeavors. For example, the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) signed between the U.S. and Iraq includes a withdrawal date for U.S. troops, and a promise not to use Iraq as a base to attack its neighbors, two clauses that were supported by Iran. In the January 2009 provincial elections many American analysts said that Tehran was a loser because their allies the SIIC lost, but Maliki still wants a unified Iraq and friendly relations with Iran. Those both fit Iran’s strategic goals. The point being that both Barzegar and the Combating Terrorism Center report argue that Iran is not attached to any individual, Sadr, or party, the SIIC, but rather wants influence within the government no matter who is at the helm. If Barzegar is right, then the question now is if the new Obama administration can accept an Iraqi government that is both friendly with the U.S. and Iran, and find some common ground with Tehran. If not, Iran will continue to oppose the Americans in Iraq, and reject cooperation.
SOURCES
Aswat al-Iraq, “Iraq, Iran sign MoUs in different spheres,” 2/28/09
Barzegar, Kayhan, “Iran’s Foreign Policy in Post-invasion Iraq,” Middle East Policy Council Journal, Winter 2008
Eggen, Dan and DeYoung, Karen, “Senior Iraqi Leader Says Pact With U.S. Is Unlikely to Pass,” Washington Post, 10/30/08
Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08
Hiltermann, Joost, “Iraq’s elections: winners, losers, and what’s next,” Global Democracy, 2/10/09
Peterson, Scott, “At Iraqi border outpost, signs of improving ties with Iran,” Christian Science Monitor, 12/22/08
Reuters, “Iraq says still at odds with Iran over border,” 3/9/09
Tehran Times, “Iran, Iraq ink energy cooperation deal,” 2/21/09
Zelikow, Philip, “The new strategic situation in Iraq,” Foreign Policy Online, 2/9/09
Thursday, March 19, 2009
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003
The first chapter of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” review of the U.S. effort to rebuild Iraq focuses upon the pre-war planning. That began in the fall of 2001 and went up right through the U.S. invasion. This period was characterized by three main trends. First, the Defense and State Departments had diametrically opposed views of what Iraq would be like after the war. Second, there was little to no coordination between the different groups working on post-war planning, even within the same agency. Finally, a best-case scenario was adopted as the operative model by the White House, which shaped all the subsequent planning.
Planning for the Iraq war began towards the end of 2001. On November 21, 2001 President Bush ordered Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to review the Pentagon’s strategy for invading Iraq. Even before that in September, Rumsfeld had already begun working on the Iraq war plan. This led to the Defense and State Departments as well as the National Security Council to eventually begin thinking about post-war Iraq.
At that time Iraq was in a state of disrepair due to Saddam’s rule, the Gulf War, and international sanctions. After the Gulf War Saddam had tried to rebuild Iraq’s infrastructure but it wasn’t successful. The non-oil sector was hit especially hard. By the mid-1990s unemployment and underemployment were over 50%. Gross Domestic Product, which peaked at $74.9 billion in 1990, dropped to below $20 billion for the rest of the decade. Iraq, which was a middle class Arab country before the Gulf War, became a poor underdeveloped one afterwards. 60% of the population depended upon the government food rations system, which wasn’t able to stop malnutrition from occurring. This led to the United Nations’ Oil For Food Program in 1995. That was manipulated both by the government, the U.N., and criminal gangs, and led to massive corruption. One thing the program did provide was an intimate look into the Iraqi economy and its needs. Unfortunately, none of that was looked at by the United States before the invasion.
On September 29, 2001 Secretary Rumsfeld ordered an internal review of the invasion plans for Iraq. Almost all of the planning focused solely upon the military side of the operation, because the Pentagon believed that the State Department would deal with the post-war situation. On December 28 Rumsfeld briefed President Bush. The Secretary stressed three themes that he would stay with until he left office. He said that the invasion would be over fast and quick. Afterwards the U.S. would turn power over to Iraqis, and the American troops would be out quickly. One of Rumsfeld’s deputies Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith continually stressed that the U.S. was going to act as liberators not occupiers. That meant Iraqi sovereignty as soon as possible after the war. Rumsfeld and Feith both thought this would make the Iraqis deal with their own problems, and not get the U.S. caught up in nation building. To support their argument the Pentagon pointed to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. Following this model also meant that the U.S. would not be responsible for rebuilding Iraq.
The State Department developed a completely different point of view. They considered the sectarian divisions within Iraq, and believed that it would take years for the country to be rebuilt and stabilized. They also didn’t think that Iraq would be like Afghanistan or that Iraqi leaders would emerge after the invasion that could take over the country. Secretary of State Colin Powell famously told President Bush that if the U.S. invaded they would be the ones that would be left to pick up the pieces. Powell warned that there would be no government and no law and order, meaning that the Iraqis would be looking to the U.S. for leadership. This conflict between Defense and State shaped the pre-war planning on Iraq with the dispute never being resolved.
In early 2002 the State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs created the Future of Iraq Project. It included 200 Iraqi exiles and experts, and was the largest study done within the government on Iraq. Its major drawbacks were that it was not an operational plan, but rather background information for the administration of Iraq, and was never presented to Secretary Powell as a counter to the Pentagon’s vision. The project was broken up into various working groups, some of which provided high quality material, while others never finished. The basic premise was that the U.S. was going to have to run Iraq after the war, and that this should be a civilian job with the goal of building up democratic institutions before Iraqis could take over. The Coalition Provisional Authority later took up this position.
In the spring of 2003 the White House became involved in Iraq planning when the National Security Council started holding meetings on the topic. In early 2003 the National Security Council’s Deputies bean holding twice-weekly conferences on Iraq. They came up with three alternatives for post-invasion Iraq. One was Iraqis quickly taking over, the second was military rule through the Central Command, and the third was a civilian government, perhaps under the United Nations. They also addressed three major concerns: security, reconstruction, and creating a pro-U.S. stable Iraq.
Which approach the United States would follow was not decided until August 2002. On August 29 the White House issued “Iraq: Goals, Objectives, Strategy.” It said that the U.S. was committed to overthrowing Saddam, and that it would work with Iraqi exiles to liberate Iraq, not occupy it. Those were wins for the Pentagon. However it did say that the U.S. would be involved in the reconstruction of Iraq, something the State Department stressed.
After the paper was released the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the National Security Council, and the Pentagon increased their efforts. The JCS ordered the Central Command (CENTCOM) to begin planning for post-war Iraq. Two Army majors that worked in Bosnia were given the task. That went against the preferences of Rumsfeld who wanted the U.S. out as quickly as possible. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice also had a steering group on Iraq created. Over at the Defense Department Undersecretary Feith created the Office of Special Plans. The major problem was that while work on Iraq was accelerating in the fall of 2002 none of it was coordinated, and there was little sharing of ideas and information. The compartmentalization of these different groups led to a highly disjointed set of ideas.
One example was the National Security Council’s (NSC) humanitarian group. Elliot Abrams and Robin Cleveland of the Office of Management and Budget led it. It was created in September 2002 with members from the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Joint Chiefs, the Defense, State, Treasure, Justice, and Commerce departments. They considered the effects of Iraq using chemical weapons, a possible refugee crisis, the U.N.’s Oil for Food program, and what targets not to hit during the war. It also wanted to get Iraq up and running as quickly as possible after the war ended. A major problem was that it had very little information about what Iraq was like. They knew that sanctions had hurt the country, but decided that its oil wealth would pay for any reconstruction. Just as important it had no interaction with the other NSC groups working on military, political, and democratization affairs.
Over at the Pentagon, planning was often vague and based upon best-case scenarios. Different officials were often told that there were plans for post-war security, but there were no actual meetings about it. The Defense Department also followed Rumsfeld’s belief that the war would be short, there would be little damage to Iraq in the process, the country’s oil would pay for everything, an Iraqi leader would emerge, and that would allow the U.S. a quick exit.
On October 15, 2001 Undersecretary Feith briefed the National Security Council on CENTCOM’s planning. They came up with three phases for postwar Iraq. First there would be military control. Second a U.S. civilian authority would take over, and then finally, Iraqi leaders would emerge and the U.S. would turn power over to them and then leave. The military had no timeline for how long this process would take. Feith also said that Rumsfeld should be in charge during this time, allowing for unity of command after the war. This idea led to interagency arguments that lasted for two months.
At the same time, the administration wanted to keep all their work secret. On October 18 for example, Rumsfeld asked Feith to create an official postwar planning office, but then rescinded that order shortly afterwards. That was because the White House had decided that the government could not openly plan for postwar Iraq when it had not declared war yet, and publicly said it was trying to avoid it.
Work continued with some of the most informative coming from the worst-case scenario papers. In October Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Feith, and the Joint Chiefs came up with a memo on 29 things that could go wrong in Iraq. Some of them were not finding weapons of mass destruction, sectarian fighting, not being able to find Saddam, Iraq breaking apart, the U.S. being there for 10 years, occupation costs skyrocketing, and world opinion turning against the war. Rumsfeld briefed the NSC and the president on this paper at a NSC meeting. In December Powell received a similar paper partially written by Ryan Crocker, the future U.S. ambassador to Iraq. It warned of a possible sectarian war for power that could lead to the dissolution of the country.
Outside and inside the government there were also warnings about what could happen in post-war Iraq. A review of the U.S.’s efforts at nation-building showed that of the sixteen countries the U.S. intervened in only four West Germany, Japan, Panama, and Grenada stayed democratic ten years after the U.S. left. Three, Cuba, Haiti, and Nicaragua got worse. Academics also noted that Iraq was not like Germany and Japan after World War II. Both were rich, developed, homogenous countries with bureaucracies. That was largely lacking in Iraq. The planning for the occupation of those two countries also started shortly after Pearl Harbor and took years to develop. The U.S. was trying to plan for Iraq on the fly. The National Intelligence Council released a paper in January 2003 that said setting up a democracy in Iraq would be a long and arduous process. In February the Army War College put out a report that said Iraq could fall into civil war because of the ethnic and sectarian divisions in the country, that the armed forces would have to be completely rebuilt, and that rebuilding the country would be a huge effort after the economy had been devastated by sanctions. It also warned that the longer the U.S. stayed, the more resistance would grow to their presence. These reports had little affect on planning however.
Overall the administration’s effort to deal with post-war Iraq was uncoordinated and fragmented. The National Security Council and Condoleezza Rice were supposed to manage policy, but State and Defense largely worked on their own. The various NSC planning groups acted separately as well. The NSC also did not consult with many key agencies until very late in the game. That meant there was no coherent strategy in the White House on what to do about Iraq after the war was over. Many including Secretary Powell, Undersecretary Feith, and a biography have blamed Rice for her weak leadership at the time, and said the administration was dysfunctional during this period. “Hard Lessons” believes part of that was due to the workings of the bureaucracy, but it also reflected the divisive views of the main decision makers. Rumsfeld for example, thought that the U.S. should be in and out of Iraq as quickly as possible, so the U.S. didn’t need to address any of the country’s big problems, while Powell predicted a long occupation. In the fall of 2002 the White House picked a mix of both views, but did not have a single, unified plan of how it was to work.
SOURCES
Collins, Joseph, “Choosing War: The Decision to Invade Iraq and Its Aftermath,” Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, April 2008
PBS Frontline, “INTERVIEWS Elisabeth Bumiller,” Bush’s War, 3/24/08
- “INTERVIEWS Karen DeYoung,” Bush’s War, 3/24/08
Ricks, Thomas, Fiasco, The American Military Adventure In Iraq, 2006
Ricks, Thomas and DeYoung, Karen, “Ex-Defense Official Assails Colleagues Over Run-Up to War,” Washington Post, 3/9/08
Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09
Woodward, Bob, State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III, 2006
Planning for the Iraq war began towards the end of 2001. On November 21, 2001 President Bush ordered Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to review the Pentagon’s strategy for invading Iraq. Even before that in September, Rumsfeld had already begun working on the Iraq war plan. This led to the Defense and State Departments as well as the National Security Council to eventually begin thinking about post-war Iraq.
At that time Iraq was in a state of disrepair due to Saddam’s rule, the Gulf War, and international sanctions. After the Gulf War Saddam had tried to rebuild Iraq’s infrastructure but it wasn’t successful. The non-oil sector was hit especially hard. By the mid-1990s unemployment and underemployment were over 50%. Gross Domestic Product, which peaked at $74.9 billion in 1990, dropped to below $20 billion for the rest of the decade. Iraq, which was a middle class Arab country before the Gulf War, became a poor underdeveloped one afterwards. 60% of the population depended upon the government food rations system, which wasn’t able to stop malnutrition from occurring. This led to the United Nations’ Oil For Food Program in 1995. That was manipulated both by the government, the U.N., and criminal gangs, and led to massive corruption. One thing the program did provide was an intimate look into the Iraqi economy and its needs. Unfortunately, none of that was looked at by the United States before the invasion.
On September 29, 2001 Secretary Rumsfeld ordered an internal review of the invasion plans for Iraq. Almost all of the planning focused solely upon the military side of the operation, because the Pentagon believed that the State Department would deal with the post-war situation. On December 28 Rumsfeld briefed President Bush. The Secretary stressed three themes that he would stay with until he left office. He said that the invasion would be over fast and quick. Afterwards the U.S. would turn power over to Iraqis, and the American troops would be out quickly. One of Rumsfeld’s deputies Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith continually stressed that the U.S. was going to act as liberators not occupiers. That meant Iraqi sovereignty as soon as possible after the war. Rumsfeld and Feith both thought this would make the Iraqis deal with their own problems, and not get the U.S. caught up in nation building. To support their argument the Pentagon pointed to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. Following this model also meant that the U.S. would not be responsible for rebuilding Iraq.
The State Department developed a completely different point of view. They considered the sectarian divisions within Iraq, and believed that it would take years for the country to be rebuilt and stabilized. They also didn’t think that Iraq would be like Afghanistan or that Iraqi leaders would emerge after the invasion that could take over the country. Secretary of State Colin Powell famously told President Bush that if the U.S. invaded they would be the ones that would be left to pick up the pieces. Powell warned that there would be no government and no law and order, meaning that the Iraqis would be looking to the U.S. for leadership. This conflict between Defense and State shaped the pre-war planning on Iraq with the dispute never being resolved.
In early 2002 the State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs created the Future of Iraq Project. It included 200 Iraqi exiles and experts, and was the largest study done within the government on Iraq. Its major drawbacks were that it was not an operational plan, but rather background information for the administration of Iraq, and was never presented to Secretary Powell as a counter to the Pentagon’s vision. The project was broken up into various working groups, some of which provided high quality material, while others never finished. The basic premise was that the U.S. was going to have to run Iraq after the war, and that this should be a civilian job with the goal of building up democratic institutions before Iraqis could take over. The Coalition Provisional Authority later took up this position.
In the spring of 2003 the White House became involved in Iraq planning when the National Security Council started holding meetings on the topic. In early 2003 the National Security Council’s Deputies bean holding twice-weekly conferences on Iraq. They came up with three alternatives for post-invasion Iraq. One was Iraqis quickly taking over, the second was military rule through the Central Command, and the third was a civilian government, perhaps under the United Nations. They also addressed three major concerns: security, reconstruction, and creating a pro-U.S. stable Iraq.
Which approach the United States would follow was not decided until August 2002. On August 29 the White House issued “Iraq: Goals, Objectives, Strategy.” It said that the U.S. was committed to overthrowing Saddam, and that it would work with Iraqi exiles to liberate Iraq, not occupy it. Those were wins for the Pentagon. However it did say that the U.S. would be involved in the reconstruction of Iraq, something the State Department stressed.
After the paper was released the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the National Security Council, and the Pentagon increased their efforts. The JCS ordered the Central Command (CENTCOM) to begin planning for post-war Iraq. Two Army majors that worked in Bosnia were given the task. That went against the preferences of Rumsfeld who wanted the U.S. out as quickly as possible. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice also had a steering group on Iraq created. Over at the Defense Department Undersecretary Feith created the Office of Special Plans. The major problem was that while work on Iraq was accelerating in the fall of 2002 none of it was coordinated, and there was little sharing of ideas and information. The compartmentalization of these different groups led to a highly disjointed set of ideas.
One example was the National Security Council’s (NSC) humanitarian group. Elliot Abrams and Robin Cleveland of the Office of Management and Budget led it. It was created in September 2002 with members from the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Joint Chiefs, the Defense, State, Treasure, Justice, and Commerce departments. They considered the effects of Iraq using chemical weapons, a possible refugee crisis, the U.N.’s Oil for Food program, and what targets not to hit during the war. It also wanted to get Iraq up and running as quickly as possible after the war ended. A major problem was that it had very little information about what Iraq was like. They knew that sanctions had hurt the country, but decided that its oil wealth would pay for any reconstruction. Just as important it had no interaction with the other NSC groups working on military, political, and democratization affairs.
Over at the Pentagon, planning was often vague and based upon best-case scenarios. Different officials were often told that there were plans for post-war security, but there were no actual meetings about it. The Defense Department also followed Rumsfeld’s belief that the war would be short, there would be little damage to Iraq in the process, the country’s oil would pay for everything, an Iraqi leader would emerge, and that would allow the U.S. a quick exit.
On October 15, 2001 Undersecretary Feith briefed the National Security Council on CENTCOM’s planning. They came up with three phases for postwar Iraq. First there would be military control. Second a U.S. civilian authority would take over, and then finally, Iraqi leaders would emerge and the U.S. would turn power over to them and then leave. The military had no timeline for how long this process would take. Feith also said that Rumsfeld should be in charge during this time, allowing for unity of command after the war. This idea led to interagency arguments that lasted for two months.
At the same time, the administration wanted to keep all their work secret. On October 18 for example, Rumsfeld asked Feith to create an official postwar planning office, but then rescinded that order shortly afterwards. That was because the White House had decided that the government could not openly plan for postwar Iraq when it had not declared war yet, and publicly said it was trying to avoid it.
Work continued with some of the most informative coming from the worst-case scenario papers. In October Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Feith, and the Joint Chiefs came up with a memo on 29 things that could go wrong in Iraq. Some of them were not finding weapons of mass destruction, sectarian fighting, not being able to find Saddam, Iraq breaking apart, the U.S. being there for 10 years, occupation costs skyrocketing, and world opinion turning against the war. Rumsfeld briefed the NSC and the president on this paper at a NSC meeting. In December Powell received a similar paper partially written by Ryan Crocker, the future U.S. ambassador to Iraq. It warned of a possible sectarian war for power that could lead to the dissolution of the country.
Outside and inside the government there were also warnings about what could happen in post-war Iraq. A review of the U.S.’s efforts at nation-building showed that of the sixteen countries the U.S. intervened in only four West Germany, Japan, Panama, and Grenada stayed democratic ten years after the U.S. left. Three, Cuba, Haiti, and Nicaragua got worse. Academics also noted that Iraq was not like Germany and Japan after World War II. Both were rich, developed, homogenous countries with bureaucracies. That was largely lacking in Iraq. The planning for the occupation of those two countries also started shortly after Pearl Harbor and took years to develop. The U.S. was trying to plan for Iraq on the fly. The National Intelligence Council released a paper in January 2003 that said setting up a democracy in Iraq would be a long and arduous process. In February the Army War College put out a report that said Iraq could fall into civil war because of the ethnic and sectarian divisions in the country, that the armed forces would have to be completely rebuilt, and that rebuilding the country would be a huge effort after the economy had been devastated by sanctions. It also warned that the longer the U.S. stayed, the more resistance would grow to their presence. These reports had little affect on planning however.
Overall the administration’s effort to deal with post-war Iraq was uncoordinated and fragmented. The National Security Council and Condoleezza Rice were supposed to manage policy, but State and Defense largely worked on their own. The various NSC planning groups acted separately as well. The NSC also did not consult with many key agencies until very late in the game. That meant there was no coherent strategy in the White House on what to do about Iraq after the war was over. Many including Secretary Powell, Undersecretary Feith, and a biography have blamed Rice for her weak leadership at the time, and said the administration was dysfunctional during this period. “Hard Lessons” believes part of that was due to the workings of the bureaucracy, but it also reflected the divisive views of the main decision makers. Rumsfeld for example, thought that the U.S. should be in and out of Iraq as quickly as possible, so the U.S. didn’t need to address any of the country’s big problems, while Powell predicted a long occupation. In the fall of 2002 the White House picked a mix of both views, but did not have a single, unified plan of how it was to work.
SOURCES
Collins, Joseph, “Choosing War: The Decision to Invade Iraq and Its Aftermath,” Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, April 2008
PBS Frontline, “INTERVIEWS Elisabeth Bumiller,” Bush’s War, 3/24/08
- “INTERVIEWS Karen DeYoung,” Bush’s War, 3/24/08
Ricks, Thomas, Fiasco, The American Military Adventure In Iraq, 2006
Ricks, Thomas and DeYoung, Karen, “Ex-Defense Official Assails Colleagues Over Run-Up to War,” Washington Post, 3/9/08
Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09
Woodward, Bob, State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III, 2006
Wednesday, March 18, 2009
The State Of Ninewa Province
As reported here before, Ninewa is about to go through an important political transition as the provincial council will pass from the hands of the Kurds to the new Al-Hadbaa List. The leader of Al-Hadbaa has said that he wants to develop the economy of the province by encouraging the private sector. He believes that there are ample resources that could make Ninewa prosper. Whether that’s possible or not is yet to be seen. What is known is that Ninewa rates worse in education, health, and a number of other fields when compared to the Iraqi average, and it is the second most violent province in the country.
Population and Territory
Ninewa is the third largest province in Iraq in area, and the second most populated. It has 2,811,091 people, 9% of the country’s total. Only Baghdad has more. The province is divided into eight districts, Baaj, Hamdaniya, Hatra, Mosul, Shikhan, Sinjar, Tel Afar, and Tilkaif. Mosul, the provincial capital is the third largest city in Iraq behind Baghdad and Basra. The population is also a mix of Arabs, Kurds, Christians, and other smaller religious minorities. Sinjar, Tilkaif, and Shikhan are also disputed territories that have parts that the Kurds claim. This is the source of one of the major disputes between Arabs and Kurds in the province, and country.
Ninewa’s Population
Total: 2,811,091
Shikhan: 49,396
Hatra: 55,157
Baaj: 133,291
Hamdaniya: 143,462
Tilkaif: 190,403
Sinjar: 237,073
Tel Afar: 382,050
Mosul: 1,620,259
Security
Security was worse in Ninewa in the second half of 2007 before improving in 2008. By June 2008 there were approximately 300 security incidents. That jumped to 375 in September, but then declined afterwards, leveling off at around 225 incidents by November. Deaths have had a slow and steady decline during that same time period. In June there were around 130 deaths. That increased to 150 in July, and was at 100 by the end of 2008. In October Christians were also attacked in Mosul, which led almost 2,000 families to flee. 80% of those have now returned. In total, Ninewa still has around 19,100 families that were displaced during the violence there.
Education
Ninewa province rates worse in education, especially amongst women, compared to the rest of the country. In Iraq, 24% of women are illiterate. In Ninewa it ranges from 23% in Hamdaniya to a high of 60% in Hatra. That’s mainly because so few women attend school. Overall, 47% of women over ten years old have less than a primary education in Iraq. Only the Hamdaniya district at 44% beats that national average. Otherwise the rate goes from 52% of women with less than a primary education in Mosul up to 90% in Hatra. The men of Ninewa only do slightly better. In Iraq 11% of males are illiterate, compared to 12% in Ninewa. Sinjar and Hatra have the most illiteracy for men at 25% and 37% respectively. 31% of men over 10 years old have less than a primary education in the country, but in Ninewa it’s at 41%. Hamdaniya does the best at 27%, but the other eight districts range from 37%-68%.
Women Over 10 Years Old With Less Than Primary Education
Iraq: 47%
Hamdaniya: 44%
Mosul: 52%
Baaj: 53%
Ninewa: 58%
Tel Afar: 66%
Sinjar: 72%
Shikhan: 74%
Tilkaif: 76%
Hatra: 90%
Illiterate Women:
Iraq: 24%
Hamdaniya: 23%
Mosul: 24%
Ninewa: 30%
Baaj: 30%
Tilkaif: 31%
Tel Afar: 32%
Shikhan: 48%
Sinjar: 57%
Hatra: 60%
Men Over 10 Years Old With Less Than Primary Education
Iraq: 31%
Hamdaniya: 27%
Mosul: 37%
Tel Afar: 45%
Baaj: 45%
Sinjar: 46%
Shikhan: 49%
Tilkaif: 54%
Hatra: 68%
Illiterate Men
Iraq: 11%
Mosul: 8%
Hamdaniya: 9%
Tilkaif: 10%
Tel Afar: 15%
Baaj: 19%
Shikhan: 19%
Sinjar: 25%
Hatra: 37%
Employment
Similarly women do far worse than men in finding employment in Ninewa and in the country. In Iraq only 18% of women are employed or looking for a job. In only one district, Hatra at 30%, does Ninewa do better than that. Otherwise anywhere from 3% of women are in the labor force in Baaj and Tilkaif to up to 10% in Mosul and Hamdaniya. Female unemployment is also much higher in Ninewa, 35%, compared to the rest of the country, 13%. Tilkaif has the lowest unemployment rate for women at 9%, and Tel Afar matches the country’s rate at 13%. The remaining six districts however have unemployment for women ranging from 14% in Hamdaniya up to 62% in Hatra. Even for men, there is high unemployment in areas, even though more males are involved in the labor force than in Iraq overall. 81% of Iraqi men participate in the labor force, compared to 85% in Ninewa. Baaj 90% and Hatra 91% have the high numbers. Unemployment is still slightly higher in Ninewa, 13%, than the national average, 12%. Tel Afar, 21%, Shikhan, 23%, and Hatra, 33%, have the most jobless men.
Female Labor Force Participation 15-64 Years Old
Iraq: 18%
Ninewa: 8%
Baaj: 3%
Tilkaif: 3%
Tel Afar: 5%
Shikhan: 6%
Sinjar: 6%
Mosul: 10%
Hamdaniya: 10%
Hatra: 30%
Female Unemployment
Iraq: 13%
Ninewa: 35%
Tilkaif: 9%
Tel Afar: 13%
Hamdaniya: 14%
Sinjar: 14%
Shikhan: 30%
Baaj: 36%
Mosul: 40%
Hatra: 62%
Male Labor Force Participation 15-64
Iraq: 81%
Ninewa: 85%
Sinjar: 78%
Tel Afar: 81%
Hamdaniya: 82%
Mosul: 86%
Shikhan: 86%
Tilkaif: 87%
Baaj: 90%
Hatra: 91%
Male Unemployment
Iraq: 12%
Ninewa: 13%
Baaj: 3%
Hamdaniya: 8%
Sinjar: 9%
Mosul: 12%
Tilkaif: 13%
Tel Afar: 21%
Shikhan: 23%
Hatra: 33%
Poverty
The lack of jobs has resulted in high rates of poverty in the province. 22% of Iraqis are in the lowest per capita income quintile. In Ninewa that ranges from 57% in Tel Afar down to 25% in Mosul.
% In Lowest Per Capita Income Quintile
Iraq: 22%
Mosul: 25
Sinjar: 27%
Hamdaniya: 36%
Baaj: 37%
Tilkaif: 40%
Shikhan: 49%
Hatra: 54%
Tel Afar: 57%
Services
Services like electricity and water, are also limited in Ninewa. 52% of Iraq has more than eleven hours of power cuts or are not connected to the national network. In Sinjar and Baaj 100% of the residents have more than 11-hour electricity outages, followed by Hamdaniya 93%, Tilkaif 80%, and Shikhan 76%. Many Iraqis rely upon private generators or buy electricity for those that do to supplement the national power grid. 21% of Iraqis however have no alternative source of power, compared to 57% in Ninewa. Access to the water network is also limited in some parts of the province. Only in Tilkaif is the entire district connected to the water system. Otherwise anywhere from 7% in Mosul and Shikhan up to 83% in Sinjar, 86% in Hatra, and 100% in Baaj do not have access.
More Than 11 Hours Power Cut Or No Connection To Network
Iraq: 52%
Hatra: 15%
Tel Afar: 26%
Mosul: 50%
Shikhan: 76%
Tilkaif: 80%
Hamdaniya: 93%
Sinjar: 100%
Baaj: 100%
No Alternative Electricity Source
Iraq: 21%
Mosul: 7%
Shikhan: 17%
Tilkaif: 32%
Baaj: 37%
Sinjar: 49%
Hamdaniya: 59%
Hatra: 81%
Tel Afar: 90%
Not Connected to Water Network
Iraq: 26%
Tilkaif: 0%
Mosul: 7%
Shikhan: 7%
Hamdaniya: 20%
Tel Afar: 53%
Sinjar: 83%
Hatra: 86%
Baaj: 100%
Food
The majority of Iraqis depend upon the government’s food ration system, which is the largest in the world. There is still malnutrition in Iraq however. 22% of Iraqis face chronic malnutrition. Shikhan does the best in this department with only 11% affected, followed by Hatra 20%, and Hamdaniya 22%, while Baaj 42%, Sinjar and Tel Afar at 48% each do the worst.
Chronic Malnutrition
Iraq: 22%
Shikhan: 11%
Hatra: 20%
Hamdaniya: 22%
Tilkaif: 26%
Mosul: 27%
Baaj: 42%
Sinjar: 48%
Tel Afar: 48%
SOURCES
Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit, “Ninewa Governorate Profile,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, February 2009
Kamal, Adel, “new ninawa governor: no possibility of Kurdish alliance,” Niqash, 2/24/09
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraqi Christians Returning To Mosul,” 3/5/09
Reuters, “UN Says 1 Million Iraqis Lack Food,” 11/12/08
Population and Territory
Ninewa is the third largest province in Iraq in area, and the second most populated. It has 2,811,091 people, 9% of the country’s total. Only Baghdad has more. The province is divided into eight districts, Baaj, Hamdaniya, Hatra, Mosul, Shikhan, Sinjar, Tel Afar, and Tilkaif. Mosul, the provincial capital is the third largest city in Iraq behind Baghdad and Basra. The population is also a mix of Arabs, Kurds, Christians, and other smaller religious minorities. Sinjar, Tilkaif, and Shikhan are also disputed territories that have parts that the Kurds claim. This is the source of one of the major disputes between Arabs and Kurds in the province, and country.
Ninewa’s Population
Total: 2,811,091
Shikhan: 49,396
Hatra: 55,157
Baaj: 133,291
Hamdaniya: 143,462
Tilkaif: 190,403
Sinjar: 237,073
Tel Afar: 382,050
Mosul: 1,620,259
Security
Security was worse in Ninewa in the second half of 2007 before improving in 2008. By June 2008 there were approximately 300 security incidents. That jumped to 375 in September, but then declined afterwards, leveling off at around 225 incidents by November. Deaths have had a slow and steady decline during that same time period. In June there were around 130 deaths. That increased to 150 in July, and was at 100 by the end of 2008. In October Christians were also attacked in Mosul, which led almost 2,000 families to flee. 80% of those have now returned. In total, Ninewa still has around 19,100 families that were displaced during the violence there.
Education
Ninewa province rates worse in education, especially amongst women, compared to the rest of the country. In Iraq, 24% of women are illiterate. In Ninewa it ranges from 23% in Hamdaniya to a high of 60% in Hatra. That’s mainly because so few women attend school. Overall, 47% of women over ten years old have less than a primary education in Iraq. Only the Hamdaniya district at 44% beats that national average. Otherwise the rate goes from 52% of women with less than a primary education in Mosul up to 90% in Hatra. The men of Ninewa only do slightly better. In Iraq 11% of males are illiterate, compared to 12% in Ninewa. Sinjar and Hatra have the most illiteracy for men at 25% and 37% respectively. 31% of men over 10 years old have less than a primary education in the country, but in Ninewa it’s at 41%. Hamdaniya does the best at 27%, but the other eight districts range from 37%-68%.
Women Over 10 Years Old With Less Than Primary Education
Iraq: 47%
Hamdaniya: 44%
Mosul: 52%
Baaj: 53%
Ninewa: 58%
Tel Afar: 66%
Sinjar: 72%
Shikhan: 74%
Tilkaif: 76%
Hatra: 90%
Illiterate Women:
Iraq: 24%
Hamdaniya: 23%
Mosul: 24%
Ninewa: 30%
Baaj: 30%
Tilkaif: 31%
Tel Afar: 32%
Shikhan: 48%
Sinjar: 57%
Hatra: 60%
Men Over 10 Years Old With Less Than Primary Education
Iraq: 31%
Hamdaniya: 27%
Mosul: 37%
Tel Afar: 45%
Baaj: 45%
Sinjar: 46%
Shikhan: 49%
Tilkaif: 54%
Hatra: 68%
Illiterate Men
Iraq: 11%
Mosul: 8%
Hamdaniya: 9%
Tilkaif: 10%
Tel Afar: 15%
Baaj: 19%
Shikhan: 19%
Sinjar: 25%
Hatra: 37%
Employment
Similarly women do far worse than men in finding employment in Ninewa and in the country. In Iraq only 18% of women are employed or looking for a job. In only one district, Hatra at 30%, does Ninewa do better than that. Otherwise anywhere from 3% of women are in the labor force in Baaj and Tilkaif to up to 10% in Mosul and Hamdaniya. Female unemployment is also much higher in Ninewa, 35%, compared to the rest of the country, 13%. Tilkaif has the lowest unemployment rate for women at 9%, and Tel Afar matches the country’s rate at 13%. The remaining six districts however have unemployment for women ranging from 14% in Hamdaniya up to 62% in Hatra. Even for men, there is high unemployment in areas, even though more males are involved in the labor force than in Iraq overall. 81% of Iraqi men participate in the labor force, compared to 85% in Ninewa. Baaj 90% and Hatra 91% have the high numbers. Unemployment is still slightly higher in Ninewa, 13%, than the national average, 12%. Tel Afar, 21%, Shikhan, 23%, and Hatra, 33%, have the most jobless men.
Female Labor Force Participation 15-64 Years Old
Iraq: 18%
Ninewa: 8%
Baaj: 3%
Tilkaif: 3%
Tel Afar: 5%
Shikhan: 6%
Sinjar: 6%
Mosul: 10%
Hamdaniya: 10%
Hatra: 30%
Female Unemployment
Iraq: 13%
Ninewa: 35%
Tilkaif: 9%
Tel Afar: 13%
Hamdaniya: 14%
Sinjar: 14%
Shikhan: 30%
Baaj: 36%
Mosul: 40%
Hatra: 62%
Male Labor Force Participation 15-64
Iraq: 81%
Ninewa: 85%
Sinjar: 78%
Tel Afar: 81%
Hamdaniya: 82%
Mosul: 86%
Shikhan: 86%
Tilkaif: 87%
Baaj: 90%
Hatra: 91%
Male Unemployment
Iraq: 12%
Ninewa: 13%
Baaj: 3%
Hamdaniya: 8%
Sinjar: 9%
Mosul: 12%
Tilkaif: 13%
Tel Afar: 21%
Shikhan: 23%
Hatra: 33%
Poverty
The lack of jobs has resulted in high rates of poverty in the province. 22% of Iraqis are in the lowest per capita income quintile. In Ninewa that ranges from 57% in Tel Afar down to 25% in Mosul.
% In Lowest Per Capita Income Quintile
Iraq: 22%
Mosul: 25
Sinjar: 27%
Hamdaniya: 36%
Baaj: 37%
Tilkaif: 40%
Shikhan: 49%
Hatra: 54%
Tel Afar: 57%
Services
Services like electricity and water, are also limited in Ninewa. 52% of Iraq has more than eleven hours of power cuts or are not connected to the national network. In Sinjar and Baaj 100% of the residents have more than 11-hour electricity outages, followed by Hamdaniya 93%, Tilkaif 80%, and Shikhan 76%. Many Iraqis rely upon private generators or buy electricity for those that do to supplement the national power grid. 21% of Iraqis however have no alternative source of power, compared to 57% in Ninewa. Access to the water network is also limited in some parts of the province. Only in Tilkaif is the entire district connected to the water system. Otherwise anywhere from 7% in Mosul and Shikhan up to 83% in Sinjar, 86% in Hatra, and 100% in Baaj do not have access.
More Than 11 Hours Power Cut Or No Connection To Network
Iraq: 52%
Hatra: 15%
Tel Afar: 26%
Mosul: 50%
Shikhan: 76%
Tilkaif: 80%
Hamdaniya: 93%
Sinjar: 100%
Baaj: 100%
No Alternative Electricity Source
Iraq: 21%
Mosul: 7%
Shikhan: 17%
Tilkaif: 32%
Baaj: 37%
Sinjar: 49%
Hamdaniya: 59%
Hatra: 81%
Tel Afar: 90%
Not Connected to Water Network
Iraq: 26%
Tilkaif: 0%
Mosul: 7%
Shikhan: 7%
Hamdaniya: 20%
Tel Afar: 53%
Sinjar: 83%
Hatra: 86%
Baaj: 100%
Food
The majority of Iraqis depend upon the government’s food ration system, which is the largest in the world. There is still malnutrition in Iraq however. 22% of Iraqis face chronic malnutrition. Shikhan does the best in this department with only 11% affected, followed by Hatra 20%, and Hamdaniya 22%, while Baaj 42%, Sinjar and Tel Afar at 48% each do the worst.
Chronic Malnutrition
Iraq: 22%
Shikhan: 11%
Hatra: 20%
Hamdaniya: 22%
Tilkaif: 26%
Mosul: 27%
Baaj: 42%
Sinjar: 48%
Tel Afar: 48%
SOURCES
Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit, “Ninewa Governorate Profile,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, February 2009
Kamal, Adel, “new ninawa governor: no possibility of Kurdish alliance,” Niqash, 2/24/09
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraqi Christians Returning To Mosul,” 3/5/09
Reuters, “UN Says 1 Million Iraqis Lack Food,” 11/12/08
Tuesday, March 17, 2009
Maliki Says More Transparency Needed But Takes No Responsibility For Corruption
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki recently met with the heads of satellite TV stations working in Iraq and talked to them about fighting corruption. Maliki said that the government needs greater transparency for its finances, a call that has been echoed by the main anti-corruption body the Integrity Committee. In February 2009 Judge Rahim al-Ogaili, the head of the Committee said that parliament needed to pass new anti-corruption legislation. He called for a law that would make officials disclose their finances if they had unusual amounts of money. Until then, there is Integrity Committee Law No. 55 that requires high-ranking officers to turn their financial records over to the Committee. Maliki just turned over his, the first time a prime minister had done so, along with 17 other high officials. More importantly, Judge al-Ogaili said his Committee is pushing for the end of Article 136 that requires ministers to okay any prosecutions of their workers. This has given ministers near veto power over any corruption investigation.
At the same meeting with TV heads, Maliki said that the corruption found in Iraq was due to Saddam. It’s true that there was a lot of theft and graft under the former regime. For example the United Nations’ Oil For Food program led to vast criminality. From officials and reports however, Iraq may now be even more corrupt. 2008 was supposed to be the year of fighting corruption, yet nothing happened according to the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. The Ministry of Trade that runs the food ration system created by the Oil For Food program is still suspected of smuggling. Parliament’s Committee for Integrity has called for the ministry to be investigated, but Maliki has done nothing about it. The Prime Minister has also been accused of undermining the Integrity Committee when it was headed by Judge Rati al-Rathi, Judge al-Ogaili’s predecessor.
It’s important that the Prime Minister and other officials disclose their financial statements, and it’s equally good that the Integrity Committee wants to end the control of the ministers over prosecutions. At the same time, both Maliki and Judge al-Rathi seem to be driven by protecting Iraq’s image, rather than actually fighting corruption. Judge Rathi for one has said that corruption gives Iraq a bad image that deters foreign investment. His solution was to not talk about the problem. Maliki has blamed Saddam’s era before for graft. In doing so, he is denying responsibility for corruption in his own government. The Prime Minister also has a record for interfering in and stopping investigations into officials. Getting rid of Article 136 would be a huge step towards giving Iraq’s anti-corruption agencies the power to look into cases. At the same time, until the attitudes of those at the top change, there will probably be no increase in prosecutions.
SOURCES
Alsumaria, “Maliki: Government seeks to fight corruption,” 3/11/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Iraq among countries with highest levels of corruption – report,” 9/23/08
Brinkley, Joel, “Iraq quietly tackles rampant corruption,” San Francisco Chronicle, 1/24/09
al-Fadhily, Ali and Jamail, Dahr, “Corruption eats into Iraq food rations,” Middle East Online, 5/12/08
Flahert, Anne, “Ex-officials: Bush admin. ignored Iraq corruption,” Associated Press, 5/13/08
Human Rights Watch, “The Quality of Justice, Failings of Iraq’s Central Criminal Court,” December 2008
Lynch, Colum, “Oil-for-Food Panel Rebukes Annan, Cites Corruption,” Washington Post, 9/8/05
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraq Seeks Financial Disclosure Law To Fight Corruption,” 2/21/09
- “Iraqi Officials Declare Financial Assets,” 3/5/09
Rosett, Claudia, “Iraq and the Importance of the U.N.’s Oil-food-Food Scandal,” Middle East Forum, 5/3/05
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09
At the same meeting with TV heads, Maliki said that the corruption found in Iraq was due to Saddam. It’s true that there was a lot of theft and graft under the former regime. For example the United Nations’ Oil For Food program led to vast criminality. From officials and reports however, Iraq may now be even more corrupt. 2008 was supposed to be the year of fighting corruption, yet nothing happened according to the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. The Ministry of Trade that runs the food ration system created by the Oil For Food program is still suspected of smuggling. Parliament’s Committee for Integrity has called for the ministry to be investigated, but Maliki has done nothing about it. The Prime Minister has also been accused of undermining the Integrity Committee when it was headed by Judge Rati al-Rathi, Judge al-Ogaili’s predecessor.
It’s important that the Prime Minister and other officials disclose their financial statements, and it’s equally good that the Integrity Committee wants to end the control of the ministers over prosecutions. At the same time, both Maliki and Judge al-Rathi seem to be driven by protecting Iraq’s image, rather than actually fighting corruption. Judge Rathi for one has said that corruption gives Iraq a bad image that deters foreign investment. His solution was to not talk about the problem. Maliki has blamed Saddam’s era before for graft. In doing so, he is denying responsibility for corruption in his own government. The Prime Minister also has a record for interfering in and stopping investigations into officials. Getting rid of Article 136 would be a huge step towards giving Iraq’s anti-corruption agencies the power to look into cases. At the same time, until the attitudes of those at the top change, there will probably be no increase in prosecutions.
SOURCES
Alsumaria, “Maliki: Government seeks to fight corruption,” 3/11/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Iraq among countries with highest levels of corruption – report,” 9/23/08
Brinkley, Joel, “Iraq quietly tackles rampant corruption,” San Francisco Chronicle, 1/24/09
al-Fadhily, Ali and Jamail, Dahr, “Corruption eats into Iraq food rations,” Middle East Online, 5/12/08
Flahert, Anne, “Ex-officials: Bush admin. ignored Iraq corruption,” Associated Press, 5/13/08
Human Rights Watch, “The Quality of Justice, Failings of Iraq’s Central Criminal Court,” December 2008
Lynch, Colum, “Oil-for-Food Panel Rebukes Annan, Cites Corruption,” Washington Post, 9/8/05
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraq Seeks Financial Disclosure Law To Fight Corruption,” 2/21/09
- “Iraqi Officials Declare Financial Assets,” 3/5/09
Rosett, Claudia, “Iraq and the Importance of the U.N.’s Oil-food-Food Scandal,” Middle East Forum, 5/3/05
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09
Sunday, March 15, 2009
Dec. 08-Jan. 09 U.N. Humanitarian Update – Iraq
In late February 2009 the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs released its latest humanitarian report on Iraq. The paper is a compilation of several others by UNICEF, Oxfam, and the International Organization for Migration, many of which have been reported here before, but also includes some new reporting as well. The humanitarian update focuses upon six main topics: refugees and the displaced, violence, women’s issues, children, Iraq’s food ration system, and health.
The Displaced
Returning refugees is a growing issue in Iraq. The number of Iraqis coming home has increased from 2007 to 2008. In 2007 an estimated 36,000 displaced people came back, compared to 195,240 in 2008. 25,000 refugees from other countries have also returned over those two years. In 2008 an average of 1,650 displaced families came back each month with the highest numbers during July, August and September, but then declining for the remaining three months of the year. Many have gone back to Baghdad, the sight of most of the displacement in the country. Other families wish to go back as well, but don’t have the financial means to.
The government has offered $432 to families that return from another province, and $216 to those that go back home within their own governorate. Baghdad began this program in October 2008, but it’s not clear whether it will continue in 2009. The Ministry of Displacement and Migration announced in February 2009 for example, that it had run out of funds for this program.
Many of those coming back face a number of problems finding basic necessities. Electricity is spotty, as well as access to public services and health care. Most importantly is finding housing. 41.8% of displaced families surveyed said they had no access to their property. 16.7% said they do have access, and 38.7% said they don’t know the status of their former homes. Of those that could go back 35% said their homes ere currently occupied. 22.1% said their homes were destroyed, 8.6% said they couldn’t go back to them because of security conditions, 2.5% said the military was using their property, while 0.5% said the government had taken it over.
In 2008 the Ministry of Displacement and Migration began plans to build housing projects for the displaced that could not go back home, but many of those plans have been put on hold because of budget cuts. Originally the Ministry was to be given $43.2 million for building housing projects in the 2009 budget, but that amount was slashed to $6.85 million because of the declining revenues from oil.
There are also restrictions and problems the displaced face when trying to receive aid from the government or retrieve their property. First, not all have registered with the Ministry of Displacement and Migration, which is a requirement to receive payments. Only Iraqis that left between January 1, 2006 and January 1, 2008 are covered. The amount of aid offered by the government is also not much, especially for those that had their homes destroyed. Iraqis that rented will probably not be able to get their places back, while those that sold, no matter what the situation, have no recourses. There are also some stories of returnees being threatened and attacked, and being forced to flee again. Finally, women have a much harder time coming up with the requirements to regain their property or get government assistance.
Both the United Nations and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) have programs for the internally displaced, but they are only reaching a fraction of the total. The U.N. has created Protection Assistance Centers for example that have only helped 26,677 people out of around 2 million internally displaced. The IOM has care packages for the displaced, but are only operating in Baghdad, Anbar, Irbil and Basra, and have only given them out to around 2,200 families, approximately 13,200 people.
Violence
Violence, especially against civilians, continues in Iraq, but at much lower levels than before. The number of civilian casualties from December 2008 to January 2009 for example decreased. In December 275 civilians were killed and 854 wounded compared to 192 killed and 591 wounded in January. Two to three dozen bodies are also found on the streets each month. On average thirteen Iraqis civilians were killed per day in 2008. Members of the Iraqi security forces are also targets with 83 killed and 200 wounded in December, and 99 killed and 231 wounded in January. In total 392 Iraqis were killed and 1,054 wounded in December, and 335 died in January, and 1,085 wounded.
Women’s Issues
The U.N. has growing concerns about the state of Iraq’s women. A 2008 report found that women headed 10.2% of Iraq’s households. There are also around 1 million widows in the country. These Iraqis are largely ignored in society, and have a much harder time providing for their families. A 2008 survey of the Iraqi and Middle Eastern press found that only 1% of stories were about women. More than half were about violence, and 20% more were on female suicide bombers. The Iraqi Minister of Women’s Affairs also recently resigned in February 2009 claiming that the government was providing her with few funds, but there are reports that she will go back to her job. Calling attention to their plight, a group of widows held a demonstration in Baghdad calling for government aid on International Women’s Day in March.
Female Headed Households By Province
Basra 5.6%
Najaf 6.8%
Babil 6.9%
Anbar 8.6%
Maysan 8.6%
Salahaddin 8.6%
Wasit 8.8%
Dohuk 10%
Tamim 10.1%
Ninewa 10.2%
Dhi Qar 10.6%
Qadisiyah 10.6%
Diyala 11.2%
Karbala 11.4%
Muthanna 11.8%
Sulaymaniya 11.8%
Baghdad 12.2%
Irbil 12.5%
Children
Children in northern Iraq are facing bad conditions. Schools visited by UNICEF in Diyala and Dohuk were overcrowded, lacked clean water, and sanitation. More than 900 children were also found in Kirkuk begging. Half of them were displaced.
Food
The Iraqi government began its food rations system in 1995 under the U.N.’s Oil for Food program. 95% of Iraqis support the system. In 2007 the Ministry of Trade, which controls it, was going to cut the handouts in half because a lack of funds, but the 2008 supplemental budget stopped that. In 2009 the Ministry of Trade still has plans to reduce the program, this time limiting it only to the poor. The packages cost the government $0.50 per person.
Health
The Ministry of Health is concerned about a measles outbreak. In 2008 6,000 cases were reported in nine provinces. They were also worried that it would spread to Najaf, Sulaymaniya, Irbil, Maysan, and Dohuk. That would place up to 800,000 children at risk. The government is telling families that they need to get their kids vaccinated, and is trying to create a new health program to deal with it.
SOURCES
Aswat al-Iraq, “Widows urge govt. to support them economically, socially,” 3/9/09
Salaheddin, Sinan, “Iraq’s women’s minister to withdraw resignation,” Associated Press, 3/9/09
Al-Shawfi, Mundher, “Iraqi government careless about its own refugees – minister,” Azzaman, 2/27/09
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Humanitarian Update Iraq, December 2008-January 2009” United Nations, 1/31/09
The Displaced
Returning refugees is a growing issue in Iraq. The number of Iraqis coming home has increased from 2007 to 2008. In 2007 an estimated 36,000 displaced people came back, compared to 195,240 in 2008. 25,000 refugees from other countries have also returned over those two years. In 2008 an average of 1,650 displaced families came back each month with the highest numbers during July, August and September, but then declining for the remaining three months of the year. Many have gone back to Baghdad, the sight of most of the displacement in the country. Other families wish to go back as well, but don’t have the financial means to.
The government has offered $432 to families that return from another province, and $216 to those that go back home within their own governorate. Baghdad began this program in October 2008, but it’s not clear whether it will continue in 2009. The Ministry of Displacement and Migration announced in February 2009 for example, that it had run out of funds for this program.
Many of those coming back face a number of problems finding basic necessities. Electricity is spotty, as well as access to public services and health care. Most importantly is finding housing. 41.8% of displaced families surveyed said they had no access to their property. 16.7% said they do have access, and 38.7% said they don’t know the status of their former homes. Of those that could go back 35% said their homes ere currently occupied. 22.1% said their homes were destroyed, 8.6% said they couldn’t go back to them because of security conditions, 2.5% said the military was using their property, while 0.5% said the government had taken it over.
In 2008 the Ministry of Displacement and Migration began plans to build housing projects for the displaced that could not go back home, but many of those plans have been put on hold because of budget cuts. Originally the Ministry was to be given $43.2 million for building housing projects in the 2009 budget, but that amount was slashed to $6.85 million because of the declining revenues from oil.
There are also restrictions and problems the displaced face when trying to receive aid from the government or retrieve their property. First, not all have registered with the Ministry of Displacement and Migration, which is a requirement to receive payments. Only Iraqis that left between January 1, 2006 and January 1, 2008 are covered. The amount of aid offered by the government is also not much, especially for those that had their homes destroyed. Iraqis that rented will probably not be able to get their places back, while those that sold, no matter what the situation, have no recourses. There are also some stories of returnees being threatened and attacked, and being forced to flee again. Finally, women have a much harder time coming up with the requirements to regain their property or get government assistance.
Both the United Nations and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) have programs for the internally displaced, but they are only reaching a fraction of the total. The U.N. has created Protection Assistance Centers for example that have only helped 26,677 people out of around 2 million internally displaced. The IOM has care packages for the displaced, but are only operating in Baghdad, Anbar, Irbil and Basra, and have only given them out to around 2,200 families, approximately 13,200 people.
Violence
Violence, especially against civilians, continues in Iraq, but at much lower levels than before. The number of civilian casualties from December 2008 to January 2009 for example decreased. In December 275 civilians were killed and 854 wounded compared to 192 killed and 591 wounded in January. Two to three dozen bodies are also found on the streets each month. On average thirteen Iraqis civilians were killed per day in 2008. Members of the Iraqi security forces are also targets with 83 killed and 200 wounded in December, and 99 killed and 231 wounded in January. In total 392 Iraqis were killed and 1,054 wounded in December, and 335 died in January, and 1,085 wounded.
Women’s Issues
The U.N. has growing concerns about the state of Iraq’s women. A 2008 report found that women headed 10.2% of Iraq’s households. There are also around 1 million widows in the country. These Iraqis are largely ignored in society, and have a much harder time providing for their families. A 2008 survey of the Iraqi and Middle Eastern press found that only 1% of stories were about women. More than half were about violence, and 20% more were on female suicide bombers. The Iraqi Minister of Women’s Affairs also recently resigned in February 2009 claiming that the government was providing her with few funds, but there are reports that she will go back to her job. Calling attention to their plight, a group of widows held a demonstration in Baghdad calling for government aid on International Women’s Day in March.
Female Headed Households By Province
Basra 5.6%
Najaf 6.8%
Babil 6.9%
Anbar 8.6%
Maysan 8.6%
Salahaddin 8.6%
Wasit 8.8%
Dohuk 10%
Tamim 10.1%
Ninewa 10.2%
Dhi Qar 10.6%
Qadisiyah 10.6%
Diyala 11.2%
Karbala 11.4%
Muthanna 11.8%
Sulaymaniya 11.8%
Baghdad 12.2%
Irbil 12.5%
Children
Children in northern Iraq are facing bad conditions. Schools visited by UNICEF in Diyala and Dohuk were overcrowded, lacked clean water, and sanitation. More than 900 children were also found in Kirkuk begging. Half of them were displaced.
Food
The Iraqi government began its food rations system in 1995 under the U.N.’s Oil for Food program. 95% of Iraqis support the system. In 2007 the Ministry of Trade, which controls it, was going to cut the handouts in half because a lack of funds, but the 2008 supplemental budget stopped that. In 2009 the Ministry of Trade still has plans to reduce the program, this time limiting it only to the poor. The packages cost the government $0.50 per person.
Health
The Ministry of Health is concerned about a measles outbreak. In 2008 6,000 cases were reported in nine provinces. They were also worried that it would spread to Najaf, Sulaymaniya, Irbil, Maysan, and Dohuk. That would place up to 800,000 children at risk. The government is telling families that they need to get their kids vaccinated, and is trying to create a new health program to deal with it.
SOURCES
Aswat al-Iraq, “Widows urge govt. to support them economically, socially,” 3/9/09
Salaheddin, Sinan, “Iraq’s women’s minister to withdraw resignation,” Associated Press, 3/9/09
Al-Shawfi, Mundher, “Iraqi government careless about its own refugees – minister,” Azzaman, 2/27/09
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Humanitarian Update Iraq, December 2008-January 2009” United Nations, 1/31/09
Saturday, March 14, 2009
Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Preface
In January 2009 the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) released a heavy tome, over 500 pages long, reviewing America’s attempt to rebuild Iraq after the 2003 invasion. The report, entitled “Hard Lessons” begins with the pre-war planning for Iraq that started in mid-2002, and goes all the way up to the fall of 2008. The paper is far too long to read or digest in one fell swoop, so instead it will be tackled chapter by chapter. Overall, SIGIR found that America’s effort was uncoordinated, derailed by the security situation, and relied upon a bad contracting process. America’s greatest success in this endeavor was to build up the Iraqi security forces, but it failed to reconstruct the country’s basic services, infrastructure, and economy.
The Inspector General was first created during the time of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). It was originally called the Coalition Provisional Authority Office of Inspector General. In October 2004 it became the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. At the same time Stuart Bowen was appointed its director, a position he holds to this day.
Since the 2003 invasion the U.S. has committed around $50 billion for the reconstruction of Iraq. It is the largest rebuilding project ever attempted by the United States. “Hard Lessons” believes that the Bush administration lacked unity of command and coordination when dealing with Iraq. To make things worse American policy and personnel were often changed. Security also became such an overriding concern that it derailed and diverted much of the reconstruction plan. Bad contracts and the lack of oversight and management also led to massive waste. The U.S. relied upon cost-plus contracts that paid companies a fixed price plus costs, allowed high overheads, paid excessive fees, and consented to long delays that all led to large cost overruns. At the same time, there were very few cases of fraud or corruption as seen by the few criminal cases that have been prosecuted.
As soon as the SIGIR went to Iraq it began to see problems. The first was the large amounts of cash that were used by the CPA to pay for everything. The U.S. for example, flew in $12 billion in $100 bills to Iraq from the Federal Reserve Bank in New York City in 2004. Second, the attacks in the country shot up security costs and delayed many projects. Last, SIGIR believed that the CPA set too many grand goals for what they could accomplish in Iraq.
All of these and more led to some tough criticisms in “Hard Lessons.” It does not believe that the U.S. met its goals for reconstructing Iraq. Electricity and oil production for example are still below goals set by the CPA. The number of successfully completed projects is also below expectations. SIGIR believes the lack of security in the country was the major cause for this failure. The U.S. was able to build up Iraq’s security forces largely from scratch after the CPA disbanded the armed forces. They have gone through a massive expansion, and while there are still problems, they have more capabilities then before. In the end, SIGIR believes that the U.S. did not have the resources or organization to carry out such a grandiose plan as rebuilding Iraq.
SOURCES
Glanz, James, “In Ramadi, Real Rebuilding, With Fresh Paint,” New York Times, 11/23/08
Pallister, David, “How the US sent $12bn in cash to Iraq. And watched it vanish,” Guardian, 2/8/07
Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09
The Inspector General was first created during the time of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). It was originally called the Coalition Provisional Authority Office of Inspector General. In October 2004 it became the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. At the same time Stuart Bowen was appointed its director, a position he holds to this day.
Since the 2003 invasion the U.S. has committed around $50 billion for the reconstruction of Iraq. It is the largest rebuilding project ever attempted by the United States. “Hard Lessons” believes that the Bush administration lacked unity of command and coordination when dealing with Iraq. To make things worse American policy and personnel were often changed. Security also became such an overriding concern that it derailed and diverted much of the reconstruction plan. Bad contracts and the lack of oversight and management also led to massive waste. The U.S. relied upon cost-plus contracts that paid companies a fixed price plus costs, allowed high overheads, paid excessive fees, and consented to long delays that all led to large cost overruns. At the same time, there were very few cases of fraud or corruption as seen by the few criminal cases that have been prosecuted.
As soon as the SIGIR went to Iraq it began to see problems. The first was the large amounts of cash that were used by the CPA to pay for everything. The U.S. for example, flew in $12 billion in $100 bills to Iraq from the Federal Reserve Bank in New York City in 2004. Second, the attacks in the country shot up security costs and delayed many projects. Last, SIGIR believed that the CPA set too many grand goals for what they could accomplish in Iraq.
All of these and more led to some tough criticisms in “Hard Lessons.” It does not believe that the U.S. met its goals for reconstructing Iraq. Electricity and oil production for example are still below goals set by the CPA. The number of successfully completed projects is also below expectations. SIGIR believes the lack of security in the country was the major cause for this failure. The U.S. was able to build up Iraq’s security forces largely from scratch after the CPA disbanded the armed forces. They have gone through a massive expansion, and while there are still problems, they have more capabilities then before. In the end, SIGIR believes that the U.S. did not have the resources or organization to carry out such a grandiose plan as rebuilding Iraq.
SOURCES
Glanz, James, “In Ramadi, Real Rebuilding, With Fresh Paint,” New York Times, 11/23/08
Pallister, David, “How the US sent $12bn in cash to Iraq. And watched it vanish,” Guardian, 2/8/07
Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09
Thursday, March 12, 2009
Grassroots Reconciliation At The Samarra Shrine
In February 2006 the Shiite shrine at Samarra was bombed. In subsequent months Shiite militias responded with a wave of attacks that eventually led to Iraq descending into a sectarian civil war. Civilian deaths went from 2,165 in February according to the United Nations to eventually shooting up to 3,590 by July. Over 1.6 million were displaced as a result. On March 6, 2009 however a remarkable event happened. Over one million Shiite pilgrims returned to the Samarra shrine in an example of grassroots reconciliation.
Samarra, a Sunni city, is the burial place for two revered Shiite Imams. Those are the Imam Hasan Askari and his father Imam Ali Hadi. Both are descendents of the Prophet Mohammad. The death of the Imam Askari is usually celebrated with a pilgrimage to Samarra. On March 6 over one million Shiites from across the country made this trip, the first time since the 2006 bombing. Moqtada al-Sadr also called for his followers to join in the procession.
The city was heavily guarded by the Iraqi security forces, which erected blast walls along the path of the pilgrims. Even though some Shiites complained that they were not able to interact with the local Sunni population that much, there were still tents and food vendors set up to greet the visitors. 5,000 Sunnis and Shiites even went to a joint prayer service at a Sunni mosque, and then marched down the streets chanting anti-violence slogans.
While there are anecdotal reports of Iraqis being tired of the sectarian war, the events at Samarra are a specific example of that new status quo. The symbolism was strong as it took place at the starting place of the civil war. There are still many problems in Iraq, but it appears that at least for the people that made the pilgrimage to Samarra, and those that greeted them wanted to put part of Iraq’s bloody past behind them.
SOURCES
International Organization for Migration, “Three Years Of Post-Samarra Displacement In Iraq,” 2/22/09
O’Hanlon, Michael, Campbell, Jason, “Iraq Index,” Brookings Institution, 1/30/09
Rasheed, Hamid, “Sow of Sunni-Shiite unity in Iraq,” Los Angeles Times, 3/7/09
Schofield, Matthew, “Iraqi pilgrims visit Samarra’s bombed mosque once again,” McClatchy Newspapers, 3/6/09
Samarra, a Sunni city, is the burial place for two revered Shiite Imams. Those are the Imam Hasan Askari and his father Imam Ali Hadi. Both are descendents of the Prophet Mohammad. The death of the Imam Askari is usually celebrated with a pilgrimage to Samarra. On March 6 over one million Shiites from across the country made this trip, the first time since the 2006 bombing. Moqtada al-Sadr also called for his followers to join in the procession.
The city was heavily guarded by the Iraqi security forces, which erected blast walls along the path of the pilgrims. Even though some Shiites complained that they were not able to interact with the local Sunni population that much, there were still tents and food vendors set up to greet the visitors. 5,000 Sunnis and Shiites even went to a joint prayer service at a Sunni mosque, and then marched down the streets chanting anti-violence slogans.
While there are anecdotal reports of Iraqis being tired of the sectarian war, the events at Samarra are a specific example of that new status quo. The symbolism was strong as it took place at the starting place of the civil war. There are still many problems in Iraq, but it appears that at least for the people that made the pilgrimage to Samarra, and those that greeted them wanted to put part of Iraq’s bloody past behind them.
SOURCES
International Organization for Migration, “Three Years Of Post-Samarra Displacement In Iraq,” 2/22/09
O’Hanlon, Michael, Campbell, Jason, “Iraq Index,” Brookings Institution, 1/30/09
Rasheed, Hamid, “Sow of Sunni-Shiite unity in Iraq,” Los Angeles Times, 3/7/09
Schofield, Matthew, “Iraqi pilgrims visit Samarra’s bombed mosque once again,” McClatchy Newspapers, 3/6/09
Wednesday, March 11, 2009
Al-Hadbaa Party Leader’s Vision For Ninewa
In the January 2009 elections the newly formed Al-Hadbaa List won an outright majority in Ninewa province. They received 38.4% of the vote, which netted them 19 of 37 seats on the provincial council. Shortly after the results were announced a politician from the Kurdish coalition, the Ninewa Brotherhood List, that ran in the election said they would be willing to work with Al-Hadbaa if Kurdish rights were guaranteed. Recently the leader of Al-Hadbaa, Atheel al-Najafi, who is likely to become governor, has been interviewed several times. From his comments it seems highly unlikely that the Kurds and the newly elected Sunnis will have much in common.
Al-Najafi had rather conventional views about developing Ninewa, and dealing with violence. He said he would create a long-term economic growth plan for the province that focuses upon the private sector. Al-Najafi believes there are plenty of resources in Ninewa that can be exploited to enrich the area. Security was another major issue as Ninewa is one of the deadliest in the country. Al-Najafi believes that there are three sources of violence. First there are political motivated attacks against the United States. Many of these insurgents also reject the political system. Al-Najafi said that the government should talk with them to resolve their problems. Second were criminal gangs that have taken advantage of the power vacuum created by the competition for power between Arabs and Kurds. It was the duty of the security forces to deal with them. Last were foreign groups that wanted to undermine the country. The security forces and the provincial government would deal with them.
Najafi’s most controversial comments however were about the Kurds who have ruled the province since 2005. Najafi told the Iraqi paper Azzaman that the Kurds had done a poor job governing Ninewa. For that reason he wants all the standing Kurdish politicians to resign, and be replaced by fresh faces that would be acceptable to Arabs. The politicians also have to address Ninewa’s issues exclusively. He said that he would reject any that thought about the needs of Kurdistan. That included desires to annex disputed territories in the north, which he said should be under the control of Baghdad until their future was decided.
Finally, Najafi blamed the Americans for the both violence and the recent past in Ninewa. He said that the American presence helped lead to the insurgency and their attacks in the province. He also accused the U.S. of being pro-Kurdish, supporting their rule over the province.
Najafi’s statements have had a cool reception amongst the Kurds as could be expected. The out-going deputy governor Khasro Goran said that he believed Al-Hadbaa wanted to kick the Kurds out of Mosul. The Kurds have also formally asked the United States to keep troops in the north, fearing future disputes with the country’s Arabs.
Since al-Hadbaa won a majority in the January elections, they will have a largely free reign to rule Ninewa. While working on developing Ninewa’s economy and security would gain support from any Iraqi, the party’s stance on the Kurds looks to be fostering more divisions in a province that has seen noting but conflict for most of the period since the U.S. invasion. Adding to the situation, al-Hadbaa could also gain support from Baghdad as Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has increasingly challenged Kurdistan himself. Either way it shows the precarious situation Iraq’s politics finds itself in. Having Sunnis gain greater representation in the country after they boycotted the first provincial elections in 2005 was obviously important, but that doesn’t mean it can’t foster further problems as well. In Ninewa's case it appears to have led to the election of a party that wants political payback against the Kurds.
SOURCES
Associated Press, “Iraqi provincial election results,” 2/19/09
Farrell, Stephen, “Election: Preliminary Results,” Baghdad Bureau Blog, New York Times, 2/5/09
Flintoff, Corey, “Shift In Power Heightens Tensions In Iraqi City,” All Things Considered, NPR, 2/27/09
Kamal, Adel, “new ninawa governor: no possibility of Kurdish alliance,” Niqash, 2/24/09
Mohsen, Amer, “Iraq Papers Thu: Corruption and Reconstruction,” IraqSlogger.com, 3/4/09
Salaheddin, Sinan, “Iraqi Kurdish politician want rights protected,” 2/21/09
World Tribune, “Kurdish government warns U.S. military pullout will spark war in N. Iraq,” 3/2/09
Al-Najafi had rather conventional views about developing Ninewa, and dealing with violence. He said he would create a long-term economic growth plan for the province that focuses upon the private sector. Al-Najafi believes there are plenty of resources in Ninewa that can be exploited to enrich the area. Security was another major issue as Ninewa is one of the deadliest in the country. Al-Najafi believes that there are three sources of violence. First there are political motivated attacks against the United States. Many of these insurgents also reject the political system. Al-Najafi said that the government should talk with them to resolve their problems. Second were criminal gangs that have taken advantage of the power vacuum created by the competition for power between Arabs and Kurds. It was the duty of the security forces to deal with them. Last were foreign groups that wanted to undermine the country. The security forces and the provincial government would deal with them.
Najafi’s most controversial comments however were about the Kurds who have ruled the province since 2005. Najafi told the Iraqi paper Azzaman that the Kurds had done a poor job governing Ninewa. For that reason he wants all the standing Kurdish politicians to resign, and be replaced by fresh faces that would be acceptable to Arabs. The politicians also have to address Ninewa’s issues exclusively. He said that he would reject any that thought about the needs of Kurdistan. That included desires to annex disputed territories in the north, which he said should be under the control of Baghdad until their future was decided.
Finally, Najafi blamed the Americans for the both violence and the recent past in Ninewa. He said that the American presence helped lead to the insurgency and their attacks in the province. He also accused the U.S. of being pro-Kurdish, supporting their rule over the province.
Najafi’s statements have had a cool reception amongst the Kurds as could be expected. The out-going deputy governor Khasro Goran said that he believed Al-Hadbaa wanted to kick the Kurds out of Mosul. The Kurds have also formally asked the United States to keep troops in the north, fearing future disputes with the country’s Arabs.
Since al-Hadbaa won a majority in the January elections, they will have a largely free reign to rule Ninewa. While working on developing Ninewa’s economy and security would gain support from any Iraqi, the party’s stance on the Kurds looks to be fostering more divisions in a province that has seen noting but conflict for most of the period since the U.S. invasion. Adding to the situation, al-Hadbaa could also gain support from Baghdad as Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has increasingly challenged Kurdistan himself. Either way it shows the precarious situation Iraq’s politics finds itself in. Having Sunnis gain greater representation in the country after they boycotted the first provincial elections in 2005 was obviously important, but that doesn’t mean it can’t foster further problems as well. In Ninewa's case it appears to have led to the election of a party that wants political payback against the Kurds.
SOURCES
Associated Press, “Iraqi provincial election results,” 2/19/09
Farrell, Stephen, “Election: Preliminary Results,” Baghdad Bureau Blog, New York Times, 2/5/09
Flintoff, Corey, “Shift In Power Heightens Tensions In Iraqi City,” All Things Considered, NPR, 2/27/09
Kamal, Adel, “new ninawa governor: no possibility of Kurdish alliance,” Niqash, 2/24/09
Mohsen, Amer, “Iraq Papers Thu: Corruption and Reconstruction,” IraqSlogger.com, 3/4/09
Salaheddin, Sinan, “Iraqi Kurdish politician want rights protected,” 2/21/09
World Tribune, “Kurdish government warns U.S. military pullout will spark war in N. Iraq,” 3/2/09
Monday, March 09, 2009
Baghdad’s Latest Reconciliation Effort
On March 6 at a conference in Baghdad of tribal sheikhs Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki called for reconciliation with former Baathist military personnel. He said that as long as these former regime members were focused on the future and not the past they would have a place in society. This followed a months worth of activities where the government was attempting to get Saddam era Army officers to return from exile and be integrated back into Iraq.
At a meeting in the capital for Tribal Support Council members Prime Minister Maliki called for reconciliation with Baathists soldiers. He said that they made mistakes in the past, but now was the time to forgive and forget, and close that chapter in Iraq’s history. A Sunni parliamentarian from Ilyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List said that the Prime Minister’s statements were needed, but more importantly, they needed to be backed up by action. That’s what the government was attempting to do the previous month.
In February 2009 Baghdad made several overtures to former soldiers from Saddam’s army that were living in foreign countries. This began with dialogue with former officers in both Jordan and Baghdad. The government was offering those below colonel jobs in the new Army, while those of a higher rank would receive pensions. According to Asharq al-Awsat this offer was open to any soldiers except members of Saddam’s Fedayeen. The Defense Ministry said they were preparing Iraq’s embassies and attaché offices across the region to accept whatever soldiers wanted to return, and set up a special committee to help integrate them. In the Baghdad meeting American and British officials were also involved, and according to the Saudi Al-Qatan paper, a delegation of Americans met with former officers in Amman, Jordan as well. The Iraqi armed forces have already taken in over 96,000 soldiers from Saddam’s army, so there was a precedent for this policy.
The motivations behind the move seemed to cause a bit of controversy in Iraq. In mid-January 2009 then Vice President elect Joe Biden visited Iraq. While there he told the Maliki government that they needed to do more on political reconciliation. A few weeks later Maliki, while meeting with French President Nicholas Sarkozy, responded by saying that the U.S. could no longer pressure Iraq, and that reconciliation was almost complete. Al-Hayat later reported that the outreach to soldiers was in fact done under pressure from the Americans.
While there were initial meetings with some officers, things seemed to quickly turn sour. In the beginning of February a former general met with Iraqi, American and British officials in Baghdad about soldiers returning. The former head of the Army also called on soldiers to go back to Iraq from abroad, and an ex-Republican Guard general said that the government was hoping 23,000 officers would come back. By mid-February however former officers were saying that they would not take up Maliki’s offer, and urged others to follow suit. They said they would only reconcile with the government if they got rid of the DeBaathification process, and paid them back pay for their years in exile. Discussions seemed to end at that point.
Iraq’s Army has already taken in thousands of former soldiers, but there are still some recalcitrant ones living in foreign countries. The latest outreach to those appeared to have been the result of Vice President Biden’s urging, showing that the U.S. still has pull within Iraq even though it is reducing troop levels. The future of the initiative is unknown however. What looked to be a promising start quickly turned into rejection by the old officers. Still, the military has been one of the few Iraqi institutions to take in members of the old regime in large numbers, although ironically it is prohibited under the Accountability and Justice Law (12) that replaced the DeBaathification order.
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, "Iraq parliament fails to elect new speaker," 2/8/09
Associated Press, “Biden Visits Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan,” 1/12/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Ministerial plan to receive former army officers,” 2/15/09
Azzaman, “Former army generals snub government’s offer to return,” 2/19/09
International Center for Transitional Justice, “Briefing Paper: Iraq’s New ‘Accountability and Justice’ Law,” 1/22/08
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraqi Government Invites Former Army Officers Back,” 2/18/09
- "Officers Who Served Under Saddam To Rejoin Iraqi Army," 2/7/09
Reid, Robert, “Iraqi PM reaches out to Saddam supporters,” Associated Press, 3/6/09
Roads To Iraq Blog, “American delegation met with former Iraqi army officers,” 2/20/09
- “Another failing reconciliation attempt,” 2/14/09
Santora, Marc and Cowell, Alan, “With Swipe at U.S., Iraq Builds ties to French,” New York Times, 2/11/09
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09
At a meeting in the capital for Tribal Support Council members Prime Minister Maliki called for reconciliation with Baathists soldiers. He said that they made mistakes in the past, but now was the time to forgive and forget, and close that chapter in Iraq’s history. A Sunni parliamentarian from Ilyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List said that the Prime Minister’s statements were needed, but more importantly, they needed to be backed up by action. That’s what the government was attempting to do the previous month.
In February 2009 Baghdad made several overtures to former soldiers from Saddam’s army that were living in foreign countries. This began with dialogue with former officers in both Jordan and Baghdad. The government was offering those below colonel jobs in the new Army, while those of a higher rank would receive pensions. According to Asharq al-Awsat this offer was open to any soldiers except members of Saddam’s Fedayeen. The Defense Ministry said they were preparing Iraq’s embassies and attaché offices across the region to accept whatever soldiers wanted to return, and set up a special committee to help integrate them. In the Baghdad meeting American and British officials were also involved, and according to the Saudi Al-Qatan paper, a delegation of Americans met with former officers in Amman, Jordan as well. The Iraqi armed forces have already taken in over 96,000 soldiers from Saddam’s army, so there was a precedent for this policy.
The motivations behind the move seemed to cause a bit of controversy in Iraq. In mid-January 2009 then Vice President elect Joe Biden visited Iraq. While there he told the Maliki government that they needed to do more on political reconciliation. A few weeks later Maliki, while meeting with French President Nicholas Sarkozy, responded by saying that the U.S. could no longer pressure Iraq, and that reconciliation was almost complete. Al-Hayat later reported that the outreach to soldiers was in fact done under pressure from the Americans.
While there were initial meetings with some officers, things seemed to quickly turn sour. In the beginning of February a former general met with Iraqi, American and British officials in Baghdad about soldiers returning. The former head of the Army also called on soldiers to go back to Iraq from abroad, and an ex-Republican Guard general said that the government was hoping 23,000 officers would come back. By mid-February however former officers were saying that they would not take up Maliki’s offer, and urged others to follow suit. They said they would only reconcile with the government if they got rid of the DeBaathification process, and paid them back pay for their years in exile. Discussions seemed to end at that point.
Iraq’s Army has already taken in thousands of former soldiers, but there are still some recalcitrant ones living in foreign countries. The latest outreach to those appeared to have been the result of Vice President Biden’s urging, showing that the U.S. still has pull within Iraq even though it is reducing troop levels. The future of the initiative is unknown however. What looked to be a promising start quickly turned into rejection by the old officers. Still, the military has been one of the few Iraqi institutions to take in members of the old regime in large numbers, although ironically it is prohibited under the Accountability and Justice Law (12) that replaced the DeBaathification order.
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, "Iraq parliament fails to elect new speaker," 2/8/09
Associated Press, “Biden Visits Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan,” 1/12/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Ministerial plan to receive former army officers,” 2/15/09
Azzaman, “Former army generals snub government’s offer to return,” 2/19/09
International Center for Transitional Justice, “Briefing Paper: Iraq’s New ‘Accountability and Justice’ Law,” 1/22/08
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraqi Government Invites Former Army Officers Back,” 2/18/09
- "Officers Who Served Under Saddam To Rejoin Iraqi Army," 2/7/09
Reid, Robert, “Iraqi PM reaches out to Saddam supporters,” Associated Press, 3/6/09
Roads To Iraq Blog, “American delegation met with former Iraqi army officers,” 2/20/09
- “Another failing reconciliation attempt,” 2/14/09
Santora, Marc and Cowell, Alan, “With Swipe at U.S., Iraq Builds ties to French,” New York Times, 2/11/09
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09
Sunday, March 08, 2009
Ups And Downs Of Iraq’s Oil Industry And Its Implications For The Budget
A government official recently announced Iraq’s oil figures for February 2009. Exports were slightly down from the previous month. That accounted for a drop in revenue despite prices staying the same. The country’s production has always fluctuated for a number of reasons, both man made and natural. A bigger issue is what the price of Iraqi crude means for the budget.
In early March 2009 an Iraqi oil official announced that February’s exports and revenue were below February numbers. In January 2009 Iraq sold around 1.9 million barrels of oil a day for an average price of $37 a barrel. That brought in approximately $2.15 billion. By February exports had declined to about 1.8 million barrels a day. The price stayed the same, but revenues were down to $1.7 billion. Aging infrastructure and bad weather were blamed for the change between the two months.
Overall, Iraq’s production has been increasing over the last year. January’s numbers were an improvement over December 2008 when Iraq exported 1.82 million barrels a day. Total production was up in 2008 at 850.239 million barrels compared to 742.079 million in 2007. Exports were also up 13.3% from 2007 to 2008. However total production dropped for the last three months of 2008. The country has never reached pre-war levels either. Today the country averages between 2.3-2.4 million barrels a day in overall production, but before 2003 it produced 2.58 million.
The continual fluctuations in oil production and the low prices have big implications for Iraq’s immediate future. This year 85% of Iraq’s revenues are expected to come from petroleum. The 2009 budget, which was just passed by parliament, is based upon a $50 a barrel price for oil and 2 million barrels a day of exports. With prices low and production not going up any time soon, that means running a deficit, which could be up to $30 billion out of a $58.6 billion budget. The Finance Minister says that it will use its savings to cover the difference, but it only has around $35 billion. That would mean depleting almost its entire account for one budget, with no guarantees that in 2010 there would not be similar problems unless the world economy recovers. For this reason, the Finance Ministry is also considering floating $5 billion in government bonds to help fund projects. On the other hand, the Oil Ministry has been desperately trying to sign contracts with foreign countries to increase production. Some service deals have been signed, but the major international oil companies have not come to an agreement with Baghdad yet, and are arguing over the terms of the contracts.
Iraq has no flexibility in its oil production. The government wants to bring in foreign companies to boost output and add needed know how and investment, but the negotiations have been inconclusive so far. That’s not soon enough however for Iraq’s 2009 budget which is based upon a higher price and export numbers than Iraq is now capable of. If Baghdad goes ahead with its budget it will be running a huge deficit that will affect all sectors of the country from the economy, which is largely state-run, to employment as the government is the largest employer. It might also influence the parliamentary elections scheduled for the end of the year as many of the winning parties in the January 2009 provincial elections promised better services. That may not be possible under the current budget and oil output.
SOURCES
Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Iraq passes sharply reduced budget for 2009,” Associated Press, 3/5/09
Associated Press, “Iraq’s oil exports down in February,” 3/3/09
- “Iraq’s oil exports inch up in January,” 2/1/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “GDP higher by 10.9 % in 2008,” 2/11/09
Al-Hashemi, Mostafa, “$25 billion surplus staves off financial crisis – Iraqi minister,” Azzaman, 2/2/09
Mackey, Peg, “Iraq to rely on own technicians to reverse output decline,” Reuters, 2/24/09
Madhani, Aamer, “Iraq’s economy sputters as oil prices drop,” USA Today, 1/28/09
Reuters, “Iraq’s Legal and Security Risks Still Frighten Firms,” 2/13/09
- “UPDATE 1-Iraq to issue 1st post-Saddam bonds for $5 bln,” 1/28/09
Robertson, Campbell and Glanz, James, “Falling Revenues Threaten Rebuilding and Stability in Iraq,” New York Times, 2/26/09
Ryan, Missy, “Falling Oil Price Could Hamper Iraqi Military,” Reuters, 2/9/09
- “Iraq must focus on reconstruction upkeep, U.S. says,” Reuters, 2/4/09
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09
Al-Tameemi, Alaa, “Parliament divided on 2009 budget,” Azzaman, 3/4/09
In early March 2009 an Iraqi oil official announced that February’s exports and revenue were below February numbers. In January 2009 Iraq sold around 1.9 million barrels of oil a day for an average price of $37 a barrel. That brought in approximately $2.15 billion. By February exports had declined to about 1.8 million barrels a day. The price stayed the same, but revenues were down to $1.7 billion. Aging infrastructure and bad weather were blamed for the change between the two months.
Overall, Iraq’s production has been increasing over the last year. January’s numbers were an improvement over December 2008 when Iraq exported 1.82 million barrels a day. Total production was up in 2008 at 850.239 million barrels compared to 742.079 million in 2007. Exports were also up 13.3% from 2007 to 2008. However total production dropped for the last three months of 2008. The country has never reached pre-war levels either. Today the country averages between 2.3-2.4 million barrels a day in overall production, but before 2003 it produced 2.58 million.
The continual fluctuations in oil production and the low prices have big implications for Iraq’s immediate future. This year 85% of Iraq’s revenues are expected to come from petroleum. The 2009 budget, which was just passed by parliament, is based upon a $50 a barrel price for oil and 2 million barrels a day of exports. With prices low and production not going up any time soon, that means running a deficit, which could be up to $30 billion out of a $58.6 billion budget. The Finance Minister says that it will use its savings to cover the difference, but it only has around $35 billion. That would mean depleting almost its entire account for one budget, with no guarantees that in 2010 there would not be similar problems unless the world economy recovers. For this reason, the Finance Ministry is also considering floating $5 billion in government bonds to help fund projects. On the other hand, the Oil Ministry has been desperately trying to sign contracts with foreign countries to increase production. Some service deals have been signed, but the major international oil companies have not come to an agreement with Baghdad yet, and are arguing over the terms of the contracts.
Iraq has no flexibility in its oil production. The government wants to bring in foreign companies to boost output and add needed know how and investment, but the negotiations have been inconclusive so far. That’s not soon enough however for Iraq’s 2009 budget which is based upon a higher price and export numbers than Iraq is now capable of. If Baghdad goes ahead with its budget it will be running a huge deficit that will affect all sectors of the country from the economy, which is largely state-run, to employment as the government is the largest employer. It might also influence the parliamentary elections scheduled for the end of the year as many of the winning parties in the January 2009 provincial elections promised better services. That may not be possible under the current budget and oil output.
SOURCES
Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Iraq passes sharply reduced budget for 2009,” Associated Press, 3/5/09
Associated Press, “Iraq’s oil exports down in February,” 3/3/09
- “Iraq’s oil exports inch up in January,” 2/1/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “GDP higher by 10.9 % in 2008,” 2/11/09
Al-Hashemi, Mostafa, “$25 billion surplus staves off financial crisis – Iraqi minister,” Azzaman, 2/2/09
Mackey, Peg, “Iraq to rely on own technicians to reverse output decline,” Reuters, 2/24/09
Madhani, Aamer, “Iraq’s economy sputters as oil prices drop,” USA Today, 1/28/09
Reuters, “Iraq’s Legal and Security Risks Still Frighten Firms,” 2/13/09
- “UPDATE 1-Iraq to issue 1st post-Saddam bonds for $5 bln,” 1/28/09
Robertson, Campbell and Glanz, James, “Falling Revenues Threaten Rebuilding and Stability in Iraq,” New York Times, 2/26/09
Ryan, Missy, “Falling Oil Price Could Hamper Iraqi Military,” Reuters, 2/9/09
- “Iraq must focus on reconstruction upkeep, U.S. says,” Reuters, 2/4/09
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09
Al-Tameemi, Alaa, “Parliament divided on 2009 budget,” Azzaman, 3/4/09
Saturday, March 07, 2009
Monthly Media Coverage of Iraq From February 2 To March 1, 2009
Iraq re-emerged in the U.S. media in February 2009, sort of. During the four weeks of the month Iraq was in the top ten stories according to the Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism twice. That happened in the first week, February 2 to 8 and the last February 23 to March 1. Also of note is the fact that Iraq broke into the top five stories in the country for the firs time since October 2008.
Iraq was in and out of the news in February 2009. In the opening week Iraq was the number four story in the country, but only received 2% of overall coverage. That was when the results of the provincial elections were finally announced. For the next two weeks however, February 9 to 15 and 16 to 22, the war disappeared from the headlines. From February 23 to March 1 Iraq re-emerged as the number 3 and number 10 stories. At number 3 was President Obama’s announcement that he would pull most American troops out of the country by the end of 2011, which garnered 6% of American news coverage. At number 10 were events in Iraq, which included the charges against Iraqi parliamentarian Mohammad al-Daini for involvement in a number of insurgent attacks including a bombing of the legislature in 2007, and the re-opening of the Iraqi Museum. That received 2% of all stories in the U.S. media.
The last time Iraq broke the top five stories in America was the week of October 6 to 12, 2008. At that time Iraq was at number 4 even though it was only 1% of all stories. That was the week that Christians were attacked in Mosul, and the U.S. and Iraq were negotiating a Status of Forces Agreement.
Overall, average American coverage of Iraq was up for February compared to the previous month, but about average for the last six months of 2008. In February the war averaged 2.5% of all U.S. media coverage. That was double the amount of reporting in January when Iraq only received 1.25%. February matched the last six months of 2008 when it was between 2-3% of all stories. That is still below the average of 2007 when the war was 25% of the news and was consistently in the top five. If not for the President’s speech on his new Iraq policy, the topic might have dropped off the radar for the rest of the month. The coverage shows that only big events such as elections and announcements from Washington will get the American media’s attention, because it is spending most of its time on the current economic crisis and the new Obama administration.
SOURCES
Baker, Peter, “With Pledges to Troops and Iraqis, Obama Details Pullout,” New York Times, 2/27/09
Meyers, Steven Lee, “Iraq Museum Reopens Six Years After Looting,” New York Times, 2/23/09
Mohammed, Riyadh, “Election Results: Who’s Up, Who’s Down,” Baghdad Bureau Blog, New York Times, 2/6/09
Pew Research center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism, “PEJ News Coverage Index: Feb. 2-8, 2009, The News Narrative Turns Bearish On Obama,” 2/9/09
- “PEJ News Coverage Index: Feb. 9-15, 2009, Stimulus Success Shifts The Storyline,” 2/17/09
- “PEJ News Coverage Index: February 16-22, 2009, Fresh Challenges, New Debates Drive A Grim Economy Story,” 2/23/09
- “PEJ News Coverage Index: February 23-March 1, 2009, The New Obama Narrative: “Change” Was An Understatement,” 3/4/09
Santora, “Iraqi Lawmaker Is Charged With Masterminding an Attack on Parliament,” New York Times, 2/22/09
Iraq was in and out of the news in February 2009. In the opening week Iraq was the number four story in the country, but only received 2% of overall coverage. That was when the results of the provincial elections were finally announced. For the next two weeks however, February 9 to 15 and 16 to 22, the war disappeared from the headlines. From February 23 to March 1 Iraq re-emerged as the number 3 and number 10 stories. At number 3 was President Obama’s announcement that he would pull most American troops out of the country by the end of 2011, which garnered 6% of American news coverage. At number 10 were events in Iraq, which included the charges against Iraqi parliamentarian Mohammad al-Daini for involvement in a number of insurgent attacks including a bombing of the legislature in 2007, and the re-opening of the Iraqi Museum. That received 2% of all stories in the U.S. media.
The last time Iraq broke the top five stories in America was the week of October 6 to 12, 2008. At that time Iraq was at number 4 even though it was only 1% of all stories. That was the week that Christians were attacked in Mosul, and the U.S. and Iraq were negotiating a Status of Forces Agreement.
Overall, average American coverage of Iraq was up for February compared to the previous month, but about average for the last six months of 2008. In February the war averaged 2.5% of all U.S. media coverage. That was double the amount of reporting in January when Iraq only received 1.25%. February matched the last six months of 2008 when it was between 2-3% of all stories. That is still below the average of 2007 when the war was 25% of the news and was consistently in the top five. If not for the President’s speech on his new Iraq policy, the topic might have dropped off the radar for the rest of the month. The coverage shows that only big events such as elections and announcements from Washington will get the American media’s attention, because it is spending most of its time on the current economic crisis and the new Obama administration.
SOURCES
Baker, Peter, “With Pledges to Troops and Iraqis, Obama Details Pullout,” New York Times, 2/27/09
Meyers, Steven Lee, “Iraq Museum Reopens Six Years After Looting,” New York Times, 2/23/09
Mohammed, Riyadh, “Election Results: Who’s Up, Who’s Down,” Baghdad Bureau Blog, New York Times, 2/6/09
Pew Research center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism, “PEJ News Coverage Index: Feb. 2-8, 2009, The News Narrative Turns Bearish On Obama,” 2/9/09
- “PEJ News Coverage Index: Feb. 9-15, 2009, Stimulus Success Shifts The Storyline,” 2/17/09
- “PEJ News Coverage Index: February 16-22, 2009, Fresh Challenges, New Debates Drive A Grim Economy Story,” 2/23/09
- “PEJ News Coverage Index: February 23-March 1, 2009, The New Obama Narrative: “Change” Was An Understatement,” 3/4/09
Santora, “Iraqi Lawmaker Is Charged With Masterminding an Attack on Parliament,” New York Times, 2/22/09
Friday, March 06, 2009
Another Tough Year Ahead For Iraq’s Farmers
Iraq was once one of the major agriculture producers of the Middle East. Now the farming sector has fallen into disrepair, and Iraq is a major food importer. Both Baghdad and the U.S. military however are hoping that it will make a come back to provide a source of growth to make up for the plummeting price of oil, and jobs for an economy that is still facing high unemployment. The problem is that the farm sector faces such large structural problems that it will probably take a decade for it to recover.
In 2008 Iraq faced one of the worst drought in years. Rainfall in 2007 was down 40% according to the Iraqi government, and affected the northern provinces of Irbil, Dohuk, Tamim, Diyala, and Ninewa the worst. Barley and wheat that are dependent upon rain were hit the hardest. Production for both dropped 51%, and in November 2008, the government announced that it would have to import 50 thousand tons of wheat to make up for the shortfall. The Ministry of Agriculture started several assistance programs, but U.S. government observers didn’t think that many were effective.
2009 looks to be no better. The Iraqi paper Al Sabah reported that the Water Resource Ministry announced in January that snow and rain were down 1/3 from normal levels. In February the Agriculture Minister said that farm production is down 30%. This year the United Nations has also designated Iraq one of 32 countries that needs external food aid. Iraq already imports 50% of its food needs.
The lack of water was just the latest hit to a sector of Iraq’s economy that has fallen on hard times since the 1980s. 26% of Iraqis are involved in farming, and it accounts for 8% of the country’s production making it one of the largest after oil. It has largely been neglected since the Saddam times however, and then faced international sanctions, the chaos and sectarian war that followed the U.S. invasion, and government incompetence. For example, many farm workers have left the rural areas for the cities. The fighting also disrupted trade within the country. Corrupt government officials is another issue. The chief Iraqi inspector in Wasit told The National that corruption was everywhere in the province. Many officials take cuts of aid that is supposed to go to farmers, and families often offer bribes to get assistance from the government. The government is also not able to supply fertilizer and water from the irrigation system. Electrical shortages have limited power for pumps. There are few tariffs, which means Iraq has been flooded with cheap food imports from Syrian, Iran, and Turkey since the U.S. invasion. The lack of adequate drainage is also leading to high salinity in the south. 5% of the country’s arable land is disappearing a year as a result. Finally, there is little use of modern farming techniques, and a lack of credit. Many farmers can’t qualify for loans anyway, and need bribes if they want one. All of these make Iraqis less competitive than their foreign competitors.
Baghdad is now trying to promote the farm sector in a drive to diversify the economy. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki announced a $200 million plan for agriculture. The government is going to subsidize seed sales and support for livestock and dates. Baghdad also has a plan to reclaim six million acres of land with high salinity. At the same time the government has cut subsidies for fuel and fertilizer.
Many U.S. officials in Iraq are skeptical of these plans. The head of the U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Team in Maysan and another member in the province told Reuters that the business was so dysfunctional and broken, and the government so incompetent and corrupt that it would be a Herculean task to revive farming. A U.S. Department of Agriculture report said the sector was “a disaster.” A U.S. farm expert thought it would take ten years to recover.
None of this is good news for Iraq’s struggling economy. The country is almost completely dependent upon oil to earn money. Now that prices have dropped for crude, the government is facing some tough decisions. Baghdad is talking about diversifying, and it’s important that the Agriculture Ministry is getting more money, but it’s unclear whether this is mere lip service or a real commitment.
SOURCES
Alsumaria, “Iraq waning farm sector urges recovery,” 3/3/09
Ashton, Adam, “Iraqi farmers are back in business, and Iraqis love local produce,” McClatchy Newspapers, 12/20/08
Aswat al-Iraq, “Agro-production down due to scarce rain – minister,” 2/23/09
Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” December 2008
Iraq Directory, “Iraq is Submitting a Tender to Buy 50 Thousand Tons of Wheat,” 11/25/08
Latif, Nizar, “Iraq in midst of ‘agricultural disaster,’” The National, 12/11/08
Ryan, Missy, “Iraq’s ailing farm sector more crucial than ever,” Reuters, 2/28/09
Al Sabah, “Iraq faces massive water shortage, Water Resources said,” 1/21/09
Sands, Phil and Latif, Nizar, “Corruption at the root of Iraq’s failing agriculture,” The National, 2/24/09
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09
In 2008 Iraq faced one of the worst drought in years. Rainfall in 2007 was down 40% according to the Iraqi government, and affected the northern provinces of Irbil, Dohuk, Tamim, Diyala, and Ninewa the worst. Barley and wheat that are dependent upon rain were hit the hardest. Production for both dropped 51%, and in November 2008, the government announced that it would have to import 50 thousand tons of wheat to make up for the shortfall. The Ministry of Agriculture started several assistance programs, but U.S. government observers didn’t think that many were effective.
2009 looks to be no better. The Iraqi paper Al Sabah reported that the Water Resource Ministry announced in January that snow and rain were down 1/3 from normal levels. In February the Agriculture Minister said that farm production is down 30%. This year the United Nations has also designated Iraq one of 32 countries that needs external food aid. Iraq already imports 50% of its food needs.
The lack of water was just the latest hit to a sector of Iraq’s economy that has fallen on hard times since the 1980s. 26% of Iraqis are involved in farming, and it accounts for 8% of the country’s production making it one of the largest after oil. It has largely been neglected since the Saddam times however, and then faced international sanctions, the chaos and sectarian war that followed the U.S. invasion, and government incompetence. For example, many farm workers have left the rural areas for the cities. The fighting also disrupted trade within the country. Corrupt government officials is another issue. The chief Iraqi inspector in Wasit told The National that corruption was everywhere in the province. Many officials take cuts of aid that is supposed to go to farmers, and families often offer bribes to get assistance from the government. The government is also not able to supply fertilizer and water from the irrigation system. Electrical shortages have limited power for pumps. There are few tariffs, which means Iraq has been flooded with cheap food imports from Syrian, Iran, and Turkey since the U.S. invasion. The lack of adequate drainage is also leading to high salinity in the south. 5% of the country’s arable land is disappearing a year as a result. Finally, there is little use of modern farming techniques, and a lack of credit. Many farmers can’t qualify for loans anyway, and need bribes if they want one. All of these make Iraqis less competitive than their foreign competitors.
Baghdad is now trying to promote the farm sector in a drive to diversify the economy. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki announced a $200 million plan for agriculture. The government is going to subsidize seed sales and support for livestock and dates. Baghdad also has a plan to reclaim six million acres of land with high salinity. At the same time the government has cut subsidies for fuel and fertilizer.
Many U.S. officials in Iraq are skeptical of these plans. The head of the U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Team in Maysan and another member in the province told Reuters that the business was so dysfunctional and broken, and the government so incompetent and corrupt that it would be a Herculean task to revive farming. A U.S. Department of Agriculture report said the sector was “a disaster.” A U.S. farm expert thought it would take ten years to recover.
None of this is good news for Iraq’s struggling economy. The country is almost completely dependent upon oil to earn money. Now that prices have dropped for crude, the government is facing some tough decisions. Baghdad is talking about diversifying, and it’s important that the Agriculture Ministry is getting more money, but it’s unclear whether this is mere lip service or a real commitment.
SOURCES
Alsumaria, “Iraq waning farm sector urges recovery,” 3/3/09
Ashton, Adam, “Iraqi farmers are back in business, and Iraqis love local produce,” McClatchy Newspapers, 12/20/08
Aswat al-Iraq, “Agro-production down due to scarce rain – minister,” 2/23/09
Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” December 2008
Iraq Directory, “Iraq is Submitting a Tender to Buy 50 Thousand Tons of Wheat,” 11/25/08
Latif, Nizar, “Iraq in midst of ‘agricultural disaster,’” The National, 12/11/08
Ryan, Missy, “Iraq’s ailing farm sector more crucial than ever,” Reuters, 2/28/09
Al Sabah, “Iraq faces massive water shortage, Water Resources said,” 1/21/09
Sands, Phil and Latif, Nizar, “Corruption at the root of Iraq’s failing agriculture,” The National, 2/24/09
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09
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